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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
Author(s): Baki TezcanSource: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2009), pp.460-504Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25651182 .
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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(it)
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*
Journal
of
the
Economic
and
WiPw
BRILL
ocial
History
of
the
Orient
52
(2009)
460-504
brill.nl/jesh
The
Ottoman
Monetary
Crisis of
1585
Revisited
Baki
Tezcan*
Abstract
In
1585-8,
the
Ottoman
silver
currency,
the
akge,
was
officially
devalued
by
100%
against
theVenetian
gold
ducat
and
foreign
silver
currencies,
and
its
silver
content
was
reduced
by
44%.
Some
scholars
have
interpreted
this devaluation
and debasement
as
a
consequence
of
the silver
influx
from
the
Americas,
whereas
others have referred
to
the
difficulties
that
the
Ottoman
state
had
to
face
in
financing
its
war
effort
against
the Safavids
in
Persia.
This
study
suggests
that the
unification of
a
number
of distinct
regional
monetary
zones
in
an
interregional
imperial
economy
by
the second
half of the sixteenth
century
must
be
regarded
as
an
important
factor
that
contributed
to
the
monetary
crisis of
1585.
En
1585-88,I'akge,
la
monnaie
d'argent
ottomane,
fut
devaluee
officiellement de
100%
par
rapport
au
ducat
d'or
venitien
et
les monnaies
d'argent
etrangeres,
et
le
pourcentage
d'ar
gent
en
fut reduit de 44%.
Certains
chercheurs
interpretent
cette
devaluation
et
cette
depreciation
comme etant
la
consequence
de
l'influx
d'argent
venant
des
Ameriques,
tan
disque
d'autres
attribuent
les
problemes
de
l'etat
ottoman
au
financement
des
guerres
contre
les
Safavides d'Iran.
Cette contribution
suggere
que
l'unification
d'un
bon
nombre
de
zones
monetaires
regionales
qui
differaient
entre
elles
en une
seule
economie
imperiale
interregionale
dans
la
seconde
moitie
du
XVT
siecle
doit
etre
regardee
comme
un
facteur
important ayant contribue a la crise monetaire de 1585.
Keywords
Ottoman
Empire,
devaluation,
debasement,
economic
integration,
monetarization
One of
the
enigmas
of
early
modern
Ottoman
history
has
been
the
debase
ment
of the
main
Ottoman
silver
currency,
the
akge,
around
1585.
Almost
425 years
after
the
event
neither
the
exact
date
of the
debasement
nor
the
dynamics
that
brought
it
about
can
be
established
with
any
precision.
Although
most
scholars
acknowledge
the
existence
of
a
relationship
*)
Baki
Tezcan,
Assistant Professor
of
History,
and
Religious
Studies,
Department
of
History,
and
Religious
Studies
Program,
University
of
California,
Davis,
USA,
btezcan@
ucdavis.edu.
?
Koninklijke
Brill
NV, Leiden,
2009
DOI:
10.1163/156852009X458223
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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The
Ottoman
Monetary
Crisis
of1585
Revisited
AG
between
the influx of
Spanish
silver
from
the
Americas
into
theOttoman
Empire
and
the
debasement,
the
reason
why
an
abundance
of
silver should
bring
about such a debasement of the silver currency is not
quite
clear.
According
to
Bernard
Lewis,
[t]he
Ottoman
rulers,
accustomed
to
crises
of
shortage,
were
quite
unable
to
understand
or
meet
a
crisis
resulting
from
an excess
of
silver,
and
thus took
the
same measures
that
they
would
have
taken
if
they
faced
a
shortage,
hence
the
debasement.1
Halil Inalcik
asserts
that
the
devaluation
and debasement
were
a
conse
quence
of
the
flood
ofAmerican
silver.
The
relationship
he
creates
between
the
two events
is
based
on
the
theory
of
a
general
price
increase
caused
by
the influx ofAmerican silver followed
by
a devaluation and debasement
which
was
inspired
by
Earl
Hamilton's
work.2
Using multiple
sets
of
data,
Omer
Lutfi
Barkan demonstrates
that the
Ottoman
economy
experienced
a
general
price
increase
which
was
very
similar
to
the
changes
in
the
Euro
pean
economy.
According
to
Barkan,
the
rise
in
prices
and
the
devaluation
of the akce
were
parallel developments
that
were
brought
about
by
inter
national
movements
in
precious
metals,
changes
in
trade
patterns,
the
tremendous
expenditures
of the
Ottoman
government
for
various
wars
undertaken
at
the
time,
and
a
great
population
increase
which
took
place
in
most
of
Europe,
as
well
as
in
the
remainder
of
the
Mediterranean
world,
during
the
sixteenth
century. 3
?evket
Pamuk
has
recently
revised Barkan's
price
indices
and
found
an
error
in
his
calculations
for
the
years
1555
and
1573,
the
only
years
in
the
sixteenth
century
prior
to
the
devaluation
for
which
Barkan
had
price
data.
After
Pamuk's
correction,
the
price
increases
between
1489
and
1573
expressed
in
grams
of silver
were
reduced
to
31%
from
60%.
After
this
1)
Bernard
Lewis,
Some
Reflections
on
the Decline of
the
Ottoman
Empire.
Studia
Islamica
9
(1958):
119-20.
2)
Halil
Inalcik,
Notes
on
a
Study
of
the
Turkish
Economy
during
the
Establishment
and
Rise of
the
Ottoman
Empire.
Tr.
Douglas
Howard
[revised
translation of
Osmanh
Impa
ratorlugunun
kurulus
ve
inkisafi
devrinde
Turkiye'nin
iktisadi
vaziyeti
iizerinde
bir
tetkik
munasebetiyle.
elleten
15
(1951): 629-90].
In
The
Middle
East
and
the alkans
under he
Ottoman
Empire:
Essays
on
Economy
and
Society,
Halil
Inalcik
(Bloomington:
Indiana Uni
versity
Turkish
Studies,
1993):
241,
243-4;
Earl
J.
Hamilton,
American Treasure
and
Andalusian
Prices,
1503-1660:
A
Study
in
the
Spanish
Price
Revolution.
Journal
of
Economic
and
Business
History
1
(1928):
1-35
3)
Omer L.
Barkan,
The
Price
Revolution
of
the
Sixteenth
Century:
A
Turning
Point
in
the
Economic
History
of the
Near East.
Tr.
Justin
McCarthy
[abridged
translation with
revisions
of
XVI.
asnn
ikinci
yansinda Turkiye'de fiyat
hareketleri.
Belleten
34
(1970):
557-607].
International
ournal
f
iddle
East
Studies
G
(1975):
13.
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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462
B.
Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
correction,
the debasement
and devaluation
appear
to
have
preceded
the
rise
in
prices,
rather
than
followed
them.4
Actually,
prices
of
barley,
rye,
and wheat taken from inheritance records inEdirne by Barkan in another
study
also
indicate
that,
despite
some
fluctuations
in-between,
the
prices
of
1543
and
1582
are
almost
identical,
which
suggests
that
the
sharp
infla
tion
actually
started
in
the
mid
1580s,
in
other words around
the
time
of
the devaluation.5
These
findings
support
Niels
Steensgaard
s
argument
that
the
increase
in
prices
should have
started
after the devaluation
and
not
before.
Both
Steensgaard
and
Pamuk
suggest
that the
debasement
of the
currency
has
to
be
explained
in terms of the
scarcity
of funds available to the treasury.
More
specifically,
Pamuk
states
that
[w]ith
the
outbreak
of another
war
with
Iran
in
1578,
the
treasury
began
to
experience
shortages
of silver
for
payments
to
the
soldiers. 6
It
is
definitely
true
that the
long
wars
of
the late
sixteenth
century
created
a
burden
on
theOttoman
treasury.
The
extent
of
this
burden,
however,
seems
to
be
somewhat
exaggerated.
According
to
the balance
sheet
of the
imperial
treasury
for
the
fiscal
year
1582-3,
four
years
after the
outbreak
of
the
Ottoman-Safavid
war,
Ottoman
finances
actually
seemed to be
doing
well.
Despite
the fact thatMurad III
appropriated
all of
the
revenues
coming
from
Egypt,
which
was
more
than
520,000
gold
ducats,
or
31,200,000
akces,
for
his
personal
treasury,
the central
treasury
had
a
surplus
of
2,071,212
akces.7
This
surplus
was
4)
?evket
Pamuk,
A
Monetary
History
of
the Ottoman
Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge
Uni
versity
Press,
2000):
122;
compare
Barkan,
Fiyat
Hareketleri :
569.
See
also
?evket
Pamuk,
The
Price
Revolution
in
the
Ottoman
Empire
Reconsidered.
International
Journal
of
Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 69-89; ?evket Pamuk,
Prices
in
the
Ottoman
Empire,
1469-1914.
nternational
ournal
f
iddle
East
Studies
>G
2004):
451-68;
?evket
amuk,
Istanbul
ve
Diger
Kentlerde
500
Yilhk
Fiyatlar
ve
Ucretler,
1469-1998
(Ankara:
Devlet
Ista
tistik
Enstitusu,
2000).
5)
Omer
L.
Barkan,
Edirne
Askeri
Kassami'na
ait
tereke
defterleri
(1545-1659).
Belgeler
3.5-6
(1966):
87,
155,
447.
6)
Niels
Steensgaard,
The Asian Trade
Revolution
of
the
Seventeenth
Century:
The
East
India
Companies
and
the
Decline
of
the
Caravan
Trade
(Chicago:
The
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1974):
79; Pamuk,
A
Monetary
History of
the ttoman
Empire:
125, 132,
137.
7)
The
deficit
of
12,830,005
akces
noted
by
Baki
(Jakir,
Geleneksel
donem
(Tanzimat
oncesi)
Osmanh
biitce
gelirleri.
In
Osmank
Maliyesi:
Kurumlar
ve
Butgeler,
eds
M. Gene
and
E.
Ozvar.
2
vols.
(Istanbul:
Osmanh
Bankasi
Arsiv
ve
Arastirma
Merkezi,
2006):
vol.
1:
171,
is
misleading.
First,
there
is
a
calculation
error,
the
deficit
according
to
(fakir's
numbers
should
have
been
8,841,285
akces.
Second,
(Jakir
did
not
include
the
treasury's
profit
of
4,912,497
akces
from
tefdviit,
an
income
item
that
is
constituted
by
the difference
of
exchange
rates
in
receiving
and
expending
funds
in
currencies other
than
the
akce. While
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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The
Ottoman
Monetary
Crisis
of1585
Revisited
463
achieved
at
a
time
when
a
total
of
38,207
soldiers,
including
auxiliary
troops
and
cadets,
received
regular
salaries?9,000
more
than
in
1574.
Moreover, 10,000,000 akces were sent to
Ozdemiroglu
Osman Pasha in
Shirvan
for the
payment
of his
troops,
numbering
at
least
another
4,000.8
Thus
as
late
as
1583,
in
the
midst of
the
Safavid
wars,
while the
number of
people
who
received
salaries from the
treasury
had
increased
by
almost
50%
in
the
previous
ten
years,
the Ottoman
central
treasury
was
able
to
deal
with the
situation,
despite
the
fact
that
more
than
11
%
of
the
reve
nues,
which
totaled
279,649,967 akces,
were
transferred
to
the
personal
treasury
of the
sultan and
were
thus
not
available
to
cover
expenditures.
It is therefore
justified
to ask
why
theOttoman
government
devalued
the akce
by
100% and debased
its
silver
content
by
44%
almost
immedi
ately
afterwards,
if the
financial
picture
was
this
rosy.
Following
the lead of
Halil
Sahillioglu,91
argue
that
theOttoman
government
responded
to
the
dictate of
market
forces,
which
had
already
practically
debased the
akce
as
a
result
of the
unification of the
Ottoman
currency
zones.
As will
be
shown,
the treasury counted most
gold
ducats for 59 akces when it received them as income, for
instance,
it
valued
them
at
60
akces when
it
spent
them;
on
this
practice
and
its
later
evolu
tion,
see
Baki
Tezcan,
Tefavut.
Osmanh
Ara?ttrmalan
I
Journal
of
Ottoman
Studies
24
(2004):
333-44.
The
6,000,000
akce
credit
the
treasury
received from
the sultan
is
also
not
included
among
the
income
items
although
its
repayment
is
noted
among
the
expendi
tures.
If
one were
to
revise
the total
income
accordingly,
it rises
to
279,649,967
akces,
producing
a
surplus
of
2,071,212
akces;
Halil
Sahillioglu,
III.
Murad
donemine ait
1582
83
(hicri
990)
tarihli
biitce?ceviriyazi.
In
Osmanh
Maliyesi
Kurumlar
ve
Biitceler,
eds
M.
Gene and
E.
Ozvar.
2
vols.
(Istanbul:
Osmanh Bankasi Arsiv
ve
Arastirma
Merkezi,
2006):
vol.
2:
33, 46. The surplus of 36,165,890 akces for the
same
year that is shown in Pamuk,
A
Monetary History
of
the
Ottoman
Empire:
133,
is
the
amount
of
money
carried
over
to
the
next
fiscal
year,
which
includes
funds
worth
34,094,678
akces
that
were
carried
over
from
the
previous
year;
the
difference
between
them,
2,071,212
akces,
is
equivalent
to
the
actual
surplus.
8)
The
figures
or
1583
[and 1574]
are:
16,905
[13,599]
janissaries,
,346
[5,957]
cavalry
soldiers
(altt
boluk),
3,736
[2,124]
auxiliary
troops
(cebeciydn,
tobciydn,
arabaciyan-i
fob),
and
9,220
[7,495]
cadets
(acemiydn),aking
a
total
f38,207
[29,175]
souls.Since
16,905
janissaries
received
39,008,019
akces,
10,000,000
would be
enough
to
pay
the
yearly
sala
ries
of
another
4,000
janissaries.
Yet since
most
probably
Osman
Pashas
soldiers
were
recruited
to
become
janissaries
after
a
few
years
of
service,
their
pay
scale
should have been
lower,
so
he
may
have
had
more
than
4,000
troops;
for
1583
figures
see
Sahillioglu,
1582
83
tarihli
iitce :
5;
for
1574
figures,
ee
Koci
Bey,
ogi
Bey
Risalesi,
d.
Ali
Kemali Aksiit
(Istanbul:
Vakit,
1939):
27-8.
9)
Halil
Sahillioglu,
Kurulustan
XVTI.
asnn
sonlanna
kadar
Osmanh
para
tarihi
uzerinde
dir
deneme.
Ph.D.
dissertation
(Istanbul
Universitesi,
1958).
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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464
B.
Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
the different
currency
market
zones
of
the Ottoman
Empire operated
on
different
gold?silver
ratios.
The
debasement
of the akce
was
closely
related to the unification of these zones and the consequent
disappearance
of
arbitrage
opportunities
as
the
different
gold?silver
ratios
moved
closer
to
each
other.
The
first
section
of the
study
focuses
on
the former
Mamluk
lands
and
demonstrates
that
the
gold?silver
ratio
in
the Levant
and
Egypt
was
different
from the
one
in
the central
lands
of the Ottoman
Empire
in
the
early
sixteenth
century.
Yet
by
the
mid-sixteenth
century
this
ratio
had
come
much closer
to
the
one
prevalent
in
Istanbul.
The
second
section concentrates on the former Safavid lands of theOttoman
Empire
and
argues
that
a
Persian
devaluation
in
themid-sixteenth
century
changed
the
gold?silver
ratio
in
these
lands,
making
silver
more
valuable
in
terms
of
gold
and
creating
an
Ottoman silver
currency,
the
sahi,
that
was
overvalued
in
terms
of
its
silver
content.
As
the
connections
between
the sahi
zone
and
the
Levant increased
as a
result
of
their
unification
under
the
Ottomans,
the
monetary
issues
related
to
the
sahi affected the
Levant
as
well.
In
the
third
section,
I
will
point
out
that
the
arrival
of
Spanish
silver
from
the
Americas
intensified
the
expansion
of the
sahi's
use
in
the
empire
by
providing
ample
supplies
to
mint
overvalued
silver
coinage
which
liter
ally
invaded
theOttoman
domains,
threatening
a
change
in
the
gold?sil
ver
ratio
at
the
center.
Consequently,
the
value
of silver
increased
above the
level
that
could
support
the
weight
and
fineness
of the
akce.
In the
last
section
I
will
argue
that
these
results
proved
to
be
disadvantageous
for
the
Ottoman
center
as
theOttoman
treasury
had
a
vested
interest
in
keeping
gold
more
expensive
in
relation
to
silver
in
the
capital.
Thus
in
1585
the
Ottoman
administration
not
only acknowledged
a
situation created
by
market
forces
but also
made
an
effort
to
intervene
by
trying
to
increase
the
value
of
gold
against
silver.
Yet the
effort
of
the
administration
failed,
and
in
1600
the
Ottoman
center
finally
revalued
silver
in
relation
to
gold.
I
When
the
Ottomans
conquered
a
new
region,
the
Ottoman
administra
tion,
at
least
initially,
did
not
endeavor
to
unify
its
dominions
under
a
single
law;
theymostly
continued
to
follow
the
local
traditions
of
the
areas
that
were
brought
under
Ottoman
sovereignty
in
matters
relating
to
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The
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465
taxation
and
land
laws.Whether
this
was a
conscious
policy,10
or
just
a
matter
of
necessity
in
the relative absence
of efficient central
political
tools of enforcement, is
open
to debate. Different
regional
currencies were
among
the local
practices
that
the
Ottoman
administration continued
to
allow
in
its
eastern
and
southern
provinces.
Thus the
empire
was
divided
into
a
number
of
currency
zones
in
which
coins
of
different
weights
con
stituted
the
major
denomination
in
daily
use.
As
will be shown later
in
this
study,
the
Ottoman
center
benefited
from the
existence
of these
zones
as
long
as
gold
was
comparatively cheaper
in
them than
it
was
in
the
capital.
The limits of these
zones were
probably
dictated
by
the
geographical
limits of the economic units rather than
by
political
boundaries. For
instance,
despite
its
political
unity,
the Safavid
Empire
included
two
dis
tinct
currency
zones.
Similarly,
although
both
greater
Syria
and
the
Hejaz
had been
part
of the
Mamluk
Empire,
the
two
regions
had
slightly
different
units
of silver
currency.11
Thus,
as
the
political
inheritor of
different
eco
nomic
zones,
the
Ottoman
Empire
consisted
of
different
currency
zones.
Although
the
akce
reigned
supreme
in
the central
lands of the
empire,
that
is
to
say
in
the Balkans
and
in
western
as
well
as
central
Anatolia,12
the
eastern
and
southern lands that
were
conquered
in
the
sixteenth
century
used
quite
a
number of
different
currencies.
As
will
be
discussed
below,
the
exchange
values
of these
currencies
among
themselves
seem
to
have been
determined
by
the
regional
gold?silver
ratios.
Thus rather
than the
silver
content
of
the coins
in
question,
their
varying
values
against
theVenetian
ducat,
or
the
Ottoman
sultani^
seem to
have
been the
decisive
factor
in
10)See Halil Inalcik, Ottoman Methods of
Conquest.
Studia Islamica 2
(1954):
103-29.
n)
Stephen
Album,
A
Checklist
of
Islamic
Coins,
second
ed.
(Santa
Rosa:
Stephen
Album,
1998):
126. The silver coins
of
Aleppo
and
Mecca,
for
instance,
are
valued
differently
in
an
inventory
of
the Ottoman
imperial
treasury
from
1518;
Halil
Sahillioglu,
The
Role of
International
Monetary
and Metal
Movements
in
Ottoman
Monetary
History,
1300
1750.
Tr.
liter
Turan and
Rhoads
Murphey
[translation
of
Osmanh
para
tarihinde
diinya
para
ve
maden
hareketlerinin
yeri
(1300-1750).
Geli?me
Dergisi
Special
Issue
(1978):
1-38].
In
Precious
Metals
in
the Later
Medieval
and
Early
Modern
Worlds,
ed.
J.
F.
Richards
(Durham:
Carolina
Academic
Press,
1983):
297,
Table 4a.
12)
Iwould suggest that thewidespread use of the akce inAnatolia and the Balkans by the
beginning
of
the
sixteenth
century
must
have
been
the
result of
a
long
process
of
economic
integration
and
a
certain
degree
of
monetarization,
which,
if
studied,
may
shed further
light
on
the
various
debasements
under
Mehmed
II.
13)
In
the
period
under
study
the
two
gold
coins,
the
Venetian
ducat
and the Ottoman
sultani,
were
identical in
weight
and
fineness.
Since
I
use
a
number of
Ottoman
terms to
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466
B.
Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
the
establishment
of
their
exchange
values
among
themselves
in
their
respective
regions.
In the formerMamluk lands of
Egypt
and greater
Syria,
for instance,
the
standard
coin in
circulation
was
heavier
than the
akce.
Among
a
sam
ple
of
67
extant
coins
struck
during
the
reign
of
Selim
I
(r.
1512-20)
right
after
the
conquest
of the
Mamluk
Empire
in
Jidda
(1),
Damascus
(23),
Aleppo
(33),
Hudayda
(1),
and
Egypt
(9)?if
one
excludes our
oins
the
weights
of
which
were
equal
to
or
lower than
0.73
g.,
which
was
the
stand
ard
weight
of the
akce
at
the time?the
average
weight
of
the
remaining
63
coins is
0.89
g.14
Although
these
weights
cannot be relied on to
judge
the standard cur
rency
weight
of the
region,
as
the
coins
may
have
been
clipped,
they
do
suggest
that the
standard silver
currency
of the
area
was
heavier than the
akce.
This
is
supported
by
archival
evidence
to
the
effect that the silver
coins
struck
in
Aleppo
were
worth
2
akces
in
1518
and
were
called
pare
or
para
(piece),
most
probably
after the
??/Xhalf),
or
qita (piece),
theArabic
terms
used
to
denote the
standard Mamluk silver
coin
introduced
by
the
Mamluk ruler
al-Mu'ayyad
(r.
1412-21),
the
muayyadi,
which the
Europe
ans
called maidinP
This
difference
in
the
silver
standard
of the
region,
as
well
as
the
name
given
to
the
local
coins
by
the
Ottomans,
suggests
that
the Ottoman
local
currency
in
the
area
was
modeled
on
the
one
used
in
Mamluk
times.
At
the
time
the
Ottomans
conquered
the
Levant
and
Egypt,
the
cur
rency
situation
in
the
Mamluk
Empire
seems
to
have been
in
disarray.
Although
it is
asserted that
theMamluk
gold
coins
were
of the
same
stand
ard
as
the
Venetian
ducats
and
theOttoman
sultanis,
the archival and
liter
ary
evidence
suggests
otherwise.
The
weight
of theMamluk
gold
ashrafi
seems to
have varied
from
one
Mamluk sultans
reign
to
the
next,
and
from
Egypt
to
Syria.
This
difference
in
weight
was
also
reflected
in
the
exchange
value
of the
ashrafi,
which
at
times
fell below
that of the
Venetian
ducat.16
denote
the
different
silver
currencies
in
circulation,
I
prefer
the ducat
to
denote
the
stan
dard
gold
coin
of the
region
in
order
to
prevent
further
confusion
by
introducing
yet
another
Ottoman
term.
14)
Ciineyt
Olcer,
Sultan
Yavuz Selim
?ah
bin
Bayazid
Han
Donemi
Osmanli
Sikkeleri
(Istanbul:
enilik,
1989):
182-6.
15)
On the
origins
of the
designation
nisf,
see
Paul
Balog,
The
Coinage of
the
Mamluk Sul
tans
of
Egypt
and
Syria
(New
York:
The
American
Numismatic
Society,
1964):
47,
387.
16)
Pamuk,
A
Monetary History
of
the
Ottoman
Empire:
95;
Sahillioglu,
Osmanli
para
tarihi :
96,
n.
9;
Ahmed
Akgiinduz,
ed.,
Osmanli
Kanunnameleri
ve
Hukuki
Tahlilleri.
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The
Ottoman
Monetary
Crisis
of1585
Revisited
467
Although
the
weight
of
the
Mamluk
gold
coin
was
less than the
Otto
man
one,
that of the
standard
Mamluk
silver
coin
was
more
than theOtto
man akce,
weighing
around 1.4-1.5 g. in the late fifteenth century, and ca.
1.1
g.
in
the
early
sixteenth
century,
if
one
were
to
rely
on
the
weight
of
extant
coins.
When
Selim
I
conquered
the
area,
the
gold
coins
struck
in
his
name
followed the
standard
of the
ghawri
ashrafls,
which
were
the
most
recent
and
the
least
valuable
in
terms
of silver
currency.
Yet
the
silver
coins
struck
in
the
name
of Selim
I
by
the first ttoman
governor
of
Egypt
seem
to
have lowered standards
even
more,
and
probably
continued
the
trend
of
debasement
visible
since the late
fifteenth
century.17
Around 1522, new silver coins were struck thatwere decreed to be
equivalent
to
the
value
of
two
and
a
half of the
former
coins,
meaning
those that
had
been struck
by
the
firstOttoman
governor.
Twenty-five
of
the
new
silver
coins
were
to
be worth
one
gold
ducat.
Although
there
seems to
have been
quite
a
bit of
opposition
to
this
policy,
the
Ottoman
administrative code
(kanunname)
of
Egypt,
dated
to
1524-5,
sanctioned
it.
According
to
this
code,
out
of
a
100
dirhems
(307.2
g.)
mix
of
silver and
copper,
which
was
to
contain
84%
silver,
250
paras
were
to
be
struck. Thus
each
para
was
supposed
to
weigh
1.23
g.
and
contain
1.03
g.
of
silver.
Not
surprisingly,
the
average
weight
of
a
sample
of
4
silver
coins
struck
in
Egypt
in
the
name
of
Siileyman
I
(r. 1520-66)
is
thus
1.22
g.
Moreover,
25
of
these
paras
were
to
equal
the value of
a
gold
coin
struck
in
accord
ance
with the
standards
of
Istanbul,
and the future
gold
coins
to
be struck
in
Egypt
were
to
follow that
standard,
that
is
ca.
3.55
g.
of
pure
gold
for
a
sultani.18
Although
there
is
no
conclusive
evidence,
what
seems
to
have
happened
in
1522,
and
was
indeed sanctioned
in
1524-5,
was
a
restoration
of
the
9
vols.
(Istanbul:
Osmanh
Arastirmalan
Vakfi,
1990-6):
vol.
3:
260,
272;
Sahillioglu,
Ottoman
Monetary History :
297,
Table
4a;
Halil
Sahillioglu,
1524-1525
Osmanh
biit
cesi.
Istanbul Universitesi
Iktisat Fakiiltesi
Mecmuasi 41
(1982-3):
434,
437-8.
17)
Norman D.
Nicol,
Raafet
El-Nabarawy,
and
Jere
L.
Bacharach,
eds,
Catalog
of
the
Islamic
Coins,
Glass
Weights,
Dies
and Medals
in
the
Egyptian
National
Library,
Cairo
(Malibu,
CA:
Undena
Publications,
1982):
95,
98;
Sahillioglu,
Osmanh
para
tarihi :
96-7,
n.
9,
11;
Olcer,
Osmanh
Sikkeleri:
159;
Stanford
J.
Shaw,
The
Financial
and Admin
istrative
Organization
and
Development of
Ottoman
Egypt,
1517-1798
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1962):
65.
18)
Sahillioglu,
Osmanh
para
tarihi :
97,
n.
11;
ibrahim
Artuk,
Kanuni
Sultan
Suleyman
Adma Basilan
Sikkeler
(Ankara:
Turk Tarih
Kurumu,
1972):
64-65;
Akgundiiz,
Osmanh
Kanunndmeleri;
vol. 6:
139.
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468
B.
Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
Mamluk
standards,
as
the
administrative code refers
to
the
exchange
rate
of
25
paras
to
the
ducat
as
the
old
law
(kanun-i
kadim) 19
Unfortunately,
we do not know the exact weight and fineness of the lastMamluk silver
coins,
but
Eliyahu
Ashtor,
relying
on
the
account
of
a
contemporary
Euro
pean
traveler,
suggests
that
25
made
a
ducat
in
1507,
and
that the
gold?
silver
ratio
accompanying
this
exchange
rate
was
1:8.5,
which
signifies
a
sharp
increase
in
the value of silver
against
gold
hence
implying
a
silver
scarcity,
as,
according
to
Ashtor,
the
ratio
in
1497
had been
1:11.1.
The
gold?silver
ratio
instituted
by
the Ottomans
in
1522
and
sanctioned
in
1524-5
was
1:7.25.20
Thus either the
Ottomans
had
further increased the
value of silver
against
gold,
or this increase had
already
taken
place
between
1507
and
1517,
the date
of the
Ottoman
conquest.
Actually,
Balog
sug
gests
that
the
Mamluk
silver
coins
struck
during
the
reign
of
Qansawh
al
Ghawri
(1501-16)
were
drastically
reduced
to
a mere
1
gram.
If
this
last
reduction
had
not
changed
the
value
of the
ducat,
the
gold?silver
ratio
at
the
time
theOttomans
conquered Egypt
might
have
been around
1:7.14,
which
is
quite
close
to
the
one
instituted
by
the
Ottomans.
It is
beyond
doubt, however,
that
the Ottoman
administration
sanctioned
a
gold?
silver ratio thatwas
quite
different from the one
prevalent
in
Istanbul,
which
was
1:11.3
at
the time.21
These
varying
gold?silver
ratios
point
toward
the
existence
of
great
arbitrage
opportunities
which
resulted
from
the
large
discrepancy
between
the value
of
gold
in
Istanbul
and
Egypt.
In
Istanbul
a
gold
ducat
was
worth
55
akces,
each
containing
0.73
g.
of
silver,
which would
make
a
little
more
than 40
g.
of
silver,
while
in
Egypt
the
same
gold
coin
could
be
obtained
with less
than 26
g.
of silver. Thus
26
g.
of silver
coinage
exchanged
with
gold
in
Egypt
was
worth 40
g.
of silver
in
Istanbul.
Apparently,
silverwas
much
more
valuable
in
Egypt
than
in
Istanbul,
or
gold
was
much
cheaper,
which
suggests
that
silverwould
have
moved south
to
Egypt
while
gold
would
have headed
north
to
Istanbul.
The latter
part
of
this
equation
is
19)
Akgiindiiz,
Osmanh
Kanunnameleri:
vol.
6:
124.
20)
Eliyahu
Ashtor,
Les
metauxprecieux
et
la balance
despayements
du
proche-orient
a
la
basse
epoque
Paris:
EVPEN,
1971):
49.
The
gold?silver
ratio
may
be
calculated
bymultiply
ing
the
silver
content
of the
silver
currency
with
its
exchange
rate
against
the
gold
currency,
and
then
dividing
the
result
by
the
weight
of
the
gold
currency:
(1.03
x
25):
3.55
=
7.25.
21)
Balog,
The
Coinage
of
the
amluk
Sultans:
43.
At
that
time
420
akces
were
struck
from
100
dirhems
(307.2
g.)
of
pure
silver,
so an
akce contained
0.73
g.
of
silver.
55
akces
made
a
ducat.
Thus
(0.73
x
55):
3.55
=
11.3;
Sahillioglu,
1524-1525 :
434;
Sahillioglu,
Osmanh
para
tarihi'>:
42,
64.
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
11/46
The
Ottoman
Monetary
Crisis
of1585
Revisited
469
verified
by
the
fact
that
Egypt
sent
its
tribute
to
the
Ottoman
capital
in
gold
coins,
a
point
that
will be
revisited
below.
It is also
interesting
to note thatwhile the
Egyptian
para contained
only
1.03
g.
of
silver,
it
was
valued
at
2
akces
in
relation
to
theOttoman
akce,
which
was
supposed
to
contain
0.73
g.
of silver
at
that time.22
Intrinsically,
the
para
should
have been worth
1.4
akces,
or
1.5
akces
at
the
most.
Thus
the
Egyptian
para
was
definitely
overvalued
in
terms
of
its
silver
content.
This
only
makes
sense
when the
exchange
value of the
para
and
the
akce
against
the
gold
ducat
is
taken
into
consideration.
Using
the
gold
ducat
as
a
measure
according
to
which
25
paras
equaled
55
akces,
one
would
expect
the
para
to be worth 2.2 akces
(55/25).
This is
significantly
closer to the
official
exchange
rate
of
2
akces
to
the
para.
The
respective
values
of
the
para
and the akce
against
the ducat
must
therefore
have
been
decisive
for
establishing
their
exchange
values
against
each
other?not
a
comparison
of
their
silver
contents.
The
available
evidence thus
suggests
that
Egypt
and
the Levant
which
constituted the Ottoman
para
zone,
on
the
one
hand,
and Anatolia
and
the
Balkans,
where the akce
reigned
supreme,
on
the
other,
had
different
gold?silver
ratios in
the
early
sixteenth
century.
Although
these
two
regions
are
close
to
each
other,
this
difference
was
not
new.
For
instance,
for the
Middle
Ages,
the
ratio
of
gold
to
silver
is
suggested
to
have
been 1:14
in
the
Muslim
Middle
East
while
it
was
1:18
in
Byzantium.23
What
this
meant
in
practice
was
that
one
could
get
a
unit
of
gold
in
exchange
for
14
units of
silver
in
Cairo,
go
to
Constantinople,
exchange
that
unit
of
gold
for
18 units
of
silver,
bring
the
silver
to
Cairo,
convert
it
to
gold again,
and
keep
an
extra
4 units
of silver
as a
28.6%
profit
created
by
arbitrage
opportunities.
This
same sort
of
opportunity
apparently
also
existed
in
the
early
sixteenth
century,
as
the
gold?silver
ratios in
Cairo
and
Istanbul
were
1:7.25
and
1:11.3,
respectively.
Arbitrage
opportunities
occur
when
two
market
zones
function
rela
tively
independently
from
each
other;
due
to
less
developed
market rela
tions
zones
are
either
not
well
informed
about
each
other's
respective
22)
For
the
value
of
the
para
in terms
of
the
akce
in
Egypt,
see
Akgiinduz,
Osmanli
Kanun
ndmeleri'. vol.
6;
111.
Three
financial
regulations
from
the
Adana
area
that
date from
ca.
1526,
1536,
and
1547
give
the
exchange
rate
of
the
para
as
2
akces
as
well;
Akgunduz,
Osmanli
Kanunndmeleri: vol.
5:
608,
613,
vol.
7: 191.
23)
K. N.
Chaudhuri,
The
Economic
and
Monetary
Problem
of
European
Trade
with
Asia
during
the
Seventeenth
and
Eighteenth
Centuries.
The
Journal
of
uropean
Economic
History
4
(1975):
343.
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
12/46
470
B.
Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
conditions,
or
they
are
not
engaged
in
a
sufficient
number of
transactions
to
have
an
influence
on
each
other.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
these
two
zones
had been economically well-connected to each other, themovement of
silver
to
the
place
where
it
was
more
valuable
in
terms
of
gold
would
even
tually
alter
the
gold?silver
ratios
in
both
regions,
bringing
them
to
the
same
level,
at
which
point
arbitrage
profits
would
no
longer
be
possible.
It
seems
that such
a
development
did indeed take
place
with
regard
to
the
Levant
and
the central
lands of
the Ottoman
Empire
during
the first half
of the sixteenth
century.
Andrea
Berengo,
whose
letters
from
Aleppo
written
in
1555-6
have
been
published, provides
some data to establish the
weight
and the
exchange
rate
of the
para
during
this
period.
He
states
that 6
maidins,
or
paras,
were
worth
a
mocenigo,
a
Venetian
silver
currency
of
almost
pure
silver
that
weighed
6.52
g.
To
be
more
precise,
Berengo
notes
that
47
mocenigos
were
exchanged
for
300
maidins
in
terms
of their
weight,
which
suggests
that each
para
contained
1.02
g.
of silver. This silver
con
tent
is
quite
close
to
the
prescribed
silver
content
of the
para,
1.03
g.
Yet
the
exchange
value
he
assigns
to
the
ducat
is
40
paras,24
which
is
well above
the
prescribed
rate of
25
paras
in the administrative code of
Egypt.
At 40
paras
a
ducat with each
para
containing
1.03
g.
of
silver,
a
ducat
was
worth
41.2
g.
of silver
in
the
Levant
in
1555,
which
gives
a
gold?
silver
ratio
of
1:11.6.
However,
in
Istanbul,
the
ducat
was
worth 60 akces
around
the
same
time.
With
each
akce
containing
0.73
g.
of
silver,
this
would
make
43.8
g.
of silver and indicate
a
gold?silver
ratio
of
1:12.34.
Thus,
in
the
thirty
years
between
1525
and
1555,
the
gold?silver
ratio
prevalent
in
the
Levant
apparently
came
much closer
to
the
one
in
the
central lands
of theOttoman
Empire,
most
probably
as a
result of
increas
ing
commercial
connections
that evened
out
the differences
which
had
created
the
arbitrage
profits
in
the
first
place.
Moreover,
the
exchange
rate
of
the
akce
against
the
para
changed
to
reflect the
new
value
of the
ducat
in
paras.
Whereas
the
para
was
valued
at
2
akces
in
1525
when
25
paras
made
a
ducat,
later
rates
suggest
that
1.5
akces
were
counted
as
the
equiv
alent
of
one
para,
which
makes
sense
since
now
40
paras
and
60
akces
equaled
each
other
in
terms
of the
value of
the
ducat.25
24)
UgoTucci,
ed.,
Lettresdun
marchandvenitienAndreaBerengo,
1553-1556(Paris:
SEVPEN,
1957):
95,
354,
355,
359.
25)
Walther
Hinz,
Islamische
Wahrungen
umgerechnet
in
Gold
(Wiesbaden:
Otto
Harrassowitz,
1991):
13,
42-3.
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
14/46
472
B. Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
the
Levant
had
been
an
independent
currency
zone
in
which
a
different
gold?silver
ratio
operated
at
the
time
of
the
Ottoman
conquest,
by
the
middle of the sixteenth
century
this area had become far better
integrated
into
themarkets of the
central
Ottoman
lands
as
indicated
by
the
change
in its
gold?silver
ratio,
which
came
quite
close
to
the
one
prevalent
in
Istanbul.
Thus
it
seems
justified
to
claim
that
the
forces of themarket
oper
ated
against
the
will
of
the
administration
by
bringing
the
different
cur
rency
zones
closer
to
each
other,
a
point
to
be
discussed
further below.
Finally,
the
Egyptian
debasement
of
ca.
1565
and the
Ottoman
one
around
the
same
time,
which
were
not
accompanied
by
a
devaluation
of
the
coinage
in terms
of
the
official
value
of
the
ducat,
imply
that
a new
currency
zone
in
which silver
was
relatively
more
scarce
and
valuable
in
terms
of
gold
was
in
close
contact
with the
rest
of the
empire.
According
to
the
correspondence
between
Cairo and
Istanbul
in
1552,
silver
was
moving
toward
this
unidentified
area,
and the
way
to
stop
this
movement
was a
debasement
of the
coinage.
In
the
next
section,
I
will
argue
that this
area was
Persia.
II
Another
currency
zone
in
the
Ottoman
Empire
can
be characterized
as
the
realm
of
the
sahi,
originally
a
Persian
silver
currency
that continued
to
circulate
in
Safavid
Persia
even
after
the
Ottomans struck their
own
sahis
following
the
conquest
of
the
western
Safavid
lands
during
the
reign
of
Suleyman
I.
The market
value
of
the
Ottoman
sahi
in
terms
of the
akce
and the para has a lot to do with the Persian shahi?*which was introduced
by
the
Safavid
ruler Shah
Ismail
in
the
early
sixteenth
century.
The
Safavid
coinage
went
through
a
number
of
debasements
during
the
sixteenth
century,
but
only
those
that
happened
in
the
second
half
of
the
sixteenth
century
seem to
have
had
an
impact
on
the
Ottoman
akce. Around
1501,
at
the
outset
of
the
reign
of Shah
Ismail,
the
Safavid
50
dinar
piece
called
shahi
weighed
9.4
g.29
According
to
Stephen
Album,
in
1518
the
weight
of the
shahi
was
reduced
to
7.88
g.
Around
1530,
it
28)
In
order
to
distinguish
the Persian from
the Ottoman
coin,
the
former
will
be
referred
to
hereafter
as
shahi,
the latter
as
sahi.
29)
H.
L.
Rabino
di
Borgomale,
Coins,
Medals
and Seals
of
the
Shdhs
of
Iran,
1500-1941
(Hertford:
Stephen
Austin
and
Sons,
1945):
Table
II
(following
p.
8);
see
Tezcan,
Search
ing
for
Osman :
315-6
(n.
46),
for
a
discussion
on
the
accuracy
of this
weight.
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The
Ottoman
Monetary
Crisis
of1585
Revisited
473
was
further
reduced
to
6.22
g.
Some
ten
years
later,
the shahi
weighed
5.25
g.
Around
1547,
the
shahi
was
debased
once
again
to
4.67
g.30
Thus, ifAlbum's conclusions are correct, between 1501 and 1550, the
Safavid
shahi lost
half
of
its
silver
content.
The Ottoman
akce,
however,
did
not
go
through
any
debasements
between
1491
and the
reign
of
Selim
II
(1566-74).
Consequently,
one
could
claim that the
Safavid debase
ments
of
the
first alf
of
the sixteenth
century
did
not
have
an
impact
on
the
Ottoman
akce.
This
picture,
however,
changes
in
the second
half
of
the sixteenth
cen
tury.
Berengo,
our
Venetian merchant
in
Aleppo,
provides
some
valuable
information
regarding
a Persian debasement in his letters of 1555. That
year
no
silk arrived from
Persia since
the Safavid
shah himself
had
bought
500
loads
of
it
for
export
to
India.
Yet the shah
paid
themerchants
half
the
price
because
he has made the
money
the half
ofwhat
they
were
worth
in
spite
of
the
protests
of the
people,
i.e. his
coins
are
called
saie
[shahi]
they
are
worth
here
18
soldi
a
piece,
and
he
has
made
two
out
of
one
and
given
them
out
as
good
coin. 31
In
a
subsequent
letter,
Berengo
states
that
the
new
shahi that
the
shah
had
struck
was
worth half the value of the old
one,
i.e.
9
soldi. At this
time,
18
soldi
were
worth
approximately
0.11
gold
ducats.
Thus
one
would
expect
the
former
Persian
shahi
to
be worth
4.5
paras,
and
the
new one
2.25
paras
at
40
paras,
or
maidins,
per
ducat.
Berengo
cites
the
very
same
values.32
Berengo
is
not
the
only
source
which
suggests
that
the
Safavids
under
took
a
major
debasement before
the
Ottoman
one.
Fernand
Braudel
states
30)
Album, A Checklist of Islamic Coins: 126-7; Hinz, Islamische Wahrungen: 59-61, relying
on
Rabino di
Borgomale,
Coins,
Medals
and
Seals
of
the
Shahs
of
Iran,
1500-1941:
28, 30,
regards
the
denomination of these
coins
differently,
yet
he does
agree
that
the shahi
lost
a
lot of
its
silver
content
during
the
reign
of
Tahmasp.
I
took
Albums
western
Safavid
stan
dard
into
consideration here.
The
Safavids
also
had
an
eastern
standard
in
the
provinces
of
Khorasan
and
Gurgan,
while
the
province
of
Mazandaran
had
its
own
standard;
see
Album,
A
Checklist
of
Islamic Coins:
126,
n.
138.
31)
Quoted
by
Steensgaard,
The
Asian
Trade
Revolution
of
the
Seventeenth
Century:
419;
this
particular
letter
is
dated November
3,
1555.
32)
Tucci,
Lettres
d'un marchand
venitien
Andrea
Berengo,
1553-1556: 92
(letter
#86,
dated
November
15,
1555),
101
(#93,
ovember
17),
113
(#100,
ovember
17),
126
(#109,
November
18);
see
also letters
#87,
88,
91,
96,
pp.
93,
95, 98,
106.
20
soldi made
a
lira,
and
in
1533
a
Venetian
gold
ducat
was
valued
at
7
lire
and
18
soldi;
in
1562,
its
value
is
recorded
as
8
lire;
W.
A.
Shaw,
The
History
of Currency,
1252
to
1894,
third
ed.
(New
York:
G.
P. Putnam's
Sons and
Clement
Wilson,
1896):
317.
If
we
take
8
lire
as
the value
of the
ducat
in
1555
as
well,
we
would
arrive
t
(18: [8
x
20]
=)
0.1125.
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
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474
B.
Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
that the
Ottoman
devaluation
of
the
mid
1580s
followed
a
similar deval
uation
in
Persia,...
which
had
devalued
the
currency
by
50
per
cent at
a
stroke. Inalcik,who
perhaps
relied on Braudel, states that a 50% devalua
tion
occurred
in
Persia
in
1585.
However,
Steensgaard
asserts
that he
did
not
find
any
evidence
in
support
of
Braudel
s
statement,
although
he
was
aware
of the debasement that
Berengo
refers
to,
which
he
prefers
to
regard
simply
as
a
50%
devaluation
in
terms
of
money
of
account.
Pamuk,
on
the other
hand,
believes
that
there
might
have
been
a
devaluation
in
Iran
in
1584,
and
suggests
that,
if
proven,
this devaluation
would have been
a
major
factor
in
contributing
to
the
Ottoman
devaluation
and
debasement
of
the later
1580s,
yet
he
adds
that the
evidence isnot clear.33
Although
twentieth-century
studies
tend
to concentrate
on
the
1580s
to
date
the Safavid
devaluation,
which
is
probably
due
to
Braudels
wording,
the
primary
source
of
Braudels
source
carries
us
further
back.
Braudel
cites
J.
W.
Zinkeisen,34
but
the
ultimate
source
is
an
Italian
physician,
Minadoi
(1540-1615),
who,
after
taking
his medical
degree,
traveled for
seven
years
in
the Ottoman
dominions.
In
his
book
on
the
Ottoman-Safavid
wars,
which he
wrote
in
1587
with
an
account
of the
events
of the
war
through
to
the
end of
1586,
he
states:
Touching
the
reuenues
of this
kingdome
[Safavid
Persia],
the
common
opinion
is,
that
in
the
dayes
of
Kinge
Tamas
[Tahmasp
(1524-76)]
the
crowne
did
yearely
receaue
into
the
Chamber
of
Casbin,
foure
or
Hue millions
of
gold,
which
afterward
he caused
to
be worth
eight
millions,
by
a
sudden
enhaunsing
of the
value
of his
coyne,
geuing
in
commandment
by
most
seuere
Edictes,
that
ouer
all his
Empyre,
for
a
certayne
space,
all the
money
that
he had
receaued,
should bee
taken and
accompted
for
asmuch
more
as
it
was
worth, and accordingly
made
pay
to
his souldiers
and
Sultans,
& all other
that
were
in
his
pay.
Which
example
(mee-thinkes)
was
well
followed
by
Amurat
the
now
king
of
the
urkes
[Murad
III
(1574-95)],
who
receauing
t
the
Citty
ofCairo
the
Cechino of
gold
[sequin]
for xliii.
Maidini,
he
put
it
out
againe
in
Constantinople,
to
pay
his
Capigi
and
Ianissaries,
withall
lxxxv.
Maidini,
commanding
that
it
should
be
of
that
value
ouer
all the
Citty,
and
countryes
subiect
vnto
it.35
33)
Fernand
Braudel,
TheMediterranean
nd
the
editerraneanWorld
in
the
Age
of
hilip
I,
tr.
Sian
Reynolds.
2
vols.
(New
York:
Harper
&
Row,
1972):
vol.
1:
540,
vol.
2:
1195;
Inalcik,
Notes
on a
Study
of
the Turkish
Economy :
253,
n.
109;
Steensgaard,
The
Asian
Trade
Revolution
of
the
Seventeenth
Century:
419;
Pamuk,
A
Monetary
History
of
the
Ottoman
Empire-.
137.
34)
J.W
Zinkeisen,
Geschichte
des osmanischen
Reiches
in
Europa.
7
vols.
(Gotha:
F.
A.
Perthes,
1840-63):
vol.
3:
802-3.
35)
Iohn-Thomas
Minadoi,
The
History of
the
Warres
hetweene the
Tvrkes
and
the
Persians,
tr.
Abraham
Hartwell
(London:
Iohn
Wolfe,
1595):
76.
This content downloaded from 152.118.148.226 on Sat, 21 Feb 2015 03:02:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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8/9/2019 The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited
17/46
The
Ottoman
Monetary
Crisis
of1585
Revisited
475
Minadoi's
account
of the
Persian
devaluation thus
suggests
that
it
hap
pened
during
the
reign
of Shah
Tahmasp,
i.e.
before
1576,
and
not
in
the
early
1580s. The information
provided
by
Minadoi, who
apparently
had
not
witnessed
the
devaluation but had heard about
it,
is in
linewith
Ber
engo's
account.
Since
the fiscal reforms
of
the Ilkhanid
ruler
Ghazan
Khan
(r.
1295-1304),
Persia
had
a
regulated
system
of
money
of
account,
accord
ing
to
which
10,000
dinars
made
a
toman
(Mongol
for
10,000).
Silver
coins
came
in
different
denominations with their
values
assigned
in
dinars.36
What
Berengo
refers
to
as
the
old
shahi
was
equivalent
to
the
50
dinars
piece
of
ca.
4.6
g.
The
information
provided
by
both
Berengo
and Minadoi
suggests
that
Tahmasp
increased the value of this coin to
100
dinars and struck smaller
coins
of
ca.
2.3
g.
that
he
valued
at
50
dinars.
The numismatic
evidence
supports
this
hypothesis
to
a
large
extent.
Album,
whose work
represents
the
latest
research
on
Safavid
coinage,
argues
that
the
2.3
g.
coins
were
worth half
a
shahi,
i.e.
25
dinars,
in
the
period
1547-52,
while
the shahis of
50
dinars
weighed
ca.
4.7
g.
Around
1553,
the
denominational
value of
the former
shahi
was
increased
to
80
dinars,
and
that of
the former half
shahi
to
40 dinars.
In
976
/
1568-9,
the
denominational values of these two coins were further
increased
to 100
and
50
dinars
respectively,
fixing
the
50
dinar
shahi
at ca.
2.3
g.,
a
standard
that
survived
well
until
1596.37
Album,
however,
does
not
provide
any
justification
for
his choice
of
80
and 40
dinars,
which
is
based
on
the
assumption
that
the
bisti,
i.e.
20
dinars,
was
the
main
denominational
value
in
the
period
1553-68.
However,
Berengo's
testimony
from
1555
quoted
above
indicates
that the
main unit
of the
Safavid
currency
in
circulation
was
the
shahi.
Moreover,
Arthur
Edwards,
an
English
merchant
who
worked
under the
umbrella of
the Russia
Company,
wrote
to
his
superiors
from
Shirvan
on
April
26,
1566
stating
that
200
shaughes
is
a
tumen.
Edwards
also
quotes
most
prices
in
shahis,
which
confirms that
the shahi of
50
dinars
was
the
main
unit
of
denomination
at
the
time.38
Thus
if
Albums
bisti
standard
for
1553-68
were
corrected with
the
shahi,
the
Safavid
debasement
of
1553,
36)
Walther
Hinz,
The
Value of the
Toman
in
the
Middle
Ages.
In
Ydd-ndme-ye Irdni-ye
Minorsky,
eds
Mojtaba
Minovi
and
I.
Afshar
(Tehran:
Publications
of
Tehran
University,
1969):
90-5.
37)
Album,
A
Checklist
of
Islamic
Coins:
127-8;
I
omit
Albums
discussion of
the
eastern
standards
within
the
Safavid
Empire,
which
would
not
have
had
much of
an
influence
on
the
Ottomans.
38)
E.
Delmar
Morgan
and
C.
H.
Coote,
eds,
Early Voyages
to
Russia
and
Persia.
2
vols.
This content downloaded from 152.118.148.226 on Sat, 21 Feb 2015 03:02:03 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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18/46
476
B.
Tezcan
JESHO
52
(2009)
460-504
established
by
numismatic
evidence,
would corroborate the
report
of
Ber
engo
from
1555
and
Minadoi's reference
to
the
reign
of
Shah
Tahmasp
as
the time of the Safavid devaluation.
Unfortunately,
Berengo
does
not
provide
any
information
about the
exchange
rate
between the Persian
shahi of
50
dinars and the Ottoman
akce.
Yet
the
exchange
rate
he
quotes
for the
old
Persian
shahi,
i.e.
4.5
paras,
suggests
that the
old
Persian
shahi
should have been worth
ca.
7
akces
or
5
paras
prior
to
its
devaluation.39
Not
surprisingly,
the
Ottoman
sahi
was
also
valued
at
7
akces
and
5
paras
as
will be
discussed below. The
new
Persian
shahi, then,
should
have been worth
3.5
akces.
There
is
addi
tional evidence which
suggests
that the new Persian shahiwas worth the
equivalent
of
4
akces
in
Iran.40
The
Ottomans,
after their
conquest
of
the
western
Safavid lands
in
the
1530s,
struck
coins
that
were
larger
than the
akce
and
were
meant
to
take
the
place
of the former
Persian
shahis.
According
to
the
numismatic evi
dence,
these
coins
originally
seem
to
have
weighed
4.4
g.,
which
is
quite
close
to
the