The Origins of Consciousness

A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS ON THE ORIGINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

A Comprehensive Analysis on the

Origins of Consciousness

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Abstract

This paper encompasses the controversial issues stemming from human consciousness in the

fields of Cognitive Psychology and neuroscience. As a result, it first illustrates what

consciousness is while addressing its closely related topic, the Binding Problem. Using this

information as a foundation, this paper then explores four experts’ theories/viewpoints on how

consciousness arises and mentions critiques of their work, as well. The four experts, though their

field backgrounds differ, are: John Searle, Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, and Daniel Dennett,

respectively. Bearing all the research in mind, I ultimately present my own theory on the origins

of consciousness as well as offer a solution to the Binding problem.

Keywords or Phrases: Consciousness, ‘single unified experience’, Binding Problem,

stimuli, perception, encoding, Qualia, A.I. (Artificial Intelligence), dualism, materialism, etc.

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A Comprehensive Analysis on

the Origins of Consciousness

Consciousness

At this very moment you are conscious. Right now, your brain is rapidly processing the

mass of stimuli in your environment and encoding it as information into each of its respective

regions. The simple sensation of this paper on your fingertips, the light intensity around you, the

contrast of black and white on this page— even the sound of pen on paper are all stimuli that

your brain is recognizing in real time. But this alone isn’t consciousness. What makes you

conscious is your awareness and subsequent interaction with these stimuli. This is exhibited

through your thoughts about this very topic, being aware of your time constraints, even the

feelings you get according to the stimuli (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007, p. 4).

But merely proving that you are conscious is not nearly as important as understanding

how the human consciousness arises. This is conceivably difficult, because this topic in

Psychology is still an inexact science- thus the reason for this paper. Raymond Cattell put it so

simply, “psychology is a more tricky field, in which even outstanding authorities have been

known to run in circles” (2009, p. 2). Still, researchers have some promising leads that point us

in the direction of certainty. But first, it helps to consider human consciousness as a single,

unified experience. By effect, the touch of this paper, the light and images that you’re currently

processing, and the conscious thoughts that you have are ultimately perceived as a whole. So

with the goal of explaining the origins of consciousness, it’s impossible to begin without

discussing the obvious gap between these variously unique stimuli and their relation to

consciousness, being that it is a ‘single’ unified experience (Williams, 1997). How do we

combine them as a whole?

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The Binding Problem

This said gap is so widely studied that it has been duly named the Binding Problem.

Human consciousness relates directly to this problem in particular, as the two are conducive to

each other. In order to deduce how consciousness arises, we need to first recognize the

limitations of our knowledge of the brain (Plate, 2007). Researchers are at a loss to definitively

answer the Binding Problem, but it’s solution awaits in the question: How or where in the brain

do varying characteristics of stimuli (such as color, shape, sound, etc.) combine so that we

recognize them as unified? In other words, you’re reading a research paper; but the question

posed is how do you come to perceive this as an essay and not a simple object with certain

shapes, texture, and colors? Despite this notorious obstacle in Psychology, there’s more to

recognize by using alternative approaches. Through a top-down perspective, it is given that the

brain has separate regions dedicated to different tasks. One region processes the form of an

object, whereas others process shape and color (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007, pp. 211-214). As a

result, this poses a second, complementary question: how does the unity of our conscious

experience emerge from the widely separate processing regions in the brain? Because of the

brain’s affinity for mystery and complexity, there are many different theories out there to explain

the Binding Problem- some of which will be analyzed and critiqued. (Williams, 1997)

Method

Although there are no proven answers to the questions posed in the binding problem, the

solution, itself, ties its importance to my task of understanding how consciousness arises. How

can one explain consciousness without understanding what we are conscious of? Provided that I

am no expert on this topic, a close analysis of the theories and viewpoints of credible researchers

on the origins of Consciousness should lead me to develop my own, personal theory of

consciousness, as well as a possible solution to these questions that remain unanswered.

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John Searle on Consciousness

John Searle’s book, The Mystery of Consciousness, is a great tool for understanding

consciousness, as well as how society and certain experts come to mistake it. The differing

expert theories will come soon enough, but one of Searle’s points is to first dispel the lingering

beliefs of dualism and materialism (Searle, 1997). In terms of dualism, the idea that two entities

coexist separately, our culture has applied this separatism to the mind and (physical) body since

Plato (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007, p. 3). He mentions how this ‘mind-body dualism’ even has a

partially philosophical aspect to it. That means to say that people traditionally view reality in two

different realms: the soul and the flesh, the mind and the body. In his eyes, this doesn’t offer an

answer to our question because it becomes impossible to do a reduction of consciousnesses with

the existence of two, separate things. He also defeats the misconception of materialism (in

relation to consciousness) with its very own definition. Materialism implies reality is an illusion

and that consciousness essentially does not exist, but this too is a backwards tradition to

understanding our thought. Although Searle may say this in a more biting tone, we must also

reject materialism because we know from our own, separate experiences that our consciousness

‘does’ exist. Now, he just has to explain his own theory.

Searle’s key to consciousness is that it is a biological phenomenon. It is as much a part of

human and animal biology as digestion or the breathing. He implies that the reason

consciousness is so controversial is because we haven’t been able to fully reduce it. And yet we

forget that it still is a natural occurrence just like digestion- we simply know more about

digestion than we do the brain.

Researchers do study after study to help us better understand the brain, which no one

could argue hasn’t helped tremendously. However, Searle says that they may be barking up the

wrong tree here. Instead of believing that consciousness is caused by the brain, Searle argues that

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the human consciousness is a naturally occurring feature of the brain. His chair analogy is a

perfect example to illustrate this. A chair is something that is functionally used to be sat on.

Essentially, it is solid, but we take for granted (so to speak) that the solidity is merely a feature of

the chair. There is no cause or effect: the chair doesn’t cause it to be solid; it being solid is a

naturally occurring aspect.

I agree with Searle on certain aspects, which I will soon explain, however I feel his

perspective immediately denies a lot of equally developed theories floating around. Perhaps it is

his tone in The Mystery of Consciousness, but on consciousness it’s either his way or the

highway (so to speak). For example, in a world of rapidly advancing technology, there’s a

dilemma that exists with Artificial Intelligence: Is it possible to create a computer to mimic the

human mind so that it is fully conscious (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007, pp. 24-25)? Accordingly,

Searle argues not. In terms of replicating the human mind, computers can only do so much. In his

book, the terms Strong AI, Weak AI, and No AI are referenced frequently. A computer with

Strong AI would ideally be able to accomplish full consciousness, as posed above. Searle’s tone

aside, he does explain why Strong AI cannot exist. I appreciate his use of logical examples

throughout his book, they help disprove certain theories, as well as strengthen his point on the

topic of AI: The Chinese Reading Room.

The Chinese Reading Room

This concept consists of putting a person in a room with a script. By feeding them

Chinese words, the person uses the script and can replicate them. On the outside it looks like

they know Chinese, but they don’t need to know anything- all they need to know are the rules to

reading Chinese. Just because someone looks like they’re understanding, doesn’t mean they

understand it. This is Searle’s main counterargument in the face of biology versus technology:

computers may appear to have a consciousness (Strong AI), but it doesn’t make them conscious.

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This brings me to Weak AI, which my views initially identify with. Computers can be

helpful for understanding aspects of consciousness but through my own experience, I doubt they

can replicate the human complexity of consciousness (“Artificial Intelligence,” 2011). I say no to

Strong AI for the same reason we have yet to prove how consciousness arises. John Searle does a

good job at putting this issue into perspective. There are a lot of theories out there, but he stresses

to look at what we hold to be true. I know I am conscious, I know that my biological existence is

natural, and I now know the importance of perspectives when approaching this issue.

(Ch. 1: Consciousness as a Biological Problem, 2007)

Francis Crick on Consciousness

Keeping Searle’s philosophy in mind, I find the interesting contrast in Francis Crick’s

explanation of the origins of consciousness. In his book, he offers The Astonishing Hypothesis to

explain this single unified experience:

“"You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of

personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of

nerve cells and their associated molecules.” (1998)

Before going into detail about what this implies, I’ve realized the importance of first

understanding the authors’ perspectives. Francis Crick was a microbiologist- and a successful

one at that (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007, pp.298-301). A simple educated guess may be that he will

be more likely to ‘reduce’ consciousness (as Searle would put it) to more definitive terms.

Correctly so, his hypothesis boldly attributes consciousness to the subsequent firing of neurons

throughout the vast networks in the brain.

According to Crick, consciousness basically occurs at a very small scale. Neurons that

have a certain action potential fire the exchange of information through the connection of

synapses, which ultimately make up a neural network (“Nerve Signaling,” 2011). With millions

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of these connected throughout our brain, they are responsible for carrying messages about

movement, vision, sensation, and even thought. Therein lies the key to Crick’s understanding of

how consciousness arises. It arises in the brain as a result of the firing of neurons. I make sure to

reiterate this because it isn’t seen as a feature of the brain (aforementioned), but something that

affects it.

Although the first two theories of consciousness bump heads each other, one thing Crick

is ready to point out is how little facts we have about the solution of consciousness (Searle, p.

33). At first the task at hand seems a little more difficult, however this is no surprise. Still, Crick

points us towards the Visual system of the brain for answers. According to his reasoning, this

system may relate to our consciousness because it is something that we’ve come to know very

well. In a nutshell, the Visual system interprets information from visible light stimuli to build a

representation of our environment (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007, p. 54). Stimuli are picked up by the

retina and ultimately follow the optic nerve into the visual cortex of the brain. Here is where a

number of complex tasks relating to consciousness occur: construction of binocular perception,

two-dimensional projections, identification and categorization of visual objects, guiding

movement, and so on.

In my opinion, I believe that this particular system plays a role in the origins of

consciousness, but it isn’t a solution to the other, non-visible aspects of our single unified

experience. After reading his Astonishing Hypothesis; for example, I wonder what implications

does this theory have on the visually impaired- there’s no doubt that they are still conscious

beings. Lastly, I also happen to agree with Searle in that Cricks theory, on a micro level, fails to

explain what are considered qualia.

Qualia

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Qualia are the qualities or properties of mental states (such as consciousness) that lead us

to define the nature of sensory input (“Qualia,” 1998). Searle uses the term semantics as an aide

in this definition. Based on Crick’s theory, focusing on the action of neurons does not explain

why I think something tastes sweet or why you feel so intensely about the Celtics. If Searle were

to debate with Crick, he’d outright say that Crick is thinking completely wrong. Searle says that

“the problem with qualia is not just an aspect of the problem of consciousness; it is the problem

of consciousness,” so regardless of using the visual system to discriminate parts of

consciousness, we are still talking about qualia (Searle, p.28). Nevertheless, Crick’s theory on

consciousness relating to neurons firing and the visual system is still plausible. And never has it

been more important to address the Binding Problem.

Crick’s Solution to The Binding Problem

As I mentioned before, the Binding Problem is difficult because we have yet to fully

understand the brain. Crick recognizes these limitations as well, but I was curious to see his

solution to how he thinks all the brain processes integrate information into a whole, being that he

is more definitive. I still am aware of his perspective in relation to his theory on consciousness.

Accordingly, the Binding Problem “is the problem of how these neurons temporarily become

active as a unit” (Searle, p. 208). His definition, alone, implies a lot of information, but his

solution is the first one I’ve seen that could make sense.

Crick challenges ‘what’ we are really asking ourselves in this Problem; instead of only

asking where the brain integrates information, what if it’s the frequency of the neurons firing?

Crick and his colleagues already knew, for example, that neurons responsive to shape, color, and

movement fire in synchrony at the average range of 40 hertz (firings per second). Likewise, these

neurons have to fire somewhere, which would presumably be an area where all major networks

go through- perhaps the thalamus? Looking towards Crick’s theory of how consciousness arises

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through the firing of neurons, these neurons then play a role in his solution to the binding

problem. Crick poses a comprehensive solution as being the synchronized firing of neurons at

the range of 40 hertz in the networks connecting the Thalamus and the cortex. At this point, I

know a great deal less than Crick and his colleagues may know in the field of Neuroscience, but

their bottom-up approach with proven facts to reach this unique conclusion deserves merit. He

may oppose Searle in many aspects, but despite whether or not he or his perspective is correct,

Crick’s theory offers potential conclusions on consciousness and the Binding Problem through

reasoning with the limited facts we do know about the brain. He didn’t just leave it open ended.

(Ch. 2: Francis Crick, The Binding Problem, and the Hypothesis of Forty Hertz, 1997)

Gerald Edelman on Consciousness

Just like Searle’s views oppose those of Crick’s, one person who has actually caught his

attention is Gerald Edelman. Considering his neurobiological background, this makes a lot of

sense. In fact, he may exhibit a similar tone as Searle, because he argues that a neurobiological

background forms the perspective you ‘must’ have in order to successfully theorize

consciousness. The key word here is successfully, because as I’ve come to realize, any

perspective can produce a theory of consciousness. But if we plan to take a perspective seriously,

he states that such a background needs to be germane; the answer to consciousness will not be

found in quantum physics, philosophical speculation, or computer programming.

Edelman has come to reach his theory of consciousness with a stressed importance on the

structure of the brain. In a similar fashion to Francis Crick, Edelman’s theory is derived from the

many neural structures in the brain, which we know fire simultaneously. However, instead of

focusing at such a small level, he bridges the relationship between these certain neural structures

and higher order processes.

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First we must analyze consciousness at the neural level. Among the neural structures in

the brain, Edelman draws upon maps, which essentially recreate a pattern of activity. For

example, some sheets of neurons reproduce the similar pattern of activity on the retina at the

back of the eye. But in terms of maps in Psychology, Edelman’s theory applies this idea more

broadly, mapping not just sensory input, but the other types of neural activity as well. The basis

of his theory of consciousness relies on ‘re-entrant connections’ that connect all of this into a

whole system. These connections allow a flow of activity back and forth, thus providing us with

Edelman’s theory of consciousness in his book Bright Air, Brilliant Fire:

“the re-entrant connections between neuronal groups in different parts of the brain

coordinate impressions from different senses to provide a coherent, consistent, continuous

experience.” (1992)

I find it very interesting how Charles Darwin and his findings now apply to consciousness (as

explained above) with the term Neural Darwinism (Cofer, 2002). Essentially, this is what makes

Edelman’s theory work. In terms of maps, some patterns are reinforced by experience, whereas

others are ultimately eliminated in a selective process that closely resembles (Darwin’s)

evolution. I assume this is attributed to our consciousness by our ability to be conscious given

the everchanging stimuli input we experience everyday.

And yet, Edelman’s theory of consciousness places a heavy reliance on higher order

processes. Differing far from Crick’s views, Edelman looks towards the functions of concepts,

which are maps of maps. Concepts arise from the brain recategorizing its own activity. In this

sense, Edelman says that concepts, alone, constitute as Primary Consciousness (aka First-Order).

Accordingly, human consciousness also features a Secondary Consciousness (concepts about

concepts), language, and a concept of self, all built on the foundation of first-order concepts.

Overall, this seems to be a very comprehensive conclusion about how our consciousness arises

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as a result of our brain interacting with our environment. It appears he’s covered both sides. So

far, I agree most with Edelman’s theory because it makes a lot of sense, given that the

assumptions are all true. One of Searle’s critiques is that he seems to find this theory to be more

of a hypothesis, but regardless, the topic of this paper is to draw on what we don’t know. As I

continue to reach my own theory, Edelman’s theory is a great aide, and so is his solution to the

Binding Problem.

Edelman’s Solution to The Binding Problem

As mentioned in class, Edelman’s 6 Point Model of Consciousness provides us with an

answer to how we integrate stimuli into a unified experience. Each of the 6 must be met, and the

first five consist of what I think of as common sense-however not for a computer, though. In

order for consciousness to occur, we need to have a memory system, a learning system, a

physical self (to distinguish among others), the ability to categorize concepts and things as events

in time, and the ability to attribute value to something. The sixth point, which is where I see

Edelman’s solution to the binding problem, is that there needs to be re-entry. By maintaining a

reciprocal relationship between stimuli within the system, everything in the brain affects each

other process and comes back. So instead of neurons firing at a rate of 40 hertz (Crick), Edelman

sees the solution as the existence of a re-entry system which allows us to integrate everything

into a single unified experience. The research used to reach this solution also deals with Artificial

Intelligence. Edelman is known to be against Strong AI by saying “the brain is not a computer.”

Moreover, I support his usage of Weak AI with the robot Darwin III, where computers can

mimic certain functions of the brain. Ultimately, Edelman was able to distinguish certain

modalities that he then referenced in Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (Edelman, pp. 90-93).

(Ch. 3: Gerald Edelman and Re-Entry Mapping, 1997)

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Daniel Dennett on Consciousness

Lastly, the views on consciousness of Daniel Dennett are worth mentioning because

again, it brings perspective to this issue. With my almost-solidified understanding of

consciousness and the Binding Problem, I find it important to use Daniel Dennett as my devil’s

advocate. To be honest, I take the three aforementioned viewpoints seriously, but the same

cannot be said for Dennett. Still, we must take in all perspectives because they also show us what

may be completely wrong. In his book Consciousness Explained, Dennett presents the idea that

we are mistaken in terms of our views on consciousness. Apparently, it may seem as though we

all have subjective feelings/experiences, which I still hold to be true, but instead these are simple

“misjudgments” of what is really happening. Right away, this denies the existence of qualia and

inner mental states, which is a fundamental part to Searle’s views. Merely out of curiosity, what

really is happening according to Dennett? Essentially, he relies on the biology of our brains to

provide a different concept of consciousness through third-person phenomena.

Basically, Dennett argues that humans have “stimulus inputs”, like the sensation of heat

on your skin for example, that trigger our “reactive dispositions” to act in response to this.

Ultimately, our “discriminative states” cause us to respond differently depending on the stimulus

inputs (Brown, 2001). This means that I might pull my hand away (due to discriminative states)

because it got too hot. Dennett’s alternative view of consciousness is that our current

understanding of conscious states is wrong; instead there is nothing ‘there’ except a brain

implementing the “programs” of behaviors I just listed.

There are so many different ways that I would like to critique Dennett’s work, but to put

it simply, he denies the idea that we have subjective feelings. If this is true, we aren’t acting as

truly conscious beings, instead we’re considered more like a computer. The fact that we might

have discriminative states implies that our consciousness is basically a “virtual machine” in our

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brain. Searle subtly (as well as overtly) critiques Dennett with the usage of words like machine,

computer, software, and program to demonstrate our similarity to artificial intelligence. Right

away the reader can sense his preference towards a Strong AI, especially when he explains what

we think we feel isn’t really there. Again, there may be some people who agree with Dennett’s

subsequent denial of consciousness, but his reasoning tells me I’m not one of those.

(Ch. 5: Consciousness Denied: Daniel Dennett’s Account, 1997)

My Views on Consciousness

At this point, it becomes almost impossible to analyze four theories of consciousness and

not come up with one of your own. Again, I want to reiterate that my knowledge of the brain

may not be as extensive as Searle’s, but we all have an equal shot at how consciousness arises.

First, I start with what I know. I know that at this very moment I am conscious. I know that my

brain is the sine qua non of my existence, and therein lies my consciousness. But as I attempt to

answer how it arises, I find that my views are a hybrid of Edelman’s theory of conscious.

I believe that consciousness arises as a result of memory and a continuous exchange of

data or information between the different regions of the brain- from the cerebral cortex, to the

thalamus, and everything in between. Information about one’s surroundings enters the brain,

travels to all pertinent regions while adding onto this information, and back again carrying a

cohesive understanding of the environment in relation to the self (or vice versa). Most

importantly, I derive our sense of self, our thoughts, and subjective feelings from Edelman’s

usage of Neural Darwinist ideas. As this constant exchange occurs, I find that the neural

networks in certain regions will be reinforced whereas others may not. By the existence of long-

term memory and working memory that remembers reinforcement and re-evaluates information

accordingly comes the cognizance of actions and self. I prefer this application of Neural

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Darwinism because it helps put a natural perspective to our higher order thought processes in

relation to everything else around us.

My Solution to The Binding Problem

In regards to my fairly ambiguous understanding of how consciousness arises, I also find

a possible solution to the Binding Problem. Edelman offered the phenomenon of re-entry as a

way to bring about a unified experience, but I feel that re-entry, or my concept of reinforced,

continual exchange is only an aspect to it. Accordingly, perhaps the single unified experience is

actually an organized, unintegrated yet perceivable experience in real time. And as time passes, I

hypothesize that working memory then takes this organization and encodes it into long-term

memory as a unified whole. Generally, this may solve the binding problem, as well as explain

how our conscious states change over time, under the assumption that the continuous flow of

information is re-categorized/re-evaluated when the memory system recalls it.

Conclusion

To say the least, I understand Searle’s intention to explain this lingering “mystery” of

consciousness. I’m not saying that my views on consciousness are correct- in fact I’m sure that

some of them are blatantly wrong- but that is the point of recognizing perspectives. As you gain

one perspective, you can compare and contrast it with the next, and so on. Although we don’t

have a proven answer to the origins of consciousness, let alone the binding problem, I am now

more advanced in my understanding of the topic than I was before. At first, I only knew the basic

functions of the brain and the definition of consciousness from what we had in class. In

hindsight, I presumed consciousness was due to some sort of brain activity, but because the brain

is so complex, I hadn’t thought of any possibilities. John Searle’s perspective taught me to re-

evaluate my own as well as others. It isn’t necessarily what we don’t know that makes us right or

wrong, but the approach that one uses to get there. Then, Francis Crick’s perspective taught me

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the importance of these brain functions on a small scale. Gerald Edelman, however, provided me

with a coherent theory that closely aligned with my understanding of topics I’ve come to learn

this semester. While still maintaining perspective, I eventually reached my view on

consciousness and the binding problem through Daniel Dennett who reminded me how wrong or

right our views can be without any proven solution. Regardless of being able to reduce

consciousness to definitive terms, I still learned a lot more facts that derived from research. Take

my stance on Artificial Intelligence as an example. In the beginning of the year, I was aware of

the limits of my own knowledge so I tied my views to there being No Artificial intelligence.

Now with my understanding of cognitive psychology and my own thoughts, this paper shows

how that, too, has changed.

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S m i t h , E . , K o s s l y n , S . ( 2 0 0 7 ) . C o g n i t i v e P s y c h o l o g y M i n d a n d B r a i n .

U p p e r S a d d l e R i v e r : P e a r s o n E d u c a t i o n , I n c .

W i l l i a m s , G a r y. ( 1 9 9 7 , O c t o b e r 1 9 ) . T h e b i n d i n g p r o b l e m . R e t r i e v e d

f r o m h t t p : / / p h i l o s o p h y a n d p s y c h o l o g y. c o m / ? p = 1 8

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The Origins of Consciousness

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