The Quito, Ecuador, earthquake risk management...

COVER: "LA VISTA DE LA CIUDAD DE QUITO" BY ANTONIO LUCIO-PAREDES

Escuela Politécnica Nacional; GeoHazards International; Ilustre Municipio de Quito; ORSTOM,Quito; and OYO Corporation, The Quito, Ecuador, Earthquake Risk Management Project: AnOveroiew. (San Francisco: GeoHazards International, 1994.)

Photo credits: Archivo Fotogrâfico deI Banco Central deI Ecuador, J. Fernandez, G. Hoefer,L. Johnson, G. Trumbull, B. Tucker, and H. Yepes.

Copyright 1994 by GeoHazards International

GeoHazards International

123 Townsend Street, Suite 655San Francisco, California 94107-1924Telephone: (415) 543-9030Facsimile: (415) 543-9032

The Quito Earthquake Risk Management Project

The Quito, EcuadorEarthquake RiskManagement Project

An Overview

Prepared by

Escuela Politécnica NacionalGeoHazards InternationallIustre Municipio de QUito

ORSTOM, QuitoOYO Corporation

May 1994


Dedicated to the Memory ofDr. Kunio 5uyama

Cofounder and Past President of OYO Corporation

No longer can man afford the luxury ofconsidering only thegood ofthe community in which hehappens to live. No one country has a monopoly on thewisdom that is required to build communities in whichhuman life can thrive andprosper. We mustharness theresources of al! peoples to face our mutual problemstogether.

- K. Suyama, 1981

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Table of Contents

Foreword iv

Project Participants v

Introduction 1

Future Earthquakes and Their Effects on Quito 3Determining the Earthquake Threat 3Assessing Earthquake Damage 5

A Month in Quito Following a Future Earthquake 9The Earthquake Strikes 11One Hour Later 13The First Day 14Two Days Later 15One Week Later 16One Month Later 17

Managing Quito's Earthquake Risk 20

Conclusions 24

AppendicesA. Organization, Chronology, and Accomplishments 25B. Priority Earthquake Risk Management Projects 29C. Acronyms and Translations 33

Hi


Foreword1 June of 1991, Dr. Kunio Suyama, President of OYO Corporation, and Dr. BrianTucker agreed to a two-and-a-half-year partnership to explore prospects for creating anonprofit organization dedicated to reducing urban earthquake risk in developingcountries. In February of 1992, Tucker metwith Dr. Jean-Luc Chatelain of ORSTOM todiscuss a suitable city in which to conduct apilot project for this organization. Chatelainrecommended Quito, Ecuador, for severalreasons.

Most important, Quito has a significantearthquake risk, experiencing over the past250 years several earthquakes with groundshaking intensities so strong that standingbecomes difficult. AlI of these events occurred when Quito was significantly lesspopulated and developed than it is today.

Quito was also recommended becauseof the reputation of its earth scientists andcivil engineers at the Escuela PolitécnicaNacional, and the related research thatORSTOM had been conducting in Ecuadorfor several years. In May of 1992, Chatelainand Tucker went to Quito to discuss the ideaof a collaborative project with ProfessorHugo Yepes, chief seismologist at theInstituto Geofisico of the Escuela PolitécnicaNacional. Yepes agreed with the need forsuch a project in Quito and introducedTucker to government and business leadersto gather community support. In July of1992, Tucker met the city's mayor, JamilMahuad Witt, who lent his support. InSeptember of 1992, the mayor convened agroup of Ecuadorian and international government, business, and scientific leaders toprovide project oversight, and work began.CA summary of the organization, chronology, and accomplishments of the project isin the Appendices).

Major financial and technical supportfor this project was provided by OYO Cor-

iv

poration, the Escuela Politécnica Nacional,the Municipio de Quito, and ORSTOM.Supplementary funding was provided byCompaiieros de las Américas and the NaturaI Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada.

The Ecuadorian and international advisors and consultants listed at the beginning of this report generously contributedtheir time and energy. Their expertise distinguishes this project. The encouragement ofthe following organizations is also appreciated: the International Association of Earthquake Engineering and its World SeismicSafety Initiative; the International Association of Seismology and Physics of the Earth'sInterior and its committee on the InternationalDecade for Natural Disaster Reduction(lDNDR); the International Society of SoilMechanics and Foundation Engineering; theOffice of the United Nations Disaster ReliefCoordinator; the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization; andthe Secretariat ofthe United Nations IDNDR.

This project was a cooperative ventureinvolving more than a hundred participantsfrom many countries and areas of expertise,who came together to make the evaluationsand recommendations presented here. Thereis one individual, however, whose generosity and vision made this cooperation possible. When initially approached for financialsupport, he asked insightful questions aboutthe project's purpose, methods, and participants, and in so doing, improved its design.Only after concluding that the project's goalwas worthwhile and the method practicaldid he ask about cost. The estimate provided seemed to him unrealistic, so heincreased it. Then, nine months after beinginitially approached, he agreed to providesupport, stepped back, and let the work begin.

He died before the project was complete. This report is dedicated to him, Dr.Kunio Suyama.


Project ParticipantsSteering Committee

J. Fernandez, J. Valverde, H. YepesB. Tucker, CoordinatorG. BustamanteJ.-L. ChatelainF. Kaneko, C. Villacis, T. Yamada

Escuela Politécnica Nacional, EcuadorGeoHazards International, USAIlustre Municipio de Quito, EcuadorORSTOM, Quito, EcuadorOYO Corporation, ]apan

J. Tupiza2

F. Vaca l

R. Vallej02J. Valverde1

J. Vega2

C. Villacis4

J. Vintimilla1

T. Yamada4

Working GroupH. Yepes!, Local Coordinator, F. Kanek04, Technical Coordinator

A. Alvarado 1 J. Egredl V. H. Pérezl

R. Arellano l A. Eguez l P. Placencia l

G. Barahona l J. Espinoza l G. Plaza l

F. Bonillal J. Fernandezl F. Ponce1

T. Brav02 P. Gachet l M. Silva l

G. Bustamante2 C. Hibsch5 M. Souris3

J.-L. Chatelain3 G. Hoefer> F. Torres7

S. Diaz l B. Lortic3 G. Trumbu1l6

E. Dupérier3 E. Marquez l B. Tucker>

IEscuela Politécnica Nacional; 2Ilustre Municipio de Quito; 30RSTOM; 40YO Corporation;5Institut Français d'Etudes Andines; 6GeoHazards International; 7Universidad Cat6lica de Quito.

Technical Advisory CommitteeG. Mader, Spangle Associates, Chairman

B. BoIt, University of California, BerkeleyW. D. Liam Finn, University of British ColumbiaF. Krimgold, VPI, Washington, DCJ. Kuroiwa, National University of Engineering, LimaM. Ordaz, CENAPRED, Mexico City

M. Reichle, CDMG, SacramentoC. Rojahn, ATC, San FranciscoC. Ventura, University of British ColumbiaL. Warnîck, Intergraph, Huntsville

Social and Economie Advisory CommitteeJ. Mahuad Witt, Mayor of Quito, Chairman

C. Abel, ANACSE, Quito F. Merino, SEIE, Quito, Vice-chairmanH. Aldetfer, Compafteros de las Américas, Quito A. Munkhammar, Skandia Group, StockholmJ. V. Cedeiio, Ministerio de Salud Pûblica, Quito R. Paredes, CONADE, QuitoJ. Chac6n, Camara de la Construccion, Quito D. Pugh, IFC, Washington, DCE. Chiriboga, Asociadon de Bancos Privados, Quito P. Ramon, INECEL, Quitoo. Davidson, US AlD, Washington, DC A. Razo, OLADE, QuitoL. Larrea, ACOSE, Quito W. Savage, Pacific Gas & Eleetric, San FranciscoA. Le Saux, Metropolis, Paris T. Tsugawa, Kajima Corporation, TokyoG. Martinez, PetroEcuador, Quito E. Vasconez, Defensa Civil, QuitoS. Mattingly, City of Los Angeles D. Zupka, UNDRO

Acronyms and English translations of organization names can be found in the Appendices.

v


Earthquake Risk Management Workshop Participants

T. Abdo, Ilustre Municipio de QuitoC. Abel, ANACSER. Aguirre, Empresa Eléctrica QuitoM. Baez, Fundaciôn RescateT. Bravo, Ilustre Municipio de QuitoJ. V. Cedefio, Ministerio de Salud Publica1. Romero Cevallos, ANACSEJ.-1. Chatelain, ORSTOMS. de Citarella, Banco PopularA. Ortiz Crespo, Ilustre Municipio de QuitoO. Davidson, US AlDM. Delgado, Câmara de la ConstrucciônJ. Fernândez, Escuela Politécnica NacionalM. A. Fernândez, US AIDJ. Gômez, Direcciôn Nacional de TrânsitoB. Haro, Câmara de Industriales de PichinchaG. Hoefer, GeoHazards InternationalD. Hollister, Asian Disaster Preparedness CenterC. V. Jara, Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros1. Johnson, Spangle Associates, ColeaderE. Juârez, Banco del PacificoJ. Jurado, EMETELT. Konno, Kajima CorporationE. Lara, EMETELR. Lee, Great Western BankP. Llerena, Banco del PacîficoB. Lortic, ORSTOMS. Mattingly, City of Los AngelesF. Merino, SEŒJ. G. MolinenJs, NexosegurosR. Moncayo, Câmara de la Construcciôn

À. Munkhammar, Skandia Groupy. Naito, Kajima CorporationM. Narvâez, Direcciôn Nacional de TrânsitoM. Navarro, Superintendencia de Bancos y SegurosR. Nigbor, Agbabian Associates, Inc.H. Nunez, Ilustre Municipio de QuitoD. Pâez, SEIED. Pugh, IFCP. Ramôn, INECELJ. Rodriguez, Defensa CivilC. Rojahn, ATCP. Român, Unidad de Transporte1. Salgado, EMAPW. Savage, Pacific Gas & ElectricW. Schlecht, City of Pasadena, CaliforniaJ. Sevilla, INECELJ. Solano, EMETEL1. T. Tobin, California Seismic Safety CommissionJ. Toral, Câmara de la ConstrucciônT. Tsugawa, Kajima CorporationB. Tucker, GeoHazards International, ColeaderF. Vaca, Escuela Politécnica NacionalR. Vallejo, Ilustre Municipio de QuitoJ. Valverde, Escuela Politécnica NacionalN. Vâsquez, Defensa CivilJ. Vega, I1ustre Municipio de QuitoC. Villacîs, OYO CorporationF. Villôn, Cuerpo de Bomberos de QuitoO. Woolfson, Fondo de Salvamento, llustre Municipio de QuitoT. Yamada, OYO CorporationH. Yepes, Escuela Politécnica Nacional

Other Contrlbutors

N. H. Agnew, Getty Conservation Institute; F. Aguinaga, Escuela Politécnica Nacional;P. Armstrong, International Conference of Building OfficiaIs; H. Bonifaz, Escuela PolitécnicaNacional; J. Brune, University of Nevada; G. Chiriboga, CODIGEM; M. A. Custode, IlustreMunicipio de Quito; P. Ellis, EQE International; W. Faulk, Getty Museum; C. Hwang,GeoHazards International; W. D. Iwan, California Institute of Technology; E. Kissil, FirstInterstate Bank; S. Low, US AID; C. M. Lucio-Paredes; O. Madrid, Escuela Politécnica Nacional;R. Maruri, Escuela Politécnica Nacional; S. Masaki-Schatz, Atlantic Richfield Corporation;S. Ohya, OYO Corporation; J. O'Kane, Independent Insurance Brokers of California;R. Prevot, ORSTOM; J. F. Ribadeneira, Escuela Politécnica NacionaI; A. Ross, Bank ofAmerica;R. Roth, California Department of Insurance; J. Savy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; H. Shah, Stanford University; J. Smallwood-Garcia, EQE International; V. Tupiza, IlustreMunicipio de Quito; M. B. Tyler, Spangle Associates; and S. Wyss, GeoHazards International.

vi

Introduction

QUito, Ecuador's capital city, was lastdamaged by an earthquake on March 6,1987. While that earthquake resulted inapproximately 1,000 deaths and $700 million of property loss outside Quito, damageand injuries within the city were minor. Thisis the strongest earthquake that currentresidems of Quito have experienced.

In the previous 250 years, however,Quito has been shaken by many strongerearthquakes, including four that producedground shaking so strong that it was difficultfor residents to stand. These four earthquakes occurred in 1755, 1797, 1859, and1868, when Quito was significamly smallerin population and Iess developed than today. In 1868, Quito was home to only 45,000people, and its population was confined toapproximately 4 square km. Since then,Quito has grown more than 25 times inpopulation (to 1.2 million residents), androughly 70 times in area (Figures 1 and 2).

3.5.----------------.--..- ,(1)3.0C ,

C.- 2.5,--.- 1797 1868 ,

E- 20 1 ,C 1755 1859 ,C 1.5 ,:;:;.! 1.0::::1r:::l.C 0.5Do.

0.0 -I-...-I~...........~~~_+__+__+__l1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050

YearFigure 1. Population growth and majorhistoricalearthquakes in Quito.


Quito's Plaza de Santo Domingo, c. 1930.

Efforts to accommodate this growthhave resulted in a proliferation of poorlyconstructed buildings and the developmentof hazardous areas. Earthquake-resistantdesign and construction are uncommon, asQuito's building code is not strictly enforcedand is otherwise inadequate. Structureshave been built on unstable sites, such asquebradas (ravines) fil1ed with loose soil.Steep hiUsides, previously uninhabited, arenow heavily populated (see map insert).

Because of these recent, dramaticchanges, past disasters cannot be used toassess the impact of the next destructiveearthquake on modern Quito. A large earthquake today will affect not only a muchlarger urban population, but also completelydifferent types of urban construction, suchas mid- and high-rise buildings.

1

The Quito Earrhquake Risk Management Project

The purpose of the Quito Earthquakellisk Management Project was to providedirection to government officials, businessleaders, and the general public in reducingdamage and injury in the next major earthquake. To do this, three objectives wereadopted:• Improve the understanding of Quito's

earthquake hazard;• Raise the awareness of the earthquake

risk both within Ecuador and internationally; and

• Design self-sustaining programs for managing earthquake risk.

To achieve these objectives, the projectwas divided into three phases. In the firstphase, future earthquakes and their effectson Quito were analyzed. In the second, theimpact on lite in Quito during the monthfollowing one of these earthquakes wasdescribed in vivid, nontechnical terms. Finally, based on the first two phases of theproject, recommendations for managingQuito's earthquake risk were formulated bya group of Ecuadorian and internationalspecialists. This report provides an overview of these three phases.

N

t

Existing urbanblocks1990

1987

1983

1971

1956

o 1946

1921

1888

1760o 1 2 3 4 5(km)

, , !

Figure 2. Historicalgrowth ofQuito.

A view ofmodern Quito, looking northwest to thejlanks ofMountPichincha.

2


Future Earthquakes andTheir Effects on Quito

Figure 3. Location ofthe potential coastal (A), inland(B), and local (C) earthquakes with respect to Quito.

TUlCAN ~

PASTO

•

C B

• LATACUNGA

• AMBATO

•QUITO

ECUADOR

PAC FICOCEAN

The intensity of ground shaking duringan earthquake depends on local groundconditions. For example, when aIl otherfactors are equal, soft soils shake more thando stiff soils. In order to account for sucheffects, Quito was divided into zones basedon local ground conditions. The groundshaking intensity of each zone was calculated

Determlning the Earthquake ThreatThe amount of shaking, or "ground

shaking intensity," that Quito will experience during an earthquake depends primarily on three factors: the strength of theearthquake (magnitude), its distance fromQuito, and Quito's ground conditions.

Geologists and seismologists attemptedto determine the magnitude and location ofearthquakes that would likely damage Quitoin the future. They analyzed Ecuador's faultsand earthquake records dating back to the16th century. Three earthquakes, representing the range of possible magnitudes anddistances, were selected for detailed assessment (Figure 3):• A coastal (subduction zone) earthquake

of magnitude 8.4 located 200 km west ofQuito;

• An inland earthquake of magnitude 7.3located 80 km east of Quito; and

• A local earthquake of magnitude 6.5located 25 km north of Quito.

1 the first phase of this project, an international, interdisciplinary team of morethan 40 seismologists, geologists, soils engineers, structural engineers, and city planners from Ecuador, Canada, France, )apan,and the United States estimated the magnitudes and locations of future earthquakeslikely to affect Quito, the level of groundshaking that these earthquakes would create, and the damage to Quito's buildingsand infrastructure.

3


for each of the three potential earthquakes(Figures 4, 5, and 6).

The effect of magnitude, location, andlocal ground conditions on ground shakingintensity is apparent in these figures. Although the magnitude 8.4 coastal earthquake wou Id release over 30 times moreenergy than the magnitude 7.3 inland earthquake, it would produce Jess ground shak-

ing in Quito as it is 120 km farther away.Although the local earthquake has the smallest magnitude, it would create the strongestground shaking in Quito as it occurs soclose (25 km from downtown). Its proximityto northern Quito and the characteristics ofsoft northern soils may result in severe,"MSK intensity 8-" shaking in the north. TheMSK scaJe is one of several ground shaking

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Severity of shaking

MSK 8- (Severe)

MSK 7+

OMSK 7- (Strong)

MSK6+

OMSK 6- (Moderate)

o 1 2 3 4 5(km), ! , , , ,

N

t

Severity of shaking

MSK 8- (Severe)

MSK 7+

OMSK 7- (Strong)

MSK6+

OMSK 6- (Moderate)

o 1 2 3 4 6(km)! , , !

Figure 4. Ground shaking intensities in Quitoresultingfrom the coastal earthquake. Black linesdelineate soil zones.

Figure 5. Ground shaking intensities in Quitoresultingfrom the inland earthquake.


Figure 6. Ground shaking intensities in Quitoresultingjrom the local earthquake.

intensity scales used by earth scientists andengineers to relate ground shaking to theeffects that it has on people, buildings, andnature. During MSK 8- ground shaking,many people have difficulty standing, andthe earthquake is dearly felt by peopledriving. In sorne cases, tree branches aresheared by the shaking, and heavy furnituremoves and sometimes overturns. Cracksform in walls and chimneys of concrete

Ssvsrity of shaking

Assessing Earthquake DamageOnce ground shaking intensity

for a particular potential earthquakehas been estimated, it is possible toestimate damage to buildings and infrastructure. To do so, it is necessaryto inventory the types of structures;analyze how each type of structureresponds to various levels of groundshaking; and finally, estimate damageto each type of structure based on theexpected ground shaking, earthquake-induced landslides, soil settlement, ground surface rupture, andliquefaction.

The behavior of structures duringearthquakes depends not only on theamount of ground shaking, but also onthe age, material, design, constructionquality, and dimensions of the structure. For example, the behavior of amuIti-story building made of concretereinforced with steel bars ("reinforcedconcrete") is very different than that ofa one-story building made of adobe.For this reason, it was necessary todetermine the prevalent categories ofbuildings in Quito. Buildings were

structures. In brick buildings, large cracksform in walls, and chimneys collapse. Partsof and, in sorne cases, entire adobe buildings collapse. Shaking would be slightly lessdowntown and even less in the south, butstill strong enough to produce moderatedamage in poorly constructed buildings.

Other earthquakes ofdifferent strengthsand locations could occur and would produce different patterns of ground shaking

than depicted here. For example, anearthquake occurring on one of thenearby fauIts to the south of Quitowould result in greater shaking in thesouth than in the north and, possibly,greater levels of shaking than any depicted here.

MSK 6- (Moderate)

o 1 2 3 4 5(km)

MSK 8- (Severe)

MSK 7+

o MSIC 7- (Strong)

MSK6+

o

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5

The Quito Earrhquake Risk Management Project

inventoried and c1assified into 15 typesaccording to materials and design. For simplicity, these buildings have been groupedinto five categories: adobe, masonry (virtually aH ofwhich, in Quito, are unreinforced),seLf-built (primarily homes constructed bythe owner without engineering considerations), steel, and reinforced concrete (Figure 7 and map insert).

Damage to these buildings, based onground shaking from each of the three

potential earthquakes, was estimated lIsingdata sets developed in California and calibrated with data from Central and SouthAmerica to apply to the buildings in Quito.Damage to infrastructure, including waterand power supply systems, sewers, androads in Quito, was also estimated usingsimilar methods.

The potential for damage due to effectsother than ground shaking was also evaluated. Damage from landslides, a major

N

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Categories ofbuildings

Adobe

Unrelnforced masonry

o Self-built

Steel

o Reinforced concrete

Open space

o 1 2 3 4 5(km)1

N

t

Damage rate

> 30%

10·29%

o 3·9%

o 0-2%

o No structure

o 1 2 3 4 &(km), t 1 1 1 1

Figure 7. Distribution ofbuilding categories in Quito(see also map insert).

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Figure 8. Building damage resultingfrom thepotentiallocal earthquake (see also map insert).


Figure 9. Damage to roadsresultingfrom thepotentiallocal earthquake.

Figure Il. Damage to thepower network resultingfromthepotentiallocal earthquake.

<1- 0

- 1·2

o 1 2 3 4 l5(kIn)

Humber of breaksper km of pipe

< 1

- 0

o 1 2 J 4 I(km)

Humber of breakspe. km of pipe

- 1·2

N

t

N

t

Figure 12. Damage to sewersresultingfrom thepotentiallocal earthquake.

Figure 10. Damage to the watersupply system resultingfromthepotentiallocal earthquake.

10·20

o 1 2: 3 4 I(ltm)

Damaged 'ength(m) pe. km of line

- >20

- <10

o 1 2 J 4 l5(km)

- <10

10-ao- >50

Dam-.led 'ength(m) pe. km of .oad

N

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N

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hazard both to structures on topof the landslide mass as well asthose below it, and from seulementof the soils in filled quebradas andover sewer pipes, over whichmany buildings have been constructed, was analyzed. (Details arepresented in The Quito, Ecuador,Earthquake Risk ManagementProject: A Compilation ofMeth0 ds,Data, and Findings.) Because ofthe distance of the three potentialearthquakes from the city, surfacerupture due to faulting will notoccur. "Soilliquefaction," a condition in which certain soils are temporarily changed from a soUd to aliquid state as a result of groundshaking, is, based on available information, not expected to occuras a result of these earthquakes.Additional study, however, isneeded.

Of the three potential earthquakes scrutinized here, the localearthquake would create the greatest damage. The damage rate tobuildings from this earthquake isillustrated in Figure 8 and the mapinsert. "Damage rate" is the ratio ofthe cost of earthquake damage tothe replacement cost of the building at current prices. Damage ratesare averaged through each zone.For example, the same damagerate may apply to a zone in whichaH buildings are uniformly damaged and to one in which sorne areslightly damaged and others completely destroyed.

The potentiallocal earthquakewouId cause extensive damage toneighborhoods in northern Quito,where ground shaking is greatestand where there are many vulnerable self-built buildings. Structuresbuilt on the hillsides surrounding

7


N

t

Damage rate

> 30%

10 - 29%

D 3-9%

1-2%

D No structure

o 1 2 3 4 5(km)" , ,

Figure 13. Building damage resulting from the March1987earthquake, based onfield observations. (Notethe much larger damage rate estimatedfor thepotentiallocal earthquake in Figure 8).

8

the city, many of which are also self-built,would experience significant damage asweil. High levels of damage would oceur inthe Centro Historico, the oldest part of thecity, primarily because of the preponderance of adobe and unreinforced masonrybuildings. Reinforced concrete buildingswould suifer less damage for the same levelof shaking.

Damage to the roads, water system,power network, and sewers resulting fromthe potential local earthquake willlikely besevere as weil (Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12).

A comparison of the damage from theMarch 1987 earthquake (Figure 13), whichhad a magnitude of 6.9 and occurred 80 kmeast of Quito, with damage forecast for thepotential local earthquake (Figure 8), indicates that the local earthquake would causesignificantly more damage. The performanceof buildings, infrastructure, and emergencyresponse agencies during the 1987 earthquake is not, therefore, a reliable indicatorof the consequences of Quito's future destructive earthquakes.

While the consequences of Quito'snext destructive earthquake cannot be forecast, they are likely to cause extensivedamage to utilities, especially roads, sewers,and water, power, and telephone systems;damage to sorne reinforced concrete structures, inc1uding sorne new buildings; extensive damage to self-built homes; and totalcollapse of many self-built, adobe, andunreinforced masonry buildings, and manycultural monuments. The next section describes the possible impacts on daily life inQuito during the month following such anearthquake.

The Quito Earthquake Rjsk Management Project

A MonthinQuito Followinga Future Earthquake

The technical analysis of this project,while providing detailed estimates of damage from potential earthquakes, does notcommunicate the impact of such disasters.The purpose of the second phase of theproject was to describe life in Quito duringthe month foUowing one of these earthquakes. This description can help government officiaIs, emergency service planners,business leaders, and the general public tavisualize the consequences of a future majorearthquake, and provide the motivation andunderstanding required to act.

The following description is based onthe technical analysis of the local earthquake and a vulnerability study of Quito'scity services, public buildings, and infrastructure. The vulnerability study was performed by interviewing officiaIs from 17different city organizations, inc1uding sewer,water, power, and transportation departments; Civil Defense; and fire and policedepartments. The locations of critical facilities referred to in the following pages areshown in Figure 14 and the map insert.

View ofPlaza de la lndependencia, bordered lYy Ecuador's Presidential Palace (background) and City Hall (not pictured).

9


CAUTIONThejollowings cU ndes:ribespossibl impacts

of the potential ID tll earthquake in Quito. Otherea1·thquakes 1?Of evaluated in this sludy wou/d produce difjerent consequences. 'lb!s is nota predictionof Cl ;peciflc earf1.?quake, earthquake damage, orconsequ.ences. Tbi descrijJtion is int6nded onlyfi l'

use trI planning andprepQ1'edness exercises and in"aising awareness of Quito's earthquake ,'isk. Theau.thors, advisors, andol/:)ercontrtbutorslo thi reportare not responsib/efor use beyond the e purpo e .

Centro Historlco -Main Roadtl

Legend

o 1 2 3 4 5(km)

10 Via Orientai

11 PanamericanaNorte

12 PlchinchaVolcano

13 Puen,aol WaterTreetment Plant

14 Quito Alrport

15 Santa Ro....aubstatlon

18 La Vlcentinaaubstatlon

La Alameda Park

La Carollna Park

Central TelephoneBulldin,

4 Civil Defenoe Office

5 Ei Ejido Park

6 Fundeporte Park

7 Via Interoceanlca

8 Machan,ara River

9 Via Occidental

Figure 14. Selected Quito landmarks (see also map imerl).

10

The Earthquake StrikesIt isjust after 9:00 P.M. An afternoon of

heavy rain has soaked the city; the streets arestill wet. Residents of Quito are relaxing withfamily and friends, having dinner, watchingtelevision, or sitting and talking. Older children are studying for the next day of schoolwhile the younger ones are asleep in bed.

Suddenly there is a slight jolt, thenheavier shaking. Dishes quiver on dinnertables, and windows rattle in their casings.The city trembles as the ground shakes violently. People are initially confused by thecommotion, but then realize that Quito isexperiencing a major earthquake.

Some people lose their balance; othersare thrown to the floor. Cabinet doors swingopen, ejecting pots, pans, and dishes ontothe floor in a terrible din. Pets run about,frightened. Pictures, lamps, and televisionsfall to the floor, causing injury to some peopleas they try to run from their homes to escapedanger. Some doors get stuck in their frames,trapping people inside.

Northern Quito experiences the strongest shaking because of its proximity to theearthquake source. The shaking is so strongthat it becomes difficult to stand and nearlyimpossible to walk. Many bookcases, refrigerators, stoves, and other heavy objects overturn, pinningorcrushingsome people beneaththem. Self-built homes are devastated. Cracksform in walls of many reinforced concretehomes, severely damaging some.

Shaking in the Centro Historico is not assevere as in the north, but is still very strong.The abundance of the vulnerable adobe andunreinforced masonry buildings leaves thearea heavily damaged. Some adobe structures collapse, especially those already damaged in past earthquakes and not properlyrepaired, trapping and killing those inside.Some unreinforced masonry church facades,cupolas, interior walls, and towers crack andcollapse. Heavy, tile roofs collapse into homes.


Narrow streets become clogged with rubble;frantic people search in the wreckage forloved ones.

Modern buildings between the CentroHistorico and the airport escape serious damage. Structures in the vicinity of the airport,however, suffer moderate to severe damage,as do self-built structures on the eastern andwestern slopes of the southern part of thecity. In southern Quito, the shaking is theleast intense, but still strong enough to crackbrick and cement block walls and destroychimneys. Practically ail unreinforced masonryschool buildings in Quito, and several reinforced concrete school buildings with shortcolumns, collapse or are badly damaged.

Adobe buildings in the Centro Historico.

11


Landslides block Via Oriental and ViaOccidental, especially in lanes next to cutslopes. Northern access to the city is interrupted by landslides on Panamericana Norte,the road to the Mitad dei Mundo, and the roadthrough Calacali to the coast. Several largelandslides and rocks fall on the TabacundoHighway and Via Interoceanica, making themimpassable. A bridge on the PanamericanaNorte is heavily damaged, rendering it, too,unusable. Several secondary streets in northern Quito suffercracking. Northwestern neighborhoods such as Jaime Roldos, Pisuli, andComite dei Pueblo 2 become isolated. Someroads in the northeast are partially blocked;slope failure at the Zambiza garbage dumpcuts the only access to that area. Severalmain north-south avenues are blocked bydamaged overpasses. Some motorists, unable to proceed, abandon their cars in themiddle of the street. More than a hundredobstructions in the roads of Quito make transit within the city and between northern, centrai, and southern Quito almost impossible.

Some ofQuito 's many overpasses.

The airport suffers only minor damageand remains operational, but is difficult toaccess, especially from the south. Policestations and the Civil Defense building sufferlocalized damage; fire stations suffer moresevere damage. In some cases, emergency

12

Slopes susceptible to landslides along ViaOccidental.

response equipment is damaged or trapped,thwarting timely response. Medicines in hospitals and clinics fall from shelves and spillonto the floor, and medical equipment isseverely damaged. Some hospital staff andpatients are injured by falling equipment. Twounreinforced masonry hospitals, and olderunreinforced masonry wings of newer hospitais, suffer heavy damage and become inoperable. Many factories and warehouses made ofsteel are damaged when poorly anchoredmasonrywallscollapse. Some industrial buildings suffer heavy damage and a few collapse,in some cases releasing hazardous materials.

Water pipes throughout Quito break, especially at their rigid joints and in placeswhere they cross filled quebradas. Landslidesblock the open canal that brings drinkingwater to the Puengasi water treatment plant.Some main sewer collectors-in particular,those located on the western slopes of thecity-rupture, damagingbuildings and streetsabove. Landslides along the Machangara Riverblock sewage outlets. Structural damage tothe central telephone building results in partial loss of telephone communication withinQuito and to the outside world. Power polesfall throughout the city, and more than 500transformers are damaged. Several distribution substations and transmission cables,especially those in the northern part of thecity, are seriously damaged, plunging most of

Fire station.

the city into darkness. FortYseconds after thestart of the earthquake, the shaking stops.

One Hour LaterOne hour after the earthquake struck,

uninjured citizens are removing rubble by handand with makeshift tools to free victims fromunderneath collapsed buildings, despite fearof aftershocks. People try to locate familymembers and apply first aid, with only thelight from car headlights. Rescue of thosetrapped underneath collapsed buildings ishampered by darkness. The injured start tomake their own way toward hospitals andprivate clinics. Because of fear of aftershocksand the unknown structural condition of theirhomes, many people who are uninjured andhave no missing family members head towardopen areas such as La Carolina, El Ejido, LaAlameda, and Fundeporte parks. A few seekrefuge in undamaged churches and convents,despite the danger of aftershocks. Some,taking advantage of the destruction and confusion, loot unprotected homes and businesses.

ln several older homes, electrical wiringshort-circuits, and fire rapidly consumes old,dry wood. Residents extinguish some fires;thick adobe walls impede other fires fromspreading widely. The fire department cannotattend to most fires because of poor communication, blocked roads, heavy traffic, lack ofpersonnel, and lack of water-many waterpipes have ruptured, cutting off supply, andmany fire hydrants were out of service even


before the earthquake. The darkness of nightis punctuated by scattered flames.

The few operating commercial radio stations broadcast information to the public. Thebroadcasters have limited knowledge of earthquake disaster recovery, and incite confusionand panic with erroneous information, including false rumors that a larger earthquake willcome in the next few days, that the Pichinchavolcano is going to erupt, and that high government officiais died in the earthquake.

Hospital hallways are crowded with patients, staff, and fallen equipment. Doctorsand nurses attempt to check the safety ofpreviously admitted patients while administering first aid to new arrivais. In the southernpart of the city, damage is less severe andfewer people are injured. Access to medical

One ofQuito 's more modern hospitals.

care is limited, however, because there isonly one major hospital in that area.

As there are no automatic shutoffvalveswithin the water supply system, large quantities of water are lost. Quito's water supply iseut off. Water and sewage flood the lowerparts of the city and damage some streets.Portions of the telephone system in operationare saturated by calls from people trying toreach relatives, friends, hospitals, and otherpublic services.

No statement about the severity of earthquake damage has been made by governmentofficiais, as they are still gathering information.

13


Aftershocks come frequently, threatening damaged structures with further collapse. Peopleof Quito wait in anguish for dawn.

The First DayDuring the first day after the earthquake,

citizens realize that roads are blocked, andhence help may not come from rescue organizations in the near future; they begin to organize groups to search buildings for the injuredand dead. Rescue operations are hamperedby a shortage of heavy equipment to moverubble.

Since the city has no official agency orplan to inspect and evaluate the safety ofbuildings, several professionals volunteer todetermine the amount of damage; no one,however, is authorized to make decisions onthe further use of the buildings. Some residents cautiously reenter damaged buildingsto search for missing persons or retrievepersonal belongings; most, however, do notfor fear of aftershocks, and will spend ensuing nights outdoors in the cold weather untiltemporary shelter can be found. A light rainworsens their situation.

Looting continues in unprotected shopsand homes. Businesses and banks are notopen; people become frustrated and angry asthey try unsuccessfully to withdraw moneyfrom automatic teller machines for their immediate needs.

With the help of radio amateurs, emergency response agencies organize rescueunits, focusing attention on the devastatednorthern areas and the Centro Historico. CivilDefense officiais are able to broadcast general instructions to the population.

Several roads cave into underlying sewers and quebradas. The city attempts to 10cate heavy equipment to open blocked anddamaged roads. Driving throughout the city isnearly impossible. Within neighborhoods,public transportation is nonexistent with theexception of taxis, which charge many timesmore than standard rates. Because of damage to the power supply system, traffic lights

are out of service, resulting in confusion andincreased traffic congestion. Broken sewersflood many vital underpasses.

Relief doctors and nurses cannot reachthe hospitals because of road conditions andpersonal and family injuries, and hospitalstaffs become fatigued. Many patients withminor injuries are asked to leave in order tofree space for the more seriously injured.Medical care is particularly difficult in hospitais without reserve water supplies and backupelectrical generators. Undamaged publicschools and military quarters are transformedinto makeshift emergency health centers toaccommodate the large number of injured.

The city's iO-hour water reserve is exhausted. The only water available in the mostaffected areas is that remaining in householdwater tanks. In some areas, available water ispolluted by sewage. EMAP-Q personnel beginmanually shutting off functioning water service for inspection and to prevent furtherwater loss from damaged pipes. Officiais realIze that in the coming week water will need to

Traffie in the Centro Historieo.

be trucked in from neighboring regions. Morethan three-quarters of the city still is withoutpower; damage to several subnetworks andsystem overload severely restrict telephonecommunication. Because of a lack of earthquake preparedness plans, utility repairs areslow and poorly coordinated.

The President of Ecuador declares Quitoa disaster area and proclaims a state ofemergency. The army is mobilized to participatein emergency rescue and disaster recovery.

Two Days LaterTwo days after the earthquake, thou

sands of people are homeless; makeshiftshelters are not able to accommodate them.Response workers are still attempting to reseue missing persons from beneath the rubbleof collapsed buildings. A strong aftershockheightens anxiety and keeps most from returning to their homes. The aftershock causesthe collapse of a few buildings damaged in themain earthquake, injuring or killing those taking refuge inside. Nonetheless, a few sleep intheir damaged homes or on the street nearbyto guard against looters, and some seekdivine protection in churches. Many sleep inthe parks, risking exposure and sicknessfrom the rain and cold. Some with relatives,friends, or homes in other provinces leave thecity, depriving Quito of badly needed emergency response and recovery professionals.

There is an increasing demand for foodand medicine, but most stores and pharmacies remain closed; some vendors and storeowners greatly increase the priee of food,medicine, and equipment. In poor neighborhoods in northern Quito and in the CentroHistorico, residents lacking food supplies,especiallythose whose homes were destroyed,are tired and thirsty. Water is being distributed by the city's six tank trucks because ofthe large number of ruptured water pipes.There are reports that some private tankersare charging many times the normal priee forwater. Some citizens, without access to fuelfor use in boiling water, become ill after


Puengasi water treatmentplant.

consuming water contaminated by sewage.There is no garbage collection, and garbageaccumulates on the streets.

Civil Defense broadcasts increasinglymore useful and specifie information. Theofficial estimates of casualties and economiclosses grow as more information becomesavailable. The media continues to fuel ru morsthat, combined with frequent aftershocks,further distress the population.

Some roads are still blocked, limitingdelivery of relief supplies. Government workers begin to clear Via Occidental and ViaOriental of debris, as these highways are vitalfor the response and recovery of the city. Afew supplies begin to arrive at the airport, butstill there is limited access for pickup anddelivery. Supplies also begin to arrive atLatacunga airport, 80 km south of Quito,although there is difficulty in distributing themto the more damaged areas of Quito.

Most of the injured have received somemedical attention. Lack of emergency medicalequipment, medicines, power, clean water,and prompt treatment in public hospitals results in poor medical attention. Some peopledie from injuries that under normal circumstances wou Id be nonfatal. Many of the injured are taken to small health centers andRed Cross first aid centers. The death tollincreases. As the morgues are full and notreadily accessible, dead bodies line hospitalhallways prior to identification and burial.Health officiais make plans to create massgraves.

15


Telecommunications center.

Most equipment and supplies for majorutility repairs are unavailable due to shortages and inaccessibility. Sewage and rainflood many utilitytunnels, damage roads, andmake repairs cumbersome and unpleasant.At the central communications building, attempts to make equipment repairs and reestablish telephone service fail, as the staff isunwilling to enter the building for fear ofaftershocks; phone service is consequentlyunreliable. While EMETEL makes telephoneservice available to government and emergency service facilities, radio communicationis found to be more reliable. Financial institutions abroad attempt unsuccessfully to communicate with business partners in Quito.

About half of the city is still withoutelectricity. The main transmission substations, Santa Rosa and La Vicentina,were not seriously damaged, but thenorthern distribution substations willneed major repairs before electricitycan be restored there. Some facilities have backup power generators,but are unable to use them becauseof a lack of fuel.

The role of the military expandsto guarding homes and shops againstlooters; recovering corpses; settingup temporary hospitals and shelters; and distributing food and water. Claims for government assistanceincrease, and people become angry

when their requests are met slowly, inadequately, or not at ail.

One Week LaterOne week after the earthquake, collapsed

buildings-responsible for most of thedeaths-are still being searched for bodies.Many people are still hoping that missingrelatives or friends will be found alive. Emergency workers remove the remaining victims.Undamaged public school buildings and othertemporary shelters are full, and many peopleare living on the streets and in parks. Undamaged private schools resume classes.

Most businesses reopen. Food is scarceand expensive. Some banks are not permitting withdrawals because of damage to bankcomputers; customers become angry, andsmall, isolated disturbances erupt outside ofthese banks. Products from northern Ecuador, mainly milk and potatoes, are difficult todeliver to Quito. Emergency supplies from theinternational community, mostly food, clothing, medical supplies, and tents, continue toarrive at the Quito and Latacunga airports.Many donations do not fit local needs, andsupplies that cannot be used or easily distributed collect at the airports, burdening reliefagencies.

Garbage trucks still cannot reach manyparts of the city, and trash and human wastecollect in streets and alleys. Many residents

Eleetricalsubstation.

16

develop gastrointestinal diseases as a resultof consuming contaminated food and water.Health care in Quito's clinics and hospitalsimproves after medicines and personnel arrive from Latacunga, Ambato, and Guayaquil,but hospitals still lack beds to accommodateail the injured and sick. Exacerbating theproblem, injured people arrive from neighboring towns such as Pamasqui, San Antonio,and Nono in search of better health carefacilities.

Public transportation is improving except in northern Quito, where many roads arestill closed. The southern roads remain theonly dependable access to Quito. Gasoline isnow available throughout the city.

Although the main water treatment plantsare now fully operable, numerous pipe ruptures within Quito keep water from beingwidely distributed. Lack of water pipes slowsrecovery. Damage to the open canal thatbrings water to the Puengasi plant may takemore than a week to be repaired. Some wateris trucked in from outlying regions.

Most of the fallen electric poles havebeen replaced. The city has electricity, withthe exception of parts of the Centro Historicoand the far northern areas. Phone service isstill unreliable. The sewage system also seesonly minor repairs because of inundation withrainwater and human waste, lack of equipment, and a Iimited quantity of spare pipes.Many utilities still wait for key equipment andspare parts, not available locally, preventingcomplete recovery.

Those who fled the city the first few daysafter the earthquake begin to return. Residents of Quito start to adjust to their new wayof life. They make plans to restore their damaged homes and businesses, although noone knows from where money for such effortswill come.

One Month LaterOne month after the earthquake, panic

has subsided, and residents no longer fear


Water treatmentplant above the Centro Historico.

aftershocks. Most residences remain damaged, and virtually none of the collapsedbuildings are being rebuilt. Shelters are stillfull, and many people are still living in smalltent cities in plazas, parks, and playing fields.For many, the only improvement they haveseen in their living condition is that the plastic, cardboard, or plywood tents they builtthemselves have now been replaced withcanvas tents provided by international agencîes. Health officiais are concerned about asignificant rise in respiratory ailments resulting from the large numbers of people living incrowded temporary quarters.

Residents of Quito have started planning and seeking assistance for reconstructing damaged or destroyed homes. Businessesare open, and the banks accept deposits andpermit withdrawals. Most children are back inschool, many in hastily constructed, temporary classrooms. Distribution centers are established to deliver food and supplies comingfrom abroad.

Tourism has ceased, adding to overalleconomic losses; foreigners watch Quito'searthquake recovery and make plans accordingly. Businesses have suffered considerablelosses, and some will never recover. For theminority with insurance, their claims remainunaddressed as the extent of damage tomany buildings has not yet been evaluated.Forthe time being, some business owners aregiven provisional payment until more accurate

17


damage estimates can be determined andreinsurers can respond. Insurance companies are having problems converting theirassets into cash, and some are likely to gobankrupt. Many businesses will receive insufficient reimbursement due to inadequate policies and lack of insurance company reservesand reinsurance.

Water service has been restored to mostparts of Quito; the use of trucked water andwater conservation are now a way of life inareas where it has not been restored. In areaswhere damage was particularly heavy, it willtake two months or more to restore regularservice.

The roads are clear of rubble, althoughin the Centro Historico some are blocked bywood poles used to support damaged buildings, especially churches. Collapsed overpasses have not been rebuilt, but the debrishas been removed and alternate routes established. Temporary bridges are being builtby the army.

Repairs to electrical substations in thenorth are still not complete, although substations in other parts of Quito have been repaired. Reduced system performancecontinues for several months due to transmission line damage in the western portion ofQuito. Telephone service is still intermittent,and loss of convenient international communication severely disrupts national and international commerce.

School buildings.

18

Because of minimal repair capacity andthe slow and difficult work of visually detecting sewer ruptures, officiais estimate that thesewage system will not be fully operational forsome five months. Funding for repairs isscarce since the system is uninsured. Collapse and blockage of major sewer tunnelscause extensive, long-term limitations in seweruse in parts of Quito. Contingency plans areestablished to clean sewage from streets anddig pits throughout the city, which will serveas interim dumps.

Officiais start defining reconstructionplans for the city. Recovery assistance forindividual citizens is insufficient, as mostproperty owners do not have earthquake insurance. National agencies, such as the National Bank for Development and the HousingMinistry, do not have enough funds to helpvictims. Questions and complaints are raisedas to how the available funds are being used.

Adobe buildings damaged in the March

1987earthquake.


,...Thepreœdingdescn'ption il/u.stml'es

sorne of the possible Impacts on Quitojrom orœpart/cula,. artbquake inQu Ito.Otbereat"thqllakes notevaluatedin thisstudy will result in diJJerent consequences. This de crlption is intendedon/y/or use in planning andpreparedness p"ograms andJor raislng awareness oft!:Je eat'thquake risk.

An earthquake could strike Quito inthe future and produce effects such as thosejust described. As Quito is the seat ofEcuador's national government and thesource of one-third of the gross nationalproduct, the effects would be felt acrossEcuador. Municipal, regional, and nationalgovernment functions would be disrupted.The city's commercial, banking, and insur-

ance industries would take years to recover.Human casualties would be substantial.

There are steps, however, that Quitocan take now to prepare for its next majorearthquake-steps to reduce loss of life,damage to property, harm to the economy,disruption to government services, and damage to cultural heritage. Sorne of these stepsare presented in the next section, "ManagingQuito's Earthquake Risk."

19


Managing Quito'sEarthquake Risk

L the third phase of the project, a group ofinternational and Ecuadorian specialists frombusiness and industry, city government,urban planning, emergency services, andinfrastructure developed specific recommendations within thei.r fields of expertise formanaging earthquake risk in Quito. Theirrecommendations were based on the technical analysis of this project, their knowledge of Quito, and their experience withprograms that have been successful inother earthquake-threatened cities. Theirwork was performed dllring a two-day workshop in July of 1993. The names of the

participants are Iisted at the beginning ofthisreport.

The recommendations are broad inscope. They include creating a Quito Earthquake Safety Advisory Board; addressingthe vulnerability of buildings, infrastmcture,and emergency response eqllipment andfacilities; developing gllidelines for safeconstruction; improving emergency planning and preparing disaster recovery plans;and furthering social and scien tific research.Many recommendations are short-term andcan be implemented within two to fouryears. SlIch measures include developing a

A view ofQuito, looking northeastfrom Panecillo Hill.

20

comprehensive building code to help ensure that new faciIities can withstand earthquake shaking; designing and practicingemergency response disaster contingencyplans; and teaching the public about earthquake safety and emergency preparedness.Other recommendations are long-term, andmay require decades to complete. Thesetend to be more expensive, and includestrengthening existing buildings and infrastructure and improving emergency service faciIities such as hospitals and the firedepartment.

The earthquake risk management recommendations, described in full in the report The Quito, Ecuador, Earthquake RiskManagementProject: A Compilation OfMethods, Data, and Findings, can be used as astarting point in designing an earthquakerisk management program for Quito. Untilsuch a program can be initiated, however,there are six projects that are of highestpriority and deserve immediate attention.They are:

1. Creoflng CI Quito Eartbquake {~rety

Adolsory Board. Implementation ofearthquake risk management programsrequires leadership, commitment, and

The Quito Eanhquake Risk Management Projecr

ongoing oversight by government officiaIs and community leaders. Efforts mustbe coordinated among government agencies at every level, schools, businesses,fmancial institutions, and other entitiesconcerned with the city's future economic health and the welfare of its citizens. Such coordination and continuingprogress toward earthquake safety goalsrequire designation of primary responsibiJity and the formation of an oversightcouncil or board.

Under this project, the Office of theMayor of Quito would appoint a specialassistant to the mayor, who would reportdirectly to the mayor and be responsiblefor the earthquake safety program. Thespecial assistant would serve as themayor's liaison to the Earthquake SafetyAdvisory Board and as its executive director. The mayor's office would define thepurpose and authority of the board, criteria for selecting members, and bylaws togovern the board's activities. The mayorwould issue a resolution creating theboard and appointing its members torepresent business, emergency services,government, and the scientific and engineering communities.

Taking Steps Toward Earthquake PreparednessRccommendations for Improving QlIitO'S Earthqllake Safety

1. Create a Quito Earthquake Safety Advisory Board.

2. Adopt and enforce an effective building code.

3. Support scientific research to further evaluate Quito'searthquake risk.

4. Develop a workplace earthquake preparedness program.

5. Improve emergency response equipment and facilities.

6. Establish a proper insurance tariff with underwritingguidelines.

21


Centro Historico.

The Earthquake Safety Advisory Boardwould advise the mayor, local government agencies, and private industry onearthquake preparedness and risk management issues. It would also be responsible for setting mitigation priorities basedon the earthquake threat; developing andadministering an earthquake risk management program; monitoring and regularIy updating the earthquake riskmanagement program; advocating theincorporation of mitigation measures intothe urban development process; andseeking local and international fundingfor mitigation projects.

22

_. AdojJlillf:!, and e'~/orcing (/Il effectiuebllilding code. An effective building codehelps to ensure that new facilities aredesigned and constructed ta withstandearthquake shaking. Under this project, acommittee of engineers and plannerswould design a building code for aIlstructural types in Quito, facilitate thecode's integration into design and construction, and regularly update the code.The code couId also provide the basis forfuture retrofit of critical structures. Enforcement is achieved by establishing acommittee to educate builders, planners,and engineers about the building code;determining an efficient method for enforcing it; and training inspectars to evaluate building design and construction.

3. lljJporUng sc/eni/fic research to fu/"tber ella/llale Qulto's eart/.lqllake ,-isR.The Quito Earthquake Risk ManagementProject was restricted to the analysis ofavailable data during an lS-month period. Hence, many assumptions weremade in the development of the potentialearthquakes and their effects. Furtherresearch is necessary to expand the soilprofile data base to obtain a more detailed zonation of the city; map the depthand location of the bedrock to improveestimations of soil amplification; identi.fyactive fauIts and determine their geometries and mechanisms to better estimatepotential magnitudes and locations ofearthquakes; instaIl instruments to measure epicenters, ground shaking, and response of buildings during earthquakes;develop improved procedures for estimating earthquake damage to structuresin Ecuador; and develop a scenario forthe greater Quito area and for otherpotential earthquakes. Such research willimprove the technical base for a moreaccurate earthquake scenario, better methods of earthquake risk management, andimproved earthquake codes and policies.

4. DtwelojJlng a U/orkplace earthquakepre/Jaredlless pJ'ogram. Educatingemployees in earthquake risks and emergency preparedness, and the spread ofthis information to friends and family,would benefit individual businesses,employees, and the community at large.Under this project, ALERTA, Quito'sprivate-sector disaster preparedness program, and various emergency serviceorganizations wouId train business management to analyze the earthquake risksthat they face, and to develop risk management plans for their institutions. Employees at every level would then beeducated in preparing for and survivingan earthquake.

5.IlJ1provlng emergency responseequlpment and jacilitie. Improvedemergency response equipment and facilities are vital for quick, effective response to a major earthquake. Under thisproject, research teams would inventoryavailable human and material resources,and, based on a disaster scenario, determine vulnerabilities and critical needs.


derwriting guidelines would be based onsoil properties, estimated ground shakingintensities and subsequent geological hazards, damage distribution estimates, andstructural design and construction. Ratingdiscounts would then be available forstructures with appropriate earthquakeresistant design and construction.

More detailed descriptions of theseprojects are included in the Appendices.

Practical steps can be taken now thatwould significantly reduce the physical,social, and economic consequences ofearthquakes to Quito, as the preceding projectsillustrate. However, managing earthquakerisk is a process that requires time, sustainedeffort, and direction, aH of which requirethat government officiaIs, business leaders,and the public be convinced that earthquake safety is important relative to theother needs of the community. With direction, leadership, and the support of thecommunity, Quito has the opportunity toprepare its citizens, buildings, and economyfor the next major earthquake.

6: ESlalJlisblng aproj)er il/surancetariff wilb underlt rlling g uirlelines.A proper insurancetariffwith underwriting guidelines considering earthquakehazards would encourage responsible,earthquake-resistantdesign and construction, and would makeearthquake insuranceavailable to residentsof Quito. The insurance tariff and un-

Ti/e roofand adobe eupola in the Centra Historieo.

23


Conclusions

T he Quito Earthquake Risk Management Project has led to several significantconclusions.

• Qllito, wbicb bas a 101lg hist01JI ofeflrlbquakes. will expet'ieltce damagillg eat·thqllakes illlhefulure. Sornewill be significantly stronger than theMarch 1987 earthquake, and will result inmajor damage to the city.

• Quito is Imp"epare(fJor il ... "e.~1 majm'eartI:Jquake, andIJecomes inCl'easillgfy tlllll1erable ulitb lùn-e. Significantloss of life, destmction of property, andharm ta the economy will result unlessgovernment, business, and communityleaders recognize and begin to addressthe earthquake threat by taking steps tamanage earthquake risk.

• teps lOti artl redllcillg Qui/o's VII 1Ilerabilit)' Lo destrllcUve earthquakessboufd be Lakell Immedialely. Quitohas the opportunity to prepare its citizens, buildings, and economy for the

24

next major earthquake, but significantprogress toward reducing the physical,social, and economic consequences ofearthquakes ta Quito can only be achievedwith the support of the community andfrom focused, sustained action by govemment, business, and conununity leaders.

• Ali Eartbquake SaJel)1AdvisoryBoardsbould he eslablished to deve/op,implement, mOllitor, and regularlyIIpdate li comp,-ebensive earlhqllakerisk mallageme1tlprogramfOl"Quito.The findings of the Quito EarthquakeRisk Management Project provide a starting point for the work of this board.

Earthquakes will be a part of Quito'sfuture, as surely as they have been a part ofits past. While it is not known when the nextmajor carthquake will occur, efforts putforth toward earthquake safety today willresult in less damage and death in the future.This project is only a step toward Quito'searthquake risk management. The next stepmust be made by Quito's leaders and citizens.


AppendixAOrganization, Chronology, and Accomplishments

Organization

The participants of the project feU intoone or more of four categories:

• An Ecuadorian-international WorkingGroup (WG), consisting of specialists ingeology, seismology, structural engineering, soils engineering, urban planning,and data management. Ali scientific, engineering, and planning work was performed by WG.

• The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC),consisting of international experts in thefields of structural engineering, soiJs engineering, geology, seismology, urbanplanning, emergency response, and datamanagement. The TAC provided WGwith technical recommendations on howearthquake risk assessments have beenmade in other cities, as weIl as advice onwhat mitigation actions may be useful inQuito. The TAC reviewed the project fortechnical accuracy and provided links with

international science and engineeringcommunities and professional organizations .

• The Social and Economie Advisory Committee (SEAC), consisting of internationaland Ecuadorian representatives from thebanking and insurance industry, publichealth, utilities, construction, emergencyresponse, and urban development. TheSEAC contributed overall guidance andadvice on long-term project planning,and provided links with internationalagencies and businesses concerned withmanaging earthquake risk. Project priorities were set by the Ecuadorian membersof the SEAC.

• GeoHazards International coordinated theactivities ofWG, the TAC, and the SEAC.

The members ofthese groups are listedat the beginning of this report.

Technical advisors tourQuito, October 1992.


Chronology

DATE

]uly 25, 1992

September 16-17,1992October 1992October 26-27, 1992

November 1992-April 1993

]anuary 11-15, 1993

March 1993

May 27-28, 1993

May-]uly 1993

]uly 14-15, 1993

]uly 15, 1993

]uly-September 1993

October 10,1993November 1993

]anuary 1994

March 3,1994

26

ACTIVITY

International meeting ofsome members ofWG, TAC, and SEACat Tenth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering in Madridta introduce project and receive initial adviceSEAC meets to establish project guidelinesWG drafts work planTAC and WG review work plan, discuss data, and proposemethodologyWG performs technical work; Ecuadorian soils engineer visitsUniversity of British Columbia, and University of British Columbia structural engineer visits QuitoFour Ecuadorian members of SEAC tour California governmentagencies and corporations having exemplary earthquake riskmanagement programsALERTA, a private-sector disaster preparedness council, is created following the model of los Angeles' BICEPPTAC, WG, and Ecuadorian members of SEAC meet to reviewprogressWG refines hazard assessment and interviews operators ofQuito's infrastructure to evaluate vulnerabilityMembers ofWG, TAC, SEAC, and selected experts participate inworkshop to describe Quito's earthquake vulnerability and draftrecommended mitigation actionsALERTA hears presentations by members of los Angeles' BICEPPand California's Seismic Safety CommissionWG writes first draft of final technical report and sends to TACfor reviewTAC and WG meet to review draft of final reportWorld Conference of Building OfficiaIs initiates project totranslate and adopt U.S. building codes for EcuadorWG and GeoHazards International submit report to mayor ofQuitoMayor of Quito makes public presentation of the findings of theproject


Accomplishments

The project accomplished thefoUowing in regard to its objectives:

Toward improving the understandingof Quito's earthquake hazard, the projectresulted in:

• A comprehensive but preliminary estimation of the consequences of potentialearthquakes on Quito.

• A survey of Quito's urban infrastructure,with emphasis on its vlIlnerability toearthquakes.

• The initiation of a review by EClladorianinsurance companies of their exposure inthe event of a damaging earthquake.

Toward ralSll1g the awareness of theearthquake risk within Ecuador and internationally, the project resulted in:

• The publication of three technical papersabout Quito's risk management measuresat international conferences in San Francisco, Califomia; Wellington, New Zealand;and Montreal, Canada.

• Nine workshops in Quito, in which forthe first time more than 100 Ecuadorianand international specialists, includingthe Mayor of Quito and other officiaIs,conferred about Quito's earthquake history, hazard, and risk.

Emergency re~ponseworkinggroup ofthe Earthquake Risk Management Workshop,july 1993.

27


• An international tour, in whichfour Ecuadorian governmentofficiais and business leadersvisited 12 California government agencies and businessesthat are specialists in earthquake preparedness.

• The attendance of two representatives of the mayor'soffice at the Metropolis Conference, a meeting of officiaisfrom the world's largest cities,in Montreal, Canada.

Plenary meeting of the Earthquake Risk ManagementWorkshop,july 1993.• The attendance of three Ecua

dorian scientists and engineersat the Tenth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering in Madrid, Spain, andat a NATO-US AIO sponsored AdvancedResearch Workshop in Istanbul, Turkey.

• Two l-week technical exchange VISltS,one by an Ecuadorian engineer to aCanadian University, and one by a Canadian engineer to the Escuela PolitécnicaNacional in Quito.

• The publication and distribution of theproducts of this report to a broad audience.

And toward designing self-sustainingprograms to manage Quito's earthquakerisk, the project resulted in:

• A framework-reviewed by internationaltechnical, government, and businessspecialists-of a comprehensive, multi-

28

year program ta manage Quita's earthquake risk.

• ALERTA, a private-sector disaster preparedness council to foster earthquakerisk management, following the model ofLos Angeles' Business and Industry Council for Emergency Planning and Preparedness (BICEPP).

• The capability of the Escuela PolitécnicaNacional and the Municipio de Quito tocreate new earthquake damage estimatesfor other earthquakes, and the ability toobtain new data on soils and structuralresponse.

• The World Conference of Building Officiais initiating a project ta translate andadopt U.S. building codes for Ecuador.


Appendix BPriority Earthquake Risk Management Projects

Establish an Earthquake SafetyAdvisory Board

Implementation ofearthquake risk management programs requires leadership, commitment, and ongoing oversight bygovernment officiaIs and community leaders. Efforts must be coordinated amonggovernment agencies, schools, businesses,financial institutions, and other entities concernedwith the city's future economic healthand welfare of its citizens. Such coordination and continuing progress toward earthquake safety goals require designation ofprimary responsibility and the formation ofan oversight council or board.

Under this project, the Office of theMayor of Quito would appoint a specialassistant to the mayor, who would reportdirectly to the mayor and be responsible forthe earthquake safety program. The specialassistant would serve as the mayor's liaisonto the Earthquake Safety Advisory Boardand as its executive director. The mayor'soffice would define the purpose and authority of the board, criteria for selecting members, and bylaws to govern the board'sactivities. The mayor would issue a resolution creating the board and appointing itsmembers to represent business, emergencyservices, government, and the scientific andengineering communities.

The Earthquake Safety Advisory Boardwould advise the mayor, local governmentagencies, and private industry on earthquake preparedness and risk managementissues. It would also be responsible forsetting mitigation priorities based on theearthquake threat; developing and administering an earthquake risk management program; monitoring and regularly updating

the earthquake risk management program;advocating the incorporation of mitigationmeasures into the urban development process; and seeking local and internationalfunding for mitigation projects.Responsible Agencies:• The Mayor of Quito• The Office of the Mayor

Adopt and Enforce an EffectiveBuilding Code

An effective building code helps toensure that new facilities are designed andconstructed to withstand earthquake shaking. Under this project, a committee ofengineers and planners would design abuilding code for aIl structural types inQuito, facilitate the code's integration intodesign and construction, and regularly update the code. Enforcement is achieved byestablishing a committee to educate builders,planners, and engineers about the buildingcode; determining an efficient method forenforcing it; and training inspectors to evaluate building design and construction.Auxiliary Tasks:• Adopt stricter building codes for the de

sign and construction of emergency service and critical facilities buildingsincluding hospitals, fire stations, policestations, Civil Defense buildings, publicbuildings, and emergency shelters.

• Establish standards for retrofit of criticalstructures.

• Publish and distribute guidelines for the design of self-built structures for use by individuals constructing their own dwellings.

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• Organize training courses for professionaIs on seismic design and construction ofnew buildings. Adapt procedures alreadydeveloped in other countries.

• Include in each building loan agreementa contract to ensure that borrowers abideby building codes.

Possible Resources:Building codes from global cities pre

clude the need for Quito to develop anentirely new code. An existing model, suchas the Uniform Building Code (UBC) of theUnited States, provides a comprehensiveframework into which Quito can incorporate appropriate seismic parameters, structural types, methods of construction, andproperties of building materials. Local andinternational organizations, such as EscuelaPolitécnica Nacional and other universities,Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, ConsejoNacional de Universidades, the StructuralEngineers Association of California, the Applied Technology Council of California, theSeismic Safety Commission of California, theInternational Conference of Building OfficiaIs, and the World Organization of Building OfficiaIs, may be valuable in helping todevelop a code.Responsible Agencies:• Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Ingenieria

Estructural• Camara de la Construccion de Quito• Municipio de Quito• Instituto Ecuatoriano de Normalizacion

Support Scientific Research toImprove Earthquake Scenarios

The hazard assessment of the QuitoEarthquake Risk Management Project was.based only on available data. As a consequence, several assumptions were madeabout depth to bedrock under Quito, attenuation relations, response of soils, andresponse of typical structures. Further re-

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search will improve earthquake hazard assessments, methods of earthquake risk management, and earthquake codes and policies.Specifically, the following studies will improve knowledge of Quito's earthquakerisk:1. Expand the soil profile data base.

Increase the number and depth of soilprofiles to obtain a more detailed soilzonation of the city.

2. Map the bedrock. Map the depth andlocation of the bedrock to improve estimations of soil amplification.

3. Map active faults. To better estimatepotential magnitudes and locations ofearthquakes and to assess seismic potential, identify active fauIts and determinetheir geometries and mechanisms.

4. Install instruments to locate earthquakes, measuregroundshaking, andevaluate response of buildings during earthquakes. InstaIl and maintainstate-of-the-art seismometers aroundQuito to measure and locate earthquakes,and strong-motion accelerometers invarious buildings and in various soil zonesto increase knowledge of site effects andspecifie dynamic characteristics of representative structures.

5. Develop improved procedures forestimating earthquake damage tostructures in Ecuador. Many methodsused throughout the world for estimatingearthquake damage are from the UnitedStates or ]apan, and therefore they do notalways account for specifie characteristicsof other regions. Damage matrices, usedin such estimations, that are specifie toEcuador should be developed to improvefuture earthquake risk assessments.

6. Develop a scenario for the greaterQuito area and for other potentialearthquakes. Develop an earthquakescenario for greater Quito and for otherpotential earthquakes in order to incorporate seismic safety into future planning

and development of the city. Future scenarios should include improved methodsof estimating earthquake casualties anddeaths for the purpose of emergencyservice response planning.

Possible Resources:Possible sources of funding for this

project include international agencies suchas the United Nations Department of Rumanitarian Affairs, US and Canadian AID,Banco Interamericano de DesarroIlo, ]ICA,and ORSTOM; and private organizationsand foundations, banks, insurance companies, and the industrial sector. Resourcesinclude graduate students, visiting experts,and the international community.Responsible Agencies:• Instituto Geofisico of Escuela Politécnica

Nacional and other schools of engineering and geology

• Professional societies and unions (suchas SEIE)

Develop a WorkplaceEarthquake PreparednessProgram

This project educates personnel in aIlsectors of industry about earthquake risksand emergency preparedness. This wouldresult in the spread of information to friendsand family as weIl, thereby benefiting notonly individual businesses and employeesbut the community at large. Under thisproject, management would first be trainedto analyze the earthquake risks they faceand develop risk management plans fortheir institutions. The Superintendencia deBancos y Seguros, the Câmara de Industria,and other relevant organizations would require management to submit educationplans.Employees at every level would then beeducated in preparing for and surviving anearthquake.


Auxiliary Tasks:• Rold industry-wide meetings to deter

mine methods of increasing risk awareness and to emphasize the opportunityof managing these risks through policymeasures.

Possible Resources:Courses on earthquake risk and emer

gency preparedness may be availablethrough or developed by the Red Cross, thefire department, ALERTA, and the Office ofCivil Defense. Useful references includeBICEPP (Los Angeles' Business and IndustryCouncil for Emergency Planning and Preparedness) and the California Seismic SafetyCommission publications. Private industryis an important source of funding for thisproject.Responsible Agencies:• Management of respective institutions

• ALERTA• Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros,

Ministerio de Industria, and other relevant organizations

Improve Emergency ResponseEquipment and Facilities

Improved emergency response equipment and facilities are vital for quick, effective response to a major earthquake. Underthis project, research teams would inventory available human and material resources, and based on a disaster scenario,determine vulnerabilities and critical needs.Priority should be given to fire-fightingequipment, search and rescue equipment,and hospitals.Auxiliary Tasks:• Work with the fire department and

Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable toregularly inspect and repair fire hydrants.

• Secure funds to purchase a crane for usein repairing and replacing damaged mainsewage collectors.

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• Provide institutions, private businesses,industries, and social and public serviceswith basic emergency equipment, such asfirst aid kits and emergency food andwater reserves.

• Improve training of search and rescueteams.

Responsible Agencies:• ReIevant emergency services organizations• Municipio de Quito• Direcci6nes de Planeamiento de la

Seguridad para eI Desarrollo Nacional

Establish a Proper InsuranceTariff with UnderwritingGuidelines

A proper insurance tariff with insurance underwriting guidelines consideringearthquake hazards would encourage responsible, earthquake-resistant design andconstruction. Under this project, the Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros, in collaboration with Asociaci6n de Compafiias deSeguros dei Ecuador, Asociaci6n Nacionalde Agencias Colocadoras de Seguros deiEcuador, and international reinsurers, wouldestablish fair rating guidelines, which wouldmake earthquake insurance available toresidents of Quito. The insurance tariff and

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underwriting guidelines would be based onsoil properties, estimated ground shakingintensities and subsequent geological hazards, damage distribution estimates, andstructural design and construction. Ratingdiscounts would then be available for structures with appropriate earthquake-resistantdesign and construction. A proper insurance tariffand underwriting guidelines couldalso ensure that earthquake insurance isfeasible for existing structures, especiallyresidential buildings.Auxiliary Tasks:• Evaluate sufficiency of client earthquake

coverage.• Train insurance company staff to advise

clients on earthquake risk managementactions.

• Train insurance company staff to monitorclients' adherence to the building codes.

Possible Resources:Sources of information for this project

include the system oftariffs used in Mexico,and CRESTA, the internationalworking groupof insurance and reinsurance companies.Responsible Agencies:• Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros• Asociaci6n de Compafiias de Seguros deI

Ecuador• Asociaci6n Nacional de Agencias

Colocadoras de Seguros dei Ecuador• Reinsurers• Insurance companies, agents, and brokers


AppendixCAcronyms and Translations

Acronyms

ACOSEANACSEATCBICEPP

CAMECOCDMGCENAPREDCODIGEMCONADEEEQEMAEMAPEMETELIASPEIIDNDRIFCIFEAINECEL]ICANATOOLADEORSTOM

SEACSEIETACUNDROUNESCOUS AlDVPIWG

Asociacion de Compaîiias de Seguros del EcuadorAsociacion Nacional de Agencias Colocadoras de Seguros del EcuadorApplied Technology Council (USA)Business and Industry Council for Emergency Planning and Preparedness(Los Angeles)Câmara Ecuatoriana de la ConstruccionCallfornia Division of Mines and GeologyCentro Nacional de Prevencion de Desastres (Mexico City)Corporacion de Desarrollo Geologico Minero y Metalurgico (Quito)Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (Ecuador)Empresa Eléctrica QuitoEmpresa Municipal de Alcantarillado (Quito)Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable (Quito)Empresa Estatal de Telecomunicaciones (Quito)International Association of Seismology and Physics of the Earth's InteriorInternational Decade for Natural Disaster ReductionInternational Finance Corporation (Washington, DC)Institut Français d'Etudes Andines (Quito)Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificacion]apan International Cooperation AgencyNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationOrganizacion Latinoamericana de EnergiaInstitut Français de Recherche Scientifique pour le Developpement enCooperation (France)Social and Economie Advisory CommitteeSociedad Ecuatoriana de Ingenieria EstructuralTechnical Advisory CommitteeUnited Nations Disaster Relief Organization (Geneva)United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Paris)United States Agency for International DevelopmentVirginia Polytechnic InstituteWorking Group

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Translations

Asociaci6n de Bancos Privados del EcuadorAsociaci6n de Compafiias de Seguros

del EcuadorAsociaci6n Ecuatoriana de Radiodifusi6nAsociaci6n Nacional de Agencias Colocadoras

de Seguros del EcuadorBanco Interamericano de DesarrolloCâmara de IndustriaCâmara de Industriales de PichinchaCâmara de la Construcci6n de QuitoCâmara Ecuatoriana de la Construcci6nCentro Nacional de Prevenci6n de DesastresCompafieros de las AméricasConsejo Nacional de DesarrolloConsejo Nacional de UniversidadesCorporaci6n de Desarrollo Geol6gico

Minero y MetalurgicoCuerpo de Bomberos de QuitoDefensa CivilDirecci6n de Aviaci6n Civil, AeropuertoDirecci6n de Fiscalizaci6n Ilustre Municipio

de QuitoDirecci6n de Planitïcaci6nDirecciones de Planeamiento de la Seguridad

para el Desarrollo NacionalDirecci6n Nacional de TrânsitoEmpresa Eléctrica QuitoEmpresa Estatal de TelecomunicacionesEmpresa Municipal de Agua PotableEmpresa Municipal de AlcantarilladoEscuela Politécnica NacionalFondo de SalvamentoFundaci6n RescateIlustre Municipio de QuitoInstituto de Capacitaci6n MunicipalInstituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificaci6nInstituto Ecuatoriano de Normalizaci6nInstituto GeofisicoMinisterio de IndustriaMinisterio de Salud PublicaOrganizaci6n Latinoamericana de EnergiaSociedad Ecuatoriana de Ingenieria EstructuralSuperintendencia de Bancos y SegurosUnidad de Transporte nustre Municipio de QuitoUniversidad Cat6lica de Quito

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Association of Private Banks of EcuadorAssociation of Insurance Companies

of EcuadorEcuadorian Association of BroadcastingNational Association of Insurance Brokers

of EcuadorInteramerican Development BankChamber of IndustryChamber of Industrialists of PichinchaChamber of Construction, QuitoEcuadorian Chamber of ConstructionNational Center for Disaster PreventionPartners of the AmericasNational Development CouncilNational Council of UniversitiesDevelopment Corporation of Geology,

Mines and MetallurgyQuito Fire BrigadeCivil DefenseAdministration of Civil Aviation, AirportMunicipal Administration of the Treasury,

QuitoPlanning DepartmentOffices of Security Planning for

National DevelopmentNational Administration of TransitQuito Electrical CompanyState Telecommunications CompanyMunicipal Drinking Water CompanyMunicipal Sewer CompanyNational Polytechnic SchoolSalvation FundRescue FoundationIllustrious Municipality of QuitoMunicipal Institute of TrainingEcuadorian Institute of ElectricityEcuadorian Institute of StandardizationGeophysical InstituteMinistry of IndustryMinistry of Public HealthLatin American Energy OrganizationEcuadorian Structural Engineering AssociationSuperintendence of Banks and InsuranceMunicipal Transportation Unit of QuitoCatholic University of Quito

Selected Maps from the Quito, Ecuador Earthquake Risk Management ProjectEscuela Politecnica Nacional GeoHazards International lIustre Municipio de Quito ORSTOM Quito OVO Corporation

Distribution of Buildings Categories

Selected Landmarks

>

No structure

o 1 2 3 4 5(km), I I I I I

Damage to Buildings

Damage Rate

• > 30%

10 - 29%

3 - 9%

• 0 - 2%

Damage Resulting from the

Potential Local Earthquake

1 - 2

< 1

o

N

Number of breaks

per km of pipe

Damage to Water

Supply System

'-- Via Interoceanica

~:¥ ~__ Panamericana Norle

_____ La Carolina Park

'iJ__----Olympic Stadium

o 1 2 3 4 5(km)I I I I I I

Categories of

Buildings

• Adobe

• Unreinforced Masonry

Self-built

• Steel

• RC Low

• RC Middle & High

• RC + Shear Wall

• Open Space

~~ EI Ejido Park

______ La Alameda Park

':-- La Villaflora

~c~_--__ puengaSi Water Plant

~;..,.----------_Via Oriental

.---- Machangara River

===1_ Panamericana Sur

Quito Airport ----t::;;

N

d=~~~------:: El Beaterio,.~:;"'~··~~.~iJn Fuel Facility

Civil Defense Office _

Via Occidental__~"

Plaza de Toros ~

Panecillo HiII-

Plaza de la Independencia--

Av. 24 de Mayo-------"f~~:f~

Central University ~

Fundeporte Park

ChillOgallO~

"

Elevation(m)

_ > 3700_ 3600 - 3700_ 3500 - 3600_ 3400 - 3500_ 3300 - 3400_ 3200 - 3300

3100 - 32003000 - 3100

_ 2900 - 3000_ 2800 - 2900_ 2700 - 2800_ 2600 - 2700_ 2500 - 2600_ < 2500

o 1 2 3 4 5(km)I I I I I I

Topography of the Quito Area

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