The relevance of pain, emotion, and cognition for moral status

Dieter Birnbacher

In the human sphere, moral status is primarily connected with

the possession of

• dignity

• moral rights

and, derivatively, with the possession of

• fundamental human rights

• legal standing

1. Moral status 

In the animal sphere, moral status is connected with

• intrinsic value

• intrinsic moral considerability

• direct human obligations

1. Moral status 

In the human sphere, there seems to be a conceptual

connection between moral status and moral rights.

 

In the animal sphere, it is conceptually possible to ascribe

moral status to animals without ascribing them moral

rights or dignity.

1. Moral status 

Positions in animal ethics that do not differentiate the

moral status of non-human animals seem to be dead

options.

1. Animals possess only extrinsic moral value (Thomas Aquinas/Kant)

 

This position suffers from implausibility. There is plenty of

evidence that at least the principle of non-harming applies

to some animals in the same way as to humans.

2. Are all animals equal?

 

2. All animals have equal moral status (L. Nelson/A. Schweitzer/P. Taylor)

 

This position suffers no less from implausibility. It fails to

make a difference between apes and amoebas.

2. Are all animals equal?

 

Leonard Nelson's argument for animal dignity reconstructed

1. All beings with interest have dignity.

2. Among non-human beings, only animals have interests.

3. All animals have interests.*

4. All animals have dignity.

2. Are all animals equal?

 

A modern version of Nelson's argument

1. All beings with interest have a claim to be morally considered.

2. Among non-human beings, only animals have interests.

3. All animals have interests.*

4. All animals have a claim to be morally considered.

2. Are all animals equal?

 

3. All animals that are subjects-of-a-life have moral right to respectful treatment (T. Regan)

Regan's position suffers from the unclarity of the notion of

"being the subject of a life”. It also suffers from the lack of

differentiation, e. g. between apes and monkeys.

2. Are all animals equal?

 

Regan's argument for animal rights reconstructed

1.All animals that are subjects-of-a-life possess inherent worth.

2.All animals possessing inherent worth have a moral right to respectful treatment.

3.Respectful treatment is incompatible with using animals as a means to human purposes, including husbandry and slaughter.

2. Are all animals equal?

 

The necessity of differentiating the moral status of non-human animals is widely recognized in animal ethics as well as in common sense morality.

It is characteristic of a postmetaphysical ethics that is no longer guided by metaphysical speculation (such as about the possession of a soul) but by empirical evidence, both by ethology and neuroscience.

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

1. Sentience/ability to suffer

Schopenhauer's evening prayer: "Mögen alle lebenden

Wesen von Schmerzen frei bleiben“

Ability to suffer seems a good criterion to start with. The

question is whether it is the only criterion.

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

2. Interests

A problem with interest as a criterion: the vagueness and ambiguity of the concept

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

Two ambiguities:

1. Something can be in an animal's interest without the animal having an interest in the thing.

2. That an animal has an interest in a thing means that it values the thing. But the valuation can either imply a thought of the thing (interest in the strong sense), or not (interest in the weak sense).

Cf. L. Nelson: "Valuation need not have the form of a judgement"

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

3. Self-Awareness

This concept is, again, highly ambiguous. Self-awareness can be

present on different degrees:

• the capacity to distinguish between oneself and others

• the capacity to assign parts of one's body and/or bodily states to oneself

• the capacity to assign conscious states and inner acts to oneself

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

Should self-awareness serve as a moral criterion in its own

right?

Two polar positions:

1. Self-awareness as a morally differentiating factor in its own right (P. Singer)

2. Self-awareness as a reinforcing factor (Schopenhauer)

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

A personal view: Hedonism seems to imply the second

position, if only conditionally.

Self-Awareness might be an aggravating factor in the

suffering produced by

• deprivation of living space/confinement

• social deprivation, loss of significant others

• killing

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

This does not imply that making animals without the

capacity of self-awareness suffer is morally unproblematic.

Reports from veterinary practice suggest that the lack of

understanding and anticipation of future events tend to

aggravate rather than weaken the symptoms of pain and

simple negative emotions like fear.

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

For most emotions animals are capable of there are simple forms that do not presuppose intelligence, a concept of past and future, or self-awareness.

Schopenhauer, for one, was wrong in postulating a correlation

between ability to suffer and intelligence.

3. Differentiating the moral status of non-human animals

 

1. The differences in the ability of non-human animals to

suffer are normatively significant and should be reflected in

animal protection legislation.

 

This is in general the case. For example, the German

animal protection law differentiates in the legal status of

non-human animals in two ways:

• differentiation between vertebrates and invertebrates

• differentiation between molluscs whose perceptual physiology is similar to that of vertebrates (such as octopus) and others

4. Some consequences

 

2. The differences in the cognitive abilities of apes and monkeys are normatively significant and should be reflected in animal protection legislation.

There is evidence that the great apes have a highly developedsense of the future

and are able to pursue preparatory behaviour for spatially andtemporally remote ends.

The presence of self-awareness in the full sense is suggested by the fact that chimpanzees and orang-utans trained in the use if American Sign Language have learnt to use signs to point to themselves.

4. Some consequences

 

This distinction is not reflected in German animal protection

law. Much more weight is given to the differentiation between

legal obligations in respect of animals living in close

cohabitation with humans and in respect of others.

The distinction is, however, reflected in the practice of animal

experimentation as well as in the EU directive on animal

experimentation to which national legislation has to be made to

conform within two years.

4. Some consequences

 

Guiding principle 17 of the directive:

"The use of great apes, as the closest species to human beings

with the most advanced social and behavioural skills, should

only be allowed in research aimed at the preservation of those

species and where action in relation to a life-threatening,

debilitating condition endangering human beings is warranted,

and no other species or alternative method could suffice for the

aims of the procedure."

 

4. Some consequences

 

The EU directive on animal research raises the question whether

moral status can depend, in addition to intrinsic criteria, on

extrinsic criteria such as public perception and public concern.

5. Extrinsic criteria for moral status?

 

 Guiding principle 16 of the directive:

“With current scientific knowledge the use of non-human

primates in scientific procedures is still necessary in biomedical

research. Due to their genetic proximity to human beings and to

their highly developed social skills, the use of non-human

primates in scientific procedures raises specific ethical and

practical problems in terms of meeting their behavioural,

environmental and social needs in a laboratory environment.

5. Extrinsic criteria for moral status?

 

Furthermore, the use of non-human primates is of the highest

concern to the public. Therefore the use of non-human primates

should only be allowed in those essential biomedical areas for

the benefit of human beings for which no other replacement

alternative methods are yet available and only in cases where

the procedures are carried out in relation to clinical conditions

having a substantial impact on patients’ day-today functioning

as being either life-threatening or debilitating, or for the

preservation of the respective non-human primate species.”

5. Extrinsic criteria for moral status?

 

Pragmatic advantages of extrinsic criteria:

• Measurability of public attitudes towards different animals species

• Less uncertainty about effectiveness of animal protection

5. Extrinsic criteria for moral status?

 

Disadvantages of extrinsic criteria:

• Lack of objectivity

• Cultural relativity of attitudes

5. Extrinsic criteria for moral status?

 

An alternative approach to extrinsic criteria: relational criteria

Moral status depends on the degree of genealogical proximity to

humans (e. g. Kattmann 1997)

Problematic consequences:

• Whales and dolphins would be less worthy of protection than monkeys.

• Birds would be less worthy of protection than reptiles.

5. Extrinsic criteria for moral status?