The Operational Environment - hsdl.org

The Operational Environment

TRADOC G2 May 2009

FOREWORD: THE NEXT WAR Historically, US military leaders have prepared for future conflict by analyzing the successes and failures of the past. The once predominant method of identifying and reviewing lessons learned is no longer, by itself, a reliable way of preparing for the next war. In a strategic environment in which the nature of conflict is dynamic and multifaceted, lessons learned must be viewed with caution. Poor application of these lessons – viewing them without the proper context – can be dangerous on many levels. What worked in one Operational Environment (OE) could easily lead to disaster in another. Analysts must know the conditions of each environment before determining whether past lessons are applicable. A holistic view is necessary in analyzing the environment in which US forces operate. This view requires more than just a review of lessons learned or an assessment of the enemy’s military capabilities; it requires a framework from which to assess the entire environment. The changing scope of war – one in which adversaries will use all available approaches to challenge US forces – means the US must operate in and manage all aspects of the OE. The White Paper that follows provides an overview of the OE framework – the model of analysis for all potential future threats. Before looking at the OE framework, though, it is beneficial to examine first the types of threats the US might face in the next war – the characteristics of the strategic, operational and tactical challenges that might lie ahead. If we look ahead just a few years – to 2025 – we can make the following projections about the enemies US forces may face: Strategic Designs In order to develop effective strategy, military leaders must constantly assess their opponents. Potential US adversaries are no exception. Over the past decade, threats and probable threats have observed several changes in US military posture that ultimately will affect the way they attempt to conduct war against US forces. Potential enemies have noted a change in US military posture – from a globally forward-deployed force to one that is less global and based within the Continental United States (CONUS). Therefore, adversaries know the US is now more reliant on agreements with other nations for force projection and subsequent reception in theater. Opponents will target such agreements and attempt to limit US basing and staging options. Threat actors have also observed the downsizing of the US military – understanding that a smaller military increases the urgency for the US to build alliances and coalitions. Adversaries will seek to exploit vulnerabilities of these agreements and

The Operational Environment_____________________________________________________ 2

seek ways to prevent their formation. US opponents will try to undercut the legitimacy and moral foundations of US-led coalitions and paint the US as a renegade hegemon set on world conquest. A smaller US military results in heightened US risk when fighting in two or more Theaters of War (TOW). Threats understand that simultaneous operations in geographically separated TOWs dilute US combat power and increase the importance of US-based alliances and coalitions. Threat actors – even those with different ideologies and religions – will form temporary coalitions in order to challenge US military capabilities. Contrary to the past, threats have seen that the US public is willing to accept heavy losses if the public perceives progress is being made; however, the US still has a mindset to resolve conflict quickly and is perceived to have a lack of commitment over time. Enemies have observed that US public backing begins to wane if timely victory does not occur, which ultimately influences political decisions. Therefore, opponents will seek protraction of the conflict and keep US forces engaged to weaken resolve and drain military and economic resources. Adversaries will continue to try to instill fear among the US public. Global communications will make this easier, by allowing for the proliferation of rhetoric almost instantaneously worldwide. The influx of information – combined with the threat of attack to the homeland – will provoke disproportional fear, forcing the US to commit or act first. Publicizing real or fabricated reports of casualties, moral violations, incompetent leadership or lack of progress will be a part of the threat’s strategy to influence public opinion in the US and internationally. Enemies will also turn to mass casualty attacks against global US military facilities, key infrastructures and high-profile public venues to weaken the economy, tax emergency systems and heighten anxieties among the US public, military members and their families home and abroad. Operational Designs While significant changes will be obvious at the strategic and tactical levels, adversaries will continue to use many of the operational designs of the past – taking advantage of the specific OE and targeting perceived US vulnerabilities. Adversaries recognize that a successful alliance among threat actors can successfully limit US ability to enter and operate within an OE. Therefore, the US is at its most vulnerable during a phased entry into theater. Adversaries will coordinate actions to attack Sea Points of Debarkation (SPODs) and Air Points of Debarkation (APODs) with explosives and chemical agents. Denying entry is not necessary – creating significant damage to delay or prolong entry into the OE is also effective.


Enemies know that success is possible when attacking the US dependence on advanced technology. Once US forces gain access into the OE, adversaries will choose to fight on terrain that neutralizes US technology. By drawing the US into a confusing close-quarters environment, where US technology is ineffective, and the fight takes on a decentralized, small-unit character. Adversarial operational plans will include regular conventional, irregular paramilitary and guerilla forces all designed to operate independently throughout the OE. Opponents will use witting and unwitting non-combatants as “human shields” and use US Rules of Engagement (ROE) against US forces. Adversaries, who are not limited by ROEs, will define their operating terms to fit the OE. Other actors – such as criminal elements and gangs – will add to the threat’s capabilities, thus increasingly challenging US abilities to maintain situational awareness in the OE. Operationally, the threat will fight both symmetrically and asymmetrically against US forces. To the adversary, asymmetrical warfare is simply a tactic that affords an opportunity to win or simply outlast the US, thus creating politically unacceptable conditions for the US. In essence, asymmetrical warfare is adaptive warfare for both conventional and irregular forces. Adversaries will avoid direct confrontation with US military firepower, instead focusing on soft targets such as command and control nodes, ISR systems, logistical components, and contracted support. Threats will attempt to fight on a 360° perimeter and will make every attempt to create chaos among the civilian non-combatant populations to mask movement. Massive POWs, refugees, mobs and riots will conceal or shield identity and intentions, simply overwhelming US military capabilities. Tactical Designs Tactically, enemies will use a combination of regular and irregular tactics to keep US forces off balance. Conventional methods will maximize the terrain advantage while allowing opponents to conduct a series of integrated area defenses designed to trade space for time while inflicting maximum damage to US forces. Threats will employ niche technologies at the tactical level such as sophisticated electronic warfare, communications, encryption devices and electro magnetic pulse (EMP) systems to neutralize network-dependent US C4ISR capabilities. Furthermore, forces will employ tried-and-true OPSEC measures, including camouflage, cover, concealment and deception. Key technologies available to small units will consist of anti-material rifles, shoulder-fired tandem warhead Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).


Irregular forces will support the tactical fight. Paramilitary forces and other associated guerilla forces will intermix with the populace, seeking to target critical support systems such as C2 and logistics. They will initiate contact when the element of surprise is in their favor. Ambushes and raids will be the preferred tactic. Conversely, these same forces will use cultural standoff when forced into a defensive posture. Irregular forces will use non-combatants and integrate religious, medical, educational and other facilities into complex battle positions in order to disguise and shield their identity and locations. ANALYZING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT While we can only make projections about the characteristics of warfare in 2025, we can say with full confidence that the next war will not be like any the US has fought before. Warfare has changed – no concrete battle lines exist, technology is an ever-changing friend or foe, and globalization brings myriad players into the equation that did not exist even a decade ago. In order to best prepare the US Army for what lies ahead, we must begin by admitting that we can only predict a fraction of what we will face. Yet, the US Army must prepare and train for these many, and unseen, possibilities. Such preparation requires the use of an adaptable framework that looks not only at the military dimension of an OE – but of all the relevant variables. This OE White Paper examines the strategic environment, global drivers, trends and relevant variables to provide a framework to help identify and train for innumerable anticipated strategic, operational, and tactical designs. This document does not state who the next enemy will be, but describes the operational environment of the future to enable the US Army to focus on and train against the capabilities of the next adversary.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 INTRODUCTION 11 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 16 GLOBAL DRIVERS AND TRENDS 35 EMERGING ADVERSARIAL STRAT/OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL DESIGNS 52 IMPLICATIONS TO LEADER DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIMENTATION ___________________________ 60

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “The Nation will remain engaged in a long struggle of continuous, evolving conflict. As in Iraq and Afghanistan today, this conflict will manifest itself in both traditional and irregular settings involving conflict in the human dimension – necessitating the presence of forces on the ground. We will face adaptive adversaries (now carefully observing US and allied forces) who will present unprecedented threats to our military establishment.” - 2007 Army Posture Statement

The US military is at war and will likely remain so for the next several decades—it is our steady-state environment. This war – characterized by eroding public and political will – influences the military’s freedom to operate. Unless some unforeseeable event occurs – something like the 9/11 attacks – public and political support for military operations will remain a challenge. Though US military forces are familiar with conflict, the current war bears little resemblance to the wars that have shaped US Army doctrine and training events. Nor will the war of the future. The defining characteristic of the Cold War, for example, was a mutually understood logic that neither conventional war nor a nuclear exchange would result in acceptable consequences. Such logic does not define the current war with Islamic radicals. In this war, no mutually determined restrictions exist – all is fair game. Adversaries will wage warfare across all domains of power – political, diplomatic, economic and military – in a way that more closely resembles the concept of unrestricted warfare postulated by Chinese military theorists.1 Some may argue that we have entered an age where the rules of warfare are unknown or unpredictable, but this is not the case; rules exist, but have not been equally accepted by both sides. Re-examining the OE framework – which was originally presented in a 1999 White Paper – is essential to identifying and understanding the potential environments and adversaries our Army will face. This paper presents a fresh look at the OE framework, discussing the strategic underpinnings, operational variables and tactical actors of the near future. The framework is applicable to the various OEs– that exist today as well as those just around the corner. The framework has been redrawn; now instead of eleven variables there are eight. The old variables have been mapped to political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time (PMESII+PT), but the methodology remains the same. The PMESII+PT framework was chosen in order to align with current US Army doctrine (FM 3.0). However, the variables of PMESII+PT are operationalized from a “Red perspective” not from their usual US effects-based perspective. Application of the variables simply means looking at the OE through the lens of each variable. By defining the makeup of these variables as they relate to the specific OE, you are, in effect, defining the nature and characteristics of that environment.


By analyzing the variables of the OE, their synergy and effects, and the theoretical strategic underpinnings presented in this paper, the institutional, operational, and training communities have a valuable tool for understanding and preparing for actions within any current or future OE. To understand the OE, one must understand the key global drivers and strategic trends that form the characteristics and nature of potential OEs. The following six global drivers are likely to have the most impact on current and future military operations, leadership development, education and training:

• Driver 1: Competing cultures, civilization, and associated ideologies. • Driver 2: Information and communications technology (ICT) proliferation. • Driver 3: Globalization/Integration • Driver 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation. • Driver 5: Science, Technology and Engineering (ST&E) advances. • Driver 6: Increasing Resource Constraints (energy and water, sustainability issues increasing

in importance). These global drivers are the foundation for the strategic trends that will affect the generation, deployment and training of US forces. The categories of trends discussed are:

• Demographic • Economic • ST&E • Threat of the spread of disease • The changing nature of power

Once an understanding of the strategic environment – its drivers and trends – is established, it is necessary to examine possible enemy actions within that environment. How will potential adversaries operate against the US? How will they counter US military and political power? Presented below, are some possible adversarial designs to answer these questions. Expected Strategic/Operational and Tactical Designs Since 9/11, potential adversaries have studied US policy, military application and public perception as well as worldwide perception of the US in order to develop their military strategy and possible military counters to US military actions. The following identifies a spectrum of strategies from the strategic to tactical level that describe how opponents will challenge US national interests. This list also describes adversary strategies that, while not directly aimed at the US, challenge US-held values and could therefore ultimately lead to US intervention. While not all-inclusive, the list shows the range and scope of potential actions as well as the willingness of adversaries to use any tool or method necessary to counter US military actions or political influence.


The strategic designs discussed are:

• Focus on strategic preclusion • Form strategic alliances to counter US influence • Target US allies and alliances • Challenge the US with simultaneous operations • Control the variable of time • Control the strategic information environment • Attack US political and public support

The following operational designs are presented:

• Attack US operational patterns/predictability • Exploit the physical environment • Exploit US operational constraints • Avoid perceived US strengths • Exploit perceived lack of cultural understanding • Seek “game-changing” technologies • Disrupt with all elements of power

In addition, the following tactical designs are highlighted:

• Exploit regular convention and irregular synergy • Employ range of technologies • Utilize information warfare as key weapon system • Employ complex battle positions and utilize cultural standoff capabilities

Army education and training must be attuned to the anomie that characterizes this era and is exhibited in the OE. The nature of the strategic environment – especially the myriad dynamic and competing cultures, the complex range of actors (both combatants and non-combatants) and technology proliferation – ensures future OEs will show continuous change over the next 15 years. This change will generate ambiguity within and across various OEs and exacerbate cultural conflicts worldwide. The complex OE is multi-polar and characterized by changing networks of enemies and allies. Adversaries prefer urban settings and complex terrain that are resistant to technical collection and mitigate the effects of standoff fires. This has led to a requirement for a multidimensional (political, diplomatic, economic and military) response to crises and operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. This environment will stress military units and commanders, as they must integrate military or support non-military activities that involve other elements of national power. The US Army and the leadership development, education and training community must focus less on who might threaten or challenge us and focus more on how and why. To accomplish this, the OE framework provides a model for describing the conditions of military operations and capabilities — i.e., the composite “how” and “why” of conflict. In addition, the OE framework provides the means (the variables of the OE) to evaluate specific regions, nations, civilizations, and transnational actors,


thereby addressing the most likely “who” and “when.” Through both these approaches, the Army will be poised for potential conflicts shaped by pursuit of national interests as well as those that may emerge. Knowing who the next threat will be is not be as important as understanding that threat’s potential capabilities and the environment in which adversaries will operate. By developing our understanding of the OE, and training on the conditions of its environment, the US Army will be ready to face current and future security challenges. Leadership development, education, and training must be capable of addressing and preparing for the following conditions:

• Simultaneous operations • Adaptation dominance • Consequence management • Shaping and crisis management • The information environment • Increased coordination and cooperation • Multinational responses • Homeland security and homeland defense • Cultural understanding • Training others


INTRODUCTION The OE framework offers an overview and assessment of: (1) the strategic environment; (2) critical variables found in any OE; (3) Impact(s) on US military operations; and (4) foreign perceptions of the US and its security strategy and (5) emerging adversarial strategies, operational designs and tactical engagements. The framework is applicable across leadership development, education, and training environments and in real-world contingency planning or pre-deployment exercises. Depending upon the required resolution needed, the model can also be applied at the global, regional, nation-state, sub-state, sub-region, and individual levels of analysis. DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL ENVIROMENT An operational environment is the “composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of commanders.” (JP 1-02) FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS – THE OE FRAMEWORK The OE framework is an analytical construct developed to analyze the complex and ever-changing combination of conditions, circumstances and influences that affect real-world military operations. The framework consists of an overview of the strategic environment, the PMESII + PT variables, discussion of the range of potential actors, and potential adversarial strategic/operational and tactical designs. It describes the next fight. (See Appendix A: Methodology for further detail.)

Operational Environment Framework

• Strategic Environment • PMESII + PT Variables • Range of Actors • Adversarial Strategic/Operational/Tactical

Designs

Framework provides a tool with which to understand and analyze any operational environment across all levels of analysis.

Graphic 1: Components of the OE Framework. PMESII + PT Variables


The variables are not limited to simply providing an understanding of an OE; they represent a compendium of conditions that require management in an OE. Military units and commanders will need to train for this variable management. Commanders and soldiers must be prepared to understand and contend with the OE variables and their impacts. Application of the variables simply means looking at the OE through the lens of each variable. By defining the makeup of these variables as they relate to the specific OE, you are, in effect, defining the nature and characteristics of that environment. Specifically, it is the linkage among variables that is critical to successful analysis – as the links set or create the conditions of each environment. Trainers and planners must understand this synergy and be prepared to adapt actions based upon the dynamic nature of this relationship. The variables apply to all relevant actors/players in an OE, both state and non-state actors. The following discussion provides a brief description of the OE variables. Political. The political variable focuses on all political power within a given OE. Centers of political power may range from official state institutions to unrecognized groups (terrorists, criminal organizations, tribes or families) or individuals (dictators or ICT empowered individuals). This includes the institutions of governance (both formal and informal), the ability to enforce the rule of law and those structures or elements which provide public services. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance or cooperation. Such systems enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy with the populations at local, regional, and national (or transnational) levels. Both formally constituted authorities and informal or covert political powers influence events. Understanding the political circumstances within an OE will help the commander recognize key actors and visualize their explicit and implicit aims and capabilities to achieve their goals. These actors can mobilize group identity, ideas, beliefs, action and violence to enhance their power and control over society, people, territory and resources. The sources of political mobilization may lie in the political leadership; religious, ethnic or economic communities; or in the indigenous security institutions such as the military or police. This variable also captures the presence and significance of external organizations and other groups in an OE. Examples include groups united by a common cause, such as NGOs, private volunteer organizations, private security firms, transnational corporations, and international organizations that conduct humanitarian assistance operations. Finally, political analysis of an OE addresses the concept of political ‘will.’ Will encompasses a unification of values, morals, agendas, effort, and the probability of acting on them. Through this unity, participants are willing to sacrifice individually for the achievement of the unified goal. Understanding the will of key groups (political,


military, insurgent, and terrorist) in an OE will help further define various groups’ goals and their willingness to support and achieve their ends. Military. The military variable explores the military capabilities of all relevant actors (including terrorists, militias and insurgents) within a given OE. Such capabilities include equipment, manpower, military doctrine, training levels, resource constraints, and leadership issues. Military leadership is especially important, and gaining an understanding of individual leaders and the human characteristics of their forces is vital to success. Analysis should focus on an actor’s ability to field forces and leverage them for use domestically, regionally, or globally. Our enemies are flexible, analytical and adaptive. Potential adversaries or groups have the knowledge and ability to use a combination of conventional and unconventional capabilities. When confronted by stronger military power, weaker forces will employ irregular capabilities and methods, using indirect approaches to achieve their aims. Simply put, the “enemy will be whatever the US is not.” The military variable also explores emerging thoughts and concepts that lead to adaptations, investment decisions or changes in operational designs. Economic. The economic variable encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. Specific factors may include the influence of industrial organizations, international trade, foreign aid, finance, institutional capabilities and the rule of law. Other factors include black market or underground economies, which are alternative structures indicating weaknesses in the mainstream economy. Such factors influence an actor’s decisions to alter or support the existing order. These decisions usually result in conflict, but if resolved through legitimately recognized political means, such changes will likely not threaten international order. Social. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE, examining social systems, social groups, societies and cultures. A social system consists of the people, groups, and institutions that exhibit shared identity, behaviors, values, and beliefs. Social groups consist of groups organized, integrated, and networked by relationships, interacting within their environment. Societies are comprised of structured, interrelated, and overlapping groups and institutions. Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and among one another. Important characteristics of a social system include population demographics, migration trends, urbanization, standards of living, and cohesiveness of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups. Analysis is conducted on the network of social institutions. Information. This variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Information involves the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems – civilian and military – by the


global community. Information systems are the infrastructure that enables the dissemination and storage of information. Broadcast and internet media sources can rapidly disseminate competing views of military operations worldwide. For political aims, various actors seek to control and manipulate how the public (local, regional, national, and international) perceives the content and context of the situation. Media coverage influences US political decision-making, popular opinion, and the sensitivities of coalition members. Observers and participants in conflict have unprecedented access to personally defined information sources. Commanders must understand and engage the information environment to achieve their operational and strategic objectives. Complex telecommunications networks now provide many of the world’s people with a vast and multilayered web of communications capabilities, allowing for a constant flow of information. In developing countries, however, information may flow by less sophisticated means – couriers, graffiti, rumors, cultural symbols, art, literature, radio, and local print media. Understanding the intricacies of the existing communication infrastructure is important because it controls information flow and influences local, regional, national, and international audiences. Infrastructure. Infrastructure is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. The degradation or destruction of infrastructure will affect the entire OE, especially the political, military, economic, social, and information systems. The infrastructure variable also analyzes the technological sophistication of a given OE, in terms of sectors of technological success or advancement, scientific and research institutions, technology acquisition policies, and the education and training facilities, which support the acquisition of technology, both domestically and through foreign sources. Physical Environment. This variable defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, sea, and space. The defining factors are complex terrain and urban settings (super-surface, surface, and subsurface features), weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions. Potential enemies understand that less-complex and open environments expose their military weaknesses. Therefore, adversaries may choose to operate in urban environments or other complex terrain and during weather conditions that may adversely affect US military operations and mitigate technological advantages. Time. The variable of time influences military operations in terms of the decision cycles, operational tempo, and planning horizons. It may also influence endurance or protraction of operations, as popular support for extended operations may diminish over time. Potential adversaries will use time against the US.


For an example of these variables once operationalized, see TRISA-Threat’s Operational Environment Assessments (OEAs). The OEAs are, in effect, real-world applications of the OE framework.1 CONCLUSION The OE framework uses the variables’ relationship to define the condition of the OE. The goal is to ensure that training environments represent the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of real-world operational environments. This is no small task, given that some experts theorize that the US and the world have entered a time of possibility and uncertainty that has no parallel in history – that the “next three decades may be the most decisive 30-year period in (the) history of mankind.”2 No doubt, the coming decades pose a challenge to US military forces. However, if the Army remains open to change and flexible enough to adapt to such advances, its ability to successfully operate in any potential OE will increase significantly.

1 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) has published several OEAs: Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, North Korea and Iran. All OEAs and related products can be found at: https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil (AKO login is required to access site.)


https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT The US military must avoid assessing the OE only through the eyes of the Cold War, 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These conflicts certainly inform the future but they do not predict it. Army leaders

must guard against preparing for the last conflict while ignoring potential future conflicts. The OE sets the conditions for Army training (in a task, conditions, standard construct) – and the related training implications are

profound. Currently, the US Army is conducting operations in what Joint Doctrine describes as a “complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment.”3 We are a military at war simultaneously working to defuse other potentially explosive security challenges.

Today’s security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats constantly appearing and disappearing. - Joint Publication 3-0

While the development of a single military peer competitor is unlikely in the near term, we must be realistic about the challenges posed by less well-equipped hostile national, transnational entities, or coalitions and alliances that challenge traditional centers of power and leverage niche technologies. We must also remain cognizant that a well-led and well-trained force can effectively challenge even the most advanced technology. In some cases, our dominant capability is just a single technology away from obsolescence. Emerging powers (national and transnational) will present substantial challenges to and changes in governance and lead to a pervasive instability. Regional powers will start to form and leverage power. New actors and combinations of actors will constantly appear and disappear from the scene. The actions of civilians, private security firms, contractors, aid agencies, governmental organizations and media will be a normal part of any operational environment. STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS The following strategic assumptions framed this study.

• The US will remain actively engaged globally, either to support its own national interests or in response to its values.

• US national interests and values will be challenged across all elements of power. • A military peer competitor is unlikely through 2025. It is possible, however, that alliances

could result in “near peer” capability. • The significance of regional alliances/partnerships will increase. • Regional challenges (political, military, and economic) will increase in importance. • The competition between and within cultures, civilizations, and associated ideologies will

result in conflict and potentially challenge US national interests. • Competition for natural resources will increase. • Globalization will continue – driven by the flow of information and communication technology

(ICT).


• Despite, the global recession, the US is expected to remain a global economic power for the near future. However, others will challenge this position (India and China).

• While state-on-state conflict is less likely in the near term, it cannot be dismissed. • Non-state actors (media, business, NGOs, individuals, groups) will continue to have

significance. • Environmental issues and concerns will increase in importance. • Legal and ethical issues will continue to shape military engagements.

Within this environment, the US military faces a formidable array of international challenges and potential adversaries: the war on terror, postwar violence and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, and nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea. In addition, simmering transnational problems that have received insufficient attention or resources during the past decade – including the spread of HIV/AIDS, environmental issues (climate change), crime, and uneven economic development – now pose grave risks and challenges to US national interests. CHALLENGES TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS AND VALUES Given that the US is engaged globally and will remain so for the foreseeable future, it is important to gain an understanding of US global and regional interests and how the US might act to support such interests. These interests not only drive US foreign policy but also highlight regions where US priorities will most likely be focused. For

example, it is in our national interest to secure energy supplies. Therefore, US national interests and values could be

challenged by any state or actor attempting to use geopolitical leverage to disrupt those supplies (China, Iran, Venezuela, or Russia). National interest is not a stagnant concept – it can change rapidly in terms of significance, scope and complexity. The following discussion provides an overview of transnational issues and geographical areas that potentially could challenge US national interest.

“It is not too much a stretch to say that events anywhere can – and do – affect our interests and the security of our nation and our people.” – John D. Negroponte 2007

Transnational Issues Transnational issues are simply those issues that transcend political borders. Such issues may have a specific region of origin, (however, this is not required) and will have global implications. The following transnational issues are highlighted as the most likely to challenge US national interests and direct foreign policy for the coming decades.

Breakdown of State Authority. The global phenomenon of failed states2 is not a new issue. Our National Security Strategy states “America is now threatened less by

2 This paper will use the “definition” presented in “The Failed State Index.” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098. This is a product from the journal Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace. As the index indicates no single definition exists, but typically, conditions of a failed state include


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098

conquering states than we are by failing ones.”4 Failed states have made a remarkable odyssey from the periphery to the very center of global politics. The dangerous exports of failed states—whether international terrorists, drug barons, gangs, human trafficking or weapons arsenals—are the subject of endless discussion and concern.

The failed state phenomena are not the only challenge to state authority. Recent examples of “states-within-a-state” have appeared to serve as providers of security, economic opportunities, and education. Many such entities are providing basic services and security for the local population. Examples include Hezbollah in Lebanon and the al-Sadr elements in the Sadr City area of Baghdad. In addition, numerous ungovernable areas exist worldwide (Afghan-Pakistan border region, parts of Somalia, Sudan, and the Tri-Border region of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil in South America.) Failed states, states-within-a-state, and ungovernable regions all result in providing fertile grounds for terrorist organizations, organized crime, insurgents and general instability affecting US global interests.

Crime. Crime has become an increasingly global phenomenon. International crime is driven in part from a group of unstable or failed states. Robust criminal networks act as insurgent/terrorist force multipliers. Growth in internationally linked crime (drug, tobacco, alcohol and human trafficking, money laundering, counterfeit and identity crimes) is benefiting from global connectivity and adding to instability and corruption. Criminal actors range from gangs, warlords and drug cartels to virtual criminal elements.

Environmental Issues. Coming decades will likely witness profound environmental changes resulting in the disruption and shifting of key population centers and agricultural production zones. Possible results could be upheaval ranging from drought to inundated coastal areas, loss of arable land and forced migration of people – all of which are potential conflict triggers. Intense weather extremes (precipitation, temperatures) will affect agricultural production and economic stability. For example, areas like Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan will likely see decreased precipitation resulting in water shortages and decreases in already stressed crop production. The Nile Delta and Bangladesh could see increased flooding, displacing millions and resulting in massive humanitarian crises. Key coastal urban centers may be forced to relocate. Global urban economic centers could be lost to flooding and increasing ocean levels (China, US, and South America). Projected impacts of future climate change indicate that there will be winners and losers among regions, sectors, and income groups. Some groups may benefit from a

“a government that has lost control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has earned the label. However, there can be more subtle attributes of failure. Some regimes, for example, lack the authority to make collective decisions or the capacity to deliver public services. In other countries, the populace may rely entirely on the black market, fail to pay taxes, or engage in large-scale civil disobedience. Outside intervention can be both a symptom of and a trigger for state collapse. A failed state may be subject to involuntary restrictions of its sovereignty, such as political or economic sanctions, the presence of foreign military forces on its soil, or other military constraints, such as a no-fly zone.”


certain amount of climate change, whereas others may suffer harm. Regions that fare relatively well may be negatively affected by changes in other regions through trade, security, and humanitarian demands and immigration pressures. Control/Competition of Energy Resources. A continuing dilemma – and possible challenge to US national interests – centers on the control of global energy resources, specifically oil and natural gas. The stability of key producer states and the competition for resources will dominate US foreign policy in the future. Public Health Issues. Public health issues will take on a global security dimension. The spread of disease globally over short time periods could lead to humanitarian or crisis situations. The likelihood that a global pandemic will occur increases dramatically with international contact and travel. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) pose not only a potential environmental hazard (accidental spills, leakage, etc), but also a tempting target for terrorists or anyone wishing to cause panic and destruction. US forces will increasingly be required to operate in environments posing potentially dangerous health issues. Geographical Areas While the world continues to globalize economically, it is fragmenting along regional lines politically. Regional powers are growing in scope and significance. Many analysts claim we are witnessing the development of a truly bifurcated international system – the separate parts or two branches being those who are integrated globally and those who are not. Some countries are well integrated globally both economically and politically; others are not. This is a geopolitical reality no matter what terminology is applied: integrated vs. non-integrated, core vs. gap, haves or have-nots. Tension between the two groups is a reality and will likely continue into the foreseeable future. (See Appendix B: Global and Regional Threat Examples for a more detail discussion of regional threat scenarios.) The following discussion presents a brief look at the OE variables as manifested across the globe. Understanding how the variables characterize each region helps military forces understand how to achieve success. The discussion will focus on a regional look with key actors (state and non-state) highlighted. In addition, a brief discussion of each region’s key perceptions of the US is included. North America Catastrophic attacks against the homeland (9/11 style attacks, WMDs, cyber attacks), illegal immigration, and drug trafficking are likely to present security challenges in the near term. In addition, the weakening economic position of the region could present a security challenge as other regions begin to challenge traditional centers of economic power.


Mexico depends heavily upon the US and recognizes that the US also depends upon Mexico. However, the economic and technological difference between the countries fuels instability in Mexico and engenders an imbalance in interdependency. Illegal immigration, corruption, drug trafficking, and civil unrest remain major problems in Mexico. To counter this, Mexico is aggressively seeking to diversify its economy by fostering third-nation relations with such countries as China. However, despite attempted economic improvements, Mexico’s economy significantly hinders its ability to fight crime and incites domestic unrest. Drug-related violence is spreading in Mexico despite massive military efforts to stop Mexican drug trafficking organizations, which have filled power vacuums left by the dismantling of South American cartels. These drug trafficking organizations have, in many ways, better resources than government forces. Corruption remains a pervasive aspect of Mexican society despite increasing trends towards transparency in government.

The US and Canada share a common heritage and language and are inextricably linked by cross border traffic, business relationships and family ties. Despite some concern regarding Canadian support of US operations in Afghanistan, Canada recognizes the US as a powerful ally. The largest oil reserve in the world is in the Canadian province of Alberta, which is likely to be strategically important to the US as other world reserves are depleted or become unavailable to the US.

North American perceptions of the US: Canada perceives the US as a close ally and the single largest trading partner. Many Mexicans view the US as hypocritical in its treatment of Mexico. Mexicans perceive the US as benefiting from cheap labor from Mexico while mistreating Mexican workers, whose remittances comprise a major sector of the Mexican economy. Mexico feels pressure from the US to control drug trafficking northward while illegal weapons continue to flow southward.5 Europe Europe and the US enjoy a vast range of common democratic, cultural, religious and political ideologies that facilitate an enduring, cooperative trans-Atlantic relationship. The continued partnerships with key European allies and NATO are vital pillars of US foreign policy. Any developments that threaten to weaken these relationships can be viewed as counter to US national interest. Common threats to both European and US interests include terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, current and potential regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. All of these threats are interrelated, as regional instability and failed states create new or continued frontiers for terrorism, weapons proliferation, and organized crime. A significant concern among many Europeans is the rapid growth of Europe’s Muslim population. Fifteen million Muslims live in the EU today, and thirty million live in the whole of Europe.6 This demographic shift and related assimilation difficulties have


occasionally sparked violent clashes. Moreover, concerns about terrorism have forced European countries to reconsider how to handle their rapidly growing Muslim communities – particularly in light of the Islamic extremist threats and hostilities present in the Central Asia, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and other locations.7

Southern Europe, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe face some of the highest risks and/or levels of instability, including separatist movements such as the Basques in Spain, ethnic Albanians in Serbia, and the TranDniester populace of Moldova. Russia. Vladimir Putin's drive to centralize power and increase state control over strategic sectors of the economy raises questions about the country's direction. However, such state control has served to stabilize Russia’s movement toward a failing state. Recent trends in Russia indicate a “diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions” which could mean that short-term stability will lead to a mid-term crisis.8 Russia’s growing suspicions about Western intentions and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on areas of concern to the US. It must be stressed that Russia still maintains the second-most-capable nuclear force in the world and controls a massive land area. Russia is a dominant player in the control of regional energy sources and is expressing interest in becoming a global energy superpower. The nation is also a member of several collective security organizations that arguably have the goal of limiting the potential of US global hegemony. Russia’s military technology is steadily growing, partially due to its ever-growing defense budget and high oil prices. The nation’s defense budget, which stood at $8.1 billion in 2001, has nearly quadrupled to about $31 billion for 2007. Russia is expected to increase its conventional and nuclear weapons technology and arsenal.9 In a 2006 speech, Putin stated: “work is already underway today on creating unique high-precision weapons systems and maneuverable combat units that will have an unpredictable flight trajectory for the potential opponent. Along with the means for overcoming anti-missile defenses that we already have, these new types of arms will enable us to maintain what is definitely one of the most important guarantees of lasting peace, namely, the strategic balance of forces.”10 Clearly, Russia takes a cautious view of US power and influence. Putin has stated repeatedly that the US is undermining global stability.11 Russia is returning to a more controlled society and sees her future in Europe and Asia as an opponent to US hegemony.

European perceptions of the US: Europe’s perception of the US may potentially influence US projection of political, economic, and military power in the long-term. The US needs to maintain a perception of strength and reliability among its allies in


order to leverage its interests with international support. Europe’s perception of the US can be characterized primarily in terms of legitimacy, security, and economy. For the first time since World War II, a large number of Europeans have begun to doubt the legitimacy of US power and global leadership.12 Their perception of the manner in which the US conducts itself in Iraq today is especially important. In their view, at stake is not only the future of Iraq and the Middle East, but also the future of America's reputation, its reliability and its legitimacy as a world leader. In the long-term, the extent of US success in these areas, and therefore the outcome, will determine the extent to which the US can continue to project its power. Middle East If exacerbated, developments in this region could easily spin out of control, negatively affecting US security concerns, (e.g., relating to Iraq, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and/or Egypt; activities in general by al-Qaeda and like-minded Islamic extremists; and of course the flow of oil). A 2006 article quotes King Abdullah of Jordan as saying that the Middle East is “juggling with the strong potential of three civil wars in the region, whether it’s the Palestinians, that of Lebanon, or of Iraq.”13 Perhaps no other region holds as strong a strategic significance to the US as this region does. Key issues include the overall Middle East peace process, ascendance of Hamas and Hezbollah, instability in Lebanon and Syria, current operations in Iraq and the pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran. The issue of religious extremism is also of interest. On the one hand, al-Qaeda is consolidating footholds in North Africa and Iraq, which increases the probability of terrorist attacks in those regions, and even challenges the stability of some regimes themselves. On the other hand, the prospect of a regional, militarized conflict between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims has increased, as well – and will likely continue to do so – with Iranian aspirations of regional hegemony and continued sectarian strife in Iraq. Such a conflict would be difficult for the US military to contain, especially if the Iranian military entered the fray on the side of the Shi’a and the Saudi military on the side of the Sunni.

The outcome of current operations in Iraq clearly has both regional and global repercussions. America’s degree of success/failure in Iraq will have impacts far beyond Iraq itself—especially with regard to how nations such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria respond to US efforts to blunt those countries’ weapons of mass destruction, terrorism support, and other dangerous or destabilizing activities. The Arab world continues to regard the US presence in Iraq as unwelcome and exploitative; it will be a lighting rod for extremism in the region. Not only will extremist elements use US presence as a mobilizing tool (for both regional and global activities), but – given the security situation in Iraq – key areas of the country will continue to attract enemy combatants and insurgent groups anxious to confront the US militarily.


Despite US plans to drawn down its military forces in Iraq, the sectarian conflict has the potential to balloon into a region-wide conflagration between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. This outcome will become increasingly likely as long as sectarian accommodation in Iraq remains at a standstill and as long as Iraq’s borders remain permeable to Iranian and Saudi influence. Iran is currently pursuing a program of uranium enrichment, which could lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, it has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, which could prove to be a direct threat to allies and US forces.14 It is striving to become the hegemon in the region. Iran could use its capabilities to disrupt or close ship traffic in the Persian Gulf, leading to the possibility of all oil exports being significantly disrupted, intentionally or otherwise. Iran has a modern conventional military, is seeking to increase its influence regionally and is currently enhancing its ability to project military power (ballistic missiles and naval power). Its overall sponsorship of terrorism is also counter to our interests in the region and globally. Iran views the attempted UN and EU imposition of sanctions, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and US rhetoric as direct threats to the regime. Iranian reactions to these threats have manifested themselves in the nuclear issue, which has become a particular point of contention. Iran claims that it is seeking peaceful nuclear technology for electricity generation. Iran’s view that it is a “great state”, and its desire to be the dominant power in the region, naturally leads to its belief that it has a natural right to nuclear weapons. Iran has learned many lessons on fighting technologically superior opponents, beginning with its experience in the Iran-Iraq War. It is actively participating in insurgent activities in Iraq as well as other regions. Iran is also developing and acquiring technologies to engage a technologically superior foe. This includes Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) technology, Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), and naval technology. Much of Iran’s naval development has occurred in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. It has focused on developing a fleet of small and fast missile boats capable of swarming targets in the gulf, as witnessed recently in the incident with the Royal Navy. Iran has also focused on acquiring anti ship missiles, including the P-270 Moskit (NATO designation SS-N-22 Sunburn). If a conflict with Iran were to occur, Iran would use all means (from weapons of mass destruction to guerilla) to defend itself. Iran is concentrating on offsets to the US technological advantage. Syria remains a pivotal player in the Middle East. Syria endeavors to exert control over Lebanese affairs in order to keep Western forces out of Greater Syria. For this reason, it is also unwilling to reach an unfavorable accommodation with Israel over the Golan Heights and support for Hamas. Syria will likely continue to exploit Iraq’s porous borders to raise the costs of the US occupation there. Syria pursues these policies because its resistance


to Western interference in the region not only increases its prestige in the Arab world, but also bolsters the stability of the brittle Assad regime at home. Hezbollah is an international terrorist organization with a global presence. It is the first non-state actor to launch anti-ship cruise missiles at an adversary. It has strong ties to the Middle East but also operates in South America, Asia and the US. It has a close relationship with other terrorist organizations, insurgent groups and criminal organizations. In the summer of 2006, Hezbollah paramilitary forces demonstrated their military capability by successfully confronting a well-organized and equipped Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Hezbollah’s well-developed integrated area defense in southern Lebanon resulted in an eventual stalemate. Hezbollah’s aggressive reconstruction efforts after the 2006 conflict dramatically increased its legitimacy in Lebanon. HAMAS' electoral success ushered in a period of great uncertainty. President Abbas, the Israelis, and the US must determine how to deal with a majority party in the Palestinian Legislative Council that conducts and supports terrorism and refuses to recognize or negotiate with Israel. The recent conflict between HAMAS and Israel highlight the growing threat in Gaza and the entire region. HAMSA could use its connections to international terrorist networks, such as that of Hezbollah, to indirectly influence US military operations in the region. As the most populous Arab country, Egypt could play an important role in shaping US military operations in the region. Egypt continues to be actively involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As such, Egypt will be essential to guaranteeing the long-term stability of any negotiated settlement between Israel and its neighbors, and, indirectly, in shaping Arab attitudes towards the US. Perhaps even more important than Egypt’s role in the Palestine issue, is that Egypt has announced the resumption of its nuclear weapons program. Likely in response to Iranian advancements in its nuclear research, this could lead to a greater threat of regional nuclear war in the future, an outcome that would pose serious challenges for US military operations in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is also of tremendous importance to the US. The world relies heavily on Saudi oil. There would be significant domestic and international economic and political repercussions if Saudi oil exports were reduced (by terrorist strikes or insufficient Saudi oil reserves and/or production capability). Saudi Arabia is also of concern because of its involvement in proselytizing around the globe with regard to Wahhabi/Salafist beliefs and practices. Much of the Saudi population is frustrated with the monarchy. Some of the frustration is a result of domestic issues. Many young restless citizens cannot


find jobs in the kingdom leaving them open to extremist recruiting. Many citizens desire more freedom as the Kingdom rates as one of the most autocratic states in the world. Frustration toward the regime also results from its ties with the US government and US foreign policy. A prime focus of their frustration is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which is one of the most important issues to Saudi people personally. Many hold the US principally responsible for the conflict due to its support of Israel. In addition, the development by Riyadh of a strategic relationship with China or Iran could adversely affect US national interests.

Middle Eastern perceptions of the US: The US is viewed as an imperialistic power seeking to quench its thirst for oil by interfering in the region’s domestic political discussions. The region views US motives in exploiting these resources with great skepticism – thus sparking discontent with the US – but a region-wide conflict (especially involving Iran, which controls the Strait of Hormuz) could reduce and/or endanger the world’s oil supply and spark secondary conflicts in other areas. Complaints can often be heard in the Middle East about US attempts to apply American democratic institutions to region-specific political problems with ill result. This region-wide gap in political development could not only complicate future military operations in the region, but may very well also create difficulties for ongoing operations in Iraq. It is in our national interest to help secure peace in the region and help counter the regional state sponsorship of terrorism. In the Middle East, commentators have not forgotten the current administration’s characterization of the “war on terror” as a “crusade” and a struggle against an “axis of evil” (which, in the Middle East, includes Syria, Iraq, and Iran). Moreover, extremist clerics often condemn US cultural influence in the region, decrying its immorality and secularism as a threat to Islam. Central Asia Poverty, authoritarian governments, Islamic fundamentalists, oil and other natural resources, and the interests of Russia and China are key issues in this region. The region remains plagued by political stagnation and repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty and widening socio-economic inequalities, along with other problems that nurture radical sentiment and terrorism. In the worst case, central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival clans or regions vie for power--opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and criminal activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan. For example, the risk of unrest in Uzbekistan remains. Terrorism and organized crime, unstable states, endemic corruption and porous borders create many opportunities for criminal and militant groups in the region.

Much like Iraq, the outcome of the current operation in Afghanistan will have both regional and global repercussions. The resurgence of the Taliban forces, the continued reliance on an opium-based economy, and inability to extend


the government’s legitimacy beyond key urban areas are keeping Afghanistan operating much like a failed state. Islamic militants are using a recent peace deal with the government to consolidate their hold in northern Pakistan, vastly expanding their training of suicide bombers and other recruits and fortifying alliances with al-Qaeda and foreign fighters. It is in the US national interest to help Afghanistan continue to strive for stability and succeed in its reconstruction efforts.

Central Asian perceptions of the US: The US presence in Central Asia has received a mixed reaction. Positive views of the US stem from the perception that the US is a counterbalance to Russia and China. Negative views stem from the belief that the US is interested in forcing regime change in governments that do not comply with the US wishes. The “Color Revolutions” in Eastern/Central Europe and Central Asia have strongly supported this assertion, and there is a wide-scale belief that these revolutions are supported by the US intelligence services. This contributes to a broader Central Asian perception that the US is a persistent meddler in sovereign nations’ internal affairs.15 Latin America. A gradual consolidation and improvement of democratic institutions is the dominant trend in much of Central/Latin America. Committed democrats in countries like Brazil and Chile are promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation. In addition, despite battling persistent insurgent and paramilitary forces with considerable success, Colombia remains committed to keeping on a democratic path. However, radical populist figures (Hugo Chavez) in some countries advocate state-controlled economic policies and show little respect for democratic institutions. Radical populists in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Nicaragua are extremely popular. The US has been vocal in its opposition of Nicaragua’s new president, Daniel Ortega, who is seen to be bolstering an increasingly assertive anti-US bloc in the region.

Venezuela, led by President Hugo Chavez, is of considerable strategic importance to the US because of the country’s contribution to US oil imports. Venezuela contributes over 15% of US imports (the fourth largest supplier after Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Mexico).16 President Chavez appears ready to use his control of the legislature and other institutions to stifle the opposition, reduce press freedom, and entrench himself politically. His quest for regional dominance is coupled with an aggressive anti-US foreign policy. He has stated his desire to reduce US influence in the region. The Venezuelan government views US power very negatively, citing the US as an imperialist. It portrays the US as connected to the wealthy oligarchs known as part of the opposition in Venezuela. President Chavez continues to deepen his relationship with Cuba – providing roughly two-thirds of that island's oil needs on preferential credit terms. Venezuela and Russia have established a thriving “arms for oil” relationship – an excellent example of global interdependencies. President Chavez also is seeking closer economic, military, and diplomatic ties with Iran, North Korea and Russia.


In Bolivia – South America's poorest country with the hemisphere's highest proportion of indigenous people – the victory of Evo Morales reflects the public's lack of faith in traditional political parties and institutions. Since his election, he appears to have moderated his earlier promises to nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and cease coca eradication. Nevertheless, his administration continues to send mixed signals regarding its intentions. President Morales is a strong critic of the US, which in turn is concerned about Bolivian coca cultivation. Bolivia has close ties with Cuba and Venezuela.

Latin American perceptions of the US: Perhaps nowhere is the erosion of US credibility stronger than in Latin America. Latin America, in general, sees the US in two distinct and often contradictory lights. The US is a menace, oppressing the other nations of the hemisphere and preventing other nations from rising up to its level. A history of military interventions, support for dictatorships and abusive regimes, and a reputation as an overbearing power foster these perceptions. On the other hand, the US is the source of aid, a destination for education, and the guardian of peace. Africa The most recent US National Security Strategy highlights the growing geo-strategic importance of Africa.17 As in other regions, it is within our national interest to help stabilize fragile or failing states in this region. The US maintains a military presence of approximately 1,500 personnel in Djibouti. This region is enjoying real economic growth after a decade of declining per capita income. The past decade has also witnessed a definite, albeit gradual, trend toward greater democracy, openness, and multiparty elections. Yet, in much of the continent, humanitarian crises (refugee problems, high AIDS/HIV rates), instability, and conflict persist. Overlaying these tensions is the potential spread of jihadist ideology among disaffected Muslim populations and the region's growing importance as a source of energy.

The fierce fighting in Darfur is testing Sudan’s new Government of National Unity. Instability in Chad is spilling over into western Sudan, further endangering humanitarian aid workers and assistance supply lines. The Darfur conflict is a growing humanitarian crisis. To date, over 350,000 people have been killed or died from malnutrition or disease and close to 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) exist. Sudan perceives US power as a direct threat to its sovereignty. President Omar Bashir says the US is exaggerating the problems in Darfur to justify an Iraq-style occupation. He claims there is no need for UN peacekeepers because the current African Union force is doing "fantastically well.”18 Bashir recently described the situation in Darfur as quite calm. However, in reality, the potential for Darfur to explode into a regional conflict is great. Chad and the Central African Republic are entangled in the crisis. The humanitarian situation in Chad is deteriorating with the increased flow of


refugees from Darfur. Current estimates indicate over 200,000 refugees have fled into Chad.19 A recent UN report – which claimed that an increasing number of African and Middle East countries are helping to arm Islamic militants trying to seize control of Somalia - has raised fears that there could be a regional conflict over this failed state in the Horn of Africa.20 Somalia continues to oppose US and UN efforts to settle the Darfur conflict and sees the US interest in terms of supporting the Christians. Following the debacle in Mogadishu, US military operations have been restricted to air strikes in southern Somalia against Al Qaeda and fundamentalist forces. Somalia views the US as casualty averse and limited by the lack of support of the American population. Somali Islamist forces have also declared jihad against Ethiopia, which could lead to increased regional tensions or a possible full-scale Ethiopia/Eritrea war. The fear in particular is that Ethiopia and Eritrea will come into conflict because they support opposite sides, and might see Somalia as another battleground in which to continue the intermittent war over their own border dispute. US foreign policy experts are worried that if this happens the region could offer the kind of training bases for Al-Qaeda elements that were provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Uranium deposits in Somalia are also attracting the attention of Iran.

Eritrea considers the US a hegemonic power that refuses to pressure Ethiopia about their border issue while backing Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia. Eritrea views the US interest in the region as the control of natural resources and strategic positioning against Chinese presence.

The recent election in Nigeria, the continent's most populous country and largest oil producer, was marred with violence, intimidation and corruption. Umaru Musa Yar’adua of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) won the hotly contested Presidential election. Since the spring election, militant groups have stepped up attacks on oil installations, sabotaging pipelines and kidnapping foreign oil workers. A representative for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) warned that attacks would continue until the government opened a dialogue addressing the restoration of the oil wealth to the people in the region. Nigerians are pessimistic about prospects for improvements. Despite being the world’s eighth largest exporter of crude, Nigeria has been losing more than 500,000 barrels of oil a day due to MEND activities. MEND also appears to be an umbrella organization for several rebel groups in the Delta. A recent report commissioned by Shell, an international energy


company, concluded that the level of conflict in the region was comparable to Colombia and Chechnya.21

African perceptions of the US: Many in Africa distrust US policy in the region. For example, in Nigeria insurgents believe the US is synonymous with Shell Oil. Insurgents believe that the US will not commit troops in the Niger Delta because Washington has neither the political will nor the popular support to attack insurgents that are fighting for a fair share of local resources. In northern Sudan, many believe that the US, through its support of the African Union forces and proposed UN hybrid force, is conspiring to occupy Sudan. The foreign intervention in Darfur is seen as a way for the US to steal natural resources, mainly oil, and occupy key strategic geography.22 Ethiopia, a nominally Christian nation, was a willing partner after 9/11. It saw the relationship with the US as a way to avoid UN sanctions while boosting its military capability and increasing its regional influence. It did so by fighting the Al-Qaeda backed regime in Somalia. Ethiopia is worried about cultural contamination and waning US interest in the region, so its sees its partnership with the US as a short-term union.23 Asia Asia includes vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies looking to the US as a source of stability, wealth, and leadership. However, it is also home to terrorism, separatist aspirations, crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions. The region is particularly at risk from avian flu. Affiliates of Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups are present in many countries.

China is a rapidly rising power with steadily expanding global reach that may become a peer competitor (economically and perhaps militarily) to the US. Consistent high rates of economic growth, driven by exploding foreign trade, have increased Beijing's political influence abroad and fueled a military modernization program that has steadily improved Beijing's force projection capabilities. China is developing more-capable long-range conventional strike systems and short-and-medium-range ballistic missile systems.24

Chinese foreign policy focuses on the country's immediate periphery, including Central Asia, where Beijing hopes to make economic inroads, increase political influence, and prevent a backlash against its rise. Its rhetoric toward Taiwan has been less inflammatory since Beijing passed its “anti-secession” law in spring 2006. China made breakthroughs with Vietnam and the Philippines for mutual accommodations for joint exploration of natural resources in the South China Sea, particularly around the petroleum-rich Spratly Islands. China has taken larger roles in multilateral talks, most notably the six-party talks focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue. China also has expanded diplomatic and economic interaction with other major powers – especially Russia and the EU – and has begun to increase its presence in Africa and Latin America. Such increases in global interaction and military


modernization could indicate that China is attempting to be more than a regional hegemonic presence. Over the last several years, the PRC has used soft power in an effort to ensure that the country will have access to oil and natural gas. The hunt for energy resources has also driven some military developments aimed at protecting import sea routes. China is not comfortable with the prospect of the US keeping these routes open, especially in the event of a conflict. To mitigate this shortcoming, China is attempting to develop a blue-water navy and extend its land-based deployments along the sea route. The land-based operations would use what the Chinese theoretically refer to as a Chain of Pearls, using conventional short-range ballistic missiles to keep the lanes open in the event of a crisis. Chinese perceptions’ of the US are multifaceted and depend on the context of the conversation and the audience. If the dialog is framed as US power, the reaction is generally negative from both the PRC government and the average citizen. Encroachments on its borders by US military power, as seen in Korea, or more recently in Afghanistan, produces an almost visceral reaction to protect national sovereignty. While intellectually, they understand that US power projection has the ability to recreate these conditions almost anywhere on her periphery; physical proximity of troops draws a psychological reaction beyond that of mere strategic concerns. The Chinese do not see a US invasion of the country but rather a cascade effect of collapse due to US influence. US pressure applied anywhere in the chain of Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan or Hong Kong could cause the other blocks to fall and split the nation. Furthermore, the Chinese view current US strategy toward China as one of containment. They see a US goal of hindering their economic and military rise; ensuring that it never comes to fruition – that the developing infant is stillborn. The analogy of infancy holds with China’s own view of its national power. Beijing considers its current state of development as being at a critical and vulnerable juncture. While they have witnessed unprecedented economic growth, any major confrontation could easily derail these gains and possibly endanger the legitimacy of the government. From the standpoint of the average citizen, all negative impressions of the US appear to originate from this fear of the US undermining China. A public opinion poll taken in 2005 provides examples of this mindset. The leading causes of dissatisfaction with the US were weapon sales to Taiwan, the war in Iraq, and increased military ties with Japan.25 According to the poll, Chinese citizenry saw Taiwan as the primary concern for direct military conflict with the US. This was split somewhat evenly, with 53% believing the US and China would or “would probably” have a clash and some 40% who thought the likelihood was small to nonexistent.26


Direct conflict between China and the US is viewed as a remote possibility outside of the Taiwan scenario. Most PLA military leaders further agree that an arms race with the US is a waste of time and resources. Trying to bridge the current technology gap would prove too costly and would still lag generations behind. Many military writings cite the Soviet example of trying to match US arms, and warn about its subsequent failure. China will instead bide for time and possibly use a combination of methods, such as technology, space-based operations and nanotechnology, to “leapfrog” the US. North Korea has long been viewed as a dangerous rogue nation because of its authoritarianism; the conventional military threat it poses; its nuclear weapons and other WMD programs and proliferation of associated technology; narcotrafficking, counterfeiting, and other criminal activity; and its past involvement with terrorists. US interest in North Korea is focused primarily on its role in the spread of WMD and related weapon systems. Currently North Korea sells ballistic missiles to any country wishing to buy them and has threatened to proliferate nuclear weapons.27 Not only is this a direct threat to our allies and US troops in Northeast Asia but also a source of instability in the Middle East, the main benefactor of the proliferation efforts. The outcome of the six party talks (two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the US) and the North Korean nuclear standoff will remain the key for the near term. Rapid economic growth and increasing technological competence are securing India's status in southern Asia. New Delhi seeks to play a key role in fostering democracy in the region, especially in Nepal and Bangladesh, and will continue to be a reliable ally against global terrorism - in part because India has been a frequent target for Islamic terrorists, mainly in Kashmir. India seeks better relations with its two main rivals--Pakistan and China. However, like China, India is using its newfound wealth and technical capabilities to extend its military reach. India’s pursuit of energy to fuel its growing economy adds to pressure on world prices and increases the likelihood that it will seek to augment its programs in nuclear power, coal technologies, and petroleum exploration. Like Pakistan, India is outside the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.

Many of our most important strategic interests intersect in Pakistan. It has become the focal point of al-Qaeda act ivies in the region. Pakistan is at the frontline in the war on terror, having captured several al-Qaeda leaders, but also remains a major source of extremism that poses a threat to the US and to neighboring India and Afghanistan. Ungoverned areas of Pakistan are currently providing sanctuary to forces bent on harming the US.

The prospects for democratic consolidation are relatively bright in Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population. President Yudhoyono


is moving forward to crack down on corruption, professionalize the military, bring peace to the province of Aceh, and implement economic reforms. Indonesia is the potential powerhouse in the region. Despite some problems with Islamic fundamentalism and fighting between the Christians and Muslims, Indonesia continues to make fundamental improvements in the economy and standard of living of its citizens. On the counterterrorism side, Indonesian authorities have detained or killed significant elements of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group, but JI remains the regions’ largest jihadist organization.

The Philippines remains committed to democracy. However, Manila continues to struggle with the thirty-five year old Islamic and Communist rebellions, and faces growing concerns over the presence of JI terrorists in the south.

Asian perceptions of the US: North Korea believes that the US is an expert at propaganda and psychological warfare. North Korea believes the US used fake propaganda to precede military invasions in Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and that propaganda is being used to justify a potential invasion of Iran.28 North Korea also believes that US operations in Iraq are an example of US state terrorism by trampling on international law and the UN Charter. They claim that US policy is reactionary and dangerous and it is paying for its preemptive strike strategy. By contrast, in the Philippines, most people find US power and culture very attractive. US assistance to operations in the southern Philippines has been successful. Highly trained, low profile troops have been working hand-in-hand with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), using technology to track down potential terrorists. Part of the success of these operations is some of these are US troops with Filipino ancestry, giving them cultural and linguistic capabilities. Additionally, some of the officers in the AFP are graduates of the US military academies. These lessons from the Philippines may be useful in other parts of the world.29 COMMON PERCEPTIONS OF US POWER As evidenced by the above discussion, people of countries and regions perceive the US differently. Some regions, such as Europe, view the US with tolerance mingled with distrust while people of other regions, such as the Middle East and Latin America, view the US as a threat. Where the US is viewed as a threat, there are some common themes:

• The US popular culture and entertainment industry is a source of cultural contamination that attacks religion, family and group values.

• The US is primarily interested in preserving the status quo, usually supports the government in power (no matter how corrupt), and always supports the existing national boundaries (no matter how inappropriate) as long as they support US interests.

• The US is interested in forcing regime change in governments that do not comply with US policies or views.


• The US views other countries as a source of talent (brain drain) and cheap labor. • The US is a competitor for global natural resources and has unfair advantages in this

competition. • The US aggressively tries to export US concepts that may not be appropriate to other

countries. These concepts include democracy, human rights, abolition of slavery, women’s rights.

• The US is content to leave the Third World in a continued state of poverty as long as it does not interfere with US conspicuous wealth and consumerism.

Perceived US weaknesses include:

• The US is casualty averse. • Despite the prodigious amounts of money spent on public education, the average

American does not understand or care about other cultures, speak foreign languages, or understand geography, history or current events.

• The US is addicted to luxury. • The US is addicted to technology and prefers to fight remotely using air power. • The USAF is predictable and unconcerned about civilian lives. • The US Army and USMC are slow, logistics-heavy and dependant on contractor

support. • The US public has no long-term memory. The events of 9/11 are no longer relevant

to US society. • The US prefers to maintain a limited armed force and solve problems with money, not

people. • The US is not a reliable ally.

Threat Lessons Learned from current US operations These lessons are being used by our adversaries to write doctrine and make investments in equipment that will enable them to remain dominant in a regional construct and withstand attacks from inter-regional attacks, should they occur. Some of the key enduring lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan about how the US conducts warfare include:

• High tech weapons and communications systems can be countered with low technology responses.

• The US military is slow to respond to information operations so that adversaries can control the message and control the fight.

• The US is very predictable in the conduct of its operations. • Shifting patterns and constant adaptation will confuse US technical intelligence

capabilities. • Despite success on the battlefield, US operations can be derailed over time through a

strategy of exhaustion. • Anti-access, access limitation and tactical shielding are effective means of metering

US response to crisis and controlling the ability to react in theater. • Small numbers of sophisticated systems can have a dramatic effect on the operational

environment and perceptions.


GLOBAL DRIVERS AND TRENDS The Army’s new strategic reality is that war is our steady-state environment – a war against adversaries employing irregular, unconventional, and asymmetrical means. A recent Army Posture Statement articulates, “the Army must be prepared to sustain operations during a period of persistent conflict – a blurring of familiar distinctions between war and peace.”30 Today’s constant tension and conflict is not completely driven by nation-states. From a leadership development, education and training perspective, the Army must be prepared to fight any type of adversary (or combination of adversaries), across the entire spectrum of conflict while preparing for possible attacks on US soil. This reality also means there is no time for a strategic pause to reset. Despite being fully engaged, the Army must now address training gaps and incorporate lessons learned. The Army “must be agile, adapting and innovating in-stride.”31 The training community needs to be as responsive and dynamic as possible. It must change and/or replace any tools, processes, and policies that prevent it from quickly adapting to the emerging challenges. With these givens – that ambiguity, instability, and inevitable change will characterize the OE; conflicts within, between and among civilizations, regions, nations, and groups are all but a certainty; and that specifics of who, what, where and when will no doubt be harder to obtain, understand, and manage – how do military leaders get a handle on the situation? Analysts begin by looking for drivers and trends to help identify the necessary training conditions. Such identifications are the first step in understanding the context in which military operations will be conducted. Six key global drivers, discussed below, were selected, not only for their scope and impact, but also for their persistence across future operational environments. These drivers tangibly affect the development of global trends – discussed in detail later – which directly influence the OE and thus have significant training implications. Global drivers are, in effect, enduring constants that help frame the nature and character of the OE. Identifying the drivers and associated trends is the first step in establishing the direction, scope and detail of Army training conditions. The US Army must improve its ability to understand the implications and the interaction and relationship of these drivers and trends. All of the global drivers have intensified a variety of threats – including the spread of WMD that empowers a group or individual; and ICT, which allows for global networking and connectivity. Some of the drivers have assisted in fueling economic inequalities, political instability and exposed conflict triggers such as ethnic divisions and social injustices. Many of the drivers are forcing change in extremely short periods of time with worldwide effect. Some of this change may occur so fast and so deep that it uproots traditional and established institutions – including governance,


education, science, communication, etc. Change itself is a driver of conflict. It destabilizes at both the individual and national level. Global Drivers The six key global drivers3 highlighted for this paper are: 1) Competing cultures, civilizations, and associated ideologies, 2) Information and communications technology (ICT) proliferation, 3) Globalization/integration, 4) Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, 5) Science, technology and engineering (ST&E) advancements and 6) Resource constraints. The OE will be deeply affected by the interplay of all of these drivers. DRIVER 1: Competing cultures, civilizations, and associated ideologies Description: Competing cultures, civilizations, and associated ideologies shape the conflict fault lines in our world. These differences argue against the notion of a universal civilization. Rather, there are modern and traditional c(and many cultures in between) that compete resources and influence. Advanced niche technologies (e.g., nuclear weapons technosuper computing, and space-based communications) and globalization often sharpen these natural differences as cultures seek dominance or act to redress real or imagined grievances. The availability of information and access to other cultures has further sharpened the knowledge of differences while at the same time mitigating effects of any Diaspora of people sharing culture and ideology.

ultures for

logy,

Scope: Globalization may be less of a “melting pot” coalescing disparate cultures and more a conflict-forcing function. US forces will be challenged by emergent powers representing different people or groups. Military Implications: The US Army will need to educate experts in foreign cultures and train many more soldiers in various languages, customs, and traditions. The “human terrain” and associated non-kinetic effects have become as important, if not more so, as physical terrain, weapons systems, and kinetic force-on-force effects. Culture and ideology may be the center of gravity in future conflict. DRIVER 2: Information communications and technology (ICT) proliferation

3 Other drivers could have been highlighted. These six where selected based on their significant impact on military forces, the OE and potential adversaries. This list should not be considered definitive or absolute. It does however; provide an effective starting point from which to analyze the OE.


Description: Perhaps one of the most significant developments of the 20th Century was the internet and its associated technologies. This ever-expanding global communications network continues to change how actors communicate, store, process, react to and manipulate information. These developments have affected

everything we do -- how we work, govern, organize, communicate and fight wars. More people have access to information and the ability to spread this information on a global scale than ever before. The availability of information has broken the state’s monopoly and challenges hierarchical institutions that relied on control

of information for power.

“Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, US public diplomacy has followed an ineffective information strategy borrowed from the Cold War.” Richard J. Josten, Joint Information Operations Center (2006)

Some may argue that globalization is the most significant global driver, however one can equally contend that globalization is an outcome of a connected world (or the ICT proliferation driver). The meteoric growth of microprocessor capabilities and the impact on processing and communications has allowed the world to become connected. It has enabled rapid advances in transportation systems and ignited an increasingly global market for goods and services. It has also provided the enemy with a global C4ISR capability. In more ways than we can imagine, US forces will face a networked enemy using the global grid as their C4ISR system. Clearly, ICT proliferation has changed the context in which governments and militaries operate. Individual citizens and groups now have the ability to quickly organize and contest or influence the direction and mode of governance and military operations from the strategic to tactical levels. From the 24/7 news environment to flash mobs, blogs and text messaging, the rapid flow of information demands rapid responses from both the government and military focus. US forces must understand all dimensions of this environment and its impact on operations (issues of tactical transparency, importance of information campaigns, changes to the collection of intelligence, speed of information). Potential adversaries have access to all the commercial tools and distribution methods, and they prove much more adept at rapidly adapting new technology and new methods to reach their intended audiences. One of the most remarkable uses of ICT has been in Iraq, where it has become an essential ideological and operational tool for the insurgency. Many groups have carried out sophisticated information campaigns with video cameras, laptops, cell phones and other wireless technologies. The US Army must learn not only to monitor such activity but also to analyze it in terms of the message, context, and intended audience and within the adversaries’ overall strategic information campaign plan. If the US military hopes to understand and counter this presence, it must be not only as technologically savvy as its opponents, but also as adroit at exploiting such technology in a timely manner. “Technological sophistication is no longer a luxury….it is now a basic survival skill.”32


Scope: ICT is omnipresent. Computer, communication and networking technology has already made computational power and networked information constantly available to those with the required resources. Decreased costs, more user-friendly interfaces, and smaller, lighter, less expensive materials will push the further integration of ICT across the globe into the hands of an ever-expanding range of actors.33 Advanced ICT is no longer a tool simply for the rich and powerful – be they nation-states, groups or individuals. Technological proliferation will affect all facets of society, challenging governments and institutions by breaking down traditional hierarchical structures that maintain the management and dissemination of information. As the technology spreads so does the empowerment. Potential adversaries will use this to their advantage. Military Implications: The networked global environment will be increasingly driven by the unrestricted and sometimes real-time flow of information and technology. This will dramatically increase the dissemination of information and the magnitude of its effects – whether it is world markets reacting in seconds to a terrorist bombing or a

video camera capturing today’s operations in Iraq. US military forces will have to be capable not only of operating in such an environment, but of influencing and focusing that environment. A wide variety of actors

with access to ICT and operating outside of the control of the military will now be part of any OE. All operations, no matter how remote, can potentially be monitored.

“I say to you that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.” Zawahiri – July 2005.

Another ICT military implication centers on the area of rules of engagement (ROE). How will forces’ ROE handle non-combatants armed not with a weapon but with a camera, the effects of which can be just as damaging? As the photos from Abu Ghraib proved, an isolated event (captured by enemy or friendly) can suddenly become a strategic nightmare. The resounding damage of Abu Ghraib can be traced back to a $20 smart card and a $200 digital camera. We must map out how the US Army can adapt to and develop the capability to shape this information environment. Our adversaries have seized the advantage in information campaigns because, without institutional barriers they can be more flexible, adapt quickly and get the message out first. Perhaps the greatest challenge now is operations security (OPSEC) for military operations. The information explosion has caused a crisis in OPSEC. Information transferred at an ever-increasing rate is more exposed to intercept and exploitation than ever before. The internet provides enemies tremendous opportunity to understand a soldier’s innermost thoughts through online blogs as well as capture commercial cellular phone calls that may relay to friends and family unit locations and even operational plans. DRIVER 3: Globalization/Integration


Description: Globalization⎯the process of growing interconnectedness and altered relationships at a fundamental level – is reflected in and made possible by expanded flows of information, technology, capital, goods, services, and people throughout the world. Harvard professor Joseph S. Nye states simply that globalization is “worldwide networks of interdependence.”34 While globalization itself is not new, the interconnectedness of the global economy has recently reached heights previously unseen.35 Increased openness and connectivity brings with it both unifying and fragmenting effects. It makes little difference how this is categorized – as the tension between the core and gap or the integrated and non-integrated. The key is to understand that globalization benefits some and harms others, and therefore, in some cases, is setting the condition for conflict. The resulting disparities (real or perceived) between those open to globalization and those who are not can exacerbate social tensions and help spawn conflict and terrorist activities. Globalization both enables and substantially shapes all the other major trends permeating the OE. Globalization makes it harder for states to live in isolation from each other and weakens or erodes traditional borders and boundaries. For some this brings prosperity and security but for others it can be a threat. Globalization and interdependence can affect transnational problems such as increasing border porosity, transnational crime and increasing energy demand and its subsequent affect on global climate change. The impacts of globalization are far-reaching, including effects on geopolitical development, regional centers of power, migration patterns, information and knowledge flows, the proliferation of technology, and the nature and characteristics of the global economy. Scope: Globalization is not a static one-dimensional concept. It comes in economic, military, environmental, social and cultural forms, among others. Economic globalization focuses on the global flow of goods, services, and capital. Military globalization refers to the network of interdependence and relationships in which military force, and the threat or promise of force are employed (e.g. alliance, treaties, partnerships and coalitions). Environmental globalization includes the transport of materials in the atmosphere or oceans and biological substances, such as pathogens, that affect human health (e.g. toxic waste, climate change, environmental disasters, avian flu, SARS, HIV/AIDS). Social and cultural globalization involves the movement of ideas, information, images, and people. Examples include the movement of religious ideas or the diffusion of scientific knowledge.36 The various shades of globalization reshape not only international politics but military operations as well. Military Implications: Globalization brings the spread of weapons and technology to many new actors, such as Hezbollah, allowing technologies and capabilities to flow into the hands of small groups and even individuals. This can lead to increases in


armed aggression, criminal activities and terrorism on a transnational scale with ease and little cost. It is a given, therefore, that US forces will need to adapt to these new challenges and missions and understand the history, culture and social norms of a multiple range of OEs. Particular focus must be given to the less integrated areas because such operations could involve crisis management events as well as humanitarian, refugee and disaster relief operations. Coping with these needs will require not only the continued capability to project power rapidly in the “outlying world” and continued forward presence, but working to enhance military cooperation through alliances and partnerships. It is critical at this time – when the US Army is transitioning away from forces built for major theater warfare toward operating in multiple, lesser contingency regional venues – that more needs to be done to understand the cultural and social dimensions of potential OEs. Without this, no military operation will be successful. DRIVER 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation Description: As previously discussed, the term WMD relates to a broad range of

adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMDs include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high-explosive (CBRNE) weapons.37 Despite on-going non-proliferation efforts, the spread of

WMDs and WMD capabilities will undeniably continue, requiring US forces to deal with the effects of WMD in the future. The possession of such capabilities provides adversaries with a powerful tool of coercion and intimidation both politically and militarily. “For (potential adversaries), these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest.”38 Nuclear actors (both current and future) will focus not on the deterrence power of such weapons but on the annihilation power. Adversaries will seek such capabilities to achieve regional power or as deterrence to US preemptive policies and actions.

Immediately behind terrorism, nuclear proliferation remains the most significant threat to our national and international stability. – Director of the DIA, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (2005).

Such weapons are nearly impossible to protect against and the psychological impact of these weapons and their use is tremendously powerful. Terrorist organizations will continue to seek such weapons as a means of violence and coercion, and several states remain committed to developing nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities. The partnership of terrorist organizations and such capabilities is chilling. According to the former Director of National Intelligence, Mr. John Negroponte, “today we are more likely to see an attack from terrorists using weapons or agents of mass


destruction than states, although terrorists’ capabilities would be much more limited. In fact, intelligence reporting indicates that nearly 40 terrorist organization, insurgencies, or cults have used, possessed, or expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons.”39 Scope: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) projects that over the next ten years, chemical and biological agents will become more diverse and sophisticated.40 Both state and non-state actors will be actively pursuing and will likely gain access to nuclear weapons, sophisticated and/or bio-engineered biological agents, and non-traditional chemical agents. In all probability, states such as Russia, China and North Korea will continue to sell WMD and missile technologies for revenue and diplomatic influence.41 Military Implication: US military forces must prepare to operate in WMD environments. Training should focus not only on the use of such capabilities by rogue elements but on catastrophic accidents as well. Geographical raids to take out nuclear capabilities may become a necessary capability to prevent proliferation. US military forces will have a significant role in the Department of Defense’s support of civil authorities in conjunction with US Homeland Security and US Homeland Defense. DRIVER 5: Science, Technology and Engineering (ST&E) Advancements Description: The pace of ST&E evolution will continue its acceleration in the next 15 years. Scientific advances seem posed to redefine all dimensions of society. Information and communication technology, electronics, bioengineering and nanotechnology will have profound effects on military operations in the coming years.

Developments in quantum computing and nanotechnology will lead to a fighting force enhanced by robotics and remotely guided, autonomous and miniaturized weapons systems. Communications systems could be

self-organizing and distributed.

By 2015, 80% of people currently entered into the workforce will remain. Yet, 80% of current technology will be replaced with new technology to which existing workers must adapt. -- CSIS Report Revolution Technology (2006)

Scope: Because of this rapid acceleration, the scope of ST&E advances is immeasurable. Undoubtedly, all aspects of society will be affected. Currently the majority of ST&E research is concentrated in the US, but this is changing. Other key actors, including China and India, are beginning to expand and solidify their efforts, challenging the US lead. For example, India graduates three times more software engineers than the US and estimates indicate that 70% of the world’s scientific research is conducted outside the US. Moreover, almost the same percentage of research done in the US is done in the private sector as opposed to government sponsored.42


The blinding pace of advancement and scientific breakthroughs will continue. For example, computing power will continue growing exponentially in the next 10-20 years.

• In the next few years, computing speeds will be 1,000 times faster than today’s supercomputer. New data storage techniques such as “nanotechnology-enabled memory” will vastly increase the capacity to store and transmit data.

• By 2015, computer chips will have evolved from silicon transistors to nanomaterials. • By 2020, given other advances in science and technology, quantum computing will be

possible. In terms of bandwidth, supply will exceed demand. 43 Other types of technology are becoming less expensive and more accessible. Dual-use civilian technologies, especially information technologies, high-resolution imagery and global positioning systems are widely available. These technologies are relatively low cost and commercially available. The importance of rapidly expanding global and regional information architectures, systems, and organizations, both private and public, cannot be overstated. Military Implications: Global proliferation of a wide range of technology and weaponry will affect the character of future conflict. Relatively low cost, commercially available technologies such as GPS and high-resolution imagery will improve the disruptive and destructive capabilities of a wide range of state and non-state actors. Ubiquitous sensors of various types and sizes will saturate the operational environment. Biotechnology may produce genetically manufactured materials resulting in “super” strength materials and fabrics used in uniform and armor development. Advanced technology can often overcome training deficiencies. For example, a laser sight on a weapon can dramatically improve marksmanship without the rigor of learning the eight steady hold factors and applying them with skill. Other ST&E advances will influence weapons systems (robotics, miniature sensor systems), and the flow of information across the OE, as well as intelligence collection capabilities and military deception capabilities. These advances will also result in

new areas or domains of military engagements and competition such as space, information (cyber) and cognitive. These developments will require that military forces respond with new weapons, doctrine and tactics.

Graphic 2: Fuel shares of world marketed

energy use 2003, 2015, and 2030. 1

DRIVER 6: Resource Constraints Description: Resource constraints spring from greater pressures on food, water, sanitation, and infrastructure resources, particularly in places where these are already scarce.


According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 60% of the earth's ecosystems are currently being used at a rate exceeding their capacity to provide goods and services. The increase in global population will also impose significant strains on the earth's natural environment. Moreover, additional resource pressures will arise from demographic shifts in population growth and rapid urbanization. Particularly in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia, such forces will combine to continue to strain scarce resources – sowing seeds for instability as a result. Scope: Most pressing resource constraints, in terms of security, are reliable energy sources and sufficient water supplies. The demand for energy and water has and will have an impact on economic growth, political stability and the conduct of military operations. The frantic quest for resources may also lead to alliance and partnerships that may work against the national interest of the US. It is critical to understand this drive for resources as it affects global conflict.

Energy. Between 2009 and 2025, global energy demand is projected to grow at an average of 1.6% per year. In addition, by 2030, energy requirements are predicted to be more than 50% higher than today.44 Fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal) will continue to be the world’s primary energy source, accounting for 81% of this demand. 45 Oil and gas supplies are becoming more concentrated in a small number of producers. Russia and Iran control 40% of the world’s gas reserves. The Middle East’s share of global oil production will rise from 29% today to 35% in the coming decade, with Saudi Arabia dominating. And by 2020, over one-half of the world’s oil production will occur in potentially unstable regions.46

Driven by population and economic growth and urbanization, developing countries will make up more than two thirds of the increase in the world’s energy demand.47 Experts believe China will need to boost its energy consumption by about 150% and India will need to nearly double its consumption by 2020 to maintain a steady rate of economic growth. Continuing reliance on fossil fuels could lead to conflicts or humanitarian crises in regions where large oil reserves exist. Interest in the stability of energy-rich countries and key transit routes will increase (Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Straits, etc.) Also, the rising energy demands coupled with the desire to reduce carbon emissions may lead to a rapid growth in nuclear energy – making the policing of nuclear technology and related activities much harder. As the above charts indicate, much of the oil and gas producing regions of the world are witnessing or could witness periods of instability or crisis that disrupt global supply. Water. As with energy, global trends in population growth, economic development, industrialization, and food production, among others, are placing increasing stress on the most precious finite natural resource: water. These trends are leading to a period marked by unprecedented, sweeping water


scarcity, toxic water quality, and daunting sanitation challenges. By 2025, an estimated 54 countries – home to four billion people or nearly half of the

world’s population – will face serious constraints on their capacity to meet water demands (India and China). If not effectively addressed, global water shortages will significantly hinder economic development and could spark conflicts within and between countries.48 While this is a global dilemma, the areas most at risk are the Middle East, Asia and North Africa.49

Graphic 3: Depiction of global water scarcity by 2025

Military Impact: The growing demand for constrained resources – both energy and water – may lead to tension, instability, competition and conflict. Military forces may be needed to prevent such tensions from escalating or to re-establish security once a crisis erupts. It is likely that such operations will require cooperation with NGOs, other international organizations (UN, CARE, etc) and possible commercial industries. US forces must be prepared to partner with such organizations.

Strategic Trends The global drivers identified establish the foundation from which trends flow. They are the strategic constants, which “drive” certain trends. Like the drivers, trends do not exist in isolation, nor are the boundaries between trends clear. These trends will challenge, strengthen or impact political, military, social, and economic institutions across the globe and affect the variables of the OE – PMESII+PT. Many of the trends that are currently evident will continue to be at the forefront in the future. Furthermore, trends that are currently manageable may become unmanageable in the coming decades. Trends by themselves do not produce definitive outcomes or events. They do however, influence all types of actors and create the conditions and circumstances that will effect military operations in the coming decades. The specific trends under discussion fall into these categories: demographic; economic; science, technology and engineering (ST&E); threat of the spread of disease; and the changing nature of power.


Demographic Trends The overall growth of the world’s population will slow down as demographic patterns shift from high birth rates, high mortality and short life expectancy to low birth rates, low mortality and long life expectancy. This will of course occur unevenly across the globe. Yet, despite these shifting patterns, the total global population could reach 7.7 to 10 billion by the mid-21st century. Population growth will be the strongest in the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and Asia.50 Countries most affected by population growth trends will include India, Pakistan, Nigeria, China, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Total population growth will remain more stable in more developed countries. Some

nations will experience double-digit growth declines. Russia, for example, will experience a 10.8% growth decline over the next four decades.51 The European and Japanese workforces are now shrinking; Japan is now actually “depopulating” and Europe will reach this condition in about in four years.52 Changing population dynamics influence both economic development and social stability. For example, aging populations will become a social and economic burden in many

developed countries, including the US, Japan and Germany. Youth bulges – particularly in the Middle East and Western Africa – and disenfranchisement will provide fertile ground for recruitment into terrorist groups, criminal elements, and drug cartels. The youth bulge creates job shortages; with no job the future is dim and hopes fade. This produces a fatalistic attitude that opens the door to recruitment by radical causes.

Graphic 4: World Population Growth Rates to 2050.

Population shifts also will force increased migration from rural to urban areas. This trend will be more dramatic in the developing world, threatening traditional patterns of agricultural production and trade. China is witnessing one of the largest migrations in history – as over 100 million of its people are flowing from the countryside to the cities. Rapid urbanization may produce social tension such as unemployment, increased ethnic tensions, and over-burdened infrastructures. Consequently, military operations will likely take place in urban environments, complex terrain, indoor spaces, and subterranean locations.

Also, as a result of increased urbanization, proximity of various divergent ethnic or religious groups could ignite long-standing tensions. If US forces are drawn into such conflicts, the application of military power alone will not suffice – cultural understanding will be critical. Coordination and integration between US armed forces


and partnerships with governmental, humanitarian, international, and aid organizations will be critical to any successful operation.

The population flow of displaced individuals, refugees and migrating groups will also expand existing cultural and demographic factors well beyond the limits of state or regional borders. This may expand local conflicts and increase the difficulties of conflict resolution. Demographic time bombs will explode (e.g. large shifts in the age and health of populations during periods of rapid population growth or decline).53 Economic Trends The explosion of ICT is also aiding the connectivity and integration of global trade and investment. “International trade, investment and capital flows are expected to grow steadily worldwide, leading to further integration of markets.”54 Despite the current global recession, increases in economic integration will remain constant. Countries left out of global trade and investment flows risk both political and economic marginalization. The traditional economic leadership of the US, Europe and Japan will be challenged. China, India and possibly Brazil will become regional and potential global economic powers. The GDPs of China and India are expected to triple by 2025.55 Asia will likely become one of the pivotal centers of the world economy. Over the next 50 years, Brazil, Russia, India and China—the BRICs economies—could become a much larger force in the world economy, accounting for over half the size of the G6 by 2025. Of the current G6, only the US and Japan may be among the six largest economies in US dollar terms in 2050.56 How the US and the rising powers will adjust to this new circumstance is unpredictable. Challenges, competition, and conflicts of interests are likely but opportunities will exist to establish new economic alignments and potential security alliances and partnerships. Science, Technology and Engineer (ST&E) Trends Continued proliferation of technology and ST&E research and development will produce some of the most dramatic affects across the OE. In the coming decades, the focus will be on the synergy of developments across multiple scientific realms – biotechnology and nanotechnology are prime examples. A 2001 RAND study concluded that the world is undergoing a global technology revolution that is “integrating developments in biotechnology, nanotechnology, materials technology, and information technology at an accelerating pace.”57 In 2006, a related RAND study concluded that technology of 2020 would continue to integrate developments from multiple scientific disciplines in a “convergence” that will have profound effects on society.58


The military implication and application of such developments is as far-reaching as one’s imagination. Weapons systems, logistical systems, medical advances, and miniaturization (of everything!) are but a few of the possible areas to be dramatically affected. In terms of implications to warfighting capabilities, the following are but a few of the possibilities “game-changing” developments:

• Ubiquitous multi-spectral embedded sensors and computational devices (to include micro and nano-sensors)

• Nanostructured materials with enhanced properties • Small and efficient portable power systems • Mass-producible organic electronics, including solar cells • Smart fabrics and textiles • Pervasive undetectable cameras and sophisticated sensor networks • Large, searchable databases with advanced data mining agents • Radio frequency identification (RFID) on products and individuals • Quantum-based cryptographic systems for secure information transfer • Robotics • Binary Bio-weaponry • Precision strike/targeting capability • Camouflage/deception/spoofing capabilities • Possible bio/chemical munitions • Airborne varieties of Ebola, etc • Gene-based(individual/societal) targeted pathogens • Mini/micro/nano satellites, cruise missiles and UASs • Non-lethal weapons

The spread of technology across the globe is unstoppable. Actors of all types will only need to acquire the necessary resources to be in the game. In effect, such capabilities could present the US with a potential array of technological peers – and rather quickly. Spread of Infectious Disease Trends Like many of the trends, disease or the spread of disease has always been a concern for military forces. However, given the increased access to and the speed of the global transportation network(s), this threat becomes more significant. Trends indicate that there is and will be an increasing danger posed by endemic disease. Tuberculosis, malaria, hepatitis, and particularly AIDS will continue to increase despite efforts being made by the international community, and are likely to account for the majority of deaths in most developing countries. There is a strong potential that most operational environments involving US forces will contain some type of threat from disease or at least some of the fomenting sources of such disease (poor sanitation, high urbanization, poor health care, lack of fresh drinking water, significant population flows, refugee camps, etc.). Trends in the Nature of Global Power


A comprehension of the geopolitical distribution of power is also crucial in analyzing any operational environment. Simply put, both the nature of power and the access to power are changing. The spread of technology is driving the migration of power away from such traditional sources as the nation-state into the hands of non-state actors such as transnational organizations, blended special interest groups and even individuals. Non-state actors now wield power once held only by nation-states, and in fact, some posses more resources than their nation-state counterparts. Power cannot be defined in terms of resources but in the ability to change behavior; power is the capacity to shape outcomes. The scale of power is not a direct function of tactical capabilities per se, but of the relationship between the tactics selected and their use in a strategy that can achieve goals. The diffusion of technology, information and connectivity, and knowledge have given the individual – or a relatively small group of individuals – the potential to be that agent of dramatic change at the global level.

Not only have ICT and globalization diminished the nation-state’s monopoly on power, but they have caused shifts in the balance between nation-states. With the rise of regional centers of power, we see new strategic actors emerge. Each actor is attempting to fulfill a national interest of some type – in effect; we are witnessing a balance of interest as opposed to the traditional ‘balance of power’.59 As time progresses, we can expect a gradual rise of regional hegemons (China, India and Russia, for example) with growing – and at times extra-regional – goals and ambitions. We can also expect an increase in the number of well-armed “rogue” states capable of contesting US national interest, presence and intervention abroad – either on their own or through proxies. Implications of Trends Trends indicate that US forces will continue to be deployed to a multitude of differing environments. Simultaneous and continuously shifting operations will be the norm. Training for sequential operations with clearly defined phases will fail to prepare forces for the realities of an OE. Conflict, post-conflict/failed state, humanitarian, disaster relief, and support and reconstruction operations will occur simultaneously. Such operations will require increased coordination/integration with a range of civilian organizations both domestic and international. US forces will be required to interact and to protect NGOs, PVOs, and humanitarian organizations more than ever before. Many of the longer-term implications of these trends are murky. Depending on how they play out over the next 15-20 years, a range of alternative security futures are in fact possible (potentially ranging from some variant of the status quo, to a more violent world, to a less violent future marked by greater cooperation and more effective international institutions). Yet clearly, they also suggest that armed conflicts and crises will continue to occur. These conflicts moreover, will primarily:

• Range the entire spectrum of conflict


• Likely require simultaneous operations of varying kinds (combat and reconstruction) vs. sequential phased operations

• Be identity (ethnic, religious) and/or deprivation-based • Be asymmetric and irregular rather than symmetric (involving at times states but also various

types of non-state actors e.g. terrorist groups, criminal organizations, guerrillas, etc.) • Occur increasingly in complex terrain to mitigate perceived technology advantages • Require better cultural understanding • Require all elements of national power to achieve success

Actors in the Strategic Environment Military forces will face a wide variety of actors in the OE, each with their own agenda, alliances and range of capabilities. These actors will range from traditional nation-states to non-combatants, transnational corporations and individuals.4 US forces will need to develop strategies to deal not only with actors presenting threats, but with a wide range of actors simply operating within a given environment. Civilians – both armed and unarmed – private security firms, contractors, aid agencies, governmental organizations, and media organizations will be a normal part of the operational environment. Partnerships between the actors is also highly likely. For example, gangs and criminal elements or terrorist organizations and criminal elements are increasingly blending to conduct operations. Along with a rise in the number and presence of such partnerships, there will also be an increased blurring of criminal activities, civil conflict, and potential terrorist activities. In addition, these elements can easily intermingle with the population and become ever more difficult to track and target.

As globalization, trade and technology impact societies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly influential in world affairs—filling gaps in the provision of social services, leveraging positions in political arenas, and connecting people, money, and ideas across the world. The United Nations Human Development Report counted 37,000 registered international NGOs in 2000, and those numbers are expected to grow significantly in the decades to come.60 Extra-governmental actors, such as private security firms, will saturate the OE. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, private firms currently handle logistics, mess halls, and fuel delivery services. In March 2006, the director of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq estimated that approximately 181 private security firms were working in the country, employing just over 48,000 people.61 Such private firms are rapidly improving their capabilities and capacities, allowing them to move into areas that only governments and militaries traditionally handled. Because of this, a clear understanding of the relationship and responsibilities between private firms and military forces is needed, but a recent GAO report indicates that current coordination 4 The significance and power of transnational corporations is exemplified in the fact that of the 100 largest economies in the world today, 51 are categorized as corporations compared to 49 countries. Many of those are involved in the energy sector. Global Witness. (October 2006). Heavy Mittal? A State within a State: The inequitable mineral development agreement between the government of Liberia and Mittal Steel Holding, NV).


is inadequate. First, private security providers continue to enter the OE without coordinating with the US military, putting both the military and security providers at a greater risk for injury. Second, US military units are not trained prior to deployment on the operating procedures of private security providers. Adversarial Counters to US Security Strategy Adversaries continuously study US political and military actions, the ensuing international responses and fallout, and the perceived success and failures of such actions – as must we. In the decade, demonstrations of traditional US military prowess were evident around the globe. Military operations in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq provided the world with fresh case studies from which to draw critical lessons learned. The following discussion examines how adversaries would likely seek to fight US and US-led coalition forces. Many of our recent lessons learned fall within that framework. Asymmetric tactics and strategies work! Success against the US does not require superior military capabilities, but rather the ability to sense and exploit US vulnerabilities and constraints. Adversaries are not required to counter US military power symmetrically; instead, fighting with unconventional, irregular and blended forces can bring success. The enemy will utilize a total war construct. Success comes from attacking the US across all dimensions of its power, be they political, economic, social, informational or military. Hybrid Threats – Combinations of threats with different capabilities enhanced by combinatorial effects Hybrid threats are a combination of regular forces (conventional and unconventional forces), irregular forces, and criminals that are employed working in coordination to

achieve a common goal. Regular forces generally are “regulated” and follow international law. Irregular forces are not regulated and do not adhere to international law. The US Army will face hybrid threats that simultaneously employ regular and irregular forces, including criminal elements to achieve their objectives using an ever changing variety of conventional (in terms of


arms, equipment and formations) and unconventional (specially equipped and organized) tactics to create multiple dilemmas. Future threats will also include criminals and criminal groups used in conjunction with both regular and irregular forces. A picture of this future was demonstrated during the Russian -- Georgian conflict where Russia employed the many criminal elements operating in South Ossetia to conduct the cleansing of ethnic Georgians from that region. Additionally, criminal organizations have the potential to provide much needed funding to operations and facilitate the purchase of equipment. These adversaries will be enabled by weapons of mass destruction and technology that allows them to be disruptive on a regional and area basis.

Focus on the strategic fight. Swift tactical success is not essential to victory. The dimension of time favors those fighting the US. An enemy need not win any engagement or battles; the enemy simply must not lose the war. Wearing down the popular support for US operations by simply causing a political and military stalemate can be all that is required to claim victory or to change US behavior/policy. Adaptation is the key to success. Success goes to those who master the skills necessary to act, react, and adapt with speed and creativity. Enemies learn quickly and change, unconstrained by rules or bureaucracy. While this may cause haphazard and incomplete change, it does allow a rapidity that is difficult to counter. Adversaries will continue to be adaptive in terms of using all available source of power at their disposal. Adaptation, broadly defined, is the ability to learn and adjust behaviors based on learning. Adaptation is closely linked to one’s environment and its variables. Adversaries can approach adaptation from two perspectives, natural and directed. Natural adaptation occurs as an actor (state or non-state) acquires or refines its ability to apply its political, economic, military or informational power. Again, understanding the variables of the OE allow an analyst to put into context the potential and to characterize the adaptation. Natural adaptation may be advanced

through the accusation of technology or key capabilities, resources (financial and material), effective organization and effective use of the information environment or even key regional or global alliances. Directed adaptation refers to adaptation based specifically on lessons learned to counter US power and influence. Counters to US actions will be ever changing and likely conducted by a hybrid force. As the graphic to the left indicates, threats will offer a mix of capabilities along the

spectrum of conflict to counter US military actions. Adversaries will learn from US


operations what works and what needs refinement. Potential “enemies will be whatever the US is not.” Like natural adaptation, directed adaptation will inform issues of force design, military strategy and operational designs. Training and leadership makes a difference. As the recent Hezbollah and Israeli conflict illustrated, a well-trained and effectively led militia can have some success against technology. This fact continues to emerge as one examines conflicts over history. A notable quote relative to the huge training difference between the Iraqi Army and the US Army came from a well-trained US soldier at the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom: “Hell, we could have beaten the Iraqis using their gear!” Adversaries are much less restrained than the US in terms of using all elements of their power. The US restricts the full use of all elements of national power to remain consistent with the rule of law and the Judeo-Christian ethic that guides much of US national policy. US interests at home and abroad are being targeted for direct and indirect attack. Rather than directly confronting US military operations, adversary attacks may be focused on political and public institutions. Lines of communication (LOCs), access points, staging areas, civilian populations, economic centers, and regional allies and friends likely will be targeted.62 Opponents will attempt to counter US strengths by attacking or exploiting perceived weaknesses.


EMERGING ADVERSARIAL STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL DESIGNS As discussed earlier, potential adversaries continue to study US policy, US military application, US public perception and worldwide perception of the US in the post-9/11 world. The following lists a spectrum of strategies from the strategic to tactical level that describe how threats will challenge US national interests and lead to military action. In addition, this list also describes strategies from nations that, while not aimed toward the US, will ultimately lead to US intervention due to a challenge of US-held values. While not all-inclusive, this list shows the range and scope of potential actions as well as the willingness of adversaries to use any tool or method necessary to counter US military actions or political influence. STRATEGIC DESIGNS Strategic Preclusion Potential adversaries have observed the change in posture of the US from a globally forward deployed force to one that is less global and based within the Continental US (CONUS). Therefore, they know the US has become increasingly reliant upon agreements with other nations for force projection and subsequent reception in theater. Adversarial alliances between nations and even non-state actors that support access denial will prevent US staging privileges. This serves as a buffer or strategic preclusion into a theater and will force the US to seek alternative, less-desirable and time-consuming ways of entry. Strategic Access Limitation Military capability is not measured in terms of what a military possesses, but rather what it can effectively bring to bear. Most potential adversaries are beginning to conclude that, by developing the ability to limit and/or interrupt access, it will be possible to reduce U.S. military capability to a manageable and, in certain cases, vulnerable level, even if only for a limited period of time. Therefore, an adversary will attempt to limit, meter, or disrupt access to the area of conflict. He will continuously attack the joint force in depth, using all available means to strike key or critical force components, such as aerial/sea ports of debarkation (APODs/SPODs) and embarkation (APOEs/SPOEs), lines of communication, staging bases, sea and air transports. Strategic Alliances to Counter US Influence Adversaries will also form non-US economic alliances to preclude US from natural resources. Embargos of oil and raw metals against the US will force depletions from US strategic reserves and create economically unacceptable conditions much similar to the US-backed sanctions placed against Iraq in the 1990s. Oil embargoes will stretch and test US exploration efforts, aging delivery systems, and processing/refinement systems thus creating conditions for conflict between the US


and oil-rich nations. Economic alliances will seek to increase value of their currency while lowering the value of the US dollar. Alliances will attempt to further US debt by forcing the US to continue increasing its defense budget in order to keep in check with adversarial technological and manning improvements. Target US Alliances Potential adversaries and actors have also observed the downsizing of the US military. They understand a smaller military increases the importance for the US to build alliances and coalitions. Adversaries will seek to exploit vulnerabilities of these alliances and coalitions and/or seek ways to prevent their formation. Threats will attempt to discredit the validity and/or cause of the alliance worldwide. They will try and undercut the legitimacy and moral foundations of a US-led alliance and attempt to split such relationships, painting the US as a renegade hegemon set on world conquest. Adversaries will also attempt to influence political decisions by creating publicly unacceptable conditions such as high casualty rates, thus leading to collapse of alliances and coalitions. Challenge US with Simultaneous Operations A smaller US military also heightens the risk to the US if faced with fighting in two or more theaters. Adversaries understand simultaneous operations occurring in geographically separated theaters dilute US combat power and increase the importance of US-based alliances and coalitions. Temporary coalitions between threat actors, even those with different ideologies and religions, will form in order to neutralize US military capabilities. Control Variable of Time Adversaries realize the importance of coalitions for their self-preservation. They have observed successes and failures of US-led coalitions. Contrary to past adversarial thought, threats have seen that the US is willing to accept heavy losses; however, the US still has a mindset to resolve conflict quickly and is perceived as having a lack of commitment over time. If timely victory does not occur, US public backing begins to wane and ultimately influences political decisions. Therefore, threats will seek protraction of conflict and keep US forces engaged to weaken resolve and drain military and economic resources. Control Strategic Information Environment Adversaries will attempt to instill fear among the US public. The information age allows the proliferation of rhetoric almost instantaneously to every US household. There will be no sanctuary. The influx of information combined with the specter of attack to the homeland will push political hot buttons that provoke disproportional fear and force US to commit or act first. Similarly, information for on-going operations will target the US public. Information operations will be designed to tear at the US


national will to continue military operations abroad. Casualties, moral violations, incompetent leadership, lack of progress, etc., whether real or fabricated, will be part of the threat’s information campaign designed to influence public opinion back in the US. Attack US political and public support Adversaries will not only use information to inculcate fear among the US public, they will also conduct attacks (no matter what level of physical destruction) against US military facilities (home and abroad), key infrastructure, and mass casualty destinations to weaken the economy, tax emergency systems and heighten anxieties among the US public, military members and their families home and abroad. OPERATIONAL DESIGNS Operational Exclusion Based on their perceptions of historical patterns of deployment and employment, future opponents will apply operational exclusion to prevent US joint forces from obtaining and using operating bases in the region, and in so doing, delay or preclude American military operations. Increased threats to forward bases raise the risks to forces, hindering operational phasing and diminishing host nation support for protection of US lines of communication (LOCs). While it is possible for the US to conduct an air and missile campaign without forward basing, a campaign using exclusively strategic rather than a mix of strategic and operational reach would be greatly diminished in its effectiveness and tempo. Operational exclusion applies diplomacy and coercion to keep other regional players on the sidelines. It includes capabilities that have operational reach – medium range ballistic and cruise missiles, special operating forces and WME to name just a few. As the perception grows of the inevitability of US operations, exclusion will entail pre-emptive attack, quite likely with WMD. Attack US Operational Patterns/Predictability Past conflicts involving the US military have been predictable. The US will establish a staging area within a Sea and Aerial Port of Debarkation (SPOD/APOD) that is relatively safe from adversarial influence. They will then rely on an air campaign and use standoff technology such as sea launched cruise missiles to set conditions prior to a major ground offensive. Once the ground campaign launches, US Army and Marine units will roll over anything in their path but in their zeal to get to the objective, will by-pass small units and/or wave surrendering enemy to continue walking toward the rear area. Future conflict within the OE will not materialize this way. Adversaries will develop operational strategies that take advantage of the physical environment, target perceived US vulnerabilities, and attack US dependence on high


technology. Adversaries know that a successful adversary alliance precludes an unopposed US entry. Therefore, the US is at its most vulnerable when conducting a phased entry into the theater. Threats will coordinate actions to attack SPODs and APODs with explosives and chemical agents. It is not necessary to deny entry. It is only important to create significant damages in order to delay and prolong entry into the OE. This disrupts US flow of military capabilities and sets the conditions for the threat to use the physical environment to his favor and adapt his operations. It is important to note that even when US military capabilities eventually overwhelm threat capabilities at SPODs and APODs, the threat will still maintain a viable capability through paramilitary and guerrilla organizations to conduct raids at SPODs and APODs. Exploit Physical Environment Physical environment challenges come in many forms: urban, mountain, jungle or subterranean. These can occur in various combinations and are where threats will withdraw to fight. For example, a densely populated urban setting provides cover and concealment for the threat. It allows the threat to “blend” in with pre-existing conditions (ethnic populations) while mitigating effects of US ISR platforms. Additionally, the combination of urban structures, associated sewer systems, utility wires, and other urban sprawl becomes complex terrain that limits mobility of US combat platforms, creates obstacles to wire-guided munitions and other stand-off weapons, and separates US combat formations. Essentially, adversaries view these types of physical environments as leveling the playing field. Threats have observed previous US experiences in Desert Storm/Shield, Somalia, Kosovo, OEF and OIF. They will not fight the US in open terrain but will seek to draw the US into a confusing close-quarters environment, where US technology is neutralized and the fight takes on a small-unit decentralized character. Exploit US Operational Constraints Operational plans will be modified to include conventional, paramilitary and guerilla forces designed to operate independently yet create a synergistic effect to the adversary’s capability. Operational plans will also include witting and unwitting noncombatants. Operational shielding will occur, as the threat will force civilians to serve as “human shields” to protect high value targets. Adversaries will use prescribed ROE against the US. They; however, are not bound to any particular set of ROE or constraints, and will define their operating terms as necessary. Other actors such as criminal elements and gangs will add to the threat’s capabilities while adding more challenges to the US to maintain situational awareness of the OE. Operationally, the threat will fight symmetrically and asymmetrically against US forces. The threat does not view asymmetrical warfare as the US views it. Asymmetrical warfare is simply a tactic he chooses because it affords the threat an opportunity to win or simply outlast the US and create politically unacceptable conditions in the US that result in a favorable conclusion for the adversary. In


essence, asymmetrical warfare is adaptive warfare for both threat conventional and irregular forces. Avoid Perceived US strengths Factual or not, nations and actors have perceived US vulnerabilities that they will attack. Potential adversaries see an over reliance by the US on technology as a combat multiplier. They understand US technology has given US military capabilities a sizable advantage in communications, mobility, and weaponry. Because of this, enemies believe the US substitutes technology over manpower as an economy of force. In order to attack these perceived vulnerabilities, the threat operates in small, dispersed units and will mass only when conditions favor it. Opponents can fight force on force but will avoid direct confrontation with US military firepower, instead targeting soft targets such as command and control nodes, ISR systems, logistical components, and contracted support. The threat will attempt to fight on a 360° perimeter. As stated previously, adversaries will blend in with the environment in order to increase mobility across the OE and attack US communication architecture, intelligence gathering systems and logistical supply/hauls. Likewise, he will target US military reliance on contractors and private security forces in order to create unfavorable conditions and dissuade further contract support. The threat will make every attempt to create chaos among the civilian non-combatant populations to mask his movements. Massive POWs, refugees, mobs and riots will conceal/shield his identity, intentions, and simply overwhelm US military capabilities. Exploit perceived lack of cultural understanding The adversaries will exploit lack of cultural understanding of US forces. They will conduct information campaigns dedicated to portray the US culture as an institution bent on political and economic global domination in the name of “western” democracy. Information campaigns will also paint US military forces as brutal and unconstrained by the accepted rules of warfare. These fabricated US cultural shortcomings are designed to alienate the populace from supporting the US and in recruiting people to support the threat. Seek “game-changing” technologies Basic low-tech counters to US capabilities provide the threat with near-peer or even niche advantages. Counter collection capabilities such as counter-signal global positioning system jammers, radar scattering, land lines, couriers and language itself create effective counters to US technical signals intelligence collection and will increase the importance of US human intelligence capabilities. Rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and shoulder-fired anti-tank (AT) missiles are easily concealed; withstand detection from anti-radar detection systems, can be cached and carried in large numbers, and make an attractive low-cost alternative for the threat in lieu of


conventional surface-to-air missiles. Electromagnetic pulse, RPG and AT weapons will also be the weapons of choice employed against high-tech US systems such as TPQ 36/37 fire finder radars, Prophet, networked C4ISR nodes, and the AH-1 Longbows. IEDs provide adversaries with the means to develop highly lethal explosives from commercial resources. IED components, while separated, do not provide a signature and thus are difficult to detect. Even when composed into a finished weapon, the multitude of detonation techniques coupled with almost endless ways to disguise and conceal, make IEDs a formidable low-tech weapon capable of defeating high-tech weapon platforms and personnel. While not all adversaries will have equal technological capabilities, many will. The OE offers the opportunity for threats to purchase military and commercial technology. Examples include unmanned aerial systems with multiple sensors and weapon packages, commercially available satellite imagery, image intensifiers, first- generation forward-looking IR, computer network attack and electronic warfare. These capabilities are available on the world market for a price and give any threat resourced to purchase them the means to strike. Disrupt with all elements of power Some of our future adversaries may seek to employ disruptive actions. Adversaries who are able to achieve a technological or technology application breakthrough, or obtain an advantage in biotechnology, cyber operations, space, or directed-energy capabilities will pose a significant threat to US forces. For example, an adversary able to cause significant disruption to our global positioning satellites would dramatically reduce our precision strike advantage. TACTICAL DESIGNS Exploit Conventional/Irregular Synergy Adversaries understand that the environment that would produce the most challenges to US forces is one in which conventional military operations are executed in concert with irregular warfare. Units that are well trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations often do not retain the precise skills, equipment and mind-set for conventional combat and vice versa. In addition, there is a synergy to the simultaneous use of conventional and irregular methods that is difficult to counter. Conventional/Irregular Synergy (C/IS) will be achieved in one of two basic ways: by a threat state actor executing conventional operations that ensure the US is simultaneously presented with an irregular warfare environment; or by a threat non-state actor conducting irregular warfare that integrates conventional means and tactics into its operations. Non-state threat actors will continue to seek and employ paramilitary capability. They will organize, train and equip themselves as cohesive units with the ability to employ modern weapons in a sophisticated manner. This training will continue to


require sanctuary training facilities; and industrial partners or covert/protected supply lines will be necessary for acquiring modern equipment. Employ range of technologies Adversaries will employ niche technologies at the tactical level that are just as sophisticated, and sometimes more so, than those possessed by the local US unit and its partners. Tandem-warhead ATGMs, sophisticated EW, communications and encryption devices and modern air defense missiles are just some examples of the many types of systems in which threat actors can and will achieve parity or superiority in tactical actions. This is not to say that threat actors will not continue to employ improvised devices of many types. On the contrary, the trend will be for threat actors to employ modern niche technologies in a synergistic manner with improvised devices. One of the most important areas in which threat actors will seek to operate in the future is in the acquisition and employment of sophisticated electronic warfare systems. Threat actors understand the continued reliance the US places on communications, ISR and visualization technologies. These technologies are vulnerable to disruption and exploitation by systems far easier to obtain and simpler to master. The cycle of threat acquisition of EW technology will continue to operate inside the cycle of US acquisition of major communications, ISR and visualization systems. Prior to conflict, threat actors typically train, organize and equip to fight local and regional opponents. Upon the expected introduction of US forces, threat actors will adapt organizations, equipment, tactics and training procedures to combat US forces. Information Warfare as key weapon system Adversarial tactical actions will be designed to achieve information warfare (IW) objectives rather than purely military ones. Causing US casualties, exposing weaknesses in training, equipment or resolve and forcing redeployment will be paramount over such considerations as seizing or retaining terrain features or battlefield victory. While the near- and mid-term gap between US and threat operational and strategic capabilities is large, the tactical capabilities gap is narrower. Adversaries recognize that the US possesses advantages in technological ISR and weapons standoff, night vision capability and tactical maneuver. However, these actors have many tactical options they can employ to mitigate these advantages. Employ Complex Battle Positions and utilize cultural standoff capabilities Adversaries reduce exposure to stand off fires and ISR by utilizing complex battle positions (CBPs) and cultural standoff. CBPs are locations designed to protect the


occupants from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. They are not necessarily tied to an avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from which to launch attacks. Camouflage, cover, concealment and deception (C3D) measures are critical to the success of a CBP. These C3D efforts and actions include, but are not limited to underground facilities, complex/urban terrain, fortification, false and decoy positions and information warfare support. Cultural standoff is the act of using social aspects of the environment to provide protection and freedom to maneuver. Cultural standoff tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by threat actors include: integrating religious, medical and other sensitive facilities into complex battle positions, employing human terrain for C3D purposes and exploiting a population using information warfare. POTENTIAL US ARMY MISSIONS Trends indicate that US forces will continue to be deployed to a multitude of differing environments. Simultaneous and continuously shifting operations will be the norm. Training for sequential operations with clearly defined phases will fail to prepare forces for the realities of the OE. Conflict, post-conflict/failed states, humanitarian, disaster relief, stability operations and support and reconstruction operations will occur simultaneously. Such operations will require increased coordination/integration with a range of civilian organizations both domestic and international. US forces will be required to interact with and to protect NGOs, PVOs, and humanitarian organizations more than ever before. This has led to a decreasing ability to focus solely on combat operations and a dramatic increase in the US military’s need to seek a multidimensional (political, diplomatic, economic and military) response to crises and conflicts. Such conflicts will be less predictable because, with the exception of a core set of allies, friends and enemies will be more situational – based on a constellation of circumstances and competition for world resources. In addition, the US Army must train for the appropriate balance and simultaneity of various types of operations.63


IMPLICATIONS TO LEADER DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIMENTATION

The OE is a key enabler supporting TRADOC Core Functions and Competencies in producing leaders and Soldiers. The OE is uncompromising and as a result, we must prepare for both its relative certainties and key uncertainties. In a sense, our ability to understand the manifestations of the OE should lead us to make informed decisions on what lies ahead and how it may impact the Army. The significance the OE plays into TRADOC core competencies is this straightforward; the OE represents the non-negotiable conditions which we must strive to replicate in order to stress leader development, training, and future capabilities. The following implications discuss the OE’s impacts to leader development, training, and concept development.

Leader Development

In order to build an Army that will dominate in full spectrum operations, TRADOC Centers of Excellence (CoE) must prepare our leaders for adaptive threats and simultaneous operations. This requires leaders that can envision likely outcomes of events within the context of their OE. The most important implication is CoE’s do not have the luxury of focusing on any one threat or under any one area within the spectrum of conflict. Instead leaders must be exposed to the multiple threats that exist in the OE. These threats range from standing conventional and unconventional forces (China, North Korea, Russia), to irregular militias and paramilitaries (Hezbollah, Islamic Revolutionary Guards, FARC), to irregular terrorist groups and criminal elements (Al-Qaeda, Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas).

In addition to threats, the intellectual agility of our educational institutions must be based on a mental acumen to analyze and understand the OE which these threats and US forces will operate within. OE’s will be dominated by people, culture, urban terrain, and information. Our leaders must understand their OE to at least attain some level of parity when opposing someone in their indigenous environment. Therefore, we must educate our leaders on all aspects of the OE through the operational variables interaction of PMESII+PT and how the OE affects elements of military design and the operations process.

Offensive, defensive and stability operations will not exist in isolation. Nor will they appear as sequential operations. Instead, leaders must understand the OE in order to make informed decisions regarding the application of warfighting functions in executing all three operations occurring simultaneously. The ability to make these decisions relies heavily on preparing our leaders at TRADOC institutions. Over the past five years, we have developed a generation of leaders that are culturally astute and focused on stability operations. While these skills must be sustained, the OE of the next twenty years will be one that challenges leaders with competing demands for defeating an adversary, force protection, influencing a population, and nation building. Successful leaders of the future will be those that assimilate the OE and as such make informed decisions on weighting their effort towards simultaneous


offensive, defensive and stability operations. To do this, our leadership development curriculum must have the following embedded within the OE to establish challenging conditions that drive specific terminal learning objectives for that CoE:

1. Simultaneous operations. Full spectrum implies there will always be some degree of offensive, defensive, and stability operations occurring at the same time. The OE will force leaders to make decisions regarding the allocation of limited resources. A trend discussed earlier was the mixture of conventional, unconventional, irregular, and criminal organizations, loosely affiliated to achieve a common goal. US forces, in every OE, will face adaptations of these threats that will drive leaders to plan for all facets of full spectrum. This is applicable for all operational themes across the spectrum of conflict as described in FM 3-0. Therefore, our leaders must prepare for major combat operations as well as irregular warfare.

2. Culture. All operations, wherever they fall under the spectrum of conflict, will be conducted among a population. The “human terrain” and associated non-kinetic effects have become as important, if not more so, as physical terrain, weapons systems, and kinetic force-on-force effects. Culture and ideology may be the center of gravity in future conflict. Leaders must engage populations and as a result, understand the values, beliefs, norms, and behaviors that form the foundation of that population’s culture. Cultures of study should include Persian, Arab, and Chinese.

3. Information. The unit or leader that can shape and control the information environment has a significant advantage. Leader development should focus on applying Information Operations (IO) in all full spectrum operations. The ability of the leader to influence information has positive results for his unit. Conversely, poor decisions regarding information operations have adverse effects towards achieving the desired outcomes. Leadership development must focus on:

• The complexities of the OE demand that leaders are intuitive in filtering information large amount of information. Leaders must be technically savvy and current or they will be at a disadvantage to their opponent on the battlefield.

• Advanced situational awareness technologies provide the leader with

access to the “wisdom of the crowd”. Mass collaboration devices provide better solutions to complex problems within the bounds of command structure. Leaders must be able to manage the volume of information to prevent information overload.

• While greater electronic connectivity is good, leaders must be aware

that this can lead to physical isolation and change the framework for


social interaction. Leaders must retain physical dimension leadership skills that bond with Soldiers by voice and touch.

• The connection of everyone and everything means that any military operation has little chance of being conducted secretly. Leadership development must stress operations security.

• Expect to see a continuing growth of “home made” movies by both soldiers and non-combatants that reflect particular points of view. Military operations will be extraordinarily well documented from a dizzying array of sources – legitimate and amateur. Control of the narrative that this produces both internally and externally will be a tremendous challenge to leaders at all levels.

4. Working with Non-DoD organizations. Current operations illustrate the capabilities that Non-Governmental, Private Volunteer and Governmental Organizations bring and their overall importance to supporting stability and support operations. Trends in the OE indicate the importance of these organizations will not change. US military support to stability in Afghanistan and Iraq will continue. It is probable that given drivers such as the environment, politics and globalization, that some form of US presence will continue in post-war Afghanistan and Iraq, similar to what we see in the Balkans. From humanitarian relief to reconstruction, units will be required to work alongside a number of non-DoD organizations. Leaders must understand these organizations and their capabilities to assess how they can shape the OE.

5. Educating for uncertainty. The primary objective of leader development should be to develop leaders capable of fighting and winning our Nation’s wars. However, trends within the OE show a growing need for military support to protecting our Nation’s borders (Mexico) and responding to environmental disasters (tsunami relief, Hurricane Katrina). Given the trend of the proliferation of WMD technology, military involvement with consequence management is probable. Much of the preceding discussion in item #4 is applicable here. In addition, leadership development should address working with law enforcement and local government to reestablish control and governance of territory, security of the population, and protection of vital infrastructure.

Training The Russian – Georgian military conflict of 2008 reminded us of how quickly the spectrum of conflict can quickly shift towards general war and that multiple OE’s exist that fall into all areas within that spectrum. The question to ask ourselves; given the several years of conducting Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE), how prepared is the US Army for facing this type of warfare should we be called upon?


The multiple manifestations of OE over the next 20 years will not be confined to unstable peace or insurgency. In addition to very capable guerilla, paramilitary, and militias the US will still contend with, trends in the OE lead to rising conventional military powers (China, India) and existing very capable militaries (Iran, North Korea, Russia) that have both regional and global interests. Looking at global drivers and trends, it is very plausible that China will emerge as a near peer military competitor by 2030. US Army military competencies along the spectrum of conflict defined by the Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA) dictate that we must prepare for all threats by training for both irregular warfare and major combat operations. Training against these changing operational themes will drive adaptation and flexibility among our Army.

An important implication of the CSA’s guidance to TRADOC is the ability to create training conditions that reflect multiple OEs. As such, our Initial Military Training (IMT) sites, Combat Training Centers (CTC) and Home Station Training (HST) requires the ability to replicate conventional, unconventional and irregular forces, all inside a sophisticated OE the replicates challenges across PMESII-PT.

In order to provide the correct adaptive enemy and simultaneous actions that will drive full spectrum operations, our training sites must be manned and equipped in accordance with the Operational Environment Master Plan (OEMP). Live, Virtual, and Constructive training must be supported by a free thinking adaptive opposing force (OPFOR) manned and equipped to stress systems to failure. Our OPFOR must be flexible with organic infantry, armor, air defense, information warfare, etc., to train Soldier/units against both a capabilities based opponent (CMETL) and threat-specific opponent (DMETL). Trends in the OE indicate that 80% of the world’s population will live in or near an urban center. Therefore, the OE conditions in which the trainee/unit operates within must contain sufficient granularity with respect to role players and facilities to replicate the cultures, urban structures, and infrastructure that will be pervasive in the OE.

Training conditions must result from realistic global training scenarios that are culturally accurate and geared towards challenging full spectrum training objectives. Training scenarios will drive both CMETL and DMETL (MRE), thus enabling Soldiers/units to learn and adjust throughout the Army Force Generation process. It is only through these investments that we will be prepared to meet the CSA’s expectations. To accomplish this, training must prepare us for the following aspects of the OE:

1. Train against an adaptive, free-thinking OPFOR that is equipped and manned to achieve victory. No adversary will enter battle with the mindset of losing. Threats in the OE have studied the US military over the years and have planned against US intervention. Threats will continuously organize conventional, unconventional, and irregular forces, adapting on the fly, in a way that places their perceived strengths in advantageous positions over US perceived weaknesses. Drivers and trends in this paper articulate that globalization, information and technology have facilitated the spread of military


capabilities from high end conventional militaries to irregular forces. These forces will continue to increase in anti-armor, ISR, and electronic warfare capabilities. The example of the Russian – Georgian conflict illustrates that we must always be ready for major war. The growing economy in China supporting their military advancements gives further testimony to this fact. Given this, why would we want our OPFOR to be anything less than the capabilities that exist in the OE? Our OPFOR at IMT, CTCs and the Exportable Training Center must be robust to challenge CMETL and DMETL. The atrophy of our OPFOR in both equipment and personnel has placed a great training risk to provide a realistic threat against full spectrum training objectives. Outdated armor, a heavy reliance on augmentation to fill OPFOR ranks, and lack of wheeled combat vehicles, Information Warfare and Air Defense must be resourced in order for our OPFOR to once again become the toughest opponent our Army will face short of actual combat.

2. Train for simultaneous and continuous engagement. A clear delineation of combat and post-combat operations no longer exists. Training must incorporate offensive, defensive, and stability operations running concurrently or changing quickly in nature, direction and scope. Phasing of events will not occur in the OE. In place, we have subtle changes in conditions that are indicators that we should weigh and shift efforts for one operation over another. Our Army must learn to recognize indicators when the enemy is adapting in order to make tactical adjustments. Therefore, our training should reflect this to help develop skills necessary for leaders and Soldiers to adapt and respond.

3. Train for the information environment. The force that controls information has an advantage. Therefore, forces must be trained to successfully operate in and shape the information environment. Training should focus on fully integrating all aspects of IO at all levels and across all operations. Units must be prepared to understand their role in the IO and specifically that all actions have reactions which will be captured digitally and used in the adversary’s IO campaign.

4. Train for crisis and consequence management. US forces should be prepared for operating in WMD environments and in response to environment disasters. Our Army should re-blue with regard to operating in contaminated areas and mitigating the effects of a WMD attack. Training should stress operating under the threat and/or occurrence of a nuclear, biological, and chemical attack. Training should also include working with host nation and domestic law enforcement, emergency relief, and humanitarian assistance agencies. This would entail providing security of an area and its populace, conducting environmental operations, disaster relief, and restoring/protecting essential services. Central to crisis and consequence management is the populace and


infrastructure. CTCs must be manned with the appropriate skilled role players and facilities equipped as per the OEMP to replicate this aspect of the OE.

5. Train for increased coordination/cooperation. As the parameters along the spectrum conflict change, so do the players. As such, our Army must be prepared to work with a variety of non-military and partnered military organizations. Trends in the OE indicate that the US will form coalitions and alliances between nation-states and non-state actors. Each entity will bring its own culture and agenda. All training should incorporate elements that stress the significance of these facts in daily coordination with multiple organizations; both military and civilian. This will include the sharing of information and intelligence. Examples that are occurring or could occur that must be replicated in training:

• Offensive and defensive operations working with Son’s of Iraq and the Northern Alliance

• Stability operations after a cholera outbreak in Africa involving US forces working with the host nation military and NGOs providing security to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts

• Humanitarian and security efforts with host nation military after a tsunami hits Indonesia

• Offensive and defensive operations against drug cartels along the US/Mexico border working with the US Border Control and Drug Enforcement Agency

• Working with state and federal law enforcement providing security to essential services and the population after rising tides flood a US eastern metropolitan area

• Conducting combined military full spectrum operations with the Republic of Korea into North Korea after North Korean nuclear ambitions become a clear and present danger to the Pacific Rim

6. Train for Urbanization. It is likely that urbanization will result in future adversaries who have highly-developed urban survival and combat skills. They may consequently choose to pursue their objectives and conduct operations in sprawling towns and cities which will already have experienced endemic lawlessness and high levels of violence. Allegiance to other actors other than nation-states will reduce the “recruitment pool” for future military recruits. Why fight for a government which does not provide for you?

Concept Development and Experimentation Implications for the United States Army in 2030

The complex and unpredictable nature of the future OE demand an enterprise approach to concept development and experimentation. The two functions must be closely linked to insure that they are mutually supporting and share an understanding of the future OE - the interdependence of nested systems and the complex web of interactions that shape that environment. That OE cannot provide details of a


specific threat or adversary, but it will provide the characteristics of the OE and the nature of the threat sufficiently focused to provide an “aim point” for concept development and experimentation. That aim point will allow development of plausible scenarios and an adaptable adversary for experimentation events. The scenarios must present challenges inherent in the complex OE itself as well as those posed by an adversary who is adept at defining himself and manipulating the OE to his advantage. Experiments must be designed to investigate the key elements of a concept in the context of that environment and threat. Experimentation must be able to manipulate variables of the environment and threat to pose an array of challenges to the concept being examined, while the concept development process must be agile enough to adapt to continual iterations of an experiment. Just as we know that we cannot predict the precise future OE, we also know that we won’t write the perfect concept. Yet, we also know that we can refine our understanding of the OE and the adversary as time passes until we reach a point where concept development and experimentation morph into force design, doctrine, and training. Over that time the process needs the flexibility to adapt to changes in the OE as quickly as the adversary will. The Army cannot wed itself to a concept for Army operations 15 - 20 years in the future. Premature commitment to a concept risks an investment of time and resources that cannot be recovered as the OE evolves…as we know it will. Experimentation must uncover those risks and drive the concept to yet another iteration. The Army cannot afford to be constrained by a single experiment a year. The OE and the threat are accustomed to a continuous evolution involving myriad complex interactions. The Army’s concept development and experimentation processes require the agility to accept change in the OE and adapt a force design and concept of operations more rapidly than our adversaries. Conclusions Armed conflict will certainly continue to be a likely course of action for state and non-state actors who do not feel they can compete or survive with their cultures or interests intact. The future OE within which these conflicts will be contested will be complex, intricate and demanding. Conditions of this environment will include unprecedented information being transmitted over commercial networks, potential technological surprise, widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, selected conventionally advanced weapons systems, and the innovative use of highly proliferated ones. There will also be significant demographic challenges and innumerable other uncertainties. The continued advancement of information age technologies provides adversaries the capability to apply military force with greater precision, lethality, agility, and survivability throughout an extended battle space when in a traditional construct.


Potential threats in this environment will retain hybrid capabilities and transition between traditional and adaptive constructs to counter conventional threats, add additional complexity to a given environment and seek sanctuary in complex terrain. However, it is important to note that even as threats develop and master adaptive means, they will retain and improve traditional military capabilities to maintain the essence of their hybrid capability. Coupled with new adaptive systems and methods, future threats will pose a significant threat that point to a time of diverse strategic, operational and tactical challenges. In conclusion, the US will remain globally engaged -- called upon to execute missions across the spectrum of conflict. Increasing interconnected economies, greater access to technology and information will challenge U.S. forces in unique and unexpected ways. To succeed will require a force that can deal with sophisticated information campaigns, integrated traditional and irregular operations, a myriad of improvised tools, networks, and innovation. To succeed in this environment requires forces that are adaptive and can deal with complexity. Capabilities must be built around full spectrum utility, take advantage of technology, especially information, technologically assisted human potential, strategic responsiveness and joint interoperability. Only through these means will the US military be able successfully negotiate the future operational environment.


APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY The authors reviewed current theories, research, and forecasts on the strategic environment and the implications on military forces, and asked if the original 1999 framework captured all the dimensions of the environment. This paper stems from on the review of hundreds of documents, including government reports and position statements as well as essays and articles from international organizations, the private sector, academia, think tanks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign sources. The authors considered current opinion on the characteristics of the strategic environment and the related military implications. This research involved an in-depth review of current analytical scholarship on the global strategic environment, including global trends and potential adversaries. The authors attempted to investigate a wide-range of theoretical perspectives and differing approaches to strengthen or refocus our own analysis. Analysts studied more than 300 sources, including official government documents such as National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review. The authors also evaluated applicable reports from RAND, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Brookings Institute as well as foreign military and governmental sources from China, India, Russia, North Korea, Germany and the United Kingdom. Academic sources, both civilian and military, were included in the research, ranging from National Defense University (NDU) to Harvard University publications. Analysts also incorporated the work of individual scholars such as Thomas P.M. Barnett, George Friedman and Alvin Toffler in the review. Concurrent with the research, a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) guided the research and provided professional insight and feedback. Membership included key subject matter experts (SMEs) from the TRADOC G2, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) and liaison officers at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).


APPENDIX B: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL THREAT EXAMPLE

Global Threats from 2010 to 2025

The US will face a plethora of strategic level threats from across the global OE by 2025. Such dangers will arise from anticipated threats as well as from unforeseen threats. The following strategic threat predictions are organized under the related unified command to better geographically orient the reader. This organization will also aid interested military commanders to more clearly focus on the predicted future threats their specific forces will likely face by 2025.

NORTHCOM

Although collapse and turning into failed state is unlikely, Mexico’s instability will remain a major issue in the near term. The Hispanic vote (majority ethnic group in the US by 2025) will surely affect all political and military decisions regarding Mexico. For more details see the following section of this report that discusses the strategic threats predicted in the Gulf of Mexico Basin.

The three remaining hotspots of strategic concern will be the Gulf of Mexico Basin, the Middle East, and South-Central Asia. See these regional discussions to follow.

PACOM

India will become a competing world power with China. In addition, China and India will represent the two largest Asian ethnic groupings. The Chinese military will grow to become the largest force on Earth and will dominate Asia; power projection overseas will remain an issue. China and India’s GDPs will rival that of the US and the EU. China will continue to increase its stature as the US’ number one threat in the Pacific and in the cyber realm. As major competitors and enemies, China and India will aggressively search for and seize new sources of oil, gas, food, and water. Possible Korean unification could redistribute the power and alliance structure of the region. A Korean unification would quickly over burden South Korea’s ability to provide food, medicine and shelter to massive North Korean immigrants. Short of Korean peninsula unification, a Korean federation could occur but would require a regime change in the north. This is unlikely given the regime’s mantra of “Juche” will continue to be the regime’s ideology of self-reliance. Ironically, North Korean nuclear ambitions will likely continue in order to force concessions in the form of international aide thus keeping tension alive across the region and the entire globe.

AFRICOM

Africa will remain a violent, starved, and unorganized continent if the African Union does not expand to include most African nations. Only through unity of effort and strong international support will Africa emerge as a self-sufficient entity. The future of AFRICOM’s success rests on its ability to not present itself as an overtly military power but one that unites Africa in bringing humanitarian and economic development to the continent.


CENTCOM

US forces will have long since departed Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan will evolve via civil wars into ungoverned areas with the Taliban dominating Pakistan, Afghanistan will be splintered among power players, and Iraq will be divided into three homogeneous regions (Kurd, Sunni, and Shia) with simmering tensions constantly present. The quest to control natural resources will dominate all politics in the region as well as US foreign policy.

EUCOM

The European Union will remain a force in the global economy although by 2025 we will begin to see a general working age population decline in ethnic Europeans. This vacuum may be filled by an influx of immigrating Arab and African population. The dynamics associated with demographic change could lead to internal conflict and the rise of crime. Terrorist groups will continue to conduct mass casualty attacks in attempts to punish the West for its “invasive” and “anti-Islamic” policies and culture. Russia will have developed into a strong regional and global power. However, Russia also faces dwindling population numbers and combined with political corruption will remain key problems for the Russian government.

SOUTHCOM

See the Gulf of Mexico Basin regional discussion to follow.


Regional Threats from 2010 to 2025

Gulf Basin

The 2025 environment in the Gulf Basin (Mexico, Central/South America, and the West Indies) will have immense ramifications for US foreign policy and will potentially guide the direction of US national interests. The Gulf Basin region will be muddled by a plethora of interlocking problem-sets; however, Mexico and Central/South America will be the focus for the imminent threat to US national security. The situation in the region will continue to deteriorate and will only be compounded by time.

The region will be crippled by economic disparity and rampant political corruption. Both of these variables will act as an incubator for drug cartels (and other transnational criminal elements) and external terror influences (non-state and state actors) to flourish throughout the region. Cartels will construct an enigma for US foreign policy to decipher by creatively balancing Mexico as a captured state (on the brink of being a failed state) through influencing the political, military, economic, social, and information realms. Though current trends point to regional economic success, the inequitable division of wealth throughout the region will be the foremost factor in future atmospherics. Economic issues will also be a driver for recruitment for threat groups and legitimate entities.

China and Russia will have a two-pronged agenda in the future. The first point will be to further develop relationships in the Gulf Basin in order to exploit natural resources, and the second will be to extend the reach of their national interests in weaker, economically-depressed countries (such as Venezuela.) Russia and China will also utilize this opportunity to set up staging areas that can later be exploited and settled over political negotiation with the US. This area of operations will also be used by proxy organizations of non-state actors (such as Hezbollah by Iran) to covertly stage potential attacks against the US. The timeline leading up to 2025 will have a number of attacks on Mexican oil pipelines (from local insurgent groups) that lead into South Texas with the concept of damaging US interests in the area of operations.

The Hispanic demographic within the US will significantly influence foreign policy as related to Mexican immigration and issues along the US-Mexican border. Mexico will remain economically and politically interlocked with the United States; however, undercurrents from criminal elements and the cartels will strain the relationship. Venezuela will attempt to sway other countries in the region away from US diplomacy and remain a military state for the future. Even though Venezuela will remain a concern of the US it will be immensely overshadowed by the close proximity of Mexico and it’s problem-set.

Drug Cartels


Drug cartels in Mexico will be one of the key challenges to US national security interests throughout the Gulf Basin region in the years leading up to 2025. The cartels will have substantial links with terror organizations (Hezbollah, HAMAS, AQ,

FARC, PIJ) and other non-state sponsored actors, which will surely result in multiple attacks on US soil. Mexican drug cartels will have a partnership injunction with other South American cartels and external street gangs operating within the US (Columbia cartels, El Salvadoran MS-13.) The cartels will consolidate over time and fight against

counterdrug capabilities in Mexico and the US. The Latin American cartels will also collaborate with Russian organized crime syndicates. These drug cartels will enjoy the financial capabilities to purchase the best weaponry on the market in order to engage and defeat US anti-drug countermeasures. Such cartels will have substantial influence kinetic force.

Graphic B1: Cartel Territories and Drug Routes.

On the negative side, these Latin American cartels are driven by financial motivation and will work with many different organizations (including terror groups) for the profit. The positive note is that they will not attempt to take any action that will hinder their earnings. Hence, the group weighs its actions and attempts to predict second- and third-order effects. The organizational structure of the drug cartel will begin to look more like terror cells, with a more decentralized hierarchy. This modification will be made in order to shield key leaders of the cartels from law enforcement.

Radical Terror Organization (Non-State Actors) Influence on Region

Many of the terror organizations will have a larger footprint in the region. The Gulf Basin region will also remain an open avenue of approach for terror organizations that plan to compromise the US borders. By the year 2025, multiple terrorist attacks will have taken place on US soil. The group(s) responsible will with great certainty have entered from the US and Mexican border and will have links to drug cartels. Al-Qaeda (AQ)-related entities or Hezbollah (Iran’s proxy) will likely carry out the attacks


on the US. The catalyst for such an attack by Hezbollah cells would be an attack on Iran or its “peaceful” nuclear facilities.

China and Russia (state actors) Influence on the Region

Russia will utilize its strategic asset Gazprom to exploit the oil resources in Venezuela along with initiatives in Bolivia (as a mechanism of Russia power.) Russia and China will conduct military sales of weapons to Venezuela along with the

potentially left-wing governments in Nicaragua and El Salvador, which have a similar ideology. Russia will have military forces deployed in Venezuela in order to put pressure on US policy.

China will purchase more land and businesses and utilize more of a clandestine approach in the Gulf Basin. Legitimate operations such as businesses like Hutchison Whampoa in the Panama

Canal area will be use for China’s needs. China will also have to battle for resources such as oil in 2025 for the large population in its country. Russia and China will likely support countries with economic or political favors.

Graphic B2: China’s Dependence on Imported Oil 2000‐2020.

Social Deterioration & Natural Disasters

Globalization will play an important dynamic in the paradigm shift for many countries in the Gulf Basin. The breakthrough in medical care along with the positive notion of longer life spans will also create a paradox with massive urbanization and severe overcrowding in many inner cities. This factor will produce a number of health concerns like potential for widespread epidemics, criminal gangs, and lack of economic stability due to a lack of educated and skilled workers. Natural disasters are always a large consideration that can change the international relationship with the region in the US.

Scenario for the Gulf Region The following model illustrates the worst-case scenario in the Gulf Basin Region for the US military. Most of the Gulf Basin Region countries begin to implode into civil strife due to the lack of economic viability and military/political oppression. Countries like Bolivia and


Venezuela move towards a socialistic perspective and adapt anti-American policies. China and Russia begin to invest financially and in turn are allowed to deploy troops (under the notion of protecting investments) and ballistic weapons system into the region. Tensions increase and a potential flashpoint emerge when joint military exercises are conducted in the Gulf of Mexico. Corruption is ramped throughout the region. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) dominate most aspects of the operational environment. Political entities allow DTOs aligned with terror groups to operate unmolested. Terror groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah utilize the region for training purposes and as a staging area. DTOs such as the Zetas assist terrorist groups in getting across the border. US alliances with Mexico and Columbia crumble from the friction from the DTOs. Mexican government collapses with the final straw of the assassination of non-compliment political figures. Mexico becomes a lawless nexus that threatens to spread to the US. China and Russia continue clandestine operations to fan the flames of anti-American sentiment and segregate the region from US diplomacy. DTOs begin to target law enforcement entities on the US side of the border and begin a creeping annex of US cities much in the same fashion that they did on their own borders cities in during the past decade. The US Border Patrol is out-gunned and overwhelmed. The President orders the Army National guard to counter the escalating situation on the border.

Multiple complex attacks are carried out against US infrastructure and civilian targets that span the country. US National Guard troops are overwhelmed with the attacks in their respective area of operations and are stretched thin on the border. The US active duty Army is called into to conduct full spectrum operations into Mexico to destroy DTOs.


South Central Asia Islamic extremism will continue to be the overriding issue in South Central Asia, with the epicenter being the tribal areas on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The situation in 2025 will be shaped by two main events, one on each side of the border.

Graphic B3: Afghanistan & Pakistan.

Afghanistan

The first event will be the premature withdrawal of Coalition troops from Afghanistan. The “surge” will have some success, but there will be no equivalent of a Sons of Iraq movement in Afghanistan. As a result, progress toward stabilizing the country will be slow, and casualties high. While the situation drags on with no end in sight, one of two things will occur that will precipitate the withdrawal of US troops from the country.

Scenario 1: The will of the American people and their elected leaders is worn down over time by the mounting number of casualties and apparent lack of progress. Eventually the President and Congress decide that the battle in Afghanistan is no longer worth fighting and, with the approval of the majority of Americans, decide to withdraw our troops.

Scenario 2: There is a major event that causes mass casualties of US troops, such as a suicide bomber gaining access to Bagram Air Base. The instantaneous outcry in the US is so great that Congress and the President decide that an immediate withdrawal is in order.

Within six months of the US announcing troop withdrawals, all Coalition troops have vacated the country. While the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police attempt to keep law and order, it is ultimately not successful. The government falls, and Afghanistan falls into chaos.


Pakistan

The second event is actually a non-event: the refusal of Pakistan to launch a real fight against Islamic extremism within its borders. Several factors contribute to this non-decision, including: the constant fighting between major political leaders and their parties, which diverts their attention from the threat; the sympathy and complicity of portions of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Taliban; and the unwillingness/inability of the military to effectively engage the Taliban. Instead, the Pakistani government continues to follow a pattern of appeasement.

Due to the continual fighting between political parties, the increasing number of major incidents such as suicide bombings, and the unabated takeover of districts in western Pakistan by the Taliban, the military decides to take control of the country. Instead of fighting to take control of those areas lost to the Taliban, the Army instead makes the decision to abandon half the country, including the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), most of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and most of Baluchistan. Feeling the threat from the Taliban to the west and India to the east, the military moves all nuclear weapons into Sindh and Punjab provinces, and destroys any nuclear-related facilities located in the abandoned territories.

The Fallout

Afghanistan will collapse and Pakistan will contract at nearly the same time. While this appears to be an excellent opportunity for a land grab by neighboring countries, threats from other countries in the region will be a major source of restraint. For example, India will not invade Kashmir due to threat from China, and vice versa. However, some areas will be under the control of neighboring countries by 2025.

Afghanistan and the abandoned areas of Pakistan will split into four main areas: Pashtunistan, Baluchistan, Hazarastan, and the Northern Areas. The Northern Areas will be heavily influenced by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. While the presence of the Amu Darya (Oxus) River will prevent Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from annexing parts of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan will control some of Afghan territory by 2025.

Hazarastan will occupy the mountainous central portion of Afghanistan. After some battles with neighboring ethnic groups, the Hazaras will be left alone to their mountainous existence.

Pashtunistan and Baluchistan will be controlled by tribal leaders, many of whom are loyal to an Islamic extremist ideology. These areas will quickly become a safe haven for Islamic extremists, including al-Qaeda.

Pakistan, now reduced to half its original territory, will continue to function independently, but will be weakened and will continue to be threatened by Islamic extremism on the one hand, and India on the other.


India will be greatly concerned by the events occurring in Pakistan, and will pressure the Pakistani military to secure or eliminate the country’s nuclear weapons. Tensions between India and Bangladesh will ease due to the former’s preoccupation with issues in Pakistan, giving the Bangladeshi military the opportunity to intensify its fight against Islamic extremists in the country. Success will most likely be considerable, with the situation well in hand by 2025.

Graphic B4: Former Afghanistan & Pakistan Territories, 2025 Projection

Scenario for South Asia

South Asia represents an area where US forces can intervene strategically, but not defeat the enemy decisively. US combat power must be in a position to bolster, train,


enable, and in limited circumstances, lead local assets. However, without a significant expansion of ground forces, the US simply lacks the mass to provide the requisite coverage for counterinsurgency, training and nation-building, while securing tenuous supply lines, in addition to offensive combat operations. The US Army specifically should remain focused on the mission of training local forces and enabling those forces through our organic logistics, indirect fire and ISR assets. This represents the best means to leverage the mass of local militaries while capitalizing on our core abilities. Pakistan is the hub of the wheel of events in South Asia. Ultimately, events in Islamabad, specifically the Pakistani government's level of willingness to decisively attack its militants (and by doing so, court a civil war) will determine US strategy and our level of intervention. Pakistan is in the interesting position of being a doomed state that has a lot of life in it. While the Pakistani government might be weak, it will probably not be weak enough to allow to the Taliban to walk without a fight. Additionally, the Pakistani Military might use the weak and vacillating nature of the Pakistani civil government to reassert control over the Pakistani state. All of this will conspire to make Pakistan a decidedly fickle state upon which to base US operations in South Asia. Thus, US operations in Afghanistan will be continued to be held hostage to the willingness of Central Asian states such as Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to host lines of communications (LOCs.) The Taliban is increasing well funded, equipped and led. Many regional adversaries will look at increasing Taliban strength as an indicator they need to support the Pashtun elements within Afghanistan. Boundary lines around countries will become increasingly blurred. Tribal, religious and economic concerns will trump political ones. As events in Pakistan spiral more centripetally, US military operations will be held increasingly more hostage to geopolitical and diplomatic events in Central Asia, Iran and China. Thus, the US must be willing to accept considerably more externally placed constraints on operations in Afghanistan. Policy makers must be ready to draw "red lines" around certain types of operations (such as drone attacks outside Afghanistan) upon which third countries cannot intervene.


Middle East

By 2025, the US will be in its eighth decade of military and political involvement in the Middle East. This involvement has had significant impacts on both the development of political structures in the Middle East, and political effects and the requirements of military strategy for the US. From the perspective of the US, roots of the current conflicts in the Middle East started with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I.

The consequences of World War I remain immense. Chief among these are the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire and creation of the modern petroleum-based economy. This, in turn, made possible the birth of modern Arab and Iranian nationalism, political Zionism and Israel, and the transformation of the involvement of Western powers from a somewhat peripheral to a central role in the affairs of the region.

Graphic B5: Current map of the Middle East. (R. Peters, 2006)

The current issues faced by the US are the outgrowth of forces most recently set into movement by the effects of World War I. The sideshow of the Desert Campaigns of WWI has become that War’s most obvious unfinished political legacy. The untidy liquidation of the Ottoman Empire and, later, British and French holdings and interests in the Middle East, has a created a map that remains a recipe for enduring conflict. Irreconcilable religious and ethnic overlays to the political map of the Middle East create fault lines of conflict that currently ensnare the US, and will continue to do so to 2025. In the next fifteen years, three major elements will color US involvement in the Middle East. First, the continuing tyranny of bad borders, and the seeds of the conflict that hasty, ill conceived, and ill-drawn political borders created in the early part of the 20th Century. The second consideration is the rise of political Shia Islam led by Iran, and potential consequences of concurrent Iranian strength and weakness. Third, the Middle East has continued reliance on petroleum extraction both guarantees its importance and relevance to the global community and contains the seeds of its own destruction. As planning for Middle Eastern contingencies moved from a secondary to a primary consideration during the 20th century, the US must be willing to debate and create an even more complex and elegant strategic vision for the Middle East in the 21st.


The Tyranny of Bad Borders

The borders of Middle East, drawn poorly at the behest of all participants, will remain “bloody,”5 in the words of the late Samuel Huntington. While the reasons for conflict within Islam and its frontiers with other cultures is well outside the scope of this work, it is well agreed that the complex stew of ethnicity, religion differences, and borders will continue to “…generate violent conflicts, within states and among them.”6 At the borders of the Islamic Middle East, it is unlikely that a final settlement of Israeli borders with Syria will occur in the absence of the collapse of the Assad regime before 2025. Furthermore, as long as Syria’s client relationship with Iran exists, Lebanese Hezbollah will continue to use its relationship with both Syria and Iran to further its goals and those of the Iranian and Syrian governments in Lebanon. The de facto borders of the Kurdish region in Iraq also threaten Iraqi stability. Additionally, Turkey will continue to triangulate with Iraq and Iran to ensure that Kurdish regional autonomy neither grows into statehood, nor that Kurdish oil wealth is used to fuel further Kurdish designs on territory.

The second map (Graphic A6) shows Ralph Peters’ concept of a stable Middle East. Important to note is the significant difference between the current political map of the Middle East and the map of a “stable” Middle East where culture kin live together and, more importantly, are self-ruled. This map is not a prediction of the next fifteen years; rather, its shows the tremendous gap between the current geopolitical reality of the Middle East and the future to 2025. This gap between an almost mythical stable future and the current reality guarantees conflict.

Graphic B6: Map of a stable Middle East, (R. Peters, 2006)

The Janus of the Middle East – the two faces of Iran

Iran will continue on its current ascendancy in Middle Eastern affairs in the 2009-2025 timeframe. However, attempting to anticipate Iranian actions should be tempered with rational examination of Iranian power, intention, and capabilities, with a view to Iranian limitations. While fears of an aggressive “Shia Crescent” must be viewed through the lens of Sunni sensibilities, Political Shia is on the march in Iraq, Lebanon, and in its home, Iran. 5 Huntington, Samuel “The Clash of Civilization s and the Remaking of World Order,” 1993 6 Peters, Ralph http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2112561/


In Iran itself, the continued currency of the concept of Persian greatness will galvanize both Iranian external and internal actions. Iran views itself as both an ancient and revolutionary state, with an enduring and comprehensive vision that will defeat its historically transient and culturally bankrupt enemies in the West.

However, Iran does face significant internal social problems, including demographic collapse of increasing velocity, youth immigration, and increasing levels of drug use and prostitution, the latter most tellingly among educated Iranian women. The demographics portion of this puzzle is revealing on a number of levels: ethnic

Persians are a slim majority (51% of total) in Iran. However, like the many of the nationalities of the former USSR in the 1960s and 70s, most ethnic discontent is quiescent in Iran. The Azeri are competently repressed, the Kurds are respectful of Iranian power and focused on Iraq, the Baluch are violent but splintered, and the Khuzestan Arabs are restless but powerless.

Thus, the Iran of 2025 bears many similarities to the Soviet Union of the late 1960s and early 1970s; while aggressive, societal pressures may be in a position to topple an ossified and unsustainable political and economic structure. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, the Iranians may not go quietly into the historical night. Iranian-US relations have a history of 30 years of armed conflict, and the bad historic baggage of decades of US/Iranian relations is kept alive by the Iranian guardianship of the Islamic Jurist as part of its foundational myth. Indeed, many Shia might view this time as the last, best opportunity to establish friendly Shia-dominated states in Lebanon, Bahrain, and Iraq. Thus, the Iranian question requires US Defense planners to contend with concurrent Iranian weakness and aggressiveness.

Graphic A7: Iran’s population profile by 5-year bracket, 2005 vs 2050.

Cruelty of Extractive Dependent Economies

The simple fact is that the vast majority of the economies of the Middle East are dependent on petroleum extraction for the vast proportion of monetary wealth. In 2025, this will continue to be case and will be the cause of and solution to most of life’s problems. Global dependence on oil creates the sole condition for the Persian Gulf’s national security importance, not only to the West, but to China, Japan, and India as well. Regional and national dependence on oil creates economies vulnerable to a single-point failure, and oil infrastructure is the prime target during wartime. Indeed, the oil extraction question is often where the issues of borders and ethnicity intersect. Two prime examples of this are the Shiites of Saudi Arabia and


the Kurds of Northern Iraq. In the Saudi case, above the prime oil fields of Saudi Arabia sit the Shia minority of the Kingdom. These Shia are viewed with suspicion by the Kingdom and are some of the poorest of its members, despite living atop some of the planet’s greatest natural wealth. It is not a stretch to say that in the eyes of most Sunni Arabs, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s quote that “Shiites are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live”7 is perceived as accurate. In the Iraqi case, Kurdish oil wealth has the potential to fuel the implosion of Iraq, as Shia and Sunni Arabs attempt to use political control of the Oil Ministry and physical control of pipeline routes to force concessions from the Kurds. Thus, the seeds of future conflict remain firmly planted in the petroleum basis of the local economies.

Scenarios for the Middle East

The Middle East confronting the US military planner in 2025 could span the range from general regional war due to the collapse of Iraq, to continuing Iranian-supported and inspired insurgencies, to an array of increasingly well-armed countries facing each other in a state of Cold War or Hot Peace. In the worst-case scenario, the collapse of the Saudi Kingdom, the splitting of the Iraqi State, the overthrow of the Alawite Assad dynasty in Syria, or religious and tribal conflict in Yemen creates the conditions for a wider regional conflict, as religious minorities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bahrain are emboldened by an Iran interested in redrawing the map of the Middle East in a way not seen since the end of World War I. Indeed, as the power of the West recedes in the Middle East, a generalized feeling that the Western-imposed boundaries must be redrawn could arise. It is highly unlikely that such an event would proceed peacefully and consensually. The most likely scenario posits that the bad boundaries of the Middle East will endure, and the ethnic and religious oppression inherent in them will remain. For US Defense planners at all levels, the Middle East represents a challenge of balancing defense priorities of access to strategic resources and the requirements for US policies to be congruent with American values.

7 http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/460zxoej.asp



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