The Paradox of Hegemony: America’sAmbiguous Relationship with the

United Nations

BRUCE CRONINUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison

There is an inherent tension between a dominant state’s role as ahegemon and its role as a great power. Hegemons have the materialcapabilities to act unilaterally, yet they cannot remain hegemons if theydo so at the expense of the system that they are trying to lead. Thusthere is a contradiction between the propensity for a powerful state totake unilateral action in promoting its self-defined interest and its desireto maintain long-term systemic stability. This tension between paro-chial interest and international responsibility creates a phenomenoncalled the ‘paradox of hegemony’. This article conceptualizes this as aform of ‘role strain’ in which hegemons are torn between theirconflicting roles as great powers and systemic leaders. It illustrates thesepoints by examining the tensions that have long defined the USrelationship with the United Nations.

KEY WORDS ♦ hegemony ♦ institutions ♦ international leadership ♦legitimacy ♦ role theory

Standing before Congress in the wake of the US-led victory over Iraq in1991, President George Bush announced the beginning of a new worldorder organized under US hegemonic leadership. Echoing these sentiments,conservative policy analyst Charles Krauthammer (1990/91: 24) proclaimedthat ‘now is the unipolar moment . . . there is but one first-rate power andno prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it’. Intuitively, thisseemed plausible. With the weakening and subsequent collapse of the SovietUnion, many expected the United States to finally achieve the globalsupremacy that had eluded it for half a century; a Pax Americana unfettered

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by potential challengers. The primary condition for the establishment ofsystemic hegemony — victory in a major war — had been achieved with thesubjugation of Iraq and the ‘surrender’ of the Soviet Union in the ColdWar.1 As a result, the debate over hegemonic decline — so prominent in theacademic and policy literature during the 1980s — had ended.2

Yet soon after building broad international support for a new order basedon multilateralism under American leadership, the US began to pursue aseries of unilateral policies in the face of widespread opposition from theother great powers. The US-inspired anti-Iraq coalition had symbolized therise of a new hegemonic era in which US leadership was broadly acknowl-edged. However, several years later, America’s announcement that it wouldtake unilateral action against Iraq over the strong objection of severalmembers of the United Nations Security Council undermined the multi-lateralism it had so recently espoused.3 Moreover, having fought for thecreation of a World Trade Organization based on principles of unfetteredfree trade, the US almost became the first nation to be cited for violating itsrules after taking unilateral action against states trading with Cuba.4

These incidents illustrate a dilemma that hegemons face in attempting toexercise their leadership through multilateral organizations. Hegemonscreate social structures and international organizations (IOs) in order toadvance particular sets of political, economic and other types of interests.5

These organizations help to facilitate the development of hegemonicinstitutions and the expansion of hegemonic world orders.6 Once establishedthey stabilize global politics and increase the likelihood that the other stateswill act according to norms promoted by the hegemon. On these points,most theories of hegemony agree. If, however, international institutionsreflect the interests of the hegemon, why do hegemonic powers so often actto undermine them? This oscillation between unilateralism and multi-lateralism places a great strain on a hegemonic order and forces the hegemonto expend its resources in trying to maintain the essential rules of the system.The US is not unique in facing this dilemma; it is inherent in the nature ofhegemony.

This article will argue that there is a tension between a dominant state’srole as a hegemon (defined in terms of leadership) and its role as a greatpower (defined in terms of material capabilities). These roles often call forcontradictory performances. While secondary states expect the former tooften act on behalf of the common good (as defined by the politicallyrelevant powers), domestic political actors expect the latter to act in pursuitof parochial interest. Thus there is a contradiction between the propensityfor a powerful state to take unilateral action in promoting its self-definedinterest and its desire to maintain long-term systemic stability at a minimal

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cost. This tension explains the contradictory behavior that hegemons oftenexhibit.

On the one hand, as the strongest of the great powers, hegemons possessthe capabilities and will to act unilaterally in pursuing their own interests.This raises expectations among domestic political actors and state officialsthat the government will pursue its own course when its interests are atstake.

On the other hand, in their role as global or regional leaders, hegemonsalso have an interest in maintaining an international or regional order inwhich law and multilateral institutions provide for a set of stable expectationsand constraints. This legitimizes the distribution of power and system rulesand helps to prevent the rise of revisionist challenges. However, havingsocialized the key states into accepting the assumptions and normsunderlying the order,7 the hegemon is placed in a position where it mustfollow the rules and institutions it had helped to establish, even when it isnot in its interest to do so. To do otherwise would undermine the very orderit created.

This tension between parochial interest and international responsibilitycreates a phenomenon in International Relations that can be called the‘paradox of hegemony’. In this article, I conceptualize this paradox as a formof ‘role strain’ in which hegemons are divided between their conflicting rolesas great powers and systemic leaders. I argue that hegemons fail in partbecause they are unable or unwilling to resolve this dilemma.

The first section of this article briefly critiques traditional conceptions ofhegemony, most of which are presented primarily in terms of power andcontrol. I argue that while these theories can explain hegemonic powerand unilateralism they cannot explain hegemonic authority and multi-lateralism. In the next section, I present a model of hegemony in which therole and identity of hegemon evolves from within international society.Building on this approach, I draw from role theory to show how hegemonicbehavior is constrained by the expectations attached to its identity ofhegemon. Following this, I argue that while both power and legitimacy areboth prerequisites for the construction of a hegemonic system, they generatecompeting interests and conflicting expectations; thus, the paradox ofhegemony. The article illustrates this paradox through an examination of theUS relationship with the United Nations, in particular its policies towardIraq from 1991 through 1999.

Hegemony as Power

Scholars and practitioners have been slow to appreciate the paradox ofhegemony because most tend to conceptualize hegemony as a function of

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material capabilities devoid of social context. Scholars who otherwise holdvery different views of International Relations conceptualize hegemony insimilar ways, usually in relation to the distribution of military and economicresources. For Robert Gilpin (1981: 29), a hegemonic system is one inwhich a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states.Similarly, Joseph Nye (1990: 87) conceives of hegemony as a situation ofunequal power in which one country has a high degree of control overothers. World-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein (1984: 38) sees ahegemonic system as one in which the ongoing rivalry between the greatpowers is so unbalanced that ‘one power can largely impose its rules and itswishes . . . in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even culturalarenas’.

In each of these conceptions, the principal idea is control by a dominantstate. The distribution of power is the key variable that explains both theconditions under which hegemony will likely arise and which state’s interestswill be reflected in the hegemonic order. Hegemonies exist because in ananarchic system each state will strive to be the most powerful actor, anduneven economic, military and technological growth enables one of thecompetitors to achieve this goal.8 While there is a spirited debate over whatcounts as a power resource and how capabilities can be successfullyconverted into preferred outcomes, this discussion tends to be limited to themechanisms through which hegemons can export their preferences globallyor regionally.9

We find this most directly in the hegemonic stability literature and in thework of one of the leading hegemony theorists, Robert Gilpin. According toGilpin (1981: 13), the ability of a dominant state to govern the system is afunction of its military, economic and technological capabilities and itswillingness to either induce or force other states to comply with itspreferences. Similarly, hegemonic stability theory is built on the premise thata leading state’s overwhelming economic and technological power willenable it both to provide the collective goods necessary to facilitate an openworld economy and to enforce the rules that make this system workeffectively.10 Sometimes power is wielded directly through inducement andcoercion, while at other times it is exercised indirectly through the creationof institutions that define the range of legitimate behavior.11

While this model can explain the propensity of a hegemon to initiateunilateral action when it is in its interest to do so, it cannot explain why theother great powers would allow a hegemon to dominate the system.Although it is not hard to understand how a hegemon can use fear andintimidation to control the behavior of small and weak states, balance ofpower theory clearly predicts that the other great powers would act toprevent a single state from dominating the system for any significant period

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of time. In fact, any attempt by one state to dominate a regional orinternational system will likely be countered by a balancing alliance.12 In aunipolar (hegemonic) system, there is no clear-cut distinction betweenbalancing against threat and balancing against power. Unless states areprepared to run the risk of being vulnerable to a change in the hegemon’sintentions, other great powers can be expected to counter the hegemon’scapabilities, regardless of how benign it may appear at the time.13 Thus,while a single state can certainly amass greater military and economicresources than its counterparts without other states acknowledging itsauthority, it cannot impose its will on the system without provoking theformation of a balancing alliance or at least generating ongoing oppositionfrom secondary states.

We can conclude from this that if hegemony were to arise solely out ofpower struggles among the great powers, it would be unstable and short-lived. Gilpin (1981: Ch. 2) may be correct in arguing that other greatpowers may choose not to challenge a hegemon for leadership if they judgethe risks to be too high; however, it is also unlikely that a hegemon couldmaintain the essential rules of the system for an extended period of timewithout some general consensus, at least among the major powers. Thissuggests that a disparity in power and capabilities among the leading states isa necessary but highly insufficient condition for the rise of hegemony. Thisis important in understanding the paradox of hegemony.

Hegemonic Authority as a Social Property

From this discussion we can conclude that hegemony is not an attribute ofa particular country, but rather it is a type of relationship that exists amonga group of countries. While an empire can arise through naked conquest,hegemony requires an acknowledgment of hegemonic authority.14 Suchacknowledgment does not automatically stem from superior capabilitiesbecause in the context of a pluralistic international society of states,hegemony is a form of leadership not domination. Whereas dominationneeds no cultural context, leadership can only develop within a socialenvironment with the consent of the broader community. Such an environ-ment provides the permissive condition for hegemony to evolve.

No less a proponent of power politics than Henry Kissinger (1957: 1)recognizes that no international order, hegemonic or otherwise, can remainstable unless it is accepted by all of the major powers. ‘Stability’, he argues,‘has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generallyaccepted legitimacy.’ Similarly, Robert Cox (1981a) has demonstrated thatthe cornerstone of a hegemonic order is the adoption of a dominant set ofideas promoted by the leading power. The relevant group of political leaders

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must therefore agree that the institutions and structural arrangements thatare created are the most appropriate for the society of states.15 Inis Claude(1966: 367, 369) argues that legitimacy is an essential characteristic of anycohesive and stable political system at either the national or internationallevel. Legitimation requires that power be converted into authority,competence be supported by jurisdiction and possession be validated asownership. The construction of a new order, then, involves a processthrough which new rules, norms and distributions of power becomelegitimized, that is, internalized by the major actors in the system.16 Thus,Ernst Haas (1983: 229) defines hegemony as the ‘national capability toadvance long-range views of world order . . . for the success of institutionscharged with that task.’

This suggests that the states will agree to specific forms of hegemonicleadership only if they accept the program that the hegemon proposes forthe society of states, and believe that the leading state has both the meansand the will to promote it. Thus, in order to become hegemonic, a state hasto promote an order that is universal in conception. Such an order is not onein which a single state directly exploits the others but one which most statesfind compatible with their interests.17 For this reason, some scholars arguethat great powers prefer an informal hierarchy so long as the hegemonprovides goods that are valued by the community at large and does notattempt to use its position to exploit the other powers. It is not hierarchythat states find problematic, international law scholar Lea Brilmayer (1994:115) argues, but subordination.

Under these conditions, the other great powers do not balance against theprospective hegemon because the hegemon’s authority is not derived fromits capabilities — which would be viewed as potentially threatening in thecontext of a balance of power system — but from its role within a group ofgreat powers. The hegemon is thereby judged by the degree to which it actswithin the boundaries established by its role.

Hegemony as a Social Role

Like great power management and the balance of power, hegemony is aninstitution that arises within an international society of states. As with allinstitutions, it consists of recognized roles, generally accepted practices anda set of procedural norms.18 Institutions generate ‘agents’ and endow themwith particular kinds of power and authority. The institutional rules definethe meanings and identities of the agents occupying the roles and stipulatethe pattern of appropriate conduct.19 Institutions thus differentiate amongactors according to the roles they are expected to perform. When we classifyan actor according to a specified role, we imply that in a variety of

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international contexts and situations, her actions and decisions will beconsistent with the rules subsumed under a general category of states.20

When actors assume a particular role, they not only develop an under-standing of their expected behavior, but also carry around a variety ofassumptions about how others within the institution will conduct themselvesin relation to them.21 Quite simply, within the context of an institution, weexpect actors to behave in a manner consistent with their identities. Forexample, within the institution of war we understand the roles of soldier,officer, civilian, prisoner, ally and neutral, and attach specific expectations tothe individuals occupying these roles. Moreover, we act toward them largelybased on these classifications. When an occupant of the role acts contrary tothe expected behavior it is recognized as a violation and we act accordingly.Thus, if a civilian engages in armed combat he or she will likely be classifiedas a terrorist and thus treated differently, even though his behavior may beidentical to that of a soldier.

Roles exist independently from the actors who occupy them; therefore theexpectations of behavior remain stable regardless of individual eccentricities.For example, we know what a parent is — and have expectations about howhe or she should act in relation to his or her children — even if we did notknow any specific parents. Two people can produce a child, but they cannotbe ‘parents’ outside the institution of the family. Similarly, over time politicalleaders have attached certain expectations to categories such as democraticstate, great power, Arab state and hegemon. These expectations changewhen the institution and roles change. For that reason, while the coreattributes that we ascribe to a hegemon will likely remain stable, the specificrole prescriptions for a hegemon may vary depending upon the type ofhegemonic system established by the specific group of states.

Actors tend to act within the perimeters set by their roles for bothsociological and rational reasons. That is, they are empowered to act in aprescribed manner when they internalize the attributes associated with theirrole, and their conformity with the role prescription enhances theiridentification with the particular role in the eyes of other actors. To theextent that actors value a particular role (and institution), they are morelikely to act according to the role prescription. A dominant state that acts asa leader rather than a dominator is more likely to be recognized andaccepted as a hegemon. At the same time, actors also know that if they actwithin the boundaries of a particular role, they could evoke specificresponses by others occupying other roles. Thus police officers that followaccepted procedure are more likely to elicit respect and cooperation fromtheir communities than are those who engage in brutality and corruption.

Roles tend to become defined as an institution is constructed or evolves.On one level they reflect the principles that constitute the institution. For

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example, the roles of the clergy in the Catholic, Protestant, Jewish andIslamic religions are products of their respective histories and underlyingdoctrines. While in each case the members of the clergy constitute a body of‘ministers’ in contradistinction to the laity, they also differ significantly in thetype of authority they may exercise within the institution.22 Similarly, therole of a hegemon in a liberal economic order is different than one that isbuilt upon the principles of mercantilism. Both are expected to act aseconomic leaders; however, the specific role prescriptions (and thereforetheir obligations and constraints) differ significantly.

On another level, the specific obligations and prerogatives that areattached to a particular hegemon are also defined as part of the processthrough which the institution is created. Often role prescriptions emergethrough common practice or custom, both of which reflect the initialconditions that led to the creation of the institution. Practices that areestablished during the early period of an institution’s development can setprecedents and create widespread expectations for future behavior. Onceestablished, however, institutional norms and roles can become ‘sticky’thereby generating and constraining future behavior.23 For example, thepractice of holding congresses to discuss issues of European importance inthe post-Napoleonic era grew from precedents that were established duringthe Congress of Vienna rather than from a formal agreement among thegreat powers. Over time the five European great powers expected each otherto bring all continental issues before the group; unilateral action was not alegitimate option even when one's vital interests were at stake.24

Similarly, within the context of international society, the institution ofhegemony generates specific norms of behavior. In a hegemonic system, thehegemon is recognized as a leader by virtue of its role in the institution. Thisrole carries with it a certain range of prerogatives and obligations that anactor who is accorded the identity of hegemon may carry out.25 While theother powers recognize that a hegemon will have greater influence insystemic matters than other states, they also expect it to provide collectivegoods and offer leadership in managing security and economic affairs even incases where involvement is not in its vital interest.

At the same time, the secondary states also expect a hegemon to observecertain limits on its behavior. Hedley Bull (1977: 228–9) argues that thereis a fundamental set of rules that limit the behavior of the great powers in thepursuit of their managerial function within international society. While hedoes not address the question of systemic hegemony per se, these limits canbe viewed as general boundaries for hegemons as well. Applied tohegemony, they include the following — that legal (sovereign) equality bemaintained (hegemonic roles must remain informal); that the hegemonfollow the rules and avoid unilateral acts that may violate them; that its

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freedom to maneuver be limited by its responsibilities; and that itaccommodate the secondary powers of major importance (in effect co-opting them as junior partners). Beyond this, hegemons are expected tofollow procedural limits and ‘decision rules’ when acting within their role asa hegemon. Thus, for example, the members of NATO expected the UnitedStates to consult with the alliance before taking military action even in caseswhere the member states were not involved.

Role Conflict and the Paradox of Hegemony

As the above discussion suggests, a hegemon’s authority is derived from itsrole in the international society of states, particularly the club of greatpowers. Accompanying this authority is increased obligation. While itseconomic and military strength provide a wider range of options forpursuing its foreign policies than that afforded to other states, it also facesgreater constraints. This tension between greater opportunities and greaterconstraints is the paradox of hegemony.

Underlying this tension is a conflict between the dominant state’s role asa great power and its role as a hegemon. Social actors often exhibit roleconflict when they hold multiple social identities and there are contraryexpectations attached to some positions in a social relationship. Suchexpectations could call for incompatible performances.26 Actors behavedifferently in various contexts depending on the way they define thesituation and their role within it. For example, when the United States actsas a mediator in a set of negotiations, it expects to absorb insults and threatsfrom the parties without retaliating. In a situation where the US is a party tothe negotiations, however, such behavior could cause the ambassador towalk out and possibly recommend severing diplomatic relations with theoffending party. Similarly, when US representatives sit on the UnitedNations Security Council they are acting within the context of a group ofgreat power security managers. The expectations attached to this role maydiffer from a situation in which they are acting as a NATO leader. As such,they may define such concepts as ‘security’, ‘credibility’, and ‘legitimacy’differently.

Anthony Giddens (1979: 118–19) describes this tension as ‘role strain’,which manifests itself in at least two points of tension — first, between theneeds and wants of the actors and the role-prescriptions that are associatedwith their various identities; and second, between the different role-prescriptions with which an individual is ascribed, adopts or is forced toassume. Both are relevant to understanding the paradox of hegemony.

In its role as a great power, a state’s primary responsibility is to use itsmilitary and economic resources to enhance the welfare of its own domestic

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constituents and institutions. Thus, in the absence of obligations owed tointernational institutions, the objectives of a state’s foreign policy isdetermined by the interests of its ruling coalition and political elites. Theseactors act as agents for the state and ‘trustees’ for their societies (or at leastthe dominant forces within their societies). There are thus two domesticforces exerting pressure on foreign policy officials — domestic politicalactors (including interest groups and, in a democracy, electoral coalitions)and the officials within state institutions.

Domestic actors are primarily interested in concrete economic andpolitical benefits that may be produced through the interaction with otherstates, for example gains from trade, cultural exchanges and protecting stateborders. Many may also support humanitarian or ideological goals, such asprotecting human rights or promoting self-determination. On the otherhand, in situations where public officials view the international environmentas being zero-sum and competitive, state elites may also be interested inmore abstract benefits, such as enhancing the state’s position in a global orregional balance of power, increasing its prestige and influence, and securingits relationships with allies. In such situations, they will define their interestsprimarily in parochial terms and their constituents will expect them topromote these interests with extreme prejudice.

The possession of superior economic and military resources enables agreat power to pursue these goals with a reasonable chance of success.Moreover, it can do so in many cases on its own without having to rely oneither the cooperation of or support from other states. Great power thusproduces great expectations. These sentiments are held both among societalactors (for example, voters and interest groups) and state elites (for example,parliamentary representatives, government officials and military leaders).Great power also tends to produce great confidence. Great powers win warsand dominate the global economy. Leaders of hegemonic states thus oftenbelieve that they can convert their resources into preferred outcomes andtherefore are more likely to pursue risky unilateral adventures.27

On the other hand, in its role as hegemon the state is constrained by itsresponsibilities and obligations to provide leadership for the system as awhole. Within the context of a hegemonic system, great power also meansgreat responsibility. As argued above, the hegemon’s position is derivedfrom its relationship with other states, primarily the other great powers. Ahegemonic system requires some degree of consensus and this usuallyinvolves creating multilateral institutions that reflect universal values and atleast the appearance of pluralism in decision-making.28 This helps to ensurethat the other powers will follow a general set of rules supported by thehegemon.

At the same time, this also limits the degree to which a hegemonic power

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can pursue parochial interests at the expense of the system that it helped tocreate. While a hegemon may in the abstract support such principles as freetrade and non-aggression, they also may find that in particular circumstancesthese principles are not consistent with their immediate preferences.However, having played a key role in constructing a universal set ofinstitutions and rules that would organize and stabilize international politics,the hegemon is expected to adhere to them even in circumstances that maynot be in its self-defined interests.

Multilateralism requires that participating states act according to gener-alized principles of conduct without regard to the particularistic interests ofthe parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in a particularoccurrence.29 This could at times force the state to act against the parochialinterest (for example, supporting free trade agreements when protectionistpolicies would clearly benefit key domestic constituencies) or in oppositionto what realists might consider to be the state interest (for example,promoting human rights when doing so may conflict with strategiccalculations).

When a hegemon fails to act within the boundaries established by its role,the credibility of the institutions and rules it helped to establish weakens.IOs act as the chief legitimizing agents of global politics.30 When theseorganizations are undermined, the legitimacy of the international order itselfis threatened. If this persists over time, the hegemonic order declines.Keohane’s (1984) theory of regimes after hegemony assumes that thehegemon continues to adhere to the norms and rules of the institutions evenwhen it no longer controls it. While he convincingly demonstrates how aregime, once established, can continue to operate without a preponderantstate to enforce the rules, he does not address what happens if that stateactively circumvents the rules by initiating unilateral action.

Resolving the Paradox

The preceding pages argue that there are competing forces operating at boththe domestic and global levels pulling the hegemon in different directions.This ‘role strain’ can explain why hegemons may pursue inconsistent policiesand why they may oscillate between unilateralism and multilateralism.Hegemons exhibit role strain whenever their leadership perceives a discrep-ancy between their positions or interests as a great power and that as ahegemon. There are several factors that could influence the degree to whicha hegemon would act as either a great power or a system leader.

First, in the absence of overwhelming domestic considerations, ahegemon is most likely to follow the rules and constraints of an institutionthat it highly values, particularly if it believes that the institution is vital to

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maintaining the hegemonic order. The more an actor is committed to aparticular set of relationships the more likely it will act according to its roleas systemic leader over that of a great power. A hegemon will thus act againstits parochial instincts if its leadership believes that a highly valued relation-ship is at stake. As a result, role salience (the relative importance of oneparticular role in relation to others in a particular situation) is a goodpredictor of hegemonic behavior.31

More specifically, in cases where the leadership of a hegemonic statedefines a particular situation as affecting the progress and welfare of thesystem, it is more likely to act within its role as a hegemon rather than agreat power. Under this condition, it is also more likely to follow multilateralnorms and procedures. For example, the United States may act against itsown domestic constituents in economic affairs in cases where the cohesive-ness of the Group of Seven/Eight is at issue. In this situation, it would beacting to enhance its role as an economic leader of advanced capitalist statesat the expense of domestic politics. Conversely, it is less likely to makedomestic sacrifices when it involves a less-valued relationship, for example, acommitment to Third World states.

Second, the stronger the position of the governing coalition, the greaterthe probability that the hegemon will adhere to the constraints of aninternational institution. This is because a government is more likely todefine a situation as having domestic as opposed to systemic consequenceswhen its political position is potentially threatened. It is safe to assume thatforeign policy elites tend to be more disposed toward meeting theirmultilateral commitments than are most domestic political actors. Thegreater the autonomy of these elites from domestic pressures, the more likelyit is that they will pursue multilateral policies.32

Third, in circumstances where the international or regional political oreconomic order is stable (and where it is populated primarily by status quopowers), the hegemon is more likely to pursue unilateral actions andparochial interests without fear of disrupting the system. The more stablethe order, the less likely that a hegemon will define any particular situationas being a threat to its well-being or cohesion. On the other hand, thegreater the potential for a hegemonic challenger or a counter-hegemoniccoalition to arise, the more likely it is that the hegemon will find it necessaryto act within its role as leader. To do otherwise would undermine its positionat a time when this could have dramatic consequences.

The next section will illustrate the preceding points by examining theongoing tensions that have long defined the US relationship with the UnitedNations. In particular, it will focus on the dilemmas faced by two post-ColdWar administrations in attempting to build a ‘new world order’ under

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American leadership through the world organization. It will do so byexamining US and UN policies toward Iraq from 1991 through 1999.

The US, the UN and the Paradox of Hegemony

Twice in this century the United States has sought to achieve a position ofglobal leadership, and both times — in 1945 and 1990 — its leaders viewedthe United Nations as one of its primary vehicles. Yet from the beginning,the relationship between the US and the world organization has beenambiguous; the US has alternately been both the UN’s most enthusiasticadvocate and its harshest critic.

On the one hand, the UN was largely the product of American thinking,American initiative and American influence.33 The first draft of the UNCharter written at Dumbarton Oaks was largely based on a US documententitled, ‘The Essential Points in the Charter of the International Organiza-tion’.34 A US diplomat led the founding conference at San Francisco in1945, the agenda was based on a US blueprint and the debate followed ascript developed by US political leaders.35 At its inception, American leadersviewed the institution both as the custodian for maintaining a favorablepost-war political order and as an important tool for exercising USleadership. Many in the State Department considered the organization to beat the heart of its program to institutionalize American leadership andpolitical values in the new post-war order.36

On the other hand, American presidents and foreign policy officials havealso frequently denounced the organization publicly, withdrawn from itsagencies, refused to pay its dues, and acted in defiance of the rules andprocedures that it had been so influential in developing. Its own delegatesreferred to the organization as a ‘dangerous place’ and a ‘sewer’.37

This ambiguity has long been a focus of study by political scientists andgovernment officials alike. For realists the tensions between the US and theUN are the inevitable outcome of a great power attempting to exerciseleadership through a multilateral security organization. Since conflictsamong the major powers are the natural state of affairs, internationalinstitutions cannot be mechanisms for building consensus. Rather, they areforums through which states act out power relationships.38 State interests,not global responsibilities or the common good, determine behavior, andtherefore the best one can expect from a global organization such as the UNis to highlight how and where state interests conflict.

For internationalists and institutionalists alike, the problems between theUS and the UN stemmed from the lack of congruence between the interestsof the Western democracies and those of the non-democracies in thedeveloping world and Eastern Europe. For example, Kupchan and Kupchan

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(1991) suggest that an effective collective security organization requires thedemocratization of the large majority of states in the system, particularlythe great powers. Ann-Marie Burley (1992) argues that these states mustalso be liberal if one is to expect the rule of law to replace the rule of politicsin security matters.

Yet even before the East–West and North–South conflicts paralyzedthe UN as an effective global organization, the US had trouble reconcilingits position as the dominant power with the responsibilities of globalleadership.

In its role as global leader, US officials saw in the UN an opportunity tobuild a consensus around a set of fundamental principles of order. Althoughthe US had the military and economic capabilities to dominate theinternational system, policy-makers believed that a liberal world order underAmerican leadership required both a system of multilateral security manage-ment among the great powers and global cooperation among the smallstates.39 As a treaty-based, universal-membership organization based onliberal principles of international organization and law, the UN wouldcommit most states to accept a set of norms that were consistent withAmerican values. By institutionalizing these norms within a legally bindingtreaty, the UN would help to maintain the status quo and legitimizeAmerica’s pre-eminent role in international affairs.

American leaders recognized that this type of multilateral order could onlyremain cohesive if all states had a stake in its progress. For this reason USrepresentatives at Dumbarton Oaks were the strongest advocates for equalrights for smaller nations within the UN structure.40 They believed that anorganization based on sovereign equality could help to forestall challengesto the system from within the periphery by enabling small states to voicetheir grievances in an open forum. The UN would therefore hinderrevolution by promoting global reform, particularly in the newly-emergingdeveloping world.41 Moreover, US officials understood that America'seffectiveness as a global leader would largely depend upon its acceptance andlegitimacy. This required a policy of inclusion and consultation rather thanexclusion and imposition by the great powers. As a result, the framersdeveloped procedures and decision rules within the General Assembly,specialized agencies and other UN bodies that would maximize democraticparticipation.42

Yet as the dominant power in world politics, the US was uncomfortablewith the unpredictability that a nominally democratic organization wouldintroduce. As the prime mover behind the procedures and decision rulesthat guided the world body, the US had pledged to respect the democraticprocess. Yet, as David Beetham points out, legitimate power is also limitedpower.43 The norm of sovereign equality provided small and weak states with

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unprecedented influence in international affairs. While this enhanced theorganization’s legitimacy, it also reduced the ability of the US to translate itsoverwhelming capabilities into diplomatic power.

Contrary to realist assumptions, the primary challenge to US authoritywithin the UN did not come from the other great powers but fromdeveloping countries. The US found itself outvoted on many issues thatwere important but largely symbolic. The UN did not affect the balance ofpower or the distribution of capabilities within the system, but it didundermine the American self-image as the dominant force in world politics.Here again the US could not reconcile its role as global leader with that ofpreponderant great power. After a brief period of dominance, the US foundthat it could not control the organization it had been so influential increating, particularly within the freewheeling General Assembly and thepolitically oriented Economic and Social Council. This led to a fiercedomestic backlash among American politicians and interest groups.44

The US faced a similar dilemma within the Security Council. In its role asglobal leader, American officials recognized that systemic stability requiredthat all great powers act collectively in security matters of global importance.The US would thus exercise its leadership through a small committee ofgreat powers, of which it would be the first among equals. This idea ofmultilateral security management dated back to Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘FourPolicemen’ proposal and to a lesser extent to the 19th-century Concert ofEurope.45 The concept of a concert-type system was particularly attractivefor the budding hegemon, since it would enable the US to share the burdensof leadership while preventing the rise of a revisionist challenger. Byrequiring consultation prior to action, the Security Council would alsodiscourage potentially destabilizing unilateral adventures by the other greatpowers and institutionalize a commitment to maintaining stability andorder.

For these reasons, the US delegates at Dumbarton Oaks insisted that theSecurity Council have considerable authority in implementing its collectivesecurity function. Toward this end, they promoted the creation of a jointmilitary force that would operate through the UN. American officialsrecognized that tensions would inevitably develop between their responsibil-ities as world leaders and the desire of domestic actors to avoid foreignentanglements. They therefore developed a mechanism that would committhe US to participate in security matters that were outside its area of vitalinterest.46

Contrary to realist assumptions, American delegates were the driving forcebehind the development of Article 43, a provision that calls for the majorpowers to make its armed forces, weapons and facilities available to theSecurity Council as needed. Despite some fear that this could lead to

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the development of a ‘UN army’, even Congress supported a strong UNenforcement capability for the organization.47 In this spirit, the US trustedthe UN with facilitating one of its primary post-war security goals — thecontrol of nuclear proliferation — through the development of the Inter-national Atomic Energy Commission.

As the premier great power, however, US policy-makers were uneasy withthe political restrictions that a concert-type system placed on their ownability to initiate unilateral action. Although the US possessed the capabil-ities to act on its own without the support of allies or partners, SecurityCouncil procedures required that the US submit its own disputes to thecollective body. America may have been the pre-eminent military power inthe world after the war, but in the Security Council it had to share itsauthority with the other great powers. Its ‘situated role’ required that itbroaden its definition of security beyond the protection of Americaninterests. Moreover, even the safeguards that were designed to prevent thegreat powers from dragging each other into unwanted adventures posedproblems for American policy-makers. US delegates had strongly supportedthe Security Council veto provisions at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco.Yet in practice US diplomats found that the veto enabled the other greatpowers to thwart American initiatives as well.

As a result, even before the onset of the Cold War, the UN provided bothopportunities and constraints for the US in its pursuit of global hegemony.Although US diplomats had largely established the structure and decision-making rules of the organization, these same rules and procedures alsolimited the ability of US policy-makers to use its overwhelming capabilitiesto pursue its self-defined interest. Over time, the US became increasinglyfrustrated at its inability to build a consensus within the organization aroundits vision of world order. For three decades it all but abandoned this road toleadership.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Third World rebellionagainst the West created new possibilities for the US to assert its leadershipwithin the UN. Yet while a general consensus began to develop around theprinciples of a new liberal international order, the tensions that defined therelationship between the US and UN remained. Contrary to the assump-tions of liberal internationalism, these tensions did not primarily stem fromconflicting interests, but rather from the dilemma of attempting to build aconsensus around American leadership while simultaneously assertingAmerican self-interest.

The US took the opportunity of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to reassertAmerican leadership by regaining its dominant role in the UN. Although thewithdrawal of Soviet involvement from the Middle East gave the US arelatively free hand to take action against Iraq unilaterally, the US

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determined that its pursuit of a post-Cold War hegemony was tied to itslegitimacy as a global leader. For that reason, President George Bushjustified the American response to the invasion in terms of the leading roleit would assume in building a ‘new world order’. While the definition of theterm was vague, its core principles were similar to those advocated byAmerican leaders during the founding of the UN a generation earlier —non-aggression, economic liberalism and self-determination.48

The American conception of a new world order was not based either oncollective security or on the US acting as a world police force. Rather, it wasto be based on multilateral security management under American leadership.The US would essentially act as a ‘sheriff ’ who would round up a ‘posse’ tooppose breaches of the peace on a case-by-case basis. This concept ofhegemony required the active involvement of the UN, since a sheriff lacksboth the authority and the resources to act without approval or participationfrom the broader community.49 All of this not only assumed a degree ofconsensus among the great powers but also among a substantial portion ofthe smaller countries. For this, the legitimation of the UN was crucial.

This approach to world order was developed at the beginning of thePersian Gulf crisis, and the procedures that guided the Security Council inprosecuting the war became established operational norms for futureactivities. Although the US had begun its military buildup in Saudi Arabiaprior to consulting with the Security Council, it took no other significantaction without first requesting and securing approval from that body. In thisspirit, American diplomats worked tirelessly not only to win support fromthe other great powers on the Security Council, but also to avoid even asingle negative vote from the non-permanent members. Secretary of StateBaker even went so far as to court Cuba for support. The US military mayhave conducted the war largely on its own initiatives, but the political anddiplomatic decisions were channeled through the concert of great powers.

Yet while the US clearly wished for the UN to play a major role in its newworld order, American behavior during the Gulf war – and in its subsequentdealings with Iraq over the following decade – illustrates many of thedilemmas discussed above. Throughout the war the US continually invokedinternational law and the UN Charter but its leadership was clearly impatientwith the restraints that this imposed on its conduct. They believed in theneed for multilateral action but at the same time often demonstrated a desireto act apart from the coalition.50 Specifically, the US was torn between itsdesire to maintain leadership over a broad coalition while at the same timeresisting coalition efforts to broker a political settlement.51

As argued above, practices that are established during the early period ofan institution’s development can set precedents that create widespreadexpectations for future behavior. The Gulf War had established a precedent

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that no military action could be undertaken (at least by the great powers)without authorization from the Security Council. These norms and decisionrules set limits on the degree to which the US could exercise its leadershipwithin the UN in the future.

The problem of ‘role strain’ became apparent in several subsequentconfrontations between the US/UN and Iraq. On five occasions between1993 and 1999, the US attempted to initiate air strikes against Iraq inretaliation for that country's defiance of Security Council resolutions. Ineach case the Council demanded that the US adhere to the procedures it hadestablished during the Gulf War. In one instance (1993), the Council gaveits support, once its support was tepid, and on three occasions there waswidespread opposition. Also in each case, US officials justified their attacksby evoking UN rules (they argued that Resolution 687, which called forIraq's disarmament, gave the US the authority to react to any violations ofthe cease-fire agreement).52 This indicates that the administration wished tocontinue to identify itself with the UN even as it attempted to pursueunilateral action.

The responses by American leaders to Iraq's defiance help to illustrate thedilemmas faced by a hegemon in attempting to maintain a multilateralpolitical order while also trying to promote what they consider to be thecountry's self-defined interest. In September of 1996, President Clintonreacted to the movement of Iraqi ground troops into the ‘no fly zone’ byordering targeted air strikes, over the objections of several members of theSecurity Council. Confident that the US leadership position was stronginternationally, the administration did not expect any serious repercussionsfrom the Council.53 This analysis was confirmed by the fact that despitecondemnation by most of the other great powers and Arab states, no onedirectly challenged America’s leadership.

However, a year later the US was forced to back off its plan to launch afull-scale air assault against Iraq, after the majority of the Council stronglyobjected. US policy-makers believed that this change in course was necessarybecause America’s international position had weakened within the UN,particularly among the other great powers. This weakness was evident by thechanged political dynamics that had developed within the Council. Sincethe end of the Gulf War in 1992, members of the Council had generallydeferred to American leadership in overseeing Iraq’s compliance with theUN’s cease-fire resolutions. Yet for the first time America’s traditional allies(including the non-permanent members of the Council) began to publiclyquestion whether the US was representing them in its relations withIraq.54

Also for the first time, another great power took its own initiative, a movethat had the backing of the majority of Council members. In the midst of

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the crisis, Russia launched a major diplomatic mission to Iraq over theobjections of the US. This challenged America’s leadership role, particularlyafter the mission was dubbed a success by the other great powers andAmerica’s Arab allies.55 At that point, the US was faced with the choice ofacting on its own in direct defiance of Council procedures or trying toregain its leadership role by agreeing to abide by a diplomatic solution it hadoriginally opposed. The decision by the Clinton administration to pursue theresponsible-leader route was made easier by its recent electoral victory,which strengthened its political position at home. The president couldtherefore afford to stand up to domestic pressure in favor of its internationalstature.

This pattern was repeated again in both February and November of 1998,as America's unilateralism jeopardized its authority and leadership within theUN. In both cases, diplomatic action by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annanforced the US to accept Iraqi ‘assurances’ and call off their planned militaryattacks. The actions of the Secretary-General had posed yet anotherchallenge to America’s leadership position within the UN. Despite extremelystrong domestic pressure from Congress, it became politically impossible forthe US to undermine the official representative of the Security Council afterhe had brokered an agreement.56 The symbolic power of the Secretary-General was so great that during the February crisis, the US had to recallaircraft that had already been launched.

This changed in late December after Iraq violated the agreement itconcluded with Annan. Unlike the previous month, the US (and Britain)launched their attack before Kofi Annan could attempt to negotiate asolution. France, Russia, China and most other states refused to support theaction. In fact in an unprecedented move, Russia and China formed atemporary alliance against the US to oppose the attacks, with China labelingthe US a ‘hegemonic menace’.57 Unlike previous actions, the US and Britainviolated the decision rules and procedural norms it had established duringthe Gulf War by launching the attack prior to consulting the other membersof the Council. While this did not prevent the attack from continuing, it didmark the effective end of the coalition against Iraq. The repercussions ofAmerica's shift toward unilateralism were further felt when Iraq refused toallow the weapons inspectors to return, effectively destroying the disarma-ment regime that had been such an important component of the post-warsettlement.

Conclusion

Hegemons bear a heavy burden. While most countries have to balance theirdomestic interests with their international obligations, hegemonic powers

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assume increased responsibilities that come with their role as systemicleaders. Hegemons have the material resources to promote their intereststhrough unilateral action, yet they cannot remain hegemons if they do so atthe expense of the system they are trying to lead. They build IOs in order toincrease the likelihood that other states will follow their preferred norms, yetthese same norms place limits on their own behavior. They have the greateststake in the progress of the organizations they create, yet on a daily basisthey need these organizations the least. They have the most influence inensuring the success of these institutions, yet they also have the greatestpotential for undermining them. They can most easily violate organizationalrules and procedures with impunity, yet their violations have the greatestnegative impact on the stability of the hegemonic order that they work sohard to maintain. This is the paradox of hegemony.

This paradox arises most visibly within international organizations. IOshelp to facilitate the development of hegemonic institutions and theexpansion of hegemonic world orders. As such, the United States investedconsiderable political and financial resources in promoting the developmentof the UN. As a result, the institution has largely reflected the Americanprinciples of procedural democracy, great power responsibility and decen-tralized authority. In the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War,America’s political leadership considered the UN to be an important vehiclethrough which to pursue global hegemony. Yet the US has had troublereconciling its propensity to pursue an independent course in internationalaffairs with the requirements of systemic leadership. It was most likely tofollow the rules and procedures of the organization when it perceived thatits leadership was being challenged, for example during the Gulf crises inFebruary and November of 1998.

This suggests several theoretical points about the institution of hegemonyin International Relations. First, the limits and prerogatives of a hegemonare as much a function of the particular political and social environment asthey are of material capabilities. The norm of sovereign equality compelledthe US to consider the views and interests of the smaller countries within theUN, a concern that would not have existed prior to 1945. Unlike previouseras, the US could not pursue hegemonic leadership without attempting tobring previously insignificant states into the general consensus. The GeneralAssembly has long been a headache for American officials, but an organiza-tion that failed to operate on nominally democratic principles would nothave legitimacy in the 20th century. For these reasons, during the Gulf WarAmerican leaders found it necessary to garner the support of states thatwould play no role in the effort to evict Iraq from Kuwait.

Second, the conflicting expectations attached to international leadershipand domestic self-interest can help explain why hegemons often oscillate

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between unilateralism and multilateralism and why hegemons often actinconsistently and erratically. While both realist and internationalist theoriescan explain the tensions that existed between the UN and the US during theCold War era, they do not adequately account for these tensions during theperiods when the US was dominant and unchallenged. The rise of ahegemonic challenger (the Soviet Union) and hostile majority (developingstates) prevented the US from dominating the organization from the early1950s through the late 1980s. Yet even when US authority was generallyacknowledged during the organization’s early years and in the aftermath ofthe Cold War, American officials continued to alternately support andundermine the organization that was supposed to enhance its leadership inthe world.

Third, by conceptualizing the conflicting pressures placed on hegemons asa form of role strain, we can better understand the perceptions and choicesof their decision-makers. The preceding pages suggest that role conflict isinherent within the institution of hegemony. This raises the question of howone can identify when a particular hegemon is facing a conflict in roles andwhich types of behaviors would fall within one or the other. Role strainoccurs whenever there are conflicting expectations attached to one’s variousrole positions. In cases where the decision rules and/or norms of amultilateral institution do not conflict with the hegemon's definition of itsstate interests, the question of role strain does not arise. Thus, when the USand the other great powers defined Iraq's defiance of UN resolutions in1993 in much the same way, the norms of consultation and consensusactually strengthened America's position.

At the same time, in cases where a hegemon is forced to choose betweenfollowing the rules and procedures of a multilateral organization andpursuing an independent path that is more conducive to its domesticinterests, role conflict arises. In these instances, the degree to which thehegemon follows the rules, even when it is not in its parochial interest to doso, determines whether it is acting as a systemic leader or great power. Thisis because a systemic leader cannot act as a representative of the broadercommunity if it acts in defiance of the rules of the community. Thus, in 1996the US had to choose between acting on behalf of the Security Council byforging a consensus, or asserting its power by moving ahead with its plannedattack on Iraq. In its role as hegemonic leader, the cohesion of the SecurityCouncil was the paramount issue, while in its role as dominant power, theprincipal consideration was American credibility and control over actions inthe Gulf.

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Notes

1. This condition is suggested in Gilpin (1981: 32–3).2. For a sample of this literature, see Calleo (1987), Kennedy (1987: 514–35), Nye

(1990) and Strange (1987).3. Sciolino (1998: A6).4. Singer (1997: A1).5. Gilpin (1981).6. Cox (1981b: 172).7. For a discussion of how hegemons socialize the leaders of secondary states, see

Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990).8. Gilpin (1981: 94).9. Specifically, theoretical debates tend to revolve around what kinds of capabilities

are required to maintain hegemony, in what relative quantities and how muchweight military versus economic resources should be assigned in relation to eachother. See Rapkin (1990: 5).

10. See, inter alia, Kindleberger (1986), Krasner (1976) and Gilpin (1975).11. Susan Strange (1994: 24) argues that hegemonic rule is achieved through the

application of ‘structural power’, which she defines as the power to shape anddetermine the institutions of the global political economy. This is similar toKrasner’s (1985) concept of ‘meta-power’. Both are consistent with Bachrachand Baratz’s (1963) ‘second face of power’, which they define as ‘the ability toset the agenda and structure situations in world politics’.

12. See, inter alia, Wolfers (1962: Ch. 8), Morganthau (1973: part 4), Waltz (1979:123–8), Posen (1984). For critiques of balance of power theory, see Claude(1962: Chs 2–3), and Haas (1953).

13. Layne (1993: 252–3).14. Doyle (1986: 30) defines an empire as effective control of a subordinate society

by an imperial one.15. This definition of legitimacy is drawn from Lipset (1960: 77).16. On the role of legitimacy in International Relations, see Hurd (1999).17. Cox (1981b: 169).18. On institutions in international affairs, see Young (1989: 12–13) and Keohane

(1988).19. Meyer et al. (1987: 12).20. See Holsti (1987: 5). Most of the work applying role theory to the study of

International Relations has been conducted within the context of foreign policydecision-making. In this sense, this article is not within the research programdeveloped by Holsti and his associates. Rather, I am using role theory to helpexplain systemic pressures placed on state leaders.

21. Rosenau (1987: 51).22. A Catholic priest, for example, has the power to ‘absolve’ a person of his or her

sins, while a Jewish rabbi can only offer counsel.23. For a discussion of the ‘stickiness’ of international institutions, see Krasner

(1988).

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24. See Cronin (1999: Ch. 3).25. For this concept of roles, see Giddens (1979: 117).26. Stryker (1980: 73).27. Gilpin (1981: Ch. 2) argues that states make cost/benefit calculations in the

determination of foreign policy, in particular in deciding on whether to initiaterisky actions. To the extent that leaders of great powers believe that theircapabilities reduce the risks of adventures, they are more likely to act.

28. Cox (1981a).29. Ruggie (1993: 571).30. Claude (1966).31. I draw here from Stryker’s (1980: 61) concept of identity salience.32. See Putnam (1988: 449).33. The origins of the organization can be traced to the recommendations that

emerged out of the (US) Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relationsin 1940. The purpose of the Committee — which was established by USSecretary of State Cordell Hull at the behest of President Roosevelt — was tosurvey the ‘basic principles’ that should ‘underlie a desirable world order’ afterthe war. See Hilderbrand (1990: 8).

34. See Luard (1982: 25).35. See Hoopes and Brinkley (1997: 185).36. See Campbell (1973: 4). See also Gregg (1993: 8–9).37. See, for example, Moynihan (1978) and Kirkpatrick (1984).38. Mearsheimer (1995: 339).39. See inter alia Krauthammer (1985: 152), Ruggie (1996: 18–27), and Karns and

Mingst (1990: 6 and 291).40. Hoopes and Brinkley (1997: 148–56).41. Gregg (1993: 13).42. See Franck (1996: Ch. 2).43. Beetham (1991: 35).44. See, for example, Krauthammer (1987).45. See Kimball (1991: 95–7).46. Hilderbrand (1990: 142).47. Hilderbrand (1990: 64–5).48. See Bush (1990).49. For a good discussion of the ‘sheriff ’ concept, see Haass (1997).50. See Tucker and Hendrickson (1992: 194).51. President Bush considered such a diplomatic resolution of the conflict to be a

‘nightmare scenario’. See Bennett (1991: 27).52. See, for example, Lynch (1998: A2).53. Kennedy (1996: 5).54. See St Louis Post-Dispatch (1997: A12).55. St Louis Post-Dispatch (1997: A12).56. Black (1998).57. Kynge and Thornhill (1998).

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