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THE POLITICAL ELITE OF
POST-INDEPENDENCE ARMENIA:
CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS
OF FORMATION
YEREVAN 2014
1
The political elite of post-independence Armenia: characteristics
and patterns of formation. – Yerevan: Edit Print, 2014; 15 p.
The present study was conducted with the support of the Academic Swiss Caucasus
Net (ASCN). ASCN is a programme aimed at promoting the social sciences and humanities
in the South Caucasus (primarily Georgia and Armenia). Its different activities foster the
emergence of a new generation of talented scholars. Promising junior researchers
receive support through research projects, capacity-building training and scholarships.
The programme emphasizes the advancement of individuals who, thanks to their ASCN
experience, become better integrated in international academic networks. The ASCN
programme is coordinated and operated by the Interfaculty Institute for Central and
Eastern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). It was initiated and is
supported by Gebert Rüf Stiftung.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent opinions of Gebert Rüf Stiftung and the University of Fribourg.
This publication is not for sale
© Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN)
© AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association (AREG SCYA) NGO
ISBN 978-9939-52-775-8
2
CONTENTS
Foreword ............................................................................................ 4
Overview of the Research on Political Elites .................................... 6
Research methodology ......................................................................14
Chapter 1. Patterns of political elite formation in post-Soviet
Armenia .............................................................................................17
Chapter 2 Characteristics of political elite: values and
preferences........................................................................................51
Chapter 3 Characteristics of future political elite ........................... 76
References ........................................................................................ 94
Appendices
Appendix A Topic guide for interviews.............................. 97
Appendix B Charts ............................................................ 101
Appendix C Tables........................................................ ...134
Appendix D Graphs ........................................................... 1
3
FOREWORD
This book presents the results of a study of political elites in Armenia.
This study was conducted by a research and analysis team from the AREG
Scientific Cultural Youth Association utilizing the framework from “The
formation of political elites in post-Soviet Armenia” project financed by
The South Caucasus Academic Network (АSCN) of Freiburg University. The
study was conducted during the period 2011–12 in the territories of the
Republic of Armenia (RA) and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR).
This study aimed to characterize the post-Soviet Armenian political
elite and the patterns of its formation. To accomplish these goals, the
following three sets of research objectives were identified:
1. Describe the main features of the process by which the political
elite is formed and identify the political elite’s salient
characteristics, including the composition of elite groups and the
patterns of elite recruitment.
2. Identify and analyze the political preferences, values and
behavioural characteristics and foreign policy positions of the
political elite’s representatives.
3. Explore the characteristics of potential representatives of future
political elites, including political culture, values and preferences,
among other characteristics.
This book consists of three main chapters, each devoted to the
examination of one of the three objectives. In addition to the three main
chapters, the book contains sections on literature review, research
methodology as well as a list of the used sources and appendixes.
This research project is unique in several ways. First, it summarizes
the entire postindependence period for both the Republic of Armenia and
the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. This timespan enhances the
comprehensiveness of the study and provides an opportunity to compare
political elite formation models in two countries. Moreover, the utilization
of qualitative research provided an opportunity to obtain data on the
peculiarities of the political culture of the NKR. This study is the first, to
our knowledge, to include the NKR because its non-recognized status
precludes its inclusion in international and regional research initiatives of
this kind.
The second advantage of this study is its extensive empirical data. For
nearly two years, both qualitative and quantitative research instruments
were utilized to collect and analyze a comprehensive and extensive
4
dataset on Armenian political elites, the implementation of which would
be impossible without the financial support of the funding organization.
This project also reviews modern scientific surveys of political elites,
concentrates on theories and methodologies recently developed in other
post-Soviet countries and selects the most effective approaches and
methods within the framework of such studies. However, this study only
partly relies on the methodologies of previous research on political elites.
One of the three major aspects of this study is its investigation of the
potential representatives of future political elites, which was conducted
by identifying and investigating the social groups that constitute the bases
of recruitment of current political elites. This approach revealed the main
features of the next generation of the political elites’ representatives. This
study also employs an experimental application of social network analysis
to identify and analyze influential groups and individuals within the
political elite, such as members of parliament.
This publication is the results of "Patterns of political elite formation
of post Soviet Armenia" research project implemented by the team of
AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO with following members:
Project Coordinator and Senior Research Analyst: Hamazasp Danielyan, PhD - Political Science
Assistants:
Armen Grigoryan - Political Scientist; Hayk Khanumyan - International
Relations Specialist
Research Project Director:
Adrine Babloyan, PhD - Sociology, AREG Scientific Cultural Youth
Association NGO, Vice President
Database Specialist:
Bagrat Harutyunyan, PhD – Sociology
Research Fieldwork Coordinator:
Tigran Harutyunyan - AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO,
Board Member
Overall Management and Control:
Hovhannes Keshishian - AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association
NGO, President
5
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON
POLITICAL ELITES
This section briefly analyzes the scholarly literature on elites that
addresses the evolution of this concept, the theoretical deliberation of
the role of political elites in defining the nature of regimes and the
transformation of perceptions of this role, as well as the characteristics
of elites in various political systems. These topics were selected on the
basis of their relevance to research on the Armenian political elite, and
these concepts and theories guided the formulation of a theoretical
framework for this study. This chapter contains three main sections
representing different periods of research on political elites, including
a review of recent scholarly publications on political elites in post-
Soviet countries. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the
alternative operationalizations of the political elite in the scholarly
literature and defines the concept adopted in the framework of this
study.
Classical Elite Theory
The first generation of scholars began researching elites nearly a
century ago. The existence of small, organized groups of individuals
who control political power was considered a fact of life by scholars
including G. Mosca, V. Pareto and R. Michels (Michels, 2001; Mosca,
1939; Pareto, 1935). These three authors used different terms (“ruling
class,” “elites” and “oligarchy,” respectively) to refer to elites, but
they discussed various aspects of the same phenomenon.
Mosca described the ruling class as well as systems of elite
recruitment. He concluded that democracy, in the Aristotelian sense,
cannot exist in reality because the existence of elites constitutes an
aristocracy. Pareto discussed the aspects of an individual’s personality
that determine her social status. Following Machiavelli, Pareto
identified two types of elite representatives based on these qualities,
6
lions and foxes, who interchangeably rule societies. Pareto also
concluded that the existence of elites was inevitable in any society
due to the substantial differences in individual qualities. Michels’ work
analyzed political organizations, particularly leftist movements and
parties; he formulated “the iron rule of oligarchy,” which elucidated
the oligarchic tendencies of political organizations. Based on his
analysis, Michels argued that even political organizations that pursue
democratic goals inevitably become undemocratic: “The democratic
currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the
same shoal. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is
simultaneously encouraging and depressing. When democracies have
gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual
transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also
the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so
fiercely” (Michels, 2001, p. 245).
As illustrated above, these early scholars of elites not only agreed
on (a) the inevitability of the existence of small, organized groups that
rule a society but also concluded that (b) these groups are inconsistent
with democratic ideals and structures.
Such interpretations of elites and their effects on democratic
systems reappear in academic literature beyond the expositions of
Classical Elite Theory. For example, C. W. Mills located and described
the elite of the post-Second World War United States in his seminal
work, “The Power Elite.” Mills argued that a few hundred individuals
held power by interchangeably occupying positions in various
hierarchies, while “the images of the public of classic democracy are
still used as working justification of power in American society... [which] are not adequate even as an approximate model of how the
American system of power works” (Mills, 1956, p. 300).
7
Revision of the Role of Political Elites in
Democratization
However, a number of other social scientists do not consider the
existence of elites to be a challenge to democratic regimes. This
disagreement is not related to the concept of a political elite itself but
rather is related to a reconceptualization of democracy. Several works
have played an important role in the reconciliation of the two
concepts. One of the earliest of these scholars was J. Schumpeter, who
defined democracy as the institutional arrangements of competing
political elite representatives "who acquire power to decide by means
of a competitive struggle for people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1943,
p. 269). This minimalistic definition of democracy was substantially
different from the approaches of earlier scholars who possessed more
idealized understandings of the concept (e.g., Aristotelian democracy,
classical democracy).
The departure from this idealistic understanding of democracy was
one of the most important contributions of R. Dahl. Dahl developed
the concept of polyarchy to distinguish existing political regimes from
the ideal democracy. According to Dahl, polyarchies contain
representatives of small organized groups (political elites) who are
constantly competing for the support of the citizenry. In Dahl’s
polyarchic model, competition among elites and participation of the
masses are the two core characteristics, and the pluralistic nature of
the political elites in such systems is emphasized. Dahl’s other
important contribution to understanding the character of political
elites in polyarchies is the idea of a system of mutual security. The
existence of this system guarantees smooth transitions of political
power from representatives of the ruling political elite to
representatives of the opposition political elite. Such a system of
mutual security emerges in a country when the opposition political
elite representatives are too powerful to be repressed by the ruling
elite representatives. According to Dahl, such a system depends on the
existence of narrow differences in interests and manageable conflicts
8
among competing groups as well as a certain level of trust among
elites to guarantee transitions of political power without endangering
the vital interests of these competing elites (Dahl, 1971, pp. 15–37).
Contemporaneous with Dahl’s work, another article analyzing
historical transitions to democracy was published by D. Rustow
(Rustow, 1970). Drawing on an empirical analysis of several historical
and contemporary cases of democratization, Rustow emphasized the
development of certain attitudes among politicians, including the
willingness to compromise on certain rules of the game within
competing parties during the early stages of democratization. After an
initial, conscious agreement to adopt democratic rules is reached,
politicians and citizens gradually become accustomed to and follow
democratic rules. Rustow described the process (or habituation phase,
in the author’s words) that results in the establishment of a system of
mutual security and emphasized the gradual nature of this process.
However, according to Rustow, certain factors can accelerate the
development of such system (Rustow, 1970, p. 361): “Their trust will
grow more quickly if, in the early decades of the new regime, a wide
variety of political tendencies can participate in the conduct of affairs,
either by joining various coalitions or by taking turns as government
and opposition.”
J. Linz, a famous scholar of Latin American regimes, argued in his
empirical research on democratic breakdowns in the region that both
ruling and opposition elites play crucial roles in the process of
breakdown. Linz focused on the idea of democratic loyalty, that is,
elites’ commitment to democratic institutional norms and procedures
while rejecting nondemocratic alternatives, including the inclusion of
the armed forces in political disputes and crises (Linz, 1978, pp. 37–
40).
However, the transitions observed during the early years of the
third wave of democratization induced many scholars to further
examine the role of elites in these transitions. The 1970–80s were also
quite fruitful in producing empirical research on political elites in both
democratic and nondemocratic countries. Many prominent democracy
scholars continued to explain the nature of political regimes in
9
reference to the dominance of particular values among elites. To a
lesser degree, scholars also examined the behavioral patterns of
political elites in different polities, among other factors. A whole body
of literature was produced recognizing the special roles elites play in
the various phases and scenarios of such transitions. Consequently,
various models and theories were developed that concentrated on the
analysis of the choices and actions of political elite representatives
during democratic transitions. For example, two of the three most
common modes of transition to democracy (top-down elite-led
reforms and reforms resulting from pacts among competing elites)
depend on the actions of elites. These modes of transition were often
considered more effective, whereas the third mode, the breakdown of
authoritarian regimes due to mass movements, was considered less
effective in establishing democracies. T. Karl summarized this notion
while commenting on Latin American regimes, “To date, no stable
political democracy has resulted from regimes transitions in which
mass actors have gained control even momentarily over traditional
ruling classes” (Karl, 1990, p. 8). In some cases, political elites were
considered the most important explanatory variable of both
democratic transitions and the consolidation of democratic regimes in
any polity (Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell & Schmitter,
1986).
This elite-centered paradigm, while influential, was contested
within the discipline. Theoretical debates among researchers over the
factors that explain democratization continued and intensified during
the 1990s and 2000s (Collier, 1999; Higley & Burton, 2006).
Meanwhile, scholars investigated the processes triggered by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly the establishment of new
regimes and the nature and role of elites in these post-Soviet
republics.
10
Research on Post-Soviet Political Elites
The final years of communist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a wave of studies
on political elites in communist and post communist countries.
Research on elites in the Soviet Union had been conducted by
Western scholars since the beginning of the Cold War period.
However, these studies concentrated on describing and analyzing the
nature of Soviet elites and rarely engaged the problem of elites’ roles
in democratization (Klugman, 1989; Urban, 1989). After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, research began to examine regime transformation
and the role that elites play in that process in the post-Soviet
republics. Elite-centered theories of democratic transition that were
developed based on the transitions that occurred in other regions
(e.g., Southern Europe and Latin America) were utilized to explain and
predict regime transformations in post communist spaces. Research on
the emerging political elites of this region comprised a significant
fraction of the academic literature during the early 1990s (for
example, Higley, Pakulski, & Wesolowski, 1998).
This interest in studying elites increased not only among foreign
scholars working predominantly on topics related to democratization
but also among local academics, who were finally able to conduct their
own research on elites, a taboo subject during the Soviet period
(Gel’man and Tarusina, 2000). The resulting body of literature on
contemporary political elites produced by both local scholars and
foreign academics can be categorized as follows:
• Research on a specific country or region concentrating on the
analysis of elite representatives’ characteristics, background, and
mechanisms of elite recruitment.
• Research on the values and attitudes of political elite
representatives in a specific country and, rarely, in neighbouring
countries (Steen, 1997). These studies are based mostly on
qualitative interviews with elite representatives (Hollander, 1999;
Miller & Hesli, 1997). Some of these studies also compared the
11
values and attitudes dominant in the elites and general populations
of the same country (Zimmerman, 2002).
• Comparative research involving many post-Soviet countries with
the aim of testing and improving general theories of the role of
elites in regime transformation. Such studies were often
conducted by foreign scholars and resulted in the revision of not
only the role of elites in democratization (Gill, 2000; McFaul, 2002)
but also of general theories of democratic transition (Carothers,
2002, Gel’man 2003).
The different outcomes of post-Soviet transitions had a direct
impact on research on elites. The direction of research on political
elites in countries where democracy was consolidated gradually shifted
and concentrated on topics that are common for comparative studies
of elites in Western democracies (Haller, 2008). For example, ex-
communist countries that became EU members were incorporated into
research projects such as the EurElite Project (for more on this project
see Best & Edinger, 2005). The empirical research of political elites in
nondemocratic post-Soviet countries (with a great emphasis on Russia)
tends to focus on specific cases (Cummings, 2005; Ergun, 2010; Horák,
2010; Urban, 2010), leaving the elites of other countries unexplored.
Very few scholarly works have touched upon the political elite of
Armenia, among which the most notable is M. Margaryan’s “Political
elite and the problem of democratic transiton in Armenia” (2006). The
author did extensive reivew of existing scholarly literature on elites
and particularly the role of elites in democratization and used this
therotical framework for interpretation and explanation of
developments in post soviet Armenia.
However, no separate studies have been conducted on the
political elites of post-Soviet Armenia with systematically collected
empirical data. Therefore, we designed a research project based on
similar studies conducted in other post-Soviet countries to understand
the structure of the elite, the evolution of recruitment patterns and
the social backgrounds of elite representatives, as well as the values,
political orientations and attitudes toward democratic ideals and
12
practices that predominate among the representatives of the political
elite in Armenia.
Definition of the Political Elite
Within the framework of this study, the political elite was defined
as a group of individuals holding strategic positions within a political
system, which enables these individuals to influence political decision
making directly and regularly. Following Higley and Burton, this
definition enables us to clearly distinguish at the theoretical level
members of the political elite from other actors that could exercise
political influence (Higley & Burton, 2006); we adapt this definition to
our study by limiting it to only those individuals who are associated
with political institutions and are directly engaged in the political
process, that is, individuals considered politicians.
In the social sciences, there are several methods of locating
political elites, including positional, reputational and decisional analysis
(Hoffmann-Lange, 2006). The present research project adopts the first
approach for two main reasons. First, this approach reflects our
definition of the political elite and is preferable for studying elites at
the national level. Second, information on political officials and public
figures is more likely to be archived and accessible to researchers. The
availability of information over the two and a half decades of the
study period is important.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it excludes politically
powerful individuals who do not hold political positions or who are
not publicly involved in politics. However, an initial screening of
biographies indicates that individuals tend to institutionalize their
influence by either running for public offices or being appointed to
mid- and high-level political positions. This strategy is particularly
observable among the wealthiest businessmen and, to a lesser degree,
former high-ranking military officers and family members of
influential politicians.
13
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research project employed both quantitative and qualitative
methods to collect and analyze the data required to answer our
research questions. The main components along with the research
methods employed in each of these components are briefly described
in Table 1.
The initial research stage involved collecting and screening the
official biographies of political elite representatives since 1990.
Biographies were collected for most Armenian cabinet members and
regional governors and all members of parliament. For the NKR, a
scarcity of data limited the biographies to a majority of MPs and
cabinet members, most of the regional governors and the mayors of
the largest towns. The quantitative analysis of these biographical data
served two main purposes. First, it enabled the characterization of
typical members and groups of the political elite and revealed the
main patterns of political elite formation. Second, it enabled the
identification of seven different areas from which most political elite
members are recruited (public servants, members of political parties,
NGO activists, members of local governance bodies, student committee
members, academics/artists/athletes, top business owners and CEOs)
for subsequent study.
Field research began with the development and implementation of
in-depth interviews with past and current representatives of the
political elite. The interview guide (Appendix A) consisted of five main
sections:
• A general overview (gender, age, position, etc.);
• The life story of the respondent (childhood, family, education,
social background and networks, etc.);
• Their entry into politics (career, political membership and
dynamics, political orientations and initial motivations);
• Their views and value system (regime preferences, opinions on
elites, main values, decision-making practices, etc.), and
14
• A mandatory test including nine incomplete sentences to be
finished by respondents (results not presented in this study).
The sample for the in-depth interviews was based on survey
criteria for the political elite. An initial list of over 150 names of
political elite representatives selected through the snowball technique
was prepared. The final list of respondents included approximately 70
politicians who were targeted for appointments with the survey team.
Overcoming apprehension and building rapport were among the most
difficult phases of the survey. Social networks were utilized to
improve collaboration and obtain appointments with political leaders.
The data collection phase was implemented from April to August 2012.
The interviews took an average of 70 min to administer. Generally, the
respondents did not refuse to answer the entire questionnaire after
approving a date for the interview. However, in several cases, the
interviewers suspected biased or insincere answers from political
leaders. Those cases were identified and described by the
interviewers. The final narratives for analysis are based on the
information gathered from 51 transcripts. The procedure was
replicated in the NKR, and the analysis of those nine transcripts is
presented as a separate subchapter.
At the end of each interview, the interviewers evaluated the
politician’s level of sincerity on a five-point scale. Of the interviews,
20% were given scores of 3 or 2, and the remaining 80% received
scores of 4 or 5. None of the interviews received the lowest score for
sincerity. Based on this evaluation process, the level of sincerity was
quite high.
After completion of the in-depth interviews, a survey was
designed and distributed to 691 representatives (500 from Armenia
and 191 from the NKR) from the seven recruitment areas to examine
the political culture of potential political elites. A representative
sample was selected utilizing a multilevel approach that had been
previously designed and tested. Field work was implemented from
February to April 2012. The strategy included the following levels of
activities:
15
• At the first level—proportional sampling was employed to obtain
the required number of respondents in each of the seven sample
segments based on available statistical data;
• At the second level—proportional quota sampling was performed
to ensure representation of the marzes/regions of the RA and the
NKR within each segment;
• At the third level—units within each segment were selected based
on the targeted sampling of units from lists (offices of political
parties, addresses of NGOs, universities, etc.);
• At the fourth level—respondents were selected through the
random selection of floor, room and person in the
buildings/offices selected at the third level.
The questionnaire contained 56 questions divided into the
following seven sections (see Appendix B in Armenian version):
• Social background and networks;
• Social and political activities;
• Attitudes toward democracy and trust in political institutions;
• Assessment of political developments;
• Political values and preferences;
• Social wellbeing and trust;
• Social-demographic characteristics.
The final stage of the study utilized Social Network Analysis to
identify and describe the most powerful representatives of the
political elite within recent three convocations of the parliament of
the RA (final section of Chapter 1).
16
CHAPTER 1. THE PATTERNS OF POLITICAL
ELITE FORMATION IN POST-SOVIET
ARMENIA
This chapter describes the main characteristics of the political
elite, reveals the changes and trends in these characteristics and
compares political elites in the RA and the NKR. To achieve this goal,
the official biographies of political elite members provided the only
realistic option to systematically collect and analyze the required data.
For the RA, elite representatives’ biographies (all MPs, all ministers and
most regional governors or marzpets) were primarily collected through
the official Web sites of the parliament and government. As a result,
1280 cases were identified and entered into the database.
For the NKR, Web sites containing the biographies of officials from
previous years do not exist, and the main sources of information were
several publications containing biographies of the MPs and an
encyclopaedia on Karabakh that contained detailed information about
many individuals on our list. In total, the NKR database contained 262
cases. The difference in the number of cases is partially due to a lack
of data about the NKR, especially for The 1990 Supreme Council (only
37 of 81 biographies were available for MPs). However, the more
important reason is the differences in the number of MP seats (33 in
the NKR and 131 in the RA) as well as less frequent changes in
executive positions in the NKR.
The obvious advantage of utilizing official biographies is that these
documents usually contain information in a standardized format. For
the same reason, it is possible to collect information about certain
characteristics (gender, age, level of education, profession, years spent
in the office, political affiliation, etc.), whereas other types of
information (such as business affiliation, past political affiliations,
reasons for leaving office) are much less frequently available in such
documents.
17
The findings of the analysis will be presented in thematic blocks
and by comparing legislative/elected and executive/appointed
positions in both the RA and the NKR.
Legislators in the RA and the NKR
Political Composition
The single most important event in the transformation of post-
Soviet Armenia occurred just before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In May and June 1990 and December 1991, Supreme Council (SC)
elections were held in both Soviet Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Okrug (NKAO). These single-member district elections
were the first multiparty elections, and as a result, the representatives
of the Communist Party were outnumbered.
Initially, the two parliaments contained a substantial number of
independent MPs (at least half in Soviet Armenia). These independent
MPs represented two main groups. The first group included
communists who had been in politics before the movement, and who
sometimes were even elected as communists, but left the party during
the transition from August 1990 to September 1991.1 For example, in
the RA, 160 of 260 elected MPs were either members of the
Communist Party or had recently been members, including at least 114
bureaucrats. However, by 1991, the communist faction consisted of
only 25 MPs who remained faithful to the Party.2
The second group included individuals who began their political
involvement by participating in the Karabakh movement. The
representatives of this group eventually either joined political parties,
1 The “Declaration of Independence” was adopted by the SC of Soviet Armenia in
August 1990. However, this document was not an actual declaration of independence
but rather an expression of such an intention. Actual independence resulted from the
Referendum for Independence, held on September 21, 1991. 2 This was not the only instance when a large proportion of MPs rapidly changed
their political loyalties; this also occurred in 1997 and 2006.
18
most frequently the ruling parties of the time, or gradually left the
political arena. In 1995, only 28% of MPs were not members of political
parties by the close of the SC term at the end of the summer.
A fully majoritarian electoral system and a large number of seats
(Chart 1.1) enabled members of newly established and minor parties to
be represented in the SC or to create their own parties and MP
coalitions after the election. As a result, the loosely organized factions
and MP coalitions were not large enough to constitute a clear majority
in parliament. To date, the SC is the most politically diverse legislative
body, representing the largest number of parties and groups. At least
12 parties and factions were recorded in the SC, including all the
traditional parties from the diaspora3 that were quickly re-established
in the RA.
This fragmentation enabled the Pan Armenian National Movement
(PANM) to emerge as the dominant player in the SC in 1990 and to
remain influential in the political landscape until 1998. Initially, the
PANM was an umbrella organization uniting a variety of activists from
the Karabakh movement and enjoying overwhelming public support.
As a loose organization, the PANM produced a number of other parties,
including the most prominent opposition parties of the period. A
notable portion of representatives of the older generation of current
elite was also affiliated with the PANM.
At the first convocation of the NA elected in 1995, the PANM
dominated the Republican block, which included a significant
proportion of the independent MPs (40 of 117 coalition members) and
a substantial number of representatives from minor parties (16). This
structure contributed to the collapse of the block and the rapid loss of
the majority in parliament by October–November of 1997. In both
1999 and 2006, the MPs elected from FPTP districts were instrumental
in shifting the balance of political interests represented in parliament.
These FPTP MPs, typically from entrepreneurial backgrounds, were
3 It should be noted that MPs from these parties themselves were not diasporan but
rather citizens of soviet Armenia that quickly joined and often also quickly left these
organizations, with the exception of ARFD.
19
incorporated into the ruling parties in waves. For example, when the
Rule of Law party, a partner holding 20 seats, decided to leave the
coalition in May 2006, ten entrepreneur MPs also left their factions
and created an entrepreneur group that later joined the other ruling
parties (the RPA and the PAP). During the same week, nearly the same
number of independent MPs, again mostly entrepreneurs, who were
elected in FPTP districts joined the RPA and ensured the new
coalition’s control of parliament. The proportion of independent MPs
varied between 6.7 and 11.5% over the next four convocations (NA1-
NA4). In the current parliament, elected in 2012, these MPs constitute
only 2.2% of members and cannot influence the balance of political
forces to the same extent as previous independents.
In future parliaments, minor parties will likely be represented to a
lesser degree. Additionally, changes to the formal election rules
affected the mode of elections of such individuals. The growing
number of party list seats in parliament (Chart 1.1) has encouraged
both electoral blocks among minor parties as well as the involvement
of prominent figures from such minor parties in the lists of larger
parties that have higher probabilities of influencing the balance of
power.4
The result of these trends was the consolidation of the party
system, which can also be observed by examining the number of
parliamentary factions. Where there once existed 12 factions in the SC,
there were seven during the period 1995–9, eight during the period
1999–2003, seven during the period 2003–7, five during the period
2007–12 and six beginning in 2012. Furthermore, over the last decade,
the diminishing size of the opposition coalition indicates the
emergence of a single dominant party in the RA. For the first time
since independence, a single party controls a sufficient number of
seats to effectively pass legislation without seeking the support of
other parties or independent MPs. Compared to the PANM of the early
4 For example, more than 10% of current RPA coalition members are represen-
tatives from eight minor parties elected through the RPA party list.
20
1990s, the current RPA faction in parliament exhibits a much more
stable structure by heavily relying on party list MPs who are replaced
by other party members if they are disloyal to the party. Additionally,
FPTP MPs are generally members of the party who are connected to
the organization through various ties.
The party politics of the NKR took a different path during the
early years of independence. The initial composition of the SC was also
dominated by independent MPs and was characterized by competition
between supporters of the PANM and the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation Dashnaktsiutyun (ARFD). This legislative competition
translated into competition with the executive branch, which was
dominated by RANM supporters, whereas the legislative branch was
dominated by ARFD supporters. By the spring of 1992, this
competition sparked a conflict that resulted in the mysterious death of
the speaker of the SC, an ARFD member. Intensified large-scale
military action and increasing human and territorial losses diminished
party competition and resulted in the establishment of the State
Defence Committee in August 1992. Extraordinary powers were given
to this body, and the activities of the SC were suspended. The
committee was led by Robert Kocharyan, a young former Communist
Party member turned nonpartisan, who was elected as the first
president of the NKR after the war and later as president of the RA.5
The existence of an external threat and the primacy of national unity
were the main arguments against the establishment of political parties
in the NKR both during the war and after the cease-fire in 1994.
Instead, the first decade of independence produced a political field
dominated by nonpartisan war veterans. In addition to these veterans,
recruitment for political positions took place among civil servants,
members of the intelligentsia and, to a lesser degree, entrepreneurs
(Table 1.2b). The nonpartisan MPs won more than one-half of the
5 During his long political career, R. Kocharyan publicly stated his negative attitude
toward political parties a number of times and has never become a member of any
party.
21
legislative seats in all elections until 2005, when one-third of the seats
were allocated to party list candidates.
This negative view of political parties was also reflected in the
formal rules; unlike many regulations copied from Armenian electoral
law, the introduction of the party list system in the NKR took place
ten years later than in the RA. Thus, party politics arrived in the NKR
much later and in a less competitive form. Three major parties were
represented in the legislative body. Two of these parties (the
Democratic Party of Artsakh and the Free Motherland Party) have
dominated the parliamentary coalitions, whereas the third party, the
ARFD, has remained supportive of the executive’s policies, with the
exception of the short period 2005–7.
The two most recent convocations included the highest number of
re-elected MPs to date; this indicates that elite recruitment has
become less competitive and draws from a narrower circle. Compared
to the 2005 elections, a smaller number of candidates, including
independent candidates, registered for the 2010 elections; this
decrease is another indication of this trend. In the NKR, the political
opposition is represented by a few individual politicians both within
and outside of the legislative body with no institutionalized party
organization.
Age and Education
The generational composition of MPs in both the RA and the NKR
(Chart 1.2) indicates that the largest influx of young political elite
members (23–40 years old) occurred during the first years of
independence. MPs of this age constituted 40.2% of the SC in the RA
and 63.1% of the SC in the NKR. Similar numbers in this age range
were also recorded in 1995 parliamentary elections (RA, 39.8%; NKR,
51.4%). The same chart illustrates that the generational renewal of
political elite decelerated. As a result, both the NKR and the RA now
possess parliaments with larger proportions of MPs aged 51 years and
older (RA, 48.9%; NKR, 35.7%). In the current convocation of the RA
NA, the proportion of MPs aged 51+ years nearly doubled compared to
22
the previous convocation (from 29.3 to 49.9%), and this increase came
at the expense of middle-aged MPs (i.e., those aged 41–50 years old
decreased from 46.5 to 25.5% of the assembly). Overall, the modal age
of elected MPs in the RA increased from 42 years during the SC to
45 years during NA1 and NA2 to 47 years during NA3 and NA4 and
jumped to 53 years during NA5.
In the NKR, the modal age of MPs increased from 41 years during
the SC to 45 years during NA1 to 52 years during NA2, which is
another indication that individuals of the same generation who
entered politics during the Karabakh movement were recruited into
NKR politics during the first decade. A re-election of MPs occurred
during NA3 (modal age, 46 years) and NA4 (modal age, 42) and largely
reflects the success of the Free Motherland Party in electing a younger
generation of politicians with entrepreneurial and bureaucratic
backgrounds to join the leadership of the current prime minister,
Arayik Harutyunyan.
An initial analysis of MPs’ education did not reveal any significant
trends either within the RA or within the NKR. The distribution of the
level of education was quite stable throughout the period of
independence in both cases. The proportion of MPs in the RA without
a university degree varied from 2.5 to 4%, whereas nearly one-quarter
of all had achieved academic levels of Ph.D. candidate (kandidatskaya)
or full Ph.D. Compared to the RA, the number of NKR MPs whose
highest level of education was secondary school was greater than in
the RA (on average, 14% compared to 1.6%). Consequently, the
proportion of MPs with a university degree or higher was smaller in
the NKR.
We examined factors beyond general education levels to
understand the influence of education on political careers. We
attempted to determine the extent to which the proportion of MPs
who received their first university degree after being recruited into
the political elite had changed. We identified MPs who obtained their
first higher education degree at a relatively older age (after 35),
typically after achieving a certain level in their political career. The
number of such MPs in the RA increased from four (1.5% of total)
23
during the SC to eight (4.2%) in NA1, 22 (16.8%) in NA2, ten (7.6%) in
NA3, 19 (14.5%) in NA4 and 17 (12.9%) in NA5. The same analysis for
the NKR revealed that the number of such MPs is quite stable and
varies from one to two MPs for each convocation.
Further analysis of the education data revealed several other
trends in professions and subject areas. Nearly half of MPs during the
independence period received a university degree in either
engineering or economics (Chart 1.3). The number of economist MPs
increased over time, whereas the proportion of engineers gradually
decreased. This pattern might be explained by the fact that two of the
major higher education institutions in Soviet Armenia offer degree
programs in these fields. The next two most common disciplines were
law and history. MPs with law degrees became increasingly common
and almost doubled in number compared to the SC. The remaining
disciplines were grouped into three broader categories: social sciences,
natural sciences and other. The latter group contains a wide variety of
fields, including pedagogy, arts, athletics, veterinary science and
agronomy. The number of MPs with education in these fields has
doubled in the current parliament compared to the SC. In addition,
the number of MPs with degrees in the social sciences has decreased
significantly in the current convocation of the NA despite the
establishment and popularization of many new universities and
departments with social science programs (including political science,
public administration and international relations) since the mid-1990s.
In the NKR, the distribution of professions was more equally
divided among engineers, economists, historians, natural scientists and
pedagogues (on average, ranging between 12 and 19%). One notable
trend is the increased representation of economists (10.8% in the SC,
21.4% in NA4) and historians (5.4% in the SC, 14.3% in NA4) at the
expense of engineers (32.4% in the SC, 14.3% in NA4) and natural
scientists (28.6% in the SC, 10.7% in NA4).
Biographies also typically report the institution of higher
education. An analysis of these institutions revealed that a stable
pattern has been established; nearly four-fifths of MPs are graduates of
Armenian higher education institutions (Chart 1.4). The proportion of
24
graduates from Private Universities6 began to increase at the end of
the 1990s and is at its highest level in the current convocation (18.4%
of MPs). The previously stable proportion (12.7–16.4%) of MPs during
the previous five convocations who received their higher education at
the state universities of other Soviet Republics and CIS countries,
mostly from Russian universities, sharply decreased (5.1%) in the
current convocation, whereas diplomas received from the private
universities of CIS countries increased insignificantly (4.4%). Another
minor trend observed in the current convocation was the increased
number of MPs with degrees from Western universities (5.1% of MPs).
One might initially assume that these changes are related to a
generational change among the elite and the increased presence of
younger MPs; however, cross-tabulations indicate that MPs with
Western educations are equally represented across generational
groups.7
In the NKR, the composition of higher education institutions is
more stable. With the exception of the SC, in which 73% of MPs
graduated from local universities and 16% from universities of the
Soviet or CIS republics, at least 85% of MPs were graduates from local
universities in all subsequent convocations. In the current
convocation, this trend has become more pronounced; all MPs (96.4%)
are graduates of local universities with the exception of one middle-
aged MP who graduated from Penza State University of Architecture
and Construction in 1988. This similarity of educational background
may be related to fewer opportunities to obtain higher education
abroad. On the one hand, the NKR is increasingly isolated by its
unrecognized status; by contrast, the NKR benefits from increased
access to Armenian universities.
6 In the Armenian context, private universities are generally considered less com-
petitive and of poorer quality compared to state universities, including universities
based on intergovernmental agreements (the American University of Armenia, the
Russian Armenian University and the French University of Armenia). 7 There are two MPs aged 25–35 years old, three aged 36–50 and two aged 51–65.
25
Occupational Backgrounds of MPs
An analysis of the immediate backgrounds of MPs reveals that the
RA SC was composed of the largest number of newcomer MPs
(Table 1.2a). More than one-third of MPs were representatives of the
intelligentsia, including academics, teachers, and journalists. The share
of the intelligentsia continually decreased over the first decade and
stabilized during the second decade. The other large group in the SC
(42.5%) was composed of midlevel bureaucrats who generally had no
prior national political experience during the SC. The number of these
representatives significantly decreased in subsequent assemblies. In
both groups, some members left politics after the second round of
parliamentary elections (1995). Others transformed their political
activities into their main vocation by launching political careers and
reappearing in our database as elected or appointed officials.
Table 1.2a displays the formation and consolidation of political
classes in the RA. A growing proportion of professional politicians in
parliament occupied both elected and appointed political positions
(the share grew from 1.5% in the SC to 32.5% in the first convocation
of the National Assembly, 39.5% in the second, 49.6% in the third,
51.9% in the fourth and 57.4% in the fifth).
Similar trends are observable in the NKR (Table 1.2b); however,
bureaucrats have been well represented in parliament (nearly half of
the SC to at least one-quarter of NA4). This pattern might be
explained by the less competitive nature of party politics in the NKR,
which has enabled career civil servants to become MPs recruited into
the political elite. The introduction of party list seats in 2005 and the
increasing number of such seats explains the larger represenation of
party list MPs (21.4% of seats) in the fourth convocation of the NA. The
26
NKR also produces a more limited representation of businessmen in
parliament8 compared to the RA.
This increasing influence of professional politicians in the RA
parallels the proportion of entrepreneurs, which also grew beginning
in the mid-1990s and included one-third of parliament during the
period 2003–7. After this peak, the proportion of MPs recruited from
these occupationս decreased. However, this change does not imply
that that the number of entrepreneur MPs decreased. For example, 6%
of new MPs in the fifth convocation were entrepreneurs.9 This
proportion is merely an indication that a substantial number of
businessmen MPs were reelected and continued to secure seats in
parliament. Although entrepreneurs were always represented in party
lists, their proportion in parliament has increased substantially over
the last decade. However, the proportion of businessmen elected from
FPTP districts did not changed significantly. The main change in this
regard is that such MPs gradually bacame members of ruling parties.
For example only one non party member entrepreneur was elected in
2012 compared to at least 19 independent businessmen elected in
2003.
Comparing the backgrounds of MPs who held political positions
before elections reveals a few additional trends (Chart 1.5a).
Increasingly, party list MPs are reelected more often than single-
district MPs. In addition, the proportion of newly elected MPs who
were engaged in party work as their main occupation increased
slightly over the last two convocations. The increased ability of
political parties, especially the dominant Republican Party of Armenia,
to ensure the re-election of their candidates can only partially be
attributed to changes in the formal rules, such as increasing party list
8 This observation may be a coincidence, but the highest proportion of business-
men elected to parliament occurred during similar time periods (2003–7 in the RA and
2000–5 in the NKR). 9 Despite formal limitations on the type of work in which MPs may engage, inclu-
ding entrepreneurship, in practice, MPs often continue to be directly engaged in their
business activities and only formally delegate the management of their companies and
assets while holding elected public office.
27
seats in parliament. These trends strengthened during the fifth
convocation with no additional changes in the proportions of party list
and FPTP seats. We argue that the most important factors behind this
change are (a) the consolidation of the political party system with a
smaller number of contesting parties and (b) the more frequent
reappearance of individuals on party lists and FPTP districts both in
cases of parties with more seats (RPA, PAP) and smaller parties (ARFD,
RoL).
There are a few notable similarities and differences between the
parliaments of the RA and the NKR in terms of MPs with backgrounds
in political positions. In both the RA and the NKR, only 20–30% of all
FPTP members were reelected. Another similarity is the negligible
proportion of MPs who built their political career at the national level
after winning local elected positions (0.7–2.9%), which indicates that
recruitment of the political elite rarely draws from the political
preferences of local populations reflected in the official electoral
results.
In the NKR, particularly during the last two convocations, MPs
with prior experience in the executive branch at both the national and
regional levels (ministers and marzpets) have been common (Chart
1.5b). The NKR data also indicate the absence of MPs who were
engaged only in party politics before the elections. Unlike in the RA,
in the NKR, a party career is rarely an effective path to either a
parliamentary seat or the political elite. Rather, political elites are
drawn from among high-ranking civil servants with experience in
governance and public administration. This dynamic may change with
increasing numbers of party list seats in parliament.
28
The Executive Branch
Ministers and regional governors (marzpets10) are core political
positions appointed by the head of the executive branch.11 Despite
certain changes in the formal procedures of appointment to these
positions over the last two decades, in general, such appointments are
in the domain of the president, who may either directly appoint or, at
a minimum, approve appointments. Therefore, an analysis of the
characteristics of these officials was conducted to uncover the
recruitment principles of the political elite; the analysis not only
reveals the leadership decisions of ruling parties but also reflects the
preferences of the president. Cases were classified according to the
years during which each of three presidents in both the RA and the
NKR was in office, and characteristics were compared among periods,12
between the RA and the NKR and among MPs.
Age and Education
An age analysis of executive positions for both the RA and the NKR
(Chart 1.6) revealed general patterns that are similar to the findings for
MPs (Chart 1.2). First, and perhaps most important, is the consideration
of the generational dynamics among elite representatives. During the
early years of independence, a larger proportion of young officials
were recruited (during the Levon Ter Petrosyan [LTP] term in the RA
10 Administrative unit of NKR is “shrjan” (region) and official name of the head is
“varchakazmi ghekavar” However in the text a single term (marzpet) will be used both
for RA and NKR to describe executive positions with similiar roles and responsibilities. 11 Whereas ministers are responsible for the design and implementation of
executive policies in their respective sectors at the national level, marzpets ensure the
implementation of such policies in the respective administrative regions (ten in Armenia
and seven in the NKR). 12 Levon Ter Petrosyan (LTP 10/1991-01/1998), Robert Kocharyan (RK 01/1998-
04/2008), Serge Sargsyan (SS 04/2008-present) in the RA; Robert Kocharyan (RK 1992,
12/1994-03/1997), Arkady Ghukasyan (AG 03/1997-09/2007), Bako Sahakyan (BS
09/2007-present).
29
and during the Robert Kocharyan [RK] term in the NKR) compared to
the subsequent decade (during the RK term in the RA and the AG term
in the NKR). In addition, the proportion of older representatives (aged
51 years and above) has increased since independence in both the RA
and the NKR. This trend is especially notable among marzpet
appointments, in which presidents possess greater flexibility to
determine the cadres of recruitment (marzpets require less specialized
backgrounds). Additionally, during the last 5–6 years, the proportion
of marzpet and minister appointments (during the Serge Sargsyan [SS]
term in the RA and the BS term in the NKR) that are younger
representatives (31–40 years old) has increased in both countries. This
change indicates the gradual renewal of the political elite. As a result,
recruits who are currently middle-aged constitute the smallest
proportion of appointments compared to postindependence (except
ministers in the RA, age propotion of which remains stable).
The following chart (Chart 1.7) presents the level of education of
people appointed to executive branch positions. In both the RA and
the NKR, cabinet appointments consistently tend to have completed
academic degrees (PhD candidate or higher) compared to marzpets.
This difference indicates that a higher level of specialization is
important for the recruitment of ministers,13 whereas other factors are
considered more important for marzpets. Both the smaller proportion
of ministers with postgraduate degrees and the significantly higher
proportion of positions filled by ministers with secondary education in
the NKR suggest a notable difference in levels of education in the NKR
and the RA. Similar differences were observed between MPs of in the
NKR and the RA. A smaller proportion of elite members completed
13 Three Charts (from Chart 1.6 to Chart 1.8) present the age and education data.
There is a single outstanding case in the NKR: one minister with primary education was
appointed to a position in his 20s. This minister was Samvel Babayan, and his political
career was possible due to his exceptional military success. He began his career as the
leader of a voluntary detachment and became a military commander in the army during
the Karabakh war. As the minister of defense, his control and authority over the NKR
army made him the most influential individual in the NKR, especially during the second
half of the 1990s.
30
higher education in the NKR than in the RA, which may be explained
by the composition of the society, which includes an overall smaller
proportion of individuals with such degrees in the NKR.14
The types of university are described in Chart 1.8. In the RA,
cabinet appointments more frequently received their degrees outside
of Armenia (nearly one-third) compared with the NKR; this difference
also holds for MPs in both the NKR and the RA. Most universities
attended outside of Armenia were state universities in Russia and
other CIS countries. The proportion of executive appointments who
attended Western institutions is smaller than the proportion of current
MPs with such education. Interestingly, in absolute terms, the number
of people with Western education given executive appointments was
highest during the first two years of independence. This trend
reflected the LTP appointment of two diaspora candidates to
ministerial positions. Both of these ministers vacated their positions
relatively early, and the recruitment of professionals from the diaspora
to high executive positions ended. During the RK period, the only
minister with a Western education was also from the diaspora;
however, unlike the ministers of LTP, he had built his career within
the ministry of foreign affairs to which he was recutied during the LTP
period. This minister served throughout both terms of the RK
presidency and remained actively engaged in politics after leaving the
ministerial position and currently serves as MP. Despite the rhetoric
about the unity between Armenia and the diaspora and importance of
utlizing diasporas human capacity intesified during the RK and SS
periods (a special ministry for the diaspora was later established) it did
not translate into recrutment of such cadres in important political
positions. In general, the recruitment to political elite from the
14 For example, the proportion of teaching staff with academic degrees is smaller in
higher education institutions in the NKR (30.2%) compared to the RA, 48.4% (state
statistical services of the RA and the NKR, yearbook 2012 for the RA
(http://www.armstat.am/file/doc/99471448.pdf, p. 126) and yearbook 2005–11 for the
NKR (http://stat-nkr.am/files/yearbooks/2005_2011/6_krtut-mshak.pdf, p. 89).
31
diaspora was limited both in the RA and the NKR even in lower levels
of the bureaucratic hierarchy.
The first nondiaspora minister with a Western education was
appointed during the SS period which is an indication of growing
number of career beurocrates with western education. In addition to
the absence of Western-educated political elites, we note that a
relatively high proportion of individuals in the NKR were educated at
private universities locally or in the CIS countries. Many of these
degree recipients were older, which indicates that political elite
members gained political influence without a university degree and
later obtained diplomas from private institutions to legitimize their
political standing and career growth.
Political Composition
The total number of ministers in the RA database appointed by the
first president, LTP, was 76, whereas the second president, RK,
appointed 71, and the current president, SS, has appointed 30. The
differences reflect decreases in both the number of ministries (26 in
mid-1995 and 18 currently) and the frequency of new appointments.
Only 12 new marzpets were recruited by LTP.15 By comparison, RK
recruited 21 individuals and SS had appointed only ten positions as of
the fall of 2013.
During the earlier years of independence, party affiliation was a
less important factor for high-level political appointments. Over 90%
of all ministers who served during the LTP period formally were not
members of any political party; only half of marzpets declared a party
affiliation, and only one-quarter of these were members of the ruling
PANM. However, nearly half of the ministers and one-quarter of the
marzpets were former members of the Communist Party who had
15 Administrative changes establishing these positions were made in mid-1995,
nearly two years before the resignation of LTP.
32
acquired managerial experience in either regional administration or
specialized sectors.
Technocratic appointments were still common during the first RK
term, but party membership became a more frequent characteristic
among ministers. During the ten years of RK’s administration, 38% of
all appointed ministers and 68% of all marzpets were party members.
The party affiliation of newly appointed officials demonstrates that
nearly half of the marzpets (42.9%) and one-fifth of ministers were
from the RPA. Compared to LTP, RK did not rely on cadres with past
working experience in similar positions of the executive branch (less
than 10% of appointments). The emergence of several new parties that
were well represented in parliament (RPA, ARFD, RoL and,
subsequently, PAP) inevitably produced coalition governments, which
were major sources of renewal for political elites at the executive
level.
The trend in party-based appointments intensified after SS took
office and reached 80% of all newly appointed ministers and 70% of
marzpets. These executive appointments included both individuals
who had been loyal to the party for a long period and officials who
became party members on the eve of an appointment. The SS
recruitment policy also relied on long-serving, influential, nonpartisan
and high-ranking officials from the RK period. At the beginning of the
SS period, these officials were considered for technocratic
appointments to positions that required special professional skills,16 but
all of these officials became members of the RPA in two waves. In
November 2009, the prime minister and two other ministers joined
the party, and in December 2010, three additional nonpartisan
ministers also enlisted.17 The overall political composition of the
executive branch during the SS was more stable, and new
16 These officials were the prime minster and the ministers of finance, economic
development and justice. 17 Interestingly, only one or two months before these decisions, most of these
officials had publicly stated that they did not have intentions to become members of
any party.
33
appointments were triggered either by a changing coalition18 or
changes within a coalitional party, particularly ROL.
The combination of (a) a smaller number of new appointments, (b)
longer tenures of executive positions and (c) higher rates of party
membership, including the recruitment of appointed nonpartisan
ministers into the RPA, is a strong indication of a recruitment model
based on a closed circle of party members. The highest proportion of
single-party members both in the cabinet (ten out of 18) and among
marzpets (nine out of ten) in the current executive branch confirms
what was observed in the legislative branch: the consolidation of the
party system with a dominant party has reached its peak since the
independence of the RA.
Unlike RA, in the NKR, party affiliation had very limited influence
on the appointments of the executive branch. During the RK
administration, 90% of all executive positions were held by
nonpartisan officials. This figure decreased slightly (nearly three-
quarters of executive appointments were nonpartisan) during the
presidency of Arkady Ghukasyan, who was a party leader and
introduced party list seats in the NKR. All three parliamentary parties
were represented in the cabinet. However, this trend reversed after
the election of the third president, Bako Sahakyan, a nonpartisan with
a background in security services. Aside from the prime minister,
Arayik Harutyunyan, who is the leader of the largest parliamentary
party, none of the executive appointees selected during the BS
administration have declared party affiliations.
To understand the factors influencing elite recruitment in the
NKR, we examined the background of executive officials. Chart 1.9a
demonstrates that executive positions were initially given to political
insiders; most frequently, these positions were given to civil servants,
who were the main source of executive positions in the NKR (nearly
two-thirds of appointments). One-quarter of the ministers were
18 In 2009, three ARFD ministers left the coalition and were followed in 2012 by
four PAP ministers.
34
promoted after serving as an MP. The most diversified elite in the
executive branch was observed during the period of Arkady
Ghukasyan, during whose term nearly one-quarter of ministerial
positions were entrusted to people with no experience in public
administration but who had entrepreneurial experience. This group
was largely from the Free Motherland Party, which became the second
largest party during the 2005 parliamentary session and later
partnered with Arkady Gukasyan’s Democratic Party of Artsakh.
With the election of Bako Sahakyan, recruitment preferences
reversed: civil servants once again became the predominant source of
political elites (seven of nine appointments). However, four of six
newly appointed governors were long-serving police or security
service officers with no prior political experience. Only one of the 15
(6.7%) executive appointments made by Bako Sahakyan was a public
politician with prior electoral experience. In comparison, this figure
was 38.9% during the RK and 31% during the AG administrations.
In the context of a nonrecognized state, the increased presence of
security officers and the replacement of public politicians may be
explained by the existence of serious external risks, including the
renewal of military actions by Azerbaijan. However, we consider this
explanation primarily as a justification used by the president for these
appointments. A weakly developed party system facilitates the
appointment of nonpartisan individuals; BS, first and foremost,
attempts to reward individual loyalty with important positions. Such
individuals are bound to him by personal ties and are accountable to
him because they had not previously built political careers.
The background of individuals newly appointed to executive
positions in Armenia also reveals the political elite recruitment
preferences of the head of the executive branch at that time
(Chart 1.9b). All three presidents relied on a system of insiders to enlist
their teams. The largest group was drawn from former civil servants;
they constituted from 40.8 to 53.3% of all newly appointed ministers
and one-third of marzpets. After the introduction of a new system of
regional administration in 1995, LTP entrusted more than half of
marzpet positions to elected MPs, who often were from same region.
35
The proportion of such appointments halved during the RK and SS
administrations; other elected officials, including mayors, were also
promoted to marzpet positions (RK and SS appointed 14.3 and 10%,
respectively). Both RK and SS preferred to recruit officers to marzpet
positions (19 and 20%, respectively). The cadre of recruits drawn from
outside of the political system is from the intelligentsia and business
sector. These two groups have been well represented in cabinets: LTP
(29.9%), RK (18.3%) and SS (23.4%). Marzpets with such backgrounds
were recruited mostly during the SS period (20%, or two individuals).
This observation is not a notable trend, and it is difficult to assess
whether SS has considered external sources of regional governance or
whether these two appointments were motivated by other factors.
Career Transitions From the NKR Political Elite to the RA
Political Elite
A former NKR president, RK, who was first selected as the prime
minister of the RA and later was elected the president of Armenia,
spurred popular discussion of the role of the Karabakh elite in the
politics of the RA. To understand the extent to which this transition
occurred and the effects on the composition of the political elite, we
briefly document all cases of political elites shifting from the NKR to
the RA and vice versa.
It is easier to list individuals who were part of the political elite in
the NKR and then became part of the Armenian elite. For example,
former Prime Minister of the NKR Leonard Petrosyan moved to
Yerevan to join the RK team. He became a minister in 1999 but was
killed in the terrorist attack on the Armenian parliament that occurred
on October 27, 1999. The current Minister of Defense, Seyran Ohanian,
succeeded to this position after serving as the Minister of Defense in
the NKR. The best example of shifting from one political elite to
another is provided by the current Deputy Prime Minister of the NKR,
Arthur Aghabekyan. After relocating to Yerevan, the former Minister
of Internal Affairs in the NKR accepted the position of Deputy Minister
of Defense of Armenia. He was then elected an MP of the RA. In 2012,
36
he returned to Karabakh and was appointed to the position of Deputy
Prime Minister of Karabakh. Arthur Aghabekyan is the only
representative of the NKR elite who has move into the RA elite and
back into the political decision-makers of the NKR.
After leaving office in the NKR, some representatives of the
Karabakh elite continue their careers as Armenian diplomats. The
former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Former President of the
NKR, Arkadi Ghukasyan, is now a Special Mission Ambassador of
Armenia, and Oleg Yesayan, the former Speaker of the NKR National
Assembly, is the current Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of Armenia in Russia. He previously held this position in Belarus.
There are fewer cases of a representative of the Armenian elite
becoming part of the NKR elite. The most vivid case is Tigran
Kyureghyan, the MP of the Supreme Council of 1990–5, who then
relocated to Karabakh. After accepting positions in LSG bodies,
Kyureghyan became an MP in the National Assembly of the NKR
during the period 2000–5. Compared to his colleagues, Kyuregyan was
not appointed to high political positions, immediately transitioning
from one political system to the other, but rather first relocated to the
NKR and built a local career before being elected to national
parliament.
Gender
The final section of this chapter is dedicated to a description of
the political elite’s gender composition. Female representatives
constitute a small portion of elites in both cases; however, certain
characteristics and trends were notable both in the RA and the NKR.
Overall, only 4.7% of all positions were held by females in the RA; a
significant portion of these women (61.7%) were MPs elected by party
lists. This pattern indicates that the representation of females within
the political elite of the RA would be lower if not for formal rules
37
reserving at least 20% of party list seats for female representatives.19
However, this use of gender quotas is relatively new in the RA, which
indicates that female politicians were frequently elected as MPs by the
proportional system before the introduction of these quotas. Only
2.6% of all FPTP MPs were women, a figure that has ranged from 0 to
4.7% over time. A similar proportion of female politicians (2.8%) were
also represented in the cabinet of the RA. Two female ministers were
recruited to all cabinets of each of the three presidents. Only one
female was ever appointed as a marzpet, constituting 2.1% of all such
appointments.
No major trends or differences in the age of recruitment between
male and female political elite representatives were revealed. Unlike
some male elites, none of the females were recruited into the political
elite without a university degree; the most frequent degrees were
earned in the social sciences (28.3% of females) and law (15%). Female
elite representatives also exhibited less diverse paths to the political
elite: more than half of female recruits were either part of the
intelligentsia (36.7% compared to 17.6% of males) or civil servants
(21.7%) before their political careers.
Females are represented in the NKR twice as often (8.8% of all
cases) as in the RA. The representation of females is significantly more
balanced across various positions (26% of all females were party list
MPs, 52% were FPTP MPs, and the remaining 22% were ministers), and
females constitute 8.5% of ministers and 10.5% of MPs. Female
representation has increased especially since BS took office as
president; 16% of all newly recruited elite members are female, a
significantly higher portion even without the introduction of quotas
for female MPs. However, marzpet positions remain less attainable for
females. The higher proportion of females with at least a university
19 Article 155.2 of the Electoral Code of the RA states that “The number of persons
of each sex shall not exceed 80% of any integer group of five candidates starting from
the second number of the electoral list (2–6, 2–11, 2–16, and so on up to the end of the
list) of a political party or alliance of political parties and of each party included in an
alliance.”
38
degree was also observed in the NKR (91.5% compared to 80.2% among
males). Another notable difference was that females received their
education in local universities (91.5% compared to 83.1% among
males). Female elites were drawn from less diverse professions: 52.2%
of females earned degrees in pedagogy and/or linguistics, and 17.4%
earned medical degrees. Female political elite members took similar
paths to the political elite as their peers in the RA: 39.1% were
appointed or elected to national political positions after years of civil
service, whereas 21.7% were part of the intelligentsia (teachers, poets,
etc.) before entering politics. Female political elite representatives
frequently possessed electoral experience before their election or
appointment to national political positions (69.6% compared to 56.3%
of males), which indicates that females are less frequently appointed
to such positions without political experience. Another indication of
the importance of experience for female elites is that in the NKR,
female representatives were entrusted to political positions at older
ages (43.1% were recruited at age 51 or older compared to 19.9% of
males). It is safe to conclude that despite their comparatively higher
rates of representation in the NKR, only females with certain
characteristics (university degrees earned during the early stages of
their life, successful and long careers in civil service or other white
collar employment) were likely to be recruited. One possible
explanation for the higher rates of female representation in the more
traditional NKR might be the relative scarcity of males in a postwar
society, specifically when a high proportion of working-age males are
recruited to the army in a society that has one of the world’s highest
rates of soldiers per capita.
39
Social network analysis as a tool for analyzing
political elites
Introduction
Naturally, not all individuals who hold formal positions are equally
influential members of the elite. To identify and describe the
dynamics within the elite, that is, among individuals and groups who
wield the most influence and power, we turn to social network
analysis.
Based on graph theory and advanced computing capacities,
network analysis methods have been employed in the hard sciences
for several decades. Over the last decade, network analysis has been
applied in many other academic disciplines as well as in other spheres.
Social scientists have gradually adopted these methods to describe and
analyze relationships among social actors both at the individual and
institutional level. A number of social network analysis (SNA) software
programs20
have been developed, enhancing the capacity of social
scientists to both analyze and visualize network data.
The core of this approach is the concept of a network (also
referred as a graph or sociogram) that consists of nodes (actors) and
ties or edges (relationships among those actors). The major difference
and, in the context of this study, advantage of network data over
conventional data are that the latter focuses on actors and attributes,
whereas the former focuses on actors and their relations (Hanneman &
Riddle, 2005).
Depending on the type of data, SNA can reveal various
characteristics of a social community, including the type, direction
and intensity of relationships among actors; the position of any given
actor within a network; and the existence of various segments
(clusters or components) in that network. SNA is considered a very
20
We utilized Gephi (https://gephi.org/), an open-source software for the
visualization and analysis of networks graphs, in our research.
40
effective tool for measuring the power relations among various actors.
Therefore, the application of SNA to political elites enabled us (a) to
look beyond the general characteristics of individuals who held
political positions in Armenia and identify and describe the most
influential individuals and groups among these elites and (b) to
visualize and present relations, and changes in these relations, over
time.
In our approach, the network is composed of political decision
makers (nodes) who were connected to each other in cases when (1)
they were able to pass a formal decision and (2) they cooperated with
each other for that purpose. The parliament and the laws passed by
that parliament are the most feasible, and most likely the only, source
of systematically collected data about formal political decisions that
indicate the authors of these decisions. This approach limits the
measurement of political influence of MPs to formally adopted
decisions, whereas other aspects of influence are not captured in the
network. Another limitation is the available data during this period;
information about the authors of passed laws was available only for
the RA21 and only beginning in 2003.
22
As a result, we created networks that include all MPs who
authored or coauthored bills that were passed by the parliament and
became laws. Each tie represented a bill that was coauthored by two
or more MPs, and the network represents all such cases. Consequently,
ties in the network are measured or weighted by the number of times
a given MP coauthored an adopted bill. This decision ensured an
interval measurement of relations, which is considered the most
“advanced” level of measurement allows us to discriminate among the
relations reported in ways that allow us to validly state that, for
21 Note that in the parliament of the NKR, this approach probably would be less
revealing of influential individuals and groups because the laws adopted by these
institutions are imported from the RA; thus, very few cases exist in which NKR MPs
actually author the bills themselves. 22
The author information of adopted laws can be found on the official webpage of
the National Assembly.
41
example, “this tie is twice as strong as that tie” (Hanneman and
Riddle, Chapter 1, 2005). Ties within this network are unidirectional
because coauthoring a bill is considered a symmetrical relation, that is,
it is impossible to identify the direction of the tie.23
Bills proposed to parliament by the executive branch are not
included24
in the network because it is impossible to identify who
authored those bills within the government. The government is
represented in the network only in exceptional cases when bills were
coauthored with individual MPs. When the network represents the
data of the full population of actors and their ties, it constitutes a full
network. These networks are very effective for description and
systemic analyses of a social structure because they anable to measure
many concepts within the SNA. Each node in the network was
assigned the following attributes: gender, party membership, faction
membership, political status (opposition/ruling party member) and
electoral status (FPTP/party list MP).
Initially, three networks were constructed to represent each
assembly of the parliament.25
The main analysis was conducted on
these three networks. However, a representation and comparison of
the data by convocations do not account for political changes,
specifically the composition of the ruling coalition. For an MP, being a
representative from the ruling party should greatly increase the ability
to pass bills in parliament. To reflect major political developments,
particularly changes in the ruling coalition, five separate networks
were created to represent the data for each period with changes in
the ruling coalition. Chart 2.1 displays all parliamentary parties since
23
Theoretically, it is possible to assign directions to ties in cases where it is clear
who was the main coauthor of the bill or who exerted greater influence over its
content, but this was not an option with our data. 24
Nearly 91% of all adopted bills during the third convocation, 83% during the
fourth convocation and 89% during the fifth convocation were authored by the
executive branch. http://parliament.am/parliament.php?id=parliament&lang=arm. 25
The third convocation (May 2003- May 2007), fourth convocation (May 2007-
May 2012) and current fifth convocation (May 2012-June 2013).
42
2003 and indicates the changes in the composition of the ruling
coalition (parties above the “opposition/ruling coalition” line).
As a result, eight networks were generated and compared. Three
of these networks represent the whole convocation (referred as Conv
3, 4, 5), and the additional five (Table 2.1) reflect periods of coalition
change (referred as Coal 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
The most interesting findings from the SNA are presented in the
following pages. These findings merely scratch the surface of the
network data, which proved to be a very effective tool for elite
research. The SNA has the potential to advance elite research, and
experimentation with network data provides opportunities to innovate
in this field.
Basic Characteristics of Networks Representing
Entire Convocations
The size and density of a network is one its important parameters.
In most cases, the size is described by the number of nodes and ties,
the diameter or similar dimensions. Comparing these network features
for MPs enables conclusions on the overall picture of the decision-
making process in each of convocations to be drawn.
Table 2.2 presents the basic characteristics of the networks. The
number of nodes, ties and average degree demonstrates that the
largest proportion of MPs directly participated in policy formulation
during periods were MPs from ruling coalition parties. This finding
indicates that belonging to a ruling coalition had tangible implications
for the ability of MPs to formulate decisions in addition to affecting
other privileges.26
In this context, it is interesting that only during the
third convocation did the number of nodes exceed the number of MPs
26
Although voting on bills is also part of the decision-making process, in this
context, we considered decision makers to be only those MPs who directly and
proactively formulated public policies by drafting a bill and successfully passing it
through parliament.
43
from ruling coalition parties, that is, even oppositional MPs were able
to pass at least one law (Graph 1). Some oppositional MPs were almost
as effective in passing legislation as the most influential members of
ruling parties27
(the size of a node reflects the number of passed laws).
The smaller number of parties and MPs from ruling coalition parties
during the fifth convocation (75 of 131 seats) suggests that a smaller
number of MPs have been and will be able to effectively influence
formal parliamentary decisions.
Two other important factors, in addition to the size of the
coalition, influence the size of the network: (a) the duration of a
coalition and (b) electoral cycles. Naturally, in cases when a coalition
was of short duration or conducted its legislative activities on the eve
of national elections, a smaller number of laws (ties) were passed, and
the number of decision makers (nodes) was reduced. The two
networks characterized by these factors are Coal 2 and Coal 3. As
expected, these networks also have the smallest diameters (3), which
is the largest geodesic distance in the (connected) network. Such
networks are considered compact. This figure is simply explained by
the smaller number of laws (20 vs. eight, Table 2.1) and authors (27 vs.
13, Table 2.2); therefore, these two networks should not be compared
to the larger networks representing whole convocation.
Graph density, which illustrates the proportion of all possible ties
that are actually present, is an important indicator of the level of
interconnectedness in a network. The fifth convocation has the
highest graph density, which once again reflects the consolidation of
political power in the hands of a smaller group of MPs. The results
presented in the next four columns confirm this conclusion.
Modularity calculates the number of communities within a network
according to the position of nodes. The number of such communities
(in the context of our research, groupings within the elite) is higher
during the fifth convocation (8). However, this finding is related not
to a structural disintegration of the elite but rather reflects (a) the
27
See the next section on individual elite members for details.
44
departure and/or isolation of MPs representing ex-coalitional parties or
(b) a single nonpartisan MP who managed to pass a single law but was
not part of the main network (largest connected components). A
higher value of connected components (5), that is, the number groups
that have no ties to other groups, confirms the isolation of certain MPs
from the main network.
Moreover, this isolation occurs across party lines, with two
connected components representing members of a single party (PAP
and ARFD ex-coalition members) and two individual majoritarian MPs
(see Graph 2). Unlike the other convocations, even independent MPs
elected through the FPTP system are unrepresented in the network,
which indicates the diminishing opportunities of such MPs to directly
design their policies.28
Instead, such MPs, who often are either wealthy
businessmen or represent business interests, join a political party
(often either the RPA or PAP) and promote their interests in the
executive and legislative branches through party channels and
personal relations rather than directly initiating and designing
legislation.
Consolidation across party lines is also reflected in the average
clustering coefficient (highest during the fifth convocation, 0.955),
which measures the average of the densities of the neighborhoods of
all the actors, and in the average path length, which measures the
proximity of nodes, which are connected components (the shortest
paths occur during the fifth convocation, 1.653).
The fourth convocation provides a transitional picture of this
political power consolidation. As displayed in Chart 3, the number of
MPs who authored legislation is significantly larger than during the
fifth convocation, and in this regard, the fourth convocation resembles
the third convocation. These MPs represent a larger number of
political parties, which was also typical in the third convocation.
Moreover, these MPs are integrated into a single connected component
28
A quick glance at the titles of laws initiated by these MPs indicates that most of
these were related to economic and/or fiscal policies.
45
and are thus similar to the third convocation in terms of
interconnectedness. These connections represent cooperation on bill
authorship, often across party lines. With the exception of relatively
more interconnectedness among ARFD MPs (displayed in orange), no
significant clustering occurs along party lines. A final important
similarity with the third convocation is the existence of a substantial
number of independent MPs. However, compared to the third
convocation, these independent MPs are not grouped together but
rather are diffused within the network and cooperate with all
representatives of the ruling coalition. The most important difference
between the third and fourth convocations is the extent of
representation of opposition party MPs in the network. Unlike the
third convocation, which included a meaningful involvement of
opposition party MPs, such MPs became marginalized during the fourth
convocation. This trend continued and intensified during the fifth
convocation. As a result, the political elite has evolved from a diverse
and consensual group, where oppositional and coalitional party MPs
as well as independents cooperated to produce formal decisions, to an
exclusive and closed group representing a dominant party (and its
minor ally party) that limits policy formulation even among partners
from previous coalitions.
Identification of the Most Influential Elite
Representatives
SNA not only presents the overall characteristics of a network but
also enables the identification of the most influential or powerful
nodes within a network. Indeed, SNA contributes to the advanced
analysis of power relations. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) summarize
the role of SNA in research on power as follows: “Network thinking
has contributed a number of important insights about social power.
Perhaps most importantly, the network approach emphasizes that
power is inherently relational. An individual does not have power in
the abstract, they have power because they can dominate others.
46
Because power is a consequence of patterns of relations, the amount
of power in social structures can vary. Power arises from occupying
advantageous positions in networks of relations... Three basic sources
of advantage are high degree, high closeness, and high betweenness.
In simple structures (such as the star, circle, or line), these advantages
tend to covary.”
These three criteria are the basis of our approach to identifying
the most powerful elites in parliament. After a brief explanation of
these three concepts, the findings are presented and discussed,
concentrating on the qualities possessed by the 10–12 most influential
MPs. The results for the entire network are presented in separate
tables (Table 2.3 represents the third convocation, 2.4 the fourth and
2.5 the fifth). The degree is the primary criterion for identifying the
most powerful MPs; other criteria produce similar standings, that is,
MPs with higher degrees also tend to have to have better results when
employing weighted degree, closeness and betweenness measures.
The degree of a node represents its connections with other nodes.
In our network, this is the number of MPs with whom a particular MP
coauthored a law. Because ties in our network are weighted, it is also
possible to produce a weighted degree, that is, to measure not only
the number of laws but also how many times each MP coauthored
laws with other MPs. Closeness measures the proximity of a node to
other nodes. MPs who are able to reach other actors via shorter paths
or who are more reachable by other actors on these shorter paths
occupy favored positions. This structural advantage reflects a second
dimension of power. Betweenness is another measure of the position of
a node within a network. Betweenness indicates how often an MP
serves as an exclusive bridge between two other MPs, which reflects
an increased capacity to mediate between MPs and thus reflects that
MP’s power.
Table 2.3 indicates that the most powerful MPs of the third
convocation were quite diverse. This diversity is related to both
political and party preferences. MPs from all parliamentary parties and
the two independent MPs are included in this most powerful group. Of
the 11 most powerful MPs, four represent the parliamentary
47
opposition. The FPTP MPs included three of these 11. Gender is
unequally represented among the most powerful MPs; only one female
is included in this elite group.
The results of the fourth convocation indicate a significant shift:
opposition MPs constituted a much smaller portion of parliament and
were largely absent from the list of MPs who were able to pass a law.
Moreover, with one exception, even independent MPs were not on the
top of the list. That exception was Victor Dallaqyan, who managed to
be one of the top five most influential MPs during the third
convocation despite the fact that he was a member of the opposition
bloc; however, during the fourth convocation, he saw his power wane
even after he split with the oppositional parties to represent himself as
an independent MP.
Instead, only MPs from ruling parties were represented in the top
positions in the list of the most powerful MPs in the fourth
convocation. The frequency of appearance in the list was roughly
proportionate to the number of representatives of each ruling party in
parliament (RPA as dominant, PAP as the main partner and ROL and
ARFD as minor partners in the coalition). MPs representing these
factions were not always elected through a proportional electoral
system, and the representation of FPTP and party list MPs was
comparable to previous convocations. The main distinction was that
influential FPTP MPs, who are often reelected from the same districts,
were already party members. There was also a transition in terms of
gender between the third and fourth convocations, with female MPs
increasing in numbers and growing in influence.
When filtered based on a weighted scale of frequency of passed
laws, several other MPs29
would rise to the top of the list of most
influential MPs. All these MPs were elected by a proportional system,
and they represented each of the four ruling parties; at least three
were part of a smaller team that concentrated on shaping public policy
29
Hegine Bisharyan, Ara Babloyan, Ara Nranyan, David Harutyunyan, bold in the
list.
48
in a specialized field (economy, justice, healthcare) without significant
involvement from other MPs (resulting in a lower number of degrees,
i.e., a lower number of coauthor MPs). This finding indicates that as
the ruling parties consolidated in parliament, a certain type of division
of labor occurred within parties. In addition to influential MPs who
held formal positions (such as faction leader) and who frequently
authored laws with a large number of MPs in a wide variety of fields, a
group of party MPs was established that “specialized” in regulating
certain fields. Professional expertise and background were important
factors that enabled MPs to assume such roles in parliament.
Data for the current fifth convocation covers only a period of one
and half years, and the composition and structure of the network
might change by the end of the term. However, based on these data,
certain trends can be observed that are briefly discussed below.
One of the new trends is a greater number of coauthors; as many
as 21 MPs have been involved in coauthoring a single amendment.
Notably, those MPs who also hold positions in parliament30
(such as
deputy speaker, faction leader, head of committee) tend to appear in
these groups more frequently and tend, in particular, to cooperate
with one another. These developments might indicate the fusion of
real political influence with formal positions and the establishment of
an acknowledged hierarchy within the ruling party and/or an
increased motivation by a larger number of MPs to demonstrate a
certain type of parliamentary performance by joining various bill
initiatives, even when the possibility of influencing a policy outcome
is small.
Another (but not new) trend is the increased influence of party
list MPs compared to FPTP MPs, despite having the same proportion of
seats during the fourth and fifth convocations. This is a continuation
of a larger trend that began in 2003 that is described above. Another
continuing trend is the increased representation of females in the
30
Galust Sahakyan, Eduard Sharmazanov, Hermine Nagdalyan, Ara Babloyan, David
Harutyunyan.
49
network of decision makers; this figure rose from 6.3% during the
third convocation to 19% during the fifth convocation. Thus, although
the increased representation of females in parliament was achieved by
adopting formal rules (quotas), this finding indicates that it in fact has
translated into greater participation of women in decision making and
policy formulation.
The most obvious and probably the most important trend is party
consolidation and the establishment of a single dominant party in the
political system, which is indicated by the percentage of MPs in the
network who are affiliated with the largest faction in parliament. In
the most recent three convocations, the RPA was the leading faction,
but its percentage rose from 27.9% during the third convocation to
46.8% during the fourth convocation and to 66.7% of the MPs in
parliament during the fifth convocation (excluding coalition partners
from the R O L).
These general results from the social network analysis, including
identification of the most influential elite members within the
parliament, reinforce findings from statistical analyses, and they
deepen and refine our understanding of the elite composition in RA.
50
CHAPTER 2: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE POLITICAL ELITE: VALUES AND
PREFERENCES
After Armenian independence, new political elites emerged; some
elites left the ranks over time, some elites were forced out, and new
figures have joined the group of political elites. Drawing from Samuel
Huntington’s argument that the system of beliefs and actions of the
elite are the most direct and significant variables explaining
democratic transitions,31 we attempt to reveal political elite
representatives’ values, beliefs, political orientations and preferences.
The selection of individuals for in-depth interviews was based on
the criteria that defined political elites in this study. Respondents were
selected using the snowball method. The final list of respondents
included more than 50 political figures targeted to participate in the
interviews. The most difficult task of this procedure was overcoming
representatives’ unwillingness to participate. Social networks were
leveraged to overcome difficulties in making final arrangements and
obtaining consent to participate. Interviewers selected for this study
were skilled in clarifying information and deepening responses. They
were also specially trained to overcome potential problems arising
from delicate questions addressed to politicians.
The in-depth interviews were conducted from April to August
2012. The main difficulties encountered during fieldwork were gaining
the approval of potential respondents and scheduling the meetings for
the interviews, especially given that this fieldwork coincided with
elections in Armenia. The average interview lasted 70 min.
Importantly, in most cases, the representatives did not decline after
initially agreeing to participate. However, interviewers noted a lack of
31 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century,” Norman: University of Oklahoma Press (1991), 36–38.
51
sincerity or bias in some responses. These specific cases were
identified and interpreted by the interviewer. At the end of each
interview, interviewers evaluated the level of the respondent’s
sincerity on a five-point scale. Twenty percent of the interviews were
given grades in the range of 2–3, and the rest received grades of 4–5.
Therefore, the interviewers perceived that a high level of sincerity
was exhibited.
After obtaining the consent of each respondent, the interviews
were recorded, and the interviewers took notes. Interviewers
produced literal transcripts without making any changes or
reformulations immediately after each interview. In cases of specific
opinions or observations, interviewers added their notes in the notes
section of the questionnaire. The tests that were administered and
completed by the respondents were also transcribed and coded.
Respondents are presented according to political party affiliation
to preserve their anonymity. Additionally, the main distinction in
approaches was made between two groups: the governing coalition
and the oppositional political parties.
It is noteworthy that three of 51 respondents were previous prime
ministers, two of whom served during the first presidential
administration, and the other served during the second administration.
The list also includes approximately 30 deputies, ten ministers and
three deputy ministers from the administrations of all three Armenian
presidents. Three respondents were leading presidential candidates in
1991, 1996 and 2013. Sixteen respondents, or one-third of the sample,
were women. The youngest respondent was 30 years old, and the
eldest was 70 years old. Fifteen respondents were 30–40 years old, 11
respondents were 41–50 years old, 15 respondents were 51–60 years
old, and ten respondents were 61 years old or above.
Twenty-one respondents were members of the Armenian
Republican Party, which is the ruling party in Armenia. Seven
respondents represented the Heritage party, three were from
Prosperous, Armenia, three were from the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation, three were from the Armenian National Congress, three
represented the NGO sector, and the others were from other
52
nonparliamentary political parties. Except for the Republican Party,
the remaining parties are oppositional.
Life Story
The first section of questions concerned the life story of the elite
representative. The aim of these questions was to discover their place
of birth, family social status and parents’ professions. Twenty-nine
respondents were born in Yerevan, seven were born in other
Armenian cities and towns, nine were born in villages, and the other
five were born in other countries. Therefore, more than 70% of the
respondents were born in a city, nearly 20% were born in villages, and
10% were from abroad. Approximately 55% of the Republican Party
representatives were born in Yerevan.
The parents of most respondents were employed in higher
education institutions and schools. The rest were employed in
construction, industry and state administration. Most of the
respondents’ parents were employed; only four respondents reported
that only one parent (in particular, their mother) was not working and
was engaged in housekeeping. Most respondents described the
socioeconomic situation of their families as normal or good, whereas
only two respondents considered their situation to be bad or difficult.
The respondents’ own answers indicate that, during the transition
phase in Armenia, the individuals who became part of the new elite
came from families that would be considered middle class.
Respondents were asked about their childhood role models who
played major roles in the formation of their personality and value
system. Almost all respondents described their parents as authorities
who influenced their lives and shaped their values. Respondents also
mentioned elder family members, especially grandparents. They
recounted the stories their grandparents had told about the Armenian
Genocide, which was cited as a major influence on the development of
their personality and values as well as a factor in their decision to
become politicians. All three members of the Armenian Revolutionary
53
Federation party reported that joining this particular party was closely
connected to hearing stories about the Armenian Genocide as a child.
A small group of respondents indicated the absence of role models
during their childhoods by emphasizing that they were quite active
and this shaped their future. Four respondents claimed to not have
thought about entering politics during their youth and that their
presence in politics was determined by chance.
Respondents often mentioned famous political and historical
figures as authorities in their lives. The following names were most
commonly mentioned: former prime ministers Vazgen Sargsyan and
Andranik Margaryan, King Tigran the Great, King Pap, Garegin Nghdeh,
Margaret Thatcher and Winston Churchill. One respondent mentioned
the president of the RA, Serj Sargsyan, and two respondents
mentioned former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. One respondent
reported that his youth was very active and he was always creating
different initiatives. During these years, Samantha Smith was a role
model for him. Respondents generally referred to historical figures,
which may reflect the absence of political authorities in Armenia.
Fifty respondents had completed higher education (seven
respondents also had postgraduate education), and one respondent had
received a high school education. Three respondents received their
higher education abroad, and the rest were educated in Yerevan.
Nearly 10% of respondents obtained their educations partly in Armenia
and partly abroad, most frequently in Russia. Sixty percent of
respondents received their degrees in the humanities and social
sciences; many of these degrees were received in jurisprudence,
which represented one-third of the humanities and social sciences
degrees. The remaining 40% of respondents studied the natural and
technical sciences.
Respondents stated that their professional education played a
substantial role in their political activity. Even those who obtained
degrees in the natural and technical sciences held this opinion. One
respondent with a technical education reported that his life vision was
shaped in the university and that his profession taught him a realistic
approach to politics. Another respondent, who graduated from the
54
Polytechnic Institute named for K. Marx, reported that he would not
have become a politician without the knowledge from his field, which
he uses in his daily activities. One of the primary activists in the
movement that began in 1988, who was later a prime minister, stated
that the Soviet Union did not limit the development of the natural
sciences and that many of the free-thinking people who proposed
liberal ideas during the Soviet period were scientists. He gave physicist
Andrey Sakharov and mathematician Alexander Shavarev as examples.
Respondents also answered questions about their hobbies and their
preferences in leisure activities. The most common response was
reading. Other favorite pastimes included various types of sports. A
few respondents enjoyed the theater or played musical instruments.
One respondent noted that he liked to frequent the casino. Heritage
Party representatives reported that they enjoyed spending time in
their social networks and participated in political activism for human
rights and ethnic and environmental movements.
During the interviews, we attempted to determine how
respondents met their spouses, the meaning they attributed to family
and how family affected their involvement in politics. Four of the
respondents were not married. One-third of respondents reported
meeting their spouse at a university; the next most frequent response
was the workplace. Respondents often characterized the family as the
cell of a society, indicated that they valued family and stated that the
family is the environment in which a person lives and receives
spiritual sustenance. One respondent called his family his guardian
angel as well as his castle and refuge. Family was widely characterized
as a person’s home, a place where one can express oneself, an
important place for a person’s tranquility and the place where one’s
homeland begins. Only one respondent claimed that a social life is
more important than the family.
55
Entering Politics
The next set of questions explored the motives, situations and
circumstances that contributed to the decision to enter the political
field.
Nearly the half of the respondents over the age of 40 identified a
single key moment in their political awakening. The Karabakh
movement, which began in February 1988, encouraged a generation of
citizens to engage in politics and build political careers, many of which
have endured. The movement also greatly shaped these politicians’ life
visions, value systems and political behavior. A similar persistent effect
of early political activism related to the Karabakh movement was
observed by anthropologists studying mass political behavior in post-
Soviet Armenia (Abrahamian & Shagoyan, 2012).
One respondent claimed to have realized that he must become
involved in politics in 1987 but that the Karabakh movement forced
him to do so. He was a member of The Yerevan City Council during
the period 1999–2003 and later became a deputy in the National
Assembly; in 2012, he once again became a deputy in the National
Assembly. Another respondent noted that he entered politics during
the Karabakh movement and that the political party environment
played a role in his becoming a politician. Respondents frequently
reported that entering politics was closely connected to becoming a
member of a particular party. Some members of the Heritage Party
noted that their political activity was linked to being involved in that
party’s different structures. One respondent had first cooperated with
the party, joined the party list and become a deputy in the National
Assembly, only afterward considering a career in politics.
Of the 21 representatives from The Armenian Republican Party,
eight noted that their entry into politics was connected to joining this
particular party. Republican Party representatives also often reported
that they were handpicked by party leaders to carry out specific
political functions. Andranik Margaryan, a former prime minister, was
most frequently cited as mobilizing and motivating new members of
56
the party that would become the ruling party of post-Soviet Armenia.
To summarize, participation in the Karabakh movement and party
membership were identified as the two most frequent paths of
political elite formation. Whereas the former path was common among
the older generation of elites, people who entered into politics more
recently considered party membership to be the defining moment in
their political path.
The third, but less common, path into the political elite was taken
by nonpartisan individuals who were elected by constituencies or
appointed to positions because of their personal or professional skills.
However, most of these individuals faced the dilemma, after a certain
point in their political careers, of whether to join one of the dominant
parties or to leave politics. Interestingly, a number of interviewees
claimed that often, the decision to join a political party was
conditioned upon their ability to exert maximum influence and not
their ideological orientations or specific policy preferences.
We also asked the respondents to identify the factors that helped
them enter the political elite as well as to indicate which qualities and
skills a person should possess to succeed in Armenian political life.
Nearly one-quarter of the respondents said that education is important
for elite membership, and another quarter cited advantageous family
and social relationships. More frequently, families were considered
important to creating quality and competitive education and to
developing a stable system of values. One respondent noted that his
family played a major role in the formation of his personality and that
“the main role belongs to the family when growing up as a true
Armenian, whereas the family has little influence over his current
political activities.” Only one respondent noted that his family’s
influence on his political activity was negative. When asked whether
they would like their children or grandchildren to be engaged in
politics, most replied that their children were free to choose for
themselves and that they would not object to a decision to become
involved in politics. One respondent reported that he would like for
his children to be involved in politics because he considers politics to
be the art of arts. Only four respondents reported that they would not
57
like their children to be engaged in political activity without providing
much elaboration on the question. It is noteworthy that these
respondents were members of the ruling political party.
We also attempted to determine what the respondents consider to
be their role in politics upon entering this field and which objectives
they pursued at the beginnings of their careers. Respondents mostly
indicated quite general objectives: to raise questions that were
important for the progress of the society and to effect change in the
country. One respondent recalled that he entered politics to build the
motherland that he dreamed of. Another respondent said that she
attempts to demonstrate to her former colleagues, journalists, by
example that not all politicians suffer from the deficiencies that she
observed during her journalistic career and that it is possible to be a
different kind of politician. Another respondent described his role as
demonstrating the possibility of honesty in politics and raising
important national issues. Respondents frequently indicated that their
goals have not changed since their initial entry into politics. One
respondent stated that he wanted to demonstrate that democratic
governance could be implemented in Armenia and that this goal had
not changed over time. Independence and Nagorno-Karabakh were
issues of great importance for the respondents. The Heritage Party
representative stated that his sole purpose in politics was to build a
state with 42,000 km2 of territory (referring to the joint area of the
Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic), which is
“our motherland territory that will serve the needs of all Armenians of
the world.”
A primary goal of this study was to reveal the main components
and features of the political elites’ value system. Therefore, elites were
asked about two topics:
• Which universal values and principles they identify with as
politicians;
• Which behaviors are acceptable or unacceptable in the political
arena.
Respondents most often selected freedom and justice as well as
democracy as the universal principles they identified with as
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politicians. They also cited family, the motherland and responsibility
toward the family and motherland as core values. One group of
respondents cited “Tseghakron” (nationalistic) ideology. Another
respondent stated that the most important principle for a human being
was to serve the nation in which he was born and that a man cannot
be a good person or espouse universal values if he fails to uphold
these values. Certain patterns were revealed by prioritizing values and
preferences. Nationalistic rhetoric was dominant among interviewees
who represented the ruling political party as well as many nonliberal
opposition members who place greater emphasis on national security
and economic prosperity than other goals. Commonly employed terms
in this group included “Motherland,” “nation,” “order,” “morality”
and “security,” compared to terms such as “statehood,” “democracy,”
“rule of law” and “freedom,” which were used more often by other
opposition members.
Respondents most frequently expressed that the use of all possible
means to achieve a goal or to enter into politics, the betrayal of
principles and disregarding the public interest were unacceptable. One
respondent considered political romanticism to be unacceptable.
Truthfulness, prioritizing the public interest, intelligence and the
ability to persuade the public were most often considered desirable.
The availability of a political team and the possession of a political
conscience were also considered important. Respondents stressed the
importance of fairness and honesty. One respondent stated that he
would never accept meanness or the use of manipulative technologies
in politics. Another respondent noted that of the universal values,
morality is primary and patriotism follows and that knowledge is a
precondition to enter the political arena.
The next question asked elite representatives whether they
consider themselves followers of any religion. The vast majority of
respondents, approximately 80%, identified as followers of the
Armenian Apostolic Church. These respondents traced their
membership to receiving sacraments, which was most often their
baptism in childhood. The others identified as Christian in a general
sense but expressed disappointment in the Armenian Apostolic Church
59
for various reasons and did not consider themselves to be members.
One respondent noted his belief in God but did not follow a religion.
Another respondent replied that he did not consider himself a
Christian but that Christian morals guide his behavior. Only one
respondent identified as an atheist.
Self-Perception of the Political Elite
Respondents were also asked to describe the current Armenian
political elite. The current elite was generally described in negative
terms, especially by the members of opposition parties, who often
distanced themselves from or did not consider themselves to be part
of the elite. The current political elite was generally described in
negative terms. The representatives of the ruling party stated that the
elite had experienced some recent, positive changes and presented
examples of such positive developments, whereas representatives of
oppositional parties relied on predominantly negative descriptions of
the elite. For instance, one oppositional party representative stated,
“there is no elite in Armenia because the main prerequisite for being
elite is having principles, but nowadays, the ruling class does not have
any.” A representative of the ruling party claimed that “to be a part of
the elite, one needs to be consistent, determined, knowledgable and
intelligent.” Many respondents not only assigned negative
characteristics to their colleagues, especially to the representatives of
competing parties, but also depicted politics itself as an immoral, zero-
sum game with far-reaching consequences both for elite members and
society in general. Of the 21 ruling party representatives, eight stated
that political fights are becoming more and more civilized and referred
to the National Assembly elections held on May 6, 2012 and other
examples to support their argument. Interestingly, there were also a
few interviewees who were disappointed in that same election and
referred to it as an example of the ruling class’s offenses.
The oppositional party representative who stated that there is no
elite in Armenia because the main prerequisite for having an elite is to
60
have principles and that politicians today do not possess any principles
also stated that “economic oligarchy dominates, and the level of the
elite is irrelevant and does not represent the development level of the
whole society.”
Elite representatives were also asked to identify the groups that
exist within the Armenian elite and their place within it. Once again,
respondents often noted that an elite with certain qualifications does
not exist in Armenia. One group of respondents distinguished between
progovernment and opposition groups as well as political party
membership to group elite representatives. One respondent identified
three groups: the first addresses serious politics, the second includes
the business elite, and the third group includes opportunists. Another
respondent also identified three groups: representatives who passed
through the Soviet school, activists who traced their origins to
independence and became the locomotive of the national movement
and active young people sharing postindependence aspirations who
received the patronage of the first two groups. One respondent
identified two groups: elites who understand national issues and elites
who do not. Still another elite representative described three layers:
the first layer acquires financial resources and does not care about
Armenia as a whole, the next layer does not have the resources but is
not prepared to engage in political fights, and the third layer consists
of those who are willing to sacrifice their interests in a struggle.
The respondents did not describe a homogenous Armenian
political elite but rather a structure with different layers, groups and
even subgroups. The responses indicated the absence of a unified elite
structure and, in fact, suggested the absence of general agreement on
underlying values, national priorities and political principles.
We also asked elite representatives to identify the factors that
helped them become part of the political elite as well as to note the
qualities and skills that a person should possess to remain in Armenian
political life. As expected, education was an important factor in joining
the political elite. Family and relationships were also important factors.
Many respondents also reported negative factors. One respondent
noted that it is necessary to be impolite and to betray to become a
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member of the elite: “adulation, applying any means to one’s purpose,
mediocrity and the special skill of initiating intrigues are negative
features that can play a crucial role in advancing a political career.”
The respondents identified three important factors that influence
integration into the political elite: being a part of a political
organization, professing an ideology and possessing financial or other
means of control. One respondent noted the need to be consistent,
determined, knowledgeable and intelligent to become a part of the
elite. Other factors highlighted included working hard, desiring to
effect change and possessing social skills.
One representative of a oppositional party said that to represent
the ruling elite, one needs to be greedy, unscrupulous and dishonest.
In contrast, a representative of the ruling party stated that one must
possess deep ideological views and values.
We also asked the respondents to describe the nature of political
struggle in Armenia as well as to note which measures employed in
this struggle are justified in their view. Eight respondents of the 21
ruling party representatives stated that political disputes have become
increasingly civilized; these representatives referred to the National
Assembly elections on May 6, 2012 as evidence of this pattern.
Another representative of the ruling party said that an atmosphere of
tolerance is important for political competition but that no such
condition exists in Armenia. Most respondents were inclined to
compromise, but the political environment does not always allow
parties to be more constructive.
Representatives from the opposition political parties gave negative
evaluations of political competition in Armenia. They indicated that
competition is unfair and violates the principle of equal opportunity
and that, therefore, society cannot form a government, and political
struggle is just an imitation of government. Another respondent
claimed that no political struggle takes place because opposition
parties are not given equal opportunities.
The respondents were also questioned about the form of
governance they consider to be the most successful and that can serve
as an example for the Republic of Armenia. Most respondents cited
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France, England, the United States, Germany and the Scandinavian
countries as the most effective forms of government. One ruling party
representative noted the importance of matching each country’s
political system to its needs; for the examples of the successful
management systems of England and the United States, their
effectiveness was stated only in terms of a particular country.
Respondents considered Western democratic political systems of
governance to be exemplary, but some of them stated that their actual
implementation in Armenia is not realistic for a variety of reasons.
The representatives of the political elite were asked about the
extent to which they were devoted to democratic values and
democratic governance. At least at the level of rhetoric, almost all
interviewees expressed positive views of democracy, and a majority
declared it the best alternative for Armenia’s future. Another
unsurprising pattern was observed in the responses to elite
assessments of the existing system. Representatives from the ruling
party held more positive opinions and often considered Armenia to be
a fully democratic country, or at least to be steadily moving toward
that state. In contrast, most interviewees from the opposition decried
the current regime as unlawful, corrupt and autocratic and indicated
that it should be altered even at the price of serious sacrifices.
Nonetheless, representatives from this group did not indicate
intentions to change the whole system but rather to enforce the
existing, formal rules of the game that are ignored by the ruling elite.
Very few interviewees considered the implementation of core
democratic components such as the rule of law, accountability, free
and fair elections and the protection of human rights to be their first
political priority. Representatives of the ruling parties also stressed the
importance of democracy, but they often said that democracy must
not contradict security issues or produce anarchy. One respondent
claimed to support democratic values to the extent they do not
endanger national security. The limitations of the democratic process
are very often justified by security issues. The restriction of citizens’
freedoms also often occurs under the guise of national security.
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We also attempted to determine how political elites would act if
they faced a situation in which they would have to choose between
displaying loyalty to the party and protecting the interests of citizens.
One group of respondents said that they would remain loyal to
political power. The other group believed that situations of apparent
contradictions between the interests of public and political power
must be avoided. One ruling party respondent said that the party’s
interests could not differ from the public interest; he added that he
could never imagine that the interests of the whole society might
deviate from the ruling party’s interests. Ruling party representatives
tended to regard their own political interests and the interests of the
people as the same. Another group of respondents argued that only
the public interest should guide politicians.
We also attempted to determine whether these elites were ready
to compromise with political opponents. The ruling party respondents
were unwilling to compromise on national security or state interests.
Some expressed willingness to compromise on issues that do not risk
national and state interests. One ruling party member considered
compromise to reflect weakness. Some ruling party respondents
considered compromise to be risky. Oppositional party representatives
considered compromise to be an opportunity to stimulate the
development of the country. The majority is always ready to make
compromises, whereas others consider political compromises to be
necessary conditions to reach agreements in political activities.
Although the willingness to compromise was expressed often, it was
conditional. The political system grants the ruling party control over
all state institutions so the ruling party has no incentive to
compromise with other parties; the ruling party is able to impose its
will.
We also investigated opinions on the problems that elites consider
to be most important for Armenia and that require urgent solutions.
Most respondents indicated that one of the most important issues
facing the country is the poor socioeconomic situation. One
respondent stated, “The first and most important issue, of course, is
the social and economic situation.” Other respondents singled out the
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Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the improvement of Armenian-Turkish
relations and social justice among critical issues. Many respondents also
consider immigration to be a real threat to the country, requiring a
quick solution. One representative stated that “immigration,
corruption, social polarization, false elections, non-developed
democratic systems and injustice in all spheres” are the priority issues.
Respondents stressed the importance of democratic values but did not
consider democratization to be a priority for Armenia.
Respondents also provided descriptions of their ideal Armenia.
Elites emphasized the desire for an exceptionally free and democratic
country. They imagine an Armenia where Armenians from the diaspora
and emigrants would wish to live. One participant noted that his ideal
Armenia is a homeland where citizens have rights and opportunities to
obtain competitive and high-quality education and where safety and
security are dominant. One representative dreams of an Armenian
homeland that is founded on human rights and ensures the welfare of
its citizens. Representatives also stressed the importance of freedom of
expression, the primacy of law, equal opportunities and social, political
and economic justice. Respondents noted the primary importance of
socioeconomic problems, whereas the quality of democracy was not a
high priority. Socioeconomic issues were salient to both governmental
and oppositional group representatives.
Respondents did provide clear answers to questions regarding their
political careers and the future. Uncertainty of the future is very
common in transitioning societies. It is clear that, in this sense,
Armenia is characterized by political instability.
The in-depth interviews with the representatives of the Armenian
political elite produced multifaceted, unique qualitative information.
The interviews reveal the main characteristics and necessary
background factors of elite formation in postindependence Armenia.
They also reveal ideological perceptions and values, ideological and
political priorities and attitudes toward issues of public concern.
We conclude that Armenia’s current political elite is increasingly
disunited; as defined by Higley and Burton (2006), the elite lacks
structural integration and basic value consensus, and high levels of
65
distrust toward various groups exist within the political elite,
especially between representatives of ruling and opposition parties.
Disunited political elites are characteristic of unstable regimes such as
illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes; this factor may be
useful in understanding the recent increasing instability in the
Armenian political system. Because of this growing disunity,
competition among various elite groups is considered a zero-sum
game. The fragmented structure of the elite and their distrustful
attitudes toward other members negatively affect the establishment of
Dahl’s system of mutual security, an important prerequisite for
institutionalizing democratic rules of the game in any polity and
transitioning power from one group to another through competitive
elections. In this context, prospects for power sharing among elites, let
alone transitioning political power to competitors, appear to be limited
over the short term in Armenia.
Female Representatives of the Political Elite
During the in-depth interviews with female representatives of
political elites, emphasis was placed on revealing their political
preferences; the peculiarities of starting their political careers; their
values and principles; and their approaches to the political elite, to the
political struggle in Armenia and to their vision of the country’s
overall development.
Before proceeding, we reflect on the political elites’ female
representatives’ approaches to the family. This introduction is
particularly relevant in the context of the public discussion of the
incompatibility of a certain level of female political engagement and
the effective realization of their role in the family. First, all surveyed
female politicians, without reservations, appreciated the role of family
in their lives; the vast majority of representatives did not believe that
family had ever hindered their political activities. Moreover, there are
several measures according to which the family (and family members)
substantially contributes to active political involvement. In this regard,
66
the following opinions are quite interesting: “My family has always
supported me; my husband never objected that I am into politics”
(female representative of the ruling party); “My family, thank God, has
always been on my side in the difficult political decision-making. If
my family, especially my husband, were not on my side, did not
approach with support and understanding, it would be very difficult
for me to effectively reinvent politics” (female representative of the
PA Party of the National Assembly); “I gave birth to my fourth child
when I was engaged in very active political initiatives, and if my
family did not support me at that time, I could not have combined
family and motherhood, the birth of my little miracle with my political
activities” (a female representative of the political opposition).
The other half of surveyed female participants did not have a
family or husband due to various circumstances (some resulting from
divorce or death). This fact supports the relevance of the above
discussion. It is evident that the tradeoff between family and political
activity is relevant to the family situations of our women politicians. It
is notable that the vast majority of male participants are married.
Unlike the men, the women politicians seldom noted historical,
state, public or cultural figures as influences in their political activities.
One respondent cited Margaret Thatcher as an authoritative figure.
Another young MP respondent was particularly impressed by
Churchill’s political activities, and a former minister cited the great
Armenian poet Silva Kaputikyan as a “spiritual mother.” Other
references were made, but it is clear that women are more reserved
than men in this regard. This phenomenon can be explained by a
unique kind of self-preservation instinct; most of the women do not
talk about their idols, perhaps because they suspect it would make
them vulnerable.
A number of features are outlined in the context of analyzing the
motives, factors and issues regarding female political elites’ entrance
into politics or engagement with professional political activities.
In this context, it is particularly important to understand the
arenas from which women transfer into politics and to track their
political career mobility. The respondents revealed three separate
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arenas from which women enter into politics. First, they are recruited
from the public sector or, according to a classic definition, the civil
society sector. In other words, their political socialization began from
engagement in public activities during which they raised many issues
of public concern and implemented many targeted projects for the
protection of vulnerable groups. Most women who shifted from civil
society into politics primarily were engaged in human rights issues and
social problems, which have received a great deal of political
attention. This transition can be considered customary.
The second arena from which women transferred into the political
elite is public administration or civil service. As a rule, it is easier to
be noticed on this platform. This track is considered advantageous for
a political career as, at least, a slow but steady path toward the
political elite. In this sense, one of the young female deputies made an
interesting comment: “...as if it were normal, I’ve always been
engaged into processes, I have not been sitting in the distance to get
an official proposal one day; I always say that it was some kind of
evolution and it is not easy to say at what particular stage that
decision was reached.” This approach indicates that the transition from
this platform into active politics is smooth and natural.
Finally, the third arena is from within a political party. This case
should not be understood as a platform for entering active politics but
rather as a platform for replenishing the ranks of the political elite.
Although active political activity as a member of a political party is
considered one of the most effective ways to supplement the political
elite, the long-term membership and activities as a party member did
not result in membership in National Assembly or the government for
the vast majority of our women. Approximately half of the
respondents received invitations to join a political party or election
lists just two or three months, and in some cases up to six months,
before the elections. This pattern can be explained by the existing
formal rules mandating the political participation and representation of
women in general, and, in particular, the participation of women in
proportional lists according to a certain proportion: “The participation
of each sex in the electoral lists of The National Assembly proportional
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party, alliance of parties and each party involved in the alliance should
not exceed 80 percent32
starting from the 2nd number to any whole
number in each five (2–6, 2–11, 2–16, and so on, until the end of the
list).”
Several interesting conclusions can be made by drawing parallels
between female and male political elite representatives’ entrances into
politics. Whereas men mostly transition into politics from the business
sphere and through political party channels, women transition through
civil society, state administration and political parties. This comparison
illustrates the social order that has formed the country’s political
landscape. Clearly, the main motivations of men who shifted from the
business sector into politics are to serve the interests not only of the
public but mostly of their own businesses.
The motivations of women entering politics are very similar to the
motivations of men. Most women did not imagine themselves actively
engaged in politics or decision-making. The women politicians have
found it difficult to specify the moments that were essential to
accessing the political area.
The human values and principles that women in particular noted
were the importance of fairness, honesty, humanity, tolerance and
peaceful coexistence. Women politicians are extremely sensitive to
these principles and values.
The female representatives’ assessments of the Armenian political
elite were rather pessimistic. One opposition deputy described the
elite as a “very indescribable, versatile and multi-layered
phenomenon.” Another representative of the oppositional party gave
the following formulation: “As our elites have already been closely
identified with so many truly unrelated ideas, unfortunately for me, it
is a kind of concept that has become unacceptable and abominable.”
One Republican deputy noted, “our political elite is fuzzy because the
expression ‘elite’ has been taken in a slightly different direction, and I
think it still has to go through the several stages of development.”
32
RA Electoral Code, Article 8.2.
69
Such assessments are reflected in the women’s observations of the
political elite groups/levels. As a rule, female representatives
experienced difficulties with clearly and correctly identifying the elite
strata and the historical and political background of its formation. In
some very uncertain cases, the so-called “detached context”
approaches were presented. One former member of the National
Assembly said, “There are both intelligent politicians and just
businessmen.” One ruling party representative gave the following
answer: “There is one layer that knows what the policy is and why it
is there, but there is a layer that appears random; this layer is exerting
great efforts to stay among the political elite; unfortunately, there is
also a layer that is not compatible with the concept of the elite in any
way but, unfortunately, there is no hope that they will change.”
Female respondents described political struggle in Armenia as very
tense, “life or death,” unhealthy and contaminated by “black PR”
strategies. Considering these phenomena unacceptable, female
respondents find that this situation contributes neither to the
development of a civil struggle nor to the strengthening of
competition principles.
There are no obvious differences in female responses regarding
issues that require urgent solution. They basically noted the same
issues that dominate the men’s responses.
Female respondents expressed strongly divergent opinions in
response to the question of which form of governance is most
successful and is exemplary for the Republic of Armenia. The most
common responses were the governments of France, Germany,
England, Sweden and the United States. Those who cited France
emphasized the semipresidential administration, which also operates in
Armenia (the amended version of the RA Constitution adopted in 2005
by a nationwide referendum was modeled on the French example). For
Germany and England, the particular emphasis was on
parliamentarianism traditions. The United States was cited as a country
with rich democratic traditions and a stable political system. For
Sweden, the female representatives emphasized the highly effective
operational model of the social state. While considering these specific
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forms of governance as the most successful, the women did not
consider them exemplary for Armenia. The respondents expressed
interesting approaches. In particular, one of the former ministers said,
“Germany is very acceptable, but they are Germans, thinking that the
law is superior, what the law says the citizen should be subjected to.
We do not have such thinking, unfortunately.” One opposition deputy,
consistent with the previous logic, stated, “There are no ways that can
be exemplary for Armenia. In general, each country should have its
management model and form the basis for it considering the mentality
of its people, its customs and traditions, the region it is in and the
surrounding neighbors, and so on.”
On the one hand, similarities in terms of political preferences,
values, principles, evaluations of issues and Armenia’s future were
observed between women and men; by contrast, unique paths into
active politics, incorporation into the political elite and the platforms
from which people transition into politics exist for women. Whereas
men mostly enter the political elite from business and political party
channels, women enter from civil society, civil service and political
party platforms. An additional important conclusion relates to the
purposefulness of female representatives. Most participants were
clearly aware of their plans in politics, were ready to take on the
responsibility and were willing make tough political decisions.
Findings from Interviews with Representatives of
the NKR Political Elite
Nine in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of
the political elite from Nagorno-Karabakh. Two participants are
deputies of the National Assembly. Six respondents are former
deputies, three of whom held previous positions as community
leaders. One respondent was a candidate during the NKR presidential
elections and a previous deputy minister.
Five participants were born in Stepanakert, three were born in
villages of NKR, and one was born in the RA. Three participants were
71
born into families of teachers; the parents of the other respondents
are highly qualified professionals such as construction workers,
farmers and veterinarians. Four respondents had higher pedagogical
education, one respondent had a higher medical education, and three
respondents had university education. Three respondents received
degrees in the social sciences, and six received degrees in the natural
sciences or related fields. Three respondents had worked in their
previous profession for a long time; two respondents had worked up
to a year, and the rest had not been employed in their profession at
all.
No respondents reported dreaming of becoming a politician during
childhood or adolescence. However, some respondents, by the force of
tradition, had been members of the Komsomol, the Communist Party’s
youth organization. Eight of the nine respondents indicated that the
Karabakh movement and the collapse of the USSR stimulated their
interest in politics and their active engagement in it.
Some of the interviewees named the intellectuals of the time as
their teenage authority figures, other respondents noted their families
and relatives, and one respondent could not indicate any authority
figure. For some respondents, Armenian writers had made an impact
on their political views.
Eight of the nine respondents entered into the political arena
during the mid-1980s as the Karabakh movement was developing.
Some respondents were members of different student groups
concerned with discussions of political issues, but the process of
becoming politicians on an institutional level started with the
Karabakh movement. Only one respondent was actively involved in
politics during the 2000s and transferred from the public sector. Four
respondents did not consider themselves politicians. However, all
respondents held political positions in legislative and local government
bodies either at the time of the interview or previously.
Six respondents indicated that family, acquaintances and friendly
relations had not played a substantial role in their political career,
whereas three others noted the important role of family. One
respondent indicated that friendship and kinship ties are important.
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Among universal principles, respondents most often selected
human rights, humanism and sincerity. Most representatives stated
that they remained loyal to the principles and goals they had at the
beginning of their political career.
The issues needing urgent solutions among NKR respondents were
the establishment of justice and democracy, the rebirth of hope,
resettlement policies, the rehabilitation of the economy and the
encouragement of real political competition.
Almost all respondents believe that the NKR president and his
social environment have the greatest impact on the decision-making
process. One respondent attributed the greatest role in this process to
the RA authorities.
It is notable that three of the nine respondents considered
themselves left nationalists, one was left-orientated, one was in the
center, and four held liberal ideologies.
Most respondents did not name a specific governmental model.
One respondent mentioned the parliamentary governance model, one
respondent mentioned the presidential model, and another one
mentioned the semipresidential–semiparliamentary governance model.
Respondents often noted that it is possible to have effective
governance regardless of the model.
Most respondents considered themselves to be individuals
dedicated to and driven by democratic values. One respondent
supports conservatism and traditional values. Three respondents
believe that democratic values are acceptable to the extent that they
contribute to national and social development.
The vast majority of respondents emphasized the importance of
remaining loyal to the public in their political practice rather than
their commitment to the political forces with which they are affiliated.
The arguments in this regard value the national interest above
everything else and emphasize the need to side with citizens.
Two respondents considered compromising to achieve primary
goals to be impossible. One respondent supported compromises if
national interests demand it. The other respondents would be willing
to sit around the negotiating table and solve key problems in a
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civilized way. However, respondents were more willing to compromise
on internal issues than on external issues.
Respondents described an ideal model of the Nagorno-Karabakh
republic as a democratic, internationally recognized state with a large
population, a stable future and stable perspectives.
Most respondents were willing to continue their current political
activities for the next six months, the next year and the next
five years. Some were considering being more proactive in their
political endeavors.
Most respondents considered themselves to be happy. Respondents
who were happy stated that their happiness derives from the
opportunity to participate in the Karabakh movement and their
contribution to the establishment of the republic of Nagorno-
Karabakh.
The Karabakh movement at all stages of its development has had
the greatest impact on the formation of the NKR political elite. The
political elite in the NKR can be called situational because it was
formed under the influence of a specific situation. All respondents
stated that they had had no intention of entering into politics, and
most respondents had entered the political arena due to the ongoing
processes resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular,
the rise of nationalism has provided motives and ideas that encourage
people to occupy a more active role in society. During the Soviet
regime, respondents likely would have pursued professional activities;
however, the creation of a national state through the independence of
Armenia (including the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) opened the
political arena. The Armenian intellectuals of the time have had a great
influence on the ideological formation of these political elites.
Universal values and a commitment to human rights are close to
the heart of these elite representatives because the Karabakh
movement began as a struggle for human and social rights and has a
clear ideological definition. These values are strongly imprinted on the
participants of the Karabakh movement.
74
The notion of situational elites is supported by the fact that one
part of the elite does not foresee their ongoing active involvement in
politics, stating a preference to be engaged in professional activities.
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CHAPTER 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF
FUTURE POLITICAL ELITES
Reviewing the biographical data of all cabinet members and MPs
elected to parliament since Armenia’s independence revealed seven
different segments (public servants, members of political parties, NGO
activists, members of local governance bodies, student council
members, academics/artists/athletes, top business owners and CEOs)
from which most political elites are being recruited. To study the
political culture of potential political elites, a survey was conducted
among 691 respondents from these seven segments.
The results of the survey were analyzed and grouped into the
following four sections:
• General profile of potential political elite members;
• Political culture (at three levels, as conceptualized by G. Almond
and G. B. Powell);
• Attitudes toward democracy, and
• General values (as conceptualized by Ronald Inglehart and
Christian Welzel).
The questionnaire included questions regarding age, gender, level
of education and income that could help to explain the variation in
responses.
General Profile
Respondents of the survey were distributed as follows: one-third
of respondents were civil servants; 23.4% were LSG body members;
22.5% were academics, athletes or artists; 9.6% were party members;
6% were NGO members; 3.5% were owners of large businesses and
CEOs; and 2% were student council members.
Of the respondents, 53.8% were female. Respondents aged 28 or
younger constituted 26.3%, and another 60% of respondents ranged
from 29 to 49 years old. Respondents aged 55 or above constituted
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only 1% of the sample. In total, 65% graduated from secondary school
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of the respondents, 73.7 had
completed some level of higher education, and another 15.2% had an
academic degree (PhD candidate or higher), whereas only 1%, all of
whom were representatives of political parties and LSG bodies, had
only graduated from secondary school. Of the respondents, 99%
reported knowledge of Russian, and 61.9% reported knowledge of
English. Other popular languages included German (11%), French
(10.9%) and Turkish (2.2%).
One-quarter of respondents from Armenia were born in Yerevan,
18.2% in other Armenian towns, 15.5% in villages and 5.8% outside of
Armenia (mostly Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russia). Of the respondents,
51.7% reported that their parents were white-collar workers during
the Soviet period, 20.6% of parents were blue-collar workers, 7.4% of
parents were farmers, and 5% of parents were middle- and high-
ranking officials. When asked to rank the social conditions of their
families at that time, 30.6% considered their families to be fully
provided for, 62% had most of their needs provided, and 1.2%
considered their family to be needy.
Of the respondents, 81.2% were living in nuclear families with five
or fewer members. Regarding income, 31.5% identified themselves as
the main breadwinner of their family, 46.2% identified themselves as
one of the breadwinners, and 22.6% reported that their contribution
to family income was not considerable. Male respondents were more
often reported to be the breadwinner (51.4 vs. 14.5% of females). Of
the respondents, 34% reported lower per capita monthly spending
(one hundred ten $) than the official minimum consumer price index
and were close to or below the official poverty line. This figure is
roughly proportional to the poverty rates at the national level. The
largest portion of respondents, 43.6%, reported income in the range
110–220$ monthly spending per capita, whereas only 3.3% reported
monthly spending over four hundred forty $/month. The proportion
of lower levels of per capita spending was more frequent in the NKR
(38.9% with less than 110$ and 55.3% spending 110–220$ per month)
than in the RA (35.9% spending less than 110$ and 43.7% spending
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110–220$ per month). Only 0.5% of respondents from the NKR
reported more than 330$ per capita spending per month compared to
9.4% of RA. The following groups reported less than 220$ in monthly
spending per capita: 86.9% of civil servants, 90.3% of party members,
86.4% of NGO members and 93.2% of LSG members. Interestingly, the
highest per capita spending (above 440 $) was reported by student
council members (38.5%) and business community members (17.4%).
We were also interested to learn how often representatives of
these segments travel outside of Armenia and to what destinations.
Respondents from Armenia were significantly more mobile than in the
NKR. Of the respondents, 43.4% in Armenia and 57.1% in the NKR
reported that they had not traveled outside of Armenia during the last
five years, and another 13.4% in the RA and 28.8% in the NKR had
traveled only once. Another 27 and 12.5% from the RA and the NKR,
respectively, had left the country between two and five times. The
remaining 14.3% of respondents from Armenia and 1.6% from the NKR
had traveled abroad more than five times. Of the respondents from
Armenia who traveled abroad, 75.3% had visited Russia and other CIS
countries, whereas only 17.7% reported visits to North America or
Europe. The proportion was much more unbalanced among
respondents from the NKR, where 94.8% of visitors had traveled to
Russia and other CIS countries, and only 3.1% had visited the United
States or European countries. Despite this general proximity to Russia
and other CIS countries, Armenians prefer EU integration (26% RA,
2.1% NKR) over integration with Russia and CIS countries (22.5% RA,
6.3% NKR) or a regional/Caucasian organization (0.8% RA, 0% NKR).
The difference in responses for the RA and the NKR may be explained
by considering the NKR’s very limited interaction with the outside
world due to its unrecognized status as well as additional options
(integration with RA) designed for NKR respondents (Chart 3.2). More
than two-thirds of those who preferred EU integration graduated from
secondary school after the collapse of the Soviet Union, whereas
58.4% of those who preferred integration with Russia and CIS
countries graduated before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Half of
the NGO members and more than one-third of the business sector
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representatives favored EU integration, whereas LGB representatives
preferred (23.6%) integration with Russia and CIS countries.
Of the respondents, 94.4% reported being followers of the
Armenian Apostolic Church, another 1.3% identified with other
Christian denominations, and 3.5% considered themselves to be
atheists/agnostics. Additionally, 48.4% thought that religion always
helped them to make important decisions in their everyday life, 43.6%
thought that religion helped them only in some cases, and 8%
reported that religion was never helpful in making important decisions
in everyday life. Moreover, when asked about membership in various
organizations, only 1.3% indicated that they were active members of
churches or religious organizations, and another 4.5% identified
themselves as passive members of such organizations. However, the
Church was considered the second and third most trustworthy
institution in the RA and the NKR, respectively.
In general, active membership in various social organizations, such
as labor unions, sports and cultural clubs, consumer rights or
environmental protection groups and professional organizations, was
below 10%, with the exception of political parties (42.2% of responses
identified active members of political parties). Among the groups most
frequently identified as active members were party members (93.9%),
student council members (30.8%), LSG representatives (17.3%), civil
servants (18.2%) and NGO members (12.2%). Another 3% of party
members, 18.5% of LSG representatives, 10.4% of civil servants and
19.5% of NGO members identified themselves as not very active
members of political parties.
Only 5.2% of respondents considered themselves to be
uninterested in politics, most frequently athletes, artists and
academics, whereas 97% of party members, 84.6% of student council
members, 78.1% NGO members, 79.6% of local governance
representatives and 76.6% of civil servants were very or mostly
interested in politics. This high level of interest in politics was also
confirmed by participation rates in recent elections. A full 94.2% of
respondents confirmed that they had participated in recent
presidential elections, 90.1% had participated in parliamentary
79
elections, and 86.8% had participated in elections of local self-
governance bodies (more details on electoral participation are
presented in the next section).
Political culture
G. Almond (2010) identified three main levels of studying political
culture: system, process and policy. In the following section, we
attempt to describe the main characteristics of political culture of
potential political elite members by adopting this approach.
The system level of political culture involves the general
orientation toward the political system and includes components such
as national pride, identification with the system and the legitimacy of
the political system. In terms of national identification and pride
(Chart 3.1), the most dominant characteristic is ethnic identity (46 and
47% in the NKR and the RA, respectively), and identification with the
political system is second (26 and 30% in the NKR and the RA,
respectively). The third most common identity is religion, chosen from
among many options. However, religious self-identification is almost
twice as strong in the NKR (16%) as in the RA, 9%, which may be
related to the fact that Armenians in the NKR had the recent
experience of coexisting with a non-Christian population within a
Muslim-dominated society. The other notable difference is that there
are three times as many individuals who consider themselves first of
all to be citizens of the world in the RA, 7% compared with the NKR
(2%).
Another measure of the support for the political system can be
considered opinions on the future of the RA and the NKR (Chart 3.2).
A total of 50.4% of respondents in the RA and 58.1% in the NKR
preferred their respective republics to be fully independent rather
than integrated with the EU, a Russian/CIS block or a regional block.
Contrary to the widespread notion that the population of the NKR is
willing to be part of Armenia, only one-third of respondents indicated
such a preference.
80
Potential political elite members were also asked about their
preferences for the current political regime versus the Soviet political
regime. A majority of potential future political elite members in both
societies expressed a strong preference for the current political regime
(Chart 3.3). The difference between the RA and the NKR may be
explained by (1) the predominance of younger respondents in the
latter group and (2) a preference for the current status/situation over
being an autonomous region within Soviet Azerbaijan. By dividing
respondents into two main age groups representing those who
graduated from school during the Soviet Union (preindependence
political socialization) and those who graduated after
(postindependence political socialization), we found a significant
relationship for the support of current political regime among those
with postindependence political socialization (two out of three
supported the current political regime). The difference in the older
generation was less significant (53% support the current political
regime vs. 46% who support the Soviet political regime).
The process level represents (a) expectations of the citizens’ and
their role in political processes as well as (b) attitudes toward different
institutions of the political system.
The vast majority of potential political elite members in both
societies were very interested or quite interested in politics (70% in
NKR and 83% in RA). There was a much stronger interest toward
foreign politics in the NKR (30%) than in the RA, 18%, whereas the
latter were more interested in national (27%) and local level politics
(20%) compared to 19 and 10% in the NKR, respectively. Regional
political developments are of interest to 12% of NKR future political
elite members and 18% of those from the RA. As expected, the most
common type of political participation is voting; however, in both
societies, the voting turnout of future political elite members was
much higher than the average rates. A total of 93% of respondents
voted during the most recent presidential elections in NKR, and 95%
voted in Armenia, with 84 and 93% in parliamentary elections and 79
and 90% in local governance bodies, respectively. Those who did not
participate in all three types of elections most frequently (3.2–6.3%)
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explained this behavior with objective reasons (e.g., absence from the
country), whereas another 1% considered elections not to be free and
fair. Interestingly, unlike local governance (1.6%) and parliamentary
elections (1%), none of the respondents identified the absence of
worthy candidates as a reason for not participating in presidential
elections.
Despite this interest in politics, almost half of the respondents
(47.3%) indicated that they were not planning to become involved in
politics directly. Frequent explanations for this decision included not
being interested in political activities (24.8%), the ability to reach
one’s goals without getting involved in politics (11%) and not believing
that one’s involvement would change anything (10.5%). Female
respondents were more often reluctant to become involved in politics
(62.4%) than male respondents (37.6%), and the proportion of
undecided respondents was similar (62% female compared to 38%
male). As could be expected from these data, male respondents more
often (55.1%) reported willingness to become involved in politics than
females (44.9%). At the same time, of those respondents who
considered themselves already involved in politics, 70.1% were male,
whereas 29.9% were female. This finding indicates that politics
continues to be largely dominated by men; however, in the future,
the proportion of women may be increased, as indicated by the
proportion of those women who indicated a willingness to become
involved in politics. We also examined the age differences of the
respondents. A total of 80.1% of respondents who decided to get into
politics were 38 years old or younger (post-Soviet socialization).
Representatives of the same generation constituted 57.2% of those
who did not plan to be involved in politics and 74.4% of those who
had not yet decided on that matter.
The distribution of responses among the segments with regard to
planning to become involved in politics is shown in Table 3.1. A total
of 25% of those who planned to become involved in politics identified
the executive branch as the area of their involvement, whereas 21.5%
indicated party politics, 12.5% indicated local governance, and 9.6%
indicated the legislative branch. The largest group (31.4%) of those
82
who planned to become involved in politics were not sure which
branch of politics they would pursue.
Regardless of this strong interest in politics and active electoral
participation, most future political elite members had very limited
experience in engaging in other conventional types of political
participation, and a very small portion of those had directly organized
this kind of action (Table 3.2.1). Boycotts and strikes had not been
experienced by most potential political elite members in either the RA
or the NKR, and more than half of potential political elite members
think that they will never be engaged in such types of actions.
A striking difference observed among respondents from the NKR
who organized or participated in peaceful demonstrations may be
explained by the Karabakh movement of the late-1980s. However, this
movement should be considered a distant and unique experience that
is not part of political practices (unlike in the RA); in recent decades,
few demonstrations have been organized in the NKR. Almost all of
these demonstrations were related to external issues and did not make
demands related to internal issues. However, there are significant
differences among the recruitment segments, where NGO activists and
political party members are the most actively engaged segments, and
public servants and members of local governance bodies are the most
passive segments (Table 3.2.2). Most future political elite members can
be characterized as subjects, who are aware of and interested in
politics but limit their public political participation to voting and,
unlike the small minority of participants, refrain from making
demands and actively engaging in promoting these demands through
the support of political forces.
The second dimension of describing political culture at the process
level is related to the measurement of the trust in social and political
institutions. The general characteristics of the level of trust in political
and social institutions observed among future political elite members
in the present study showed some differences compared to findings
from a survey among the entire population of Armenia conducted by
83
the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in 2011.33
In general, in
the present study, potential political elite representatives exhibited a
higher level of trust in political institutions compared to the general
population and a lower level of trust in social institutions, such as the
healthcare system, the educational system and banks (Chart 3.4.4).
There were also similarities with regard to the level of trust among
the general population and potential elite representatives. For
example, the army was the most trusted institution among the
respondents of our survey. The level of trust among respondents from
the NKR (51% fully trust the army, whereas another 33% somewhat
trust the army) was higher than in the RA (42% fully trust, and 32%
somewhat trust). The level of trust in the army was slightly lower
among the general population (34% fully trust, and 32% somewhat
trust), and the army was the second most trusted institution, with the
Church being the most trusted among the population (46% fully trust,
and 32% somewhat trust the Church). Among the representatives of
political elite members in the RA, the Church is the second most
trusted institution (38% fully trust, and 29% somewhat trust), whereas
in the NKR, the Church is only the third most trusted institution (24%
fully trust, and 25% somewhat trust), following the president of the
NKR (30% fully trust, and 34% somewhat trust). Respondents from the
RA trust the president to a lesser degree (27% fully trust, and 26%
somewhat trust), in contrast to the much lower level of trust among
the general population (11% fully trust, and 25% somewhat trust). The
fourth most trusted institution among the NKR political elite
representatives is the police, where more than twice the number of
respondents fully trusted the police (21%) compared with political elite
representatives in the RA, 9%, whose trust level was similar to the low
level among the general population of the RA (Chart 3.4.1 contains
detailed information on the level of trust in these four institutions).
When comparing the four most trusted institutions among potential
political elite representatives of the RA and the NKR and the general
33
http://crrc.ge/oda/.
84
population of the RA, only two institutions (the army and the Church)
had high levels of trust from all three groups.
When comparing the levels of trust in the legislative, executive
and judicial branches and local self-government (Chart 3.4.2), the
latter was the most fully trusted institution both among potential
political elite representatives of the RA and the general population (20
and 11%, respectively), whereas in the NKR, local self-government was
trusted half as much (6%) as executive government and parliament (13
and 12%, respectively). The levels of trust both among potential
political elite representatives of the RA (8 and 7%, respectively) and
the general population (7 and 6%, respectively) toward these two
institutions were lower than in the NKR. Despite the low level of trust,
courts were trusted twice as much by the population of the RA, 7% as
by potential elite representatives of the RA and the NKR (3%).
Another difference was the higher level of mistrust toward
governance bodies among the general population compared to
potential elite representatives: in case of LSG, 21% of the general
population of the RA compared to 15% of the potential elite
representatives in the RA and 10% in the NKR reported full mistrust;
28% of the population of the RA compared to 19% of the potential
elite representatives in the RA and 11% in the NKR mistrusted
executive, 30% of the population of the RA compared to 22% of the
potential elite representatives in the RA and 8% in the NKR mistrusted
legislative body. The courts are the least fully trusted institution in
this group among representatives of the potential political elite in the
RA and the NKR (3%), whereas the level of full trust among the
general population of the RA in the courts is more than twice as high
(7%).
The levels of trust in political institutions that are crucial for a
competitive democratic society, including media, NGOs and
ombudsmen, were quite low among both groups and comparable to
the low level of trust recorded among the general population of the
RA (Chart 3.4.3). The most significant difference regarding these
institutions was the higher level of trust in the ombudsmen of the RA
(13% among the general population and 10% among potential elite
85
representatives of the RA reported full trust) compared to ombudsmen
of the NKR (only 3% fully trusted), with 17% expressing full distrust in
both groups of the RA compared to 25% expressing full distrust in the
NKR. Taking into account the fact that in the RA and the NKR, the
institutions were created almost simultaneously (2004 in the RA, 2005
in the NKR) and that the NKR Law on Human Rights Defender was
copied almost exactly from that of the RA, we infer that the
difference in trust is based on the personalities and performance of
the ombudsmen.
We also asked our respondents about their trust in political parties
and the electoral system. The percentage of respondents who trust the
electoral system is the same in the RA and the NKR (10%); however, in
the RA, 27% of respondents fully distrust the electoral system,
compared to 15% in the NKR. Political parties are slightly more often
trusted (7% in the RA, 4% in the NKR) and distrusted (27% in the RA
and 19% in the NKR) in the RA than in the NKR. Unfortunately, there
were no questions in the CRRC (2011) survey on the level of trust in
political parties or the electoral system to be compared with our
findings.
We also investigated the extent to which the level of trust in
institutions differs among representatives of those institutions versus
the general population. For this purpose, we measured the level of
trust among three segments representing these institutions, namely,
representatives of NGOs, political parties and local self-governance
bodies (Chart 3.4.5). As might be expected, experiences working in
any of these institutions at least doubled the level of trust in that
institution. The most significant difference was observed among
representatives of LSG bodies, 39% of whom fully trusted that
institution.
The respondents were asked indicate their level of trust in the EU
and the UN (Chart 3.4.6). In this case, the most significant difference
was among representatives of the potential elite of the NKR, their
counterparts from the RA and the general population of the RA. The
latter two groups had comparable levels of trust and distrust toward
both the EU and the UN, whereas respondents of the NKR distrusted
86
these institutions twice as much. This finding again shows a difference
in attitudes toward external political institutions in the RA and the
NKR. This difference may be explained by both the limited interaction
with those institutions in the NKR as well as the frustration resulting
from the lack of attention from the outside world, including a
reluctance to recognize and engage with the NKR.
At the policy level, political culture indicates the main policy
expectations from the government, which includes both the general
understanding of government’s role and areas of involvement as well
as formulations of particular policy goals.
To measure policy preferences, respondents were asked to rate on
a ten-point scale three questions about income equality, type of
ownership and the government’s responsibility in the sphere of social
security. These three questions were taken from a six-question set in
the World Value Survey.34
The details of findings on these six
questions, along with a comparison of World Value Survey data
collected in Armenia in 1995,35
as well as two questions from the
Caucasus Barometer of 2012 conducted by the CRRC36
in 2012 are
discussed below (for the results of separate questions, see Chart 3.5.1
to 3.5.6).
Based on the aggregated data, six main groups of policy
preferences were identified. Representatives of the group labeled
“leftist” gave leftist answers to all three questions, those who were
“left leaning” gave leftist answers to two out of three questions,
“neutrals” selected the middle point in at least two cases, the
“situational” group representatives gave at least one rightist answer
and one leftist answer, “right leaning” respondents chose two right-
leaning answers out of the three questions, and “rightist” respondents
indicated right-leaning preferences for all three questions. Chart 3.6
suggests that socialistic aspirations are still predominant among future
34
WVS questionnaire available at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/survey_1995 35
Dataset available at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp 36
http://www.crrc.am/research-and-surveys/caucasusbarometer/documentation
87
political elite members both in the NKR and the RA; however, these
aspirations were more strongly expressed in the RA (34% leftists and
20% left leaning) than in the NKR (18% leftist and 21% left leaning).
Another interesting finding was that in both groups, a significant
portion (approximately 30%) did not have consistent preferences on
public policy issues. With regard to recruitment segments, leftist
preferences were the most frequent among civil servants (35%) and
LSG members (28.1%). Rightist preferences were the most frequent
among civil servants (37%) and political party members (25.9%). The
latter finding may partially explain why leftist preferences are not
translated into voting preferences in either the RA or the NKR and
why not a single leftist party has been elected to either parliament
since 1999. The only exception was the ARFD, which is predominantly
viewed as a nationalistic party, with its socialistic ideology often
forgotten.
Among the representatives of the younger generation of
respondents (post-Soviet socialization), leftist aspirations are weaker
(26.1%) compared to those with Soviet socialization (36%). At the same
time, situational policy preferences were rarer among the latter group
(26.8% among the Soviet socialization group vs. 31.6% among the post-
Soviet socialization group). Another interesting difference was found
when comparing policy preferences between genders. Female
respondents more often reported right and right-leaning preferences
(55.6 and 59% in RA and NKR), whereas most male respondents
favored leftist responses (55.7%).
Respondents were also asked about their opinions on the general
direction of internal policies (Chart 3.7). The largest group both in the
RA and the NKR (38.4 and 50.3%, respectively) considered that
internal policies were mostly moving in the right direction. The
second largest group of respondents (36.8 and 37.2%, respectively)
believed that policies were not being changed. However, in the RA,
respondents more frequently answered that internal policies were
mostly (12.4% compared to 6.3% in the NKR) or surely moving in the
wrong direction (8.1% compared to 2.1%, respectively). When answers
were separated among the recruitment segments, student council
88
members stood out as the most satisfied with developments regarding
internal policies, with 23.1% assured that those policies were moving
in the right direction and 38.5% believing that the policies were
mostly moving in the right direction. Artists (46.2%), party members
(28.8%) and NGO representatives (22.5%) considered that the policies
were mostly or surely moving in the wrong direction, whereas the
majority (56.5%) of business owners considered that the policies were
not being changed.
Attitudes Toward Democracy
Surveys measuring attitudes toward democracy have been
implemented in virtually all parts of the world during last two
decades, including in some of the post-Soviet countries. In the
framework of the survey conducted among future political elite
members, a separate section was designed to measure support for the
democratic regime, preferences for alternatives to democracy and
additional questions that would clarify perceptions on what constitutes
democratic values and ideals. Several of these questions were taken
from above-mentioned surveys (World Value Survey and Caucasus
Barometer) conducted in Armenia to be able to compare these
attitudes between potential elite representatives and the general
population. However, most of the questions in this section are not
comparable with the above-mentioned surveys because they were
specifically designed for this project or were taken from thematic
surveys that were not conducted in Armenia.
When directly asked about the importance of living in a
democratic country, respondents in the RA expressed stronger
sentiments (77% indicated that it is very important for them) than in
the NKR (58%). At the same time, both groups consider their
respective political regimes to be on approximately the same level of
democracy (RA Mean 4.30, NKR Mean 4.46). Thus, the gap between
democratic aspirations and reality is substantially larger in the RA than
in the NKR (Table 3.3). An analysis by segment demonstrated that NGO
89
activists, artists and student council members value living in a
democratic country the most (mean: 9.56, 9.54 and 9.54,
respectively), and representatives of these segments gave the lowest
ratings for the current level of democracy (mean: 3.61 and 3.92 for
activists and artists, respectively), whereas student council members
gave the highest ratings for the current level of democracy (6.23).
This contrast may be explained by the fact that student councils were
dominated by the representatives of ruling political parties and were
reluctant to criticize either the regime or the authorities.
To measure the level of support for democracy, another question
was asked regarding preferred alternatives to the democratic regime in
the RA and the NKR. A strong majority, 80% in the NKR and 82% in
the RA, indicated that there were no better alternatives to democracy.
Those who indicated that there might be better alternatives for the RA
and the NKR were asked to specify their preferences. The most
preferred alternatives were “the rule of a strong leader” (7% in the
NKR and 10% in the RA) and “the rule of the best educated experts”
(10% in the NKR and 2% in the RA). Remaining alternatives (including a
one-party system, rule by military officers, rule by clerics and a Soviet
regime) were considered alternatives to democracy only by 1–1.5% of
respondents in each group (Chart 3.8).
Despite the low levels of trust in political institutions that are
critical for the existence of any democratic regime (details of the level
of trust were presented in previous section), less than 10% of potential
future political elite members considered the elimination of those
institutions and limitations on civil liberties to be acceptable. A strong
majority (at least 60%) considered these kinds of undemocratic
developments to be completely unacceptable. The least supported
developments in the RA were bans on political parties (6.9%); the
dissolution of parliament and unrestricted rule of the president (5.5%);
bans on NGOs and the limitation of media freedom (2.6%); and the
announcement of martial law for an unspecified time period with the
limitation of political freedoms (0.8%). In contrast to this, in the NKR,
respondents more often would tolerate a ban on NGOs and a limitation
of media freedom (6.6%) and bans on political parties (6%) compared
90
to the announcement of martial law for an unspecified time period
with the limitation of political freedoms and the dissolution of
parliament and unrestricted rule of the president (both 2.2%).
This overwhelming support for democratic values and institutions
decreased to some extent when additional questions were asked to
verify the intensity of preferences for democracy. When asked to
choose between the two options, 38% in the NKR and 39% in the RA
prefer “to be governed by good and experienced individuals regardless
of the outcomes of elections,” whereas only slightly more than 60% in
each group believes that “authorities should be established as a result
of free and fair elections.” Another set of questions was asked to
identify the proportion of respondents who (1) believe that
government should be viewed as an employee and held accountable
by the people, (2) believe that people should participate in protests
against the government to demonstrate that the people are in charge,
and (3) believe that elections are important to defining the future of
the country (for details, see Chart 3.9.1 to Chart 3.9.3). Interestingly,
two-thirds of respondents representing potential political elites and
the general population provided answers that indicate a political
culture with democratic values and principles. However, support was
slightly higher among the representatives of the potential political
elite of the RA compared to elites in the NKR and the general
population of the RA. At the same time, a higher percentage of
respondents from the NKR considered elections important because
they define the future of the country (69.8%) when compared with
their colleagues from the RA, 62.2%. One possible explanation for this
variation might be the notion that elections conducted in the NKR are
not only important for choosing officials but also for securing the
legitimacy of the regime in the external world.
Despite this support for democracy, the picture changes
dramatically when democratic goals are compared to economic and
social achievements and security issues. When asked to prioritize the
goals for the development of the country, economic development was
the first choice in both the NKR (68%) and the RA, 62%, followed by
national security (NKR 28%, RA, 26%) and restoring order in the
91
country (NKR 4%, RA, 7%). Freedom of speech and public influence
over important government decisions were secondary priorities for 8
and 7%, respectively, in the NKR and 14 and 13%, respectively, in the
RA. These findings reflect the dominance of survival values over self-
expression values, which are very briefly presented in the next
section.
Values
Inglehart and Welzel developed a new theory of modernization
according to which the modernization process consists of two main
transitions: industrialization and postindustrialization. These transitions
produce substantial cultural changes in many countries, as observed
through an analysis of the World Value Survey data. Based on these
data, the authors concluded that industrialization replaces traditional
values with secular rational values (rationalization of authority),
whereas postindustrialization replaces survival values with self-
expression values (emancipation from authority). Although the authors
acknowledge that socioeconomic development is not a deterministic
process and cultural change is not irreversible or linear, they argue
that “cultural change is a major factor in emergence and survival of
democracies” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 58, Pp. 46–47).
To provide a better picture of the value systems among potential
elite representatives, an attempt was made to determine the
composition of different worldviews based on five variables utilized by
the authors to measure the first group of values (traditional vs. secular
rational values) and three of five variables to measure the second
group of values (survival vs. self-expression values). Based on these
aggregated data, five groups were identified for the first set of values
and three groups for the second set of values.
Charts 3.10 and 3.11 reflect the proportion of values in both groups
(RA and NKR). An analysis based on gender, generation and level of
education revealed insignificant differences, indicating that a similar
proportion of values was represented across the respondents. The
92
most notable difference was related to the respondents with self-
expression values: 75% of representatives from this group had
undergone post-Soviet socialization. Some peculiarities were recorded
among the elite recruitment segments, where representatives of
political parties, NGO members and student council members had a
higher frequency of rational secular values, whereas athletes, civil
servants and business owners more frequently adhered to traditional
values.
The composition of traditional versus rational legal values was
similar among future political elites in the NKR and the RA, whereas
for survival versus self-expression values, significant differences were
observed. In the NKR, survival values were much more common (84%)
than in the RA, 75%, whereas self-expression values were almost
nonexistent (less than 1%) compared to 3% in the RA.
This distribution of values among political elites and the
established mechanisms of recruitment from certain groups makes it
highly unlikely that in a short term prespective a critical number of
individuals who are both capable of and willing to produce genuine
democratic changes in the political system will be incorporated into
the political elite.
93
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96
APPENDIX A. TOPIC GUIDE OF
INTERVIEWS
General questions:
1. The code of the interview _______
2. The code of the assistant ______________
3. The date (dd/mm) ___________________________
4. The place_________________________________________
5. Duration /ex.` 65 minutes/`_____________
6. Respondent`s name and surname __________________
7. Respondent`s position___________________________________________
8. Respondent`s sex 1. male 2 female
9. Respondent`s birth date_________________
10. Respondent`s education
1. Secondary
2. Vocational
3. Bachelor
4. Graduate
5. Postgraduate
11. Respondent`s profession according to his/her__________________
Life story
Please let`s talk a little bit about your life
1. Where and when were you born? What kind of family do you have
/Interviewer. Nuclear/large family, children, the condition of
the house, social status/. Who were you your parents: profession,
education?
2. What kind of important memory do you have about your childhood,
which were conditional for your political activity and principles, Who
were role models for you at that time. Who had roles in the
formation of you identity and value system. /Inetrviewer. Family,
friendship, school, other eucation centers, organizations, parties,
other/
3. What is you first profession and where did you study? How did you
decided to chose that profession. Did you work according that
profession? If not, then why? If yes, the how long, where? How much
are important your profession and work experience for your today`s
97
work.
4. What is your hobby, if they have changed during the time, how do
you spend your free time during the evening, holidays and vacations.
With whom and how do you spend your leisure
5. Who are your friends, how do you chose them, do you have friends
at your work, who also are your friends.
6. How did you meet your wife/husband, his/her family which factors
were conditional to marry him/her. Tell us about your children, what
kind of school did they go, their hobbies and aim. Generally what
does it mean family for you and how it is related to your political
career?
Entry into politics
Now let`s talk about your political career
1. When and how did you recognize the need to enter into politics?
/Interviewer. Ask about concrete historical events, leaders and
persons impact/ Please describe your story in politics in which
parties, organizations did you participated, how have you held as a
politician. Which events do you consider crucial in your career.
2. What kind of role did your family, parents have in your career? Who
from your family helps you in your political activities? Would you
like your children and grandchildren enter into politics?
3. How did you see your role and what kind of aims did you pursue in
politics? How have they been changed during the years and why?
4. As a politician what kind of universal and political
principles/functions do you seclude for you? What do you consider
acceptable and not acceptable for entering into politics?
The value system and motivations of political elite
1. How would you describe political elite in Armenia? Who are the
representatives of elite?
2. What kind of clasters/groups can you seclude inside our political elite
and where is your position there? How well integrated do you feel
among them?
3. What kind of factors would you seclude that would help to become
part of elite? /Interviewer. Family, connection, origin, education,
friends/. Which skills/qualities a person should have in order to
consist in modern Armenian political life. According to this which
98
qualities do you consider important for you personally?
4. How would you describe political struggle in Armenia? What kind of
tools are used? /Which one do you think is justified?
5. When reaching your goals you encounter problems how persistently
do you struggle? What would disappoint you? While reaching the goal
when is it allowed to ignore others interest, when is it allowed to
take advantage of others weakness.
6. In your opinion today what are the problems that require primary
solutions in Armenia? Who are engaged in political decision making
process? Who have more impact on decision making: the leadership
of the country, local/regional elite, voters, active citizens, business
elite: /Interviewer: pay attention to:
local, regional, national, legislative, executive and judicial
decision making
election results.
7. Which political ideology do you adhere? In your political view do you
consider yourself rightist, leftist, centrist? /Interviewer: pay attention
to:
political orientation
membership in political groups
political stereotypes and attitudes
political values and norms
forms of political behavior
8. Which political regimes do you consider the most successful and
which are exemplary for Armenia.
9. How much are you devoted to democratic values and whether do
you consider them acceptable for Armenia.
Interviewer: pay attention to:
only a small group can govern the country and make decisions
everybody should participate
freedom of speech
10. In your opinion what is more important while making political
decisions: professional knowledge or political calculation/expediency
11. What would you do if in your practice a situation would be created
when you would have to choose to be loyal to citizens/community or
to your political party.
12. Are you ready for compromises with your political opponents? Why?
Are there dangers related to that?
99
13. Generally what do you think how much our society is
conflicting/compromiser?
14. According to you what is ideal Armenia? What kind of political system
should it have? How can Armenia achieve to that?
15. How do you see your future? Can you accurately predict your future
in 6 month, 1 year, 5 years?
16. Generally how much happy and secure do you feel as a person, as a
citizen, as a politician? Why?
At the end evaluate the honesty of the respondent.
1 2 3 4 5
totally not honest totally honest
100
APPENDIX B. CHARTS
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
Chart 3.9.1 Government like a parent vs like an employee
62.1% 67.9%69.5%
37.9% 32.1%18.5%
RA NKR CRRC'2012
Government is like an employee; thepeople should be the bosses who control thegovernment.
People are like children; the governmentshould take care of them like a parent.
Chart 3.9.2 People should vs should not participate in protest actions
68.9% 62.1%65.6%
31.1% 37.9%20.2%
RA NKR CRRC'2012
People should participate in protest actions against the government, as this shows the government that the people are in charge
People should not participate in protest actions against the government, as it threatens stability in our country.
131
132
Chart 3.10 Distribution of traditional vs. rational secular values
Traditional17%
Mostly traditional47%
Neutral3%
Mostly rational secular27%
Rational secular6%
Chart 3.11 Distribution of survival vs. self-expression values
Survival78%
Transitional20%
Self-expression2%
133
Tab
le 1
. R
esea
rch
com
pone
nts a
nd m
etho
ds
Rese
arch
com
pone
ntRe
sear
ch q
uest
ions
Met
hodo
logy
/ Da
taW
hat i
s the
stru
ctur
e of
pol
itica
l elit
e in
Arm
enia
and
ho
w it
has
evo
lved
dur
ing
last
two
and
half
deca
des?
Qua
ntita
tive
anal
ysis
of b
iogr
aphi
es o
f pol
itica
l elit
e m
embe
rs.
Wha
t are
the
mai
n ch
arac
teris
tics o
f typ
ical
mem
bers
an
d gr
oups
of t
he p
oliti
cal e
lite?
Anal
ysis
of le
gal i
nstit
utio
nal f
ram
ewor
k re
crui
ting
polit
icia
ns.
How
con
solid
ated
and
div
ersif
ied
is th
e po
litic
al e
lite
in
post
sovi
et A
rmen
ia?
In-d
epth
inte
rvie
ws w
ith p
oliti
cal e
lite
repr
esen
tativ
es.
Wha
t are
the
mot
ivat
ions
of i
ndiv
idua
ls fo
r pur
suin
g po
litic
al c
aree
r?
Wha
t are
the
pred
omin
ant b
elie
fs a
nd v
alue
s,
incl
udin
g:
·
regi
me
pref
eren
ces,
·
opi
nion
s on
the
role
of p
oliti
cal e
lites
,
·
p
erso
nal a
nd p
oliti
cal p
riorit
ies i
n th
e de
cisio
n-m
akin
g pr
oces
ses,
·
ext
erna
l pol
itica
l orie
ntat
ions
.W
hat a
re th
e m
ain
char
acte
ristic
s of p
oliti
cal c
ultu
re
amon
g va
rious
gro
ups f
rom
whi
ch ty
pica
lly p
oliti
cal
elite
mem
bers
are
bei
ng re
crui
ted?
How
futu
re p
oliti
cal e
lite
mem
bers
vie
w d
emoc
racy
an
d ho
w th
eir v
iew
s diff
er fr
om th
e ol
der g
ener
atio
n an
d ge
nera
l pop
ulat
ion?
Wha
t are
the
pred
omin
ant v
alue
s of p
oten
tial p
oliti
cal
elite
?
The
patt
erns
of p
oliti
cal e
lite
form
atio
n in
pos
t sov
iet
Arm
enia
and
NKR
The
valu
es, p
refe
renc
es a
nd
self
perc
eptio
n of
pol
itica
l el
ite re
pres
enta
tives
in p
ost
sovi
et A
rmen
ia
In d
epth
inte
rvie
ws w
ith p
oliti
cal e
lite
repr
esen
tativ
es.
Polit
ical
cul
ture
of
repr
esen
tativ
es o
f pot
entia
l po
litic
al e
lite
Repr
esen
tativ
e su
rvey
am
ong
indi
vidu
als f
rom
the
segm
ents
that
mos
t oft
en p
rodu
ce p
oliti
cal e
lite
mem
bers
(pub
lic se
rvan
ts, m
embe
rs o
f pol
itica
l pa
rtie
s, N
GO a
ctiv
ists,
mem
bers
of l
ocal
go
vern
ance
bod
ies,
stud
ent c
omm
ittee
mem
bers
, ac
adem
ics/
artis
ts/a
thle
tes,
top
busin
ess o
wne
rs
and
CEO
s).
APPENDIX C. TABLES
134
Incomplete Primary Secondary Higher (BA/MA) PhD candidate PhD and higherSCRA 0.70% 1.50% 1.10% 67.80% 23.00% 5.90%NA1RA 1.00% 3.10% 1.00% 73.00% 18.40% 3.60%NA2RA 1.30% 0.70% 2.00% 69.10% 17.80% 9.20%NA3RA 0.70% 1.40% 2.10% 72.30% 14.90% 8.50%NA4RA 1.30% 1.30% 2.50% 68.20% 21.70% 5.10%NA5RA 0.70% 0.70% 1.50% 74.30% 18.40% 4.40%Total 1.00% 1.50% 1.60% 70.40% 19.50% 6.00%SCNKR 0.00% 10.80% 16.20% 54.10% 18.90% 0.00%NA1NKR 0.00% 0.00% 14.30% 62.90% 20.00% 2.90%NA2NKR 0.00% 0.00% 8.80% 70.60% 20.60% 0.00%NA3NKR 2.80% 0.00% 16.70% 61.10% 16.70% 2.80%NA4NKR 0.00% 0.00% 14.30% 71.40% 10.70% 3.60%Total 0.60% 2.40% 14.10% 63.50% 17.60% 1.80%
Table 1.1 The level of education of MPs in RA and NKR
SC NA1 NA2 NA3 NA4 NA5Intelligentsia 35.70% 17.30% 16.40% 9.40% 10.90% 11.80%
Businessman 4.90% 15.70% 25.00% 34.50% 17.90% 5.90%
Bureaucrat/Civil Servant 42.50% 26.70% 11.80% 3.60% 14.70% 16.90%
Party boss/activist 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 0.70% 3.20% 5.10%
Officer/War Veteran 4.50% 2.00% 2.00% 1.40% 3.80% 7.30%
Party list MP 0.00% 0.00% 7.20% 16.50% 20.50% 33.80%
FPTP MP 0.80% 29.30% 25.00% 28.80% 25.60% 15.40%
Minister/Marzpet 0.40% 0.00% 0.70% 2.10% 2.50% 0.00%
Mayor/City Council Member 0.40% 2.10% 4.60% 1.40% 0.00% 3.00%
Other 10.90% 5.80% 5.30% 1.40% 0.60% 0.70%
N of Cases 266 191 152 139 156 136
Table 1.2a Occupation of MPs of RA before being elected
135
SC NA1 NA2 NA3 NA4
Intelligentsia 16.20% 22.90% 8.80% 2.80% 3.60%
Businessman 5.40% 11.40% 17.60% 11.10% 10.70%
Bureaucrat/Civil Servant 48.60% 31.40% 35.30% 25.00% 28.60%
Party boss/activist 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.80% 0.00%
War Veteran 24.30% 8.60% 5.90% 8.30% 3.60%
Officer in Police/Army 5.40% 2.90% 2.90% 5.60% 0.00%
Party list MP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 21.40%
FPTP MP 0.00% 20.00% 20.60% 33.30% 28.60%
Minister/Marzpet 0.00% 0.00% 2.90% 8.30% 3.60%
Mayor/City Council Member 0.00% 0.00% 2.90% 2.80% 0.00%
Other 0.00% 2.90% 2.90% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 1.2b Occupation of MPs of NKR before being elected
Covering periodComposition of
coalitionN of laws adopted
N of MPs in ruling
coalition/ in the network
Coal1 05.2003-06.2006 RPA/ARFD/ROL 183 71/75
Coal2 06.2006-05.2007 RPA/ARFD/ULP 20 57/27
Coal3 05.2007-03.2008 RPA/PAP/ARFD 8 104/13
Coal4 03.2008-04.2009 RPA/PAP/ARFD/ROL 54 112/70
Coal5 05.2009-05.2012 RPA/PAP/ROL 114 96/86
05.2012-06.2013 RPA/ROL 36
Table 2.1. Description of networks reflecting changes in the coalition
75/42
Network name
Conv
3Co
nv4
Conv5
136
Nod
esTi
esAv
. Deg
ree
Av. W
eigh
ted
Degr
eeDi
amet
erGr
aph
Dens
ityM
odul
arity
(c
omm
uniti
es)
Conn
ecte
d Co
mpo
nent
sAv
g Cl
uste
ring
Coef
ficie
ntAv
g. P
ath
Lent
h
Conv
379
465
11.8
504
0.15
17
20.
764
2.18
7Co
nv4
109
1111
20.4
42.8
40.
186
52
0.69
51.
98Co
nv5
4224
211
.518
.24
0.28
18
50.
955
1.65
3Co
al1
7545
012
50.8
40.
162
51
0.75
92.
168
Coal
227
614.
55.
23
0.17
46
40.
882
1.92
3Co
al3
1324
3.7
8.5
30.
308
32
0.91
81.
579
Coal
470
366
10.5
16.1
50.
152
72
0.77
42.
493
Coal
586
756
17.6
32.6
40.
207
51
0.77
72.
015
Tab
le 2
.2 B
asic
Cha
ract
erist
ics o
f Net
wor
ks
137
Nam
eGe
nder
Part
yList
/FPT
PPa
rty
Rulin
g/O
ppos
ition
Fact
ion
Degr
eeW
eigh
ted
Degr
eeCl
osen
ess C
entr
ality
Betw
eenn
ess C
entr
ality
Ecce
ntric
ity
Sam
vel B
alas
anya
nM
ale
FPTP
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L36
211
1.52
6315
789
567.
1568
177
2Vi
ktor
Dal
laky
anM
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e34
129
1.65
7894
737
405.
9684
361
3Ga
lust
Sah
akya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
3220
81.
5921
0526
335
3.81
4185
53
Levo
n M
krtc
hyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD28
210
1.63
1578
947
229.
8846
627
2Hr
anus
h Ha
koby
anFe
mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tRu
ling
RPA
2399
1.81
5789
474
91.2
2622
173
Grig
or G
onje
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ULP
Opp
ositi
onU
LP21
106
1.88
1578
947
180.
2662
813
Vaha
n Ho
vhan
nisy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
2110
31.
8421
0526
311
4.36
7453
53
Rudi
k Ho
vsep
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD21
129
1.90
7894
737
73.8
3275
698
3Vo
stan
ik M
arou
khya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
2083
1.75
84.0
3445
362
3Sh
avar
sh K
ocha
ryan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
NDP
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e20
882.
0263
1578
945
.408
0604
3Va
rdan
Mkr
tchy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stAD
PO
ppos
ition
Just
ice
2088
2.02
6315
789
45.4
0806
043
Rafik
Pet
rosy
anM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gPe
ople
's M
P19
611.
8289
4736
814
7.67
9034
23
Gagi
k M
elik
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A19
321.
8421
0526
378
.293
0619
43
Suki
as A
vetis
yan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
1941
1.86
8421
053
76.9
8455
661
3Ed
mun
d Ts
atur
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ADP
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e18
381.
8815
7894
716
2.15
7785
93
Hovh
anne
s Mar
gary
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
1897
1.80
2631
579
93.5
4249
733
Hegh
ine
Bish
arya
nFe
mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L17
901.
9210
5263
224
.428
7876
73
Mkh
rtic
h M
inas
yan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
Peop
le's
MP
1710
31.
9605
2631
642
.452
3974
13
Vlad
imir
Bada
lyan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
Peop
le's
MP
1685
1.97
3684
211
32.5
0347
985
3M
ushe
gh M
ovsis
yan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tO
ppos
ition
Just
ice
1635
1.89
4736
842
82.1
5482
395
3Ar
men
Dan
iely
anM
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent
Rulin
gRP
A15
621.
8684
2105
311
9.00
9931
73
Mek
hak
Mkh
itary
anM
ale
FPTP
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L14
932.
2631
5789
519
.239
6684
94
Hran
t Kha
chat
ryan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
CRU
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e14
202.
1447
3684
242
.169
2464
44
Hray
r Kar
apet
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD14
761.
9605
2631
640
.407
9170
93
Herm
ine
Nag
daly
anFe
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A14
331.
9210
5263
256
.545
6971
23
Hako
b Ha
koby
anM
ale
FPTP
Peop
le's
MP
1415
02.
1842
1052
60
3Sa
mve
l Nik
oyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A13
681.
8947
3684
247
.292
2734
33
Mkr
tich
Mkr
tchy
anM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A13
362.
0526
3157
914
.074
0939
43
Arar
at M
alkh
asya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
1239
2.06
5789
474
13.3
6487
359
3Al
bert
Baz
eyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
Repu
blic
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e12
782.
1842
1052
60
3Ru
ben
Hayr
apet
yan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
t - R
PA 2
006
Rulin
gN
one
1278
2.18
4210
526
03
Haru
tyun
Pam
buky
anM
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent -
RPA
200
6Ru
ling
Non
e12
782.
1842
1052
60
3Sa
mve
l Ale
ksan
yan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tN
one
1278
2.18
4210
526
03
Ham
let T
amaz
yan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tPe
ople
's M
P12
782.
1842
1052
60
3Ga
gik
Tsar
ukya
nM
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent
Non
e12
782.
1842
1052
60
3Le
von
Sarg
syan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
t - R
PA 2
006
Peop
le's
MP
1278
2.18
4210
526
03
Mna
tsak
an P
etro
syan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ULP
Opp
ositi
onU
LP11
552.
3815
7894
729
.853
0663
84
Arm
en R
usta
mya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
1176
2.02
6315
789
4.45
3044
572
3Va
hram
Bag
hdas
arya
nM
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent
Opp
ositi
onPe
ople
's M
P11
562.
1842
1052
60
3Ar
am S
args
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
Repu
blic
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e10
102.
3815
7894
70
4Ta
tul M
anas
erya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
depe
nden
tO
ppos
ition
Just
ice
1010
2.38
1578
947
04
Serg
ey Is
reay
elya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
depe
nden
tO
ppos
ition
Just
ice
1010
2.38
1578
947
04
Grig
or H
arut
yuny
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stAD
PO
ppos
ition
Just
ice
1010
2.38
1578
947
04
Arsh
ak S
adoy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stN
DCP
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e10
102.
3815
7894
70
4
Inde
pend
ent -
RPA
200
6
Tab
le 2
.3 D
istrib
utio
n of
pow
er w
ithin
3rd
con
voca
tion
of N
A
138
Step
an Z
akar
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ADP
Opp
ositi
onJu
stic
e10
102.
3815
7894
70
4Vo
lody
a Ba
daly
anM
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent
Non
e9
212.
1052
6315
847
.913
9166
43
Alva
rd P
etro
syan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
954
2.18
4210
526
03
Razm
ik M
artir
osya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
925
2.10
5263
158
2.96
9104
929
3Le
rnik
Ale
ksan
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A8
222.
6710
5263
225
.045
9707
4Ar
arat
Mkr
tchy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
826
2.42
1052
632
0.14
2857
143
4As
hot A
ghab
abya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A7
142.
4342
1052
60
4Ar
tak
Arak
elya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
738
2.06
5789
474
1.88
2299
073
3M
ikay
el V
arda
nyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
Inde
pend
ent
Rulin
gAR
FD7
72.
1447
3684
20
3Sa
mve
l Sah
akya
nM
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent
Non
e7
72.
1447
3684
20
3Ag
hasi
Arsh
akya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stN
UO
ppos
ition
NU
77
2.14
4736
842
03
Alek
san
Kara
pety
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stN
UO
ppos
ition
NU
77
2.13
1578
947
03
Vard
ges M
atev
osya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
618
2.69
7368
421
04
Asho
t Ars
enya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
618
2.69
7368
421
04
Man
vel N
azar
yan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tO
ppos
ition
Peop
le's
MP
618
2.69
7368
421
04
Arth
ur B
aghd
asay
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
614
2.07
8947
368
0.79
6019
835
3Hr
ant G
rigor
yan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tRu
ling
RPA
618
2.17
1052
632
03
Kare
n Ka
rape
tyan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tRu
ling
Peop
le's
MP
624
2.34
2105
263
03
Gurg
en A
rsen
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ULP
Opp
ositi
onU
LP5
262.
3947
3684
210
.964
3689
64
Man
uk G
aspa
ryan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tO
ppos
ition
Non
e5
102.
5789
4736
80
4Ar
men
Mkh
itary
an
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
510
2.57
8947
368
04
Gegh
am M
anuk
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD5
402.
5657
8947
40
4Va
zgen
Kar
akha
nyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A5
52.
4078
9473
70
4Ha
mle
t Har
utyu
nyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A5
52.
4078
9473
70
4Ar
men
Ash
otya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
55
2.40
7894
737
04
Mhe
r Sha
hgel
dyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L5
172.
3947
3684
21.
3658
8411
63
Sam
vel S
hahg
aldy
anM
ale
FPTP
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L5
122.
4078
9473
70
3As
hot A
poya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
depe
nden
tRu
ling
ARFD
510
2.40
7894
737
03
Hrip
sime
Avet
isyan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stU
LPO
ppos
ition
ULP
428
2.76
3157
895
04
Tigr
an T
oros
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A4
93.
1052
6315
80
4Ar
thur
Pet
rosy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stU
LPO
ppos
ition
ULP
48
2.76
3157
895
04
Aram
ayis
Grig
orya
n M
ale
FPTP
Inde
pend
ent
Opp
ositi
onN
one
48
2.52
6315
789
03
Vazg
en K
hach
ikya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
412
2.26
3157
895
62.9
4595
127
3Ga
gik
Mkh
eyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L2
10
00
Khac
hatu
r Suq
kias
yan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
depe
nden
tN
one
21
00
0
139
Nam
eGe
nder
Part
yList
/FPT
PPa
rty
Rulin
g/O
ppos
ition
Fact
ion
Degr
eeW
eigh
ted
Degr
eeCl
osen
ess
Cent
ralit
yBe
twee
nnes
s Ce
ntra
lity
Ecce
ntric
ity
Galu
st S
ahak
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A63
281
1.41
1215
730.
3989
12
Arm
an S
ahak
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A51
611.
5607
477
282.
7574
889
3Ha
kob
Hako
byan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
5011
01.
5794
393
420.
2040
613
3Ar
am S
afar
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P47
137
1.57
9439
315
4.71
9963
13
Nai
ra Z
ohra
byan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PRu
ling
PAP
4712
61.
5981
308
197.
0840
733
Vard
an B
osta
njya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PRu
ling
PAP
4521
51.
5887
8524
8.45
1827
43
Vikt
or D
alla
kyan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
dep.
Non
e43
631.
6635
514
148.
2428
207
3Ar
evik
Pet
rosy
anFe
mal
ePa
rty
List
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P42
761.
6448
598
123.
1177
461
3Sa
mve
l Sar
gsya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A41
491.
6261
682
79.6
7641
832
3Ar
sen
Avag
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P40
571.
6915
888
63.2
4651
573
3M
elik
Man
ukya
nM
ale
FPTP
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P37
421.
7196
262
36.3
6568
533
3M
artu
n Gr
igor
yan
Mal
eFP
TPPA
PRu
ling
PAP
3742
1.71
9626
236
.365
6853
33
Karo
Kar
apet
yan
Mal
eFP
TPPA
PRu
ling
PAP
3742
1.71
9626
236
.365
6853
32
Goha
r Eno
kyan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PRu
ling
PAP
3658
1.70
0934
675
.898
2038
53
Hovh
anne
s Mar
gary
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
3511
51.
7289
7231
9.88
5012
43
Vers
and
Hako
byan
Mal
eFP
TPPA
PRu
ling
PAP
3536
1.77
5700
991
.943
6472
73
Avet
Ado
nts
Mal
ePa
rty
List
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P34
381.
7383
178
106.
0429
562
3He
ghin
e Bi
shar
yan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
3312
11.
7009
346
261.
9170
687
3Ru
ben
Haru
tyun
yan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
3349
1.77
5700
958
.395
4891
43
Mar
tin S
args
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A33
461.
7570
093
79.6
2251
269
3Ha
yk S
anos
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
Inde
p.Ru
ling
RPA
3233
1.80
3738
363
.494
8247
3Ar
a Ba
bloy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
3111
51.
7102
804
108.
7368
104
3Ro
bert
Tov
mas
yan
Mal
eFP
TPPA
PRu
ling
PAP
3131
1.81
3084
133
.992
4182
43
Kare
n Av
agya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
3070
1.79
4392
514
0.52
1089
33
Erne
st S
ogho
mon
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
SDHP
Rulin
gPA
P30
351.
8130
841
12.2
1972
087
3M
krtic
h M
inas
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A29
971.
7383
178
90.8
1082
074
3Va
rdan
Ayv
azya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2943
1.78
5046
765
.447
3526
43
Ara
Nra
nyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD28
107
1.75
7009
313
1.93
5701
93
Herm
ine
Nag
hdal
yan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2762
1.83
1775
783
.052
1607
93
Hran
t Grig
orya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A27
271.
8691
589
03
Nah
apet
Gev
orgy
anM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A27
271.
8691
589
03
Rust
am G
aspa
ryan
Mal
eFP
TPPA
PRu
ling
PAP
2727
1.86
9158
90
3Ti
gran
Ste
pany
anM
ale
FPTP
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P27
271.
8691
589
03
Haru
tyun
Gha
ragh
yozy
anM
ale
FPTP
Inde
p.Ru
ling
PAP
2727
1.86
9158
90
3Ar
men
Pet
rosy
anM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A27
271.
8691
589
03
Vahe
Hak
obya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A27
271.
8691
589
03
Tab
le 2
.4 D
istrib
utio
n of
pow
er w
ithin
4rd
con
voca
tion
of N
A
140
Arm
en A
brah
amya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
dep.
Rulin
gPA
P27
271.
8691
589
03
Arm
en M
elik
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P27
271.
8691
589
03
Hran
t Mad
atya
nM
ale
FPTP
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P27
271.
8691
589
03
Rafik
Grig
orya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2649
1.78
5046
753
.381
8406
33
Arts
vik
Min
asya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
2584
1.83
1775
768
.567
4803
93
Sam
vel N
ikoy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2553
1.79
4392
542
.794
1577
23
Davi
d Ha
ruty
unya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2412
31.
8878
505
71.6
7376
436
3Su
kias
Ave
tisya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2339
1.81
3084
194
.852
0734
63
Kare
n Va
rdan
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
Inde
p.Ru
ling
ARFD
2338
1.82
2429
977
.421
8562
43
Vaha
n Ho
vhan
nisy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
2268
1.83
1775
746
.096
4918
23
Gagi
k M
elik
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A22
341.
8504
673
67.0
2988
521
3Ar
ayik
Hov
hann
isyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A21
551.
8691
589
35.3
5668
454
3Ga
gik
Min
asya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2062
1.84
1121
528
.755
9319
23
Vazg
en K
arak
hany
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2049
1.85
9813
164
.453
3316
53
Hovi
k Ab
raha
mya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A20
321.
9158
879
29.8
4216
184
4Ar
tyus
h Sh
ahba
zyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD19
681.
8878
505
25.4
1145
499
3Hr
ayr K
arap
etya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
1951
1.88
7850
535
.079
0655
33
Mik
ael M
anuk
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD19
371.
9065
421
56.5
9830
147
3An
ahit
Bakh
shya
nFe
mal
ePa
rty
List
HPO
ppos
ition
HP18
591.
9158
879
24.4
6167
931
3M
isha
Step
anya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
dep.
Rulin
gRP
A18
231.
9719
626
60.4
4849
029
3Ho
vhan
nes S
ahak
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A17
961.
8691
589
55.8
4842
415
3As
hot A
rsen
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A17
192
10.3
2017
297
3Al
eksa
ndr S
ahak
yan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
1719
210
.320
1729
73
Kare
n Ch
shm
arity
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
1719
2.02
8037
47.
8512
2410
94
Rafik
Pet
rosy
anM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A16
961.
9719
626
30.8
0949
208
3Ka
rine
Ache
mya
nFe
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A16
471.
9532
7186
.638
3766
93
Alek
san
Petr
osya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
1617
1.92
5233
644
.475
2977
13
Arm
en R
usta
mya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
1548
2.10
2803
726
.254
8239
54
Bagr
at S
args
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD15
451.
9719
626
14.0
2311
848
3St
epan
Asla
nyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L15
291.
9906
542
19.2
6029
332
3Ed
uard
Sha
rmaz
anov
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
1523
1.94
3925
234
.488
5874
73
Khac
hik
Man
ukya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A15
152.
0467
290
3As
hot T
onoy
anM
ale
FPTP
PAP
Rulin
gPA
P15
152.
0467
290
3Li
lit G
alst
yan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
1489
2.12
1495
311
.504
0814
3M
khita
r Mna
tsak
anya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
dep.
Rulin
gPA
P12
392.
0373
832
3.29
5903
309
3Ar
men
Mar
tiros
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
HPO
ppos
ition
HP12
372.
0560
748
7.06
6721
887
3Ru
zann
a Ar
akel
yan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
1236
2.07
4766
43.
6644
3531
44
Kare
n Ka
rape
tyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A12
291.
9906
542
26.4
8543
858
3GO
VERN
EMEN
TN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/AN
/A12
281.
9719
626
12.0
0727
196
4St
yopa
Saf
arya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stHP
Opp
ositi
onHP
1221
2.06
5420
63.
6714
2857
14
Arts
runi
Agh
ajan
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L12
152.
0747
664
17.3
6749
527
4Kh
achi
k Ha
ruty
unya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
1121
2.24
2990
712
.714
7137
24
141
Volo
dya
Bada
lyan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
Inde
p.Ru
ling
RPA
1121
2.01
8691
66.
1085
1859
24
Areg
Ghu
kasy
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
1111
2.13
0841
10
4Ar
men
Ash
otya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A10
282.
0280
374
5.72
0796
302
4Sa
mve
l Bal
asan
yan
Mal
eFP
TPPA
PRu
ling
PAP
1012
2.23
3644
92.
6278
0987
44
Arta
k Da
vtya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
935
2.04
6729
33.3
5489
733
3Hr
anus
h Ha
koby
anFe
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A9
152.
1588
785
7.77
0801
076
3Ar
shak
Mkh
itary
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PRu
ling
PAP
99
2.26
1682
20
4As
hot A
poya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
dep.
Rulin
gAR
FD9
92.
2616
822
04
Mik
ayel
Var
dany
anM
ale
FPTP
Inde
p.N
one
99
2.26
1682
20
4Ar
thur
Agh
abek
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Rulin
gAR
FD8
242.
1869
159
03
Laris
a Al
aver
dyan
Fem
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
dep.
Opp
ositi
onHP
818
2.06
5420
63.
7091
6161
13
Lyov
a Kh
acha
trya
nM
ale
FPTP
Inde
p.N
one
88
2.13
0841
10
3As
hot A
ghab
abya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A7
82.
1214
953
0.52
53
Mkh
itar V
arag
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
Inde
p.N
one
612
2.23
3644
90
3Is
hkha
n Kh
acha
trya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
610
2.43
9252
32.
6115
5259
93
Tach
at V
arda
pety
anM
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
dep.
Rulin
gRP
A6
62.
3644
860
3Ga
gik
Gevo
rgya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDRu
ling
ARFD
66
2.36
4486
03
Mya
snik
Mal
khas
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A5
62.
5420
561
0.36
6666
667
3Ar
a Si
mon
yan
Mal
eFP
TPN
URu
ling
Non
e4
122.
3738
318
03
Vaha
gn M
akhs
udya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PRu
ling
PAP
48
2.57
9439
30
3Le
von
Sarg
syan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
44
2.38
3177
60
3Ru
ben
Sado
yan
Mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
44
2.36
4486
03
Arm
en M
khita
ryan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A4
42.
3271
028
03
Grig
or M
arga
ryan
Mal
eFP
TPIn
dep.
Rulin
gRP
A4
42.
1682
243
03
Kory
un N
ahap
etya
nM
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A3
92.
3738
318
03
Gagi
k Ts
aruk
yan
Mal
eFP
TPPA
PRu
ling
PAP
33
2.57
9439
30
3Kh
achi
k Pe
tros
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L3
32.
4112
150
3Ru
ben
Gevo
rgya
nM
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PRu
ling
PAP
26
2.62
6168
20
3Ar
tak
Zaqa
ryan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A2
42.
9345
794
03
Tigr
an T
oros
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A2
20
03
Arta
shes
Avo
yan
Mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L1
12.
7196
262
00
142
Nam
eGe
nder
List
/FPT
PPa
rty
Rulin
g/O
ppos
ition
Fact
ion
Degr
eeW
eigh
ted
Degr
eeCl
osen
ess
Cent
ralit
yBe
twee
nnes
s Ce
ntra
lity
Ecce
ntric
ity
Saha
kyan
Gal
ust
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A25
571.
1379
3103
418
82
Hovh
anni
syan
Arp
ine
fem
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2155
1.37
9310
345
13.5
3Ba
bloy
an A
ram
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2123
1.37
9310
345
13.5
3Ar
zum
anya
n Al
eksa
ndr
mal
ePa
rty
List
FDP
Opp
ositi
onHP
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Khac
hatr
yan
Ishk
anm
ale
Part
y Li
stRo
LRu
ling
RoL
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Man
ukya
n Ab
raha
mm
ale
Part
y Li
stIn
dep.
PAP
PAP
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Min
asya
n Ga
gik
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A20
201.
4137
9310
30
3M
inas
yan
Mkr
tich
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A20
211.
4137
9310
30
3N
ahap
etya
n Ko
ryun
mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Pogh
osya
n Ka
rine
fem
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A20
201.
4137
9310
30
3Va
rdap
etya
n Ta
chat
mal
ePa
rty
List
Inde
p.Ru
ling
RPA
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Nag
hdal
yan
Herm
ine
fem
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2050
1.41
3793
103
03
Shar
maz
anov
Edu
ard
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A20
501.
4137
9310
30
3M
nats
akan
yan
Mna
tsak
anm
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A20
501.
4137
9310
30
3M
urad
yan
Ruza
nna
fem
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2050
1.41
3793
103
03
Avag
yan
Kare
nm
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Bade
yan
Man
vel
mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Davt
yan
Arta
km
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Zaka
ryan
Art
akm
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Kara
pety
an N
aira
fem
ale
Part
y Li
stM
IAK
Rulin
gRP
A20
201.
4137
9310
30
3Ho
vhan
nisy
an A
rayi
km
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
2020
1.41
3793
103
03
Mar
gary
an H
ovha
nnes
mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L4
111.
8965
5172
478
3Ba
baya
n Ar
men
mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Opp
ositi
onIn
de.
416
10
1Ho
vhan
nisy
an V
ahan
mal
ePa
rty
List
ARFD
Opp
ositi
onAR
FD4
121
01
Min
asya
n Ar
tsvi
km
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDO
ppos
ition
ARFD
416
10
1Ru
stam
yan
Arm
enm
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDO
ppos
ition
ARFD
412
10
1Ag
hvan
Var
dany
anm
ale
Part
y Li
stAR
FDO
ppos
ition
ARFD
416
10
1Ha
ruty
unya
n Da
vid
mal
ePa
rty
List
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A4
92.
3103
4482
80
4GO
VERN
MEN
TGO
V.GO
V.GO
V.Ru
ling
310
2.79
3103
448
04
Bish
arya
n He
ghin
efe
mal
ePa
rty
List
RoL
Rulin
gRo
L3
102.
7931
0344
80
4Ay
vazy
an V
arda
nm
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
36
2.79
3103
448
04
Mar
ukya
n Ed
mon
mal
eFP
TPIn
dep.
Inde
p.N
one
21
00
0Gr
igor
yan
Man
vel
mal
ePa
rty
List
Inde
p.Ru
ling
RPA
24
10
1Sa
roya
n Se
drak
mal
eFP
TPIn
dep.
Rulin
gRP
A2
41
01
Farm
anya
n Sa
mve
lm
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A2
41
01
Hako
byan
Hak
obm
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A2
20
00
Ache
mya
n Ka
rine
fem
ale
Part
y Li
stRP
ARu
ling
RPA
24
2.06
8965
517
03
Tab
le 2
.5 D
istrib
utio
n of
pow
er w
ithin
5th
con
voca
tion
of N
A
143
Grig
orya
n Ha
ykm
ale
FPTP
RPA
Rulin
gRP
A2
42.
0689
6551
70
3Ba
bukh
anya
n Ha
ykm
ale
Part
y Li
stCL
URu
ling
RPA
22
2.06
8965
517
03
Gevo
rgya
n Ar
thur
mal
eFP
TPRP
ARu
ling
RPA
22
2.06
8965
517
03
Baba
yan
Vaha
nm
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PPA
PPA
P1
11
01
Vard
anya
n El
inar
fem
ale
Part
y Li
stPA
PPA
PPA
P1
11
01
144
Civil Servants 25.20% 43.50% 19.60% 11.70%Political party members 15.20% 4.50% 6.10% 74.20%NGO members 22.00% 51.20% 19.50% 7.30%LSG members 14.20% 49.40% 24.70% 11.70%Student Council members 53.80% 15.40% 7.70% 23.10%Business owners 17.40% 60.90% 21.70% 0.00%Academics 16.80% 67.20% 13.00% 3.10%Athletes 8.30% 83.30% 0.00% 8.30%Artists 15.40% 69.20% 7.70% 7.70%
Yes No Undecided Already involved
Table 3.1 Do you plan to get involved in politics?
Signed a petition
Peaceful Demonstration
Strikes
4 2 0
23 29 3
35 29 35
38 40 62
2 6 0
10 68 3
54 18 42
34 8 55
Table 3.2.1 Types of political participations (in percents)
34
Did not participate and would never participatein such action 52 44
NKR
Organized it 0 0
Participated in it 7 5
Did not participate in such action, but mayparticipate in future 41 50
Did not participate and would never participatein such action 62 55
Boycott Other protest actions
RA
Organized it 1 1
Participated in it 11 10
Did not participate in such action, but mayparticipate in future 26
145
Proactive (5/5)
Active (4/5)
Participants (3/5)
Follower (2/5)
Passive (1/5)
Subject (0/5)
Civil Servants 3.10% 3.90% 13.20% 79.80%Politcal Party members 3.40% 10.20% 32.20% 10.20% 28.80% 15.30%NGO represenatives 14.30% 17.10% 14.30% 31.40% 22.90%LSG represenatvies 2.00% 13.10% 18.20% 66.70%Student Council members 42.90% 28.60% 28.60%Businness owners 25.00% 75.00%Academics 0.90% 2.60% 7.90% 14.00% 24.60% 50.00%Athletes 20.00% 80.00%Artisits 28.60% 28.60% 14.30% 28.60%
Segments
Table 3.2.2 Types of political culture among potential political elite represenatives seprated by segments.
QG1. To what extent it is important for you to live in a democratic
country?
QG2. To what extent you consider RA/NKR to be
democratic?(1-not important at all, 10- very
important)(1-not democratic at all, 10-
fully democracy)Valid 500 498
Missing 0 2Mean 9.29 4.3Valid 191 191
Missing 0 0
Mean 8.8 4.46
RA
NKR
Table 3.3. Frequencies for support of democracy and perception on the nature of the existing regime
146
APPENDIX D. GRAPHS
Graph 1. The political composition of network for the third convocation (MPs
from ruling parties in red, opposition in blue, independent and oppositional
MPs joint to ruling parties in green)
147
Graph 2. Party composition of the fifth convocation: (MPs from RPA in red,
ARFD in green, PAP in purple. RoL yellow)
148
Graph 3. Party composition of elite in the fourth convocation (each color
represents separate party, nodes in bluе are independent MPs, nodes in black
are MPs from oppositional parties)
149
THE POLITICAL ELITE OF
POST-INDEPENDENCE ARMENIA:
CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS
OF FORMATION
AREG SCIENTIFIC CULTURAL YOUTH ASSOCIATION NGO
Kievyan str. 12/10, 0028 Yerevan, Republic of Armenia Tel./fax: +374 10 270873
www.ngoareg.am email: [email protected]
Publication: Ofset. Size: 60x84 1/16 Paper: Ofset.
Publication size: 1000 examples
150