The processes, principles and goals of constitutional design

Class #2 - Gov 1109

Lijphart 2

Class Structure

I. Why are constitutions important?II. Processes of constitutional design

Inclusive or elite-driven (Ginsburg, Samuels)

III. Principles of constitutional design Power-concentrating or power-sharing? (Lijphart) Nine choices

IV. Contrasting case-studies Majoritarian democracy: Case study of the UK May 2005 and 2010 elections Consensus democracy: Case study of the Swiss 2003 election

V. Discussion What would be the arguments for adopting either type of constitutions in

Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?

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Questions

In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?

What would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?

Lijphart 4

Required readings

PROCESSES: Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and Justin Blount. 2009. ’Does the Process of

Constitution-Making Matter?’ Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5: 201-223

PRINCIPLES: Arend Lijphart. 2004. ‘Constitutional design for divided societies.’ Journal of

Democracy 15(2): 96-109

CASE STUDIES: Kirsti Samuels. 2007

Constitution building processes and democratization: A discussion of twelve case studies. International IDEA

Lijphart 5

Additional useful resources

Comparative Constitutions Projecthttp://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions

International Constitutional Law Documentshttp://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/index.html

International IDEA www.IDEA.int

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Lijphart 7

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1. Why are constitutions important?

Lijphart 9

I: Why are constitutions important?

1. Constitutions structure patterns of legitimate authority within nation-states e.g.

Electoral rules determine the number of parties in parliament and in government

Executive-legislative relations influence capacity for effective governance Federalism determines vertical power-sharing

2. Constitutions embody symbolic national goals and aspirations

3. Negotiated constitutional settlements integral to peace-building and reconciliation process

In Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan

4. Potential for practical policy reforms e.g. Electoral reforms in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela Constitutional change in Bolivia, UK, Turkey

Lijphart 10

What are constitutions?

The body of highest-order legal rules and principles that specify how other laws are to be produced, applied, enforced and interpreted

What counts? A single Constitutional document Supplementary charters of human rights Or a series of basic laws and unwritten conventions

Major contrasts can exist between de jure Constitutions and de facto constitutions

Lijphart 11

“In any given year…some 4 or 5 constitutions will be replaced, 10-15 will be amended, and another 20 or so proposals for revision will be under consideration.”

Worldwide, the average lifespan of a constitution is 17 years

Ginsberg, Elkins and Blount 2009 p202

Constitutional Change

Lijphart 12

Lifespan Duration of Constitutions0

24

68

10Pe

rcen

t

0 50 100 150 200Lifespan

Source: Comparative Constitutions Project

Lijphart 13

Types of Constitutional Change

State building Post-conflict peace settlements

E.g. Afghanistan constitution

State reform Transition from autocracy

Eg Choice of electoral system in post-Communist states Common in established democracies

Revision or amendment of existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options

eg UK green paper “The Governance of Britain” (2007)

Lijphart 14

Who decides?

Executiv

eExpert commissions

and international advisors

Legislative bodies and committees

Special constituent assemblies

Inclusive constitutional referendums

Parti

cipat

ion

Lijphart 15

Used to be elites; trend is growing use of public participation in constitution making (Ginsburg et al Fig 1 p207)

Processes involving a referendum produce constitutions that are more likely to have virtually every category of right..more likely to ensure universal suffrage, secret ballot, use of referenda.

More inclusive processes may produce more democratic outcomes Source: Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount (2009) p218

Does inclusion matter?

Lijphart 16

2. Principles of constitutional design

Lijphart 17

II: Principles of constitutional design

Arend Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (1968)Democracy in Plural Society (1979)Democracies (1984)Electoral systems and party systems (1994) Institutional design in new democracies (1996)Patterns of Democracy (1999)“Constitutional design for divided societies” (2004)Thinking about Democracy (2008)

Lijphart 18

1. Legislative electoral systemProportional representation eg party listMixed eg mixed member proportionalMajoritarian – eg Single member pluralityPros and cons?

2. Within PR Open or closed lists Size of multimember districts Degree of proportionality Pros and cons?

Choices for divided societies

Lijphart 19

3. Parliamentary or presidential government?Parliamentary executives have collegial executiveAvoid zero-sum majoritarian electionsAvoid executive-legislative stalemateAvoid rigidityPros and cons?

Choices

Lijphart 20

4. Power-sharing executiveCollegial cabinetsMandates specific group representation

Eg BelgiumParty ministers on proportional basis for those

with 5%+ seatsE.g. South Africa

Choices

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5. Cabinet stabilityNo-confidence voteFixed term parliamentsConstructive vote of no-confidence

6. Head of stateCeremonial role eg monarchy If selected

Limited powers Appointed by multiple actors

Choices

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7. Federalism and decentralizationSecond federal chamber over-represents less

populous unitsFederal boundaries?Size of federal states?

8. Non-territorial autonomyEg minority rights over education

9. Power-sharing in appointed positionsCivil service, judiciary, police

Choices

Lijphart 23

Types of democratic constitutionsS o u rce : L ijp h a rt D e m o c ra cie s (1 9 9 9)

egU K ?

N e w Z e a la n d?B a rba d os

M a jo rita rian(W e s tm in s te r)

egU S A

C o s ta R icaF ra n ce

M ixed

egE U

B e lg iumS w itze rla nd

C o n se n sus(C o n so cia tio n a l)

Democracies

Lijphart 24

Consociational democracy

Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation Netherlands exemplified ‘pillorized’ divided society Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensus Why? Constitutional arrangements

Executive power-sharing/grand coalition Minority veto in government Proportional representation of all major groups in elected/appointed

office Cultural autonomy for groups

Model for other divided (plural) societies? E.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Cyprus

Lijphart 25

Normative values

Majoritarian democracy Goals…

government accountability and transparency of decision-making

single-party executives, effective opposition parties, vigorous parliamentary debate, and decisive elections.

Yet dangers of elective dictatorship, permanent majorities, lack of checks and balances.

Consociational democracy

Goals… consensual decision-making,

bargaining and compromise multiple parliamentary parties,

each with a stake in coalition government, and

dispersed decision-making processes.

Yet dangers of ineffective governance, extreme multiparty

fragmentation, lack of accountability.

Ref: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999

‘Majoritarian’ ModelPower-concentrating

Effective and accountable

‘Consensus’ ModelPower-sharing

Inclusive &representative Exec-Parties One-party cabinet Coalition government

Executive Executive dominant Balanced exec-legislature

Party system Two-party Multi-party

Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional Representation

Interest groups Pluralist Corporatist

Federal-Unitary

Government Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federal

Parliament Unicameral Balanced Bicameral

Constitution Flexible More Rigid

Judiciary Parlt. sovereign Judicial review

Central Bank Dependent Independent

Lijphart 29Typology of DemocraciesRef: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999

Executive-Parties

2.01.00.0-1.0-2.0

Uni

tary

-Fed

eral

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

VEN

US

UK

TRI

SWI

SWE

SPA

POR

PNG

NOR

NZ

NET

MAU

MAL

JPN

JAM ITA

ISR

IRE

ICE

GRE

GER

FRA

FIN

DENCR

CAN

BOT

BEL

BAR

BAH

AUT

AUL

Majoritarian

Consensual

Lijphart 30

Consensus democracy matters

For the inclusion of minority partiesFor the protection of minority interestsFor women’s representationFor public policy, economic outcomes, and

welfare states

Lijphart 31

The logical sequence of consociational theory

PR electoral systems or

reserved seats

Federalism & decentralization

Election ofethnic minority

partiesPeaceful

democratic consolidation

Election ofethnic minority

parties

Greater support within minority communities

Does the logic make sense? Criticisms?

Plural societies

Lijphart 32

Potential criticisms?

For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings shaped by political structures and elites. Power-sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages (Donald Horowitz)

Eg Bosnia-Herzegovina By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote-pooling

across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)

Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victory

Majoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)

III: Majoritarian institutions

Case study: UK May 2005 and 2010 general elections

Lijphart 34

Institutions: UK 1945-1997

Unwritten constitution – Magna Carta etc. One-party cabinet government since 1945

Collective responsibility, primus inter pares Two-party parliamentary competition

Labour and Conservative in govnt and opposition Programmatic & disciplined parties

Mass-branch party organizations, few independents, few backbench rebellions, manifesto program

Parliamentary sovereignty (no Supreme Court) Unitary state (local government administration) Bicameral parliament but Commons predominant Plurality FPTP elections – exaggerates votes: seats for

winner

Lijphart 35

UK Ballot paper

Lijphart 36

2005 UK election resultJune 2005 % of Votes % of seats Ratio Number of

seatsLabour 35.2 54.9 1.56 355

Conservative 32.3 30.4 0.94 197

Lib Dem 22.0 9.5 0.43 62

SNP 1.5 0.9 0.60 6

PC 0.6 0.5 0.83 3

Other 8.4 3.4 0.40 23

   

       

Labour Maj. 2.9 24.5   66

         

Total 100 100   659

Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

Lijphart 37

2010 UK election resultParty Seats Gain Loss Net Votes % +/-%

Conservative 306 100 3 +97 10,706,647 36.1 +3.8

Labour 258 3 94 -91 8,604,358 29.0 -6.2

Liberal Democrat 57 8 13 -5 6,827,938 23.0 +1.0

Democratic Unionist Party 8 0 1 -1 168,216 0.6 -0.3

Scottish National Party 6 0 0 0 491,386 1.7 +0.1

Sinn Fein 5 0 0 0 171,942 0.6 -0.1

Plaid Cymru 3 1 0 +1 165,394 0.6 -0.1

Social Democratic & Labour Party 3 0 0 0 110,970 0.4 -0.1

Green 1 1 0 +1 285,616 1.0 -0.1

Alliance Party 1 1 0 +1 42,762 0.1 +0.0

UK Independence Party 0 0 0 0 917,832 3.1 +0.9

British National Party 0 0 0 0 563,743 1.9 +1.2

Ulster Conservatives and Unionists - New Force 0 0 1 -1 102,361 0.3 -0.1

English Democrats 0 0 0 0 64,826 0.2 +0.2

Respect-Unity Coalition 0 0 1 -1 33,251 0.1 -0.1

Traditional Unionist Voice 0 0 0 0 26,300 0.1

Christian Party 0 0 0 0 18,623 0.1

Independent Community and Health Concern 0 0 1 -1 16,150 0.1 +0.0

Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition 0 0 0 0 12,275 0.0

Scottish Socialist Party 0 0 0 0 3,157 0.0 -0.1

Others 1 1 1 0 319,891 1.1 0.0

Turnout 29,653,638 65.1 4.0

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UK House of Commons 1900-2010 Overall Maj Govnt

1900 135 Con Salisbury/Balfour1906 129 Lib Campbell Bannerman1910 None Asquith1910 None Asquith1918 283 Coalition Lloyd George1922 74 Con Bonar Law1923 None Baldwin1924 210 Con MacDonald1929 None MacDonald1931 492 Nat MacDonald1935 242 Nat Baldwin/Chamberlain/Churchill1945 147 Lab Attlee1950 6 Lab Attlee1951 16 Con Churchill1955 59 Con Eden/Macmillan1959 99 Con Macmillan/Douglas-Home1964 5 Lab Wilson1966 97 Lab Wilson1970 31 Con Heath1974 0 Lab Wilson 1974 4 Lab Wilson/Callaghan1979 44 Con Thatcher1983 144 Con Thatcher1987 101 Con Thatcher1992 21 Con Major1997 178 Lab Blair2001 167 Lab Blair2005 66 Lab Blair/Brown2010 None Cameron?

Lijphart 39

‘Winner’s bonus’ UK

Note: The votes-seats ratio is calculated as the percentage of UK seats divided into the percentage of UK votes for the governing party. A ratio of 1.0 would indicate no electoral bias for the government. Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 20101.00

1.10

1.20

1.30

1.40

1.50

1.60

1.28

1.091.07

1.10

1.171.14

1.20

1.13

1.27 1.28

1.22

1.44

1.37

1.23

1.46

1.541.56

1.30

Vot

es: s

eats

rat

io

Lijphart 40

UK % Vote 1900-2010

Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated

1900

1906

1910

1910

1918

1922

1923

1924

1929

1931

1935

1945

1950

1951

1955

1959

1964

1966

1970

1974

1974

1979

1983

1987

1992

1997

2001

2005

2010

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Con

Lab

LD

Other% o

f UK

vote

Lijphart 41

UK % Seats 1900-2010

Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated

19001906191019101918192219231924192919311935194519501951195519591964196619701974197419791983198719921997200120052010

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Con

Lab

LD

OtherNum

ber o

f MPs

Lijphart 42

Why exaggerative bias for winner?

1. Malapportionment Unequal size of electorates in each seat Decline of urban pop/Labour constituency Delayed effect of boundary changes

2. Differential turnout Lowest in safe Labour seats

Lijphart 43

Geography also matters:UK 2005 Election Seats

Source: Pippa Norris Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)

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Simulated seats GB 2010

FPTP STV AV PR List0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

306

246

281

234

258

207

262

188

57

162

79

150

2835

28

78

ConLabLDOther

Lijphart 45

Moderate party competition

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project/ Judith Bara EPOP 2005

Lijphart 46

Breakdown of classic ideal type since 1997

Federalism: Devolution for Scotland and Wales Northern Ireland assembly Elected Mayor/Assembly for London

Electoral reform: Party list PR for Europe AMS for Scotland/Wales STV for Scottish local elections May 2011 referendum on AV for Commons

House of Lords reform Written Bill of Rights- Euro. Convention Use of referendums

Advantages and disadvantages?

IV: Consensus democracy

Switzerland

Lijphart 49

Swiss democracy

Pop 7.4m Plural cleavages

Religion (46% Catholic, 40% Protestant) Language

(65%German, 10% Italian, 18% French), Region/canton Class ($32,800 per capita PPP 2003)

Social divisions, yet elite consensus? Stable power-sharing coalition but lack of

accountability?

Lijphart 50

Swiss democracy

Since 1848, Switzerland has been a confederation, currently with 26 cantons and 2873 communes.

The Government (Federal Council) has 7 members elected by parliament for 4 years

From 1959-2003, ‘magic formula’ 2 seats each for the FDP, CVP, and SPS, and 1 seat for the SVP.

October 2003, 2 seats given to SVP, 1 CVPAnnual president rotates as primus inter pares

Lijphart 51

Swiss parliament

Bicameral Federal Assembly: Direct elections PR List elections w. high proportionality votes : seats The National Council (popular representation, 200 seats, based

on population size per canton) and The Council of States (cantonal representation, 46 seats, 2 per

canton) Eight party factions in Federal Assembly and 13 parties in total.

Federal Supreme Court Many popular initiatives and referendums.

Lijphart 52

October 2003 Election resultsNationalrat and Ständerat: 19 october 2003 (%) %Vote 200 %Seats 46

Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 26.6 55 27.5% 8

Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz SPS 23.4 52 26.0% 9

Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz FDP 17.3 36 18.0% 14

Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz CVP 14.4 28 14.0% 15

Grüne Partei der Schweiz GPS 7.4 13 6.5% -

Liberale Partei der Schweiz LPS 2.2 4 2.0% -

Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz EVP 2.3 3 1.5% -

Eidgenössische Demokratische Union EDU 1.3 2 1.0% -

Schweizer Demokraten SD 1.0 1 0.5% -

Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz PdA 0.7 2 1.0% -

Lega dei Ticinese LdT 0.4 1 0.5% -

Solidarités Sol 0.5 1 0.5% -

Christlich-Soziale Partei CSP 0.4 1 0.5% -

Alternative Liste AL 0.5 1 0.5% -

- Sozialistisch Grüne Alternative Zug SGAZ 1

Freiheitspartei der Schweiz FPS 0.2 - -

Lijphart 53

Swiss party competition

European Liberal

Conservative

RightLeft

SVP Radical right

SP Social Democratic

Green Party

Free Democrats

CVP Christian Democrats

Note: Legislative voting patterns 1999-2003

Advantages and disadvantages?

Lijphart 55

V: Discussion

In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?

What would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?

Lijphart 56

Conclusions

Useful classification of democratic institutions From ideal types to continuous measures Clarifies values and normative debates Systematic comparisons Consequences of institutional design?

Next class: Electoral Systems

Lijphart 57