The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conventional Deterrence

Toh Boon Ho

1

Author’s Note

This opinion piece was written in January 2004 and submitted for the 2003 Chief of

Defence Force Essay Competition. It won a merit award.

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The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conventional Deterrence

Toh Boon Ho

Introduction

The Fall of Baghdad in April 2003 to American-led coalition forces highlighted

another significant milestone in the on-going United States (US)-led Revolution in

Military Affairs (RMA). US conventional forces, using the latest in Information

Communication Technologies (ICT), sensor technologies and stand-off Global

Positioning System (GPS)-enabled Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), swiftly defeated

the remnants of Iraq‟s conventional forces in a blitzkrieg lasting merely 27 days.

Although the 1991 Gulf War placed the US armed forces on the cusp of the threshold of

the latest manifestation of the RMA, it promised more than it delivered.1 But the second

Iraq campaign in the Spring of 2003 was different from the first. It highlighted the

coming of age of the current US-led RMA and further entrenched the US as its

undisputed leader.

Given the rise of the new RMA, what is its impact on conventional deterrence?

Does the new RMA contribute to conventional deterrence success or failure? Are there

any limitations in the new RMA? How should armed forces respond to this new

development? This paper will examine these questions and relate them to Singapore‟s

deterrence posture and assess how the advent of the RMA will impact on Singapore‟s

RMA and Conventional Deterrence

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defence strategy.

The rise of the new RMA

According to Andrew Marshall, a RMA results from „a major change in the nature

of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which,

combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational

concepts, fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.‟2 Despite

differences in academic circles over the definition of RMAs and whether RMAs naturally

follow military revolutions or vice-versa3, the bottom line for the military practitioner is

whether there has been a discernible change in present capabilities from the past? Is it an

evolutionary change or a major break from the past? If so, are they brought about by

major social and organizational changes in society? Or has new technologies severely

disrupted the present from the past? In this respect, Andrew Marshall‟s all-encompassing

definition of RMAs which result from the convergence of changes in technologies,

doctrinal reassessment and organizational change is best-suited for our analysis.

What is the new RMA? Within military circles, despite acknowledging the

existence of a RMA, the jury is still out on what exactly constitute this new RMA we face

presently. But the consensus is that rapid changes in ICT has created a disjoint with the

past, particularly in the speed of sensor technologies for acquiring information,

information processing and execution of military operations. The decision-making cycle

or OODA loop4 has quickened considerably compared to the past. What used to take days

is now reduced to mere minutes. The operational tempo has increased manifold.

Toh Boon Ho

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Cyberwar is now upon us.5 Commentators have cited the unsuccessful decapitation strike

against Saddam Hussein on a Baghdad suburban restaurant as a concrete example of the

new RMA in executing swift military action brought on by the integrated network of

sensor-shooter platforms to deliver precise attacks against specific targets without

causing excessive civilian casualties.6

Conventional deterrence

Conventional deterrence, according to John Mearsheimer, „is a function of the

capability of denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional forces.‟7

Written in the context of the Cold War in Europe, Mearsheimer argued that traditional

theories of conventional deterrence emphasising balance of forces or the type of weapons

possessed by each side were flawed.8 Deterrence success or failure depended on the type

of military strategy being employed by decision makers. Mearsheimer identified three

types of military strategy: attrition, blitzkrieg and limited aims. From the decision

maker‟s perspective, deterrence will prevail in an attrition strategy, fail in a blitzkrieg

strategy and create an ambiguous outcome in a limited aims strategy in which the

aggressor does not intend to destroy his opponent but instead, opt for the limited aim of

seizing a small portion of the opponent‟s territory. Ambiguity prevails because the

limited victory may translate into a war of attrition and impose more costs than benefits.

In such situations, deterrence prevails. But if limited victory is won through a blitzkrieg

strategy and a fait accompli ensues, the benefits will outstrip the costs of military action.

Hence, deterrence will likely fail in this situation.9

RMA and Conventional Deterrence

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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 1990

Following a border dispute with Kuwait, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the

tiny emirate of Kuwait in August 1990. Kuwait‟s small armed forces proved to be no

deterrent against the third largest armed forces in the world then. Iraqi forces conducted a

blitzkrieg which led to the rapid fall of the emirate. Using Mearsheimer‟s theory, a few

outcomes can be discerned. There was no balance of forces, given the preponderance of

Iraq‟s forces as opposed to the small Kuwaiti armed forces. The area of operations

favoured an attacker who utilized surprise and a blitzkrieg strategy to overrun the tiny

emirate. These conditions favoured deterrence failure.

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-1991

When US forces intervened in the Gulf region in 1990, a rapid build-up of

coalition military forces ensued. Despite UN resolutions to withdraw from Kuwait, Iraqi

forces dug-in and prepared to defeat the coalition forces in the “mother of all battles”. If

Mearsheimer‟s theory is applied, coalition forces should desist from attacking a battle-

hardened and well-entrenched enemy of equal strength. Conventional deterrence should

have prevailed and the Iraqis would be able to hold on to their gains in Kuwait since they

had adopted a limited aims strategy of only ingesting Kuwait and then switching to the

defensive with an attrition strategy in mind.

At that time, US commentators feared the Iraqi attrition strategy, as it could have

easily led to a second Vietnam quagmire costing numerous US casualties. Notable

exceptions included Mearsheimer himself, who argued that the US military had been

Toh Boon Ho

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transforming itself between the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and its intervention in

the Persian Gulf in 1990.10

The transformative effects will ensure a swift, decisive victory

with few casualties in any ensuing conflict with Iraq.11

Mearsheimer and US military leaders were proven right in their assessment.

Investment in the latest technologies and weapons platforms, particularly the use of

stealth aircraft and PGMs, and sophisticated land platforms, coupled with Joint

Surveillance and Targeting Radar System (JSTARS) battle information management

systems and doctrinal changes in the form of the Airland Doctrine secured victory and

liberation for Kuwait. The 1991 Gulf War showcased the powerful dividends to be reaped

from an RMA-equipped military force when pitted against a non-RMA equipped military

force in an ideal setting for conventional warfare. The conflict hinted at greater

transformations in the future. But the 1991 Gulf War also highlighted deficiencies in the

coalition forces. The criticisms included the lack of jointness within and among the US

military services and coalition partners.12

In particular, fratricide incidents among

coalition units and the need to separate the battlespace among the services were strong

indications of further improvements in joint warfare.13

The heavy use of PGM footage in

media briefings masked the reality of actual air operations where PGMs constituted a

minor component of total ordnance dropped by coalition air forces.14

The low casualty campaign shocked and surprised many.15

Fundamentally,

conventional deterrence as we knew it had to undergo a rethink. The new RMA allowed

military commanders to once again pursue decisive victory on the battlefield. Non-RMA

RMA and Conventional Deterrence

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equipped forces, particularly those modelled on Soviet lines, were compelled to examine

the lessons of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and comprehend the inadequacy of their Soviet-

era strategy.

The New RMA and Conventional Deterrence

The 1991 Gulf War indicated the inadequacy of Mearsheimer‟s conventional

deterrence theory. The coalition forces were not daunted by the battle-hardened, well-

armed and Soviet-equipped Iraqi armed forces. The new RMA helped ensure victory for

the coalition forces. In this respect, conventional deterrence failed. The US‟

predominance in the new RMA will ensure that even in the event of conventional

deterrence failure, as illustrated by the Kuwaiti case in August 1990, the failure had

reinforced the credibility of subsequent US deterrence threats precisely because the US

had demonstrated that only it alone had the power projection capabilities to secure

victory against any aggressor anywhere in the world. The US victory in the 1991 Gulf

War reinforced this outcome.16

Subsequent US involvement in other conflicts in the 1990s, notably the

intervention in Kosovo, further reinforced US dominance in the new RMA. Despite

ongoing controversy over the non-introduction of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) ground forces, the conflict marked the first time political-military objectives

were largely secured without any combat casualties on the US-led NATO forces. Unlike

the 1991 Gulf War, technological advancements like the introduction of GPS-enabled

PGMs, particularly Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and the continued use of

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stand-off weapons like Tomahawks and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) first

introduced in combat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War constituted the majority of munitions

used during Operation Allied Force. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were also used

in significant numbers for the first time. Except for the notable downing of an F-117

Nighthawk, Serbian air defences were largely powerless against the NATO air onslaught

which operated above their air defence combat ceilings.17

These developments have a significant impact on conventional deterrence. Using

Mearsheimer‟s theory again, it is clear that these technological advances, coupled with

doctrinal changes and revamped force structures, create incentives for RMA-equipped

military forces to execute a blitzkrieg strategy in pursuit of their political-military goals.

The costs of such a strategy have also been lowered because of the new RMA. Warfare

has now been reduced to a spectator sport. The rise of professional military forces mean

that only a small segment of society is actively and willingly engaged in military

operations. The extensive use of PGMs has also kept casualties low. With minimal

collateral damage, civilian casualties have been dramatically lowered, making it

politically acceptable for casualty-adverse societies to use force and thereby avoiding

public protest over its use. The new RMA has also enabled RMA-equipped forces to fight

short, decisive wars, rather than long, inconclusive campaigns of attrition which will

erode public support on the home front.18

RMA and Conventional Deterrence

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Coping Strategies in the New RMA

US superiority in the new RMA is without equal. No other military outfit can

approximate to the US‟ lead in the current RMA. Rather than play catch-up with the US,

asymmetrical strategies are now being touted as the potential solution to circumvent and

defeat the US-led RMA. Cyberwar strategies aimed at disabling or disrupting the

information networks undergirding the current RMA is one asymmetrical strategy.19

Terrorism is another alternative. Protracted war is an additional potent counter-strategy.

In spite of their potential, cyberwar strategies can be easily neutralized by cyber

defence strategies to protect critical information network infrastructure from intruders.20

Although devastating in themselves, terrorism acts are self-defeating strategies. Like the

kamikazes of the Pacific campaign in the Second World War, they cannot impose long-

lasting strategic impact on military strategy.21

Terrorism imposes costs, but not enough

pain to cause determined societies to desist from sending their military forces to eradicate

the terrorist network. Instead of sapping the will of the terrorist-hit society, it bolsters

their will. Casualties become an acceptable cost as victimized societies galvanize

themselves for a noble cause to neutralize and eliminate the terrorist threat altogether.

The temptation to harness the current RMA and use force to pursue political

objectives is premised on a short conflict with minimal casualties. A protracted conflict

will weaken the rationale for using force in the first place. If the RMA promises to create

deterrence failure, the converse of protracted conflict is to create deterrence success.

Given the casualty-adverse nature of modern Western democracies, any protracted

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conflict with rising casualty figures will increasingly produce a strong reaction to „bring

the boys home‟. Protracted war constitutes the most dangerous asymmetrical strategy

against the current RMA.

Limitations of the New RMA

The new RMA is not omnipotent. It also contains weaknesses, particularly in

situations where protracted war ensues. Protracted war hold the danger of sapping an

occupying army‟s will to fight, especially when low-intensity conflict through guerrilla

warfare is supported by an occupied people prepared and willing to support the guerrilla

infrastructure with recruits, money and supplies.22

The current American occupation in

Iraq is illustrative of the dilemma faced by a victorious army in danger of winning the

war, but losing the peace.23

It has also shown the limitations of the current RMA. The

RMA cannot stop ambushes of coalition troops with improvised roadside bombs or

suicide bombers targeting security installations.24

Successful counter-insurgency

campaigns require good, timely intelligence and population control strategies. The cliché

that successful counter-insurgency boils down to “winning hearts and minds” may be old,

but holds relevance in today‟s context. Iraqi resistance groups assiduously avoided the

use of mobile communications which were vulnerable to electronic eavesdropping, a

forte of the US‟ dominance in the current RMA. The dramatic deaths of Saddam‟s two

sons25

and his own personal capture by US forces26

were not the result of the US‟ lead in

the RMA, but rather, the result of successful “old school” tactics capitalizing on human

foibles of greed and reliance on good intelligence and sound investigative techniques,27

RMA and Conventional Deterrence

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reminiscent of security operations undertaken during the Malayan Emergency. RMA-

equipped militaries ignore this salient truth at their peril.

Lessons for the SAF

The mission statement of the SAF is clear: To enhance Singapore‟s peace and

security, and should deterrence fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the

aggressors. No other military organization comes close to challenging the current US‟

lead in the new RMA. Only the US has the resources and technological wherewithal to

engage in a broad-based adoption of the new RMA. But this does not preclude less-

endowed but technologically capable military organizations from engaging in a niche-

based adoption of the new RMA.28

The SAF has grown progressively over the past 39

years into a formidable but balanced military organization through sound defence

planning. Its conventional military capabilities are built on a capable defence

technological infrastructure and military organization that seeks „jointness‟ and

interoperability among the 3 services to punch above its weight such that the net result is

more than the sum of its parts.

The SAF is not slow in adopting vestiges of the new RMA. Organizationally, it

has set up a Future Systems division headed by a Future Systems Architect to examine

the impact of the new RMA on the SAF and to strategize the integration of the RMA

within the SAF. Doctrinally, there is a movement towards Integrated Warfare29

, which

has been a major beneficiary of the new RMA with its emphasis on battlespace

dominance and resultant economy of effort through force concentration and precise

Toh Boon Ho

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assault on an enemy‟s centre of gravity. Technologically, the local defence industry and

defence research facilities have been strengthening its cyberwar capabilities to realize

battlespace and infospace dominance. Placing all three aspects of Andrew Marshall‟s

definition together, the SAF is indeed a forward-looking military organization prepared

and able to exploit the new RMA through niche-based capabilities.30

If the SAF is conventionally powerful, and made even more so through the

multiplier effect of harnessing the power of the RMA, does this portend the breakdown of

conventional deterrence in accordance with Mearsheimer‟s theory given the enhanced

effectiveness of the SAF‟s ability to launch a sudden and successful blitzkrieg against

any potential regional enemies? Would it not then lead to a regional arms race in a classic

rendition of the security dilemma? Fortunately, as Tim Huxley has observed, despite its

strong conventional offensive capabilities, the SAF is ultimately a doomsday device

which should never be used and is at its most effective when used as a deterrent.31

9/11 and the Irrelevance of the SAF?

The 9/11 events and the resultant conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have

showcased the dangers posed by asymmetrical warfare. The RMA-equipped US military

have shown its dominance of conventional warfare, aided by the RMA. But conventional

deterrence manifested through an RMA-equipped military force did not deter terrorist

groups from committing their atrocities in the first instance.32

Within the region, the real

threat posed by radical terrorist groups executed through suicide car bombings against

civilian targets33

can only be deterred via sound intelligence-gathering and political

RMA and Conventional Deterrence

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solutions to longstanding grievances effected through population control strategies

focussing on encouragement and pressure so effectively executed during the Malayan

Emergency.

The regional terrorist threat with its insidious and shadowy character have

highlighted the limits of the RMA. An organization equipped for conventional war is not

necessarily the best-equipped military force to mount a counter-insurgency campaign and

win a war of intelligence. A return to basics is necessary. The SAF began its origins as an

internal security outfit. Its key role in the politically turbulent 1950s and early 1960s was

training itself for a public security role to be used in aid of the civil power as a

supplement to the police.34

This role receded with the emphasis on growing the

conventional capabilities of the nascent SAF to match the security realities of Cold War

Southeast Asia. Now that the conventional threat has receded with the end of the Cold

War, the asymmetrical threat has resurrected itself in different forms presently. The

spectrum of threats has expanded considerably. They range from the suicide bomber to

potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attacks employing biochemical agents.

While the local defence industry and defence research community has displayed its forte

in chemical defence capabilities,35

it has also become necessary to deploy SAF units in a

static point defence posture to defend key civilian targets like Singapore‟s all-important

billion-dollar petrochemical industry situated on Jurong Island against potential terrorist

acts.36

The growing involvement of the SAF in UN peacekeeping initiatives has also lent

greater urgency to the SAF to re-visit its origins and train itself for the peacekeeping

role.37

Peacekeeping emphasises security presence, not firepower. It values local

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knowledge and intimacy with the local population. The primary mission is to safeguard

the target population, not its destruction. This is no different from the SAF‟s original

public security role. In a certain way, the SAF at the beginning of the new century, has

indeed come full circle to re-visit its original role.

Conclusion

What does the future hold for the SAF? Perhaps it is apt to borrow from business

theory the idea of diversification. In the military context, it is the diversification and

investment in broad-based capabilities covering the full spectrum of threats. To be

effective as a conventional deterrent, the SAF has adopted a structured approach towards

harnessing the new RMA in niche areas to boost its conventional deterrence capabilities.

But the rise of asymmetrical threats has also revealed weaknesses in the new RMA. In

such situations, a return to the SAF‟s origins of training for a public security role is

necessary. This is a function which is not alien to the SAF. It had been done before and

can be reconstituted again to meet present dangers. By investing in broad-based

capabilities, the SAF will be fully equipped to meet the wide-ranging multiple security

threats of the 21st century.

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1 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf

(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 188-189, 209-212. 2 Quoted in Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and

Dale Hill, “The Revolution in Military Affairs”, in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues,

eds. Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Gritner (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press,

1995), p. 65. 3 See Williamson Murray and Macgregor Knox, “Thinking About Revolutions in Warfare”, in The

Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, eds. Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 1-14; Clifford J. Rogers, „“Military Revolutions” and “Revolutions

in Military Affairs”: A Historian‟s Perspective‟, in Towards a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defense and

RMA and Conventional Deterrence

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Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, eds. Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff

(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 21-35. 4 The OODA loop comprises a decision-making cycle which features Observation, Orientation, Decision

and Action. Devised by John Boyd, whoever repeatedly observes, orients, decides and acts more swiftly

than his opponent wins. See David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower‟s Quest for Strategic

Paralysis”, in The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. by Philip S. Meilinger

(Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997), p. 366. 5 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!”, Comparative Strategy, 12, 2 (Spring 1993),

pp. 141-165. 6 It took only 45 minutes between the sighting of Saddam and the bombing of his potential hideout. On the

leadership decapitation strike, see Mark Thompson and Timothy J. Burger, “How to Attack a Dictator, Part

II”, Time, 161, 15 (21 April 2003), pp. 22-23; Michael O‟Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of

Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 7-20. 7 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 15. 8 Ibid., pp. 25-28. 9 Ibid., pp. 28-66. 10 Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001),

pp. 80-85. 11 John J. Mearsheimer, “Will Iraq Fight or Fold Its Tent?: Ground War in Kuwait”, New York Times, 8

February 1991. 12 Owens, Fog of War, pp. 89-94. 13 In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, 24 percent of American combat deaths were due to „friendly fire‟. See

Amanda Bower, “Misfiring in the Fog”, Time, 161, 13 (7 April 2003), p. 31. 14 PGMs only constituted a mere 9.26 percent of total aerial warhead tonnage delivered by US forces during

the 1991 Persian Gulf War. See Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge,

Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 273. 15 Coalition casualties were 293 dead, half of them due to combat. See Owens, Fog of War, p. 87. 16 Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China

Relations”, International Security, 27, 2 (Fall 2002), p. 65. 17 Barry R. Posen, “The War for Kosovo: Serbia‟s Political-Military Strategy”, International Security, 24, 4

(Spring 2000), pp. 58-61. 18 Colin McInnes, “Spectator Sport Warfare”, in Contemporary Security Policy, 20, 3 (December 1999), pp.

154-155. 19 Stephen J. Lukasik, Seymour E. Goodman and David W. Longhurst, Protecting Critical Infrastructures

Against Cyber-Attack, Adelphi Paper 359 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 7-14. 20 Ibid., pp. 15-24. 21 Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1994), pp. 847-848. 22 Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1998), pp. 40-41. 23 Evan Thomas, Rod Nordland and Christian Caryl, “Operation Hearts & Minds”, Newsweek, CXLIII, 1

(29 December 2003/5 January 2004), pp. 20-26. 24 Michael Elliott, “The War That Never Ends”, Time, 161, 26 (7 July 2003), pp. 16-19. 25 See Romesh Ratnesar, “And Then There Was One”, Time, 162, 4 (4 August, 2003), pp. 32-35. 26 “After the euphoria”, The Economist, 369, 8355 (20 December 2003), pp. 59-60. 27 “Saddam Hussein and the Dollar War”, Stratfor, www.stratfor.com, 18 December 2003. 28 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions”, The National

Interest, 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42. 29 See Lim Chuan Poh, “IKC2: Transforming the SAF in the Information Age”, in Realising Integrated

Knowledge-based Command and Control: Transforming the SAF (Singapore: Pointer, 2003), p. 8. 30 Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia, Adelphi Paper 329 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1999), p. 71. 31 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen &

Unwin, 2000), p. 63.

Toh Boon Ho

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32 Choy Dawen, Kwek Ju-Hon, Lai Chung Han, Lee Seow Hiang, Joseph Leong, Roland Ng and Frederick

Teo, “Introduction”, in Creating the Capacity to Change: Defence Entrepreneurship for the 21st Century

(Singapore: Pointer, 2003), p. 3. 33 See Carlyle Thayer, “Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, Pointer, 29, 4 (October-December 2003),

pp. 53-62; Daniel Tan Kuan Wei, “The Fatal Attraction of Suicide Terrorism”, Pointer, 29, 4 (October-

December 2003), pp. 81-95. 34 See Toh Boon Ho, “Operation Photo – The British Army, Internal Security and the 1956 Singapore

Riots”, Pointer, 26, 2 (April-June 2000), pp. 120-138; M.S. Gill, History of the Singapore Infantry

Regiment 1957-1967 (Singapore: The Singapore Command and Staff College, 1990). 35 David Yeo, “DSO National Laboratories receives international designation”, Pioneer, Issue 308 (Jun

2003), p. 14. 36 Geoffrey Liem, “Working hand in glove to protect Singapore”, Pioneer, Issue 308 (Jun 2003), p. 13. 37 David Yeo, “In the company of peacekeepers”, Pioneer, Issue 309 (Jul 2003), pp. 2-5. 38 Chan Kairen, “Dealing effectively with threats to Singapore‟s security”, Pioneer, Issue 308 (Jun 2003),

p. 9.