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2014 Working Paper Series

Volume 8

The Representation of Religious Identity in Papua:

Indonesia-ness and Papua-ness

Cahyo Pamungkas

Editors: Christopher A. Woodrich and Frank Dhont

Recommended Citation: Pamungkas, Cahyo. "The Representation of Religious Identity in Papua: Indonesia-ness and Papua-ness" 2014 International Indonesia Forum, Working Paper Series 8 (2014).

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THE REPRESENTATION OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN PAPUA: Indonesia-ness and Papua-ness1

Cahyo Pamungkas

The Research Center of Regional Resources (PSDR) The Indonesian Institutes of Sciences (LIPI)

Gedung Widyagraha LIPI Lantai 2 Jl. Jenderal Gatot Subroto Kav. 10 Jakarta Selatan

(email: cahyopamungkas@gmail.com)

ABSTRACT The main question of this study is how Muslim Papuans contest their identity with Christian Papuans. The terms Muslim or Christian Papuans refer to native people, belonging to the Melanesian race, who embrace Islam or Christianity. This research used in-depth interviews, participant observation, and literature studies. To analyze the findings, this study uses Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, defined as a form of power which only can be recognized by its voluntarily acceptance and legitimation. This study focuses on the representation of religious identity in the field of political struggle, as occupied by Muslim and Christian organizations in Papua. Since 2003, there are no significant changes in the inter-group relationships, since the political tensions between the Papuan native and Indonesian governmentstill continue. Many religious and political tensions in Papua unconsciously strengthen this identity formation. In religious tensions, Muslim Papuans and Muslim migrants collaborated against Christian Papuans and Christian migrants. Key words: contest of identity, social actors, field of religion, symbolic power

ABSTRAK Pertanyaan utama penelitian ini adalah bagaimanakah Muslim Papua mengkontestasikan identitas mereka dengan Kristen Papua. Istilah Muslim atau Kristen Papua mengacu pada orang-orang asli Papua, ras Melanesia baik yang memeluk Islam atau Kristen. Penelitian ini menggunakan wawancara mendalam, pengamatan terlibat, dan studi literatur. Untuk menganalisis temuan penelitian, studi ini menggunakan teori Bourdieu tentang kekuasaan simbolik, yang didefinisikan sebagai bentuk kekuasaan yang hanya dapat dikenali dari penerimaan secara sukarela dan legitimasinya. Penelitian ini memfokuskan pada representasi identitas keagamaan dalam ranah politik, yang ditempati organisasi Muslim dan Kristen di Papua. Sejak tahun 2003, tidak ada perubahan signifikan dalam hubungan antar kelompok, karena ketegangan politik antara orang Papua dan Pemerintah Indonesia terus berlanjut. Banyak ketegangan agama dan politik di Papua memperkuat pembentukan identitas orang asli Papua. Aktor dalam ranah keagamaan adalah Kristen Papua, Papua Muslim, Kristen migran, dan Muslim migran. Dalam ketegangan antarumat beragama, Muslim Papua dan pendatang Muslim berkolaborasi terhadap warga Papua Kristen dan pendatang Kristen. Kata kunci: kontestasi identitas, pelaku-pelaku sosial, ranah keagamaan, kekuasaan simbolik Introduction

The question addressed by this study is how Muslim Papuans have contested their

identity with Christian Papuans in the fields of religion and politics. The terms

“Muslim” or “Christian Papuans” here refer to native people of Papua, belonging

1 This paper is presented in the 7th IIF (International Indonesia Forum) conference on 19 August 2014 in Bandung.

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to Melanesian race, who embrace Islam or Christianity. A discourse on identity

contestation between social actors in political and religious fields cannot be

distinguished from the objective relations between those actors. If the religious

field is viewed in terms of religious social practices, we can thus consider political

and religious fields in the consideration of religious political practices. These

fields include Papuan Muslims, migrant Muslims, Papuan Christians, and migrant

Christians. Religious political practices in this study involve the totality of

religious organizational actions in competing for acquiring material capitals, such

as ritual sites and religious educational premises, and for gaining symbolic

capitals, such as a recognition of legitimate religion in Papua.

Bourdieu explained that a field is a domination arena between social

actors, in accordance to their capital possession.2 Consequently, the composition

of capital and the value of capitals owned by social actors determines their

positions, either dominant or subordinate. In political and religious fields in

Papua, those social actors are Papuan Christians, migrant Muslims, and Papuan

Muslims. Migrant Christians are a significant group, but nevertheless in this

discussion we include them in the category of Christian Papuans due to their

numbers are not significant compared to Muslim migrants. Their capital

composition can be seen in the Table 1.

Table 1. Capital composition between social actors Social actors Economic

capital Social capital Cultural capital3 Symbolic

capital Non-physical

Objc. Inst.

Migrant Muslims**** (NU, Muh. MUI, Yapis, dan ICMI)

In process of being included in the APBD

National networks

- Indonesian language

v vv* -

Papuan Muslims (Majelis Muslim

APBD fund sources of IDR 1.5 billion per

Local networks

- Local idioms - Indonesian language

vv v* Recognition of their Papuan nativity

2 Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar, Chris Wilkes (ed.), An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: the Practice of Theory (London: The McMillan Press Ltd, 1990), p. 8. 3 Significant capital cultural can be seen from the education levels of the elite. Catholic leaders are, on average, graduates and postgradutes; Christian priests are undergradutes and graduates of the Higher Theological School; and, most Muslim leaders are undergraduates. Considering their languages, almost all Papuan Christians and Muslims speak their mother languages tongues. From a cultural aspect, Papuan Christians are thus superior to the Papuan and migrant Muslims (based on interview with H (ALDP) on 17 February 2008).

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Papuua, MMP) annum Papuan Christians** (GKIT, Baptist Church, Jayapura Diocese)

APBD and non-APBD fund sources of more than IDR 10 billion per annum

- Local networks - National networks - International networks

- Local idioms - Indonesian language - Dutch language - English language

vvv vvv* - Recognition of their Papuan nativitiy - Recognition that Christians have been developing the Papuan civilization

Source: Cahyo Pamungkas, Papua Islam and Special Autonomy (MA thesis in the department of Sociology, the University of Indonesia, 2008), p. 134.

Remarks: The sign * refers to religious society organization leadership; ** to social actors in their dominant positions, including migrant Christians (Asosiasi Pendeta Indonesia); **** social actors of subordinate positions, including PUIM (Persatuan Umat Islam Manokwari); *** social actors in subordinate positions, including FKMJ (Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Muslim Jayawijaya). Objc.= cultural capital in the forms of cultural artefacts; inst.= intellectual qualification from educational systems and training such as academic graduation certificate; v = low, vv = medium, vvv = high. As shown in Table 1, in the ownership of capitals, migrant Muslims and Papuan

Muslims are in subordinate positions in comparison to Papuan Christians, who are

in dominant position. However, the most effective kind of capital to use in

political and religious fields is symbolic capital, because those who hold such

capital maintain the source of symbolic power. Identifying each religion with

Papuans and the Papuan land is a strategy of contestation. Christian Churches

have large symbolic capital because Christianity is considered the legitimate

religion of native Papuans. Therefore, this paper argues that Muslim Papuans, in

their subordinated position, struggle against Christian Papuans for recognition of

their identity.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF PAPUAN IDENTITY

Bourdieu contends that symbolic capital can be founded in the recognition and

authority possessed by social actors.4 In the fields of politics and religions in

Papua, Christianity is considered to be the religion of native Papuans. The

recognition is not taken for granted, but formed through the Christian Church’s

discourses and social processes. The zending missionaries have significant roles in

producing knowledge of Papuan identity. It is comprehensible if we refer to

Church’ role in introducing Papuans to modern knowledges, so that they may

4 Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar, Chris Wilkes (ed.), An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: the Practice of Theory (London: The McMillan Press Ltd, 1990), p. 13.

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identify themselves.5 Bishop Leo Laba Ladjar indicated that the Catholic Church

has been independently teaching Papuans to write and read, and giving them

health services, mainly in Southern Papua and Pegunungan Tengah.6 Catholicism

has opened the way for Papuans to discover modernity.

Catholic Churches accommodate many native Papuan traditions into

religious traditions compared to Protestant Churches. In an observation of the

ordination of a priest of St. Michael Parish in Kamandega Village, Waris, Kerom,

we found that customary native ceremonies were incorporated into the ordination.

The Catholic Church has been acculturating the Papuan and Catholic traditions, so

that Catholicism becomes united with, not distanced from, the Papuan traditions.7

Many texts related to the native Papuan identity are produced by the

churches in Papua. Priest Mth. Mawene (2003: 54-55) wrote a well-known book,

titled Ketika Allah Menjamah Papua [When God Touches Papua], which stated

that the island of Papua is the land of the Christ, based on his interpretation of a

poem written by Ottow and Geissler when they first stepped on the island.

Mawene (2003: 54) concludes that the historic poem can be read as a conquest

formula, indicating that from then on the land and its population were legitimately

confirmed as belonging to God, and that God has absolute power over it, and his

commands must be obeyed there.8 From the votum, or ordination, formula,

5 Rizzo, Suzanna Grazia. “From Paradise Lost to Promised Land: Christianity and the Rise of West Papua Nationalism” (Disertation in the University of Wollongong, Australia, 2004). 6 Interview with the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura, Mgr. Dr. Leo Laba Ladjar OFM, in Jayapura, 17 March 2008. 7 Interview with Fr. J. Jonga (Waris Parish), in Jayapura, 20 February 2008. Acculturation or the mutual coexistence between the church and traditional community has endured for over 50 years, or since the 1940s. Today, the Church is accused of being a force which weakens the traditional systems of Papua. Leo Imbhiri (general secretary of Dewan Adat Papua), on 22 February 2008, indicated that religion was an integral part of the Papuan traditional community. 8 The identification of Papua as a ”Bible land” was realized by local political elite. Farhardian cites his interview with a leader of Dani clan as following: ”In September 1998, I said to the government and its apparatus who worked here in Wamena: never let Javanese and non-Papuans work here, their posts should be held by Papuans, do not bring your bad religions here... Papuans are now upset because of some tricks deployed by Muslims. We say: Your God is not real, you better return home. You can pray in your own neighborhood. You have to leave... People heard me praying this way: This land has been possessed by Jesus. The Bible came first here. Papua Land will be Papua Land forever. We offer the land to God. This land is for erecting the cross of Jesus. It is a Christian Land. We do not welcome Muslims.” (Charles Edward Farhadian, Rising the Morning Star: A Social and Ethnographic History of Urban Dani Christian in New Order Indonesia (Dissertation in Graduate School of Art and Science, Boston University, 2001), p. 230.

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discourse indicates that on the Island of Papua, devotion to the living God is held.

This devotion does not only concern spiritual life, but also includes the worldly

life of the Papuans. Elsewhere, Mawene indicates that Papuan society cannot be

separated from the Bible, because the Bible has created the current form of Papua.

Priest Mawene shows that the identification of Papua with Bible should

not be used for the interests of Papuanisation, the politics of which are a response

to the Indonesianization and Javanization in the era of the New Order. However,

in practice, because Papua is identified with Christianity, Papuanization is

essentially another form of Christianization. That is the point criticized by

Mawene, because the Bible does not preach exclusivism, but the liberation of

men. According to Mawene, before the coming of the Bible, Papua was an

unknown land, marked with a dark space in the world map9.

The chairman of the Papuan Baptist Church Service Body, Priest Socratez

Sofyan Yoman, wrote a book titled Pemusnahan Etnis Melanesia, Memecah

Kebisuan Sejarah Kekerasan di Papua Barat (2007). The book explicates the

roles of the Church. Firstly, the spread of Christianity in Papua brings along moral

messages regarding human rights and issues in Papua.10 The Churches in Papua

speak of freedom and human rights regarding such matters as the arrest of Filep

Karma, violence in Wasior, Wamena, and Abepura, and the murder of Theys H.

Eluay and Yustinus Murip for breaking into an armory in Wamena.11 It also

discusses issues of religious and racial discrimination in Indonesia. For example,

many churches in Western Java are forced to close by the government because

local majority gives no permit for them, while mosques proliferate dramatically in

Papua, and Islamic religious law is enforced in Aceh.

Recognition of Christianity as the religion of Papuans is not only shaped

through discourse, but also through social processes. The identification of Papua

9 Mawene, M.Th, Ketika Allah Menjamah Papua. Jayapura: Panitia Perayaan Tingkat Provinsi 148 tahun Injil Masuk di Tanah Papua (Makalah tidak dipublikasikan, 2003), p. 2. 10 Latifah Anum Siregar (the chairman of ALDP and general secretary of MMP), in an interview in Jayapura on 19 February 2008 stated that Papuans have known western people as being Christians, evangelists, good-hearted, and saviors, while they discovered Indonesia through annexation, military operations,, and transmigration programs. 11 A similar point was indicated by Beny Giay (STT Walter Post) in an interview in Jayapura on 10 March 2008, and by Septer Manufandu (Foker LSM) on 7 March 2008 in Jayapura, without explicitly indicating the victims’ names.

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with Christianity derives from the relation between religion and politics in the

struggle of the Papuan people. The Catholic Church has a different perspective

than that of the Protestant Church. Brother Saul Paulo Wanimbo OFM (in Arwan

2003: 88) indicates that, in the context of Papuan people’s struggle for their right

to determine their own fate, they make use of religious propaganda strategies,

including the slogans “Papua, the land of peace” and “Papua is the blessed land of

God”. In such a context, religion is used as an instrument for Papuans to express

their aspiration against the injustice they’ve experienced since their integration

into Indonesia.

The discourse that native Papuans are Christians of Melanesian race is

refuted by the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura, Mgr. Dr. Leo Laba Ladjar OFM. He

argues that this identification is obviously superficial.12 In such a case, religious

reason cannot be understood as a theological construction, as native Papuans have

their own special belief systems which is absolutely distinct from that of

Christianity. He contends that the emphasis of Papuans’ Melanesian race and

Christian identity is the mobilization of the political interests of the Papuan

independence movement, especially for uniting all native Papuans.13 He indicated

that such an identification was expressed by Theys H. Eluay in 2000, who said

that Papua was a land blessed by the Lord Jesus Christ. Such a statement did not

accommodate Thaha M. Alhamid, the general secretary of PDP, whom everyone

knew as an architect of the PDP and who contributed significantly for the struggle

for an independent Papua. The political use of religion and race for mobilizing

native Papuans, he argues, was a humiliating act of Christianity being considered

a mere instrument for a certain group’s political interests.

The bishop’s perspective suggests that tension between Muslims and

Christians in Papua is not a religious conflict, but one between the Papuan people

and Indonesian national interests. The only solution is dialogue, such as that

12 Interview with the Catholic bishop of Jayapura, op. cit. The same view was expressed by Thaha M. Alhamid in an interview on 20 February 2008 in Jayapura: for Papuans, religion was understood as a cultural matter, with the slogan “one stove, three stone components (Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam). Latifah Anum Siregar on 19 Februari 2008 said that religious issues have rarely ignited conflict in Papua because the issues of confrontation between Papuans and migrants were more eminent. 13 Interview with the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura, op. cit.

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between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement. He considers

the construction of Melanesia in the minds of Papuans to be oriented to the East,

i.e. to the Melanesia of Pacific Melanesian countries and not Indonesian

Melanesia. A deeper observation would reveal that the Melanesian race in

Indonesia includes ethnic groups in South-East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, North

Maluku, and Papuan coastal area. The identification of Papuan identity with

Christianity, the bishop adds, is inappropriate, for there are Muslim customary

societies, with their rights to customary lands, such as in Walesi, Fak-fak and

Kaimana.14

CONTESTATION OF IDENTITY IN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FIELDS

The establishment of a grand mosque in Manokwari

In 2005, Christian groups objected against the construction of the Manokwari

Grand Mosque. The mosque’s construction committee was led by vice governor

Rahimin Katjong, who argued that the area’s Muslim community had long

planned the mosque’s construction. It was intended to be a representative prayer

site, and they said it functioned merely as a place of worship which ensured

concentration, stillness and religious people unity.15

The committee’s application for permission to begin construction,

submitted through letter No. 13/PAN-PMR/MKW/X/2005 (dated 4 October

2005), was rejected by the regent of Manokwari, Dominggus Mandacan, through

letter No. 450/1040 (19 October 2005). This rejection was based on the objections

from figures from and leaders of the Christian denominations in Manokwari, who

were prepared to announce their stance to maintain and develop Manokwari as a

historic city which was important in the spread of Christianity in Papua. In

statements read before the public by Priest I.S. Rumbiak on 17 November 2007, it

was announced that: (1) the Christian communities renounced the construction of

the grand mosque and the Islamic center; (2) and the communities demanded the

dismissal of the construction committee. Christians in Manokwari responded to

14 Interview with the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura, op. cit. 15 At the site, construction of the facilities for MUI, PUIM (Persatuan Umat Islam Manokwari), PHBI (Panitia Hari-hari Besar Islam), BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat), LPTQ and YAPIS (Yayasan Pendidikan Islam) were planned. From a legal perspective, the presence of the great mosque was in accordance to the Religious Affairs Ministry Decree No. 394/2003 of 3 September 2003, regarding the Establishment of Regional Mosques.

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the planned construction with a huge rally before the offices of the Regional

Peoples’ Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, or DPRD) of the

West Papua province on 17 November 2005 (Media Papua 18 November 2005).

Responding to the demonstrations, the chairman of DPRD of West Papua,

Jimmy Idjie, promised that all parties would Manokwari’s importance in the

spread of Christianity. In the middle of the protests, a spokesperson advanced a

proposal to the DPRD of West Papua and the DPRD of Manokwari, calling for

regional legislation which affirmed that Manokwari was a city of Bible, as well as

dialogue between different religious groups, to be held for building a common

understanding of Manokwari as a Bible city and Papua as a peaceful area.

Ultimately, the cornerstone-laying ceremony, intended to be held on 21

October 2005, was canceled by the committee. In response to the refusal, the

mosque’s construction committee wrote a letter to the Regent of Manokwari,

numbered 17/PAN-PMR/MKW/XI/2005 and dated 14 November 2005, which

requested that the regent facilitate a meeting including the committee, MUI

(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, the Indonesia Ulama Council), and Muslim and

Christian denominations in Manokwari. At this meeting, the committee would

explain their rationale behind the planned construction. This indicates that the

committee had yet to have communication with Christian leaders.16 Considering

the objections against the mosque, the regent of Manokwari recommended that the

committee build good communications with church denominations.

Referring to Bourdieu’s, elaboration of the notion of habitus, this

exclusivism can be seen as a habitus of the migrant Muslims.17 Presumably, we

may see why they have such a habitus: they have grown in circumstances in

which Islam is the majority religion, in their hometowns. Religious habitus consist

of religious practices and inclinations, incorporated into the social actors since

their youth, in the forms of perceptions and behaviors in evaluating their religion

16 The same matter was stated by LA (chairman of LDII in Papua) on 9 March 2008, Mualimin (general secretary of Hidayatullah of Papua) on 8 March 2008, Qomari (general secretary of PWNU of Papua) on 4 April 2008, and DS (chairman of GPA of Papua) on 2 April 2008. 17 Baca lebih lanjut Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power. Cetakan kelima, diedit oleh John B. Thompson dan diterjemahkan oleh Gino Raymond dan Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 12 dan Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of A Theory of Practice, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 78.

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in comparison to others’. This inclination contains religious rituals and beliefs

which they acquired from their original circumstances.

After the objection against the mosque became a public discourse, the

Papuan provincial MUI submitted a proposal to the MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua,

the Papuan People Assembly) with letter No. 62/MUI-PAPUA/XI/2005, dated 30

November 2005. This letter pushed the following points: (1) Manokwari would be

developed as a special religious town, for it was there that the Bible first entered

Papua; (2) the capital of the West Papua Province would be restored to Sorong.

That day, the chairman of MRP issued a letter informing the regent of Manokwari

that the MRP would establish a special committee to look into the mosque’s

case.18 To respect the feelings of Muslims and Christians in Manokwari, the MRP

did not issue any recommendations regarding to the construction of the

Manokwari Great Mosque. Preparations for the election of the new regent at the

end of 2005 ultimately made the issue disappear from discourse.

A member of MRP representing Christians, Priest Hofni Simbiyak,

indicated that the refusal of the mosque was due to a lack of communication

between the Persatuan Umat Islam Manokwari (PUIM) and the churches in

Manokwari.19 Each side was fixed on their respective perspectives. The PUIM

argued that developing facilities for religious rituals, in accordance to one’s

religion and beliefs, was part of basic human rights, while the Christian side

believed that Manokwari historic because it had been the site where the Bible had

been first brought to Papua, and as such there had to be legislation which assured

that other religions’ symbols were not made eminent. The refusal of this mosque

can be considered a failure of dialogue and communication between the mosque

construction committee and Church leadership and local customary communities.

After the protests against the construction of the Manokwari Grand

Mosque, a group of local lawmakers issued a bill which established Manokwari as

a Bible City (Kota Injil). It is not clear who drafted the bill, but its creation had

impact: it became a common subject of discourse in Manokwari, Jayapura and

Jakarta. The bill could, basically, only be acceptable if it referred to restoring local

18 Interview with Aroby A. Aituarouw (chairman of MMP) on 17 April 2008 in Jayapura. 19 Interview with Priest Hofni Simbayak (MRP) on 12 March 2008 in Jayapura.

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culture.20 There were, however articles that could be regarded as harming inter-

religious harmony, including the following: (a) article 26, point 1, indicates that,

beside the establishing of public facility names, the local government has the

authority to install religious accessories and symbols at public places and

buildings, or government offices or business facilities or religious facilities; (b)

Article 37 proscribes that the wearing of outfits exhibiting religious symbols in

public spheres, educational facilities and government offices, is forbidden.

Priest Hofni Simbiyak said that the bill establishing the Bible City was a

result of a seminar, held by the churches in Papua, which established three holy

cities: Manokwari, Fak-Fak, and Merauke. He argued that the bill had to be seen

in a reference to its spirit, i.e. that Christians in Manokwari had to be treated

similarly to how as Muslims were treated in Aceh, with its Islamic religious law.21

He opined that Muslims in Papua should not show their religious symbols,

including hijabs, in state educational facilities and government offices. This was,

he emphasized, not a case of Christians discriminating against Muslims, but an

effort to understand, recognize and respect Christians as native Papuans.

An opposite view was held by a politician of the Papuan branch of the

Golkar Party. He considered the refusal of the mosque’s construction to be a result

of influences and pressures from priests who came from outside of Papua and

intended to protect the city of Manokwari from deeply Islamization.22 The

chairman of the West Papua branch of MUI indicated that there was a plan to

establishing Manokwari as the Jerusalem of Papua. However, it is clear that many

mosques have been built in Manokwari by migrant Muslims, who are strong

businessmen in the region.23

A different point of view was expressed by the vice chairman of MMP

(Majelis Muslim Papua, the Assembly of Papuan Muslim) and the deputy 20 This can be shown with the presence of article 4, which mentions that the regional government has the authority to establish policy related to spiritual and mental empowerment affairs. Article 27, in the framework of mental and spiritual development, permits the use of Indonesian and local languages (i.e. Meyakh, Hatam, Sough, Mpur and Numfor Dore). Article 25 indicates that activities of spiritual and mental development are to be done with consideration for historic, cultural, traditional values, and the local wisdom present in communities, especially those with native Papuans or native Papuans who are Christians. 21 Interview with Priest Hoffni Simbiyak (MRP), op. cit. 22 Interview with AB (Uniyap), op. cit. 23 Ibid.

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chairman of DAP, Fadhal Alhamid. He opined that the rejection of the mosque’s

construction was influenced mostly by political reasons, particularly in the context

of the West Papuan gubernatorial election of 2005.24 Rahimin Katjong, a

candidate for vice-governor, paired with incumbent governor Abraham Atarury,

and the two attempted to attract a constituency of Manokwari Muslims by

establishing a committee for the construction of the Manokwari Great Mosque.

However, such a plan was not communicated with the chairman and religious

leaders. After his success in the gubernatorial election, Katjong has a moral and

political burden to continue the construction of the mosque. He is now demanding

the MMP to lobby the local government and Christian leaders. In his position as

the deputy chairman of MMP, Fadhal contends that if the MMP is asked to lobby,

he will have two points to put forth:25 (1) the MMP will not recommend the

construction of a mosque, but rather Islamic boarding schools and multiuse

facilities; (2) the old committee for the mosque’s construction have to be

dismissed, erasing remaining negative political images.

Aroby A. Aituarouw, the chairman of the MMP, explained that a few

months earlier the chairman of the Manokwari branch of the MMP had met with

the chairman of Dewan Adat Manokwari, Barnabas Mandacan, and

communicated the aspirations of Manokwari Muslims for the construction of the

mosque at the provincial level. They argued that it was so that the province would

be in accordance with Decree of the Minister of Religioun No. 394/2003, and not

simply for the purpose of Islamization.26 He said that the chairman of the Dewan

Adat had agreed to this, and opened a way towards the construction of the mosque

and communication with Christian leaders.

The establishment of the STAIN Al-Fatah in Jayapura

24 Interview with Fadhal Alhamid (vice chairman of MMP/DAP), 21 March 2008, Jayapura. 25 Ibid. 26 Interview with Aroby A. Aituarouw (chairman of MMP), op. cit. Dialogue and negotiation is a practice between native Papuans, both Christian and Muslim. It indicates that, beside their tolerance and moderateness, other religious habitus of native Christian and Muslim Papuans include their flexibility and dynamics. Dialogue and negotiation are determined by a flexible, dynamic, tolerant and moderate religious habitus, and its objective social structure (i.e. relationship between religious Papuan people) is frequently filled with tensions, especially after the fall of the New Order regime.

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The establishment of the STAIN (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, the State

Islamic Institute) Al-Fatah campus represented a status shift of the STAI (Sekolah

Tinggi Agama Islam, the Islamic Institute) Al-Fatah Jayapura, established in

1989.27 In 2003, the Yayasan Pendidikan Wiraswasta Papua (YAPSI), the owner

of the STAI Al-Fatah Jayapura, asked for a letter of recommendation from the

Papuan province governor, the chairman of the regional religious ministry, the

DPRD, and the chairman of the Badan Pekerja Sinode of the GKIT Papua.

Responding to the recommendation request, the governor issued letter of

recommendation No. 4241.4/795/SET on 20 February 2003.28

The DPRP similarly gave recommendation, through letter No. 421.4/96

dated 1 February 2003. Furthermore, the regional office of the ministry of religion

issued a recommendation letter, No. WZ/2/BA.05/0097/2003, on 4 February

2003. The director of the University of Cendrawasih then issued letter of

recommendation No. 00118/J20/PP/2003 on 14 February 2003. One and a half

years later, the chairman of Badan Pekerja Sinode GKIT of Papua, Priest Herman

Saud surrendered his recommendation, No. 212/G-16.b/VI/2004 dated 2 June

2004. President Megawati Soekarnoputri finally issued executive order No.

92/2004 on 18 October 2004, regarding the establishment of the STAIN Al-Fatah

of Jayapura.

In 2007, with some aid from the municipal government of Jayapura, the

STAIN purchased 10 ha of customary land in Bumi Perkemahan Waena from the

Kaigere clan, at a cost of IDR 3 billion, and followed through with a customary

land release ceremony. However, a few days later, a protest against the

groundbreaking was organized by Ondoafi Besar Hedam Dasim Klebew, Asosiasi

Pendeta Indonesia (API), Badan Pekerja GKIT of Sentani Classis, and the Forum 27 The Badan Pengurus of the STAIS was established by YAPSI in 2000 by John Dumatubun, Korwa, C. Ooyuku, Abas Polanakan, and I Ketut Sudiarta. Those figures who established the STAIN Al-Fatah in 2005 are Thaha M. Alhamid, M. Saleh Inan, Idrus Alhamid, Ahmad Faru, Musa Rumbaru, Umar Bauw, and Azis Hagemur (profile of the STAIN Al-Fatah). The founders of the STAIS and the STAIN were both migrant and native Papuan Muslims (interview with Idrus Alhamid, Rektor STAIN Al-Fatah on 27 Februari 2008). He explains that considerations give the following recommendations: (1) the presence of the STAI Al-Fatah since 1989 has coincided with the development of human resources in the province of Papua, (2) for increasing the role of the STAI Al-Fatah, it is necessary to increase its certification from a private higher education institution to a state funded institution, (3) for developing instructions, maintenance and supervision from the government, such an increase in status of the STAI Al-Fatah is necessary.

14

Hak Ulayat Masyarakat Adat Sentani. They sent a letter to the mayor of Jayapura

(No. 01/OND.HDK/I/, dated 27 January 2007) regarding their rejection of the

land release in Waena. The letter was signed by the Ondoafi Besar Agustinus PH

Ohee. The reasons of the refusal were mentioned below: “The existence of suggestions, proposals and urgings for the rejection on behalf of all components of the customary community Hedam Sentani, who do not consent to the use of the land for the developing of the Islamic Higher Education Center.”

One day earlier, on 26 January 2007, the Badan Pekerja GKIT of Sentani

Classis issued a letter containing prayer support No. 14/A-1.b/I/2007. It was

indicated therein that, in a term of 3 weeks, they had received reports from the

Hedam Ohei community and local Christians who rejected the planned customary

land release for the construction of the STAIN Al-Falah. Their rational is

presented below: “Firstly, the land was part of the customary rights of customary community, inherited from ancestors as a HOME and motherland for the community, from generation to generation. Secondly, the land was a gift from God for the purposes of being managed by any creatures of God where they were placed, and not for any transactional goal. Thirdly, the Papuan Land had been blessed through the initial prayer of the two apostles, i.e. Ottouw and Gessler, so that almost all customary communities of Papua have been converted into Christianity and the Papuan Land has become a Christian territory.”

The objection against the land sale was also expressed by Forum Hak

Ulayat Masyarakat Adat Sentani, in their letter to the Mayor of Jayapura. Their

refusal was based on the argument that the sale of land by the Kaigere clan to the

STAIN would create a greater opportunity for horizontal conflicts to emerge. On

29 January 2007, API, through their letter to the Governor of Papuan No.

007/DPD-API/2007, stated their rejection of the land sale. API is an organization

with membership consisting of Protestant priests from all over Indonesia. Their

rationale against the land sale consisted of five points: “First, the land sale violates the Perdasus [Special Regional Legislation] on Customary Land Rights, mentioned in the UU Otsus of Papua. Second, the land around the Waena camping ground is a natural reserve (for a green belt). Third, the establishing of a State Islamic University or an Islamic Center would provide no direct benefits to Papuan youth in terms of human resources development and Christian faith empowerment – the majority religion of Papuans. Fourth, the establishment of such a university or Islamic center is part of an Islamization program to make Indonesia a country which obliges people to follow Islamic law.” Responding to the objections against the land sale, the clan leader of the

Kaigere, Darius M. Kaigere, wrote a response in letter No. 36/KSK-KLB/IV/2007

13 February 2007, which was directed to Agustinus Ohee (of the Ondoafi Besar

15

Hedam), Sentani Classis, groups rejecting the Islamic Center, Edison Modouw,

and the Papuan branch of API. In his letter, he gave the following points. First,

any party that rejected the plans was requested to consider them well and

proportionately, for after some rational thought, the prejudice and accusations

would have no ground. The Kaigere clan had also had a meeting with STAIN, for

assurance regarding what the STAIN would do in the future.

Second, the land sale to the STAIN was legitimate, according to law and

PP No. 65/2006. The local government was the facilitator and filter for the land

provision for anything bigger than one hectare. Third, STAIN Al-Fatah was a

state owned educational institution which had long operated in Jayapura, under

the name STAIS Al-Fatah, and in Papua in general. Fourth, in the name of

humanity, goodness and harmony the clan asked any party who was against the

STAIN to reconsider and reevaluate everything in a proportionate manner and

from the perspective of religion, customary rules, socio-cultural norms and law. It

was urgent that non-Muslims should never be trapped in polemics between

interest groups using clan, religious, and racial ties to ignite conflicts that would

surely harm the people of Papua. The letter concluded with the following passage: “… We have land and the STAIN Al-Fatah has knowledge, and we are working to create synergy in the interest of future education. Is there anything wrong there, brothers? If the STAIN, with its educational mission is refused and dismissed, do you have a more elegant solution? … Let us see the intentions of the STAIN Al-Falah in their entirety, and not just partially. We need the STAIN’s presence in the same manner we need other higher educational institutions: for developing our people to provide qualified human resources for developing our beloved land.”

Amidst the heated debate over the land sale, the MRP issued a letter of

support for the anti-sale party through letter No. 484/119/MRP/2007, dated March

2007, which was addressed to the provincial governor. In the letter, the MRP

stated its corroboration for the statement of the BPH-GKIT and some church

denominations in the Waena and Waena communities.29 A member of the MRP,

Tom Lany, objected, saying that, as a representative of Muslim community, he

could not agree with his colleagues’ refusal of the STAIN, as the STAIN was 29 The consideration of the MRP of the case was based on the refusal issued by the Badan Pengurus Harian GKIT and the Church Denominations in Wamena and Waena people regarding the STAIN, and anticipated the occurrence of social disorders that could develop violent acts that would harm peace and public order (Chairman of the MRP’s letter No. 484/119/MRP/2007 on 1 March 2007).

16

meant to educate and develop the people of Papua. Also, Islamic high education

was a vital issue, and closely tied to the interests and futures of Papuan Muslims.

Responding to pressures from anti-land sale groups, the chairman of the

Majelis Wali Amanah (MWA) of the STAIN Al-Fatah, who was also the general

secretary of the PDP (Presidium Dewan Papua, the Papua Presidium Council),

Thaha M. Alhamid, along with the chairman of MMP (Majelis Muslim Papua)

met with governor Barnabas Suaebu on 1 March 2007 and submitted an

explanation for the construction of the new campus through letter MWA.101-

B/03-2007. In the meeting, the governor gave a positive response to the presence

of this educational institution. As cited by the chairman of MWA, in his letter to

the STAIN, the governor would support the STAIN with some funds from the

APBD, although the school was to be funded by the national government budget.

The same letter was sent as to both the chairman of the MRP and the DPRP

chairman, in order to pressure the DPRP to facilitate a meeting with the API so

that the group could clarify its refusal.

In the letter written by MWA to governor Barnabas Suaebu, we find the

following several points. First, if the refusal had only come from the customary

(Klebeuw) community, and was based on a commitment to protect the customary

land, the STAIN would recognize this rejection. However, the refusal came from

customary communities living outside the area (Ondoafi Besar Hedam Dasim

Klebeuw). The objections from API were considered be intended as provocative

and accusative. Second, the construction of the STAIN’s campus was not for the

purpose of Islamization or to enforce the Islamic Law, but rather based on the

Papuan Muslim traditions which had developed in harmonious customary

villages. The theological perspective of Papuan Muslims was against fundamental

Islam or radical Islam. It was mentioned that Papuan Muslims highly respected

family religions, and the principles used by Papuan Muslims were based on a

vision of rahmatan lil’alamin, and specifically rahmatan lil Papua. The most

significant point can be found in the final passage: “Our concern for building this institution of higher educational is based on a veracity that average Papuan Muslim children are from those families who are incapable of paying for their children to have an education outside Papua. Several Islamic organizations came into Papua after its integration into Indonesia (NU, Muhammadiyah, MUI). Those organizations never gave access to Muslim Papuan children to have undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate educations. These facts spurred us to make efforts towards

17

helping ourselves. Besides, through this institution of higher education, we are attempting to ensure that the accreditation process for teachers of Islam in public schools in Papua need not be done in Java, or Sulawesi, or somewhere other than in Papua, so that their point of view and religious spirit are kept intact, to assure that Papua is a Land of Peace.”

At the time of field work, the STAIN campus was in the process of

construction, and the land release had been cleared. The director of STAIN, Idrus

Alhamid, indicated that some resistance from the API and parts of the Ondoafi

Besar Waena had continued. They had held a demonstration when the building

was under construction in Waena camping ground in June 2007.30 To make sure

that undesirable events would not happen, the construction site was guarded by 8

armed police officers. The school’s director said that Thaha Alhamid contributed

significantly in protecting the existence of STAIN, from its initial establishment

up through the peak of rejections from non-Muslim groups in June 2007.31

Related to the STAIN campus’ construction, Priest Kirenius Bole of API

stated that the rejection of STAIN was not a matter of religious conflict, but

because API had received complaints from the Ondoafi Bear Hedam-Sentani that

the land release had been against the customary law, since the release process

bypassed the Ondoafi Besar Hedam-Sentani.32 The people who sold the land were

of the Kaigere clan, who were under the jurisdiction of the Hukum Adat Ondoafi

Besar. The same matter was expressed by Priest Hofni Simbiyak: the MRP’s

support for the refusal of building permits for the construction of the STAIN

campus was not an issue of religious conflict, he said, but because the land release

had not yet been consented by the Ondoafi Besar Hedam Sentani.

According to the Second Deputy Chairman of DAP, and also the vice

chairman of MMP, Fadhal Alhamid, arguments that the land release was not

agreed by the Ondoafi Besar Hedam Sentani and that are Islamization programs in

Papua are clearly inappropriate.33 Each clan has different mechanisms in selling

and releasing land, and other clans or the Ondoafi Besar need not interfere. The

land release of the Waena camping ground for the construction of the STAIN

30 Interview with Idrus Alhamid (director of the STAIN Al-Fatah) on 27 February 2008. 31 Thaha M. Alhamid was appointed the Chairman of the Majelis Wali Amanah of the STAIN Al-Fatah, in the capacity of communicating with native Papuan who were Christians (Ibid.). 32 Personal communication with Priest Kirenius Bole (Chairman of the DPD of the API of Papua) on 5 March 2008 in Jayapura. 33 Interview with Fadhal Alhamid, op.cit.

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campus was legitimate according to the customary laws of the Kaigera clan.

Fadhal argues that the objections of API and MRP were fundamentally incorrect,

and based more on fears of Islamization, because the establishment of STAIN was

intended mainly to educate the Papuans.

Refusals of mosque construction in Jayawijaya

On 2 March 2008, the PGGPTJ (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Pegunungan Tengah

Jayawijaya, the Association of Central Mountain Churches of Jayawijaya) issued

letter No. 10/SP/PGGPTJ/W/07 to the chairman of DPRD Jayawijaya indicating

their refusal of any construction of mosques, prayer places, or Islamic boarding

schools in Jayawijaya and the entire Pegunungan Tengah area. This resistance to

any non-Christian religious activity did not follow the mechanisms enforced in all

territory of the NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Republic

Unity State).34 The letter contains the following points. First, the churches in the

Pegunungan Tengah felt humiliated by Muslims for in their effort of building

mosques, prayer places, and Islamic boarding schools, as they never approached

or worked with Christians (the area’s majority community).

Second, the PGGPTJ did not consent to the construction of any mosques,

prayer places, or Islamic boarding schools, nor the planned Islamic center

program in Jayawijaya, as the area was opened to modernization through

evangelization in the word of Jesus Christ, and because the nearby regencies had

been derived from Jayawijaya.35 Third, PGGPTJ refused the presence of the

prayer place at Air Garam, an Islamic boarding school in Hetigima, for that was

where the Bible had first arrived in Pegunungan Tengah. The mosque of

34 A similar case occurred in 1995. In a meeting between Kingmi Church and Muslims of Pegunungan Tengah, some members of Christian leadership were more closed to Islam. In 1995, the Classis of Gereja Kingmi Beoga of Puncak Jaya objected to the construction of a subdistrict mosque, but they failed to stop its construction (Giay 1998: 85). According to Priest Beny, a conflict erupted in 2004 when Muslims in Wamena were to build an Islamic Center and great mosque after purchasing a piece of land in Lembah Baliem. The land was, however, the point where the Bible had been first brought to Lembah Baliem, so that plan was dismissed, out of respect to Christians. 35 The Jayawijaya Regency has been repartitioned into the Puncak Jaya, Pegunungan Bintang, Tolikara and Yahukimo Regencies. Jayawijaya Regency is administratively a mentor for other regencies, so that influence and symbols of Islam that showed in Jayawijaya would also spread to other regencies.

19

Megapura was also rejected by the church union, for the congregation was not

sufficiently large to meet the requirements36 for its establishment.

Fourth, the PGGPTJ did not consent to the planned construction of an

Islamic prayer place for the members of the Batalyon 756/WMS Pos Woma, as

this process did not follow the correct procedures. The regional branch of the

Ministry of Religion had not been invited, by official letter, to come to the

meeting between the Pos Woma soldiers and the people living nearby.

Furthermore, based on the urgings and complaints of Christians living near Pos

Woma, the Church demanded the cessation of the prayer place’s construction, and

that ritual activities be stopped, as the mosque’s sound system was too loud and

caused a disturbance. The churches suggested that, if the military members of the

Pos Woma wanted to have ritual activities, they could have them in private rooms

or go to the nearest mosque. Furthermore, the PGGPTJ asked that all members of

the Yon 756/WMS/Pos Woma be recalled, and that Pos Woma be given back into

the Kodim 1702 Jayawijaya.

There were five points of the PGGPTJ’s stance, seen below: “Considering the fundamental matters we detailed above, and the fact that the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darusalam (NAD) is licensed to implement Islamic law in the frame of special autonomy, and in Java Christians are subject to religious hindrances for various reasons (majority religion and regional legislation), it is not too much to ask that the national government implement the same policy in Papua. We live in the same NKRI, our rights and obligations are set according to Pancasila and the Constitution. We thus demand the DPRD of Jayawijaya to produce a regional legislation for protecting and providing umbrella rights for the Christian Papuans in Papua. Papuan historical records in the NKRI indicates that Papuans are fundamentally nationalists, having no arrogance and shallow fanaticism. While Christians in Java, Poso, Moluccas, and other parts of Indonesia [faced discrimination], their priests and religious people were persecuted, murdered and their church buildings were burned, torn down, and destroyed, it is clear that no such dark page has occurred in Papuan history, no mosques or Muslims have been victimized. We thus once again demand the DPRD of Jayawijaya to immediately create a regional legislation for protecting Papuan Christians.”

The above statements show sentiments of Papuan Christians who wish to

have special autonomy for Papua, similar to that of Aceh, which has implemented

Islamic law. Furthermore, Christians in Jayawijaya, as in other parts of Papua,

have difficulty accepting the obstruction of efforts to build religious facilities in

36 Thusly, the mosque at the edge of the Jalan Bhayangkara Wamena had to stop its activities and to be used of other purposes, as it was considered illegal. Refusal of mosque construction occurred throughout the neighborhoods, subdistricts, and regencies of the Kawasan Pegunungan Tengah.

20

Java, and the razing of church buildings. Both facts push them to demand that

their local government to act the same way the Javanese governments do: protect

the rights of Christian Papuans through a regional legislation. The language used

by the PGGPTJ is almost the same as that used in the demand of Manokwari

churches for their government to protect the majority religion in Papua.

In the context of Jayawijaya, several churches demanded that all mosques

which had already fulfilled all requirements might be consecrated and given legal

protection with regional legislation, while other mosques had to be revoked by the

legislation. The demand of Papuan Christians to be protected through a state

policy is fundamentally not based on hatred towards people of other religions, but

influenced by the experiences of Christians outside Papua: there is a strong

solidarity among churches in Papua and those in outside of Papua. This case must

be viewed critically, for new mosques are indeed built by immigrant Muslims and

Muslim military members.

The objection against mosques in Pegunungan Tengah is explained by

Farhadian as a social effect of the presence of Islam in the area of Dani clan,

Kampung Karubaga, Lembah Baliem Barat. He observes that there are some

school teachers and civil servants in that area who are Muslims. When the GIDI

(Gereja Injili di Indonesia, the Evengelist Church in Indonesia) forbade the

construction of a mosque in the village, several migrant Muslims in Karubaga

built a mushala. The marriage of a Dani woman and a migrant Muslim in

Karubaga made the woman to convert to Islam. 37

Further investigation indicates that resistance towards Muslims in

Pegunungan Tengah emerged in 2001. Tom Lani was a member of the MRP,38

the founder of the FKMJ (Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Muslim Jayawijaya,

Communication Forum of Jayawijaya Muslim), indicating that relations between

Papuans Christians and Muslims in Walesi were harmonious in the 1980s. When a

church building was under construction near his village, Lani (a businessman)

contributed cement to the construction. When a mosque was being built,

Christians contributed materials and manual labor. However, the situation

37 Farhadian, 2001, Opcit, p. 221. 38 Interview with Tom Lani (MRP) on 5 March 2008 in Jayapura.

21

changed when some priests came from outside Papua and began preaching that

Islam would not be allowed to grow in Wamena. The impact was that the Church

and local customary communities began to problematize the establishment of

mosques, smaller Islamic prayer houses, and Islamic schools.39

In 2005, a protest against the construction of STIA (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu

Administrasi, Higher School of Administration Sciences) was held by the Synod

of the GKIT of Wamena. They said that Islam was not permitted to become

important in Papua, as most of the Papuan population was Christians.40 However,

Tom Lani, as a Muslim leader, businessman and a clan leader, stated that he was a

native Papuan, and as consequence he possessed customary land inherited from

his ancestors. He claimed that any building built on the land was exclusively in his

clan’s authority, any other clan or person had no right to interfere. At the time of

field research, the construction of this school was still underway.

Tom Lani said that, if Papua becomes independent, the Wamena

Christians would want all Muslims to return to Indonesia. He argued, however,

that Walesi Muslims were native Papuans who had customary lands and rights,

and that they would never agree to leave Papua.41 Wamena Muslims preferred

special autonomy over independence, and they maintained this autonomy because

Papuan Muslims were still dependent on migrant Muslims, particularly those from

Java.42 If he were not Muslim, he would choose to support Papuan independence.

He considered Papuan Muslims to not have sufficient understanding of Islam, and

that there was not yet any local people capable of becoming Islamic preachers; as

such, they agree to maintain Papua’s special autonomy. Two Walesi Muslims

have served as high officials in Jakarta: Haji Said Asso who works in the

Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara (Menpan, Ministry of State

Aparatuses Empowerment) and Ibrahim Uban, who works now in a Kejaksaan

Negeri (Local General Prosecutors Office) in Jakarta.

39 In 2001, in Timuma, Air Garam, Wamena, a smaller mosque was burnt down by Christians who had been provoked by two immigrant provocators who worked in the Office of Religious Affairs of the Regency. The mosque at Air Garam has been rebuilt by local Muslims (Ibid.). 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.

22

Tom Lani disagreed with the statement by Priest Beny Giay that Islam came

into Lembah Baliem in 1978 through militarization: “As far as I can tell, Islam came into Wamena in 1960s, before the Pepera (referendum). In the preparation for the referendum, several clan leaders i.e. Olokoma Asso, Opnai matuan, Musuar Yelipele, Mokarowalo Buka and leaders of Silo, Luka, Logo, Kuralu clans were invited to have a meeting with President Soekarno in the Istana Negara.43 Led by the President, they pronounced the Islamic credo, after which they pledged to raise the Indonesian flag from Sabang to Merauke and yell ‘merdeka’. Those clan leaders wore songkok (simple dark caps for men), commonly worn by Javanese Muslims. After saying the credo and pledge, Mokarowalo Buka asked the President to send several Javanese to live in Wamena, as it was a time of war, and they hoped that the Javanese would protect them from other clans. President Soekarno sent some 25 families to Wamena, and placed them on customary land in Sinata. From then on, the area was named Megapura. They were welcomed warmly by clan leaders, and built the first mosque in the area. After the referendum, the people of Megapura, in cooperation with Muslim clans, built a mosque at the military district headquarter in Jayawijaya” (interview with Tom Lani 11 March 2008).

If Tom Lani’s statement is true, than Priest Beny Giay’s statement that

Islam is identical to the military operation is not fully correct. Inter-clan wars in

the Pegunungan Tengah area of Wamena date back hundreds of years, including

in 1978. Lani’s clan (Muslims) were in a war against clans from Wamena Barat

(Christians), as to Lani clan supported the NKRI, and their opponents wanted the

independence of Papua. Lani stated that religious and political sentiments against

Islam continues to bear traces of the inter-clan wars of Wamena Barat.44

SYMBOLIC STRUGGLE IN THE FIELDS OF POLITICS AND RELIGION

Based on above discussion, the religious habitus of each social actor can

be identified within their historical contexts. Bourdieu (1990) shows that habitus

are inclinations that encourage a social actor to act and react; creates perception,

behavior, and practices which are regular and with the rules which are not

questionable. Political and religious practices of social actors are in a dialectical

relationship between habitus and objective social structures, i.e. the political and

religious fields. For example, the construction of the STAIN Al-Fatah by YAPSI

is a politico-religious practice, produced by immigrant Muslims who are driven by

43 The statement has not yet been verified, for the literature indicates that there were only five Irian community figures who had a meeting with President Soekarno in the Istana Merdeka on 1 May 1963: A.B. Kurubay, J. Dimara, Lucas Rumkoren, A. Mallo and Herman Wayoi (The State Secretariat of Republic of Indonesia, 1975: 431). The five expressed their loyalty of Irian leadership to Republic of Indonesia (Ibid.). 44 He contended that protests of Pegunungan Tengah churches were insignificant, for it was their right to hold protests. However, Tom Lani indicated that if violence occurred, as a Muslim he had a right to take revenge (interview with Tom Lani [MRP], op. cit.).

23

their religious habitus for developing Islamic preaching, as well as Muslims

influenced by the political and religious fields that placed them at a subordinate

position. While negotiations held by the MMP regarding the STAIN construction

are determined by a dialectical relationship between their habitus (which is

flexible, moderate and tolerant) and the fields of politics and religion, those fields

put the MMP at a marginalized stance. In the situation in which the refusal

occurred, migrant Muslims gave the problem to their Papuan fellows, represented

by Thaha M. Alhamid. On another hand, the refusal of the STAIN construction by

Papuan Christians cannot be separated from the closed relations between religious

groups in the political and religious fields in which Papuan Christians are

dominant. A description of religious practices and the habitus of social actors in

the political and religious fields in Papua can be seen in the table below.

Table 2. Religious habitus of Social actors in the Political and Religious Fields

Social actors Political and religious practices Habitus Meaning Historical contexts

Migrant Muslims

-The plan for the construction of the Manokwari great mosque - Establishment of STAIN Al-Fatah - Establishment of the STIA Yapis in Wamena

- Exclusive - Majority mentality - Symbolic - Loving Islamic preaching

- An effort for affirming Islam-ness as superior to cultural traditions in everyday life

- Originating from and growing outside Papua, in places where Islam is the majority religion

Papuan Muslims - Communication with Customary Council of Manokwari - Dialogue with the Governor in the matter of the STAIN - Efforts to respond to the refusal against the mosque

- Moderate and open (family religion) - Flexible and dynamic - Preferring dialogue

- Prioritizing culture over religion, and interpreting religion as muamallah (a matter of good actions)

- Raised in a customary Papuan community, where the principle of family religion is observed.

Papua Christians - Refusal of the Great Mosque’s presence, regional legislation bill on Bible cities. -Refusal against theSTAIN. - Refusal against mosques

-Moderate and tolerant (family religion) -dialogue is given a priority -exclusive* -symbolic*

-As a deed in giving priority to customary tradition than to religion. -As a reaction towards Papuan people experience in the

- Raised in a customary Papuan community - Reaction to refusal of church buildings outside Papua - The

24

development in Jayawijaya

era of the New Order

development of religious radicalization

Sources: Cahyo Pamungkas, 2008, Opcit, p. 159, * = occurring in the post New Order era.

The capital used in the political and religious fields is symbolic capital, i.e.

recognition of native Papuans who have certain traditions. In the case of refusal

protests against the Great Mosque of Manokwari, Papuan Christians indicated that

Manokwari was a Bible city, for Christianity had been recognized as part of their

native traditions. Christianity first entered the island through Pulau Mansinam in

Manokwari, and thus in Papua Manokwari is considered a sacred city of

Christianity. Ottouw and Geissler’s arrival to the island is commemorated yearly

on 5 February as the day of the spread of Christianity, the commemoration of

which is always centered in Manokwari; Papuans come from throughout the

island to attend. The phenomenon is understood by Papuan Christians because

Christianity has been recognized as part of the customs and cultures of the people

of Manokwari; as such, they believe Christianity must be protected.

What has to be investigated further are the interests laying behind the

refusal of the great mosque. It is conceivable that the act was aimed at protecting

the customs and cultures of native Papuans, including Christianity. However, it

seems that the act was a manifestation of a desire to maintain the church’s power

domination, which had been established for so long; the act could also have been

caused by a political interest in Papuanizating other cultural symbols. The same

supposition may be applicable to the volition of building a mosque: investigation

may show that the planning of the great mosque’s construction was prompted by

certain political interests, i.e. political compensation to Muslims voters in the

2006 gubernatorial election of West Papua.45

In the field of religion, migrant Muslims have not enough capacity to act

in the arena as they are not provided with a certain symbolic power. Papuan

Muslims had communication with Papuan Christians through the chairman of

Dewan Adat Manokwari, which indicated that the mosque’s construction was not

meant to foster Islamization, but to observe certain government rules. This

45 In other words, the establishment of the great mosque constitutes a symbol or mask for covering other interests of the politicians behind its construction, for instance, in the provincial governor election of Papua Barat in 2005.

25

mosque has yet to be established, as both Muslim and Christian Papuans prefer to

maintain their peaceful condition.

A similar struggle has occurred over the STAIN campus. The symbolic

power utilized there was the customary system. The mask, or euphemist form,

used against the land release for the STAIN campus was the argument that the

land release from Kaigere clan to the STAIN violated certain rules and lacked

permission from the Ondoafi Besar Hedam. Customary land issues were used as a

”mask” by the Church and the Ondoafi Bear to refuse the new STAIN campus.

However, further examination indicates that, as in the statement of the Dewan

Adat Papua, there had yet to be a ruling on a customary land release applicable to

all clans in Papua. The consequence is that each clan observes their respective

customary laws or adapts their laws to national and regional ones. Considered

through a positive legal perspective, the sale process of the land from Kaigere clan

to the STAIN was in line with the regional legislation of the Jayapura city, with

the municipal government acting as a facilitator. We may see that, behind the

problem of customary land, there is possibly an interest of conserving the

Church’s domination over the rapidly growing Muslim population.

For balancing their position, the STAIN party were represented by a native

Papuan, Thaha M. Alhamid, who made use of a similar “mask”: the customary

system and culture. Alhamid told the governor that the establishment of the

mosque was aimed at developing the human resources of Papuans so that they

were capable of maintaining Papua as the land of peace. The notion of “human

resources of Papuans” is a cultural symbol, comparable to the “customary land” in

the former case. When Alhamid spoke on STAIN empowering Papuans, we may

see that the interest behind the scene is to make STAIN an institution to enforce

the presence of Muslims in Papua, so that Islam may become the rahmatan

lil’alamin. In the case of STAIN, Papuan Muslims attempted this by increasing

their symbolic capital, while Papuan Christians experienced a deflation of their

symbolic capital.

The case of churches’ resistance to the development of mosques in

Jayawijaya indicates the same pattern. The symbolic capital excercized there by

Papuan Christians was the fact that Christianity came earlier than Islam, and had

26

thus become a more “native” religion for Papuans. For Papuan Christians, Islam

was considered a religion brought by migrants from outside Papua. Confronted

with this, the Muslims of Jayawijaya who were organized in the FKMJ argued

that Islam was also part of the customary system of native Papuans, and that

Jayawijaya Muslims had their right to build their own mosques and schools on

their customary land. In this case, the Muslims of Jayawijaya used their symbolic

capital as native Papuans, so that their mosques and schools could remain existent.

A dissimilar case was experienced by migrant Muslims in Air Garam, Wamena,

where their mosque was burned down by local residents.

The struggle in the political and religious fields was also conducted by

construction of discourse by social actors. These discourses were representations

of their respective identities. Papuan Christians, who were dominant in the

political and religious fields, contended that Christianity was the religion and

culture of native Papuans of the Melanesian race, whereas Islam was the religion

of Indonesian (migrants) of the Malay race. Migrant Muslims created a discourse

indicating that their presence was necessary, that they would stimulate the Papuan

economy. In this field, the dominant discourse, the one deemed legitimate, was

that Christianity was the religion and cultural identity of native Papuans.

Discourse indicating that Islam was also the religion of Papuans was a

counter-discourse, as Islam was regarded as the religion of migrants and identified

with Malay Indonesian culture. The dominant identity in the fields of politics and

religion in Papuan was the Christian Papuan identity. The dominant identity was

constructed via discourses that Christianity is the religion of Papuan, and such

discourse determined the religious habitus of Christian Papuans. The identity was

then objectivated through representations in practices of everyday life, such as

their manner of appreciating and perceiving Christianity and other religions.

CONCLUSION

When Bourdieu described the symbolic power practiced by the Kabila community

in Algeria (1977), he said that the “benevolence” of the clan leader towards his

community members was essentially a “mask”, for it hid a volition for being

obeyed. Symbolic power is a power form with a violent nature and oppressiveness

which is hardly recognizable, but is easy to discover from its goal: to get some

27

recognition. Group identity may become symbolic power if the identity is a form

of euphemism, used for legitimizing an issue in a certain field. The customary

land and human resources of Papuans may become an euphemism or mask for

covering certain interests.

In their struggle for gaining identity recognition, Muslim Papuans

contested against Christian Papuans in the field of politics and religion. Both

Muslim and Christian Papuans initially had similar religious habiti, i.e. being

moderate and tolerant. However, after the New Order ended, their habitus

transformed; moderate Christians became more radical. Furthermore, they made

use of symbolic capital, i.e. their customary systems and their position as native

Papuans. Considered in the matter of their capital possession, Muslim Papuans

were subordinate, while Christian Papuans were dominant. Nevertheless, in the

case of the STAIN refusal protest in 2007, Christian Papuans faced a deflation of

their capital. Papuan Muslims had an inflation of their capital by confronting the

issue of customary land with the matter of empowering native Papuans.

In political and religious fields, migrant Muslims have difficulty playing

any roles, as they are not native Papuans. Nonetheless, migrant Christians (as

represented by the Asosiasi Pendeta Indonesia) can play their roles more freely

because they have the same religion as Papuan Christians. The identity

contestation between religious people began with the confrontation between

migrant Muslims and migrant Christians. Nevertheless, the conflict did not

develop into a violent conflict between Muslims and Christian Papuans, who

succeeded in resolving it through dialogue and communication.

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