The Pacific Problem, 1924

8/3/2019 The Pacific Problem, 1924

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I,I, (l:ffUThe Paorric problem.

lB. p o l i ~ of the United Statee and ,in facti of a l l the white c o u n t r i ~ s havingtheir ebores washed by the waters of the Pacific Ocean,is to keep their soil ,the ir ins ti tu tions and their manner of living free from the ownerehip,the dominio)and the customs of the Orientals "ho people the other shores of this the grens t

all oceans.Eventually in their search for eXistence the white and yellow races will

be brought into armed conflict to determine which sha ll p reva il .7thy has this not occured before i t may be asked. For two very good r e a s ~

One)the yellows 'conquered everything worth having in the world and then deWmtawar and physical str ife were the means of gaining the goal of l i fe whi

. ~ J W "in their philosophy ia the pursuit of pesce and h a p p t n e s ~ e o t h e r ~ i a that thenations of the western world had become 80 expert in the Brt of war and iwn ttP

t

making of gun powder that they not only no longer feared the invasions ofthe li!Pngolian hordes but ~ s h e d their COICmerce under the guns of their menof war to the sates of Pekin and ths Bay of Xedo' in f a c ~ as far as thecontinents of ~ o p e and Asia are concerned )their people have reached a stateof more or less geographic equilibrium as to centers of populat ion.Thsi r r d r u R people however are increasing in number constantly, th eir s oil is supporting. CfIJ'"as many as i t ~ c o n v e n i e n t l y look after)so a l l that remains is the finding ofa new outlet and haven for their ever increosing millions.

Westward from the old corllinenp of Europejandeaetward from the s t i l l older continent of Asia)lie the new and undevelopedvaetneeeee of the new world. Fortunately for us the; were seized and takenpoe.e ion of by the whites in spits of the fact that they undoubted1 were

I .dleooYered end visited by the yellows many centuries before.In those daystbe ~ . p o r t a t i o n problems were so diff icult that a crossing of the Pacific


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2meant months of sailing on uncharted eeae with the crudeet navigat ing i n e t ~umente and compaeees that were juat being und-retood.Now the croBsing of t.acific is nothing,it is no more than a ferry b ~ t w w e e n two poin,s across tre

water.It is not miles that count in t ransportat ion i t is the time requiredto negoti ate the distanceTJ1e Pacific is no rider today than _ s the Atl_antic at the time of our civil war , i t is becoming increasingly narrowerand the day is not far off when,neither months,weeks NOr days will be usedin computing the tr ip but hours and minutes alone

TJ1e asiat ics know thisfull well and already had not restrictive measures been adopted by the whitea,Australia and Oanada,the United Statee and Mexico w o u l ~ have been the haven

of millions of the Mongolian race,capablejstrong and viri le people broughtup in the atmosphere of intense economic competition and perfectly ableto defeat economicslly,possess and eventually absorb any othet races cro singtheir pnth'

TJ1e pressure of these eas twrn people has become more pronounced andaccentuated 88 they have aga in taken to recreating their _r making power'The oj apanese organized into one of tl:B great world powers are dl!laanding anequal voice,an equal position and an equal right to live and labor where theyd ~ 8 i r e ) b e 8 i d e and under the same conditions with the whites. They haveste ped firmly on to the continent of Asia where their powere of organizationmay easily lead to a recreation of the greatest military machine the world

) ... < \ ' ~ever saw,the ies of Ghenghis lhan and Tarlemane.,...

So we are face. with aproblem much greater than i t appears on the sur face ,the t o f aintaining notoD17 the poli t ical eupremacy but also the veryf existence of the white race.Uld lurope with i t . feuds)it . wars and even wors. i ts commercial piracyjis_ t 1 r . q uaab1e and 1Dcapabl. of oarrying on any grent effort outeide of1 v ..........."1 ur Bbould th q be,Did they not stop the ongol1an invasion


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-}tJ 'U ~ at the walle of Vienna and hu e they Itat,.. SO populated their own valleys)step eeend lande 1'0 that i t would scarsely pay for anyone else to intrudeT

Thereforei t is quite evident that the struggle must be taken up by the white inhabitants of the new world/and of this new world by the inhabitan ts of North Americaprimarily' The northern continent ie gifted by nature to a greater extent thanany other por tion of the earths surface. I t is rich in coal and iron while avery ~ r e a t percentage of i ~ superficial area is poten tia lly r ic h in a g r i ~ulture,grazing lands and a ll necessary woods and metals.

The southern continent not onlyis much smaller than i ts neighbor to the north bu t is proportiona1ay verypoor in coa) i ron/and agricultural spaces)while much is covered with mount-aine and vaet wooded eW8.JlPB.Today the population of the whole of south Amer-ica is barely one half that of the United Wtates alons.The north Americancontinent can without doubt support no less than 800,OCO,OOO people.

The rumblings of this coming str ife have censedto be inaudible whiepere;but are the loud protests of the Japanese people)the vanguard of Aeiatics,over the exclusion laws, the land laws and theirunequal treatment a t the hande of our citizens.

Sooner or later... the diplo-matic meane of handling these queeticns will fai l and a physical means of im-preesing our will on the hos tile s ta te will be the 'only recourse In otherwordelar.

Three th ings a re necessary to the e u c c ~ s f u l t ~ r m i n a t i o n of awar. ' i ret the deetruction of the boetile armed forces .second th estructlono tAe hoetUe power to make war end third the deetruction of the moraleo tAe holt i le population eo that the war will not be renewed at an early

:toe.


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lone of these measures are possible of accomplishment by a passive defensivealone. The offensive must bs assumed and maintained until a successfUl con-clusion of the war is obtained.If this is not done and the wer of ini t iat iveand offense is handed to the e n e m y , ~ e f e a t wil l cer ta in ly be the result .

Before the European War of 1914-18 military power was reckoned i n ~ t e r m sIof land power and sea power'The theatre of operations or that part of the earths

surface to which the hostile I-nd or sea forces were capable of engaging ini 'combat was restricted to an ocean or a part of i t ,on the land Lo s singleI n I

frontier or one or more contiguous frontiefl.The field of operations or theareas in which these land ot sea forces caoe into hostile contact, consisted

of only 500r a 100 miles d is ta nc e. ~ i t h th e advent of air power a ll of ~ things changed.As the air covers the sea and land in equal measure there isno restrict ion on the application of air power as to location. I ts solel imitation is i ts radius of action.Aircraft have been b uilt th at are capableof g o ~ n g fsrther with one csrgo of fUel than any other carrier ever devised.No part of the sea or land is now ~ f 0 their operations.Thereforeour former ideas of the apPl icat ion of m i l i t e ~ y power need en;ire revision.~ h o u l d two f i r s t class military powers of the present day come ihto armedconflict , the world will be the theatre of operations,while the actual fieldof operations will extend to all parts of the country that is forced to takethe defensive/and that has lost the power of ini t iat ive. Today i t is necessaryto gain the ascendency f i r s t with air power before a d cision can be obLainedover an en8lllY'

The old conception ot eea power was that i ts mission was to -'eepthe sea areas clear o f tle enem,y so as to allow uninterrupted freedom of mov!m;')ntto our own lea cratt- fad., air power controls a ll locomotion on t e surfaceot ths water not covered by the submabine boat and as the submaribe is soIlow of l o c o m o t i o n ~ blind .a to view even while on LOp of the w a t e ~ and sor.at.rloteel 1a olUia1D& radlua 1 t w11l BOon pall into the category of an


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)auxiliary of air power' Communication by commercial vessels on anu across theseven seas no longer d pends upon a powerful battleship f lee t but upon the tiny

S ; airplane,the search over the surface of the earth on the part of the greatnations at present is not for naval bases i t is for air bases.

The developement of airpower has been and is so rapid that i t has paeeed a ll other analogous develI - }opements,that is the develop,ment of either land 0 : sea power. The reasontor this is that i t util izes an entirely new medium for 10COl40tion the air ./It uses a ll the engines of d e s t ~ ~ c t i o n which have been developed for use onthe ground and i addition i t has a msans of applying these agencies of des-t ~ ~ c t i o n from the most a d v a n t ~ g e o u s position,a place over and above i t sintended victim.Nothing can combat a ir power except other air power.Armiesor navies alone have no appreciable effect on i t .


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6NorthR e ~ d i n g the)Pacific Ocean as a whole we may consider i t as a huge isosolesof the basetrillllgie with i t I B vertex on Behring strai ts , one end)on ths Panama Canal andthe other end in the ~ i l l i p i n e s or the coast of Asia directly opposite them.The sides of theis great triangle are approximatsly 7'00 miles in lengUl)while the bese measures about 11000 miles or about one half the distance aroundthe earth at that latitude. ~ l o n g the Eastern side ofthis Triangle weof)find the URi ted States eith er in possessionlor completely dominatingjthe wholeex)ent of tsrritor,y.


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the mainland but had the power of initiative against the1In t1mes past have been)not on11~ from attack trom

able to dominate in sea powe r the1 rendered themselves

continent.The strategical developement of Japan in this respect has not beenunlike the progress of Great Britain.Hence wethe 'complete dominance of all these pdlh-

find the policy of Japan to be/fDr o ~ ' 1Asiatic islands,as a meansfor her own military protection but a lso for fu rth er ing her interests

on the continent of Asia.Unlike the United States however the ~ a p a n e s e Islandsdirectlyare under the strategical menace of air power applied)from the continent of Asia,,4gain we fin the strategical similitar , of Japan with t he Bri ti sl J ISlea) in

~ r ' ' ' ' ' ' -that England f inds the con tinen ta l air power to be the grea.est menace tot

her existenc e. Japan therefore will develope her air power to the utmost.In so far as the application of her air power is concerned Japan has theline P o r ~ s a - A a m s t a k a e x c l u s i v e , a v a i l a b l ~ or a distance of about 4 o Q ~ ~ l e s .This' complete11 dominates that part of A s i ~ rI>Wo #~ r a c t i c a l 1 1 eveTfWhere on the continent of Asia prOper we find a populationmore or less hostile to the Japanese. So,as far as the twosides of thetriangle are concerned we find in the east a homogeneous strategical entit1complete in i tself and menaced only from across the pacific )While in thewest we find wi i ~ f l U l a r empire occupying a base a l i t t le more than one half

51 iI,a.of the len;th of the triangle and menaced strategically both from the Pacificand the continent of Asia.


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8 findSurvey,ing the base of the triangle or the line Panama-Manila we)firet anexpanse .01' " " ~ O miles of ' ocean to the Kingman ree, owned by the Unitedstates)but)from there on,a practically continuoue series of i slande withinshort dis tances of each other, clear to the coast of Asi4,these islands areeither in the possession of or entirely dominated by Great Britain.The onlyland encountered between Panama and the Kingman reef is 61ipperton Islandabout 5900 miles west of Panama and claimed both by France and the Republicof Mexico.CThe U.s. should acquire this at once)Roughly,then)England throughher foothold on these islands/combined with her air and sea power, should beable to control about one half of the base of the tr iangls.This in turnjoined up to her base Singapore-New Zealand covers all the rest of the Pacifis

I "'""J \,t . o . . , ~Ocean.ProceBding north from the Kingman rsef,which laeiaseta y for ourpurposes (1.s ths middls of the squatorial Pacific,we encounter the Hawaiianmore than of open seaIslands over an expanse of a l i t t le .6. a thousand miles/CIt was this routethat ths early Polynesian naVigators followed in their voyages from thesouth seas to the Hawaiian Archipelago)Frolll the mainland of North America theHawaiian Islands are barely more than 2000 miles.In themselves they are veryI......-s 117'1. Ihighly developed and c a p a b ~ e of any sort of mil it ary ~ t . P r o c e e d i n gin turn north from Hawaii a distance of about 2'00 miles we encounter theAlaskan Peninsula/a part of the continent of North America.One tbousand miles a-.tnor th brings us to the Behring S t r a i t s . s s p ~ a t i n g North America from Asia,only'2 miles wide/with two islands ,one owned by Russia and the othsr by taeUnited States/standing between.These islands are 6 miles apart so that theterritory of the Unijed Sta tes actua lly touches that of Russia/and thegreatest distance aoross water from America to Asia is only 21 miles.(Beforethe oompletion ot the Atlantio telegraphic cable by Cyrus P'iel4l in 1868, the"estern Union telegraph company had actually surveyed a l ine from theUD1ted Stat to lurope b.1 wa1 of Behring Straits and had cut t rai ls wellup into the IlOrtb oOUllt!'J.'fh. B u c ~ e s s t u l operation of the cable stopped thework)


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from. the continent.Attu i s about equidistant from both

to f ind) easy to b o m b s ~ from the air /and very concentrated,which makes itdiff icul t t o d is tr ibu te the a ir units over sufficient area to minimize a ir

9So find tha t beginning with a distance of over'!OOO miles between Panamaand Asia come to a gap of only ,0 mUss between the United States andAsia.ln add it ion to th is i m p o ~ t a n t mili tary geographical fact)the position

~ O the Aleutbn Islands i s very significant . These stretch westward from thecontinent untU a t Attu af ter having covered ,/4 of the d is ta hc e to Asia

from Asia~ w find United States soi l only 600 miles away/or about ths same distance

'000 milee,and about 600 miles further to Pugetpossessionabout 1 ~ O miles from. Attu. This Island

may be considered as t he northern end of the Japanese baseiErom h"re on thei ielands l ie in unbroken eequence to Formosa.An ieland offers many advantages

for an a ir s ta t ion . l t is easy to dllfend on the ground/easy to organizeaeroneutically and easy to operate from.l t t disadvantage is that it is easy

bombardment attack.Any advance along th e nor thern l ine by ei ther Japan or the United Statesagainst the other) can neither be flanked 1101' taken in reverse. An advanceby the northern l ine on the par t of Japan would completely turn thep os it io n o f the Hawaiian Islands for instance. On the other hand an advanceon the par t of the United States against Japan by the northern line)would com-pletely turn the position of the Bonin Islands. In both cases t ~ l i n e ofcommunications .ould be shortened about twenty five per cent.,Turning to the south snd pro.eeding . e s t from Honolulu,the f i r s t land tha tIwe encounter is yalte Island a d1stance of j:?OO miles.This i s owned by theUnited ' t a t e ," l1111e. 80uth o f Waite Island the northern 1sle.nds of theMarshall group are encountered. theBe belong to Japan or a t l eas t oJ apan hasthe lIlII1dat,ol7 oyer th - .The . e are a l i t t l e cloeer to Honolulu than 1s


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10K1cronieeian Archipelago)hundrede of l i t t le islands,all in the poseession ofJapan except the ieland Of Guam.Roughly Guam l ies half way between Wake) )Island and Kan il . t he d is tance from i t to both being about 1600 miles.It is, Isurrounded by the Japanese Islands of the Marianna group.lpmost d ir ec tly tothe north of GU8111 and at a dietance of about 1000 miles l ie the Bonin

1!hoseIBIEnds,connected to Guam by a Btring of Ielands w i 4 ~ - ~ e greatest gap ~ i R ~i s 400 miles or four hours flight for thr ordinary bombardDlent airplane.Outaide of Japan i tself/the Bonin island ie Japans etrongeet pOBition foreither offense or detenee along the southern line Iwhether by a ir or by water.

011 a rediuB 01'From it} " f about 1500 miles 16nY force advancing west trom theUnited statee along the Honolulu-Kanila line may be attacked in flanffrom Wake Island to the P h i l l i p i n ~ s , a distance of over '000 miles.In caee ofdeteat the United States forces would have to fal l back on their magazinesof ManUa or Honolulu,both to a flank,or be deetroy'ed wheras the Japanesewould have their whole base to retid to in case of necessi ty .The distancefrom GuBlll to Yokohama ie about t800 miles or about 600 miles less than thedietance froc Manila to YokohOllla,furthermore i t is connected by a tringe ofislands whose gretaest distance apart i8 400 milee.Prom a strategic standpoint Guam i s of the greatest importance.

1600 miles west 01' Guam/we reach the Phillipines}our own PDssessiOD)very rich)not only agriculturally ~ t h e r w i s ~ but alsothe very beet POint from which to pueh trade into t he con tinen t of Asiawith i t ' s 8 o ~ 0 0 0 9 0 0 people.A 2000 mile radius from Manilla will cut orencloee the great marte of eaetem Asia.This ie the actual value of thePhillipinee and 18 no) only a treaendous alYantage to the United States buta180 to all white peopl.,becauBe i f the Phillipines became a possession ofJaPllll tne poB1tiOl1 ot Great Britain in the East would be greatly threatenedi t not t1n1med end Great Britain 18 the only other White power oapableo t ~ . l c a l l l ....rt1Jtc 11. 1 in the far k s t i t 18 to their intereBt that


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11the United States remain in possession of these islands. This is particularlyso since the defeat of the United States ship subsidy bil l which ElllgIllJldi.. .t.e ~ t w : L O ~ i.Att. i / U . . r - - ~ C . .tI ' ! e4 . " lI.ra to defeat. j - - - 0

Therefore a survey of the Northern Pacific Ocean_ould not be comnlete without taking into account the relation of Great Britainto our problem in that quarter. As has been mentioned b e f o r ~ British possessions flank our southern line of advancefrom Honolulu westward.With conditions asthey exist a t present ~ with German sea power extinguished En&lan.d can release

.J t 3 ~ I i : l ~ ....t&ha g reat par t of her sea power for use in the Pacifil.tier own i .dMuh are conn-ected by an unbroken line of magazines up to and including the Malay P e n i n s u l a ~With Singap9re at i t ' s extremity. This position situated about 1500 milessouth east of' Manila dominates the whole western Pacific and the IndianOceanos only from a standpoint of sea power but even more f'roo a standpointof' air power. A combination between Japan and Great Britain against theUnited States would entirely preclude the use of' the .outhern line of advance

~ c . . . . W.4by any sea force. alone of' the United States.An ~ ~ ~ e under those circumBt~ - ances could be made only by air power.Formerly the Anglo-Japanese alliancemade a combination between t h ~ s e powers possible; since the signing of thetreaties growing out of' the conference for the l imitat ion of armamants)the Anglo-"apanese alliance has come to ani end, so that a t the present timeshould h o e t ~ l i t i e s seem imminent between the United States and Japan,Englandwould observe a s tr ic t neutrality because in a way the United States would be" )waging a campaign to protect the British possessions in the Pacific,much asJapan fought Englands war for her against the Russians in 1904-,.It would not

jbe in keeping with Englands traditional policy to actively aid anyonejunlessher own possessions were direotly menaced.ThisjJapanJat the t i m ~ would becaretul to BYoid.The Singapore base therefore puts Great Britain in the position)f i r s t of protecting hersel t in t he Pac if ic and Indian Elceans and at the samet iae ot ten a coqust.tlllh inYitation to the United S tates to come around andYb i t M l i t t le in the far last.


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.1hUe th18 apparently proferred Brit-18h ass18tance 18 allu.ring in the e x t r e m ~particularly to our navy)which not only is reaching out for any root to g r a ~to keep from sliding over the precipice of the eouthern lineJbut also because ournavy is greatly influenced by British opinion or expressed opinion.,

Consequently the United States mustbe s ~ of i t l s negotiations with great Britain in anything a f f e c t i ~ p o ~ s i b l emilitary operations against Japan. Should we be led to adopt the southern

route as a line of operations with the expectation of British a s s ~ t a n c e,~ g a i n s t Japan/any sea power experiments along that line would sndin ut ter failure without their assistance.Forof sea power across the Pacific except as the

that matter any advance X{b;,auxiliary of air power is r a practical impossibility.

Having taken thia hasty survey of ou.r strategicalposition in the Pacific le t us turn a moment to a consideration of what isnecessa r/ to establish a military depot or magaZine sometimes erroneously) )called a base.

An 9J'm;f may occupy a position and i f given a few days to preparei t for defense,it is capable of developing i t to almost as great an extent~ b as i t would i f i t had been there for a protracted spac'A1f i ts communicationshosti leare squarely bshind i t and particularly i f . 4 k ~ ground forces have to

captw-e of the Danish f leet with hie cavalry when theysuch examples as Cervera at Santiago,Makaroff at Port

,.-__- - - - - . r ~ " " " " " 6 ii cross the water i t has l i t t l e to fear Sea forcesjbattleships etc. ,can do k...,....no hera,on the other hand i f an army catches a fleet in a harbor i t may des- r troy i t . There being,Arthur or lapileoDswere frozen t ight in the ioe.


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JO " . r ~ t l>- 4t.rn- "A naYJ must f i rs t seek out a harbor with a depth of water of forty feet at"ow'tide,othetwise a wounded bat tlesh ip wil l be unable to enter i t,8f td if i tv.. ,J'l ' . . .u-i-ttLaeppo! he . ~ e i o at all times)when i t is needed the most will be just the

CQu" . r t I,... s . . . . ~time t ' a t i t ' s use will be required.With., the complexity of modern navalarmaments has como e corresponding augmentation of shore establishments.Thedock yards take years to build,ths technical repair and supply facil i t iesrequire not only vast sums of moneY7but infinite pains and a great deal oftime.This is rapidty becoming s' ntricate a proceeding)that fleets are bedl;lngless and less lbnobl1e;are chained to their depots a n ~ ~ t h ~ change of

~ I u . . r , . . . . ,r l' t'th eatre of operations)require a new arrangement of ~ .Any app ~ c a ~ o nof sea power at a distance of over a couple of ~ h o u s a n d miles from i t ' s baserequires years of preparation and not only millions but bil l ions of dol la rseXpenditure. As naval preparations increase in size and extent,just so much

do they become better targets for a ir attack,and as the uti l i ty of thegreat surface battleship is rapidly drawing to a close,most of the effortexpended in ~ u r f a c e naval armaments 18 largely a waste of energy.An air force on th e other hand can establish i tse lf with the greatestease.An unoccupied field,a stretch of ocean beach,even the crater of avolcano may be occupied and operated from with a minimum of preparationwhen compared to the installation of a naval depot or the emplacementof art i l lery of pos ition.Air forces are e as ily landed from seacraft.The' st.Bombardment troup landed on and operated from Hatteras Island duringthe past Summer with l i t t l e preparation.All their supplies including2000 pound bombe,treators,gasoline and tuel were landed in ,1/a feet ofwater.In Iovember a pursuit plane was landed in an open roadstsad onsurf boats frca the lighthouse tender Itukui and set up and made ready forf ligh t in a oouple of hours by two mechanics.Aircraft may be carried asdeok loads Oil .ubllarin",a modem submarine may carry 6, landed in their01111 wararproo1' oa... md set up in a short time.The csses can then beuae4 .. boat. aad l lgbt . rs to r the debarcation of o ther supp lies .


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14I t operating oYers... a w el l o rg an iz ed air force can be ready to s t r i k ewithin 6 hours o f i ts a rri v a l a t i t ts debarcation point. In th e ap p l i cat i nof a i r power cert ai n principlee muet be clearly held i n mind.To begin w i an y operation i n ta e air requires t h a t the advantages d rived from i tmust be fought fo r. j u s t as a corresponding operation on land worth whilerequires armed contact because i f i t i e worth while th e enemy wi l l attemptbs t o p i t . To ineure the ' pe r a t i on of a i r c r a f t t he re fo re t he p u r s u i t aviationmust be concsntated a t the decisive p o i n t at the inception o f th e operation.To be e f fe c ti v e a v ia ti on ha s to a c t i n coacentrated compact bodies becausei f i t does n ot i t can be defeated i n d s t a i l no matter what the s i ze o fthe opposing force may be. For t h i s reason ae much as many othere an a irforce cannot operate with success from fl o at i n g or se a c r a f t airdromesagainst an air force f ir m ly e s ta b li sh e d on land airdromes.There i snothing whatever to fBsr from so cal l ed naval a ir pl an e c a rr i er s ,b e au s een ot only can they n ot operate e ffe c i s n t l y on th e high seas b u t even i f th eycould they cannot p lace suuf f i c i e nt a i r c r a f t i n th e air a t one time t oinsure a concentrated o p eratio n . Consequently a h o s t i l e a ir force w i l lseize l an d a ir dr om es from which to launch i t t . a tt ac ks a ga in st i t ' ~ n t e n d e dvictims. I n s ele ct in g i t !s primary objective due consideration w i l l begiveb to th e hoe t i l e a i rp o we r. i t ' s airdromes, shops, supply points andcommunicating systems


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15Withe this brief survey of the condi tions 'n the Petifie, let us passto a consideration of the defense of the Hawaiian Islands in part1c-ular.ln our disoussion we ahall assume that Japan is t he adversary andthat no matter ..ether the pos it ion of the Hawaiian Islands is usedas an offensive point on the line of operations along the southernroute against Japan,whether i t 1s used as a flank position in anoffensive operation by the United States along the ~ o r t h e r n lineor whether i t is merely held to prevent the islands falling into thehands of the enemy irrespective of their strategical import from astrictly military standpoint,the princ ip les of defense of the groupof islands in particular will remain much the same.

The Inhabited islands of the Hawaiiangroup stretch from north west to south east for a distance of '50 milesor three and a half hours flight by air)lane.(We shall assume 100 milesper hour as the ave.age speed of locomotion of an air forse.Roughlythen 1000 miles means 10 hours flight etc .) ! l l of them are very suitablefor the installation and operation of air forces. The climate is espec-ially propitious.There are no fogs,comparativsly l i t t le rain,steadywinds,prectiaally no storms,a wind of 50 or 60 miles per hour is consi-dered a very severe storm,the nights particularly are clear and espee-ially favorable to the opera tion of aircraft. The question of navigationover and between th e iUands is very easy not only by the system ofplotting the course and compass steering but also by the use of directional radio.'rom the northern island of Niihau a chain of smallislands aJId reefs stretch out for 1100 miles to Midway lsland,acable station,which alao i4 suffioiently large and suitable for theeetabl1shm8l1't of airdromes.ln addit ion the submarine cable runs from1114ft7 to eJu. thence north through the Bonin Islands to Japan.Fromtap,no. in the possion of Japan, ," miles south weet of Guam,a cable


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16rW\s to Shanghai Ohina and connects with the cables al along the .J apanesebasefrom Formosa north. The posaesoion of Midway Island and Guam therefcr elfould give ~ i n t e r r u p t e d cable commW\ication from Midway to Japan andthe whole Japanese bese by -ytime would sever communication

of both Guam and Yapj and' at the semet.. 'I"-over our cables from Honolulu lfesX.While1

the importance of cables may be somewhat cortailed due to the develop-ement of the radio telegrapl,they are s t i l l a much surer and more secretmeans of communication.Several of the small islands and reefs betweenMidway and Niihau Island are not only suitable for the installatio nof observation posts and radio stations but also for landing fields andemergency airdromes.The distance of Midway Island from Yokohoma and themJapanese base is eome 2JOO miles or a couple of hW\dred miles moredistant than Honolulu is from San Franchco.The difference in t ime beingt . 8 days by seacraft from YOkohamaAagainst 1 days from Francisco toHonolulu.The distance from Midway to the Aleutian Islands of Alaska isabout 1'00 miles or 4 days by seacraft," hours by air .

Assuming a state of war to be impendingand with the mission of the Ia_i ian Department to be the holding ofthe Island of Oahu for four months before the arrival of supportingtroops, le t us estimate what th e ac tion of Japan will b e . ~Japan 'knows that she owes her exi st snce to her milUtary power, she knowsthat without the applicstion o f the la test developments in the ar tof war she cannot hope to preva il aga inst a great power like the UnitedStates any more than she did against Russia/had she, Japan s t i l l usedthe organization and methods of her t radit ional military policy andsystem.She knows full well that the United States will probably enter

..the next n.r with the methode and weapons of the former war, and willtherefore orrer the enticing morsel which all nations that have followedthie . . ,et . . haTe done tefore.Japan aleo knows full well that the defen8eot the 8&.11 . p'CIUP h bued on ths defenee of the Island of Oahu


17/27

17alone and not on the defense of the whole glloup.The leland of Oahu with

lL\.nd Ii ts militsry depot s both naval a n d . m ! l i ~ & ~ , i t s airdromes,water supplies)the oity of Honolulu withit 's wharves and su ply points forms an easyoompaot and convenient objeot for a ir attack.The whole area of theisland is only about 600 s ~ u a r e miles,of this about one hal f is verymountainous,while the rest is taken up in great part by agrioulturaldevelop,ments.The area having an important military bearing consieteof about 100 square miles or about the seme military area for a ir defeneeae the ci ty of New York.

In eelecting the weapons to be used against a l o c a t i l - o ~of th6s kind an a ir foroe has the ohoice of toxio gaeee,explosive bombsf varoius sizes &Ad Ce g o l i l . ) f h o i p h o r ~ u s and incendiary bombs of

controlled and directedweapons consiet of thearious categories .The means for applying these

aereal torpedo which +bs t anc e is an airplaneby gyrascopes and radio,this can be applied anywhere within the cruisingcapab il it ie s o f the a irplane.Next the gliding bomb which is a device e n a b l i ~ 1an airplane to launch thisprojecti le a t a distance of some miles fromi t s target without passing over d t and last the drop bomb which requiresthat the aircraft employing them pass over the target .

There is no adequate defenseagainst air attaok except anI. air force. Thie can be eupplemented byauxil iaries on the ground such as cannon/machine guns) and balloon b a r r n g e ~but without a ir power these arrangements act only to give a fa lse sen.eof security very much what th e .Qs tr ic h must feel when he hides hishead in the sand.Our a ir force in the European war los t Ieee than onet ~ t h of ane per cent from around ant iai rcraft lefenses of a l l kinds.

partiaular17 U not a tt ached to theoi

Purtbermore)Wben dealred/ground defenses can be neutralized e a s i l y ~a ir force) a n d ~ t t e m p t i n g to actI ~ " ' "


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18I believe theretae that should Japan decide upon the reduction and seizureat the Hawaiian Islands the following procedure would be adopted.Ten submarines would be loaded with 6 pursuit airplanes and spares eanh,t he ai rp lane c ra te s being made in two segments so that each one couldbe used as a barge when emptied of i t ' s cargo.These crates would becarried as deck loads) the boats would dive only for concealment.Two airplane transports would be provided each loaded with 50 bombard-ment p l a n e s . ~ . T h e s e spi,s could be equipped with a flying otf decklaid down in sections while the transports we in use.These seacraft would be started so as to arrive at the islands ofNiihau and Midway respectively on D day.

The eubmarines with the ~ r s u i t equipment aboard would land atNiihau on the evening of D d a as there are only 148 people on theisland,no radio station or other means of communication except by waterI )probably the f i rs t information of this forve, received a t Honolulu) wouldbe the appearance of the hostile aircraf t .There a . ~ _ " u ~,splendid seaglling ~ to 60 foot f ishing b o a t ~ which would be of greatassistance to any force seiZing the island of NIIHAU.

The pursuit ships could be set up and made re dy for servicedurine the night and be ready for duty the next morning.(20 submarinescould car ry twice as many pursuit ships as the tsn mentioned above).The force d e s t i n e ~ for Midway island could debark i ts bombardment

equipnent trom the traneports,prepare the airdrome in the sand withlanding mats end the necessary auxiliaries to the aircraft .AIl the islandsbetween KidWBy end Kiihau would be occupied with observation posts andradio set

The tlying time from Midway to NIIhau is eleven hours.Byequipping the bombers with aUXilia ry gas tanks in their bomb compartmentsa oruietag abil i ty ot about 16 fours can easily be given them.As soonu N t up UI4 teeted these ships would fly to NIIhau and be ready to


19/27

'9attack Oahu Immediately afterwards.While these operations are tak ing place the Island of Guao

would be seized(Under these conditions the Phillipines would fal l oftheir own weight w1jhin a year or two)

The distance from Nllhau to Honolulu is about"0 miles or an hout and one half flight or a total of three hours there, - I )and back,allowing 40 minutes for an ,ttack and an additional 20 minutesfor eventualities would require a maximum of 4 hours for one attackmission.CThB present U.S. pursuit airplane with auxiliary gae tank has4 1/2 houre fUel,the bomber hae about 6.)

The lst.Attack would be arranged as followe.,~ H 6 { -Japanese pursuit/60 ships,organized into\} equadroas of 20 shipe each2 equadrons to par ti cipa te in combined attack with bo bardment,remain in reserve on the alert.(The Japanese pursuit is comparativelyweak due to the fact that the U.S.has only 2 emaIl squadrone of 9 ehipseach at Honolulu)Japanese bombardment,100 ships ,organized into one group of 4 squadronsof 25 ships each.The objectives for attack a r ( ')Ford Island airdromehangere,storehouees and ammunition dumpet(2)Navy fuel oil tankBj'(})water) )eup ly of H o n o l u l ~ 4 ) w a t e r supply of Schofield barracks(5)SchofieldBarracks airdrome and troop eetablishments(6)Naval submarine station7)city and wharves of Honolulu.

Weapons to be used,Mustard gas on water supplies,Phosgene gas on airdromes,canto - ents and navy :rards.High explosive on airdromes,naval fuel tanks and

oity of Ronolulu'Ths. use of high explosiveagainst the city of Honolulu to be Combined with

DOtloe to . . . .ouate the city within four hours when i t will b.


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20All bombs to be three hundred pounders.Assl.ll!ling that there are 7'Jf. ofthe bombardment ships ready for duty the Japanese bombardment wil l beable to carry 75 tons per attack and will be able to deliver } attackswithin the twenty four hours.No attention will be paid to the navaldjy dock because this can be used only for the d ~ c k i n g and rep air o fvessels. I t is much easier to sink these vesse ls than to take the timeto des troy the concrete work of the dry dock.If an attack should bed,cided upon i t would be made when a veessel was in the dry dock.Thefuel contained in the unprotected oil tanks offers an easy targetand i t !s destruction will stop the use of the submarines.

For attack bombardment ehips will be loaded with , high explosive,2Illustard and 2 phosgene bombs each.

Attack will be launched as follows.Bombardment . . . . . . . . .,( I ) Attack to be made on Ford Island at 71:)0 A.M.route to be direct .Group to move in column of squadroBs to vicinityof targets then to attack in column of fligh ts in V.Each ship will drop following projectiles on targets named.

Ford Island 1 H.E.1 Phosgene Total 22,tons high explosive,22tons ofphosgene gas.(One }gO pound bomb hit t ing on or inthe vicivity of hangarswill wreck several of them i f not protected by earth traverses,i t willset one or more oil tanks on f i re , i t will detonate an ordinary ammunitiondupp pr destroy or sink any unarmored vessel.6 tons of phosgene gaeper square mile will kil l every person in i t not well protected.)Navy yard each 1 H.E.,1 phosgene.Honolulu 1 H.E.bomb per f l ight total 12 bombs }60o lbs.Yater 8I1pply of Honolulu Each ship 1 mustard gas bomb to ta l 22 tons.Yater aupply ~ o h o t 1 . l d !arracks Each ship 1 mustard gas bomb total


21/27

At conclusion of attackJbomb .rdment will return d ire ct to Niihau and p r e p a ~to make similar attack at 200 P.M.( No attention is paid to the art i l leryof pos it ion because i t t - greatest effect is against hostile surfaceseacraft.

Japanese pursuit aViation will meet bombardment over Ford Island.It will pproceed by squadron,one at '500 f t alti tude approaching Ford Ielandfrom Kaena Point(West),one at 5000 f t alti tude from the east and downthe suns rays.whould hostile pursuit fai l to appear or be destroyedairdromes will be attacked with machine guns.The squ dron on the aler tand observationwill be held to d fend the airdromes on NIIHAU.Lietening/poets will extendas far as the coast of Oahu on submarines and sampans. Rallying pointBarbers Point.fo r pursuit .slalwa.Pursuit will be sure that bombardment has completedi t ' s mission before leaVing the Island of Oahu. Upon th e retu rn toNiihau the pursuit will hold i t se l f ready to deliver an attack at 200 P.M.

I have gone .into an attack by an enemy in some detailto show how very easily i t can be done by a determined and resoursefulenemf.If i t is considered that a hostile force can land on the-eland of Oahu think how very easy it is to land on the island ofNUhau,how easy i t i s to make it an op.rating point for aircraft andhow easy i t is to prepare i t for defense against water or land attack.Aotually nothing can stop i t except air power.I have put in the landing onMidway to show that i t can be done,that instant communication withJapan assured and that any advance of water traneports can be made forthel100 mUes between Midway and Niihau under air power protection.,!b1ak what an a ir attack using high explosive and gae projectiles such.. I baYe outllnM would mean and think thnt i t can be repeated at leastthree tim e. p er d&7.Onoe a permanent footing has been obtained on anyof the 1.1aDd. Oahu oan be reduced by aeronautical siege and no amount


22/27

22of sea power or land power will get i t off because air power will sinkor destroy the surface ships as fast as they come along,even couldaircraf't carriere or transports reach the vicinity of the islands theywill have to establish themselves permanently on land in o r d ~ r to operateeffectively. I have taken as an example a very ronall number of uapaneseaircraft and a landing at only one point,the easiest for them and thehardest 'or us.As a matter of fact the Island offering the best aie-drome facil i t ies and one which is very easy to defend is the I slandof Lanai. but one of the inhabit ed islands is almost as good a s another.in this respect.Of course i f Japan were all ied with Englamd and thela t ter operated from her base at Singapore along her islands to FanningIsland and then north in a manner analagous to the japanese attack outlinedabove,Oahu would be attacked from two sides.

Well i t may be said , this sounds well but what will our a ir forcebe doing in the mean timet

As things stand now i t would be almost useless.There are only two l i t t le squadrons of p u r s u ~ t aviation with a total of2 Thomas Korse planss,these have no machine guns/so,obViouely,thej couldoffer l i t t le resistence to hosti le pursuit .The personnel with two orthree exceptions has had very l i t t le training in pursuit work,no pursuittarget practice and no batt le exercises, these two small units have beens e p ~ t e d and one has been grouped with an observation squadron.They willsoon be placed together however. They have no reserves of pilots men or,material to ta l l back on, and even i f at war strength and properly equipped)these l i t t l e 2' planes would be put out of buisness in one encounter.A l i t t l e dab of pursuit such as this is is even worse than i f none at)a l l were hereJbecause i t gives an impression to those unfamiliar withanat ion that SOlIe offensive power can be exerted by these few planesand or.... l t WDuld be even more effecive to station a cou;le of caompa-111 of iDt..\17 her. with DO art i l lery or auxil iaries to support them


23/27

,

2'becauee they could utilize the nat iona l guard and improVise to some extentunite tor-ad from the civil population.There is very l i t t le use inmaintin1ng any aviation here unless two pursuit groups of one hundredshipe with their complete personell in men and equipment are maintsined h e There are two bombardment squadrons with a total of 15 bombardment ships.1P1ese are the Martin bombers obsolescent in a way but s t i l l a veryJ )effective ship oarticularly at low altitudes.This equipment is in prettyFgood ehape,axcept thst the ehips have no bomb hoists and no bomb racksfor the 1100 or 2000 pound bombs.This bombardment force aleo ishaplessly unable to ward off a n decided attack. the 15 shipd would maintainonly the equivalent of one flight in commissionJor about 8 ships, sufficientonly fo r b ring ing a determined attack home against one battleship.Experience has shown that one flight per battleship is necessary forcompletely destroying and sinking i t . (When i t is realized that more than1000 bombardment planes can be made for the cost of one battleship andthat 2000 Ib bombs cost only 800 dollars in production the outlay is)pretty small)There should be a minimum of one bombardment group of100 ships to bring any effective resistence into play against an e n ~ I Y .As there is practically no pursuit aviation h e r ~ a t present/ i t isimpossible to expect effective use of bombardment.The observation aquadron relatively is better equipped to fulf i l l i t sfunct ions than are the air force units. It is organized on the peace timebaeis and had 1} shipe in commission more or lesG e q u i ~ p e d . T h e r e were6 radio Bete with talitFilonee.Telephone transmission of signals has beenthe rule with the ar t i l lery. This will not work in war.The squadron hasa tJlree told IIbsion to perform ~ n for the Department headquarters,Jone to r the lDtantry di.ieion at Schofield and a third for the fixedJdefen along the ooaet near Honolulu.None of the ships are eqUippedto take photograph. except one, al l shipe should be in observation

)__r - l l&. f t I . ._....._ ~ 1 l 8 t . - a t . i . en..ti.o oL-this, _


24/27

24squadron in existence and under the conditions of divided control i twould render very l i t t l e service.

There is no command organized for the a ir serviceAt department headquarters there is an a ir officer with an assistant.Hehas no function of command and acts merely in an advisory capacity tothe commanding general.The sta tio ns of the a ir forces are s eparate anddietinct and handled very much in the way that aviation schools were inthe United It . tes. In other word. the air force is not handled as anana.

There are no plans for the employment of the air service in case ofwar, there ie no plan of reconoissancell,no plan of bombardment no plane foilthe operation of the various bran.ches,or what they will do in the p r e p a r a ~ stagee,during the batle or in the exploitation.There is no system ofairways to the various Islands,no meterological system,no laieon systemand no connection with the anti-aircraft art i l lery and search l ights ,there is no eysfem of air observation and listening posts.In other wordsthere ie no real organization of the a ir forcee for war in the HawaiianDepartment.


25/27

2'he military forces in the Hawaiian Iolands are known as the Department ofHawaii.This nllllle leads in a way to a wrong conception of what theyactua lly are .The commsnd is esentially a tactical one and really isa j P ~ f o r the defense of a fortreee. The original plan of defensecontemplated holding a emaIl parcel of land in the vicinity of honolulu and Pearl tiarbor in much the sllllle way that Port Arthur was organ-ized for defense by the Russians, th is of couree was seen to be impossiblefrom a military standpoint,the mission therefore was changed to cover

"he whole ~ s l a n d of Oahu,which is thw case at present. 2ith the comingof air power th.. system of defense again needs revisien,the missionof the ground forcss ehould remain tne.samerthat is the prevent ion of any 1landing on the Island of Oahu by a hostile fore e and the police andhandling of the civil population. For the air Force however, the mission

Wmust be to prevent landings on any islands,!estroy any force eitherin the air on the water or under the water within the radius of theiroperation. While the air forces now on duty in the -epartment are,entirely inedaquate to the task in hand s t i l l a cadre of organizationcan be adopted,a commander of the air force and statf instal led,effecientplans f or war drawnup and written down,the pursuit aviation organizedand trained to pursue,the bombardment organized and trained to bomb,and the observation organized and trained to observe and also to assumethe tactical offensive when observation is of secondary importance. Allsupply arrangements should be brought directly under command of theAir 'orce Commander as should be all arrangements for the d ' fenss againstaircraft.Hie duties should Be those now prescribed for the commander ofthe a ir force of an armJ(as a matter of fact the militsry force in Hawaiipartakes of t he cha ract er of what we designated an army in the European .

!he offen.i atY foroe shou ld be brought together under onetaotloal oa.aaDd aDd stationed as close to eaoh other phys ical ly as. . . . . .leah.le_ 4 . . . . . . . . . .4 .. . __ ....'"'_ .... __ .&..1 __ .. I


26/27

21 26section should be sta tioned together,an entirely seperate and indepen-dmt laison system for the ail! force should be installed,a trackingboard for hostile aircraft should be maintained a t air force headquartersand all antiaircraft organizations, l istening posts and sea ~ l i g h t organizaconnected with i t .All islands should be connected to this point .by radioand these should be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the army'Thepresent system of naval control of radio for these islands is entirelyunsatisfactory and will result in great harm during war.)All l ighthouse organizations,keepers and tsnders should be incorporated in thedefense against aircraf t observation and laison net.This personnel isvery effecient and is now distributed on practically a ll the islands.Alll ight houses should be connec ted by telephone with the radio net.A systemof airways to a ll the islands should be installed,with aias to navigation

"".Mn'viAs to training,a definite system of command abd operations should beput i ~ t o effect and p r a c t i c e d ~ the headquarters of the air forcecommander.Without a system of that kind pract ical ly no result can beobtained from the air force. The commander of the air forve should handlehis organizations in person in the air wh,enev;r the whole fo ve i t J , ~ ~~ C I! -.. ~ - \ o - ' :(.,gaged and frequently with each b r a n c h . ~ ~ &-.. .... tY.,., .. k :1"


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21s t i l l targets to represent hostile balloon barrages and ground targetsshould be practiced.!.b & 5 ~ l course in radio of a ll k i n d s / ~ the use o f l

instruments and particularly bomb sights.

The observation aviation should concentrate on radio and signaling,and be trained in the tact ics of attack aviation.

All aviation should be given 8 very s t i f f course in map reading sketc-hing and navigation.This work here hae been of the moet rudimentarynature.Without proper methods of navigation position cannot be maintainedto and from objects out of sight of land in storms or clouds

The Pacific Problem, 1924

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Transcript of The Pacific Problem, 1924