The Political Economy of Pro-Poor GrowthINC-led minority coalition (UPA) (left support) National...
Transcript of The Political Economy of Pro-Poor GrowthINC-led minority coalition (UPA) (left support) National...
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1 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
The Political Economy of
Pro-Poor Growth
Evidence from Education Policies
in India and Brazil
Nicole Rippin and Bettina Boekle-Giuffrida
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2 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth: Evidence
from Education Policies in India and Brazil
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1. Introduction
2.1 Possible Equilibriums in Policy Formulation
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
3. The Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.3 Country Case Brazil
4. Lessons Learned
1.2 The “Education Puzzle”
2. The Theoretical Framework
2.2 Possible Equilibriums in Policy Implementation
3.2.1 Policy Formulation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu
3.2.2 Policy Implementation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu
3.3.1 Policy Formulation in Pernambuco and Ceará
3.3.2 Policy Implementation in Pernambuco and Ceará
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3 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
When is Growth Pro-Poor?
Pro-poor
recession
Anti-poor
recession/
growth
Pro-Poor Growth
(both definitions)
Pro-Poor Growth
(relative definition) 1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
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4 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Importance of Elementary Education for Pro-Poor
Growth
Source: Lopez (2004)
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
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5 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
The “Education Puzzle”: Impact of Educational
Investments on Poverty and Growth in India
Source: Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart (2005)
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
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6 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
The “Education Puzzle”: Impact of Educational
Achievements on Poverty and Growth in India
Source: Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart (2005)
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
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7 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Theoretical Framework: Possible Equilibriums in
Policy Formulation
Clientele-Relationship with the Non-Poor Clientele-Relationship with
the Poor No Political Competition Political Competition
Government
Poor Electorate Supports Bribes Ignores Supports Bribes Ignores Supports Bribes Ignores
Support X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Uninformed
Oppose X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X
Support X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Informed
Oppose X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X
Reputation Financial
Capability
Political
Stability Constitution Supporting
External Parties
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Policies can ceteris paribus be expected to be formulated in a way
that releases their pro-poor potential if:
The poor are the clientele of the government
The government is confronted with a combination of political
competition and a majority of poor voters well aware of the
importance of the policy in question
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8 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Enforcing Power No Enforcing Power
Unaware Aware
Poor Beneficiaries
Public Official Lobby Don’t Lobby Lobby Don’t Lobby Lobby Don’t Lobby
Enforces X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Altruistic
Hampers X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X
Enforces X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Not
Altruistic Hampers X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X
Theoretical Framework: Possible Equilibriums in
Policy Implementation
Accountability
enforced by
Government
Interest Groups Financial
Capability
Geographic,
Socio-economic,
etc. Conditions
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Policies are ceteris paribus expected to be effectively
implemented in a certain area of influence if:
The responsible public official has a strong commitment to
implement
The poor have enforcing power and are fully aware of it
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9 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Methodology: Case Selection
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Responsibilities: India Brazil
Policy Formulation Centre, States Centre, States
Policy Implementation Centre, States Centre, States, Municipalities
Indicators: Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu Ceará Pernambuco
Area (sqkm) 275,045 130,058 148,825 98,911
# Districts / # Municipalities 23 30 184 185
Population 76,210,000 62,405,700 8,547,809 8,810,256
% SC Population 16.2% 19.0% - -
% ST Population 6.6% 1.0% - -
SGDP (in million at current prices) Rs 3,712,000 Rs 3,392,000 R$ 60,099 R$ 70,441
Work participation rate 45.8 44.7 58.5 (Fortaleza) 54 (Recife)
NER (upper primary) 57.5 88.1 98.3 96.8
Literacy Rate 60.5 73.5 80.9 82.1
EDI (1st – 8
th grade) 12 4 - -
IDEB (1st – 4
th grade) - - 4.4 4.1
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10 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Country Case India: The Lok Sabha (Lower House)
Elections
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
The political environment can be divided in two main periods:
The majority of the poor electorate seems to be politically unaware
and uninformed about the importance of elementary education:
Before 1989/90: Indian National Congress, party of the
middle class, is uncontested dominating all elections
After 1989/90: Fierce competition between various parties
(362 in 2009), from Communists with focus on the poor to the
Bharatiya Janata Party of the upper castes
32% could not identify most pressing issues, 2% named
education (National Election Survey 2009)
Election campaigns concentrate on food subsidies, votes of
the poor are broadly distributed:
Left Front (10.6%), INC (27.3%), BJP (16.8%) (2009)
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11 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
2.70
2.90
3.10
3.30
3.50
3.70
3.90
4.10
4.30
1980
-81
1981
-82
1982
-83
1983
-84
1984
-85
1985
-86
1986
-87
1987
-88
1988
-89
1989
-90
1990
-91
1991
-92
1992
-93
1993
-94
1994
-95
1995
-96
1996
-97
1997
-98
1998
-99
1999
-00
2000
-01
2001
-02
2002
-03
2003
-04
2004
-05
2005
-06
2006
-07(
RE)
2007
-08
(BE)
Indian National Congress
(centre)
National Front (right-left coalition)
Samajwadi Janata (INC supported)
United Front
minority
(centre-left support)
Bharatiya Janata Party (right)
(minority coalition + strong centre-left opposition)
National Democratic Alliance
(right minority coalition + weak
opposition)
Year of Lok Sabha Election
Unni Krishnan (1993)
83rd Amendment (1997)
93rd Amendment (2001)
2% education cess (2004/05)
Lost vote of confidence
Indian National Congress
(till 94 minority + strong right
opposition
INC-led minority coalition (UPA)
(left support)
National Education Policy 1992
National Education Policy 1986
Country Case India: National Educational
Investments over Time
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Before 1989/90:
Government ignores the
poor, pro poor potential not
released
After 1989/90: Government bribes the
uninformed poor, depending on coalition
sometimes clientele-influence, pro-poor potential
not / partially released
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12 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Country Case India: The Vidhan Sabha (Legislative
Assembly) Elections
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
The political environment in Andhra Pradesh:
The political environment in Tamil Nadu:
Two main parties: Indian National Congress and Telugu
Desam Party, both in the centre of the political spectrum
Share of votes of the poor: 42.9% INC, 39.6% TDP (2009)
Two main parties: Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and All India
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
DMK significantly in the lead among the poor and very poor
Political competition on social issues almost absent
Political competition on social issues, especially education,
but considerable amount of swing voters due to vote buying
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13 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.75
4.00
4.25
1984
-198
5
1985
-198
6
1986
-198
7
1987
-198
8
1988
-198
9
1989
-199
0
1990
-199
1
1991
-199
2
1992
-199
3
1993
-199
4
1994
-199
5
1995
-199
6
1996
-199
7
1997
-199
8
1998
-199
9
1999
-200
0
2000
-200
1
2001
-200
2
2002
-200
3
2003
-200
4
2004
-200
5
2005
-200
6
2006
-200
7 (R
E)
2007
-200
8 (B
E)
Year of Vidhan Sabha Election
Telugu Desam Party (AP)
(centre)
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (TN)
(centre/centre-right)
CLIP (2005)
ABL (2003)
PISA 2010
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (TN)
(centre-left)
TN Midday-Meal-Scheme (1982)
Introduced
AP Midday-Meal-Scheme (2001)
Enforced by Court's decision 2001
Indian National Congress (AP)
(centre)
Country Case India: State Educational Investments
over Time
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Andhra Pradesh:
Governments almost
ignore the poor, pro-poor
potential not released
Tamil Nadu:
DMK has strong focus on education but
poor are uninformed and bribed, pro-poor
potential released when DMK is in office
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14 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Country Case India: The Implementation of SSA
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Administration in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu:
Highly inflated due to two implementation societies,
monitoring almost absent
Commitment of high-level officials higher in Tamil Nadu:
Average tenure State Project Director: 20 months vs.
7.5 months in Andhra Pradesh (2004-09)
Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran (Midday-Meal-
Scheme) and State Project Director Vijaya Kumar (ABL)
Beneficiaries have almost no enforcing power:
Teachers appointed, promoted, transferred by Education
Director: performance-based wages / promotions impossible
Resistance of teacher unions broken (not best practice!)
Minor role in construction, repair, maintenance through Village
Education Committees which are often not even active
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15 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Progress in Implementing Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
(2002-08)
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Implementation of the national program Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan:
Progress (2002-2008) Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu
Expenditure (Percentage of SGDP) - 0.20% + 0.17%
Schools + 3% + 4%
Without building 15% 0.1%
Without girl’s toilet 53% 38%
Classrooms (since 2004) + 13% + 14%
Average number per school 4 6
Need for major repair 6% 4%
Teachers + 12% + 82%
Para-teachers 23% 0.4%
Absence rates 25.3% 21.3%
Engagement in non-teaching activities 57.0% 50.4%
Almost all the difference is made by the commitment of high-level
government officials in Tamil Nadu
“Things are mainly working despite not because of the system”
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16 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Country Case Brazil: The Câmara dos Deputados
(House of Representatives) Elections
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
The political environment can be divided in two main periods:
The majority of the poor electorate seems to be politically aware
and informed about the importance of elementary education:
Era Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002): The centre-
right Brazilian Social Democratic Party led coalition forms
majority government
Era Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002-10): The left Workers’
Party leftist-centre coalition first forms minority, after 2006
majority government
High political awareness after oppression under military
dictatorship and only recent redemocratization (since 1985)
Constitution of 1988 called Citizen’s Constitution, includes
universal right to education
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17 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
3.8
4.0
4.3
4.5
4.8
5.0
5.3
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
National Education Plan 2011
PISA 2000
FUNDEF (1996)
FUNDEB (2007)
IDEB (2007)
National Education Plan 2001
Bolsa Escola Program (2001)
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
(centre-right coalition)
Partido dos Trabalhadores
(leftist-centre minority coalition)
Partido dos Trabalhadores
(leftist-centre coalition)
Bolsa Familia (2003)
Year of Câmara dos Deputados
elections
Country Case Brazil: National Educational
Investments over Time
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Cardoso (1994-2002):
Government cannot bribe
the poor, pro-poor potential
at least partially released
Lula da Silva (2002-10):
Poor cannot be bribed,
strong clientele-influence
from the left parties
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18 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Country Case Brazil: The Assembly Elections
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
The political environment in Céara:
The political environment in Pernambuco:
Centre-right Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB)
achieved governable majorities from 1991 to 2006
After a short mandate of left-wing Brazilian Socialist Party
(PSB) from 1995 to 98, Pernambuco was ruled by Union of
Pernambuco, a coalition between centre Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and right-wing Party
of the Liberal Front (PFL) from 1999-2006
Political competition on social issues
Policy making highly influenced by PSBD at the national level
Political competition on social issues
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19 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Alphabetization at the Right Age (2005)
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Ceará)
(centre/centre-right)
Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Pernambuco)
(left)
Union of Pernambuco (Pernambuco):
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (centre)
Partido da Frente Liberal (right)
Alphabetize with Success (2003)
Be Alert and Accelerate (2003)
Year of assembly elections
Country Case Brazil: State Educational Investments
over Time
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Ceará:
Government cannot bribe
the poor, pro-poor potential
at least partially released
Pernambuco:
Government cannot bribe the poor, but strong
liberal clientele promote privatization course,
effect yet unknown
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20 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Country Case Brazil: State-Level Implementation of
the National Program Brasil Alfabetizado
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Administration in Ceará:
Comprehensive reform from 1995 onwards, e.g. performance-
based appointments and community involvement
5 secretaries of education within seven years with rather low
levels of qualification and commitment
First education secretary appointed under reformed system,
Antenor Naspolini, was former coordinator of UNICEF in
Ceará and main reason for Ceará’s progress
Administration in Pernambuco:
Public officials still often appointed according to political
affiliation rather capability and qualification
Beneficiaries repeatedly excluded from implementation
processes and denied access to relevant information
(confrontation rather than communication)
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21 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Progress in Implementing Brasil Alfabetizado
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Implementation of the national program Brasil Alfabetizado:
Almost all the difference is made by the commitment of high-level
government officials in Ceará
But different to Tamil Nadu, the systems itself promotes the
commitment of public officials
Policy implementation in Ceará characterized by strong and
sustainable pro-poor alignment
Focus on institutional empowerment of municipal
administrations much stronger in Ceará:
59 out of 185 municipal administrations participating in
Pernambuco (2010)
182 out of 184 municipal administrations participating
in Ceará (2010)
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22 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Country Case Brazil: Municipal-Level Implementation
of the State Program Alphabetization at the Right Age
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Administration in Fortaleza:
Continuously insufficient literacy levels in primary education
Mayor committed and long time in office (1993-04, 2008-12)
Little commitment on higher administration levels, jobs are
often conceived as tremplin to a more prestigious career
Administration in Maracanaú:
Increase in IDEB from 3.9 (2005) to 4.7 (2009), one of
Ceará’s most successful municipalities
Known for making headlines with fraud and corruption
Beneficiaries have almost no enforcing power, school councils
weak and without real power
Reform of administration: performance-based component in
salaries, municipal law holds directors responsible for
school’s progress
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23 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Lessons Learned: Policy Formulation
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Awareness of the poor electorate for political processes and
importance of respective policies:
Brazilian experience recommends open political dialogue with
policy recipients from early on: Institutionalization of feedback
mechanisms between policy makers and recipients
Instrument to evaluate effectiveness of policies and monitor
progress of states, municipalities and schools
Monitoring of policy outcomes:
PISA results produced “healthy shock”, asserting pressure on
the government through public awareness and concern with
regard to (international) reputation
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24 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Lessons Learned: Policy Implementation
1. Introduction
1.1 Pro-Poor Growth
1.2 Education Puzzle
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Policy Formulation
2.2 Policy Implementation
3. Empirical Application
3.1 Methodology
3.2 Country Case India
3.2.1 Formulation
3.2.2 Implementation
3.3 Country Case Brazil
3.3.1 Formulation
3.3.2 Implementation
4. Lessons Learned
Increase proportion of committed public officials:
Transparent recruitment according to merit and capabilities
Members of schools and village councils need to be trained
and provided with information necessary to monitor
achievements
Enforce good performance of those who are not:
Beneficiaries need de jure and de facto enforcing power to
hold officials accountable
Decentralisation ought to be handled with care:
But if beneficiaries are not endowed with de jure and de facto
enforcement power, implementation successes will crucially
depend on commitment of officials and consequently
reinforce inequality patterns
High level of state-level centralization hampers accountability
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25 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth
Thank you!