THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS

Stephen John Stedman

A New Foreign Policy Doctrine

NOT SO LONG AGO we could confuse the end ofthe Cold War with the end of history and entertainthe possibility that we had survived the famous

Chinese curse of living in interesting times. A new era of inter-national security seemed about to dawn, where even the mostprotracted conflicts appeared solvable. International mediationin Angola, Cambodia and El Salvador led to negotiated settle-ments of long civil wars and revived the hope that ballots, notbullets, would finally determine the fate of peoples around theglobe.

But as Ralph Ellison cautioned in his masterpiece. InvisibleMan, history is not an arrow but a boomerang. Just when theend of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry held out the promise that ratio-nality and reason would triumph over ideology, the world wdt-nessed the bloody dissolution of states in Yugoslavia, Somalia,Liberia and Ethiopia. So, too, came the revival of virulentnationalism throughout the former Soviet empire and genoci-dal campaigns on the fringes of western Europe. Even thosesuccessful cases of mediated civil war now hover on the brinkof renewed bloodshed. The fortunes of history, it seems, haveas much to do with the persistence of hatred and memory aswith the vicissitudes of grand ideologies.

Yet the end of superpower rivalry continues to entranceAmerica with the chimera of a new world order. That illusion,alongside often violent disorder in many states, has produced akind of "new interventionism." This outlook combines anawareness that civil war is a legitimate issue of internationalsecurity with a sentiment for crusading liberal international-ism. The new interventionists wed great emphasis on themoral obligations of the international community to an eager-

Stephen John Stedman is Assistant Professor of African Studies andComparative Politics at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced InternationalStudies and the author of Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation inZimbabwe, 1974-1980.

2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ness for a newly available United Nations to intervene indomestic conflicts throughout the world.

Thus future historians may compare 1991 and 1992 to theyears just after World War II, when the doctrine of contain-ment evolved. like that time, the last tv o years have seen aseries of events, precedents, incremental decisions and policyrationales give birth to a new doctrine of American foreignpolicy. While that new doctrine remains inchoate, a fewimportant facets are visible and suggest that the United States,far from turning inward, may be taking upon itself a morecrusading, interventionist role in world affairs.

Many eager advocates of this new doctrine lack a sufficientsense of the dilemmas, risks and costs of intervention. Theyoften fail to take account of the special dynamics of civil waror the realistic limitations of the United Nations as the chosenvehicle for action. The precepts of this new doctrine chafe attraditional notions of sovereignty, remain contradictory andare leading international actors toward largely uncharteddomain. Followed unthinkingly, the new interventionism couldbecome increasingly expansive, untU the United States and theUnited Nations ultimately take on tasks for which they are ill-prepared, leaving themselves embroiled in numerous internalconflicts without the will or resources to bring peace to any.

A Doctrine of Dubious Presumptions

THE UNPRECEDENTED U.N. DECISION onDecember 4, 1992, authorizing the deployment of

military force to provide humanitarian relief to starvingSomalis was the culmination of year-long pressures. Wellbefore the deployment of 21,000 U.S. troops, congressionalleaders from both parties and many in the media had formonths urged massive intervention, including establishing aU.N. trusteeship if need be.

But Somalia did not stand alone as a cause worthy of inter-national intervention. Many of the same chorus of" congres-sional leaders, political pundits, television commentators andprint journalists also clamored for U.S. military action to stopSerbian aggression in the former Yugoslavia. They endorsedwar crime tribunals against Serbs, demanded firmer action toprotect and feed afflicted Bosnians and castigated U.N. peace-keepers for their unwillingness to engage armed partisansattempting to thwart humanitarian relief. In turn, U.S. and

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS 3

U.N. intervention was urged for Liberia, East Timor, Sudan,Zaire and Haiti as well.

The new interventionists seek to end civil wars and stopgovernments from abusing the rights of their peoples. Theyassume that civil war today is more prevalent, violent andthreatening to international^curity than in previous eras, u ^ h e n e w i n t e r v e n -They beheve that active inter- . .national intervention is neces- t i o n i s t s s e e k tO e n dsary to bring a semblance of c i v i l w a r s a n d S t o porder to the post-Cold War g o v e r n m e n t s fromworld, based on the dubious ° , . i_ • i_presumption that the Cold a b u s i n g t h e n g h t sWar's end makes internal vio- o f t h e i r p e o p l e s . "lence somehow more tractable.But their often contradictorydemands for intervention—either mediation, an active combatrole on behalf of a warring side, or simply shielding civilianscaught in the middle—belie a lack of coherent understandingof peacemaking in internal conflicts.

The new interventionists advocate "a new humanitarianorder in which governments are held—by force, if necessary—to higher standards of respect for human life." They contendthat "the protection of ethnic, religious and other minoritiesendangered by conflict and alienated from a hostile govern-ment is now increasingly a recognized obligation of the inter-national community." To adherents of this approach, sover-eignty is no longer a tool for creating international order, buta "political constraint" on international action.' In the wordsof former U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar,"We are clearly v^tnessing what is probably an irresistible shiftin public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of theoppressed in the name of morality should prevail over fron-tiers and legal documents."^

The new interventionists seek to establish guidelines toensure that the United Nations polices any regime failing tomeet the broadly and often ill-deflned "humanitarian needs"of its people. Such a rule is possible, they believe, because the

'From Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, JTie Challenges of Famine Relief: EmergemyOperations in the Sudan, Washington (DC): Brookings Institution, 1992, pp. 8, 131 and 119.

^Quoted in David J. Scheffer, "Challenges Confronting Collective Security:Humanitarian Intervention," Scheffer, Richard N. Gardner and Gerald B. Helman, Post-Gulf War Challenges to the UJ/. Collective Securit)/ System: Three Views on the Issue of HumanitarianIntervention, Washington (DC): United States Institute of Peace, 1992, p. 4.

4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

end of the Cold War has vanquished the ideological con-straints on intervention in the domestic affairs of U.N. mem-ber states. Guidelines for intervention would mark a significantshift in the long-standing meaning of the terms of internationalrelations. Sovereignty would no longer reside with states butwith the people within them; self-determination would nolonger refer to peoples, but to individuals. Precedent, rhetoric,faulty generalization and expectations: such is the stuff of doc-trine.

Doctrine Reunites American Liberalism

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM has its roots inlong-standing tendencies of American foreign poli-

cy—missionary zeal, bewilderment when the world refuses toconform to American expectations and a belief that for everyproblem there is a quick and easy solution. It reunites dividedstrains of American foreign policy liberalism: traditionalWilsonian liberalism, defined by support for internationalorganizations and self-determination of peoples; and its ColdWar cousin, defined by anticommunism.

The challenge of explaining the new interventionism lies inproviding an account of how two camps at odds for most ofthe last 25 years can today find common ground. The key toresolving the mystery is found in the insight of formerHarvard professor of government Louis Hartz: that aJlAmericans are liberals, united in their commitment to freedomand the belief that the future of their freedom depends onfreedom flourishing everywhere.^

Over the last forty years, however, Gold War liberals tendedto a Manichaean view of world politics. They believed thatAmerica had to engage actively in mortal combat with an eviland implacable Soviet foe. The perceived dangers of interna-tional communism prompted Gold War liberals to advocateintervention globally in an attempt to prevent regimes evenvaguely sympathetic with communist ideals from coming topower.

The reaction to Gold War liberalism was an alternativesteeped in the Wilsonian tradition. Issues like the VietnamWar, nuclear strategy and U.S. support for authoritarianregimes split America's liberal consensus. The generation of

'Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1955.

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS 5

the 1960s saw Vietnam as immoral and a betrayal of theAmerican belief in self-determination. The U.S.-Soviet armsrace, too, was judged as a threat to international security,prompting Wilsonian liberalstoward international organiza- uj^^ ^^^ i n t e r v e n -tions and negotiation as a way . . .out of the nuclear dilemma, t i o n i s m h a s i t sWilsonian liberals railed roo tS i n l o n g -against American support forauthontanan regimes as a poll-against American support for gtandillff t e n d e n c i e s

gcy that compromised American Oi Ann.encai lvalues respecting human rights f o r e i g n p o l i c y . . . . "and self-determination.

The end of the Cold Warfinally allowed these competing liberalisms to recombine. Thetwo groups slowly found common ground on respect forhuman rights, their belief that the internal character ofregimes has implications for international peace, and on theirsupport for international organizations to reform, and evensometimes to remove, rogue regimes. Right and left have thuscome to agree on the broad outlines of America's future for-eign policy.

The reunion was also made possible by changes in each lib-eral strain. The horror and revulsion over Vietnam had ledthe Wilsonian liberals to an almost categorical opposition toAmerican intervention abroad. In 1978, for example, whenSenator George McGovern called for international interven-tion in Cambodia to stop the Khmer Rouge genocide of itsown people—anticipating in some ways the thrust of the newinterventionism—his former anti-Vietnam allies dismissed himout of hand. The Vietnam analogy was frequently invokedwhen the question of American military intervention wasraised.

Wilsonian liberals had couched much of their opposition toAmerican intervention abroad in terms of respect for nationalself-determination and support for individual human rights.Yet a contradiction exists between these two goods—respectfor national sovereignty may preclude intervention in the faceof a government's horrific violations of the individual andminority rights of its own citizens.

Mounting evidence of the corruption and brutality of manyThird World regimes (and rising claims to self-determinationin the aftermath of the Cold War) eventually led many

6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Wilsonian liberals to abandon their commitment to self-deter-mination. By the late 1980s international opinion, which hadoften served as a brake on the crusading tendencies ofAmerican foreign policy, began to concur. A consensusemerged among international lenders that economic and polit-ical conditions on aid were necessary for Third World devel-opment and government reform. Wilsonian liberals had finallyresolved the contradiction between self-determination of peo-ples and human rights, opting in favor of the latter.

For Cold War liberals, meanwhile, the collapse of the SovietUnion released them from the need to support authoritarianregimes as bulwarks against global communism. They alsocame to appreciate the potential of international organizationsand international law, a shift best explained by apprehensionsabout the costs of providing order in the post-Cold War era.

As consensus emerged in the 1980s that economic powerwas the dominant currency of international relations and animportant component of national security. Cold War liberalsopened to the possibility of a larger U.N. role in securityaffairs. Collective security, they hoped, could help alleviateAmerica's crushing defense burden and massive public debt.This new-found courtship, however, has its limits. FormerCold War liberals do not wish to relinquish America's interna-tional leadership. Rather, they see the end of the Cold War asmaking international organizations more ideologically predis-posed to follow the American lead.

The Gulf War's Errant Example

FOR THE NEW interventionists the Gulf War is awatershed of international cooperation and consensus.

It should, they believe, serve as a model for a new system ofglobal collective security. International order is seen as flowingfrom the credibility and capability of a unified community ofnations, unshackled from ideological polarization, to deter anyact of interstate and internal aggression.

Actions taken by the United Nations in response to Iraqiattacks on its Kurdish population are now renowned as settingimportant precedents. In particular U.N. Security Council res-olution 688, which allowed that an act of internal aggressionmay be deemed a threat to international order, is interpretedas establishing humanitarian intervention in a state's affairs asa legitimate response of the international community.

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS 7

Overlooked, however, are the many special circumstancesthat make the Gulf War an unlikely model for future collectiveresponses. While the war was sanctioned by the UnitedNations, the military action remained firmly under Americancommand and control. While international forces drove theIraqi army from Kuwait, the costs of the operation ranupwards of S70 billion. And while U.N. resolution 688 estab-lished legal precedent, its practical relevance may be moot:U.N. protective forces entered Iraq only after OperationDesert Storm demolished what was the world's fourth largestarmy, thus destroying Iraq's capacity to resist. In short,humanitarian intervention could work in Iraq because it fol-lowed, not preceded, the most successful U.N. peace-enforce-ment mission ever.

The Gulf War and the subsequent protection of Iraqi Kurdsnonetheless provided the basis for Operation Restore Hope inSomalia as well as the legal rationale for the 22,000 U.N.troops providing humanitarian relief in Bosnia. Many newinterventionists claim that precedent has been set for peace-enforcement—that is, war—against Serbia and for humanitari-an intervention in Liberia and Sudan as well.

But the model of the Gulf War—a limited mandate to fighta conventional war in the vast openness of a desert—may berelevant only to wars involving secession of relatively homoge-neous populations in readily defined territories. Rarely doessuch a situation occur.

Toward Selective Intervention

BILL CLINTON comes to the presidency sympatheticto the new interventionism. His election marks the

accession to power of a generation intent on making Americalive up to its professed ideals. But to avoid an increasinglyexpansive doctrine that risks extending American interventionto all areas of the globe, Clinton must scrutinize the underly-ing assumptions of the new interventionism.

Foremost, a more realistic perspective of internal state vio-lence would avoid much of the new interventionist hysteriasurrounding civil war in the post-Cold War era. Such wars areno more frequent than before. At present there are 18 civilwars; in 1985 there were 19. Civil wars today are no morebloody than those past. The U.S. civil war cost upwards of600,000 lives; the Spanish civil war of the 1930s and the

8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Nigerian civil war ofthe late 1960s killed on similar scales.Today's civil wars should not be expected to be more

amenable to negotiation; they will remain among the most dif-ficult conflicts to settle politi-^ ^ ^ tih

p" to »\/nirl nn ^^Y- ^^ ^ ^ twentieth centu-

ry about 18 percent of civifincreasingly ^ ^ars ended withexpansive doctrine the elimination or uncondi-. . . Clinton must ^^"^ surrender of one party.

. . , Moreover, the same percent-scrut inize tne f j ^ | d dg setdedunderlying assump- in the period before the Coldtions of the new ^^^ ^^ during it, suggesting. , , . . )) that it is the dynamics ofinterventionism. ^for their intractability.

The end of the Cold War peels away but one layer of con-flict from civil wars, only to reveal a host of others beneath.While there was a short window where the ending of the ColdWar provided the superpowers leverage to settie various dis-putes such as Angola and El Salvador, the actual end of theCold War significantly reduces their ability to infiuence formerinternal allies.

Nor will outside intervention aimed at defeating recalcitrantwarring groups—even if undertaken by the United Nations—prove any more likely to succeed in the post-Cold War era.For example, some new interventionists have insisted that theUnited Nations use military force to compel the KhmerRouge to abide by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. But whyshould the United Nations be expected to succeed where theVietnamese army, one of world's most disciplined, could not?Likewise, what would enable the United Nations to defeatAngola's UNITA when the Cuban army had failed to do so?

U.N. troops may carry international legitimacy, but internalparties will still command the asymmetries of civil war: partieswin by not losing; the will of those who intervene will waneover the long term if resource and human costs run high; andintervention will be one of many commitments for outsiders,whereas internal actors will be singleminded in their dedica-tion. The primary advantage this new era affords for enforcingpeace in places like Cambodia or Angola is that the superpow-ers will no longer equip rival factions. But such factions havealready proven adept at maintaining access to weaponry, as

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS 9

bordering states often have incendve for condnuing to armwarring sides.

The guiding pdnciple of the new intervendonism—theinternational community's obligation to intervene wherever astate or group within a state fails to meet the humanitadanneeds of its people—cannot be enforced consistently. To do sowould dictate intervention in every civil war as well as instates with regimes so repressive as to destroy even its incipientthreat. Potential cases for intervention far outstrip avaJlableresources. Intervention will have to be selective, and a moralprinciple applied unevenly will leave even well-intended inter-national actors variously open to charges of hypocrisy, cow-ardice, neglect or self-interest.

Some internal wars are also more threatening to interna-tional security than others. Hundreds of thousands of refugeesfrom the Balkan war place heavy burdens on newly indepen-dent east European states undergoing transitions to democra-cy. Left unchecked, Serbian aggression could advance toKosovo and Macedonia, raising the specter of broader inter-state conflagration. The war in the Badkans is a greater dangerto international security than civil wars in Som^a, Liberia orSudan because it may overwhelm Europe's political stabilityand economic productivity, prerequisites for Third Worlddevelopment. Even in Africa, Mozambique's civil war bearsthe greater stakes, threatening to flood southern Africa withrefugees or to overwhelm South Africa's tenuous transition tomajority rule and economic renewal, which would wreck aboon for the entire continent.

While there may be cause for the United States and UnitedNations to step into civil war for reasons of international secu-dty, the goal of intervention must be clearly defined. Only acombination of coherent strategy, sufficient leverage and akeen sense of timing will allow a third party to bdng peace.Most civil wars become amenable to settlement only after theyhave played themselves out with ferocity. A short-term empha-sis on ceasefires may only prolong conflicts and mitigateagainst parties perceiving that their survival depends on politi-cal settlement. While attempting mediation or ur^ng negotia-tion, third parties may inadvertentiy prolong conflicts. A deci-sion to try combatants for war crimes, say, may assuage oursense of justice but work against a negotiated end.

Many civil wars may have to be allowed to run an uglycourse. Herein lies an irony that clouds the clear morality of

10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

many new interventionists: the possibility that humanitarianassistance may extend war and anarchy rather than end it.Aid to besieged populations, if it assists prolonged resistance,may only end up costing more lives. Likewise, arming a weak-er party in the belief that justice calls for a "fair fight" maysimply produce a permanent state of war. Fewer lives may belost if one side wins outright. Moreover, a decisive victory issometimes the best result, followed by a forward-looking con-ciliatory peace.

There are no panaceas for internal conflicts. The hope thatinternational intervention in one war will prove a deterrentelsewhere is simply that—a hope, with little evidence to justifyit as a proposition and plenty to suggest that domestic tyrantsdo not learn from other cases. Civil wars and ethnic rivalrieshave histories and dynamics all their own that diminish theeffects of precedents set elsewhere.

Finally preventive diplomacy, while a reasonable expectationfor avoiding interstate war, is more difficult for internal con-flicts. In the 1980s some analysts predicted that Yugoslaviawould collapse into civil war; today one would be hardpressed to find an expert who does not believe Zaire will sooncollapse into war as well. Yet such predictions are differentfrom knowing exactly when internal violence will begin.Predicting ci\al war is akin to predicting earthquakes: analystsknow the fault lines running beneath the surface and can pro-vide probabilities and estimate time periods, but they cannotsay vsdth any confidence when the big one will strike.

Recognizing U.N. Costs and Limits

PRESIDENT CLINTON will need a realistic sense ofwhat the United Nations can and cannot do. The

United Nations is simply incapable of playing the role that thenew interventionists demand of it. Only if used with a prudentsense of its costs and capabilities can the organization play alimited role in bringing peace in the world.

The organization is currently overextended and underfund-ed. During the last three years it has been involved in 14peace missions, the same number of missions as undertaken inall its preceding 43 years. The estimated cost of peacekeepinghas grown from $750 miUion in 1991 to S2.9 billion in 1992,of which member nations have contributed only $2 billion,leaving a shortfall of almost $900 million for this year alone.

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS 11

These figures do not include U.N. commitments to Somaliaand Mozambique, which could double U.N. expenses.

The scope of U.N. involvement in civil wars has expandeddramatically. In addition to peacekeeping the United Nationsis now expected to extend protection to noncombatants andfood convoys, to supervise, monitor and sometimes run elec-tions, to oversee land reform, to document war crimes and, ifneed be, to provide order when societies and governmentsbreak down. The United Nations has somehow taken on amythic status as the cure for all ills. Yet it has not received theresources necessary to carry out even the tasks it hasembarked on already, let alone to meet the open-ended com-mitments of humanitarian protection called for in Yugoslaviaand Somalia.

Despite its expanded role, the United Nations remains wed-ded to previous doctrines sharply delineating peacekeepingand peace-enforcement on the basis of enemies. In peacekeep-ing there is no enemy, and success depends on keeping it thatway. In peace-enforcement the United Nations determines anaggressor and sets out to defeat or deter it militarily. There isa clear enemy and mission, and the rules of engagement arebroader than merely returning fire in self-defense.

Yet recent demands for U.N. intervention in civil wars pre-sent dilemmas for U.N. troops, revealing a yawning gapbetween tded doctrines andnewly appointed tasks. In the ..^he United Nationscase of Bosnia, U.N. troops . . _ . , .,"providing protection" face IS S i m p l y i n c a p a b l eenemies but lack a mandate to o f p l a y i n g t h e r o l edefeat them. In cases of peace- ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^building—acting as reieree in . . .certifying elections and moni- i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t storing demobilization—U.N. d e m a n d o f i t ."troops may make enemies andeventually need to engage inpeace-enforcement. Such is the case in Cambodia, where theKhmer Rouge refuses to meet treaty commitments andattempts to undermine the peace process. Finally, in Somaliathe task of "providing order" could lead to the worst case:enemies on all sides and an open-ended commitment toadministering the country.

The United Nations has built-in flaws that cannot be reme-died simply by increasing its resources, capabilities and organi-

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zation. By its very nature the United Nations is prone todeliberation; that is the essence of a large bureaucracy thatpurports to represent all peoples of the world. Its strength—the ability to grant international legitimacy to an endeavor—atthe same time forms its weaknesses: slowness, inefficiency andthe possibility that the national interests of its members willblock constructive collective action. A confusion of demands,the need for consensus in decision-making and the tendencytoward incremental action rob the United Nations of coherentstrategy when approaching intervention.

A review of past operations, however, shows that when a sit-uation calls for classic peacekeeping—agreement between war-ring parties who have reasonable command and control overthose with weapons—the United Nations can do the job.Although U.N. peace-building operations in Cambodia andAngola are at various stages of unraveling, U.N. experience inNamibia and El Salvador shows that the organization canindeed play a key role in ending civil war. Where parties tocivil war have reached public agreement on ending hostilities,prompt and decisive action alongside commitment of adequateresources can make the difference. Strengthening U.N. capa-bility to place peacekeeping troops on the ground quickly aftersettlements are reached would be a major contribution topeace.

The Lessons of Yugoslavia

FROM A STRATEGIC standpoint U.N. interventionin Yugoslavia has been a disaster. No overriding goal

or cohesive plan exists. Steps resembling peace-enforcement—no-fly zones and sanctions—are implemented with no man-date to enforce them. Investigation and the threat of warcrimes prosecution, which only make sense if the internationalcommunity deems the war in Bosnia a total war, could workagainst a mediated settlement. Actions that resemble peace-keeping, such as repeated attempts to create and monitorceasefires, assist the provision of humanitarian aid but work atcross purposes to the search for a permanent solution, as com-batants merely use the pauses to regroup and gain tacticaladvantage. Measures to protect food and people—including arequest to use Belgrade as a shipping depot for deliveries toBosnia—^weaken potential peace-enforcement operations. Andprovisions for the self-defense of troops protecting convoys and

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS 13

refugees may lead to de facto peace-enforcement, without thenecessary commitment, planning and resources to ensure suc-cess.

The new interventionists argue that the lesson of Yugoslaviais that the time for international action is before crises becomewars; the United Nadons, they say, must improve its tools ofpreventive diplomacy. They contend that improving U.N.intelligence gathering and establishing a rapid deploymentforce of 10,000 to 60,000 troops will enable the UnitedNadons to intervene rapidly in crises and to avoid futureBosnias and Somalias.

Yet such proposals skirt the crucial issue. Preventive diplo-macy depends on quick, decisive action. Informadon and toolsto respond to crises are necessary but insufficient without afirm decision and the demonstrated will to use them. The abil-ity of the United Nations to respond decisively will always beinferior to the ability of individual states or small groups ofstates to do so.

The Balkan crisis is telling in this regard. Deterring acts ofaggression within states is much more difficult than deterringacts of aggression between states. It should be rememberedthat at the beginning of the Balkan war there was no Sloveniaand no Serbia, but a state called Yugoslavia. Knowing whatthe world knows now, injecdng 30,000 troops between Croadaand Slovenia may have been a good idea. But at that dmemany in the United Nadons desired that Yugoslavia stayYugoslavia. A decision to inject troops into the conflict wouldhave been seen by many as prejudicing the internal conflicttoward a secessionist outcome.

The crises over Slovenia and Croatia made apparent thedifferent strategies among Western powers for avoiding war.Germany argued that quick recognition of those states mightprevent war; U.N. special representative Cyrus Vance believedthat recognition would increase the possibility. Germany'sstrategy might have worked if Europe had closed ranks behindit. But coming on the heels of German unification, a unitedEuropean response was stymied by fears that Germany woulddominate European decision-making and that Croatia'sauthoritarian past would revive the unseemly prospect of anew German-Croat alliance. There also existed genuine confu-sion over whether Yugoslavia should be one or many. IfEurope could not reach consensus on quick acdon, how couldthe United Nadons?

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Peace-enforcement in the Balkans?

THE UNITED NATIONS has set the stage for peace-enforcement against Serbia, warning Siat Serbian

actions in Kosovo could constitute a threat to internationalpeace. Former Secretary of State George Shultz has urged theuse of military force on humanitarian grounds to stop Serbianaggression in Bosnia. Ronald Reagan has called for forming"an army of conscience." And Western diplomats have dis-cussed a host of specific measures—enforcing the no-fly zoneover Bosnia, establishing war crimes tribunals for Serbianleaders, recognizing Macedonia and placing U.N. troops thereto act as a trip wire in case of Serbian attack.

Yet peace-enforcement in civil wars requires a clear, com-pelling case for reasons of international security; humanitarianconcerns are not enough. Indeed if humanitarian concerns—measured by deaths and genocidal campaigns—^were the justi-fication for military intervention, Bosnia would rank belowSudan, Liberia and East Timor. Serbian thugs are certainlyrank amateurs compared to Gambodia's Khmer Rouge andMozambique's RENAMQ, both of whom have been accordedinternational legitimacy in the search for peace.

Peace-enforcement in civil wars is more difficult than peace-enforcement in interstate wars and often requires a long-termpresence as an army of occupation. There are no clean civilwars: enemies are rarely concentrated, visible and vulnerable;it is often difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiersor enemies and allies, and if one inadvertently confuses thetwo, soon there are no allies at all.

The war in Bosnia combines a war of secession with aninternal war fought among a diverse population. Bosnians arenearly divided in thirds among Groats, Muslims and Serbs.Bosnian Serbs have fought because they do not want to be aminority in a state outside Serbia; Groats and Muslims havefought because they do not want to be minorities wathin agreater Serbia. It is unclear whether there is unified commandand control among Bosnian Serbian militias. According to onecount, no less than 19 separate armed groups are engaged.

Peace-enforcement in the Balkans should address the rela-tionship between the conflict and its effects on internationalsecurity. Action against Serbia should only be to deter aggres-sion against Kosovo and Macedonia, to prevent escalation tointerstate war and to weaken Serbia's capability to carry out

THE NEW INTERVENTIONISTS 15

further attacks. U.N. military intervention should not aim toend the war in Bosnia. U.N. troops would find themselvesfighting a protracted guerrilla war. The war in Bosnia shouldbe ended politically or militarily by the territory's various war-ring groups.

The Pitfalls for President Clinton

THE CLINTON foreign poficy will fikefy be marked bycompeting instincts. A presumption of moral certitude

and search for global social redemption may vie with a realis- -tic sense of the limits of American power to bring peace andjustice to a world marked by violence, brutality and politicaldisintegration.

The new president inherits from his predecessor few clearguidelines about when and where to intervene militarily.George Bush's last major speech before leaving office revealsthat the former president never resolved whether he was arealist or a liberal. Addressing the cadets at West Point, Bushspoke of America's moral and spiritual leadership and thethreat of tyrants who "ignore the welfare of their own men,women and children." But he also warned against "universal-ism" and a perceived need for the United States to react toevery "outrage of violence." The speech could provide gristfor those who seek to curtail America's policing of the worldor those who seek to broaden humanitarian intervention bythe United States. It did little to quell demands for moreforceful action in the Balkans.

If the United States joins in peace-enforcement againstSerbia, President Clinton should seek to avoid an "elastic doc-trine syndrome." Foremost, the new president must explainthat military intervention is in America's own interests, that itis necessary to prevent a possibly larger interstate war thatmay involve NATO allies. Clinton should avoid the temptationof rhetoric that speaks of upholding the rights of peopleseverywhere, of supporting the dictates of international moralityor of" doing, in President Bush's phrase, "God's work."

It will taike courage. The American people prefer more loftyreasons to use military force than the unadorned truth thatnational interests are at stake. If Clinton chooses the rhetoricof the new interventionism, he should be prepared for thenext case for intervention that the most vivid televisionimages—depicting a world sharpened, simplified and devoid of

16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

context—thrust to the top of his foreign policy agenda,whether it be Tibet or Tajikistan, Myanmar or Malawi.

It may be, as the new interventionists insist, that the inter-national community has begun to accept the proposition thatinterests of people come before the interests of states. Such aprinciple could be a valuable tool for creating a more just andsecure world. But carried out absent a sense of limits and ofpolitical and economic realism, and if applied according to thedictates of television, rather than the national interests of theUnited States, not only will this new American foreign policybe unsustainable but the post-Cold War era will likely be moreconfrontational, conflict-ridden and violent than the one thatpreceded it.