The political effects of grievance handling by stewards in a local union

The Political Effects of Grievance Handling by Stewards in a Local Union

DAVID M E Y E R

The University o f Akron, OH 44325

This study develops and tests three long-standing propositions about the relationship between grievance-handling behavior and political outcomes in a local union: (1) more favorable grievance handling enhances the steward's likelihood of re-election; (2) the more the political support obtained in an election, the greater the steward's ability to affect grievance outcomes favorably; and (3) as the relationship between management and the union evolves, grievance handling becomes more efficient and effective. Data on grievances and election results of Ford-UA W Local 400 from the 1950s were used to test hypotheses derived from these propositions; most received substantial, significant support.

I. Introduction

The recent literature contains little about political behavior in unions, despite the intense interest shown by researchers during the 1940s, 1950s, and early t960s. With the exception of Gamm's (1979) article on politics in national unions, more recent studies have neglected internal union politics, as evidenced by Nash's (1983) literature review on stewards which concluded that little research has been done on local union politics. Katz and Sabel (1985) pointed out the importance of understanding local union politics, particularly how control over the grievance procedure affects political outcomes. This study addresses the lack of research by attempting to empiri- cally model how grievance-handling behavior affects reelection.

Meyer and Cooke (1988) have shown that more favorable grievance outcomes are associated with larger, more supportive constituencies, that is, political influence affects grievance outcomes. This study explores in more detail the mechanism by which constituency size and support as well as other factors produce grievance outcomes favorable to the grievant. It also examines how favorable and unfavorable grievance outcomes affect the likelihood of reelection.

My data were obtained from election results and the grievance records at the Walter E Reuther Library archives for UAW Local 400 in Highland Park, Michigan. Over the period 1948 to 1959, Local 400 represented the employees at three Ford Motor Company plants, with 105 grievance "committeemen" or stewards handling over 7,000 formal written grievances. Yearly elections were held from 1948 through 1953 and biennially thereafter. Depending on the contract and the number of

JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH Volume XV, Number 1 Winter 1994

34 JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH

employees, between 14 and 25 stewards were elected by districts, which represented work groups or groups of jobs on a given shift.

Stewards had the authority to resolve grievances at the first step of a four-step grievance procedure and to appeal them to the second step. Because the data are aggregated (in one test) by steward, it is important to note that the stewards and their grievances were paired at the first step and that each steward was solely responsible for handling the grievance at the first two steps and was the spokesperson for the grievant at the third step. The first step in the appeal process was to the grievant's supervisor; at the second step, the plant 's labor relations manager handled the grievance. Thus, if one controls for the plant where a grievance was filed, one con- trois for management differences at the second step. At the third step, a management committee (the same for all plants) handled the grievance. At any given time, each steward faced the same management team for grievances resolved at the third step. Since most grievances receiving unfavorable responses were resolved at the second or the third step, management's effect on grievance processing can be separated from the effect of the steward's political influence.

Because the stewards were not involved in the resolution of grievances moved to or resolved at the fourth step, arbitration, these grievances are not included in this study. Several aspects of these data deserve highlighting. Because the actual grievances were available for study, each was examined, and data were gathered on the type of grievance, contract clauses cited, dates of filing, time of processing, the names of the people involved in the processing, and so forth. Election results (who was elected and the number and distribution of votes) were also tabulated. Such data allow a closer examination of the intricacies of internal union workings than has been published before. Even so, because of data limitations, only an exploratory, limited empirical examination of internal union politics is possible.

I test basic propositions on the development and use of political influence within a local union which is broadly defined as the pressure that can be used by the steward to obtain resolution favorable to the grievant. Political influence can be used intraorganizationally within unions to obtain resolution more favorable to the grievant than normal or interorganizationally to cause management to respond more favorably than normally. Either use reflects greater political influence.

II. Propositions and Hypotheses The early literature provides an in-depth examination of the internal workings of local unions and concludes that for local union leaders success in the grievance procedure is the foundation for political success. 1 The process of achieving political success is circular: success in the grievance procedure increases political influence, which in turn results in greater success in the grievance procedure.

The implicit models tested in this study of local unions are simply stated: For stewards the likelihood of successful reelection is related to grievance-handling outcomes, and grievance-handling outcomes are related to the grievance's merits and

DAVID MEYER 35

the steward's political influence. Due to the time difference in generating political influence in the election for use after the election, the equations tested are sequential, not simultaneous.

Three statements from the literature provide the basis for these models. First, management affects the political support for stewards in how it causes and responds to grievances (Meyer and Cooke, 1988, pp. 320-25). Second, stewards (and other union officers) can pressure management by associating economic consequences with management actions in causing and responding to grievances. 2 Third, as the parties learn which behavior receives positive or negative reinforcement, they alter their behavior and deal more effectively with each other (a learning curve). This may be due to the clarification of rights and of the situations in which those rights are applicable.

These statements are based on three assumptions. First, stewards are interested in obtaining, maintaining, and increasing political support. A component of maintaining and increasing political support is furthering the perception among constituents that a steward is better able to obtain favorable outcomes for the supporting constituency (given similar merits) than rivals are (Kuhn, 1961, p. 123). Thus, stewards attempt to pressure management to ensure more favorable outcomes for their constituents' grievances. Stewards will pressure management only when the benefits of applying pressure exceed the costs and only if management will provide more or less favorable outcomes to various constituencies (management 's vulnerability) (Kuhn, 1961, p. 83).

Second, because of data limitations, there are no direct tests of management's impact on grievance outcomes or union politics. This omission is unfortunate because managers play key roles in creating grievance situations and in informally resolving many of them. Although the roles played by the managers involved in the grievance process cannot be fully explored, managers' patterned responses to different work groups and stewards can be examined. Different groups of workers may be able, through relative power differences, to affect management's profitability (Kuhn, 1961, pp. 101-3). As stewards are better able to garner and focus the application of this relative power, they can personally inflict economic consequences on manage- merit. 3 As managers and stewards develop personal relationships, they may maxi- mize the positive outcomes of joint goals over a set of grievances, i.e., "cut deals," so that stewards with more influence than others can obtain more favorable grievance outcomes. Although the effects most likely are felt in informal resolution, similar effects may show up in the formal process.

Third, three things occur in this dynamic learning environment. One, the support of different constituencies (within an election district) shifts among stewards as the constituencies' perceptions shift regarding each person's relative ability to obtain more favorable, desired outcomes (Sayles and Strauss, 1953, pp. 60-65). A norm is established (across districts), and the steward's performance is compared with it. Two, managers will move to reduce the relative power of groups who are perceived


as abusing their higher relative power (Kuhn, 1961, p. 144). And three, as the relationship develops between managers and stewards, both will learn to use their relative economic and political power more effectively, will better understand the behavioral implications of rights, past practices, and policies (in light of the merits of grievances), and will behave accordingly (Slichter et al., 1960, pp. 736-38; Kuhn, 196I, p. 46).

This study examines the behavior of union stewards given management action and response. Although many different supervisors were involved at the first step, only three labor relations managers (at any given time) responded to grievances at the second step, and those managers comprised a committee that responded to grievances at the third step. Thus, for grievances resolved at the second and third step, all variance due to management differences is taken into account by controlling for the year of filing, plant, and level of resolution. Because grievance outcomes reflect both management's and the union's expectations and arguments, any difference in outcome across managers (this affects only the second step) reflects the extent to which management deviates from the constraints of policy, past practice, and contractual language. These constraints will become better specified and under- stood over time as the relationship develops.

The key variables examined here, the steward's ability and political influence, operate in the grievance procedure to gain the most advantageous outcome: resolution favorable to the grievant. Because all stewards dealt with members of the same management and because only relative differences in ability and influence are examined (in comparison to an unspecified and shifting norm), bias due to different manager's abilities and responses is reduced. By examining the behavior of stewards within election districts, I omit from the model the variation that occurs due to the differences in sets of supervisors across districts. Any steward elected in that district, however, would have to deal with the same supervisors; hence, comparing only relative performance further controls for supervisor difference across districts.

As discussed elsewhere (Meyer and Cooke, 1988, p. 319), when the formal grievance procedure is studied and the informal procedure is not, selectivity bias occurs. Yet, it is difficult to study the informal procedure in the era of the duty of fair representation. It is highly probable that any problems not resolved favorably in the informal procedure will become grievances in the formal procedure. Omission of the problems that were resolved informally and never became grievances biases down- ward the effect of political influence on formal grievance resolution for stewards with political influence, because only their most tenuous cases are not resolved informally and favorably for the grievant. Only these cases would be filed as formal grievances.

As measured here, political success consists of winning an election and garner- ing the support of a greater part of the constituency. Also, the empirical examination is limited to situations where there is direct correspondence among the steward, the constituency, and the outcomes of the grievance procedure.

DAVID MEYER 37

The first proposition tested is that more successful grievance handling leads to greater political success. A person had to win an election in order to handle grievances. The narrow range of the const i tuency 's perception of acceptable grievance handling (the norm) becomes a limiting factor because only previously successful stewards who run again can be examined. The test examines a circular process: when a steward was elected, handled grievances, ran for reelection, and was reelected or rejected. That is, I test whether the steward under consideration for reelection is perceived as the most acceptable candidate by the majority of the voters (not necessarily the constituents). "Mandate," a measure of the proportion of voters voting for a candidate, provides a measure of the degree to which a candidate is perceived as the best alternative. Rather than a 0, 1 test for acceptability, as measured by winning or losing, "mandate" provides a rough proxy for the degree to which the winning steward was more acceptable than the other candidates. The degree of acceptability, of course, is biased by who comprised the field of opponents. 4

Other variance-limiting problems arise when considering the natural extensions of political success or failure. As a candidate wins, is successful, and wins again with a larger mandate, a logical move is to try to gain a more prestigious position in the union. Of the 105 stewards examined here, 14 ran for executive offices, and 11 of them won. Similarly, a candidate who wins and is not successful at handling grievances may choose not to stand for reelection. Of the 144 possible candidates for reelection, 36 chose not to stand for reelection (including the 14 who ran for higher office). Neither type of candidate enters the tests of this model, further limiting variation in measured success (and the number of cases used to test the model). Eleven candidates ran for reelection and lost, and five candidates made successful come- backs after not running or after running and losing.

Hence, the hypothesis testing in this study is conservative. The test includes only winning candidates who handled grievances and stood for reelection as stewards in the next election. It does not include candidates who were successful and ran for higher office, candidates who handled no grievances after being elected, and candidates who were not successful enough to run again or stewards who chose not to run again.

Within this limited range of success, it is hypothesized that the more favorably stewards process grievances, the more successful they will be. Three measures of favorability are examined here: (1) whether the outcome is favorable to the grievant, (2) the level at which resolution took place, and (3) the speed of resolution. The measure with the greatest impact on the constituency is the favorability of the resolution; the level and speed of resolution have minor effects in comparison. Because all grievance processing commences with the filing of a grievance, the number of grievances filed is discussed first and takes place in light of the informal procedure.

Under the following competing constraints, the steward must decide how to handle grievances to achieve the best possible won-loss record: time, the potential of winning and losing each grievance in a series of grievances, whether to file each


grievance, the amount of influence that can be expended and its effects, and the trades possible. These decisions occur in an environment where the constituents have a normative expectation of the response that grievances (given the merits) should receive. There are also normative expectations as to the procedural outcomes (level and speed of resolution) that must be factored into the decision of how to handle (or even file) a grievance. The steward must size up each case and act within these constraints or his or her political support will wane. Doing this successfully indicates political savvy.

It is important for the steward with a losing case to appear to have done every- thing possible to get a favorable resolution. This involves not only pushing the grievance to as high a level as possible but also spending time at each level arguing the merits of the case. In short, if a grievance is to be won, the steward wants it resolved quickly and at the lowest level, where handling it involves less time and effort. If a grievance is to be lost, pushing it to the highest level and arguing over it for a long time may soften the negative affect of the grievant(s) toward the steward.

If all problems are resolved favorably and informally and no grievances are ever filed, a steward could still be seen as the best advocate and protector of the constituents' rights. Indeed, there were stewards who were reelected even though they handled no formal grievances. But if a problem is not resolved favorably in an informal fashion, then the steward may choose to file a grievance. The best advocate may be a steward who attempts to get favorable resolutions to all problems, using all means available so that hypothesis HI follows:

HI : To a point, stewards who process more grievances (NGRIEV) than other stewards will have a greater likelihood o f (a) winning reelection with (b) a greater mandate than other stewards. 5

This hypothesis is drawn directly from the discussion of the shopping of grievances by Sayles and Strauss (1953, pp. 60-61). Note that either a steward han- dles more grievances because he or she is perceived as having more influence to successfully resolve them (a substantive reason), or he or she files (relatively) more grievances to give constituents their day in court (a procedural reason). But the pri- mary success measure is favorability, and it would be senseless for a steward to process a large number of losing grievances. The steward might also use the formal procedure more than the informal procedure (relatively), which could lead to the selectivity bias mentioned earlier. Either the substantive or the procedural reason supports the relationship hypothesized.

Management also has expectations about the acceptable numbers (and types) of grievances (within the limits of rights) that may differ from the constituency's expectations. Management may see filing more grievances than the norm as "flooding" and therefore may respond negatively. Such a possibility is another consideration for the steward in deciding to file each (or a set of) grievance(s).

In general, for a given number of grievances filed, the more favorable the typi- cal response, the greater the perception of the constituency that the steward has been

DAVID MEYER 39

successful, according to Meyer and Cooke (1988). The inclusion of "partially favorable" responses coded at 0.5 has almost no practical effect on the results, however, because 0.5 is almost equal to the mean of favorability (.490). Response favorability has both individual and collective components. The greater the number of individual constituents who have had their grievances handled and won by the steward, the higher the proportion of potential voters who perceive that the steward is successful. Collectively, as the proportion of individuals who have had their grievances handled successfully by the steward increases relative to the size of the constituency, the greater the possibility that any individuals who did not receive favorable outcomes to their grievances will be perceived as an insignificant minority. Thus,

H2: Stewards who obtain more favorable resolution (FAVOR) of grievances than other stewards, will have a greater likelihood of (a) winning reelection with (b) a greater mandate than other stewards.

Although some constituencies may make it more difficult to obtain favorable grievance outcomes or political success than others due to differences in supervisors and constituency expectations, across many constituencies this difficulty should be normally distributed. Outcome differences due to tougher or easier constituencies are omitted variables in the model.

Slichter et al. (1960, p. 732) concluded: "Union stewards or first level committeemen are not considered to be fulfilling their jobs if they don't take at least one appeal above the immediate supervisor." They then discussed the appropriate level at which grievances should be resolved. Here, the records show that the steward could routinely move grievances to the third step (the last that I measure) to show that the grievant received the best possible representation. Additionally, the records show that as the grievance moved to higher levels, the chances of it being favorably resolved dropped dramatically. In general, obtaining favorable outcomes may be more likely if a steward has a more meritorious case or more political influence than peers. Given that only losing grievances are moved forward and controlling for the overall favorability of response, it is also possible that moving grievances to higher levels reflects less political influence. This would be true if stewards with less influence and a losing grievance move all of their losing grievances to higher steps, attempting to minimize the negative effects of unfavorable outcomes. Hence, any hypothesis concerning level is ambiguous.

With regard to the speed of settlement, a certain norm (unspecified) must be met or the steward and union can lose control of the pressure exerted to resolve the grievance. In general, the faster the (favorable) response, the greater the positive effect on the constituency. Kuhn (1961, p. 7) concluded that prompt and equitable settlement are the two most important features of a grievance procedure. Sayles and Strauss (1953, pp. 72-74) discussed pressure, timing, and the difficulties of keeping control of workers as the time since filing lengthens. Lichtenstein (1985) observed this phenomenon in UAW Local 600 during the 1950s. But if grievances with less merit are dismissed more quickly than are more meritorious grievances, quick resolution


may not be seen as the best advocacy. Hence, controlling for favorability and level of resolution, the hypothesized direction of influence on speed is ambiguous.

The second issue concerns how union stewards use political influence in the grievance procedure. Meyer and Cooke (1988) found that stewards having more relative influence can use this influence to gain more favorable outcomes for their constituency.

Along with having relative influence, a successful steward must use that influence in a beneficial manner. This leads to the second proposition: Political influence

can be used in grievance processing to fur ther the relative position o f a steward's constituency (which will lead to continued or increased political support in subse- quent elections). The same three outcomes of grievance processing examined above are also examined here as dependent variables: favorability of grievance outcome, level of resolution, and speed of resolution. Affecting these variables are measures of a steward's political influence: the work group's skill, the number of workers represented (relative influence factors), and mandate (proxy for both relative influence and ability to use that influence). This adds tests of level and speed to the framework examined by Meyer and Cooke (1988). In addition, the type of grievance is more finely specified.

As discussed above, the impact of political influence on level and speed of resolution is ambiguous. There are reasons to think that greater political influence will lead to both higher and lower levels of resolution and to both shorter and longer speeds of resolution, because only losing cases are appealed to higher levels, yet influence is used to obtain favorable resolution.

In the grievances examined, very few unskilled workers listed their occupations, whereas skilled workers were far more likely to list their occupations, supporting the hypothesized relationship. As a result, it was inappropriate to test for the impact of skill on outcome. 6

Political influence increases with the number of workers represented and with a cohesive mandate from the voters. From the discussion above, furthering the relative position of the constituency in the grievance procedure consists of obtaining more favorable results relative to other stewards. If all stewards have equal influence, there would be no differences in resolution. Therefore, I hypothesize:

H3: Stewards with greater mandates (percentage of voters voting for those stewards) will be able to obtain more favorable resolution of grievances than will other stewards. (MANDATE)

H4: Stewards who represent a larger number of union members will obtain more favorable resolution of grievances than other stewards. (NVOTES)

It is presumed here that there is a degree of latitude available in favor, level, and time for resolving grievances that have similar merits. Slichter et al. (1960, pp. 694- 96) provided five sources for latitude in grievance resolution. Meyer and Cooke (1988) showed that greater latitude in favorability exists for grievances involving issues with a low clarity of rights than for grievances involving issues with a high

DAVID MEYER 41

clarity of rights. All of these distinctions cover only sources of latitude derived from legitimate policies and practices. Adding illegitimate sources that may increase the latitude of grievance resolution would only increase the total latitude in which the parties could fashion a resolution. Therefore, it is a reasonable presumption that some latitude exists.

In testing these hypotheses, all grievances handled by an elected steward can be used. The large N allows me to control for the different types of grievances and to provide a more detailed specification than that used by Meyer and Cooke (1988). Also, I can control for the different management teams in the plants under consideration. Adding controls for grievance type and plant helps to test the validity of my assumption that the effects of variation in management behavior can be ignored at the first level and across plants at the second level.

The third issue concerns how grievance handling is affected as the parties learn to deal with each other. Slichter et al. (1960, pp. 736-38) called the learning process "adjustment" (see also Lichtenstein, 1985); it involves the refinement of the interpre- tation and application of contract language, management policy, and precedents resulting in a meeting of the minds over contentiable issues. As rights concerning these issues become clearly established, resolving them for a given situation becomes more routine. The establishment of a routine for handling grievances is the subject of the third proposition: As the part ies learn to deal with each other, they

become more efficient and effective at handling grievances.

As the parties establish what work rights mean and what situations are governed by rights, and as the stewards and supervisors learn how to deal with each other, several results occur. First, supervisors (and employees and management) make fewer errors, causing fewer grievances. Second, stewards can assemble better cases and learn what does not warrant a grievance, leading to higher quality grievances that are argued more effectively. Therefore,

H5: As the union-management relationship develops, the grievance outcomes will become more favorable to the grievant. (NYEARS)

Third, the precedence followed to resolve disputes becomes more generally known as well as who is authorized to resolve disputes. Hence, given a grievance, supervisors know both what to do and what they can (and cannot) do. Taken generally,

H6: As the union-management relationship develops, grievances will be resolved at a lower level in the process. (NYEARS)

Extending the third result of learning to the time needed for resolution, the rules are better known and how to act in the procedure (what works and what does not) becomes more routinized. Thus,

H7: As the union-management relationship develops, less time is needed to resolve grievances. (NYEARS)

When a learning curve was estimated from my data, it is noteworthy that before June 1950 there is no evidence of final grievance resolution at the first step; it was


more than four years into the relationship before a supervisor resolved a grievance without an appeal to a higher level. That this much time was necessary to lead to an uncontested resolution at the first level suggests that supervisors had little authority to resolve grievances. It may also mean that the informal procedure was rarely used. Furthermore, although arbitrated grievances are not examined here, 43 percent of all the grievances arbitrated during 1948-1959 were arbitrated between 1948 and 1952 even though only 20 percent of the total grievances were filed during 1948-1952.

III . M o d e l Speci f icat ion and Data

The equations estimated are:

WON-LOST t, MANDATE t = a 1 + blNGRIEVt_ 1 + b2FAVORt_ 1

+ b3LEVELt_ 1 + b4TImEt_ 1 + bsNYEARS t, (1)

and

FAVORt+ 1 , LEVELt+ 1 , TIMEt+ 1 = a 2 + b21MANDATE t + b22NVOTES t

+ b23NYEARSt+ 1 + b24TRUCK + b25TRIM + b26HP + b27LOW CLARITY

+ b28POLICY + b29STRIKEABLE + b210DISCIPLINE + b211DISCHARGE

+ b212FAVORt+ 1 (for LEVEL and TIME) + b213LEVELt+1 (for TIME). (2)

The definitions and the properties of these variables are reported in Table 1. Equation (1) aggregates the data by steward and election district and examines the political effects of grievance handling prior to an election (during time t-l) on the reelection of that steward at time t. Logit is used to estimate WON-LOST. Note again that only stewards who handled grievances after being elected and who then ran for reelection are considered. The variable NYEARS controls for the effects of different elections, as data are pooled across all eight elections. Including NYEARS in the equation controls for differences in circumstances of different election periods, such as learning.

Equation (2) carries forward the political influence obtained in an election (at time t) and examines the effects of this influence on grievance handling during the period following successful reelection (at time t+l). The amount of political influence used to affect the grievance's outcome is presumed to be the same for each grievance handled. Although the assumption of equal influence may not be entirely realistic, it is necessary for the empirical test. Political influence is more likely to be differentially applied depending on how the outcome of the grievance may affect the political career of the steward handling the grievance. Because of this assumption, the results will severely underestimate the true effect of influence on grievance handling as the effects of influence are averaged across all grievances; those grievances that had more than average political influence applied are treated as equal to those where no influence was used.

To address the problem of assuming equal application of political influence to each grievance, the type of grievance is controlled for. In addition to the categories

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DAVID MEYER 45

examined by Meyer and Cooke (1988), I examined whether the grievance concerned policy or issues that could lead to a strike or was in response to a discipline or discharge. The effect of each type of grievance on FAVOR, LEVEL, and TIME is compared with the category High Clarity of Rights, which is left for the constant term and, from Meyer and Cooke (1988), is less affected by political influence. Specifying grievance categories also helps control for the different rights applicable to the grievance and also for variances in management action and response (now treated categorically rather than pooled). For a more thorough discussion of differences in grievance handling by type of grievance, see Meyer (1987).

To examine better how different managers differentially affected the grievance procedure, the plant at which the grievance was filed is controlled for, with the TRACTOR plant as the omitted category. Although many supervisors were involved at the first step, few grievances that received unfavorable responses were not appealed to the second step. As discussed earlier, differences due to different managers involved are controlled for in grievances resolved at the second or third step. Thus, in sum, management di f ferences are control led for in the major i ty of grievances examined here. Also, FAVOR is controlled for in examining LEVEL, and FAVOR and LEVEL are controlled for in examining TIME.

IV. Empirical Results

Grievance handling has a significant effect on both the probability of being reelected and the percentage of votes obtained in that reelection (Table 2). 7 Results presented in Table 3 provide statistically significant support for the propositions that political influence was used in the grievance procedure and that contract administration became more efficient and effective as the parties learned how to deal with each other.

The significant differences in outcomes by grievance type (Table 3) indicate that care must be taken in pooling grievances across categories. Care must also be taken in pooling data across plants; hence, different managers may handle the same grievances differently; in particular there are large differences in the TIME and LEVEL of resolution. Care must also be taken in pooling data across elections (Table 2) as there was a significant relationship between NYEARS and both WON- LOST and MANDATE. Finally, as these data are specific to a UAW-Ford relationship at only three plants, it would be imprudent to generalize these results to other settings; hence, magnitudes of effects are not discussed.

Support for the hypotheses 1 (a) and 1 (b) and 2(a) concerning NGRIEV and FAVOR is found in the estimates shown in Table 2. NGRIEV significantly affected WON-LOST and MANDATE. The more grievances filed, the greater the probability of winning reelection and the greater the mandate. FAVOR did not significantly affect MANDATE, but FAVOR did significantly and positively affect WON-LOST. As the results of grievance handling were more favorable, there was a greater probability of winning reelection.


Table 2

The Effects of Grievance Handling on the Probability of Winning and the Percentage of Voters Supporting the Candidate

(standard errors in parentheses)

WON-LOST MANDATE (Logit)

NGRIEV +.0210 c +.221 b (.0113) (.134)

FAVOR +2.885 b +13.291 (1.174) (14.139)

LEVEL -1.322 -19.012 b (.900) (10.431)

TIME +.0212 +189.137 c (.0174) (132.126)

NYEARS - 1.692 a - 16.532 a (.527) (6.429)

Intercept +8.342 a + 111.873 a (2.434) (32.862)

N 82 61

F - - 2.173 c

R 2 - - .165

~2 - - .089

a ( b. c) Significant at the .01 (.05,. 10) level.

There is statistically significant support for concluding that the lower the level at which g r i evances were reso lved and the greater the t ime spent in reso lv ing grievances, the greater the MANDATE. The signs of these relationships are the same as in the WON-LOST equat ion . The lower the level at which g r i evances were resolved, the greater the probabil i ty of winning reelection, and the higher the mandate. The greater the t ime spent in handl ing a gr ievance (control l ing for LEVEL and FAVOR), the greater the probabil i ty of winning reelection (bordering on significance) and of receiving a larger mandate (significant at < .10 level). In summary, Proposit ion 1 is very well supported: grievance handling outcomes do affect political outcomes.

As shown in Table 3, there is statistically significant support for the conclusion that, as the size of the s teward 's election district increased (NVOTES), the steward was able to obtain more favorable results for constituents and push those grievances to higher levels; also, as the MANDATE of the steward increased, the steward was able to push grievances to higher levels. Thus, hypothesis 4 is supported and hypoth-

D A V I D M E Y E R 47

Table 3

The Effects of Political Influence, Plant, and Grievance Type on Favorability, Level, and Time

(standard errors in parentheses)

FAVOR LEVEL TIME

MANDATE -.0004 +.007 a +.020 (.0009) (.002) (. 111)

NVOTES +.0001 c +.0002 b +.008 (.00006) (.0001) (.007)

NYEARS +.097 a -.549 a +5.848 b (.022) (.037) (2.700)

TRUCK -.034 -.265 a -11.363 b (.038) (.064) (4.491)

TRIM +.094 c -.340 a - 12.729 b (.056) (.094) (6.417)

HP -.007 -.518 a -7.050 c (.034) (.058) (4.152)

LOW CLARITY -.068 b +.017 +9.505 b (.032) (.055) (3.746)

POLICY -.036 +.068 +.519 (.046) (.078) (5.418)

STRIKEABLE -.039 -.350 a +6.647 (.045) (.075) (5.549)

DISCIPLINE -. 157 a +.268 a + 1.769 (.036) (.061) (4.254)

DISCHARGE -.037 +.210 -12.167 (.158) (.266) (19.363)

FAVOR - - -.392 a +21.200 a (.046) (3.429)

LEVEL - - - - +33.656 a (2.037)

INTERCEPT +.344 a +3.311 a -71.102 a (.068) (. 115) (10.094)

N 13501350 1133

F 9.619 a 58.360 a 26.357 a

~2 .066 .338 .226

a ( b, c) Significant at the .01 (.05, .10) level.


esis 3 is not. The results concerning LEVEL are at odds with the findings from Table 2.

As the relationship developed over time, grievances were more favorably resolved at lower levels. Thus, hypotheses 5 and 6 are supported. Hypothesis 7 is not supported. In fact, there is statistically significant support for a relationship in the opposite direction. As the relationship developed, grievance resolution took more time. Note, however, that the probability of obtaining a favorable outcome for a grievance decreased significantly as level increased (FAVOR in the LEVEL equation) and that the time necessary to obtain a favorable outcome at each level was significantly greater than the time needed to obtain an unfavorable outcome (FAVOR in the TIME equation, controlling for LEVEL). Finally, as expected, the time to resolve a grievance increased significantly as the level of processing increased (LEVEL in the TIME equation).

Examining the results of the control variables, there were significant differences in grievance handling in the different plants. FAVOR, LEVEL, and TIME for some plants (TRUCK, TRIM, and HP) were, for various relationships, significantly different from the benchmark TRACTOR plant, although FAVOR showed much more consistency across plants. The consistency of FAVOR could be expected because management in each plant was administering, interpreting, and applying the same contractual rights, past practices, and precedents. Yet, the level of the procedure reached and the time taken for resolution at all other plants varied significantly from the TRACTOR plant; different processes were at work.

Similarly, significant differences in grievance handling occurred for the different categories of grievances when compared with the benchmark HIGH CLARITY category. As expected (Meyer and Cooke, 1988), LOW CLARITY grievances were lower in favorability and took longer to resolve. As could be anticipated, DISCI- PLINE grievances were lower in favorability and were pushed to higher levels than HIGH CLARITY grievances, while the handling of DISCHARGE grievances did not differ significantly. Neither did the handling of POLICY grievances differ significantly from HIGH CLARITY grievances. Finally, STRIKEABLE grievances were resolved at significantly lower levels than HIGH CLARITY grievances. Thus, it is important to control for the similarity of merits of the grievances; even this crude control has significant effects on the outcomes.

Examining the effects of these groups of control variables shows that it would be inappropriate to pool individual grievance handling measures across either plants or grievance types. In total, the variables examined did a fair job of explaining variation in the level and time of resolution, but they did not explain well the favorability of the outcome or the political outcomes.

V. Summary and Conclusions

There is support for each of the three propositions examined. A steward's grievance handling did affect both the probability of winning reelection and the percentage of

DAVID MEYER 49

voters supporting that steward. The size of the steward's constituency provided political influence that was used to obtain more favorable results in handling grievances. Both the size of the constituency and the degree of support in the steward's constituency provided political influence to process grievances to higher levels, yet more favorable political outcomes resulted from resolution at lower levels. This could be because politically successful stewards found ways to settle grievances informally at the lowest level and took only solid, strong cases to higher levels. Finally, the parties developed their relationship over time to more efficiently and effectively process grievances.

The effects of the time taken to resolve grievances on political success and influence were, ~ priori, ambiguous. Clearly and significantly, political success and influence were related to taking a longer rather than shorter time, even controlling for both FAVOR and LEVEL. When the relationship between TIME and FAVOR (controlling for LEVEL) is examined (it was significantly positive), a possible explana- tion is discovered. The longer a grievance was under consideration at any level, the more likely management would respond favorably. Even if management denied the grievance, the additional consideration may have reflected a more meritorious case or additional consideration due to the steward's political influence, both positive indicators of advocacy.

In these developing steward-supervisor relationships, greater political influence was better left unused. Political influence could have been used to go over the supervisor's head, but using this greater influence (overtly) seemed to create a political backlash; the steward's reelection was more likely if the matter was settled at a lower level. The political backlash against a "too powerful" steward could have had sources within the work group, union, or management (i.e., management retaliation against work groups with "too much" power, see Slichter et al., 1960, pp. 680-81; Kuhn, 1961, p. 144).

Applying these findings to the operation of nonunion dispute resolution procedures presents some interesting dilemmas. It is apparent from the findings presented here that in unionized settings the parties developed expectations that there would be some difference in grievance outcomes due to the application of economic and political influence and found those differences workable. This contrasts with the findings of Greenberg's review of the procedural justice literature (1987) that concludes that consistent, accurate treatment is necessary for the outcomes of a procedure to be seen as just. That is, the same variance in grievance outcomes observed here, if found in a nonunion situation, would indicate that the process was unjust and that management favorites were getting better treatment. Furthermore, Greenberg also found that a just process must also provide voice and correctability, which would indicate that a more formalized process than an open door is necessary. Nonunion firms are then caught in a bind: they must provide voice and correctability, typically through a formal dispute resolution procedure, but must provide consistent, accurate treatment, that is, management cannot play favorites. Peterson and Lewin (1990) made these and many other points in questioning the viability of nonunion grievance procedures.


In un ion ized si tuations it ma y be that p rovid ing contractual rights, an advocate for those rights (the union) , and a gr ievance procedure to enforce those rights might pro- v ide a suff icient amoun t of jus t ice to al low some difference in t reatment within those parameters. That gr ievance procedure outcomes affected by un ion politics are perceived as jus t seems to be true even taking into account the duty of fair representation. N o n u n i o n employers are not prone to offer formal ized rights, advocates, and procedures end ing in third party, b i n d i n g arbi t rat ion. Hence , ins tead of hav ing a u n i o n to b l a m e for u n f a i r n e s s and in jus t i ce , m a n a g e m e n t b e c o m e s the v i l l a in . Research is needed to better def ine the parameters of fairness and just ice and to dis- cover i f those parameters are the same in u n i o n and n o n u n i o n workplaces.

This init ial empir ical examina t ion of gr ievance hand l ing and local un ion poli t ics suppor t s p r o p o s i t i o n s that are bas ic to i ndus t r i a l r e la t ions : that pol i t ics af fects gr ievance handl ing and vice-versa and that, over time, the parties learn to deal with each other more ef fec t ive ly and eff icient ly. A m b i g u i t y c o n c e r n i n g the effects o f poli t ical inf luence on the t ime taken to handle a gr ievance is resolved. The genera- t ion of polit ical inf luence, however , stems f rom resolving gr ievances at lower levels and is used to push gr ievances to higher levels. This study has laid the groundwork for a con t inued examina t ion of the internal poli t ical work ings of un ion locals, the effects individuals have on gr ievance processing, the effects managemen t and managers have on gr ievance processing, and the effects that the gr ievances themselves have on gr ievance processing.

N O T E S

1This paper cites only a few of the studies undertaken during this time; dozens more could be listed. For a more thorough bibliography, see Nash (1983).

2Applying economic pressure on management to cause a resolution more favorable to the grievant is a process described in Kuhn's (1961) work on fractional bargaining.

3The ability to personally apply power is a process that is much more complex than presented here. The degree to which a steward is able to personally embody whatever economic power the workers have is dependent on a complex interaction involving the issue at hand, the leadership abilities and charisma of the steward, and, most importantly, the cohesiveness of the work force. The ability to successfully use this power is dependent on the vulnerability of management. Furthermore, internal union politics affect the development and use of this power.

4The bias due to the composition of the opposition is reduced because potential candidates are less likely to run against strong incumbents and are more likely to run against weak incumbents.

5It is important to note that if the constituents perceive that the steward is not devoting enough time or effort handling their cases at an acceptable, normative level (given the merits), this hypothesis will be negative.

6The results of tests including skill showed that skill significantly (> .001 level) increased the favorability of the outcome, significantly (_> .001 level) decreased the level of resolution, and had no effect on the time needed for resolution. Including skill reduced N to 594. Except for the control variable for low clarity of rights grievances, the significance levels of the variables having coefficients that were significant were not affected.

DAVID M E Y E R 51

7N is different for each equation due to the lack of vote data for the 1955 election. Hence, for the 21 stewards standing for reelection in that election, MANDATE could not be calculated. The results do not change drastically when WON-LOST is estimated using N = 61.

R E F E R E N C E S

Gamm, Sara. "The Election Base of National Union Executive Boards." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 32 (April 1979): 295-311.

Greenberg, Jerald. "A Taxonomy of Organizational Justice Theories." Academy of Management Review 12 (January 1987): 9-22.

Katz, Harry, and Charles Sabel. "Industrial Relations and Industrial Adjustment in the Car Industry." Industrial Relations 24 (Fall 1985): 295-315.

Kuhn, James. Bargaining in Grievance Settlement. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.

Lichtenstein, Nelson. "UAW Bargaining Strategy and Shop Floor Conflict: 1946-1970." Industrial Rela- tions 24 (Fall 1985): 360-81.

Meyer, David. "Problem Creation and Resolution in Unionized Workplaces: A Review of the Grievance Procedure." Ms., University of Wyoming, 1987.

and William Cooke. "Economic and Political Factors in the Resolution of Formal Grievances." Industrial Relations 27 (Fall 1988): 318-35.

Nash, A1. The Union Steward: Duties, Rights, and Status. 2d ed. Ithaca: New York State School of Indus- trial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1983.

Peterson, Richard, and David Lewin. "The Nonunion Grievance Procedure: A Viable System of Due Proc- ess?" Employee Responsibilities andRights Journal 3 (March 1990): 1-18.

Sayles, Leonard, and George Strauss. The Local Union: Its Place in the Industrial Plant. New York: Harper, 1953.

Slichter, Sumner, James Healy, and E. Robert Livernash. The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Manage- ment. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960.

The political effects of grievance handling by stewards in a local union

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