The Origin of Determination

8/7/2019 The Origin of Determination

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The Origin of Determination

in the Neoplatonism of Proclus

D. Gregory MacIsaacCOLLEGEOFTHE HUMANITIES

CARLETON UNIVERSITY

Philosophy has as its task not only the discovery of thedeterminations into which all things fall, but also theexplanation of how these determinations arise. In Procluswe may distinguish three related sorts of determinations.

First, there are the determinations which emerge withinany given taxis in the hierarchy of all things and whichmay be thought of as its content, such as the intelligiblegenera in Intellect (Nous), or the various animal species inthe material world. Second are the determinations whichgive a particular taxis its overall character, such as thesimplicity of the henads, or the temporality of souls.Finally, there are the determinations which emergethrough discursive thinking itself, the logoi through which

we grasp the determinations of all things. What follows isan account of the character and origin of these relatedsorts of determination in Proclus' system.

I

Proclus is the most important figure in AthenianNeoplatonism. Living in the fifth century A.D., he wasDiadochos, the Successor or Head, of the PlatonicAcademy, in the generation before its closure by theEmperor Justinian. His philosophy manifests the matureform of pagan Greek thought, in which the principles ofPlatonic and Aristotelian philosophy reached their fullestelaboration. In some ways Hegels judgement is fair, thatProclus philosophy is the culmination of Greek thought, inwhich the sensuous world has disappeared and the wholebeen raised into spirit. It is certainly true that in Procluswe often find a full working out of positions which arepresent in a more seminal form in earlier thinkers.


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The first principle in Neoplatonism is the One, or Good,from which all things unfold. The One transcends allcategories of Being, as Plato says in the Republic. Wecannot oppose a pagan necessitated emanation to a

Christian free creation, because the One is above anydetermination which could be imposed upon it bynecessity. We find in Proclus the One as the first principlefrom which all things unfold according to a triadic rule ofremaining, procession, and return. This triadic unfoldingstructures the universe, making a hierarchy of unity andmultiplicity. Things which emerge from the One first aremore similar to their principle than are later things,according to the Neoplatonic rule of similarity of effect to

cause. Hence the universe is a hierarchy which beginsfrom absolute simplicity, and unfolds stepwise into everincreasing multiplicity.

The One is also the Good. There is a general identificationof unity and good, because the good of any particularthing is the unity that makes it be the sort of things that itis. Thus in hierarchically ordered causes and effects, theeffects attain their good by receiving the unity which isappropriate to them from their causes, a unity which isless strong than that of their causes. So there is a two-foldmotion in the unfolding of all things from the One. Theprocession (proodos) through which an effect emergesgives rise to a reversion (epistroph), which is an eroticstriving back after its cause.

From this fundamentally erotic ontology comes the priorityof intelligible moment over intellectual moment, in themovement of thinking. Thought desires its object, and so

the object must be a prior unity from which thinkingissues, as a procession from and reversion upon it. Thispriority of intelligible over intellectual is important,because the greater part of the spiritual world in Proclusconsists of cognitive entities. The determinations intowhich things fall in Proclus play out within thishierarchically ordered unfolding motion. Therefore, insearching for the origin of determination in the Proclineuniverse, we must focus on the unity afforded to a thing

through its reversion upon, or failure to revert upon, itsown cause.


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Proclus hierarchical universe is more detailed than whatwe find in Plotinus, and he is often accused of needlesslymultiplying entities. This is not a fair accusation. Proclusdoes not so much widen the scope of the Plotinian spiritual

world, as subject it to a detailed analysis. The triadicmotion of remaining, procession and return whichstructures Proclus universe is such that there is apotentially infinite internal regress in any term, becauseeach term shares the structure of the whole. For example,the intelligible moment ofNous is such that each of itsthree moments, Being, Eternity,Autozion, participates inthe other two moments, according to Proclus principlethat each thing is in each thing, according to its own

mode. So Being will have a triadic structure, in which eachmoment in the triad participates in the other two, and soon. The many entities in his system can be thought of asmoments in the continuous unfolding of power from theOne which are isolated for us by the dividing activity ofdiscursive reason itself, moments which Plotinus speaks ofin a less detailed manner as the hypostases ofNous andSoul. For this reason any attempt to give an exhaustiveschema of Proclus spiritual hierarchy will fail. He has

alternate versions, because any such elaboration is likedividing Aristotles potentially infinitely divisible line.Therefore, the catalogue which follows is not exhaustive.

Immediately after the One come the principles of FirstLimit and First Unlimited. Limit and Unlimited runthroughout the entire hierarchy, conferring upon all thingstheir fixed identity as well as their productive power. Afterthese principles come a class of unities, the henads. Thehenads are the first determinations into which theuniverse falls, and while immitating the absolute simplicityand fertility of the One, they differ from it in that there aremany of them. From the henads proceed chains ofcausation, or seirai, modelled after the trains of the godsfrom Platos Phaedrus. The henads are above Being, whichfor Proclus is the first moment in Intellect (Nous).

Nous for Proclus is divided into three primay orders(taxeis): intelligible (noton), intelligible and intellectual

(noton kai noeron), and intellectual (noeron). Thesetaxeis are identified as Being, Life, and Nous proper. Each


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determinations of certain important taxeis. Here we willlook at the determinations which could be thought of asthe contentof each taxis. In section IV we will discuss thedeterminations which give each taxis its overall character.

The One itself is beyond all determination. Its need totranscend determination in order to be the source of alldeterminations is similar to Aristotles description of theindeterminacy of passive Nous, or of the point which isable to observe the motions of all the sense organs,because it is determined to none of them. However, hereit is a matter of power. The One is absolutely simplebecause it is completely powerful, and any determination

would be a diminution of its power. Limit and Unlimited,likewise, seem to be above all determination as principlesof the determinate, in the sense that it is thepredominance of Limit or Unlimited which constitutes anygiven determination. Limit and Unlimited appear in lowertaxeis: as Same and Other, Rest and Motion, and otherpairs of opposed terms, the combination of which makes adeterminate mixture (mikton).

The henads are really the first determinate principles in

the universe. They are the result of the application to theOne of the metaphysical rule that any monadic principlegenerates not only effects which stand as a lower taxis,but co-ordinate terms that hold a lower place in the sametaxis. So the first term, or monad, of the taxis ofNousgenerates lesser noes, and the monad of Soul generatessouls. So too does the One generate henads. The monadof any taxis is imparticipable by lower taxeis, so all thingsreceive their unity through participation, not in the One

itself, but in their proper henad. The henads are abovebeing, so in the strict sense they cannot be thought. Anydiscussion of them is a discussion of their analogicalcounterparts in discursive speech. The character whichmakes the henads what they are is the simplicity whichthey share with the One. And it is this character whichmakes it very difficult to understand how they could bemutually distinct. Proclus thinks that each henad also hasits own particular character. This character is often

described in relation to the series (seirai) which dependfrom them. Sometimes this description is in terms of


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general cosmic functions, such as presiding over theremaining. the procession, or the return of things, or interms of particular terms which manifest the character ofthe seira as a whole, such as the god Apollo, or the visible

sun, or the various levels of the Circle figure. In general,the henads are ordered insofar as they preside over moreuniversal or more particular beings.

Seeing that the distinction between henads is oftenphrased in terms of subsequent entities, it is a veryimportant question whether a henad is primitively thecharacter which it bestows on its seira, or whether in factit is named according to the character which only emerges

in its seira. We will discuss this at length in a later sectionof this study. For the moment, however, we will anticipateour discussion, and say that the character which a henadpossesses in common with its seira, and which it somehowbestows on its seira, both exists primitively in the henadand emerges with the seira as a whole. It is this primaryidiots which makes the henads mutually distinct. But howcan things which are absolute simplicities have differentcharacters in the first place? It seems that Proclus usesthe pure principle of procession itself in order to explainhow henads have different characters. If monads give riseto things which are similar to themselves before thosewhich are dissimilar, then the monad which is the Oneitself will gives rise to henads which are arranged in ahierarchy. Those closer to the One preside over moreuniversal beings, while those further away over morepartial, and so some henads preside over Being, othersover Life, Nous, Soul, or Body. The question remains,however, how things whose only character is simplicitycould also have distinct characters. Should they not beidentical in their simplicity? In fact, they should not.Edward Butler has argued that the distinctions whichemerge in the next lower taxis, in Being, are such they aremutually mediating; their identity is bound up with theirdifference. So Rest is Rest, not only because of its self-identity, but through is difference from Motion. Further,both Rest and Motion are identical through a third term,Being, insofar as they are both Beings. This sort of mutual

distinction mediated by other terms, according to Butler,


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would destroy the operative character of the henads,namely their simplicity. Hence he suggests a persuasiveinterpretation of the henads: that it is precisely by beingunique and individual that each henad imitates the

simplicity of the One. Their simplicity, like the simplicity ofthe One, is a sign of their excess of power. So it is by eachbeing simple, like the One, that they have the power toconfer on other things the character (idiots) which eachhas, and they preside over more universal or more partialbeings, just as the One itself as the first presides over allthings. So this is the first sort of determination within ataxis which we find in Proclus: a distinction betweensimple henads whose pure procession dictates that they

have different characters, and whose superfluity of powerestablishes different seira of beings.

Within the taxis ofNous as a whole, Proclus distinguishesbetween the intelligible, intelligible and intellectual, andintellectual taxeis. Our discussion of the determinationswhich emerge within Nous will be restricted to theintelligible taxeis. The intelligible moment ofNous as awhole is Being, but it is further subdivided into Being,Eternity, and theAutozion. These three are not co-ordinate, but rather are hierarchically ordered moments,each called an intelligible triad. Being, as the firstintelligible triad, is also called the One-Being by Proclus,as the unified principle of the sort of determinateexistence which belongs to all beings, and as below theOne itself. The One in the One-Being is not the One itself,but the One which goes with Being. The One-Being, or justBeing, is not itself determined into different sorts ofbeings, but rather is the principle of the sort ofdetermination by which one being marks itself off fromanother by having certain characteristics, unlike the sortof mutual distinction of pure procession possessed by thehenads. Being, as the principle of this sort ofdetermination, gives rise to Eternity, as the moment ofpower (dunamis), which itself gives rise to theAutozion.

TheAutozion is the paradigm of the Timaeus, accordingto Proclus. It is the place of the primary Forms, which areidentified with the Greatest Kinds (megista gen) of Plato's

Sophist. So it is in theAutozion that the multiplicity of


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intelligible genera, the primary determinations into whichall beings fall, occur. They do not occur in Eternity, whichis the principle of their being brought to birth, and is a sortof principle of fertility, and they do not occur in Being

itself. Rather, according to Proclus, the intelligible generastrive for the unity of Being itself, but in failing to achieveits unity they make themselves many. This is the same asPlotinus account ofNous, in which Nous makes itselfmany through its failure to grasp the One, but Proclusmore detailed analysis situates such a motion even withinthe intelligible moment ofNous itself.

One should never forget that for Proclus these elements of

the spiritual world are not dead categories. The intelligiblegenera are living minds, which despite residing in theintelligible taxis ofNous as whole, share in the self-consciousness which emerges fully in the intellectualtaxis, albeit in an intelligible manner. They are livingminds which gain their respective determinations througha cognitive return on Being itself. They desire their cause,and they seek to be reunited with their cause in theirgrasp of it. However, the moment of return in Proclus isalways both a success and a failure; it is the moment inwhich the power of the cause comes to be possessed bythe effect, but possessed in a deficient manner, due to thedeficiency of the effect. That there are many intelligiblegenera is due to the fact that none of them is able tocapture all of what Being itself is. Each understands theunity which the One-Being is in its own manner, andmakes itself to be only a limited grasp of Being, ratherthan the whole of Being. Of course, each also shares ineach other, and as Plotinus says, each is all and all areeach. However, their limitation to a particular grasp ofbeing is what determines them as different Forms. In thissense, each of the primary Forms can be thought of as adeficiency. Each fails to be the One-Being, and each failsin its own particular manner. As J. Trouillard points out,this is a general principle in Procline metaphysics. Theeffect multiplies the power of its cause, as a sort ofcompensation for its inability to instantiate the power ofits cause in a singular manner:


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Le procdant compense ainsi dans une certaine mesure

lcart de sa procession. Il fair prolifrer ses puissances et

les diversifie, parce qutant plus faible que son principe il

ne peut assimilar dun seul coup la plnitude de sa

communication ni participer dune seule faon sa propre

gense. Cette complication ne fera que crotre au fur et

mesure que nous descendrons les degres de la

procession, cest--dire des ngations, jusqu lme.

So the determinations which emerge in theAutozion arethe determinations produced by thinking itself. Thinkingitself is a return upon an object which precedes thethinker and is desired by the thinker. Insofar as the objectis more unified than the thinker it is not grasped, butinsofar as it is grasped it is made many by the thinker.Being is not only the One-Being. Being is a processionfrom the One-Being into the multiplicity of intelligiblegenera, so in that sense the intelligible genera in the

Autozion do grasp being. More properly, in their failedgrasp of the One-Being they generate themselves as thearticulation of Being. It is this that Proclus means by givingthe name Being (ousia) both to the first intelligible triad,and to the intelligible moment ofNous as a whole, whichalso encompasses the second and third intelligible triads.Further, Proclus thinks that each of the determinationswhich emerge in theAutozion stand in a seriesdepending from the henads, so that in some manner eachForm in theAutozion has as its principle not only Eternityand the One-Being, but a particular henad.

Like Nous, Soul has hierarchically ordered internalarticulations. However, Proclus does not usually give thestatus of a taxis to these articulations. That being said,

there is a similar relation between the essence (ousia) ofSoul and its activity (energeia) as between the intelligible


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and the intellectual taxeis ofNous. The ousia of the Soul isa fullness oflogoi, which stand as the object for thecognitive grasp which Soul has of itself through itsenergeia. The energeia of the Soul is a projection

(probol), or throwing forth oflogoi, describedmetaphorically as an unfolding or unrolling of the hiddenlogoi in the Souls ousia. Discursive reason, or philosophy,is for Proclus the projection of these logoi. So we candistinguish in the Soul two general sorts ofdeterminations: the logoi in the Souls ousia, and theprojected logoi. However, we should refrain from thinkingof these as two completely separate levels. Rather,Proclus thinks of the Soul as a self-development, from

ousia, through dunamis, to energeia. The ousia of the Soulis also its moment of remaining in Nous, so one couldthink of its ousia equally as a point of origin for theunfolding ofNous which the Soul is, or as a dividedreflection ofNous. The second description is prominent inProclus discussion of the Timaeus, because in theTimaeus Plato describes the structure of the Souls ousiain terms of ratios (logoi) and proportions (analogiai). Thefirst description is prominent when Proclus describes

dianoia as an unfolding ofNous.The projected logoi are unfoldings, or unrollings of theSouls own ousia, which is its participation in Nous. Theirproduction is a generation of a new level ofdeterminations, one more multiple than the source whichthey seek to unroll. Proclus describes the Souls thinkingmetaphorically as a sort of circling dance around thecentre which is Nous. Each of the logoi which the Soulprojects is a point on the circumference of the circle,grasping the centre from its own perspective. For thisreason the Forms which reside in Nous cannot be capturedin philosophical thinking, but rather are the inexhaustiblesources of philosophy. Here again we see the productionof internal determinations as the function of an eroticreversion upon a higher unity. The Soul desires to haveitself conscious to itself, and projects logoi through itsdesire to return upon itself. The success of this projection,and the fulfillment of this eros, is not some sort of

sufficient grasp ofNous by dianoetic logoi. Instead,


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dianoia points the Soul beyond itself, to a nosis whichleaves projected logoi behind altogether.

The determinations which emerge in the taxis of Body are

not the project of an erotic reversion. As J. Trouillard oftenpointed out, the Soul is the centre of the Procline cosmos,as the point where the increasing complexity of theunfolding cosmos begins to turn into a dispersal. It is herethat the power which flows from the One begins to fail andmove towards the deficient indeterminacy of matter. Themost important determination which emerges in the taxisof Body is three dimensionality, or bulk. Thisdetermination is an image of the geometrical

determinations which belong to the Souls discursivethought. Body does not desire or think, and so it cannotgain its determination through the sort of cognitivereversion which we find in Soul and Nous. Instead, Body isthe external activity of Soul, like the radiant heat from afire. This is a common description of the relation betweentaxeis in Proclus, but unlike the higher taxeis, any externalactivities which bodies may have are not such as to behypostasized as a lower taxis. Proclus uses a beautifulimage to describe the bulk of bodies as a sort ofexhalation from their seminal logoi. Of course, there areother sorts of determinations which emerge with body: themultiplicity of individuals which fall under various animalor plant species, and all of qualities and relations, etc.,which make up the sensible world. Although thesedeterminations are not the product of a cognitive return,they still stand in a relation to their causes as a deficientmultiplicity to a higher unity. For example, the species dogincludes the idea of having a certain range of colours.Individual dogs do not possess this range, but rather aparticular colour or combination of colours. In this sense,the species is more unified, because it is not coloured, andmore fertile, because it is the principle of the multiplicityof colours exhibited by individual dogs.

III

What this examination of the internal determinations of

various taxeis has illustrated is that for Proclus the entireuniverse is ordered according to the principle ofanalogia.


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The determinations which emerge in each taxis are animage of the determinations of the taxis which lies aboveit, so there is an analogy which holds between all taxeis ofhis universe. A given taxis most often makes itself into an

image of its cause through its cognitive reversion, but thisis not always the case. In all cases, a given taxis isconsidered by Proclus to be, in a sense, the same contentas its upper neighbour, translated to a greater level ofmultiplicity. This is expressed in another way by thedoctrine of series, or seirai, which depend from thehenads. Each term in a seira manifests the character ofthe entire seira in its own manner, a manner which ismore multiple than the previous term. So each term in a

seira is a multiple image of its predecessor, which is itselfa multiple image, tracing the relation of image andparadigm back to the henad.

In Procluss universe, all things below the One have athreefold existence: as a principle in their causes, in theirown proper manner of existing, and as an image in theireffects. Analogy works by similarity. Causes bring intoexistence like things before unlike, so the analogy whichholds between all taxeis is a function of the similarity ofeach effect to its cause in the previous taxis. Proclusoccasionally gives examples of the analogy which holds ina given seira, such as his description of the seira of figure,and the seira of the circle. The passage which describesthe seira of the circle, in particular, displays the similaritywhich holds from the highest to the lowest members,running through all of the taxeis.

Proclus doctrine of analogy has been discussed before,

and we do not intend here to rehearse all of its aspects.But what we wish to point out is that Proclus ownemphasis, and that of his modern commentators, is on theidentity which holds between different taxeis due to theiranalogia. Procluss description of the seira of the circle isintended to show how each member is somehow the sameas all the others, in its own manner. What we wish to focuson in the remainder of this study is not the identity but thedifference between taxeis, and to see what being the

same in its own manner means.


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IV

We have examined the determinations which could bethought of as the content of each taxis. Here we will look

at the determinations which give each taxis its overallcharacter. The character of a taxis as a whole isdetermined by its monad, whether that be the One, Nous,or Soul, or any one of the more intermediate monads.Causation in a seira is commonly referred to in thecontemporary literature as vertical causation, whilecausation within taxis is called horizontal causation. Thisspatial metaphor is serviceable, as long as its limitationsare realized. So we can say that the determination of any

given entity is to a great extent due to the confluence ofvertical and horizontal causes. That is to say, because ofthe analogia which holds between taxeis, any given entitymanifests the character which it has in common with othermembers of its seira, and which it receives ultimately fromthe henad at the head of its seira. But it manifests thischaracter according to the particular sort of determinationwhich characterises the taxis as a whole: henadically,noetically, noerically, discursively, mathematically, inbodily manner, or in a manner belonging to someintermediate taxis.

What we should notice is that each taxis gives rise to anew sort of overall determination, one which does notexist in any of the higher taxeis. This is not the converseof the principle ofanalogia, but an important part of it.Similarity is not identity, but rather the togetherness ofidentity and difference. Hence the principle ofanalogiameans that the same things exist in different taxeis indifferent manners. Proclus description of the seira of thecircle, for example, is intended to show the identity whichholds between members. But it just as strongly showstheir difference, and how each is circular in its ownmanner. Indeed, none of the members of this seira whichhe enumerates are in fact what we would initially think ofas circles, because the mathematical circle is left out ofthe catalogue. Rather, they are each something else whichmay metaphorically be called circular.


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Each taxis originates in a monad, which itself isunparticipated by lower taxeis, but gives rise to theparticipated members of its own taxis. This monadpossesses primarily (prts) and causally (archiks) the

character it confers on the taxis as a whole, and there isonly one such monad which possesses this character inthis manner. That is to say, there is only one Being, oneLife, one Nous and so on that is Being, Life, or Nous in theprimary manner and such as to confer being, life, andnous on other things. Proclus says that the same holds ofeach of the Forms. This means that even within each taxisthere is a hierarchical ordering, such that each member isboth similar to and different from its monad. However,

what interests us is the relation between taxeis as awhole. Soul possesses in a secondary manner the Formswhich Nous possesses primarily, and so is an image ofNous. The taxis ofNous itself originates the determinationwhich we may call cognition, if we speak generally. Thehenads are above thought, so Nous is the first hypostasiswhich grasps itself in thought. Therefore it possesses thisdetermination primarily (prts), so that the thinking ofSoul is secondary (deuters) with regard to Nous, and

causally (archiks), in that Souls thinking is caused byNous. So Souls thinking is a secondary attempt to graspthe intelligibles in Nous, just as Nous' thinking is a primarygrasp of itself as intelligible. However, Soul also originatesa character which it possessesprts and archiks. This isthe temporal division of its thinking. It is the temporality ofSoul which marks the manner in which it possesses theForms (eid) ofNous. In other words, what Nous possesses

prts and archiks it confers on Soul in a secondarymanner. But Soul possesses this noetic charactersecondarily according to the determination which it itselfpossessesprts and archiks.

My argument is that in Proclus each taxis possesses anoverall determination which is primitive to that order,because it is primitive to the monad of that order. Further,according to Proclus this primitive character is not causedby any higher principle. This is behind his striking doctrineof the self-constituted (authupostaton). The term self-constitution strikes us because it seems peculiar for


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something to give rise to itself. Self-constitution is really aform of self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency (to autarkes) is aprinciple which is explained but not argued for in theElements of Theologypropositions 9 and 10. The self-

sufficient provides itself with its own well being (eu). It isable of itself to fulfill itself with its own good. The self-sufficient still participates in the Good itself, and shows itssecondary nature in that it needs to be fulfilled with good.

The Good itself is above fulfillment.

How the self-sufficient can both be itself the principle of itsown good, and be dependent on the Good itself isexplained in the propositions on self-constitution in the

Elements of Theology, and in a passage on the self-sufficient from the Platonic Theologywhich Dodds refersus to. In Platonic Theology1.19, Proclus explains thatthere are different sorts of self-sufficiency for each taxis.In effect, self-sufficiency is the ability to give oneself thegood which is appropriate to ones taxis. For this reasonthe members of any seira do not step outside of their ownproper station, but rather receive the good which isappropriate to their nature. And the self-sufficiency ofhenads, intellects, souls, and even of the visible cosmos istheir ability to participate in their causes in such a waythat they receive their good in their own manner. In thispassage, Proclus even distinguishes between the differentsorts of self-sufficiency appropriate to different levels, ineffect applying the principle to the principle. If self-sufficiency is the principle that each taxis gives itself itsgood in its own manner, then in this text Proclus says thateven self-sufficiency itself shows this variation amongtaxeis, and is not identical for all things. For each of thehenads is itself a goodness (agathots), and so is self-sufficient through itself, while Nous is self-sufficientthrough participation (kata methexin), Soul throughirradiation (kath ellampsin), and the cosmos throughsimilarity (kath homoiotta). Proclus expresses this inanother way. All Nous is agathoeids, but notautagathots norprts agathon. In other words, becausein Proclus one and good are convertible, each henad is notonly a one, it is a good. So good, as much as one, is the

determination which the monad of the taxis of henads,


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which is the One itself, confers on its taxis. Therefore eachof the henads, and only the henads, is a goodprts andarchiks. Nous, insofar as it confers upon itself its owngood, does so in a manner which is marked by its own

determination, which is Form and cognition. Therefore it isnot itself good, but rather agathoeids, or boniform, withthe emphasis on Form.

The self-sufficient is not the same as the self-constituted,although everything that is self-constituted is self-sufficient. It is clear that Proclus thinks the henads areself-sufficient, but it is not clear whether or not he thinksthey are self-constituted. He only mentions self-

constitution in relation to the gods in one inconclusivepassage. I think myself that the henads are not self-constituted, because self-constitution is the sort of self-sufficiency which comes through reversion (epistroph),and the henads are above reversion. Carlos Steel hasargued persuasively that self-constitution comes throughself-reversion, in Proclus. The causal motion by whichNous and Soul come to be is one of remaining, procession,and reversion (mon,proodos, epistroph). This triad isthe parallel ofousia, dunamis, energeia. The moment ofepistroph is thus the activity which issues from the ousiaand dunamis ofNous, or of Soul. This activity is anepistroph, because it is the moment in which a cognitivebeing tries to grasp itself consciously. It is actually moreproper to say that cognition is defined with reference toepistroph than the reverse. For Proclus knowledge in thetrue sense is an epistroph by which one comes topossess both oneself and ones cause. Reversion is alwaysa reversion both upon oneself, and through oneself uponones cause. It is through this epistroph that Nous andSoul receive their good, so epistroph is an erotic striving.If it is through epistroph that Nous and Soul receive theirgood, and both are self-constituted, then it is throughepistroph that Nous and Soul tender to themselves theirown good. One and Good are convertible, so the mannerin which Nous and Soul receive their good is also theparticular unity which belongs to them as taxeis. In otherwords, for the self-constituted the particular determination

which the taxis originates is their manner ofepistroph. Or


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to put it more strongly, the determination which Nousgives rise to is self-constitution itself, i.e. receiving onesgood through self-reversion, and the determination whichSoul gives rise to is a secondary sort of self-constitution,

i.e. temporal self-reversion. Because this self-reversionmeasured by Time is a motion from one intelligible objectto another it is called self-motion, or autokinsis. Thus wefind self-sufficiency, self-constitution, and self-motion ashierarchically arranged manners of conferring ones goodupon oneself. And it is through these three principles thatthe henads, Nous, and Soul confer upon themselves theoverall determination which is primitive to their order,while Body gives itself its determination in a more

deficient manner.

So it seems that the taxis of henads receives its overaldeterminate character from the One itself. Each henad isself-sufficient and possesses its good without need for theinternal articulation which arises in Nous. Each is its owncharacter through its own simplicity, just as the One issimple. However, the taxis of henads has anothercharacter than unity, and that is the fact that there aremany of them. Each member of this manifold is simple,because the One is its monad, but that there is a manifoldat all cannot be due to the character of the One. The Oneis the cause of the existence of the henads, for sure, butnot of their multiplicity, because it confers unity on them.What has emerged is the numerical multiplicity whichcomes from procession itself, because they are formallyidentical yet numerically distinct, and this multiplicity willincrease with each successive taxis. And the principle ofthis numerical multiplication is not the One, but ratherFirst Limit and First Infinity. This supposition, however, iscontroversial, as there are scholars who place Limit andInfinity below the henads.

Nous is self-sufficient through self-constitution, or throughthe multiplicity of self-reversion. So Nous is self-constituted insofar as it gives itself its own good. But italso participates in the Good through the henads.

Therefore self-constitution is not what it initially might

seem. Nous does not bring itself into existence. Rather itdetermines for itself its own manner of existing. While it is


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due to the One that Nous is, it is due to itself that Nous isthe way that it is. Nous produces itself both as Being andas Nous, as thought and thinker and the overcoming ofthis division. Note that the numerical multiplicity which

emerged with the procession of henads is present in Nousas well, through the distinction between the monad ofNous and the particular noes. Each taxis originates its ownoverall determination, and passes it on to its effects.

So with Nous two overall determinations emerge whichgives the taxis as a whole its character. Nous is both thegeneration of internal multiplicity and the overcoming ofthis multiplicity in the self-coinciding which is self-

cognition. Its internal differentiation is seen both in themultiplicity of intelligible genera which are theAutozionand in the internal articulation into intelligible, intelligibleand intellectual, and intellectual moments. The multiplicitywhich marks the intelligible genera is overcome throughthe principle that each part of the intelligibleinterpenetrates each other part. And the triadic internaldistinction is overcome because the third moment is themoment of return, or epistroph. The intellectual momentofNous, as we have seen before, is its erotic striving tocoincide with itself. It is in this third moment that Nous iscomplete, so to speak, and constitutes itself as a divinemind, as the distinction between thought and being andtheir unity. Thus for Nous self-sufficiency is not the simpleself-coincidence of a henad, but is rather a self-mediatedcoincidence through epistroph. For this reason, I think,Proclus calls Nous self-constituted, distinguishing it fromthe higher self-sufficiency of the henads.

Nous, however, is a self-coincidence in which there is notperfect self-coincidence. This must be the case, as Nousfalls short of the simplicity of the henads. The internalarticulation is overcome, but also remains. The intellectualmoment ofNous does indeed grasp the intelligiblemoment, but it possesses it not intelligibly (notiks), butrather intellectually (noeriks). So while Nous as a whole isone, its internal articulation into Being, Life and Nous doesnot disappear. Nous is a complete self-coincidence, but

one in which each part possesses each other part in itsown manner.


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The determination which marks the taxis ofNous ispassed on to Soul, and so Soul is also a self-constitutedprinciple. It too is a principle which coincides with itselfthrough a cognitive return on itself. However, the overall

determination which Soul originates is the inability tocoincide with itself completely. Nous grasps its ownmultiplicity through its single cognitive act, while Soulgrasps its multiplicity through a divided cognitive act. Itsown essence, as its participation in Nous, its present to itas an inexhaustible source of discursive projection, and sothe epistroph of Soul is not a completed projection ofdiscursive logoi, but one which can continue indefinitely.For this reason Proclus calls it a motion from thought to

thought, and Souls self-constitution is called self-motion(autokinsis). Time as the measure of motion is for Proclusa particular Nous which serves as the touchstone ormeasure of the Souls divided projection.

There are two main differences between the overalldetermination which Nous originates and that which Souloriginates. First, the intelligible order ofNous, comprisedof Being, Eternity, andAutozion, is a divided image ofsomething which is itself beyond being. The henads aredistinct through the pure mutual distinction which comesfrom procession, which somehow confers on each a simpleidiots which is not defined with reference to anotheridiots. Being is determinate, however, precisely becauseeach being is what it is both with reference to itself, andwith reference to all other things. 'Rest' is the opposite of'Motion', and 'Father' is the father of 'Son', and 'Part'involves a participation in 'Whole', for example. The Soulslogoi, on the other hand, are not images of a simplesource above Being, but are divided images of thoseprimary determinations into which Being falls in Nous. Soalthough the Forms (eid) in Nous are unified relative toSoul, they are not pure simplicity. This means thatphilosophy has as its source not simplicity, butdeterminate eid which have determinate relations toeach other, and even though it cannot ever adequate theeid in its discursive projection, philosophy begins in thedeterminations of psychic being and turns the Soul

towards higher objects which are still determinate beings.


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Nous, on the other hand, as the producer of Being, isturned towards a source which has simplicity as itscharacter.

The second main difference between Nous and Soul is thatwhile the internal articulation ofNous is a completedfinitude, that of Soul is not. Although Nous has a logicaldynamism it is also unchanging. There can be no newForms in Nous, even though there is perhaps an infiniteinternal triadic regress. So while the number of Forms isalways finite because Nous is a completed act of thinking,there may be a potential infinity of moments or aspects ofthe act ofNous for Souls divided thinking to pick out. So

Soul, while always having projected only a finite numberoflogoi, can continue projecting indefinitely. Itsintellectual moment is always being produced, unlike theintellectual moment ofNous.

We have described the overall determinations of the taxisof henads, ofNous, and of Soul in terms of self-sufficiencyin its primary instantiation, and as the secondary sorts ofself-sufficiency which Proclus calls self-constitution andself-motion. Below Soul is Body. Body also originates its

own sort of overall determination, but it is distinct fromthe higher principles because it does not revert uponitself. So Body is not self-sufficient. The particulardetermination of Body is in fact exactly the failure to beself-constituted, which is a complete lack of self-graspingor self-coincidence. One part of a body cannot overlapwith another part, and for this reason bodies dont think.Bodily things have only their own divided sort of image ofself-coincidence. No individual can exhaust the fertility of

the species under which it stands, according to Proclus,and so rather than the timeless perfection of the species,we find a succession of generations through birth, life, anddeath. This is likely what Proclus means when heattributes self-sufficiency to Body as a whole, but not toindividual bodies, in the Platonic Theology.

V

We have discussed the determinations which are thecontent of any given taxis, as well as the overall


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which holds between all levels of the universe, not thedifference. However, the difference in the relation ofsimilarity is just as crucial. But where does the differencecome from? Proclus thinks that the similarity which holds

between orders is non-reciprocal, so that the lower orderis similar to the higher, but not vice-versa. If you analysesimilarity in terms of identity and difference, then insofaras a member of the lower order holds the same place as amember of the next higher order it is identical with it, andso the lower member has the requisite identity for therelation of similarity. However, its difference is the crucialaspect. Really the difference of the lower entity is itsmanner of being the higher entity, so from the lower

perspective in a sense its difference is its identity. Fromthe higher perspective, however, this difference is onlydifference. An example is likely helpful here. A coffee tableis similar to the logos of table in the mind of thecraftsman, because a table is something you can putthings on, and you can put things on a coffee table.However, the particular manner in which a coffee table issomething you can put things on, its 'way of being atable', is in a low-to-the-floor manner convenient for the

early stages of dinner parties. So while you can say thatthe coffee table is similar to the logos of table, you cantsay that this logos is similar to the coffee table becausethe logos of table is not something low-to-the-floor forearly on in the evening. And it is exactly this non-reciprocal relation of similarity that allows the same logosto be the foundation also of the dining room table, and theside table, etc. In a sense if you ask the question of whatthe logos is, each of the particulars are also that sort ofthing. But the difference present in each particularprevents you from giving the same answer about thelogos. The logos is not a sort of table, it is the logos oftable itself. What both the logos and its particularinstantiation are is defined with regard to what the logosas a whole is, not with regard to what the particular as awhole is, therefore the particular is similar to the logos,but not vice-versa. Another way of thinking of non-reciprocal similarity is the following. If we say that a son islike his father, it is because he has taken his father as amodel and tried to become like him. However, if we then


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say that the father is now like his son, it is only becausethe son has come closer to being what the father alreadywas.

What this all bring out is that the difference whichemerges with each taxis does not exist in the higher taxisin any manner. Proclus states this in a number of ways, ofwhich non-reciprocal similarity is one. Another way is bystating that the causation which holds from one taxis toanother is non-deliberative. Nous does not take thought ofthe particular manner in which Soul will come intoexistence. Rather, it thinks itself, and Soul is the externalactivity which comes into being around it, like heat from a

fire. Yet another way of stating the same point is to saythat the existence of something in its cause (kataitian) isa secret (kruphis) existence. What this means is thatinsofar as what emerges from a cause pre-exists in thatcause, it does not do so in the determinate manner whichemerges only with the effect. So when Proclus says thatsomething exists kruphis kataitian he is expressing therelation of similarity which we have just discussed. Thelower member exists in its cause only insofar as it is whatthe cause is. But it does not exist in a determinate mannerin the cause, because its novel manner of being what thecause is is exactly how it differs from its cause.

We should think together the fact that the differencewhich each order manifests does not pre-exist in its cause,and that this difference is the manner in which a givenorder is an image of its cause. Then it becomes clear thatthe determination of any given taxis is due to itself, not toits cause. Of course it is due to its cause that we can say a

taxis is an image of its cause, but with the very strongsense that what it isits manner of being an imageis dueto itself. This is what Proclus means by the doctrine of self-sufficiency/self-constitution/self-motion. Consider self-constitution. Self-constitution means not only that thecharacter ofNous, its manner of giving itself its good, isdetermined by itself. It means that this character isdetermined through atemporal self-reversion, or desire ofitself. Compare this with Body, which is also such as to

determine its own character, but it does not do thisthrough reversion. Bodys deficiency in this respect is not


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a product of Soul. So self-constitution is not only themeans by which Nous (and Soul in autokinsis)determines its own character, it is itself the characterwhich belongs to Nous. And because the overall

determination of a particular order, or its character,dictates the manner in which the determinations withinthat order exist, we must conclude that according to theprinciple ofanalogia each order, or each successivemember of a series, comes to be what it is not because ofits cause but because of itself. It is in virtue of its causethan effect exists, but it is in virtue of itself that it isexactly what it is.

VI

What becomes clear here is that in the unfolding of theProcline universe there is a radical spontaneity at eachmoment when a new taxis, or a new member of a series,comes to be. The henads are the first determinations toappear after the One, if you consider Limit and Unlimitedto be not determinations but the principles ofdetermination. The One dictates that the henads aresimple, but the fact that there are many henads opens a

gap between them, for this multiplicity could not havecome about because of the One. What this means is thatnot only is it due to the effect that the effect exists in themanner that it does, it is due to the effect that what theeffect is can be called an image at all. What it is to be animage is not dictated by the paradigm, but by the imageitself. How are the henads images of the One? There is nocriterion to use to judge their status as images exceptthemselves, because the One is not similar to them. That

a plurality of simple units is the first image of the One toemerge is because that is in fact what emerged. The samerupture holds at every level of the system, such that thereis a radical spontaneity of the emergence of determinationat every level, and each level defines itself not only asimage, but defines for itself what it is to be an image.

Let us examine this spontaneity in terms of the seiraiwhich depend from the henads. Each next term is similar

to the previous term, which as we have seen means it isboth identical to it and different from it. So each term


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cannot be wholly other than the previous term. Somehowin its difference it is also the same. How can this be? Itcannot be that the various terms of a seira are heldtogether by some abstract quality, which can be

predicated univocally of each member of the series. Takethe series of the circle as an example. The steadfastnessof the gods, the continuous projection oflogoi by Soulfrom Nous as its source, the geometrical circle, and thereproductive cycle of animals are not all univocallycircular. One can say that they are circular by analogy, buthow that is possible is what we are investigating here.

The element of identity which each member of a series

has is its common origin from the same henad, and fromthe prior terms in the series. In a sense, each termemerges and in emerging defines both itself and theentire series. The emergence of a term which isdetermined in a particular manner itself originates the factthat this particular thing is a novel manner of instantiatingthe character of the series. J. Trouillard makes this pointwith regard to the henads, but I think he goes too far. Heclaims that the henads are in fact only distinguished bytheir series. Regarded in themselves they areindistinguishable from the One. While this is a temptinginterpretation, I think it can be rejected on Proclinegrounds. In one sense he is correct, in that the onlydifference between the One and the henads is that theyare the One as participated. But the same can be said ofthe monad of any order and the members of that order.

The only difference between Nous itself, the monad, andindividual noes is that the monad is imparticipable. Theyare really the same thing. But they are really also distinct,because each logical distinction in Proclus is an ontologicaldistinction. And so the henads are the place in the systembetween absolute simplicity and determinate multiplicity.

They are the pure idea of multiplicity in identity itself. Soin that sense they are not distinguished by their series,but are mutually self-distinguishing. I think that is whyProclus says that each has a character, an idiots which isnot in opposition to any other. So although the henads arenot distinguished only by their series, it is the case that

the overall character which a series possesses, and which


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is 'conferred' on the series by the henad, is determinedjust as much by the unfolding of each member of theseries as by the henad.

However, we shoud not think of a series in terms of settheory. It is not a set defined by its members. A set canhave any members and the set is just the sum of themembers. What is missing is the idea of priority andposteriority which holds between terms of a series. Eachmember of a set is not what each other member is, in itsown way, with them all ordered hierarchically from unityto multiplicity. The example of virtue and its exercise maybe helpful here. A just man possesses a settled state of

character such that he does just acts. However, noparticular just act is the virtue itself. Nor is the virtue theset of all the just acts performed by the man. Further, themans possession of justice and his action is not merely asum of just actsplus this thing called justice. Rather, thevirtue of justice is such as to found the particular just acts,and as their principle is ontologically distinct from them.

There is definitely an idea of a meta-level in Proclus, touse a bad expression, in the sense that the hierarchy of

things is arranged according to increasing degrees of unityand multiplicity, or what is the same, self-coincidence.

This seems very much like a plan of unfolding, whichmight remove the radical spontaneity which each levelhas to define itself as an image. One might think of theunfolding of all things from the One as a sort ofmathematical unfolding, in which each term is somehow amere result of the previous terms and the application of arule. Three is just two plus one, for example, in the same

way that fifty-eight is just fifty-seven plus one. The ideathat each next member of a series is more multiple thanits predecessor could be the plus one rule.

If the unfolding of all things from the One followed a planof this sort, then we have two possibilities. Either this planis such that all of the emergent determinations pre-existdeterminately in the first term. But Proclus denies this, aswe have seen. Or the plan is merely a rule which is applied

to each term, in order to get the next term as a result. Butthen we are left with the same radical spontaneity. If the


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rule which is applied is that the emergent term is the nextsort of multiplicity, what is it that determines exactly whatshape the next sort of multiplicity takes? It is not thecause, and not the rule, so it must be the effect itself.

What we are speaking of is the emergence of what itmeans to apply the rule at all.

This spontaneity might seem to put philosophy itself, andthe ordered cosmos which it seeks to grasp, in doubt.Ontologically it might seem that the cosmos is such thateach order is simply other than all the others. However, ifthe relation between taxeis were simply otherness, thenrelations of cause and effect would disappear, because in

Proclus they depend on similarity. And if the hierarchy ofcause and effect disappears, then the order of the cosmositself disappears, and it becomes a mere collection ofthings. Epistemologically, such a cosmos would beunknowable, because thought requires order, and cannotthink simple otherness. Such a cosmos would be asunintelligible as a collection of featureless atoms.

However, this is not the case. What Proclus is describing isnot the emergence of mere otherness, but the emergence

of order itself. In Neoplatonism Being, Order, Intelligibilityare not themselves the Absolute. Rather, the primarydeterminations of Being are the order which emerges fromthe free activity of the power which comes from the One.

The emergence of the Greatest Kinds (megista gen), forexample, is both the emergence of those particulardeterminations and the emergence of them asexpressions of their hidden cause. In Proclus thefundamental determinations of Being are themselves a

living activity. Far from being simply other than theircause, they are ordered toward it as the term of theirstriving. In defining themselves as an image of theircause, they also give themselves their ordered relation totheir cause.

And Philosophy as discursive reason which exists primarilyin souls has as its proximate aim to grasp the order ofthese primary determinations of Being. The fact that

philosophical logoi are not themselves those primarydeterminations, the Forms (eid), is itself the source of the


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freedom which philosophical reflection has to make foritself an image of them. Discursive logoi are not simplyother than the eid in Nous, but rather are a free livingorder which continually brings itself into being as the

secondary image of the primary determinations of Being.The Soul at the same time brings its logoi into existenceas images of the eid, and also makes it be the case thatthat is what it is to have a secondary possession of theeid.

However, it might seem that just any discursive logos atall could stand as an image of a given eidos. How can weavoid making philosophy a pure act of will, contingently

related to its source? I think the solution to this worry is toremember that each member of a series not onlytranscends its effect, it is also immanent in and socompletely present to its effect. So while, in a certainsense, we can think and say anything about the Forms,the Forms themselves are completely present to the eyeof our Souls, and we happen to say different things aboutdifferent Forms, because our thinking is founded in andstrives towards the variety of Forms.

To return to the example of justice, while there may be agreat range of acts which are just, whose exact content isnot dictated by the virtue itself, what makes each act justis that they are done with an eye to Justice itself. Each isan attempt to articulate what Justice is, and can only beperformed by an actor who possesses the virtue, and onlywhen he is not trying to act in accordance with some othervirtue, such as Courage, or acting out of the lack of thevirtue. Turning to the higher forms, such as Equality or

Motion, while the manifestations of these are many andvarious, depending on which taxis they appear in, they arenever manifested as an image without their ownimmediate presence as well. So if Equality as a Formexcludes Inequality, this limits the sorts of manners inwhich the lower terms may be equal, because the Formcant be manifested while its contradictory is present.However, this may be to raise the same question again,namely in which ways is the contradictory of a Form also

manifested in a lower taxis, or in what ways is a higherForm immediately present to something lower. I think the


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real solution is fairly phenomenological. We should not bescared that the just man will lie, cheat, and steal, becausewe see that those actions in fact are also accounted for;they happen to issue from the absence, not the presence,

of Justice.

VII

This brings up the final of the three sorts ofdeterminations which I list at the beginning of this study,the discursive determinations through which the Soulthinks all things. I will only discuss this sort ofdetermination briefly. Philosophy itself moves completelywithin the sphere of psychic logoi. It has as its task to turnthe soul towards its non-discursive source, and when thesoul puts aside discursivity it also puts aside philosophy.So the Soul reasons about the determinations within eachtaxis, and the overall determinations of the taxeis, byproducing logoi which belong to its own taxis, and whichsymbolically stand for the ordered determinations of otherlevels. That these particular logoi are images of thedeterminations of the henads, and Nous, and Body, is notdue to the other orders, but rather to Soul itself. We can

consider the hierarchical ordering oftaxeis itself onlythrough a hierarchically ordered image of it in our ownthought. J. Trouillard was pleased to say that this is in factthe particular determination which discursive reason addsto the series which depend from the henads, that itrecapitulates in its own terms the members of the entireseries. He says this with reference to the powers of theSoul in general, but it is most properly said of discursivereason, the power which we have been employing

throughout this study.

In order to present my argument clearly, I will use taxis, whichmeans "order" or "rank," to refer to the ontological level of henads,Nous, Soul, or Body. In this usage, taxis is contrasted with seira,which means "chain" or "cord", usually translated as "series," andwhich refers to the causal chain descending from the henads,through all the lower taxeis. In doing this I risk giving a falseimpression, because Proclus' own use of these terms is not soconsistent, although his ontological distinction is clear. See Proclus,

The Elements of Theology, ed. and trans. E.R. Dodds, 2nd ed.


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(Oxford, 1963), prop.21. What is needed is a detailed study ofProclus' use of terms such as taxis, seira, diacosmos, and arithmos.

Damascius was Diadochos when the Academy was closed in 529A.D. Damascius has to this point not received as much attention as

Proclus, although many of his texts survive.

Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol.2: Plato and thePlatonists, trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson, 1894 (Lincoln andLondon, 1995), p.451.

See L. Gerson, Plotinus metaphysics: emanation or creation? TheReview of Metaphysics, 46 (1993), 559-574; J. Trouillard,Procession noplatonicienne et cration Judo-Chrtienne,Noplatonisme. Mlanges offerts Jean Trouillard (Paris, 1981),pp.1-30.

See Proclus, Thologie Platonicienne, 6 vols., ed. and trans. H.D.Saffrey and L.G. Westerink (Paris, 1968-1997), 3.2, pp.6-7 (hereafterProclus, Platonic Theology). Earlier and later indicate causal priorityand posteriority, rather than temporal sequence.

I speak here of the hierarchically ordered causation through whichthe universe unfolds. The sort of causation which holds within thenatural world is not hierarchically ordered, and is only a dim imageof true causation.

See Stephen Gersh, KINSIS AKINTOS: A study in the spiritualmotion of Proclus (Leiden, 1973), pp.120-121.

See Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An investigationof the prehistory and evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition(Leiden, 1978), pp.143-151. This aspect of Proclus system suggestsa fractal structure.

Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 3 vols., ed. E. Diehl(Leipzig, 1903-1906), 2, p.26, lines 23-29 (Hereafter Proclus,

Commentary on the Timaeus). Cf. W. Beierwaltes, Proklos,Grundzge seiner Metaphysik(Frankfurt am Main, 1965), pp.199-200, and Proclus, Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon, 2 vols., ed. andtrans. A. Ph. Segonds (Paris, 1985-1986), 2, p.321, lines 10-14.

While there is controversy over the placement of Limit/Unlimitedwith regard to the henads, L. Siorvanes argues convincingly for theirplace immediately after the One, and before the henads. He arguesthat there is a triad of principles, with Limit holding the place ofousia, Unlimited as dunamis, and Providence holding the place of

energeia, as the analogical causes of these three elements in lowerthings. See L. Siorvanes, Proclus. Neo-Platonic philosophy and


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science (New Haven, 1996), pp.175-179. See also Proclus, TheElements of Theology, props. 87-92; Proclus, Platonic Theology3.27,pp.93.26-95.10; 3.14, p.51.6-7; 4.3, p.16.6-10; Proclus, In primumEuclidis Elementorum commentarii, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1873)p.6 (hereafter Proclus, Commentary on the Elements of Geometry);

W. Beierwaltes, Proklos, Grundzge seiner Metaphysik, pp.50-60;A.D.R. Sheppard, Monad and Dyad as cosmic principles inSyrianus, Soul and the Structure of Being in late Neoplatonism,Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius, ed. H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd(Liverpool, 1982), pp.1-17; and C. dAncona, PROCLO: ENADI EAPXAI NELLORDINE SOVRASENSIBLE, Revista di Storia dellaFilosofia, 47.2 (1992), 265-94. DAncona argues that Proclus speaksin two ways about the relation between Limit/Unlimited and thehenads. Sometimes the henads seems to be produced by this firstpair or principles. But at other times the henads transcend any sortof otherness, because they are produced from the one kathhensin, or according to the mode of unification. Therefore Proclusis really speaking about two different sorts of things when he speaksin these two different manners. However, it seems to me that wehave to admit at least one sort of otherness in the henads, namelythe fact that there are many of them, even though in themselvesthey are simplicities. Their multiplicity is due to theirproodos, orprocession, which is governed by Unlimited.

From henas, or unit, cognate with hen, or one. There are varioussorts of henads, but here I am speaking of henads which come

before Being (huperousioi henades). Proclus also calls these thedivine henads, or simply gods. See Proclus, The Elements ofTheology, prop.119.

This is the Living Being from Platos Timaeus 30c. See Proclus,Commentary on the Timaeus 1, p.416.6ff.

See J. Opsomer, Proclus on demiurgy and procession: ANeoplatonic reading of the Timaeus, Reason and Necessity. Essayson Platos Timaeus, ed. R.M. Wright (Duckworth, 2000), pp.131-2.

Proclus assigns the various Greek gods to these different aspects ofNous, and to the henads. These mythological divinities reveal insymbolic form the various aspects of the spiritual world. See H.Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism, Magic andPlatonism in the Later Roman Empire (Paris, 1978), pp. 483-484.

See D.G. MacIsaac, The Soul and Discursive Reason in thePhilosophy of Proclus, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. ofPhilosophy, University of Notre Dame, IN, 2001, pp. 132-152.

Being, Life, and Nous, in Nous is also a triad ofousia, dunamis,energeia.


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For this division see Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 2,p.125.10ff. The divisions of the Soul in Proclus correspond to thefollowing passages of the Timaeus: 35a1-35b2 (ousia); 35b2-36b6(harmonia); 36b6-36c5 (eidos/schma/idea); 36c5-35d7 (dunamis);36d8-37c5 (energeia). Proclus sometimes uses the term eidos for

formal part of the soul, sometimes schma, and sometimes idea.For eidos see Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 2, p.126.2; forschma see 2, p.316.3; for idea see 2, p.127.2 and 9.

It is unclear whether or not there are other hypercosmic souls thanthe monad which generates all souls.

Plato, Timaeus.40e: cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. andtrans. E.R. Dodds, note to proposition 184, p. 295.

Procluss technical term for human souls is the partial soul(merik psuch).

L. Siorvanes, Proclus. Neo-Platonic philosophy and science, pp.136-140.

Proclus, Platonic Theology3.5, p.18.

Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop.21; Proclus, PlatonicTheology3.2-3, pp.6-14.

He uses the term idiots, as well as dunamis or agathots. SeeProclus, The Elements of the Theology, prop.123, 125, 131; Proclus,Platonic Theology1.19, and 3.5-6; and see discussion andreferences in L. Siorvanes, Proclus. Neo-Platonic philosophy andscience, pp.167-175.


Proclus, Platonic Theology3.6, pp.20-28.

E. P. Butler, "Polytheism and the Henadic Manifold," Dionysius 23(2005), 83-104. I find less persuasive his thesis that the One isnothing other than the henads. His contention that an existent Onebefore the henads would remove their character of simplicity bymaking them subordinate, and so less 'one', is contradicted byProclus' ability to accept an order within the henads, with somepresiding over more universal and others over more partial beings,while still holding that each henad is simple. See Proclus, PlatonicTheology3.5-6. Indeed, Butler's own promising thesis that eachhenad's simplicity lies in an idiots which is not reducible toontological oppositions argues against his removal of the One as

something distinct from the henads. The idiots of the One itself isthat it grounds all other things while transcending their oppositions,


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while the idiots of a particular henad is that it grounds a particularseira of beings while transcending the oppositions within that seira.Thus the One and the henads transcend all oppositions, and so arenot opposed to each other, and can all be called simple. So theorder which holds between the One and the henads can be as

described in Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop.21, whereeach manifold issues from an unparticipated monad, and thisrelation does not make the henads any less 'one' than the One.

More plausible, I think, would be a general thesis about the relationbetween an unparticipated monad and its coordinate manifold,holding that the monad and the manifold are really the same, butare considered from different perspectives. The One would be theprinciple as it is in itself, and the henads the One in relation toothers. However, this is not to eliminate the One or the henads,because in Proclus' system things are really different depending onthe point of view from which they are considered. In other words,Butler is wrong to reduce the One to the henads, because it is justas proper to reduce the henads to the One, and at the same timesay that they are distinct. The same seemingly paradoxical position,furthermore, should also be applied to the monad ofNous and ofSoul, and all others. This is simply the position which Neoplatonistshave held since Plotinus about the relation between an hypostasisand its coordinate particulars, where they are both the same anddifferent from each other.

Only those things which are deficient in power lose the character ofsimplicity, according to Proclus. See Proclus, Platonic Theology3.5,p.18.

It is a triad of Limit/Unlimited/Mixed, or Remaining, Procession, andReturn, the triadic moments which structure all spiritual entities.

Proclus, The final section of Proclus commentary on theParmenides. A Greek retroversion of the Latin translation. by C.Steel, F. Rumbach, with an English translation by D. GregoryMacIsaac, in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale,8 (1997), pp. 211-267, see lines.1-33 (= Cousin 1242.18-K.L.34).

Each henad has its own character, but is also not different fromeach other henad, because they are all simple. Beings, on the otherhand, differ from each other, in that what each one is, all the othersare not. See Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem, in Opera inedita, V.Cousin (Paris, 1864), 1047.24-1049.37 (hereafter Proclus,Commentary on the Parmenides). This passage is cited anddiscussed in the introduction to Proclus, Thologie Platonicienne 3,pp.lxvi-lxxii.


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Plotinus, Enneads I-VI, trans. A.H. Armstrong, 7 vols. (Cambridge,Mass., 1966-1988),5.1.7.

Plotinus, Enneads 5.8.4. See also Proclus, Commentary on theParmenides 1047.24-1049.37.

J. Trouillard, LUn et lme selon Proclos (Paris, 1972), p.151. Seealso Proclus, Platonic Theology3.5, p.18.

Being is the first term of Being, Life, Nous. But the Being in Being,Life, Nous is itself a triad of Being, Eternity,Autozon.

Proclus' phrase is .

Discursive reason as the projection of the Soul's essential logoi(Proclus' phrase is ) is the topic of D.G.MacIsaac, The Soul and Discursive Reason in the Philosophy ofProclus (see footnote 15).

See for example, Proclus, Commentary on the Elements ofGeometry, p.16.

Proclus gives an etymology of Time (chronos), the measure of thethinking motion of Soul, as choronous, i.e. the nous which dances ina circle like the chorus. See Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 3,p.9.16-18; p.28.

J. Trouillard, La mdiation du verbe selon Plotin, RevuePhilosophique 146 (1956), 65-73, see page 71.

J. Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclos (Paris, 1982), pp.119-127.See also Proclus, Platonic Theology3.6.

Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 2, p.24.31-25.23.

See Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp.130-132.

Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop.65: cf. C. Steel, Hyparxischez Proclus, Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo (atti del Icolloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul neoplatonismo,universit degli studi di catania, 1-3 ottobre 1992). ed. F. Romanoand D.P. Taormina (Firenze, 1994), pp.79-100.

Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop.28 and ff.

Proclus, Commentary on the Elements of Geometrypp.137.3-138.10.


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Proclus, Commentary on the Elements of Geometrypp.148.5-150.12: From what has been said it is clear that the circleeverywhere has primacy over the other figures. But we must alsocontemplate the entire seira to which the circle gives rise. Beginningabove and ending in the lowest depth of things, it perfects all of

them according to their suitableness for participation in what theyreceive from it. On the gods [i.e. the henads] it confers reversiontowards and unification with their own causes, remaining inthemselves and not departing from their own blessedness. Thehighest unities among them it sets up as centres, as the aiming-points for the secondary divinities, fixing the plurality of powers inthe secondary divinities firmly about these centres and holdingthem together by the simplicity of these centres. To intellectualbeings the circle gives everlasting activity in relation to themselves,granting them to be filled from themselves with knowledge, to grasptogether the intelligibles in themselves and to bring to perfectiontheir intellections from out of themselves. For all Nous tenders toitself its intelligible object, and this object is as a centre to Nous;Nous holds together around it, desires it, and is unified towards itfrom all sides through the entirety of its intellectual powers. TheAutozion illuminates Souls, conferring upon them their self-motion,that is, their reversion towards Nous and their circling dance aboutit, and their re-establishment through their own periods whichunfold the partlessness ofNous. Here again the intellectual orders,like centres, will have preeminence over souls, while the souls havea circular activity about them. For every soul, through its own

intellectual part, is centred about the Highest, the One itself, butbecause of its multiplicity it travels around its own Nous in a circle,desiring to embrace it and fold itself around it. On the heavenlybodies the circle confers their likeness to Nous, i.e. theirhomogeneity and uniformity, their function of enclosing the universewithin limits, their fixed and measured revolutions, their eternalexistence without beginning or end, and all such things. Thesublunary elements owe to the circle the periodicity in theirchanges, which is an image of the heavenly cycle, the presence ofthe ungenerated among things generated, of the stationary amidstchanging things, and of the bounded amongst divisibles. All things

exist eternally through the cycle of generation, and the equilibriumamong them all is maintained by its balancing destruction; for ifgeneration were not recurrent, the order of things and the wholecosmic scheme would soon have been dissolved. Animals and plantsowe to the circle the likeness between parents and offspring. Foranimals and plants are born from seed and produce seed in theirturn: generation becomes reciprocal, with a recurring cycle ofgrowth from the immature to the fully grown and back again, so thatdecay accompanies generation. On things that we call contrary tonature the circle imposes order by limiting their boundlessness and

regulating even them rightly by using the last traces of the powersresident in it. Hence such unnatural events recur at bounded


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intervals, and times of dearth as well as of fruitfulness are based onthe revolutions of the circles, as the myth of the Muses has it. Allevils may have been banished from the divine to this mortal region,yet even they are in revolution, as Socrates says [Theaetetus 176a],and have a share of the circular period and ordering. Hence nothing

is unmixedly evil and abandoned by the gods; rather the providencethat perfects all things brings even the boundless variety of evilsaround to the limit and ordering appropriate to them.

See A. Charles, Analogie et pense srielle chez Proclus, Revueinternationale de philosophie, 87 (1969), 69-88; J.M. Dillon, Image,Symbol and Analogy. Three basic concepts of Neoplatonic allegoricalexegesis, The significance of Neoplatonism, ed. R. Baine Harris(Norfolk, Virginia, 1976), pp. 247-262; and D.G. MacIsaac, The Souland Discursive Reason in the Philosophy of Proclus, pp. 103-114,179-185 (see footnote 15).


Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop.21-24, 99-101.

Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop.22.

Proclus, The Elements of Theology, props.194, 195.

Each monad confers its character on its subsequents, so all that has

being has it due to the first Being, all that has life has it due to thefirst Life, and so on. Further, the power of the higher cause extendsfurther than the lower, so that the Procline universe is organisedaccording to nested loops of causation. E.R. Dodds gives a goodchart of this in his commentary on props. 58-59 of the Elements ofTheology, where the One, Being, Life, and Nous give rise to animals,plants, dead bodies, and matter, with Soul in the centre. SeeProclus, Platonic Theology3, 5-6.

Proclus, The Elements of Theology, prop.10.

The visible cosmos as a whole is self-sufficient, but individual bodiesare not.

On the self-constituted see Proclus, The Elements of Theology,props.40-51, 189-191; Proclus, Commentary on the Parmenides 785-6, 1144-1146, 1148-1151; Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 1,p.239; 1, pp.280.28-281.13: That which is really generated is thatwhich does not produce itself, but is produced by another andbecomes an image of another, and is composed of many dissimilarparts, and ever receives a restored existence, to which Time is

yoked, it having an uninterrupted generation coextensive with theinfinity of Time, and its numerical identity is in always becoming


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one, but not in always being one. That which is thus generated, onecould even say, proceeds from not-being. The self-constituted, onthe other hand, being generated from itself, does not proceed fromnot-being. For even if you should divide it in your thought into causeand caused, it proceeds from being. For the maker and the made

were one, so that it proceeds from its own being, for which reason itis eternal, never leaving itself behind. But that which is only fromanother is established from not-being, because separated from itscause it is no more, and the cause is other than that which iscompleted; and Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 3, pp.215.25-216.4: Immortal is said in the most proper and primordial sense ofthat which procures to itself immortality, just as also that is beingprimordially which exists through itself, nous primordially that whichis nous through itself, one primordially that which is one throughitself. In effect everywhere that which possesses a given qualitywhich it is primordially is of this sort through itself. Because, it iswere not it through itself, but through another, it is this other whichwill be primordially either one or intellect or living, or whatever, andeither it will be this primordially or, if nothing is it primordially, weprogress to infinity. Thus that which is immortal in the true sense isthat which is immortal through itself and that which procures toitself immortality, while that which is not life through all of itself noris self-constituted nor possesses immortality through itself is notprimordially immortal.

Proclus, Commentary on the Parmenides 936.8.

C. Steel, Conversion vers soi et constitution de soi selon Proclus,Retour, repentir et constitution de soi, ed. A. Charles-Saget (Paris,1998), pp. 161-175.

Remember that they are above the determination of form, so theterm formally applies only analogically. Remember as well thatwhile each henad is identical in that each is a simplicity, they eachstand at the head of a different series and confer a differentcharacter (idiots) on their own series.

See note 10 above.

Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 3, pp.215.25-216.4.

Plotinuss description remains the best, at Enneads 5.8.4. Note thatfor Proclus the multiplicity of intelligible genera comes through thedivision of a prior unity, the One-Being. So for Proclus thought is notprimarily a connecting of two things which are distinct, a connectingwhich needs a criterion of truth. Rather, thought is itself this divisionof a prior unity. The connecting activity which thought does in fact

engage in is only possible because thought is putting back together,so to speak, what it itself already took apart.


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See D.G. MacIsaac, "Eternity and Time in Proclus," in MedievalPhilosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, andChristianity, ed. J. Inglis (London, 2002) pp.83-105.

See Stephen Gersh, KINSIS AKINTOS.

See the passage on the Circle, Commentary on the Elements ofGeometry, pp.148.5-150.12, quoted above in note 47.

Proclus, The Elements of Theology, props.28-32.

Proclus, Commentary on the Parmenides 912.34-917.22.

Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus 1, p.321.11-17, p.336.1-5.

See C. Steel, Breathing thought: Proclus on the innate knowledgeof the soul, The perennial tradition of neoplatonism, ed. J.Cleary(Leuven, 1997), pp.293-309.

I am speaking in terms oftaxeis or in terms ofseirai depending onwhether I am referring to a taxis as whole or its internaldeterminations. Really these are two ways of speaking of the samething.

I am smoothing over here the status of Limit and Unlimited in orderto make my general point.

J. Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclus (Paris, 1982), pp.198-199: le driv ne reflte pas son principle de faon passive, maisilsassimile activement lui. Quand nous reportons le caractre srielsur la monade gnratrice, nous pouvons entendre la chose de deuxmanires: Ou bien nous voulons dire que ce caractre exprimeeffectivement lorigine et que chaque membre de la srie luiressemble par cette perfection mme, et nous avon raison. Ou biennous croyons que cette ressemblance suppose un lment communabstraitement dfinissable et quelle peut se lire quivalemmentdans le sense descendant ou dans le sens ascendant, et nous avons

tort.

J. Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclus (Paris, 1982), p.201: Et entant quelle est imparticipable, aucune hnad ne se distingue delUn. Seules ses participations (son nombre) lui fournissent uneposition intelligible. Seule sa srie lui donne ltre et laffirmation.Sans elle lhnade se rsorberait dans le Non-tre par excs, toutcomme les centres secondaires dune sphre se condondraient avecle centre principal sils cessaient de se distinguer par le rayon quechacun projette vers la priphrie. Lhnade nest pas une entit,

mais un passage, qui ne peut se dfinir que par ce quelle produit.


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One might think that Christian Neoplatonism is in a better positionwith regard to this problem, because the Christian God does in factpossess the examplars of all created things. And so one could saythat the order which emerges in creation does pre-exist as thedivine plan. However, one can ask the same question in Christian

Neoplatonic systems. How is it that creatures are patterned aftertheir divine exemplars? Creatures are not themselves Godsthoughts, so what it is that determines that this finite thing, a treefor example, is exactly how it is? It isnt the examplar of tree,because that is a simple intelligible, and the material tree isnt oneof those. If you say that there is a plan which determines this, thenyou are saying that one simple intelligible gives rise to bark andleaves in three dimensions because of another simple intelligible,and you have the same problem.

See D.G. MacIsaac, The Soul and Discursive Reason in thePhilosophy of Proclus (see footnote 15).

J. Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclus (Paris, 1982), pp.201-202.

The Origin of Determination

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