The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy (SDC ... · 12 13 14 14 14 14 15 16 16 17 18 18...

SDC position paper

The role of nuclearpower in a lowcarbon economy

March 2006

Contents

1 Introduction1.1 Why the SDC is re-examining its nuclear position1.2 Nuclear power in context1.3 Energy supply options1.4 The process for the SDC’s review1.5 Our approach2 Sustainable Development Analysis2.1 Environment2.1.1 Low carbon status2.1.2 Climate change benefits2.1.3 Waste and decommissioning issues2.1.4 Reprocessing2.1.5 Environmental and landscape impacts2.1.6 Summary2.2 Economy2.2.1 Total cost of nuclear power2.2.2 Security of supply2.2.3 Market delivery2.2.4 Market design2.2.5 Impact on alternative energy sources2.2.6 Summary2.3 Society2.3.1 Developing a policy on nuclear power2.3.2 Employment opportunities2.3.3 Safety and security issues2.3.4 Proliferation risks2.3.5 Health impacts2.3.6 Intergenerational issues2.3.7 Summary3 SDC Position on Nuclear Power3.1 Our energy challenge3.2 The starting point3.2.1 Reducing energy demand3.2.2 Increasing the contribution of renewables3.2.3 The clean and more efficient use of fossil fuels3.3 Nuclear power: our advice

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You can contact the SustainableDevelopment Commission at:

London (main office): 020 7238 [email protected]

Edinburgh: 0131 244 [email protected]/scotland

Belfast: 02890 [email protected]

Cardiff: 029 2082 [email protected]/wales

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The role of nuclear power in a low carbon economy 01www.sd-commission.org.uk

Introduction

1.1 Why the SDC is re-examiningits nuclearpositionThe SDC’s previous position on nuclearpower was agreed in 2001 as part of ourinput into the Energy Review conducted by the Performance and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office. This formed the basis of our input to the Energy WhitePaper (EWP) process.

The 2003 Energy White Paper was a watershedin energy policy, and was unique internationallyfor committing the UK to a 60% cut in CO2

emissions by 2050. Although it is now possiblethat this target will need to be increased, in orderto meet the international obligation to avoiddangerous climate change, the EWP containeda bold vision for future energy supply anddemand. The four primary goals were:

> Putting the UK on a path to cut CO2

emissions by 60% by 2050, with realprogress by 2020

> To maintain the reliability of energy supplies

> To promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond

> To ensure that every home is adequatelyand affordably heated.

The EWP outlined a vision for energy supply in2020, which saw electricity supplies still basedon a market-based grid, but with increasingcommitment to more local generation andmicrogeneration. With a strong focus on energy efficiency, renewables, and greater use of combined heat and power (CHP), the EWP stressed the need for technologicaland economic innovation to help bring newtechnologies to the market, thereby creatingfuture options.

Since then, there has been mixed success withthe policy measures put in place to deliverthese goals. Carbon emissions have been risingfor the past three years, mainly as a result ofincreased use of coal in power stations due to high gas prices, but also due to increaseddemand for energy, despite the effect of a number of energy efficiency measures.Progress with renewables has been reasonablyencouraging, and despite concerns over delaysin the offshore wind sector, it is still consideredpossible for the UK to meet or get close to its10% renewables target by 2010.

However, rising oil and gas prices have putpressure on consumers, and there is increasingconcern that, over the longer term, theinevitable decline in the UK’s North Seareserves will lead to energy security problems.In the electricity sector there are worries thatthe decline of the UK’s nuclear power capacity,due to scheduled closures, will reduce totalgenerating capacity and could increase CO2

emissions unless this capacity is replaced bycarbon-free generation.

In response to these concerns, the Governmenthas announced a new Energy Review, whichwill report after the Climate Change ProgrammeReview finishes, in mid 2006. As the Government’sadvisor on sustainable development, the SDCdecided during 2005 that it needed to revisit its position on nuclear power so that it waswell placed to advise the Government on thisimportant and controversial issue.

1.2 Nuclearpower in contextNuclear power currently provides around 20%of the UK’s electricity. This translates into 8% of the UK’s energy needs once other sources ofenergy, such as transport fuel and non-electricheating, are taken into account. Our evidencebase shows how this contribution is scheduledto decrease over the next 30 or so years,assuming no plant lifetime extensions.

Since the 2003 Energy White Paper thefundamentals have not radically changed, andmany of the measures introduced since 2000

02 The role of nuclear power in a low carbon economy www.sd-commission.org.uk

are still in the process of bedding down.However, a number of commentators havesince expressed concerns over the UK’s energy policy, which can be broadly grouped as follows:

> The ‘generation gap’: with nuclear andcoal plants expected to close down, thereis concern that the UK faces a shortfall inelectricity generating capacity over thenext 15 years

> Carbon emissions: there is concern that the ‘generation gap’ will lead to theconstruction of more gas-fired electricitygeneration, which will increase CO2

emissions

> Security of supply: with increasing relianceon gas imports, there are concerns over the security of these sources, withpotential impacts on both electricitygeneration and heat supplies; there is afeeling among some commentators thatthis issue was not sufficiently dealt within the EWP

> Price instability: reliance on gas leads to the fear that energy prices will become more unstable, and could risesubstantially over time, with potentialimpacts on the economy and fuel poverty

> Technology gap: the development of newtechnologies such as carbon capture andstorage and hydrogen fuel cells may takelonger than needed to fill the gapsidentified above

These concerns have led to calls for acommitment to new nuclear capacity, toreplace the capacity coming offline over the next 30 years.

1.3 Energysupply optionsNuclear power is not the only option available toreplace old nuclear plants, and there is thereforea choice to be made. Some commentatorsquestion whether the alternatives to nuclearwould be able to deliver the capacity, carbonsavings, and security of supply benefits thatnuclear can. This point is addressed in ourevidence base1.

Having examined a broad range of studies thatoffer different scenarios of our energy future, it is clear that there is more than enoughrenewable resource in the UK to provide adiverse, low carbon electricity supply. All thescenario results suggest that it is possible tomeet our energy needs in a carbon constrainedeconomy without nuclear power.

Regardless of what we do on nuclear power a broad range of renewables will be required,and we will need to achieve the substantialenergy savings that have been identified as cost effective using currently availabletechnologies. Significant improvements inenergy efficiency, leading to overall reductionsin demand, is a priority for action. Developingrenewables’ capacity to the levels required willtake time, so many models project greater useof combined heat & power (CHP) to use fossiland renewable fuels more efficiently, and thedevelopment of carbon capture & storage (CCS)technologies to help bridge the gap over thenext 50 or so years.

In view of the widespread agreement byrespected analysts that a viable energy futureis possible for the UK without new nuclearpower, the SDC has approached this issue as a choice rather than an absolute necessity. It isin this context that the SDC has examined therole of nuclear power in a low carbon economy.

1.4 The processfor the SDC’sreviewThe SDC has spent several months gathering anextensive evidence base in the following areas:

Paper 1: An introduction to nuclear power –science, technology and UK policy

Paper 2: Reducing CO2 emissions: nuclear and the alternatives

Paper 3: Landscape, environment andcommunity impacts

Paper 4: Economics of nuclear power

Paper 5: Waste management anddecommissioning

Paper 6: Safety and security

Paper 7: Public perceptions and community issues

Paper 8: Uranium resource availability

We have attempted to provide a balanced andcomprehensive view – both the positives andthe negatives – so far as we are able. Thereforethe papers will have elements that reflect thepro-nuclear and the anti-nuclear perspectives.

We are publishing the evidence base at thesame time as our own position to provide a resource for Government and the generalpublic to draw on. We believe such anevidence base is vital for there to be a trulyinformed debate on this issue.

1 Paper 2 – Reducing CO2 emissions:nuclear and the alternatives


Too often the debate around nuclear is highlypolarised, with heavily entrenched positions on both sides. This does not help with aconsidered analysis of nuclear power, andtends to result in reports that seek to justify a pre-determined position. Such reports areeasily dismissed by opponents and will beregarded with suspicion by those that are truly‘neutral’; they are therefore of limited value to the public debate.

Our stand-alone evidence base is publishedalongside this paper, as a separate resource.

1.5 OurapproachIn March 2005 the UK Government and theDevolved Administrations jointly published a shared framework for sustainabledevelopment, ‘One future – different paths’, in which five new principles of sustainabledevelopment were agreed across Governmentfor all policy development, delivery andevaluation – see Figure 1. Based on theseprinciples, the UK Government published itsSustainable Development Strategy, ‘Securingthe future’ to guide its policy-making processacross different departments. We havetherefore examined new nuclear developmentagainst these five principles.

In this paper we have not followed the five principles slavishly, as some are moresignificant for the nuclear issue than others. We have dealt with ‘environmental limits’ and‘sound science’ together; we have looked inconsiderable depth at ‘sustainable economy’;we have covered ‘good governance’ in relationto public engagement and in conjunction with‘a healthy and just society’.

In examining the evidence base, and takinginto account the context of the five principlesand the 2006 Energy Review, we have

Living within environmental limits

Respecting the limits of the planet's environment,resources and biodiversity – to improve ourenvironment and ensure that the naturalresources needed for life are unimpaired andremain so for future generations.

Achieving a Sustainable economy

Building a strong, stable andsustainable economy whichprovides prosperity andopportunities for all, and in whichenvironmental and social costs fall on those who impose them(polluter pays), and efficientresource use is incentivised.

Promoting good governance

Actively promoting effective,participative systems of governance in all levels of society – engaging people’screativity, energy, and diversity.

Using sound scienceresponsibility

Ensuring policy is developed and implemented on the basis of strong scientific evidence, whilst taking into account scientific uncertainty (through theprecautionary principle) as well as public attitudes and values.

Ensuring a strong, healthy and just society

Meeting the diverse needs of all people inexisting and future communities, promotingpersonal wellbeing, social cohesion andinclusion, and creating equal opportunity for all.

Figure 1: UK sustainable development principles

Securing the Future – delivering UK sustainable development strategy

prepared this paper following extensivediscussions at the Commissioner level with the following questions as our framework:

A. If we replace or expand our nuclearelectricity generating capacity, what is the public good for the environment?(Living within environmental limits andusing sound science responsibly)

> Is nuclear a truly low carbon technology,taking into account a full lifecycle analysis?

> What contribution can it make in combatingclimate change?

> What are the waste and decommissioningimplications, and how will they be dealt with?

> What are the wider environmental impacts– in the UK and overseas?

B. What is the public good for oureconomy? (Achieving a sustainableeconomy)

> What are the total costs of nuclear power over the lifetime of planning through construction and operation todecommissioning and disposal of waste?

> What are the implications for security of supply?

> How would new nuclear capacity bedelivered in the context of the UK’s energy market?

> Is the lack of appetite for new nuclearpower a case of market failure? Does thecurrent market structure need reform?

> What are the implications for alternatives to nuclear power?

C. How is the public good best served in the decision-making process for newnuclear and how does it contribute tosocial well-being? (Good governance;strong, healthy and just society)

> How should policy on nuclear power bedeveloped to assure public confidence?

> What are the implications of a UK decision for overseas governance issues of thenuclear supply and waste disposal chains?

> What are the implications of a decision on nuclear for planning andlicensing conditions?

> What are the health implications of a new nuclear programme?

> What are the security risks associated with a new-build programme and how are these best managed?

> What are the risks associated with nuclear proliferation and how are thesebest managed?



2. SustainableDevelopment Analysis

This section will look at the case for nuclear power based on three areas ofanalysis, and using the five principles of sustainable development. The analysisbelow draws exclusively on the SDC’s evidence base, which consists of eightseparate reports that are published alongside this paper.

2.1 Environment2.1.1 Low carbon status2

No energy technology is currently carbon free.Even renewable technologies will lead to fossil fuels being burnt at some point in theirconstruction due to the high levels of fossil fuel usage in almost every transport mode and industrial process, including electricitygeneration. For example, wind turbines arebuilt of steel, and fossil fuels are thereforeconsumed in their construction either directly,during manufacture, and also from petroleumusage when the parts are transported to theconstruction site. However, the fossil fuel usedover the life of the turbine is ‘repaid’ in lessthan 10 months, as the turbines themselvesgenerate zero carbon energy3.

Nuclear power stations are no different, withlarge up-front energy requirements duringconstruction4, although this is balanced by thehigh power output of each plant. However,nuclear differs from many renewables in itsrequirement for mined fuel (uranium ore).Although the total volume of fuel used is lowcompared to the volumes of fossil fuel requiredin gas or coal plants, uranium mining and the subsequent fuel processing is an energyintensive activity that must be included for fulllifecycle emissions analysis. Decommissioningand waste activities are also likely to requireenergy inputs, and therefore their long-termimpact on nuclear power’s CO2 emissions willdepend on the carbon intensity of futureenergy supplies.

Our evidence shows that taking into accountthe emissions associated with plantconstruction and the fuel cycle, the emissionsassociated with nuclear power production arerelatively low, with an average value of4.4tC/GWh, compared to 243tC/GWh for coaland 97tC/GWh for gas5.

However, emissions from decommissioning andthe treatment of waste also need to be assessedbut this is difficult for two main reasons:

> in the UK, decommissioning of existingplant is highly complex and involves plantthat was not designed withdecommissioning in mind

> the UK has not decided on its approach to waste management, which makes it difficult to assess the associated CO2 emissions.

The carbon impact associated with the ‘back-end’ of the nuclear fuel cycle is spread acrossall of the UK’s nuclear power plants (active and decommissioned) and includes all of theelectricity generated over their lifetime. Newlycommissioned plants are likely to have lowerlifecycle carbon emissions than for previousreactor designs, because of improvements inplant design (for example, smaller size, andimproved thermal efficiency and use of fuel),and because new plant is designed so that it can be dismantled and decommissionedmore easily.

A number of commentators have expressedconcerns that any move to low-grade uraniumores could substantially increase the carbonintensity of nuclear power. Our evidence onuranium resource availability6 shows thatpredicting if and when this might happen isvery difficult to do with any accuracy. Resourceavailability is discussed in more detail below,but it is by no means certain that all the highgrade ores have been discovered, and anyincrease in the price of uranium could triggerrenewed interest in uranium prospecting.

It is worth noting that the CO2 emissionsassociated with many of the construction inputsinto a nuclear power plant could be subject to emissions trading schemes, depending ontheir country of origin. This presents a possiblesolution to the lifecycle emissions problem if


3 Sustainable DevelopmentCommission (2005). Wind Power in the UK.

4 In addition to carbon emissions from the production of concrete.

5 These figures are for carbon (C)rather than CO2. They have beenconverted from the data used in our evidence base by multiplying the CO2 figures by 12/44.


as many of the inputs as possible could bebrought within a comprehensive emissionstrading regime. This could be achieved directly,by including those industries that supplynuclear plants, or indirectly by requiring carboncertificates for the calculated carbon value ofimported inputs.

In the long-term, the move towards a lowcarbon economy more generally should lead to a reduction in the emissions from nuclear-related activities, but this will depend to alarge extent on the uptake of low carbontechnologies in the relevant sectors (e.g.mining, and fuel processing).

Our evidence leads us to conclude that nuclearpower can currently be considered a lowcarbon technology, but that a number ofconcerns remain over its long-term energyrequirements from ‘back-end’ liabilities, andthe potential impact of increasing the use oflow-grade uranium ores. The priority should be to internalise any outstanding carbon costsas far as possible so that it competes equallywith other low carbon technologies.

In our analysis of the possible contribution ofnuclear power to reducing CO2 emissions, thelifecycle emissions from nuclear power are notincluded. This allows a fairer comparison withother low carbon technologies, all of which willhave some associated emissions.

2.1.2 Climate change benefits7

In the 2003 Energy White Paper, theGovernment outlined its long-term objective to cut CO2 emissions by 60% from 1990 levelsby 2050, with significant progress by 2020. On the basis of this goal we have assessed the potential contribution nuclear electricitygeneration could make to reducing CO2

emissions over the long-term, based on two scenarios for nuclear new-build.

Nuclear power currently makes up around 20% of UK electricity, and around 8% of totalUK energy supply. Electricity generated fromnuclear power currently displaces around 14million tonnes of carbon (MtC) per year, with a range of 7.95MtC to 19.9MtC (depending onwhether it is assumed to displace coal or gas-fired electricity generation). This is equivalentto around 9% of total UK CO2 emissions in 2004(with a range of 5-12.6%).

As the large range in these figures illustrates,the actual contribution of nuclear power toreducing CO2 emissions depends heavily onwhat type of plant, or fuel, it displaces. If thefuel is carbon intensive, such as coal, then the savings are large, but if nuclear were todisplace a low carbon technology, such as windpower, then there may be no carbon saving.The DTI currently assumes that the standardleast-cost comparison plant is gas CCGT(combined cycled gas turbine). This seems

a reasonable assumption over the next 20years, although in reality this is very dependenton gas and carbon prices.

Our evidence assumes that new-build nuclearplant would displace new-build gas CCGT plant,which has an emissions level of around90tC/GWh – i.e. if nuclear plant is not builtthen gas CCGT would be built instead. The caseis similar for renewables, which at present aredisplacing output from old coal and possiblygas plant, but in the long-term would mostlikely displace new-build gas CCGT. There is no overlap between nuclear and renewables,or any other low carbon technology, and untilthe combined capacity of such technologies isvery high (which is not a realistic prospect formany decades based on current trends), theyare all likely to result in CO2 savings from thedisplacement of gas plant.

Our evidence looks at two scenarios for nuclearnew-build above our current baseline ofdeclining capacity: replacement of existingplant (10GW), and an expansion that wouldroughly double current capacity (20GW).

It is important to note that there are constraintson how quickly a replacement or expansion of nuclear capacity could be constructed. Ourreplacement and expansion scenarios assume a maximum build rate of 1GW per year startingin 2015, which would deliver 10GW by 2024,with a similar rate of new-build under theexpansion scenario delivering a further 10GWby 2034.

Although the build rate may be faster during2024-2034 (for example as lessons learnedfrom early projects are applied to later ones), it may equally be more protracted between2005 and 2024 (for example due to licensingand planning problems, opposition from the public, or problems of supply if severalcountries demand new orders from a limitednumber of suppliers). We note that Britain has no recent track record of nuclear plantconstruction, and the most likely reactordesigns would be imported.

Detailed analysis, and a full explanation of the assumptions used, is given in our evidencebase. However, it is clear that the nuclearcontribution to a 2020 CO2 reduction targetwould be limited, with the full carbon benefitsoccurring over the following decades. To avoidany uncertainties over the build rate, theemissions savings figures for the total capacityinstalled under each scenario should be used.

These show that a replacement programmeconsisting of 10GW of new nuclear capacitywould displace 6.7 MtC, which represents a 4% cut in CO2 emissions from 1990 levels(165.1MtC). An expansion programme woulddouble these figures, with 20GW deliveringaround 13.4MtC of emissions savings, equal to an 8% cut in emissions.

6 Paper 8 – Uranium resourceavailability



It is therefore clear that a new nuclear powerprogramme would deliver sizeable reductionsin CO2 emissions. However, it is also importantto realise that cuts of at least 50% would stillbe needed from other measures to meet the2050 target, even with a doubling of nuclearcapacity from current levels. Nuclear power can therefore be seen as a potential carbonreduction technology, but this must be viewedwithin the context of the much larger challengewe face. We will need a wide variety ofsolutions; those that decrease our demand forenergy, and those that can deliver low or zerocarbon energy supplies.

2.1.3 Waste and decommissioning issues8

There is a need to distinguish between thelegacy impacts of decommissioning and wastemanagement of the existing nuclear capacity,to which the UK is already committed, and the impacts that would result from a newnuclear programme.

The current legacy for decommissioningexisting nuclear power plants is not directlyrelevant to decisions about whether to progresswith nuclear new-build. However, such a legacyis one of public concern, particularly in relationto the cost. A recent review by the NDAsuggests that their accelerated approach for the decommissioning of existing sites will costapproximately £56bn. Much of this covers alarge number of non-power producing facilities,but certainly the costs of decommissioning oldMagnox reactors are substantial. Our evidencepoints to costs of £1.3bn and £1.8bn in twocases, and this is before waste disposal.

The proposed new nuclear plant designs areexpected to require much less expensivedecommissioning, as unlike most existingplants, decommissioning has been given more consideration in the design process. They are also expected to produce less waste by volume. Our evidence estimatesdecommissioning costs at between £220m and £440m per GW of capacity, but this is before long-term waste disposal costs.

A new-build replacement programme (10GW)would add less than 10% to the total UKnuclear waste inventory (by volume). Assessingthe increase in radioactivity of the inventory is complex and depends on reactor design anduse, and the time chosen for the comparison.Thus, ten years after removal, the increase inactivity could be a factor of nine, declining to a factor of 0.9 of current total activity 100 yearsafter final fuel removal.

The role of reprocessing as a wastemanagement tool is complex because of thecosts (relative to the price of primary uranium)and safety and security issues (for example,the risks of proliferation – this is discussedfurther in Section 2.3.3 on security).

All wastes have to be managed over thelong-term so as to protect people and theenvironment. A dominant challenge of muchnuclear waste is the period of hundreds ofthousands of years over which it must beeffectively isolated from people and theenvironment. This raises issues that are uniqueto nuclear waste, such as the long-termstability of our civilisation and climate, and theextent to which future technological advancesmight bring forward solutions so-far unknown.

Nuclear wastes in the UK are divided into threecategories:

> High level wastes (HLW) are those in whichthe temperature may rise significantly as a result of radioactive decay. This factor hasto be taken into account in the design ofstorage or disposal facilities. HLW comprisesthe waste products from reprocessing spentnuclear fuels.

> Intermediate level wastes (ILW) are thoseexceeding the levels of radioactivity for LowLevel Waste (LLW), but which do not requireheat production to be taken into account in the design of their storage facilities. ILW include nuclear fuel casing and nuclearreactor components, moderator graphite from reactor cores, and sludges from thetreatment of radioactive effluents.

> Low level wastes (LLW) are wastes notsuitable for disposal with ordinary refuse but do not exceed specified levels ofradioactivity. Most LLW can be sent fordisposal at the National Low Level Wasterepository at Drigg. LLW that is unsuitable for disposal is mostly reflector and shieldgraphite from reactor cores, which containsconcentrations of carbon-14 radioactivityabove those acceptable at Drigg.

Spent fuel, which contains uranium andplutonium, is currently not classified as wastein the UK because it contains resources that can be reprocessed and used again as fuel or for other uses. If, however, the UK decidedto abandon reprocessing as part of its wastemanagement strategy, then spent fuel wouldneed to be reclassified as HLW.

The Committee on Radioactive WasteManagement (CoRWM) has established abaseline inventory, based on planned closure of existing plant, no new-build, reprocessing of spent fuels, and continuation of currentpractices for the definitions of waste. Allradioactive wastes, including spent fuel, arepackaged so that they are in a form suitable for storage, volume estimates are based onpackaged wastes. The baseline inventoryincludes all wastes both in existence andforecast to arise in the future (for examplefrom decommissioning). The baseline inventoryshows that over 90% of radioactivity isassociated with HLW and spent fuels, but

8 Paper 5 – Waste management and decommissioning


these comprise less than 2% of the inventoryby volume.

The relationship between managing historicand current waste arisings and waste arisingfrom any potential new-build is complex.CoRWM’s priority, as defined in its terms ofreference, is to develop a publicly acceptablesolution to current and historic waste arisings.But the issue of new waste arisings hasgenerated sharply opposing views amongstakeholders, and the public perception ofnuclear power is strongly conditional onsolutions to the waste management problem(see section 2.3.1).

Phased deep geological disposal is generallyseen as a strong contender for dealing with the UK’s nuclear waste, and one thatoffers a reasonable compromise betweenintergenerational justice and scientific certainty.Site-specific geology is important for deepgeological disposal but in the past it has beendifficult to survey and select the most suitablesites due to local opposition, as was shownwith the rejection of the planning applicationfor the Nirex Rock Characterisation Facility in Sellafield in 1997. Attempts to survey sites during the 1970s and 1980s wereabandoned on economic grounds and because of public opposition.

Thus, although 30% of the UK may theoreticallybe considered to have suitable geology fordeep disposal of nuclear waste (including clay, crystalline and sedimentary rocks), it hasproved difficult to match technical suitabilitywith public acceptance.

Although CoRWM is due to present itsrecommendations to Government in July 2006as part of the ongoing Managing RadioactiveWaste Safely programme, it would appear thatimplementation of an agreed policy for thelong-term management of radioactive wastescould remain several years away. Indeed, it has taken Finland (the only country with anagreed waste management policy) around 25years for an acceptable solution to be agreedand implemented.

Evidence to CoRWM estimates that the cost of phased deep geological disposal of nuclearwaste would be around £13bn, although it isunclear what impact a new nuclear programmewould have on these costs, and whether morethan one repository would be necessary. Thismay not cover the total cost of waste disposal,such as the low level arisings which are generallydealt with through near surface disposal.

2.1.4 Reprocessing

Reprocessing can be used as a means ofmanaging waste, in that it reduces the amountof problematic HLW from the waste stream9,leaving higher volumes of non-heat producing

ILW and LLW. As the spent fuel is separated intoplutonium (for use as mixed oxide fuels, orMOX) and uranium, it can be enriched again foruse as fuel. However, this practice is controversialmainly because:

> stockpiles of separated plutonium riskbeing exploited in an uncontrolled way,leading to concerns about proliferation(see Section 2.3.4)

> the majority of nuclear discharges into the NE Atlantic are from reprocessingplants10 (Sellafield and Cap de la Hague)and therefore these are the major source of pollution

> it is often claimed that reprocessing is uneconomic.

Such evidence would suggest that reprocessingshould not be part of the nuclear fuel cycle of a new generation of nuclear plants. However,the UK may want to consider making use of itsexisting plutonium stockpile by burning MOXfuel in existing or new nuclear power plants.

2.1.5 Environmental and landscape impacts11

Mining is the dominant landscape impact fromnuclear power. Although there are no uraniumreserves in the UK and most is extracted fromAustralia, Canada and Kazakhstan, it is importantfrom a sustainable development perspective torecognise the landscape and community impactsof this activity wherever it occurs as part of the‘footprint’ of nuclear power.

In many respects the environmental impacts of a uranium mine are similar to those ofmetalliferous mining, its land-take depending onthe concentration of ore – but the radioactivecontent of waste materials (e.g. spoils andtailings12) is a significant difference.

Underground extraction is the most commonlyused technique. In-situ leaching13 is widelyused as a low cost method and has the leastvisible landscape impact, but groundwaterrehabilitation and pollution can be a concern.There are significant legacy issues includingaquifer pollution in countries of the formerSoviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe.

The total land requirement for 1GW of nuclearcapacity, including mining and the fuel cycle, is between 100 and 1,000ha. This is similar to the land-take for terrestrial wind energy.

Key concerns about uranium extraction in bothdeveloped and developing countries include:

> the exclusion of traditional owners fromthe management and protection of their lands including site selection, and ongoingenvironmental regulation, monitoring and reporting

> the need to review a complex regulatoryregime to clarify roles and responsibilities,

9 Paper 5 – If spent fuel were notreprocessed in the UK it would be classified as HLW; therefore,reprocessing reduces the totaltheoretical volume of HLW by separating out plutonium and uranium.

10 Paper 6 – Safety and security11 Paper 3 – Landscape, environment

and community impacts12 These are the sands left after

uranium has been chemicallyremoved.

13 This technique involves using acid or alkaline solutions to leach out uranium from highlyporous deposits, such as sands,underground

including whether the extent of self-regulation is appropriate

> ongoing surface and ground-waterpollution issues both for current and future activities.

Some of these problems can be managedthrough regulation and management, but thiscan be compromised by, for example, poorgovernance, short-term cost considerations and possible conflict with economic goals anddevelopment aims. This can result in productsbeing brought to world markets at prices thatdo not reflect the full social and environmentalcosts of their production.

However, any mining impact from nuclearpower activities needs to be balanced againstthe potential environmental and health impactsof the energy sources it might displace. Thehealth and safety impacts of coal, for example,are significant, as are coal’s environmentalimpacts in the form of air and groundwaterpollution. Oil and gas exploration also haveenvironmental and health impacts.

There is general agreement that any newnuclear power programme would try to makeuse of existing nuclear sites, thereby limitinglandscape and visual impacts. It is also the casethat nuclear power plants are very similar toconventional fossil fuel plants in terms of localenvironmental and landscape impact, so thenet impact of additional nuclear capacity islikely to be minimal14.

However, some coastal sites may not besuitable for new nuclear power stations andflood-risk criteria may lead to a preference fornew inland sites. This is because of the need to ‘climate change-proof’ decisions on whereto locate new plant to be sure they take intoaccount changes in climate that are already in the pipeline. The criteria that were used to select the current mainly coastal locations are up to 50 years old and will need to bereviewed, as many nuclear power stations and other facilities are vulnerable to sea-levelrise, storm surges and coastal erosion over thenext few decades.

In view of the need to reassess the suitabilityof existing sites, further consideration needs tobe given to their viability over the longer term.

2.1.6 Summary

Our evidence shows that nuclear power couldtheoretically make a substantial contribution to efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, as a viablelow carbon technology. However, the evidencealso shows that even by doubling our existingnuclear capacity, a new nuclear powerprogramme can only contribute an 8% cut inemissions on 1990 levels, so a wide variety of other measures will be needed.

Nuclear power is therefore a viable option for tackling climate change, but as we state in Section 1.3, for the UK it is a choice whetherit is part of the overall energy supply mix,rather than a necessity.

Nuclear waste and decommissioning raise a set of complicated issues with very long-termimpacts. Considering the impact of nuclearnew-build in isolation, we accept that futurenuclear plant designs will be far easier todecommission and that it is possible to do thisin a way that limits the environmental impacts.However, the long-term management ofnuclear waste poses significant environmentalproblems that are difficult and costly to resolve.

We look at intergenerational considerations in Section 2.3.6, but on the environmental side it is difficult to be completely confidentthat the solution proposed for long-term waste management will avoid any adverseenvironmental impacts over the time periods involved.

On reprocessing, there remain serious concernsover the long-term security and economicviability of this form of waste management,with many in the industry now calling for a‘once-through’ fuel cycle. The evidence wouldseem to support this conclusion, although thereremains the question of dealing with the UK’splutonium stockpile.

Other environmental impacts from nuclearpower centre on uranium mining, which canhave a number of adverse effects in producercountries. However, such impacts must bebalanced against the environmental and health& safety concerns related to alternativessources of energy, especially fossil fuels.

2.2 EconomyWhat is the public good for our economy?(Achieving a sustainable economy)

2.2.1 Total cost of nuclear power15

Our evidence strongly suggests that attempts to estimate the cost of a new nuclearprogramme are unlikely to be accurate. This is primarily because there is not enoughreliable, independent and up-to-dateinformation available on the nuclear plantdesigns available for such calculations to bemade. In addition, waste and decommissioning costs are, at present, not fully known.

The levelised cost of nuclear power (the p/kWhcost of output) is heavily dependent on capitalcosts. This makes the cost of nuclear outputvery sensitive to both construction costs, andthe discount rate used (the required rate ofreturn for the project).


14 Paper 5 – This is under theassumption that nuclear capacitywould most likely be replaced byfossil fuel plant, with or withoutcarbon capture and storagetechnologies.

15 Paper 4 – Economics of nuclearpower

History shows us that construction costs for nuclear power plants can be inflated byregulatory issues, delays, bad management,and on-site problems. Our evidence alsosuggests that there may be a degree of‘appraisal optimism’ in the industry projectionsof construction costs, and, with the only recent example (the EPR under construction in Finland) clouded by hidden subsides, it is unlikely that this information deficit can be filled.

The nuclear industry claims that private sectordiscipline, lacking in previous programmes,would help to ensure that any appraisaloptimism is recognised and overcome.However, even if the private sector were todeliver a new-build programme, there is thepossibility of moral hazard, which could act as a form of Government guarantee evenwhen this is not part of Government policy. The term moral hazard is commonly used in the insurance industry to describe thephenomenon whereby individuals ororganisations may purposely engage in risky behaviour, knowing that any costsincurred will be compensated by the insurer.

Moral hazard may affect the nuclear industrybecause investors and companies who decideto take part in nuclear projects, both directlyand indirectly, may be willing to take on higher levels of risk than otherwise under the expectation that the Government would be unwilling or unable to let the project orenterprise fail. An example of this can be seenwith the rescue of British Energy, Rover and theMillennium Dome. This will tend to depressbalance sheet costs, but could in the long runlead to large costs for the taxpayer, in effectacting as a form of subsidy that is virtuallyimpossible to avoid.

The waste and decommissioning elements of the cost calculation are fraught withcomplications, particularly because these costsoccur so far in the future. With UK nuclearwaste policy still undecided, there are nocertain estimates of the total cost of wastedisposal for new-build plant. Therefore anyattempt to ‘put aside’ funds to deal with these costs may expose future generations to cost overruns, especially if the scientificrequirements for waste storage and disposalchange over time or the plant generates lessrevenue than forecast (for example because of operating and maintenance problems).

Nuclear power also has a number of externalcosts which are not usually calculated as part of standard cost calculations. These costsinclude safety and security arrangements,limited liability guarantees, health issues (eitherfrom routine operation or the risk of accidents),complex licensing and planning arrangements,and the cost of possible foreign policyinterventions in securing access to uranium.

This does not mean that nuclear power is not a viable, economic option. Once built, nuclearreactors produce useful, low carbon electricity16

for many years, and have low operating costs.However, this means that it is cheaper to supplynuclear output than to switch reactors off andthis makes nuclear power a ‘price taker’, as it is unable to dictate the market price.

This fact, along with the technicalcharacteristics of nuclear reactors (e.g. longstart-up times), means that nuclear outputperforms a baseload function in virtually allcases. This will continue to be the case untillarge-scale electricity storage technologiesbecome much cheaper, enabling nuclear power(and, possibly, some renewable technologies)to perform a load-following function.

2.2.2 Security of supply17

The fuel component of nuclear electricitygeneration is a very small part of the overallcost, and is relatively small in volume per unitof output. Therefore, nuclear is often referred to as a domestic source of energy, as it doesnot need a continuous supply of fuel – rather,fuel is loaded every year or so.

However, the small quantity of delivered fueloriginates from a much larger supply of rawuranium and in the UK all of this is imported.Our evidence shows that there are someserious concerns over the short-term availabilityof uranium supplies, and although this isunlikely to be relevant to new-build plant, it does raise questions for security of supplydue to the long lead times for developing new uranium mines.

However, our evidence also suggests that oncurrent predictions, there are no major concernsover the long-term availability of uranium. Amanageable increase in price would stimulate a significant increase in economically viablereserves, without allowing for further exploration.

Our evidence also points out that in the pasturanium reserves have been consistentlyunderestimated, and that as a resource it hashad far less prospecting than other minerals.This would suggest there is probably enoughuranium at a reasonable price to match futuredemand, and that as uranium represents a verysmall part of the overall cost of nuclear power,the impact of future price rises will be limited.

The long-term security of uranium supplies is heavily influenced by geo-political factors,particularly as countries such as Kazakhstan andRussia become important players in the worlduranium market alongside traditional supplierssuch as Australia and Canada. Despite anofficial policy on ensuring diversity in supplies,instability in a major producer country couldhave a serious impact on both price and, more importantly, fuel security. The predicted


16 As discussed in section 2.1.1 above,nuclear power does not emit CO2

directly, but there are lifecycleemissions to take into account.

17 Paper 8 – Uranium resourceavailability

temporary shortfall in uranium supplies overthe next decade also highlights a potentialweakness in the uranium market: the long leadtimes for developing new resources.

For domestic electricity supply, nuclear powermay offer a hedge against high fossil fuelprices or temporary supply disruptions, butcannot offer complete security due to itsreliance on imported uranium. In this regard,nuclear power is not a domestic source ofelectricity in the same way as renewables.

Uranium resources may also show pricevolatility, particularly in the short-term whenshortages are expected. However, evidence on portfolio theory suggests that greaterdiversification of supply sources tends to reduce price risk, particularly when fuel costsare zero (as in the case of most renewables) or low (as in the case of nuclear)18.

On balance, nuclear power has positiveattributes for security of supply consideration,but these should be viewed on a portfolio basis and are not exclusive to this technology.Diversification into any basket of electricitygenerating options will help to reduce price risk and increase security.

It is also frequently claimed that nuclear power is necessary to provide baseload power.However, there is no justification for assumingthat other plant cannot also perform a baseloadfunction, and contrary to popular perception,the increased variability (sometimes termed‘intermittency’) of some renewabletechnologies does not increase the need formore ‘firm’, or baseload, capacity19. Therefore,nuclear plant will need to be assessed againstthe long-term wholesale price of electricitywithin the confines of a carbon constrained,and environmentally sensitive, economy.

2.2.3 Market delivery

Our evidence suggests that nuclear power may find it difficult to compete in the UK’sliberalised energy market without some formof public sector support. This is due to the long lead times of nuclear power and its high risk profile, which may discourage investors.However, the Government has made it clearthat any new nuclear programme will need to be delivered solely by the private sector.

This does not rule out the possibility that the Government may decide to help supportthe development of new-build plant, eitherfinancially or through ‘practical measures’. Our evidence points to a number of financialsupport options that the Government mayconsider, but there is uncertainty over whetherthey would be both legal (under EU state aidrules), or compatible with the Government’sstated belief in liberalised markets.

2.2.4 Market design20

The concept of specifying the ideal proportionof each single technology in the UK’sgenerating mix belongs to a previous regime,where electricity supply was a nationalisedindustry. If liberalised markets are to be theprimary mechanism for the delivery ofelectricity supplies, then this constrains theability of Government to centrally plan the fuelmix, without major interventions in the market.

Energy policy aims such as CO2 emissionreductions and security of supply can bedelivered by markets if the right structures are put in place. The market has so farperformed well on security of supply, and the incentives are in place to ensure that newcapacity is developed before shortfalls in supplydevelop – this is done through a simple pricemechanism. To deliver this new capacity whilstreducing CO2 emissions requires the electricitymarket to take account of national orinternational carbon constraints, and to factorthese in to long-term investment decisions.

The current market for carbon is based on theEU Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS), which is currently designed to run in three yearperiods, with caps set by national governmentsin advance of each commitment stage. Thisinherently short-term system provides no long-term framework for investors, and is currently based on emissions cuts fromprojected baselines rather than absolute cuts from current levels.

The SDC believes that the EUETS should aimtowards total downstream emissions trading,which would eventually need to include thewhole economy – business, transport (includingaviation), the public sector, agriculture and,very importantly, individuals. EU-wide caps on emissions should be determined by a long-term emissions reduction target, which shouldthen be divided into annual decreases whichwould form the basis of the EUETS or itssuccessor. This system would give nearcomplete certainty of intention, and shouldassist investors in taking long-term decisions on low carbon investments.

There are two alternatives to this approach:develop mechanisms which intervene in themarket to encourage specific technologies ortechnology groups, or reform the current marketdesign to allow for more centralised planning.

The Renewables Obligation is an example ofmarket intervention, and was justified by theGovernment as necessary to promote theinnovation and scale needed to create a viable,large-scale renewables sector. In this regard,renewables were identified as suffering frommarket failure due to their lack of collectivetechnological maturity. Can the same be saidabout nuclear power?


18 Shimon Awerbuch (University ofSussex) has done extensive work in this area.

19 A large percentage of variablerenewables would increase theneed for ‘balancing services’, butwould not lead to the need foradditional baseload capacity, as the increase in reserve requirementis met from remaining plant. In addition, diversity of sources will always reduce the need forreserves. This issue is explained in detail in the SDC’s publication,Wind Power in the UK (2005).

20 Paper 4 – Economics of nuclearpower

There would not appear to be a case forinnovation support for a new nuclearprogramme with reactor designs based onexisting technologies (‘Generation III’ designs).The technologies that might compete for a UKorder are all versions of mature technologies,with a long history of operation combined with substantial public subsidy. In addition, the nuclear industry itself claims that thesereactors are ‘market ready’.

Our assessment therefore is that new nucleardevelopment should not qualify for marketintervention in the same way as renewables do through the Renewables Obligation (RO).The RO was established to provide the fixed-term support necessary for renewables to meet Government targets and was justified on innovation grounds. On the basis of thisassessment we would not, therefore, support a proposal to amend the RO to enable publicresources from fuel bills to be used to supportthe development of nuclear power.

The Government has consistently put liberalisedenergy markets at the heart of energy policy, a policy started by the previous administration.It therefore seems unlikely that any majorchanges would be made to the basic design of the market.

2.2.5 Impact on alternative energy sources

Our evidence21 looked at the possibility thatinvestment in nuclear power would detractfrom investment in renewables. Assuming thatnew nuclear plant would be privately financed,the conclusion from the evidence was thatthere was unlikely to be an economic impact,although this did not rule out a political impact.The SDC is concerned that political attentionwould shift and undermine efforts to increasethe proportion of renewables in the energymix, and the efforts to improve energyefficiency throughout the economy.

Government support for renewables andenergy efficiency since the 2003 EWP has been mixed. On the one hand the RenewablesObligation has been raised to deliver 15% of electricity from renewables by 2015, andprogress with commercially viable, large-scalerenewables such as wind and biomass co-firinghas been encouraging. On the other hand theGovernment has done less to stimulate themarket for microgeneration, and the funding on offer for this sector over the next threeyears is small (at £30m), and unlikely to put the UK on course for mass-marketpenetration. Similarly, many of the planningbarriers to microgeneration have not beenadequately tackled.

On energy efficiency, good progress with theEnergy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) by energy

suppliers has been overshadowed by risingenergy demand, and the Government’scommitment to much tougher buildingstandards for new buildings is now seriously in question. While changes to the BuildingRegulations are encouraging, the proposedCode for Sustainable Homes, intended to be the‘pull’ for more advanced buildings standardsincluding encouragement for microgeneration,is currently inadequate in this regard.

It is clear that the Government has largelybeen successful when dealing with centralisedand relatively straightforward policies, but hasstruggled when faced with more complex,decentralised issues, or those that require alarge number of minor fixes, rather than asingle over-arching solution. This ‘attentiondeficit’ on the part of Government is veryrelevant to the nuclear issue, where a single-minded focus on one large solution could leadto a significant decrease in both political andeconomic attention for the wide variety ofsmaller solutions that we will need over thelong-term to move to a low carbon economy.

The SDC is also concerned that commitment toa new nuclear programme would send a strongsignal to all energy users that the pressure for reducing individual energy demand hasbeen lifted. Such a signal would be extremelyproblematic for any future sustainable energystrategy, as the need to reduce demand is akey part of delivering the carbon savings weneed, irrespective of whether a new nuclearprogramme goes ahead.

There is also some evidence to suggest thatmaking consumers more aware of their energyconsumption can lead to more sustainableenergy use, and more sustainable consumptionof other goods and services22. Bringing energygeneration closer to the point of end use is oneway of doing this, but efforts to achieve thismay conflict with a nuclear-centric approach.

While our evidence indicates that new nuclearinvestment is unlikely to detract from privatesector investment in renewables (consideringthe size of the financial markets involved), weare concerned that an expanded RO that alsosupports nuclear might undermine the EnergyEfficiency Commitment (EEC). This is becauseboth add a levy to consumers’ bills, so theremay be political pressure to keep the totalburden to a minimum – this could reduce future increases in EEC.

From an infrastructural perspective, there areconcerns that investment in a new nuclearprogramme would reinforce the UK’s relianceon a centralised grid system and could thereforedecrease the investment available for thenetwork reinforcement needed to cope withmuch higher levels of decentralised generation(microgeneration) and large-scale renewables.


21 Paper 4 – Economics of nuclear power

The evidence suggests there is somedisagreement over these costs, but if they arehigh, there is the potential for conflict. This isbecause the transmission and distribution ofelectricity in the UK is a regulated industry, andall investments need to be approved by Ofgemas part of the district network operators’ (DNO)price control agreements. Faced with calls forlarge investments across the network, Ofgemmight have to prioritise what it allows, unless itis willing to accept higher costs for consumers.

There is also the related problem that continuedreliance on centralised supply may exacerbatethe current institutional bias towards large-scalegeneration, and the reluctance to really embracethe reforms necessary to ensure a moredecentralised and sustainable energy economy.The role of Ofgem is central to this issue.

The lack of flexibility, or ‘lock-in’, associatedwith investment in large-scale centralisedsupply like nuclear power is also a concern. This relates to the issue of sunk costs. A newnuclear programme would commit the UK to that technology, and a centralised supplyinfrastructure, for at least 50 years.

During this time there are likely to besignificant advances in decentralisedtechnologies, and there is a risk that continueddependence on more centralised supplies may lock out some alternatives. Decentralisedsupply is generally more flexible because it is modular, and can adapt quicker and at less cost to changed circumstances. More locally-based energy provision may also be conduciveto the sustainable communities agenda, a key part of the UK Government’s SustainableDevelopment Strategy.

Any bias towards one mode over anotheressentially prevents a level playing field, anddoes not therefore encourage true competition.It may be hard for the microgeneration sectorto overcome such bias, and this may prevent or slow it from reaching the economies of scalenecessary to show its full potential.

2.2.6 Summary

Nuclear power may be able to make a usefulcontribution to the UK’s economy, by providinglow carbon electricity at a competitive price.However, our evidence shows that it is verydifficult to assess the total cost of the availablenuclear technologies, particularly as the onlyrecent development that is relevant to the UK(in Finland) has a number of hidden subsidiesthat obscure its true cost.

In our view commercial investors are bestplaced to make a real assessment of the risks,and will have much better information on likelyconstruction costs and therefore the final costof power produced. They will also be able to

account for wholesale electricity prices, and forthe price of carbon, which is likely to be centralto their business case.

There are still a number of outstanding coststhat, unless internalised, may not allow a fullreflection of the cost of nuclear power in thoseinvestor calculations. There is also the issue ofmoral hazard, and the impact that might haveon reducing the apparent cost of nuclear powerby increasing the financial risks to the taxpayer.

The case for nuclear power tends to be viewedin isolation, but this takes no account of theimpacts that a nuclear development routemight have on other alternatives, and on the prospects for a level playing field for all technologies. Although the measurableeconomic impacts may be limited, the politicalimplications of a shift in emphasis towardsnuclear could be to further weaken thecommitment of Government, and therefore the investment community, to renewables and specifically microgeneration technologies.

On balance, the economic case for nuclearpower is heavily dependent on its position in relation to other low carbon alternatives, and the effect it might have on the long-termability of the UK to meet its emission reductiontargets. If nuclear power can prove itself to be an economically viable competitor in a lowcarbon economy, without leading to a drain of investment for other alternatives, then itscontribution to a sustainable economy may bepositive. If, however, nuclear power requirespublic support (whether immediately or in thelong-term) and/or it diverts funds away fromother viable alternatives, then its contributionmay well be negative.

It is of little doubt where the UK’s currentnuclear capacity stands. The burden of proofwould now seem to be on the nuclear industryto show that updated designs, combined with private sector financing and projectmanagement, could lead to a differentoutcome. However, this must take place on atruly equal and transparent basis, so that costsare internalised and the taxpayer is protectedfrom long-term liabilities. An assessment of thecost – and public acceptance – of nuclear wastepolicy is essential for this to take place.


22 Sustainable Consumption Roundtable(2005). Seeing the light.

2.3 SocietyHow is the public good best served in thedecision-making process for new nuclear and how does it contribute to social well-being? (Good governance; strong, healthy and just society)

2.3.1 Developing a policy on nuclear power23

‘Good governance’ is one of the five principlesof sustainable development, as is ‘ensuring a strong, healthy and just society’. In thedecision-making process on development of nuclear power, engaging the public must be a requirement. Controversial decisions by Government have in the past led toconsiderable public outcry (such as thecontroversy around GMOs), and Governmentwould be well advised to avoid suchconfrontational approaches on this issue.

Our evidence on public perceptions showslimited explicit support for nuclear power (less than 30%) and demonstrates that publicsupport depends strongly on factors such as a solution to dealing with long-term waste,decommissioning, and nuclear proliferation, the level of trust in Government, and trust inthe nuclear industry more generally.

While climate change is seen as a reason to re-consider new nuclear development,acceptance is conditional on first resolving the waste issue convincingly. Our evidence also shows that if the nuclear industry appearsto lobby Government, public suspicion of thesecrecy of the industry is raised.

Our conclusion from this research is that, forgood governance reasons, a comprehensivenational debate will be needed to explore allpossible sustainable energy options with thepublic, before any decisions are made on anew nuclear power programme by Government.It is dangerous for any government to appearto ride over a social framing that is not whollywilling to embrace a mistrusted technology,and where deep feelings are evident forsustainable futures in economy and society.

In the 1989 Electricity Act energy projectsabove 50MW in England and Wales are referredto the Department of Trade and Industry; and projects in Scotland are referred to theScottish Executive; in Northern Ireland allenergy projects over 10MW require consentfrom the Department for Trade, Enterprise and Investment. Common practice is for theGovernment to conduct a planning inquiryundertaken by the relevant body.

Whilst any planning or consent process shouldbe as efficient as possible, it would be a causefor concern if standard procedures for planningand licensing of nuclear power plants were

streamlined in any way that undermined thepublic’s right to consultation and due process.

As the consents process for large powerprojects is a devolved matter, it is worth noting that the ‘no nuclear’ policies in Scotland and Wales could prove problematic if the UKGovernment decided to proceed with a newnuclear programme, as three existing nuclearsites are currently located in Scotland, with two more in Wales. There are no nuclear powerstations in Northern Ireland.

2.3.2 Employment opportunities

Employment opportunities in the vicinity ofnuclear sites is clearly advantageous to theeconomy of the local region during operationand would stimulate employment for theconstruction industry and for decommissioningthe plant in the future. But employmentopportunities also exist for alternative lowcarbon energy sources, and these are oftenmore widely spread through a range ofindustrial sectors. In addition, the employmentpotential of carbon capture and storagetechnologies, which are often seen as in directcompetition with nuclear power, is extensive.

It is therefore very difficult to calculate any netemployment impact from a new nuclear powerprogramme, as any jobs created may come atthe expense of jobs in other sectors.

2.3.3 Safety and security issues24

Nuclear power stations are designed with strictsafety procedures, and stringent standards foremergencies both on and off-site. UK civilnuclear power stations have a very good safetyrecord; however experience at a UK militaryreactor (Windscale) and elsewhere (Chernobyl,Three Mile Island) show just how dangerous a major accident can be. While we recognisethat these events are rare, they are also one of the main reasons for public concern andcannot be dismissed.

The high levels of security at nuclear powerstations are regularly reviewed against currentintelligence about the intents and capabilitiesof terrorist groups. The possibility of a terroriststrike on a nuclear plant has been a focal pointfor security analysts since 9/11. Modern reactordesigns have substantial containment buildingswhich are unlikely to be breached even by acrashing commercial airliner, and the reactorfuel is protected against impact and fire byother structures.

The industry assessment is that attempts atdamaging the plant, either by external attackor sabotage, will probably cause the reactor to shut down safely once a fault is detected.However the mode of a terrorist attack cannotbe accurately predicted and therefore there


23 Paper 7 – Public perceptions andcommunity issues

24 Paper 6 – Safety and security

cannot be complete confidence that such anattack would not lead to significantly adverseconsequences.

Use of nuclear fuel (reactor grade and spentfuel) by terrorists is raised as a concern. Reactorgrade fuel must be processed to produceweapons-grade material to raise it from 4-5%uranium-235 to over 90% uranium-235. Spentfuel is an even more difficult starting materialbecause it contains much less Uranium-235than fresh reactor fuel.

However shipments of spent fuel forreprocessing could be attacked en route fromthe station to the reprocessing plant, eitherwith the intention to spread contamination overa wide area or to steal the material for futureuse in a nuclear weapon. Reactor grade fuelcould be used to make a ’dirty bomb’.

The industry assessment is that spent fuelcontainers are robust and undergo stringenttesting and that the spent fuel pellets theycontain are not easily dispersed even undersevere impact and fire. But an alternative viewis that stolen spent fuel would be valuable as a dirty bomb in itself and is therefore of valueto terrorists. It would appear, therefore, that the potential use of nuclear fuels by terroristsremains a risk, and therefore a concern.

Nuclear accidents are recorded and ascribedlevels on a scale 0-7 (Chernobyl was level 7),and most accidental releases in the UK are atlevels 0,1 or 2. While major accidents are rare,evidence from Sellafield and Japan reveals that human error and management lapses are most often responsible – circumstances whichundermine public confidence in the industry,even in industrialised countries with tightregulatory regimes.

Public confidence in the regulatory regimes for nuclear power stations in all countries, not just the UK, is also important becauseunplanned discharges can have serioustransboundary effects. This raises a number of problems, including the difficulties ofensuring that the regulatory institutions in lessdeveloped countries are sufficiently resourced,and for identifying and dealing with poorhealth and safety practices which could lead totransboundary environmental or health risks.

2.3.4 Proliferation risks25

Terrorist organisations, almost by definition,operate outside national and international law,and therefore safeguards to protect againstproliferation are almost irrelevant to suchgroups. Similarly it is very difficult to protectagainst civil nuclear power being developedinto a military nuclear capability wheremotivations are strong enough, as has beenshown in a number of countries.

The UK therefore needs to be fully aware of the implications of developing new nuclearcapacity, particularly in the context ofinternational treaties such as the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change. If nuclearpower is part of the UK’s chosen solution toclimate change, then it would be considered a suitable solution for all countries. The UNFCCCexplicitly encourages “the development,application and diffusion, including transfer of technologies, practices and processes thatcontrol, reduce or prevent anthropogenicemission of greenhouse gases” (Article 4.1c).

Reprocessing nuclear reactor fuel can raise it tothe quality required for nuclear warheads, mosteasily from light water reactors. Pressurisedwater reactors would have to be closed downfor several months, but in a country thatwishes to do this the only barriers are political,as there is no engineering constraint.

Several international treaties have beenconcluded with the aim of making sure eitherthat civil nuclear power is not used for militarypurposes or that any attempts to do so aredetected. The two principal treaties thatconcern the UK are the 1970 Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)and the Euratom Treaty, to which the UKbecame a partner on joining the EuropeanCommunity in 1973.

Out of the 188 states that have signed the NPT,the UK is one of five declared Nuclear WeaponsStates (NWS), the others being France, the USA,the USSR and China. The only states that havenot signed the NPT are India, Pakistan andIsrael, all of which are known to have nuclearweapons, while North Korea has chosen towithdraw from the NPT.

The provisions of the NPT are implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). Following the difficulties of carrying out inspections in Iraq before 2003, additionalprotocols were developed giving IAEAinspectors greater rights of access and requiringadministrative procedures to be streamlined so that, for instance, states cannot delay theissuing of visas as a means of delaying anunwanted inspection.

States also have to provide significantly moreinformation, including details of nuclear-relatedimports and exports, which the IAEA is thenable to verify. The IAEA concludes that withoutthe NPT, there might be perhaps 30 to 40Nuclear Weapon States, whereas more stateshave abandoned nuclear weapons programmesthan started them.

Nevertheless, a number of difficulties in the relationship between civil and militaryapplications continue to cause concern among many commentators, including:


25 Paper 6 – Safety and security

> the difficulties of enforcing internationaltreaty obligations

> proliferation risks associated with thewidespread use of nuclear technologies in countries with very diverse systems of governance

> the capacity and resources available to enforce international obligations in a potentially growing number of states with a nuclear capacity, and

> how to deal with states that withdrawfrom treaties or develop nuclear capabilityoutside of them.

In the global environment that we inhabittoday, such considerations are pertinent to theUK’s deliberations about its own energy needs.

2.3.5 Health impacts26

Within the UK, the operators of nuclear plantsmust conform to the general health and safetystandards laid down in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSW Act) as well as theNuclear Installations Act 1965 (as amended)and related legislation.

The nuclear industry is regulated by the NuclearInstallations Inspectorate (NII), on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), who set out the general safety requirements to dealwith the risks on a nuclear site, in conditionsattached to the Site Licence. Radiologicalprotection of employees and the general publicin the UK is covered by this strict legal framework.

Permitted dose levels to the public, as a resultof civil nuclear industry operations, are only asmall fraction of natural background radiation.Most of the collective dose in the EuropeanUnion arises from industrial activities and isattributable to the phosphate industry and oil and gas extraction. The nuclear industryaccounts for 12% of the EU collective dosefrom all industrial activities.

Radioactive discharges from electricitygeneration are low, whereas fuel reprocessingdischarges account for 83% of the EU collectivedose attributable to the nuclear industry. Incontrast to existing nuclear facilities, spent fuelfrom new nuclear power stations may not bereprocessed, on the grounds of risks to humanhealth and proliferation.

Current expectations are that spent fuel fromany potential new stations would be stored on site, potentially for the whole operatinglifetime of the station, before a final disposaloption is selected. The options for wastedisposal and decommissioning therefore remainthe same as for existing facilities.

Overall, the health impacts of well-managednuclear power facilities are small, especially in comparison to some other energy sources,such as coal (mining and combustion) and oil(combustion). However, the risk of a nuclearaccident, however small, places nuclear powerin a unique category where the low risk ofroutine activities must be balanced against the very low probability, but potentially highimpact, of a serious accident.

2.3.6 Intergenerational issues

One of the features of sustainable developmentwhich perhaps distinguishes it from simply an environmental or economic focus is therequirement to analyse the long-term impactsof any policy decision. Nuclear power, with itswaste legacy, has clear inter-generationalimpacts as nuclear waste is expected to remainradioactive for tens of thousands of years.

No civilisation foresees its own demise, but a brief look at history shows the cycle ofcivilisations developing to peak power andinfluence and declining to marginal influence,and sometimes disappearing. During thisdecline the fruits of an advanced civilisation –whether engineering expertise, artistic orlinguistic skill etc – will also disappear, leavinga hiatus in knowledge about the civilisation,and certainly a hiatus in knowledge about howto deal with any legacy from that civilisation.

It is estimated that some elements ofradioactive nuclear waste will continue to betoxic for hundreds of thousands of years. Inview of historical evidence of the decline ofcivilisations, it would seem appropriate to takeseriously the issues of leaving a radioactivelegacy for many future generations, whenknowledge of where and how that waste isstored could die away over time.

Our evidence27 shows that information transferis a key factor, with the management systemmore important than the media used, and that the greatest threat to information transferis institutional change. A number of externalevents, such as climate change, naturaldisasters, wars, and civilisation collapse couldall affect the long term management ofradioactive wastes, but it is the more ‘trivial’causes such as destruction of archives by paperdecay or disruption of electronic media thatcould lead to problems.

While it is recognised that the nuclear wastelegacy is a serious problem that the UK andother countries already have to deal with (as aresult of existing nuclear capacity), any decisionto increase that waste legacy with a newnuclear power programme naturally addsadditional weight to this issue. Therefore any


26 Paper 6 – Safety and security27 Paper 5 – Waste management and

decommissioning

decision to develop new nuclear capacity has to be taken in the context of the currentwaste legacy, albeit that future waste arisingsare likely to be considerably smaller thanexisting volumes.

2.3.7 Summary

Our evidence shows that it is essential for the Government to allow the fullest publicconsultation in developing a policy on nuclearpower. Not doing this would compromise theprinciple of good governance, and risks a hugepublic backlash against top-down decision-making. The Government needs to engage thepublic in a wider debate where nuclear poweris considered as one of the many options thatcould be required for a sustainable energy policy.

We are satisfied that any new nuclear powerplant in the UK would be built and operated to the highest safety and security standards.However the same level of confidence cannotalways be applied to other countries, and this remains a cause for serious concern. Inaddition, nuclear power facilities and processesare vulnerable to attempted exploitation byterrorist groups, and although standards maybe high, this does not rule out the possibility of a successful strike.

The proliferation of nuclear materials is equallya cause for concern in this context. A decisionto develop nuclear power in the UK essentiallyremoves our ability, both morally and legally, todeny the technology to others. The widespreadadoption of nuclear power would greatlyincrease the chances of nuclear proliferation,both through the efforts of nation states andpossibly terrorist organisations.

Whilst the health impacts of a well-regulatednuclear power industry are low, the risk of alow probability, but high impact event must be considered, especially in the context of the international concerns raised above.

Finally, we remain deeply concerned about the intergenerational impacts of the legacy of nuclear waste. Considering the currentuncertainties over total costs and the science of long-term waste management, we find it difficult to reconcile these issues withsustainable development principles.


3.1 Our energychallengeThe previous section analysed nuclear poweragainst the principles of sustainabledevelopment. Using this, along with anassessment of the alternative energy optionsavailable, the Sustainable DevelopmentCommission has developed a position onnuclear that will form a central part our adviceto Government in the current Energy Review.

The two overriding concerns for Governmentare the need to:

> reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions aspart of efforts to tackle climate change, and

> increase confidence in the security ofenergy supply.

The challenge of reducing emissions of CO2

quickly enough to avoid severe and dangerousclimate change is huge. The UK needs to makelarge cuts in its CO2 emissions, and we need tostart doing this immediately. Current measuresto reduce greenhouse gas emissions areinadequate for this task.

There is no single large measure which willsolve the climate change problem. Diversity ofenergy supply options will increase our abilityto meet our carbon reduction goals and helpprovide energy security – it will also reduce the risk of price fluctuations. Reduced energyconsumption combined with new andrenewable energy sources will lead to reduceddependence on imported fossil fuels. Viewed as such, climate change and energy securityaims are highly complementary.

3.2 The startingpointThe 2003 Energy White Paper authoritativelyestablished the rationale for a long-termenergy policy based on energy efficiency,renewables and the cleaner and more efficientuse of fossil fuels. We reaffirm that this strategyis a sound one and should be pursued withvigour. There is a continued case for action onthese three fronts, regardless of a decision onnuclear power.

3.2.1 Reducing energy demand

The starting point for implementing the 2003 Energy White Paper has been and must continue to be, energy efficiency. This must include efforts to encourage energyconservation and to restrain the growth inenergy demand.

So far efforts to boost energy efficiency,although increasingly successful, have beeninsufficient for making a real impact when set against our rising demand for energy. There is still vast potential for promotingenergy efficiency in all sectors, with greatbenefit to the economy and consumers. Wecould more than halve the energy consumptionof our homes and offices using existing energyefficiency measures combined with on-sitegeneration of renewable or low carbon energy.

But policies are not yet sufficiently strong to setus on the right trajectory. Efforts to encourageenergy efficiency in the business sector throughemissions trading schemes have not gone farenough, and engaging and incentivisinghouseholds to dramatically improve theefficiency of their homes is urgently needed.

We must aim for overall reductions in energydemand, not just marginal improvements incarbon intensity. And we must do this acrossthe complete energy spectrum, by reducingelectricity consumption (which is only around a third of total UK energy supply) but also byreducing our demand for heat and transport fuels.


3. SDC Position onNuclear Power

3.2.2 Increasing the contribution ofrenewables

The UK’s renewable resources are some of thebest in the world, and could provide all theUK’s electricity over the longer term. Despitesome significant developments, our currentapproach remains half-hearted, and the levelsof public investment needed to bring forwardnew technologies are inadequate whencompared to our international competitors.

It is critical that the Government should nowinvest far more (both politically and financially)in renewables, particularly microgeneration andbiomass technologies, and marine renewablesand offshore wind, where the UK has a clearnatural advantage.

3.2.3 The clean and more efficient use of fossil fuels

It is clear to us that fossil fuels will remain a necessary part of our energy mix for sometime. We fully support the Government’s statedtarget for 10GW of good quality CHP by 2010as a way of increasing the overall efficiency of energy supply. However, based on our lackof progress on this target, the foundations forexpanding the use of this energy efficienttechnology are not strong.

We also support the recent interest fromGovernment in carbon capture and storage(CCS) technologies, which could effectivelyremove the CO2 emissions that come fromburning fossil fuels such as gas and coal. Thesecould provide a bridge to a more sustainableenergy future whilst providing the UK withsignificant export potential in another area ofexpertise. Of course we must recognise thatCCS is as yet an unproven technology, and its development could allow a future role for coal, about which we have concerns both forreasons of sustainability and human health.

3.3 Nuclearpower: ouradviceIt is clear that nuclear power could generatelarge quantities of electricity, contributematerially to stabilising CO2 emissions and add to the diversity of the UK’s energy supply.However, even if we were to double ourexisting nuclear capacity, this would bring an8% cut on total carbon emissions from 1990levels by 2035, and would contribute littlebefore 2020. Nuclear cannot tackle climatechange alone.

A key issue that the Commission exploredthrough the evidence base was whether the UK could have a viable energy future withoutnuclear power. Or in other words, whethernuclear power is a choice, or whether is it anabsolute necessity.

The conclusion from the analysis was that theUK could meet our CO2 reduction targets andenergy needs without nuclear power, using acombination of demand reduction, renewables,and more efficient use of fossil fuels combined with carbon capture and storage technologies.

In this context, the Sustainable DevelopmentCommission assessed whether nuclear powerhas a role to play in future UK electricity supply.We have a number of serious concerns:

Intergenerational issues

The intergenerational impacts of a new nuclearprogramme are of great concern, particularlywith regard to decommissioning and thedisposal of nuclear waste. Even if a policy forlong-term nuclear waste is developed andimplemented, the timescales involved (manythousands of years) lead to uncertainties overthe level to which safety can be assured. Weare also concerned that a new nuclear programmecould impose unanticipated costs on futuregenerations without commensurate benefits.

Cost

There is very little certainty over the economicsof nuclear power. A new nuclear powerprogramme could divert public funding awayfrom more sustainable technologies that will beneeded regardless, hampering other long-termefforts to move to a low carbon economy withdiverse energy sources. Nuclear power is alsoprone to moral hazard, which could lead toforced public subsidy regardless of theGovernment’s original intentions.


International safety and security

If the UK cannot meet its climate changecommitments without nuclear power, thenunder the terms of the Framework Conventionon Climate Change, we cannot deny others the same technology. The UK has been a world leader on climate change, and must takeaccount of the implications of this legal issue.We are concerned that other countries whoadopt nuclear power may have much lowersafety standards than the UK, and this increases the risk of accidents (transboundarycontamination) and radiation leaks from wastematerials. Greater use of nuclear power alsoincreases the risk of nuclear proliferation, whichimpacts on international security.

Technological lock-in

A new nuclear power programme could lockthe UK into an inflexible, centralised electricity-generating system for the next 50 years.Investments to develop the electricity networksto cope with more decentralised, small-scaletechnologies will be suppressed just as theirpotential is growing.

Reducing energy demand

To meet our carbon reduction targets, we willneed much greater action to reduce energydemand. We are concerned that a new nuclearprogramme would give out the wrong signal to consumers, encouraging the impression thatthe challenge of climate change can be tackledby a large-scale technology fix. Greater use ofdecentralised, small-scale energy generatingtechnologies helps to increase awareness of energy consumption and foster moresustainable behaviour. We are concerned that anew nuclear programme could indirectly reducepolitical support for policies aimed at energyefficiency by competing for public funding.

Therefore the majority view of theSustainable Development Commission is that in consideration of these issues,there is no justification for bringingforward plans for a new nuclear powerprogramme, at this time, and that any such proposal would be incompatible with the Government’s own SustainableDevelopment Strategy. This is our advice to Ministers.

Nonetheless, the majority of the Commissionalso believes it is right for the Government tocontinue to assess the potential contribution of new nuclear technologies for the future, aswell as pursuing answers to our nuclear wasteproblems as actively as possible. We believe a full and thorough national debate onsustainable energy options will be needed inthe future, particularly if new nuclear power is to be pursued.

A sustainable energy policy would combine anaggressive suite of policies for energy efficiencyand renewables, with the development of thecarbon capture & storage (CCS) technologies, to effectively remove the CO2 emissions thatcome from burning fossil fuels such as gas andcoal. The Sustainable Development Commissionbelieves there is an urgent need to driveforward a low carbon innovation programme,with public funding dramatically increased tothe levels of our international competitors. Thisshould be combined with long-term targets forabsolute reductions in CO2 emissions to providecertainty to the business community andstimulate private investment. Uptake shouldthen be encouraged through the smart use offiscal incentives, targeted regulations, and anexpanded role for emissions trading schemes.

Following our suggested pathway would makethe UK a leader in low-carbon technologies. If we take full advantage of this, we willenhance our economic competitiveness.


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Contact usYou can contact the Sustainable Development Commission at:

London (main office): Sustainable Development Commission, Ground Floor, Ergon House, Horseferry Road, London, SW1P 2AL

Telephone: 020 7238 4999

Email: [email protected]

www.sd-commission.org.uk

Edinburgh: 0131 244 [email protected]/scotland

Belfast: 02890 [email protected]

Cardiff: 029 2082 [email protected]/wales

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