THE SEAT TO VOTE RATIOVOTER TURNOUT & GERRYMANDERINGOF THE OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

1.BACKGROUND

THE PROBLEMA discrepancy exists between the share of seats won and the share of votes cast for either party in the Ohio House by Ohio voters

THE ASSUMPTIONThe act of “gerrymandering” is the main cause of this discrepancy between votes and seats

“To manipulate the boundaries of an electoral constituency to favor one party through partisan control of the redistricting process

HOW CAN WE MEASURE IT?

▸ Seat to Vote Ratio▸ Percent total seats won / percent total

votes cast for a certain party in a particular election

▸ The further from 1.00, the less accurately voter preferences are represented by the election results

WHAT HAS OHIO DONE ABOUT IT?

Pre-November 2015

▸ Ohio Apportionment Board (OBA)

▸ 5 members: Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, 1 member appointed by each of the 2 major parties

▸ Resulted in 1 minority party member (at current partisan composition of state government)

November 2015-present

▸ Ohio Bipartisan Redistricting Commission Amendment (OBRCA)

▸ 7 members: Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, 2 members appointed by each of the 2 major parties

▸ Results in 2 minority party members (at current partisan makeup of state government)

OBRCA REQUIRES NEW GUIDELINES

▸ 2 members from each party must agree to the plan

▸ Compact, contiguous districts▸ Districts cannot be strategically drawn

to favor one party over another▸ Minimize splitting up cities, counties,

etc

WHAT IS OBRCA DESIGNED TO DO?

▸ Decrease partisan bias in the redistricting process

▸ Encourage split party control of the process

▸ E.g. lower the seat to vote ratio

“If this passes, the result will be legislative districts that are more competitive and fair. It won’t be perfect. Perfect isn’t possible. A number of districts still will be lopsided, but there will be noticeable improvement overall.

Curt Steiner, CEO of Steiner Public Relations

SO WILL IT WORK?

▸ Literature suggests even more stringent redistricting reforms only minimally reduce the seat to vote ratio

▸ Even states with independent redistricting commissions still experience noncompetitive elections, high incumbency reelection rates, & low voter turnout

▸ Ex. California’s Citizens Redistricting Commission

“Unfortunately, the literature generally indicates that redistricting reforms, including independent redistricting commissions, have only small impacts on electoral outcomes.

FairVote, formerly the Center for Voting and Democracy

IS THERE MORE TO IT?Higher voter turnout, combined with bipartisan redistricting, results in a much greater change in the seat to vote ratio

2.DATA & METHODOLOGY

THE HYPOTHESISWhen voter turnout is higher and there is split party control of the redistricting process, the seat to vote ratio should be closer to 1.00

THE DATA

▸ All data from the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office

▸ House election results from 1972-2014▸ Seat to vote ratio calculated by summing

the total seats won and total votes cast for the Republican Party in each of Ohio’s 99 House districts for each general election from 1972 to 2014

▸ Ohio voter turnout counts from 1978-2014

THE METHOD

▸ Compare the voter turnout and the seat to vote ratio between 1978-2014

▸ Analyze key years ▹ Look for high/low voter turnout and

compare to seat to vote ratio▹ Consider the partisan control of the

redistricting process

3.ANALYSIS& RESULTS

KEY ANALYSIS

1992

Highest voter turnout ever recorded in Ohio. New map drawn by split party state government control takes effect. Seat to vote ratio in 1992 is 0.98.

1992-2002

Same map in effect. Voter turnout begins to decrease. Despite no change in the map from 1992, seat to vote ratio begins to increase beyond 1.00 in this period, from 1.03 to 1.12.

2002-2012

New maps drawn with more GOP control. Voter turnout continues to decline, seat to vote increasing. Seat to vote ratio recorded furthest from 1.00 ever in 2012 at 1.23.

OVERALL RESULT

Decreased voter turnout benefits the party in control of the redistricting process; lower voter turnout pulls the ratio away from 1.00

DATA ANALYSIS IMPLICATIONS

▸ Changing the partisan composition of redistricting process can have impact

▸ But voter turnout still influences it greatly regardless

THE ASSUMPTION IS INCORRECTGerrymandering & the redistricting process don’t solely determine seat to vote ratio; voter turnout influences it greatly and perhaps even more

4.ALTERNATIVES

EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES

Goals

Limit partisan bias +

Facilitate split party control ++

Raise voter turnout +++

Criteria

Efficiency +

Political feasibility ++

Effectiveness +++

3 ALTERNATIVES TO CONSIDER

#1 Ohio Bipartisan Redistricting Commission Amendment

Status quo; creates Ohio Redistricting Commission comprised of elected officials

#2 Independent Redistricting Commission

Upgrade Ohio Redistricting Commission to be comprised of citizens, not elected officials

#3 Automatic Voter Registration & Mail-in Voting

Automatically register voters who get driver’s licenses; create secure vote-by-mail system

5.RECOMMENDATION

“Unfortunately, the literature generally indicates that redistricting reforms, including independent redistricting commissions, have only small impacts on electoral outcomes.

FairVote, formerly the Center for Voting and Democracy

THE SOLUTION ISVOTER TURNOUTWe can overcome the redistricting reform challenge by also increasing voter turnout; OBRCA based on incorrect assumption

AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION & MAIL-IN VOTINGAutomatically register voters who get driver’s licenses; create secure vote-by-mail system

#3

WHY ALTERNATIVE #3?

▸ Major increase in voter turnout▹ Ex. Oregon vote-by-mail system

▸ As a result, data project a significant lowering of the seat to vote ratio even without redistricting reform

With the OBRCA already passed, this alternative overcomes the incorrect assumption that the OBRCA’s effect on partisan bias in the redistricting process is enough on its own

THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS

Voter turnout above 55% for general elections (above 75% for presidential elections)

Partisan bias limited through OBRCA composition requirements and redistricting rules

Split party control facilitated by OBRCA requirements and by increased voter turnout

1.00

THE CONCLUSIONTo achieve the goals of the OBRCA, Ohio must enact policies to significantly increase and maintain high levels of voter turnout

THANK YOU

Questions?page.246@osu.edu