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The Moroccan nationalistmovement: from local tonational networksFadma Ait Mousa

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The Moroccan nationalist movement: fromlocal to national networks†

Fadma Ait Mous∗

Centre Marocain des Sciences Sociales, Universite Hassan II Casablanca, Casablanca, Morocco

Studies of anti-colonial nationalism in Morocco have long privileged a macro-level of analysis,masking socio-political processes and local networks. This paper approaches the emergence ofMoroccan nationalism through social relationships and focuses on networks of local actors andtheir fusion into a larger national network. Using urban areas as a starting point allows abetter grasp of these local networks and the actions around which they were articulated andbetter description of the trajectories of these urban pockets towards the emergence ofcollective organisation at a national level. From this description of the articulations betweenthe local and the national, the paper aims to respond to the question: what is retained of thelocal within the construction of the national?

Keywords: Morocco; nationalism; social networks; urban spaces; Fez; Tetuan

Reading the memoirs and other writings of Moroccan nationalists gives the impression of

‘nationalism against a local backdrop’. The history of the nationalist movement is divided

between numerous local histories and a ‘unitary’ national history. Each town is therefore held

up by its nationalist sons as the birthplace of Moroccan nationalism as a way of producing notori-

ety and pride. Hachemi Filali,1 for example, talks of his native Fez as the cradle of the first

nationalist network, an early core emerging around the Qarawiyyine2 that spread, according

to an interesting but not entirely undistorted diffusionist model (one centre/one periphery), all

over the country to propagate the new watchword in a ‘linear strategy’ well defined by the orig-

inal core. And yet, this development was constructed after the fact.

Admittedly, each author loves his own town and seeks to adorn it with a historical role that

will enhance its reputation while serving the author’s political or memorial aims. This enhance-

ment of the local informs us about the process through which the national emerges. An urban

phenomenon in its modern form, the Moroccan nationalist movement, was born in cities,

which were the first to ‘resign themselves’ to the realities of colonialism.3 Networks appeared

and became organised here and there in Moroccan cities, although as yet scarcely visible,

soon after the First World War. These local networks were seemingly unlinked, except for

†This article is drawn from my doctoral dissertation (Aıt Mous 2012). Translated by Edward McAllister, St Antony’s

College, Oxford.∗Email: aitmousfadma@gmail.com

# 2013 Taylor & Francis

The Journal of North African Studies, 2013

Vol. 18, No. 5, 737–752, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2013.849888

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the vague idea of ‘safeguarding the Arabo-Muslim personality’4 used to counter colonial pol-

icies seen as dangerous. Chronologically speaking, this phrase corresponds to what Odile

Moreau calls ‘the hollow years’ of Maghribi nationalism (2003, 59), or the period 1912–

1929; and which Abdelkrim Hajji terms ‘the missing link in the history of the national move-

ment’ (1983, 232). During this period, ‘not much happens’, according to histories that are

fond of great events and ‘turning points’. But at the micro-level, an intellectual ferment was

taking place among the future entrepreneurs of the nationalist idea. The historiography of Mor-

occan nationalism has long privileged the macro-scale, thus masking the socio-political pro-

cesses and networks of actors at work at the micro-level. This has led to a stereotyped history

of Moroccan nationalism as linear and monolithic.

The aim here is to describe the trajectories of these local networks towards their fusion into a

national network, paying special attention in each case to the actors, spaces and actions around

which these networks developed. In addition, the role of actors serving as bridges that built

relationships between different spaces will be highlighted. Identifying and describing networks

of local actors within each city studied allows us to analyse the passage from the local to the

national and the process by which these local networks became fused into a national one.

Using the city as a starting point has made it possible to grasp these local networks and the

actions and spaces around which they developed, and to describe better the trajectories from

these urban cores to the formation of a collective organisation at a national level. Furthermore,

the description of the articulations between the local and the national5 led me to address a central

question: what is retained of the local in the construction of the national (understood here as the

discursive construction of the nation)?

I take two cities as schematic case studies: Tetouan in the Spanish protectorate and Fez in the

French protectorate. In each, the dispersed and local settings of networks of actors and their

actions will be highlighted. Then, we describe the process through which these networks built

up inter-relationships and then fused into a national network with the creation of a single organ-

isation encompassing nationalists from different cities from 1930.

Preliminary local networks

Tetouan

The city of Tetouan became the capital of the Spanish protectorate of northern Morocco in 1913.

Attitudes of the city’s inhabitants to this event ranged from taking advantage of the new order,

fleeing (into near or distant exile), taking up arms and joining the resistance leaders on the nearby

mountain, sinking into lethargy, etc. The fact that the city had been occupied without bloodshed

and that the Spanish had begun reassuring the population of the protection of their possessions,

especially their religion, meant that the inhabitants of the city gradually adapted to the new

order. Moreover, Spanish colonial policy quickly sought to improve its image and encouraged

the Moroccans to accept Spain’s presence. The aim was to attract the support of rural and

urban elites to the protectorate regime and bring them around to an idea of fraternisation and

friendship that would result in mutually beneficial collaboration. In contrast to links with

France, Hispano-Moroccan relations enjoyed a long legacy. It was to this ‘shared’ past that

the Spanish referred, insisting in official speeches and in the press on the community of blood

and race linking the Spanish with Moroccan Muslims. Based on a so-called ‘Moorophile’ dimen-

sion, this policy claimed to be firmly in favour of Islam and Arabness, and was used beyond the

Moroccan context as Spain’s image in the Middle East.

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In practice, this policy of consideration towards Tetouani notables went further in its ‘liberal-

ism’ than that of Marshal Lyautey towards the elites of ‘French Morocco’ in as much as in

Tetouan, it took the shape of a genuine association in the management of the affairs of the

Spanish protectorate (Kenbib 2002, 63–83). Perhaps this permissive liberalism was intended

to mask the feeble efforts of Spanish capitalism to pull the northern zone out of its socio-econ-

omic decline?

This association of Moroccan and Spanish elements, spoken of in terms of their ‘collabor-

ation’, in fact characterised the attitudes of many actors in northern Morocco. It is within the

interstices of this relationship that the national movement emerged in the city. Here, the

impetus for the national movement came from a small group of older men from the generation

born before the protectorate that had witnessed their country’s loss of independence. The

members of this small group of notables were born into well-known Tetouani families (and

gradually those of other towns in the region) and were inserted in networks based on different

relationships (familial, professional, economic . . .). Politically speaking, these pioneers were

not opposed to the Spanish protectorate, with which they ‘collaborated’ as members of the

Makhzen.6 Above all, they encouraged conciliation, peaceful action and diplomacy. While

sparing the Spanish authorities, they launched virulent attacks on the French protectorate,

which they considered to be the main ‘enemy’ to be fought against.

Initially, the Tetouani network was made up of a dozen personalities scattered between the

different organisations created and used by the network as propaganda relays for the idea of

‘reform’ (isla_h), which were influenced by the Salafist current.7 This small network was charac-

terised by strong interpersonal links forged through education and the adoption of shared ideas,

but above all through the existence of a common identity. Members of the network thought of

themselves an ‘elite’, as opposed to those notables whom they considered ‘uneducated’, but

whom they also courted as necessary financial backers. Each group had its meeting place.

Other peripheral actors relative to this group were senior officials, educated but seen as tradition-

alists. In all of the actions initiated by this first central network in Tetouan, we find these different

groups working together: an enlightened elite that conceived the project; senior Moroccan, but

also Spanish, officials providing the official seal; and notables (wujaha’ al-bled) offering

funding and prestige.

This small network was also peculiar in having a central figure responsible for initiating

almost all the actions that gave rise to the nationalist movement in the north: Haj Abdeslam Ben-

nouna (1888–1935), an important figure of Andalusian origin, well educated and intelligent. His

name was closely linked to every event in the Spanish zone until his death in 1935.8 Though his

role as ‘father of Moroccan nationalism’9 has been denied to him due to a ‘friendship’ with Spain

deemed too ‘passionate’,10 it remains true that this modernist before his time seems to have been

involved in all the initiatives that resulted in the emergence of the nationalist movement in north-

ern Morocco during this period. According to Benjelloun, he ‘never ceased to be a nationalist

even at the zenith of his collaboration with the Spanish’ (1983, 41).

In collaboration with the Spanish authorities, these pioneers set up a series of cultural and

economic actions under the banner of reform. From a cultural perspective, Bennouna and

friends focused on creating quality education for young people, especially given the absence

of a Spanish education policy comparable to that established by France in the south. The

young Tetouani nationalists of the 1930s were the recipients of this education and benefited

from the group’s other initiatives. These cultural and economic actions must now be looked

at in detail, as well as the interrelations between them and especially the links with the

younger generation that took over from their elders during the 1930s.

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The first cultural initiative, dating from 1916, was the Moroccan Scientific and Literary Athe-

naeum (Ateneo Cientıfico y Literario Marroquı). There are two separate versions of how this

organisation was founded, each citing a different initiator. The first version points to a

Spanish initiative taken by the Spanish High Commissioner General Francisco Gomez

Jordana, with the agreement of the Khalifa, Moulay Mehdi. Its avowed aim was to ‘serve the

cause of rapprochement, indeed union, between Moroccans and Spaniards, work for the

respect of Muslim norms and favour the formation of an anti-French front’ (Kenbib 2002,

68). The second version has Haj A. Bennouna as the originator of the initiative before it

gained official backing. According to his son, Mehdi, as well as his biographer Benzzouz, Ben-

nouna’s first cultural initiative was the creation of a high-level cultural organisation gathering

the important figures of the northern zone, whose mission would be to promote education. He

proposed his idea from 1914 to the city’s clerics to win them over to his project. He quickly

gained the support of his former teacher and Minister of Justice, the fqıh Ahmed Rhouni

[1871–1953]. The two men joined forces to realise the project, which could not come to fruition

without the consent of the Spanish authorities. They convinced the then High-Commissioner,

General Jose Marina to accept. However, the departure of the general in July 1915 prevented

the project from getting off the ground. They had to wait until the arrival of the new High-Com-

missioner, General Jordana, on 10 October 1916 to resubmit the project, making use of their net-

works of links with the Spanish. General Jordana charged Rhouni with drafting statutes of the

institution, which Bennouna revised and presented to a commission meeting in the town hall

of Tetouan on 5 December 1916. This commission was comprised of Fqıh Rhouni (Minister

of Justice), Ahmed Torres (Pasha of the city), Mohammed Raghoune (representative of the

Grand Vizier), Abdeslam Bennouna (mu_htasib) and two Spanish translators. The project

passed and Bennouna thus obtained legal recognition for the first cultural association in

Morocco, in Tetouan.11

This organisation has been presented as at once ‘an intellectual circle, a club and a literary,

artistic and scientific academy’ (Wolf 1994, 152). However, its main role was as a cultural

organisation responsible for educating young people. Note here the use of the term ‘Moroccan’,

an important term within the construction of an idea of nationhood, even if only at the level of

discourse. Its official language was Arabic.12 The achievements of the Athenaeum were numer-

ous: the founding of the first Hispano-Arabic school on 1 January 1917;13 the creation of the first

school of handicrafts in 1919; publication of the journal al-I_slah (Reform14) in 1917; and cre-

ation of the al-I_slah printing press. Moreover, on 20 December 1924, the Tetouani network

opened the first free school in the northern zone, al-Ahliyya. Influenced by the Middle East

(Syria, Egypt, Lebanon), the education at this school was imparted in levels resembling those

of the official schools of the protectorate, while insisting on hygiene and paying teachers a

monthly salary. The school’s success was also due to the fact that, while preserving Arab-

Muslim culture, it was open to modern teaching methods. Mohammed Daoud, a young

history scholar and son-in-law of Bennouna, was its first headmaster. The school taught

Qur’anic exegesis, the bases of Islam, Arabic, arithmetic, geography and history, the latter as

a way of rehabilitating the glory of the great events of the Muslim world’s past. Another signifi-

cant point is the subject taught by Mohammed Daoud himself. His addition to the curriculum

was the study of nationalist poems, which pupils learned by heart, the aim being to inculcate

a spirit of nationalism from childhood. The importance of this socialisation early on is under-

scored by the fact that many of the future leaders of the nationalist movement in the north

attended this school. Indeed, among the first pupils were: Abdelkhalek Torres, Taıeb Bennouna,

M’hammed Azzimane and Mohammed el Khatib.15

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In contrast with France, which attempted to associate a handful of evolues with some of the

institutions created in the south (such as the Office Cherifien des Phosphates and professional

associations), Spain gave little importance to such ‘collaborative’ initiatives in the economic

sphere. In the north, the call for this kind of association came more from the Moroccan side.

At the initiative of A. Bennouna, in 1928 the Tetouan group founded the Cooperative Industrial

Company and the ‘al-Mahdia’ Arabic printing press (see below). For Bennouna, the decline of

the country was caused by economic stagnation: the solution was therefore to become economi-

cally stronger through the creation of a national economy. Mehdi Bennouna tells us how his

father had the idea of founding an electricity cooperative:

As for the matter of creating a Moroccan economy and industry, he had corresponded early on withTalaat Harb Pasha in Egypt. Talaat Harb Pasha had founded Bank Misr. Then, he created severalcompanies that became very important to the Egyptian economy. He advised my father to start bycreating a bank, because it is the bank that finances other industrial projects. My father respondedthat given the problem of interest, he could not start this way in Morocco, he had to start with some-thing else: hence electricity, because electricity supplies other industries. So that is the idea he cameup with at the time.16

The Hispano-Moroccan Industrial Cooperative was founded on 1 March 1928. Financially,

it had been created by Bennouna’s own capital, as well as investment from his friends and

acquaintances among the notables of the northern zone (not only Tetouan): Mohammed

Rzini from Tetouan, Mellali Rmiqui from Ksar el-Kebir, Moulay Ahmed Raissouni from

Chaouen; in addition to subscriptions from the Spanish (15% of the capital), some Moroccan

Jews, and the participation of 1800 individuals whose individual share portfolios were some-

times worth only a dozen pesetas.17 The young A. Torres asked his brother Ahmed to buy him

as many shares as he thought necessary. The creation of this cooperative was hailed by local

elites as a ‘victory’.18 The attitude of the Spanish authorities was enigmatic. That the green

light was given to this project is surprising, since it associated Moroccans and Spaniards in

an important company, especially as the former held the majority of shares and could therefore

take decisions contrary to the wishes of the Spanish. Furthermore, this cooperative was in

direct competition with the pre-existing and powerful Spanish company Electricas Marroquıes.

The logic of the colonial relationship seems to be deficient here, in the sense that the auth-

orities of the protectorate would normally defend the monopoly of Spanish companies,

especially against a Moroccan company. It seems that the Spanish gave the green light to

the project knowing that it would fail due to the weakness of the Moroccan bourgeoisie.

The cooperative later enjoyed Spanish subsidies, a fact which could be read as a way of

making the nascent Moroccan bourgeoisie financially dependent on Spain (Benjelloun

1983, 56).

Still within the economic arena, and encouraged by the relative success of the cooperative,

Bennouna then embarked upon a plan for a whole movement of cooperatives: a carpet coopera-

tive in Chaouen in the early 1930s, and a cooperative of Moroccan butchers in Tetouan (1934).

He also founded a textile factory in Tetouan (1930), which failed through lack of capital and

Spanish competition. The list of his unrealised projects is just as interesting: a bank (suggested

by his correspondence with Talaat Harb); a sugar refinery (through contacts with Cubans in

Granada); a waste treatment plant and even a cement works. The question remains, of course,

whether Bennouna’s various initiatives were part of a general vision aimed at setting up a Mor-

occan national bourgeoisie in the northern zone, whose strategy would have been to counter

Spanish capitalist penetration. Bennouna’s biographers have no answer. Moreover, given his

wealth of social contacts, particularly among the different notables of Fez, the absence of

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common projects seems strange. Why, when the cooperative began to suffer from Spanish com-

petition, did he not seek the help of his numerous rich friends in the southern zone?

In 1928, the Tetouan network founded an Arabic printing press, al-Mahdia, which was funded

mostly by Bennouna but also by his friends and acquaintances among the notables. Mohammed

Daoud was put in charge of the venture, which was of great importance in that it produced works

in Arabic, including the pamphlets of the future Party of National Reform and the nationalist

newspapers and journals of the northern zone. The press was also used to print the textbooks

for the Ahliyya School, instead of buying them at greater expense from the Middle East.

In short, the forerunners of the nationalist movement in Tetouan prepared the political and

financial ground for the newer generations that entered politics from the 1930s.

Fez

In contrast to Tetouan, Fez, the capital at the time, had met the signature of the protectorate

treaty in 1912 with bloody opposition.19 This unrest meant that, more than any other city, Fez

enjoyed special attention and particularly sustained application of the ‘association’ policy advo-

cated by France’s Resident-General Lyautey. Lyautey established contact with the population,

sought to address the grievances of the elites, and managed to reassure, seduce and ‘compro-

mise’ the Fassi notables: ‘From his first meeting with the a‘yan [notables] of Fez on 29 May

1912, in the eye of the storm, he attempted to assuage their fears of Algerianisation. He

spoke to them as a man attached to his traditions and respectful of those of others. He

showed his respect for Islam, the sharı’a, and the habits and customs derived from it’ (Rivet

1988a, 180).

Three networks have emerged from my research on the city as spaces in which future nation-

alists met and gained experience. In addition to the traditional cases of the Qarawiyyin (symbo-

lised by Allal El Fassi) and the College Moulay Idriss (Mohamed Belhassan Ouazzani), there is

the municipal council of Fez (al-Majlis al-Baladı) with its councillors from among the notables,

some of whom (particularly the English proteges) would go on to be at the centre of the dem-

onstrations of 1930 and set up the movement of free schools in Fez. These figures were, in a

way, the financial wing: the ‘bankers of the national movement’, to use R. Rezette’s expression

(Rezette 1955, 285).

Fez’s municipal council was created by a 2 September 1912 dahir (decree) of Sultan Moulay

Youssef that established its composition, mode of operation, and attributions.20 The decision to

endow Fez with a majlis baladı was politically motivated, taken as it was after the events of

April that year, which has culminated with the formal institution of the protectorate, and

within the framework of Lyautey’s policy of association. As such, the measure contributed to

calming the situation. The first elections were held from 8 to 11 September 1912, in Dar

al-Majlis. The formation of lists, drawn up by the Pasha, was not subject to precise criteria

beyond the vague notion of being a ‘notable’. Councillors were chosen from Fez’s most distin-

guished figures, all born into the most socially, economically and financially influential families,

as well as religious brotherhoods. Some were under the protection of western powers that were

rivals of France, particularly Britain (Yakhlef 1990). If the aim behind the creation of this inno-

vative institution was the structuring of Fassı notables in order to benefit from their influence on

the population, the notables themselves found an opportunity to assert their know-how in the

management of public affairs. Despite the fact that the autonomy of the Majlis was compromised

by French interference in the form of the establishment of lists of electable notables and Pasha

Ben Baghdadi’s firm hold on power,21 these constraints did not totally suffocate the role of delib-

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erative practice among the Fassı notables, who did not hesitate to use their powers. During the

first elections of September 1912, it was ‘even remarkable to see the degree of seriousness and

concern for the public good displayed by the notables when reaching their decisions. The same

observations apply to the dignified and solemn atmosphere of the sessions in the Majlis’ (De la

Casiniere 1924, 24). Furthermore, competition between candidates was ‘so disputed that certain

hapless candidates, crumpled, shed tears of disappointment’ (Rivet 1988b, 157).

The councillors hailed from different sections of Fez’s nobility and were elected from among

the most socially and economically prominent families. They also came from religious brother-

hoods. These figures were merchants (tujjar), ‘ulama’, shurafa’ and heads of brotherhoods.

Although all are described as ‘notables’,22 this is not a homogenous appelation (Henia 2006),

since the group included Francophile and other more versatile elements, such as notables pro-

tected by other powers. The latter enjoyed a certain level of autonomy and could cause turbu-

lence during the sessions of the Majlis, although this was rare and usually occurred around

small Francophobe groups and activities. The list of these ‘agitators’ included Hamza Tahiri,

Mohamed Benjelloun, Omar Hajoui and Taher ben el Amine (British proteges); and

Mohamed ben Abdeslam Lahlou and Mhamed Benzakour (German proteges). These figures

were all prominent merchants and businessmen and had spent long periods in Europe, trading

in Manchester, London, Marseilles, etc.

The importance of emphasising this network is above all to highlight the precedence of the

notables’ participation (especially that of the proteges) in the creation of the nationalist

movement. M. Kenbib has already pointed to the funding role played by this group, acting as

the ‘nationalist bank’ from the 1930s. This underscores a specificity of the Fez actors in their

attitude to the French protectorate, which was divided between support on the surface and a

deep-seated opposition, to paraphrase J. Berque. As such, these councillors cannot be reduced

to docile lackeys of the Pasha or the head of the municipality. Their role was more than decora-

tive, at least in the early days, especially because the proteges were still admitted to the Majlis.

They would be excluded from the council in 1928–1930: ‘Around 1930, France got rid of its

protege notables, and the Majlis al-Baladı became little more than “a rather short consultation

of complacent notables”’ (Berque 2001, 297).

The example of a ‘local’ action carried out by the protege councillors on 28 July 1920 illus-

trates the point. Under the influence and leadership of Hamza Tahiri, a group of municipal coun-

cillors (Hamza Tahiri, Mohamed Ben Taleb Chami, Mohamed Ben Thami Benchaqroun, Abdel

Hadi Ghallab, El Ghali Ben M’hamed and Mohamed Guessous) called a meeting of the Majlis

al-Baladi and recorded in the order of business an issue deemed ‘embarrassing’ for the local

authorities, both the Makhzen and the French, namely the low water level in Oued Fez due to

the diversion of the river to benefit the colonists. Their proposal was not acted upon.

The second major hub of activism in Fez was, as is well known, the Qarawiyyin. Founded in

859, Fez’s mosque-university is considered, along with the Zaytuna in Tunis and al-Azhar in

Cairo, as one of the principal Islamic religious and intellectual centres in North Africa. The

school’s development went through several stages, ultimately becoming devoted to producing

and preserving ‘a tradition that embodies Moroccan continuity’ (Laroui 1993, 194). The Qara-

wiyyin represented the highest level of studies in Morocco during the period in its role as the

centre for the diffusion of knowledge that had been codified for centuries. Any kind of social

mobility, as well as the social reproduction of the intellectual elite, indisputably required attend-

ance at this university which opened the door to the different levels of the civil service for the

members of the Makhzen. In 1912, the Qarawiyyin was on the verge of bankruptcy and debates

raged around the subject of its reform. Taking part in this debate were the French authorities

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(who were reluctant to make too many changes due to its religious importance, which was to be

protected according to the protectorate treaty) and by supporters of an internal debate on the

urgency of reform. Internally, this position was defended by Salafi ‘ulama’ (Belarbi Alaoui,

Abdeslam Serghini and others) and spread gradually to their students (_tolba). These young stu-

dents also attended the free schools founded by Fassı notables, some of whom were councillors.

Fez was hit by a double downgrading: the loss of its status as capital, and also the displacement

of its university. When the French/Spanish education systems (schools for notables, Muslim col-

leges) came into effect, the old university and its teacher ‘ulama’ lost their monopoly. A new

market needed to be created, new openings found. The solution was the free schools.

In Fez, faced with a French colonial education policy seen as a dangerous source of Gallicisa-

tion for young people, the ‘pioneer’ actors responded by refusing to send their children to the

schools of the coloniser. Instead, they began renewing the old msıds (local Qur’anic schools),

then founding free schools and reflecting with their young graduates on the future and possible

reform of the Qarawiyyin. It was especially in the network space of the Qarawiyyin that these

young men met, build contacts and began to think about the future of the country. Among

them were Hachemi Filali, Allal el Fassi, Mokhtar Soussi, Brahim Kettani, Bouchta Jami’i,

Abdelaziz Bendriss, Fquih Ghazi and other_tolba (both locals and those from other regions).

These young men decided to found a cultural association and a secret political organisation

around 1927. One of these young men, a future nationalist and signatory of the independence

manifesto, tells us about the practices of the group:

Our group was almost never apart. We divided our time between our university studies and meetingsin our homes. We were influenced by the Arabo-Islamic nah

_da [renaissance] in the East and the

Muslim world in general. We were also aware of all the methods (secret or open) in use via theArab political thought we read about in books, Egyptian and Arab newspapers and magazines . . .as well as reading on the salafi and political thought of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and MuhammadAbduh, al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida and other leading thinkers. Back then, reading this materialencouraged us to create a parallel or equivalent to these movements in Morocco in order tooppose the protectorate.23

Alongside the Qarawiyyin came a rather different institution. The College Moulay Idriss, opened

9 November 1914, on the orders of Marshal Lyautey was a ‘modern’ secondary school aimed at

the ‘sons of notables’. Initially, the college functioned without a specific statute, a defined cur-

riculum or enough staff. Its creation ‘took place within a climate of political conflict, and thus

raised contradictions which the protectorate, still unsure of its definitive establishment in

Morocco, was loath to control by force’ (Merrouni 1983, 143). Though originally conceived

to help implement Lyautey’s policy of renewing the Makhzen, it was not until 1919 that the insti-

tution was assigned the goal of forming an ‘industrious middle class’ to act as intermediary

between coloniser and colonised. A close look at the process by which the college was

created and evolved, its statutes and objectives reveals the indecision of the protectorate auth-

orities. Six years of hesitations and contradictions were needed before the order of 4 September

1920, which began an important phase in the life of the college and of ‘Muslim’ secondary edu-

cation. This point is important in deconstructing a certain reading of events, according to which

the creation of the college was part of a pre-established and premeditated project by the protec-

torate authorities in respect of Arabic language teaching.

The education imparted at the college was mixed: alongside General Moroccan and Muslim

culture, pupils were required to have ‘sufficient knowledge of French [as an] instrument for

acquiring accurate and complete notions of European civilisation’ (Paye 1992, 162). The

languages of instruction were therefore both French and Arabic. Among the future nationalists

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that attended the college were Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, Abdelqader Tazi, Abdelwahab

Lahlou, Mehdi Lemniı and M’hamed Zghari. Because of Fez’s small size and the interwoven

nature of its social networks, the connection between the_tolba networks and those of students

attending the college took place easily. This occurred especially thanks to certain actors func-

tioning as bridges, such as the ‘ulama’ of the Qarawiyyin (especially Belarbi Alaoui and Abde-

slam Serghini) who taught Arabo-Muslim education at the College Moulay Idriss.

Indeed, these linkages grew into a real network that developed around the Naciriya free

school. The school was founded in 1921 by a committee composed of four merchants

(Mohamed Benjelloun, Mohamed Berrada, Larbi Lahrichi and Ahmed Mekouar) and young

fqıh Mohamed Ghazi (also a student at the Qarawiyyin) was appointed as headmaster. The

school provided a fairly high standard of education, thanks to the quality of its teachers and cur-

riculum. Several of Ghazi’s classmates joined him to teach at the school (Allal el-Fassi, Mokhtar

Soussi, Abdelaziz Bendriss, Seddik Alaoui, Mdini Alaoui and Brahim Kettani). However, it was

around theatre – a passion shared by both_tolba and students of the college – that the links dee-

pened, such as in the case of Mohamed el-Qori’i of the Qarawiyyin and Abdelwahed Chaoui

from the College Moulay Idriss. The first actions undertaken by these young men were linked

to their status as students. The_tolba fought for the reform of the Qarawiyyin and the college

students for the right to gain the baccalaureate and to continue their studies in France.

However, their Salafism, learned from Belarbi Alaoui and their readings, was directed most viru-

lently against the brotherhoods. One example is that of Abdelhay Kettani, sheikh of the Ketta-

niyya brotherhood, whom they accused of ‘collaboration’ with the French authorities.

Connecting local networks

These local networks, of which two examples have been described here, did not remain separate

for long. Around 1926 (the end of the Rif war), links began to be forged between different local

groups through visits and correspondence. The first contacts between future nationalist leaders

took place during visits within the framework of the secret associations created in 1926 by the

different local networks. According to historian J. Halstead, these associations ‘offered a space

in which the issues of the day could be discussed and in which new ideas could spread. Meetings

were held in private houses, at which passages from books and newspapers from Arab countries

were read aloud’. Political discussion would follow tea, dinner, and musical performances (Hal-

stead 1969, 167). Such groups began to communicate with each other: letters were sent to the

‘Tangiers section’ by several young men from other cities, particularly Tetouan and Fez.24

These letters show that the networks were sharing information about their patriotic actions,

and that it would not be long before actions in the large cities were gaining coordination and

cohesion, attributes that became obvious in 1930.

Well before that date, however, individual liaison agents had begun to pass information and

ideas, connecting up different social and urban spaces and enabling actors in different locales to

envisage and embark on integrated action. M’hamed Bennouna, none other than the brother of

Haj Abdeslam Bennouna, was such a liaison between networks in Tetouan and Rabat. His ear-

liest visits to Rabat date from 1921. He was in Rabat in 1926 for the foundation of the secret

Ligue Marocaine, the first association created to serve the nationalist cause. The Ligue operated

with a dual face: a public face based on Salafism and the fight against the religious brotherhoods,

and clandestine operations articulated around the political struggle against the colonisers.

Sources indicate that it was M’hammed Bennouna, recently returned from Egypt, who played

a key role in its foundation. According to Halstead, ‘M’Hammed Bennouna had attended and

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made the major address at the founding meeting of the Rabat group in August 1926’ (1969, 168).

While all the sources report M’hamed Bennouna’s presence (and that of his nephew Taıeb

Bennouna) at this meeting of the Rabat network, we know almost nothing of how they established

contact. We can infer, however, that the secret nature of the meeting shows that these people not

only knew each other, but were linked by strong relationships. It is difficult to image this secrecy

without genuinely close, previously created relationships that allowed trust to be built. The

meeting resulted in the establishment of the association’s constitution and its centre in Rabat,

while developing sections in other cities and in all zones. On his return to Tetouan, Bennouna

undertook to set up the Tetouan branch of the Ligue Marocaine. This was achieved before the

end of August 1926 under the presidency of his brother, Haj Abdeslam Bennouna.

In about 1927, certain members of the Rabat network (Ahmed Belafrej and Mekki Naciri)

visited their colleagues in Fez. These two future leaders of the Moroccan nationalist movement

capitalised on their peripatetic role, with Mekki Naciri moving to Tetouan where he founded a

political party in the late-1930s and Belafrej acting as a bridge between the different zones of the

protectorate in Morocco. In Tangiers, Abdellah Guennoun played a similar role in linking upthe

nationalists of the north and the south.

The other means of contact between different local networks was correspondence, thanks to

the role played by the British postal service. This is illustrated by two sets of letters exchanged

between the networks of Rabat-Sale with the Tetouan network and between Fez and Tetouan.

Reading these letters brings to the fore two important conditions for the fusion of different

local networks: conceptual clarification and trust-building.

The first condition emerges from the body of letters exchanged between Mohamed Daoud

from the Tetouan network and the members of the Rabat network, collected and published by

Ahmed Ziadi (Ziadi 2000). They were written in 1927, when M’hamed Bennouna reported to

his Tetouani colleagues the wish of the Rabat network to merge with them. Daoud replied,

‘We cannot merge before knowing their thoughts on the following issues: brotherhoods,

science, colonialism, etc.’ (Ziadi 2000, 5). He follows these letters by calling for a ‘clarification

of terms’, before any merger could take place. Mohamed Daoud collected the main points of

controversy between the two networks and wrote to the Rabat group to find out their opinions

and attitudes towards the burning issues of 1927 for young Moroccans. Although we do not

have the letters written by Daoud to the young Rbatis, we do have six replies from the Rabat

group to Daoud, all of which bear the names of their authors and specific subject titles.25

They were written in Rabat between 11 and 16 January 1927, except for one that is undated

and signed with the pseudonym ‘Ibn al-Wa_tan’ (son of the nation), who Ahmed Ziadi believes

to be Mohamed Hassan el-Ouazzani.

The main issues dealt with in the letters relate to colonialism, the enrolment of Moroccans in

the colonial armed forces, especially the fight against religious brotherhoods. This last issue is

one of the most divisive among the young men from the different networks. Anti-brotherhood

actions did not have the same scope for nationalists in the north and south. There was no unani-

mity on the question. Thus, the anti-marabout campaign implemented by the Rabat group seems

to have somewhat upset Daoud, who does not seem to have paid much attention to this com-

ponent of the Salafi message. In fact, while the Tetouanis were aware of issues such as education,

culture and the Arabic language, and while they did see themselves as fighting against ‘heresies’

and ‘charlatans’ of all kinds, they did not seem to combat sects and brotherhoods with the same

virulence as elsewhere. We know that reformists from the northern zone maintained peaceful

relations with the brotherhoods’ zawaya, some of which were particularly well respected by

the Tetouanis, who were spiritually closely attached to this set of institutions that formed part

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of everyday life. Moreover, Daoud dreamed of uniting all components of society, hence his call

to act with flexibility towards members of religious brotherhoods. In contrast, the young south-

erners, who had not forgiven the brotherhoods for their complicity with the colonisers, nor for

what they saw as their dividing effect on the nation, felt that this struggle was part and parcel of a

religious reform that preceded the call to national unity.

The other condition acting as a prerequisite to network formation is establishing and maintain-

ing trust. This issue emerges from the letters exchanged between Mohamed Daoud of Tetouan

and Allal El Fassi between 1928 and 1937. The two men had met while Daoud was studying at

the Qarawiyyin.What emerges from these letters is the ‘suspicion’ harboured by the young Allal

El Fassi in relation to Haj Abdeslam Bennouna because of his ‘collaboration’ and his multiple

links with the Spanish. For El Fassi, as for the southern nationalists, it was unthinkable that one

could be ‘nationalist’ and be on good terms with the protectorate authorities. As a result, he

asked in several letters if Daoud could be sure of the discretion and ‘loyalty’ of the Bennouna

brothers (Abdeslam and Mhamed). Thus, in a letter dated 22 November 1928, Allal el-Fassi

informed Daoud (for whom he used the pseudonym Abu Sulayman) of the recent creation of

a clandestine association in Fez, which he was to keep secret and whose programme would

be sent at a later stage. The letter made clear that the aim of the association was to struggle

against colonialism through publications and tracts, and that it had sections throughout the

country. This news was accompanied by a series of decoding letters. Daoud was also asked to

send the letter to ‘brother Ibn el-Hassan’ (i.e. Mohamed Hassan el-Ouazzani), the na’ib

(deputy) in Paris, and to act as intermediary in this correspondence. At the end of the letter,

el-Fassi asked Daoud if he thought the Bennouna brothers could be relied on with the secret

information. He demanded a response via the British post office. In another letter dated 15

January 1929, Allal again asked Daoud the same question about the Bennouna brothers’ trust-

worthiness: ‘I would like you to clarify the issue I asked you about previously, the discretion

of the Bennouna brothers. You are surely aware that what we are creating requires great reflec-

tion and care, and we have not spent enough time around them to know how discrete they are. So,

let us know’ (Daoud 2000, 53). We do not have Daoud’s reply, but he did give an answer, several

months later, in announcing to Allal his marriage to A. Bennouna’s daughter.

From local networks to a national movement

Soon after the protests over the ‘Berber’ dahir of 16 May 1930 (on the organisation of customary

justice), these hitherto scattered, though connected, local networks fused into a collective

national organisation. The dahir gave young nationalist figures, now prepared and ready for pol-

itical action, a specific target. It provided the opportunity for a geographically dispersed young

generation to combine its forces and organise in opposition to the protectorate system. The sim-

ultaneous, nationwide protests, as has often been said, mark the moment when the Moroccan

nationalist movement affirmed itself and became structured. But it did so primarily byaccelerat-

ing the rapprochement between groups of young nationalists already operating autonomously in

different cities: Fez, Rabat, Sale and Tetouan. Indeed, it should be noted that the protests against

the dahir were articulated at local level, not yet explicitly in the name of a Moroccan nation.

As Hassan Rachik has observed, petitions and delegations sent to the Sultan in protest against

the dahir were expressed ‘in the name of the cities of Fez, Sale and Rabat’ (Rachik 2003,

68–69).

In August 1930, Chakib Arslan visited Tangiers, followed by Tetouan where he met the

majority of members of the different local networks. After the visit, Moroccan nationalists, in

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both the north and south, adopted a new organisational structure. According to several historians,

for example, A. Benjelloun, it was Arslan who advised them to give their movement a pyramidal

structure. However, Mehdi Bennouna26 maintains that the structure and organisation were the

result of the experiences of Moroccan actors themselves. In any case, the structure was

indeed conceived as a pyramid: at the summit, there was the zawiya, made up of a very small

group of leaders who knew each other perfectly, and each of whom knew the names of the

members of a subordinate group.

This second group was known as the ta’ifa. Its purpose was to filter new adepts and was com-

posed of a longer list of members who did not know the members of the zawiya. This type of

organisation was first used in Fez. The nationalists of the Fez network, Allal El Fassi, Hamza

Tahiri and Ahmed Mekouar, began discussing the idea in August 1930. A meeting held on 23

August 1930 was attended by a dozen important figures: as well as the three already mentioned,

there were Mohamed Hassan el-Ouazzani, Ahmed Bouayad, Larbi Bouayad, Mohamed Diouiri,

Abdelqader Tazi and Omar Sebti. Some authors mention other members. According to Allal

el-Fassi, the zawiya comprised nationalists from the south (Allal el Fassi, Hamza Tahiri and

Mohammed Ghaz) and names from Tetouan (A. Bennouna, Mohammed Daoud, Ahmed

Ghilane and fqıh M.Tanana). This was the first time that a single structure brought together

actors from different cities.27

In addition to the terms used (zawiya and ta’ifa), the adoption of the names of the Prophet’s

companions as pseudonyms point to the fact that the nationalists were taking on the structure of a

religious brotherhood. This seems paradoxical, given their enmity towards the brotherhoods.

Amongst the advice and pointers given by Arslan to the nationalists was the recommendation

to rein in the intensity of the attacks on the heads of brotherhoods. For Arslan, the enemy

was elsewhere and the focus should be on organising the nascent movement. Another expla-

nation is given by Hachemi Filali, for whom the use of this terminology was an attempt to

rally the vieux turbans, the older urban notables, to the young nationalist movement.

However, 1930 did not mark a definitive union, but heralded a new period of propagation, the

beginning of what can be identified as a ‘strategy’. The blueprint presented by Hachemi Filali as

a programme conceived in the heart of the Qarawiyyin now became practicable. It was from this

first core that directives began to be given. Thus, Mohamed Ghazi was required to move to

Meknes, Brahim Kettani to Oujda, Bouchta Jamii to Kenitra, Mohamed Diouri to spread the ral-

lying cry in Kenitra and so on. The limits of the local began to appear rapidly, particularly with

the intensification of the networks and the impossibility, for security, of direct contact between

different levels of the organisation. It was at this point that the young nationalists devised

symbols for wider diffusion.

Conclusion

This description of the local as a cause of the national has located the existence of network

spaces and explained how they came into contact by looking at the processes of network creation

and the individual actors connecting them. The analysis of the emergence of Moroccan nation-

alism as a general phenomenon is illuminated by the description of these local sites. However, if

nationalists aim at forging a nation, any intermediary bodies and local identifications (linguistic

communities, religious groups) that create local difference must be dissolved. Here, the local is

synonymous with diversity and heterogeneity, while the national seeks homogeneity and unity.

The initial question, then, remains. What is retained of the local within the construction of the

national?

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In the case of Moroccan nationalism, the construction of the national, though it emerged from

the local, would retain virtually nothing of its points of origin. Local forms of speech were

dropped in favour of Classical Arabic. The unitary ideal requires it thus. Of course, the issue

here is not a liturgical form of Arabic. Thanks to the efforts of academics and literary figures

from the Mashriq (especially Egypt), there was a new, relatively flexible language that could

serve as a vehicle for contemporary issues. Nonetheless, linguistic pluralism was sacrificed in

favour of a language elevated as ‘unique’ according to a hierarchical logic.

Popular culture, or Gellner’s (1989) ‘low culture’, was postponed until after independence, as

showing interest in it during the protectorate would have been synonymous with colonial policy.

Mohamed el-Fassi, who had worked on the popular stories of Fez, left them aside. He says that

back then, speaking of such things would have meant giving the colonialists the chance to divide

the nation. This is how he subsequently justified his choice:

The reasons that motivated me to publish on popular literature only after independence were, firstly,the lack of interest among intellectuals and, secondly, because during the protectorate we wanted toprotect the Arabic language and rejected any tendency that could have weakened it. I did not wantpeople to think that, because of my interest in popular literature and the vernacular language (al-lugha al-‘amiyya) I supported the trends in vogue in the east among some colonial Orientalists.Now that we no longer fear any competitor for the language of the Qur’an and that I am totally con-fident in the development and the convincing future of Classical Arabic, [. . .] I have published theresults of my research and am now compiling an encyclopaedia of mal

_hun. (El Fassi 1986, 8–9)

‘Low Islam’ was also fought against in favour of ‘High Islam’. Nationalists opted for the uni-

versal. As reformists defending a purified Islam, they combatted all ‘heterodox’ practices (broth-

erhoods, visiting marabouts, sanctuaries, ostentatious spending, etc.), which they accused of

being innovations. Religion purified of innovations and ‘local heresies’ therefore becomes hom-

ogenous and unitary. However, it must not be thought that affiliation to brotherhoods was defi-

nitively banned. In practice, people continued to join brotherhoods, including some nationalists.

Only the practices of adepts deemed to be heterodox were completely banned. The difference

was that henceforth, ‘value was attached to global identity, that of the Muslim community,

and no longer to local identity’ (Rachik 2003, 82–83). Allegiance to the nation also implied

the suppression of ‘tribal’ affiliations. Allal el-Fassi, as a comprehensively national thinker, cri-

ticised ‘village thinking’ among his contemporaries (El-Fassi 1979, 22–25).

In short, it was as if, while the nationalists were turning to the Arabo-Muslim universal as a

reference point, colonial policy opted for the local and the particular at every turn. Rivet tells us

that the protectorate authorities in Fez would have liked to have seen Allal el-Fassi as mayor the

city, busied with local issues instead of with the abstract idea of the nation. The anecdote has a

particular context; it was during the reform of local government in the 1940s that this ‘localism’

was encouraged. This reform created a bottom-to-top pyramidal structure, from the jma’a de rue

through election of street representatives, or na’ib zanqa, who would in turn elect a neighbour-

hood council presided over by the muqaddam, and neighbourhood councillors and muqaddamın

making up the city council. However, ‘this reform did not, as Berque had advised, usher in the

election of mayors in the large cities. To justify his proposal, Berque retorted to possible detrac-

tors that he would rather see Allal el-Fassi priding himself as mayor of the city of Fez than devis-

ing the project of an unobtainable and ungovernable theocratic polity’ (Rivet 2001, 205).

Conversely, it was precisely because colonial policy was turning towards the local that nation-

alists responded by stressing the national. For Moroccan nationalists, this was inseparable from a

certain idea of modernity. Modernisation was intrinsic to ideas of the national, universal and

impersonal, while the local and community-based became synonymous with traditionalism.

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Notes

1. Born in Fez, where he studied at the Qarawiyyin university-mosque, H. Filali (1912–2008) was a prominent

local figure and pioneer of Moroccan nationalism. An active Istiqlal party member, in 1944 he signed the

1944 Manifesto for Independence, was appointed to the National Consultative Council in 1961 and elected

to the Moroccan Parliament for Casablanca between 1963 and 1977. In 1981, he was appointed Minister of Reli-

gious Affairs, and later was appointed advisor to the King.

2. Founded in Fez in 857, the Qarawiyyin mosque has long been considered the Moroccan source of knowledge

and training for elites.

3. Armed resistance continued in the countryside until 1934.

4. Interview with H. Filali, 2004.

5. J. Revel notes (1996, 10):

[. . .] have a critical distance in relation to the macro social approach that has, through very different

methods and often tacitly, dominated historical and social science research for a long time; together,

they strive to give the experience of social actors (the ‘everyday’ of German historians, the ‘life

history’ of their Italian colleagues) renewed meaning and importance in contrast to the interplay

between structures and the salience of anonymous, unconscious, large-scale social processes that have

long appeared to have been the sole foci of researchers.

6. The Franco-Spanish agreement of 27 November 1912 stipulates that the regions in the zone under Spanish influ-

ence would remain under the civil and religious authority of the Sultan. To implement this and differentiate the

Spanish zone from the French, Spain opted for a new policy that involved the appointment of a representative of

the Sultan known as the Khalifa, hence the use of the French term zone khalifienne to refer to the north and zone

sultanienne for the south. In legal terms, the Sultan delegated his powers to the Khalifa, residing in Tetouan, who

was under the ‘control’ of the Spanish High-Commissioner. Prince Moulay el-Mehdi ben Ismaıl was the first

khalifa appointed by Sultan Moulay Youssef and arrived in Tetouan on 27 April 1913 and was set up alongside

the first High Commissioner, General Felipe Alfau Mendoza. The Khalifa had his own Makhzen referred to as a

Makhzen khalifien.

7. The Salafiyya was a reformist current that advocated a return to the original ideals of Islam and is considered to

be a response to the problems emerging from contact with colonisers. The Salafiyya is founded on selective

memory, since it preaches a return to a past considered as glorious. On the other hand, the Salafiyya did recog-

nise Muslims’ ‘backwardness’ in comparison to western countries. The three main thinkers of this current are

often cited as: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), and Rachid Rida

(1865–1935). All three advocated the reform of Islam by returning to the first Islamic state and the renovation

of the language of the Qur’an, Arabic.

8. According to Wolf (1994):

This man would become a main point of interest in the history of northern Morocco, but in the south his

role as innovator remained largely unknown. Abdeslam Bennouna, who was to become the father of

militant nationalism for the country as a whole, proved to be an truly brilliant political mind, as well

as a hard worker and a first class organiser. (149)

9. Rezette (1955, 72, 83) was the first to use this term, which was taken up again by Mohammed Hakim Benazzouz

in his three-volume biographical work (Benazzouz 1987).

10.

Haj Abdeslam Bennouna was an uncontroversial nationalist, open and extremely moderate. A landlord

like his father, he was certainly nationalist through deep conviction but afflicted by an unquestionable

amateurishness, like several of his co-citizens, that did not prevent him from making a resounding con-

tribution to nationalism in the north. (Benjelloun 1983, 39)

11. On 30 December 1916, 110 Tetouani figures – of which 7 were Spanish – were invited to a meeting held to elect

the directing committee of the new organisation. The Grand Vizier presented them with a list of 30 names, of

which they were to choose names 15 as members of the directing committee.

12. According to article 13 of the statutes of the Athenaeum, Arabic was the official language. It is also stated that

if texts relating to foreigners must be published, they should be so in both Arabic and Spanish. Article 3 even

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says that it would be preferable if the seven Spanish members had knowledge of Arabic (Benazzouz 1987,

147–150).

13. The leadership of the school was entrusted to Abdeslam Bennouna. He also taught arithmetic, accounting and

geography to pupils who followed religious studies in the circles of the Great Mosque. One future young nation-

alist was among them: Thami Ouazzani.

14. Once more, it was Abdeslam Bennouna who suggested the name of the journal and who took over its manage-

ment. The first issue appeared on 29 January 1917. This journal is the earliest nationalist journal published by a

Moroccan cultural association, thanks to the efforts of a small group of Tetouani figures. The content dealt with

Tetouan’s history, but especially articles advocating social reform along Salafi lines.

15. Mohammed Daoud noted: ‘I taught nationalism to [all] the future leaders of the Party of National Reform, except

Haj M’hammed Bennouna and Thami Ouazzani’ (Benjelloun 1988, 94).

16. Mehdi Bennouna, interview, 5 January 2000. On Talaat Harb and Bank Misr, see Davis (1983).

17. It should be noted that there was no similar economic initiative in the cities within the French protectorate.

18. Bennouna had previously initiated other projects: in 1906 he started a business with Ahmed ben Abdellah

Mdina; in 1909 he started a mine prospecting company with a Spanish friend; in 1917 he participated in a

Spanish company manufacturing pottery; in 1923 he acquired shares in a German company importing merchan-

dise from Germany; in 1928 he founded an association with Hassan Benjelloun, Mohamed Lahlou and his

brother Haj Mhamed Bennouna, a company owning shops in Fez, Tetouan and Seville (Benjelloun 1983, 54).

19. The drummers of the Cherifian army garrisoned in Fez massacred their French instructors on 17 April 1912,

publicly expressing the hitherto latent and diffused anger and grievances resulting from the revision of military

service in 1910–1911. Their actions triggered a popular movement during 17–19 April, leading to the manifes-

tation of popular hostility towards the protectorate treaty.

20. The remit was administrative and financial. It was also responsible for deciding on all public works (public

hygiene, roads, maintenance of schools and hospitals, etc.) in the Muslim areas of Fez-Bali and Fez-Jdid and

establishing – under the oversight of the Head of Municipal Services – the municipal budget.

21. As a general rule, the Makhzen did not nominate the Pasha from among the residents of Fez. Thus, the pashalik

of Fez was occupied by Mohamed ben Bouchta ben al-Baghdadi, who hailed from the Bghedada tribe in the

Gharb. This was something of an exception, since all the strategic roles governing urban life in Fez, Rabat,

Sale, Meknes, and Casablanca were held by important urban families. However, the Pasha’s deputy (khalifa)

usually belonged to an old Fassi family.

22. The term ‘notable(s)’ (Arabic ‘ayn, plur. a’yan) belongs to the vocabulary of social stratification. The historio-

graphy of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries highlighted a binary social stratification system: the elite

(al-kha_s_sa) versus the populace (al-‘amma). The former category revolving around the centre (the Makhzen),

was composed of shurafa’, ‘ulama’ and notables (a’yan). Its status was based on several resources: social

and material capital, descent from the Prophet (shurafa’), access to material assets and the de accumulation

of capital (rich merchants, tujjar) and a monopoly on religious knowledge (‘ulama’). This binary distinction

was deconstructed and surpassed by nationalist ideology that foregrounded the role of the people (sha‘b), the

masses ( jamahır), and the diffusion of knowledge (and its monopoly) through the press, tracts, conferences,

etc.)’. Today, the term is used within a modernist register to pejoratively to refer to a traditional category,

seen as obsolete or patronising, serving the elite (nukhba). See Henia (2006).

23. Interview with Hachemi Filali, 2002.

24. A collection of such letters sent to Abdallah Guennoun was published in the journal Dar-al-Niaba, 7 and 8

(summer and autumn 1985a,b), 9–16 and 5–12, respectively.

25. The ‘Rabat network’, through the ‘pull’ of the capital, was itself translocal. In fact, the members of this network

were from Rabat, Sale, Tetouan, and even Fez (the case of Mohamed Hassan el-Ouazzani, Omar Abdeljalil and

Abdelkbir el-Fassi). The young Fassıs had come to the capital, Rabat, to continue their studies or, in the case of

Abdelkbir el-Fassi, to find work.

26. Mehdi Bennouna, interview on 5 January 2000.

27. In 1933, another organisation was founded under the name Comite d’Action Marocaine by almost the same

figures.

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