The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 16 | Issue 10 | Number 5 | Article ID 5147 | May 15, 2018

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The Moment of Truth for Prime Minister Abe’s Russia policy

James D.J. Brown

Abstract

Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s anticipated trip toSt Petersburg and Moscow at the end of May2018 represents the culmination of his “newapproach” to Russia. Unveiled two yearsearlier, this policy seeks to achieve abreakthrough in the countries’ long-standingterritorial dispute by reducing Japan’s initialdemands and offering incentives in the form ofenhanced political and economic engagement.Having stuck resolutely with this policy despitecriticism from the West, Abe now needs it todeliver, not least to boost his flagging approvalratings. This article highlights exactly what theJapanese leader hopes to achieve and assesseshis prospects of success. Particular emphasis isplaced on the proposed joint economicactivities on the disputed islands and thespecific legal obstacles that need to beovercome.

Key words

Japan, Russia, Japan-Russia, NorthernTerritories, Kuril Islands, Prime Minister Abe

On May 25 2018, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō isexpected to participate in the St PetersburgInternational Economic Forum (SPIEF),Russia’s most important annual business event.The next day, the Japanese leader is scheduledto attend the opening ceremony of the Year ofJapan-Russia at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow.This will be Abe’s seventh trip to Russia asprime minister and his 21st meeting withPresident Putin. More importantly, this visitwill represent the culmination of Abe’sattempted rapprochement with Russia, aforeign policy priority that he has pursueddoggedly since returning to power in December

2012. What does Abe hope to achieve from thiscrucial summit and can he succeed?

Abe’s “new approach”

Although Abe has been consistent in his desirefor closer relations with Japan’s northernneighbour, these efforts accelerated after May2016. This was when the Japanese leader,during a summit with his Russian counterpartin Sochi, announced a “new approach” tobilateral ties. This is said to entail discarding “atraditional way of thinking” in favour of “afuture-oriented standpoint” in order “toovercome the current negotiation stalemateand make a breakthrough” in concluding apeace treaty (MOFA 2016a). This finalnormalisation of relations has remained elusiveon account of the countries’ longstandingterritorial dispute. This relates to the SouthernKurils, a group of islands off the coast ofHokkaidō that were seized by the Soviet Unionat the end of World War II and ruled thereafter.The islands continue to be claimed by Japan asits “inherent” Northern Territories.

In practice, this “new approach” features twoelements. First, it entails a moderation ofJapan’s immediate territorial demands.Traditionally, Japanese governments haveinsisted on the return of all four of the disputedislands as a bunch, a policy known as “yontōikkatsu henkan ron”. \1 Commitment to amaximalist approach has long prevented Tokyofrom accepting Moscow’s offer to transfer thetwo smaller islands to Japan after the signing ofa peace treaty. This proposal was originallymade by the Soviet Union in the JointDeclaration of 1956 and was subsequentlyreaffirmed on several occasions by President

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Putin. Although Abe will not settle for just thetwo smaller islands, which constitute only 7%of the disputed landmass, he evidentlyrecognises the impracticality of maintaining ahard-line stance. Instead, Abe is opting todownplay explicit demands for the islands’return and has focused on achieving a morerealistic interim deal.

Map of the disputed islands (Source:CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific,The Australian National University(http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/kuril-islands))

The second aspect of the “new approach” arethe sweeteners that Japan hopes to use tosecure Russian concessions. Again, thisrepresents a change in policy since Japanesegovernments have previously sought to holdback political and economic engagement untilafter Russia shows greater willingness tocompromise on the territorial issue. Abe hasreversed this sequencing, providing incentivesupfront in the hope that adding dynamism tothe bilateral relationship will help achieve thelong-desired breakthrough. Specifically, theAbe administration has prioritised high-level

political and security dialogue with the Russianleadership in order to promote mutual trust.Additionally, strong emphasis has been placedon improving bilateral economic relations,including through the announcement of aneight-point cooperation plan.\1 To overseeimplementation of this agenda, Abe created theposition of Minister for Economic Cooperationwith Russia, the only cabinet portfolio thatexplicitly names a foreign country.

This rapprochement has been contentious sinceit has taken place at a time of profound tensionbetween Russia and the West over issuesincluding Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine, itssupport for the Assad regime in Syria, itsalleged interference in the 2016 U.S.presidential election, and its suspected use of anerve agent in the attempted assassination offormer Russian spy Sergei Skripal and hisdaughter in Salisbury (U.K.) in March 2018.The U.S. government has categorised this as apattern of “malign activity around the globe”and has identified “strategic competition” withRussia as a principal priority of nationaldefence. Washington, along with other Westerncapitals, has also introduced a series ofincreasingly punitive sanctions (U.S.Department of Defense 2018; U.S. Treasury2018).

This places Japan in an awkward position. Onthe one hand, the Abe administration remainsdetermined to persist with the “new approach”and to take advantage of what is perceived tobe an opportunity for progress on the territorialissue. Yet, on the other, the Japanesegovernment wishes to avoid the appearance ofthere being too much distance between its ownforeign policy and that of its crucial U.S. allyand other Western partners.

This difficult balancing act has been mostevident in Japan’s response to the Skripal case.Following this incident on 4 March, the U.K.government “concluded that it is highly likelythat Russia was responsible,” describing it as

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the “unlawful use of force by the Russian stateagainst the United Kingdom” (Hansard 2018).In response, London expelled 23 Russiandiplomats who were described as undeclaredintelligence officers. In the subsequent days,the U.K. ’s pos i t ion was endorsed byinternational partners and a total of 28countries expelled more than 150 Russiandiplomats. The notable exception was Japan,which neither supported the U.K.’s allegationsagainst Russia nor joined in the expulsion ofRussian diplomats. Instead, the Abeadministration was only willing to state that“Japan’s view is that use of chemical weaponsis unacceptable … and Japan hopes to seeclarification of the facts as early as possible”(MOFA 2018b). This prompted praise from theRussian ambassador in Tokyo, who stated that“The point of view of the Japanese governmenton this issue has much in common withRussia’s position.” (TASS 2018d).

This stance only changed towards the end ofApril when, fearing isolation at the G-7 foreignministers’ meeting in Toronto, Japan signed upto the group’s joint statement on the Salisburyattack, which explicitly identifies Russia as thelikely culprit (Gov.uk 2018). AlthoughAmbassador Galuzin expressed sadness atseeing Japan’s signature on this document(TASS 2018e), the Abe administration will hopethat their late endorsement of the U.K.’sposition and continued refusal to considerdiplomatic expulsions will signal that theirchange in policy was a reluctant concession toWestern pressure. This echoes Japan’sresponse to Russia’s annexation of Crimea inMarch 2014. At that time, although Tokyo didultimately follow Western partners in imposingsanctions, it was slow to act and the measuresintroduced were considerably weaker thanthose of other G-7 members. Moreover, despitegiving rhetorical support for Ukraine’sterritorial integrity and condemning changes tothe international status quo by force, the Abeadministration soon made clear its eagerness toresume rapprochement with Russia.

The timing of Abe’s “new approach” mayappear puzzling since usually Japanese leadersare hesitant about pursuing foreign policiesthat risk attracting Western, above allAmerican, ire. This unusual boldness can beexplained by two factors. Firstly, strategists inTokyo are concerned that ostracism from theWest after 2014 has had the effect of pushingRussia closer to China. In response, theJapanese authorities wish to use the “newapproach” to encourage Moscow to distanceitself from Beijing and thus neutralise what theNational Institute of Defense Studies hasdescribed as the potential danger of a “unitedfront against Japan” (NIDS 2016: 223-4). It isthis goal that informs Tokyo’s decision tocontinue security cooperation with Russia. Thisincludes: “2+2” talks between the countries’defence and foreign ministers; regularmeetings between the head of Japan’s NationalSecurity Secretariat Yachi Shotarō and hisRussian counterpart Nikolai Patrushev; annualsearch and rescue exercises between Japan’sMaritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) andRussia’s Pacific Fleet; and visits to Japan bysenior Russian military officers, includingcommander in chief of the army Oleg Salyukovand chief of the general staff Valerii Gerasimov.An added point of controversy is that Patrushevhas been sanctioned by both the United Statesand the European Union and Gerasimov issubject to E.U. sanctions.

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Figure 2: Commander in chief of theRussian army Oleg Salyukov test drives aType-10 tank during his visit to Japan inNovember 2017. (Source : JGSDF(http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/about/2017/20171214.html))

The second explanation is that the Abegovernment evidently concurs with the viewthat the present time is “a historic window ofopportunity” to improve Japan-Russia relationsand achieve a breakthrough on the territorialissue (Togo 2017). This is based on theassumption that Russia’s post-Crimea isolation,as well as the economic difficulties it hassuffered due to Western sanctions and low oilprices, could cause Moscow to place greatervalue on economic and political cooperationwith Japan, thereby making territorialconcessions more likely. Added to this, there isthe belief that Putin has a positive attitudetowards Japan, based on his passion for judoand friendships with former Prime MinisterMori Yoshirō and judo legend YamashitaYasuhiro. It is also known that Putin’s daughterKaterina studied Japanese at St PetersburgUniversity (Grey et al 2015). Additionally, Putinis seen as possibly the only Russian leader withsufficient strength to face down domesticopposition and make the compromisesnecessary to solve the territorial problem, justas he did in 2004 when settling the borderdispute with China.

Based on these assumptions, optimists will seethe May 2018 summit as part icularlypropitious. Following the Skripal case and theintroduction of a fresh set of U.S. sanctions on6 April, Russia’s isolation from the West hasfurther deepened, making Japan’s status as anoutlier within the G-7 all the more appealing toMoscow. Additionally, the summit follows soonafter Putin’s official inauguration as Russianpresident on 7 May. This is deemed significantsince it should represent the start of Putin’sfinal term in office. With the Russian leader

having received a powerful endorsement fromthe electorate in March and no longer having toface voters again, Japanese leaders will hopethat Putin will now judge he has the freedom toproceed towards resolving the territorialdispute and concluding a peace treaty, therebypartially restoring his international image.

Encouraged by such thinking, the Japanesegovernment has pulled out the stops inpreparing for the summit. This began at thestart of the year when Abe used his speech atthe opening of parliament to state that “Therelationship between Japan and Russia has themost potential of any bilateral relationship.”(Kantei 2018). Following the Russian election,Abe was also quick to call Putin to offer hiscongratulations and to reconfirm hisdetermination to advance bilateral relations(MOFA 2018a). Just two days after the vote,Foreign Minister Kōno welcomed his Russiancounterpart Sergei Lavrov to Japan where thesides agreed to hold a strategic dialoguebetween First Deputy Foreign MinisterVladimir Titov and Vice Minister for ForeignAffairs Akiba Takeo on 19 April. It was alsoannounced that further bilateral security talksbetween Deputy Foreign Minister SergeiRyabkov and Senior Deputy Foreign MinisterMori Takeo would take place in Tokyo in May,while a third “2+2” meeting would bescheduled for the second half of 2018. Linkingthese agreements with his government’spolitical agenda, Kōno declared that “securitydialogue is important to deepen mutualunderstanding between Japan and Russia andto move towards concluding a peace treaty.”(Nikkei 2018).

There was a further burst of activity at the endof April when Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)Secretary General Nikai Toshihiro visitedRussia for the Russia-Japan Forum, an eventorganised by the newspapers RossiiskayaGazeta and Mainichi Shinbun. During this trip,Nikai met with Prime Minister DmitriiMedvedev and Chair of the Federation Council

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Valentina Matvienko. He also described 2018as “a unique opportunity to deepen relations”and signed a cooperation agreement betweenthe LDP and United Russia Party (Mainichi2018b; RIA Novosti 2018). At the same time,Sekō Hiroshige, who is Minister of Economy,Trade and Industry, as well as Minister forEconomic Cooperation with Russia, was inMoscow to meet First Deputy Prime MinisterIgor Shuvalov. The purpose of these talks wasto ensure that meaningful economicagreements would be ready for announcementat the St Petersburg International EconomicForum on 25 May.

Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō hosts Russiancounterpart Sergei Lavrov in Tokyo on 21March 2018. (Source: The Japan Times(https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/ 0 3 / 2 7 / c o m m e n t a r y / j a p a n -commentary/japan-skripal-poisoning-u-k-s-fair-weather-friend/))

Further to these political and economicpreparations, the Japanese side has worked tocultivate a friendly atmosphere in bilateral ties.This included giving Foreign Minister Lavrov abirthday cake shaped like a football during hisvisit to Tokyo in March. At the end of April, itwas also announced that Viktor Ozerov is oneof four Russians to be presented this year withthe Order of the Rising Sun, a national honourawarded by the Japanese government. A

member of the United Russia party and asenator in the Federation Council representingKhabarovsk, Ozerov is under U.S. and E.U.sanctions for his role in promoting Russia’sintervention in Ukraine. Furthermore, it isrumoured that Prime Minister Abe will use theopportunity of his Russia visit to deliver anAkita puppy to Alina Zagitova, the teenagedRussian figure skater who won gold at thePyeongchang Olympics.

Domestic political considerations also play arole in the Abe administration’s desperation toensure that the May summit proves a success.Persistent accusations of scandal have sappedAbe’s approval rating and he has recentlysuffered foreign policy setbacks, an areapreviously seen as a strength. Specifically,Japan has been sidelined from the pageant ofsummitry occurring around the Koreanpeninsula and, despite Abe’s fawning efforts tocultivate close personal ties with PresidentTrump, the U.S. administration refused to grantJapan an exemption on steel and aluminiumtariffs, leaving Japan as the only major U.S. allywithout such a waiver. Seeing his prospects ofan historic third term as LDP party leader indanger of slipping away, Abe would greatlywelcome a breakthrough in relations withRussia, not least because he has promised toresolve the territorial issue before the end ofhis time in office. A fruitful summit in Maycould therefore revitalise Abe’s premiership. Afailure would encourage those within the LDPwho are already sharpening their knives.

What Abe hopes to achieve in May

Since the visit is intended to celebrate the Yearof Japan-Russia, Prime Minister Abe will firstlybe aiming for a symbolic demonstration of hissuccess in forging a relationship of personaltrust with the Russian leader. This has been aconsistent feature of Abe’s Russia policy,though he has not yet found the right formulafor developing personal chemistry with Putin.For instance, the Russian leader has not been

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enthusiastic about Abe’s proposal that theyrefer to each other as “Vladimir” and “Shinzō”.Ahead of his visit to Japan in December 2016,Putin also declined Abe’s offer of an Akitapuppy and he arrived at the summit nearlythree hours late.

Aside from achieving more positive optics onthe relationship between the two leaders, theJapanese side will be aiming to announce animpressive slate of economic agreements at theSt Petersburg Economic Forum on 25 May.This will demonstrate the results of two yearsof work on the 8-point economic cooperationplan. It will also serve as a prelude to the nextday’s talks in Moscow, when the emphasis willshift to the territorial issue.

Prime Minister Abe would dearly love this to bethe moment when a deal on the status of theislands is finally realised. However, while Abemay be an idealist in terms of ultimate politicalambitions, he is a pragmatist when it comes tothe means of their pursuit. What this entailswith regard to Russia is that, although Aberemains committed to the goal of all fourislands one day being returned, he recognisesthat this is impossible at present. Hisimmediate aim is, therefore, to maximiseJapanese access to the disputed territory.

At present, the supposedly “inherent” NorthernTerritories are almost entirely disconnectedfrom the rest of Japan. Since the expulsion ofJapanese residents by the Soviet Union after1945, the islands have had no settled Japanesepopulation. There are also no Japanesebusinesses operating there and the Japanesegovernment discourages citizens from visitingother than via a fixed number of official visa-free trips that take place each summer. Withthe territory having been under Moscow’scontrol for almost 73 years, few Japaneseremain with any direct experience of havinglived on the islands. As such, the Abeadministration fears that, unless connectionsare re-established quickly, the islands’

estrangement from Japan will becomecomplete.

Abe’s access pol icy has two speci f iccomponents. The first is to make it easier forthe former residents and their relatives to visitthe islands. The existing system, which hasoperated since 1992, enables relevant Japanesecitizens to visit the islands without the need ofa visa, which would acknowledge Russianauthority. To make the system reciprocal,Russians now living on the islands arepermitted to visit Japan under the sameconditions. These annual summer visits areconducted using the Etopirika, a Japanesepassenger ship that is based at Nemuro, theclosest Hokkaidō port to the disputed islands.These trips can be very time-consuming, notleast because it has been the practice for allentry procedures to be conducted at sea at apoint near Kunashir/i. This means that, evenwhen traveling to one of the other islands, allvisitors must go by way of Kunashir/i, in somecases adding six hours to the journey time(TASS 2017). Additionally, even during thesummer months, the weather conditions andvisibility in the area can often be poor. Thesefactors mean that it is increasingly difficult forformer residents, whose average age is over80, to make the trip.

The Etopirika, which is used for visa-freev i s i t s to and f rom the SouthernKurils/Northern Territories. (Source:

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w w w . m a r i n e t r a f f i c . c o m(https://photos.marinetraffic.com/ais/showphoto.aspx?photoid=1191509))

While hosting Putin in Japan in December2016, Abe made an appeal on humanitariangrounds for Russia to ease the burden forremaining Japanese islanders who wish tocontinue visiting their former homeland. Thisincluded handing over a letter that had beenwritten by the former residents. This approachproved successful and in April 2017 it wasagreed that an additional maritime entry pointwould be opened closer to the HabomaiIslands. It was also decided that a visit forformer residents would be permitted byairplane. Initially scheduled for June 2017, thisspecial flight was postponed due to badweather and only eventually took place inSeptember.\1 Abe’s aim for the May summit willbe to ensure that these new arrangementscontinue in 2018 and beyond.

The second element of the access policy is theproposal for joint economic activities on theislands. This is the core of Abe’s “newapproach” and it is on this basis that the resultsof his Russia trip should be judged. Theproposal for joint economic projects is not new;in fact, it was proposed by Russian ForeignMinister Evgenii Primakov during a visit toTokyo in November 1996. At the time, theJapanese side was hesitant, fearing that anagreement on joint economic activities wouldeffectively mean shelving the sovereigntydispute. Others worried that Japaneseinvestments might be confiscated or arguedthat contributing to the development of theislands would simply reinforce the Russianoccupation (Kimura 2000: 191-199). Abeappears to share no such concerns, insteadviewing joint economic activities as the key tounlocking progress on the territorial issue.

Although many observers considered Putin’svisit to Japan in December 2016 to be adisappointment, it did result in a formal

agreement to discuss joint economic projects.Subsequently, survey trips to the islands byofficials and business figures from each sidewere conducted in June and October 2017.Further apparent progress was achieved duringAbe’s visit to Vladivostok in September thatyear when the leaders agreed on five initialcandidate projects. These are aquaculture,greenhouse agriculture, tourism, wind power,and waste reduction (MOFA 2017).

The individual projects are economically small-scale and may even prove lossmaking. Theirsignificance is in the fact that it has beenannounced that these joint economic activitieswi l l be conducted “under a spec ia larrangement”, meaning “legal frameworks thatwill not harm the positions of either side”(MOFA 2016b; 2017) . This has beeninterpreted as indicating the Russiangovernment’s willingness to permit Japanesebusinesses to operate on the islands withouthaving to be subject to Russian jurisdiction(Shimotomai 2016). This would indeedrepresent a major change since Moscow wouldessentially have conceded that the islands aredistinct from the rest of Russian territory andthat Russian sovereignty over them is notabsolute. Abe would also have achieved a levelof access that far exceeds the current situation,enabling Japanese businesses and individualsto re-establish a permanent presence on theislands for the first time in seven decades.

If Abe can return from Moscow with a signedagreement committing the sides to conductingjoint economic activities under such a legalframework, this would represent a significantdiplomatic achievement. It would not, however,bring an end to the territorial dispute. PrimeMinister Abe has not abandoned the goal ofseeing the eventual return of the disputedislands, and, by opening the door to a revival ofJapanese influence, the joint economic projectsare viewed as a stepping stone towardsachieving this.

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Intriguingly, Iwata Akiko, a journalist who issaid to be close to Prime Minister Abe, hasdescribed the joint economic activities asactually “the start of a step by step setting upof a framework for Russia-Japan cooperationafter the border’s establishment” (Iwata 2018).This seems to suggest that, having initiallyserved as a system to enable a Japanesepresence to operate on the islands while theyremain under Russian control, the special legalframework could ultimately function as amechanism to permit the continuation ofRussian involvement on the islands after atransfer of the territory to Japanese control.This would, in theory, assist Japan in dealingwith the issue of the Russian citizens thatwould remain on the islands following theirreturn to Japanese sovereignty.\1

Can Abe succeed?

With regard to the symbolic component, thecelebration of the Year of Japan-Russia shouldprovide ample opportunities to showcase thefriendly nature of bilateral ties and theappearance of close personal relations betweenAbe and Putin. Indeed, the problem may be thata display of too much camaraderie with theRussian leadership could attract criticism fromthe West. This issue may be magnified byPresident Macron’s attendance at SPIEF. Onthe one hand, the decision of the French leaderto attend the economic forum provides coverfor Abe to do the same. At the same time,Macron has demonstrated a willingness tospeak truth to powerful leaders, includingcondemning Russian state-media for“spreading propaganda” while standing next toPresident Putin (Chassany and Hille 2017). Ifthe French president does something similar inSt Petersburg, for instance by publiclycriticising Russia for interference in foreignelections or the Skripal case, it will drawattention to Abe’s silence on these matters andmake the Japanese leader look weak.

The situation may also not be plain sailing

when it comes to economic cooperation. DuringMinister Sekō’s visit to Russia at the end ofApril, he met with Minister for EconomicDevelopment Oreshkin and Minister of EnergyNovak, as well as First Deputy Prime MinisterShuvalov, and undoubtedly the sides will havefound some promising-sounding deals toannounce during Abe’s visit. The question,however, is how many of these agreements willprove substantive.

Since its unveiling in May 2016, the 8-pointeconomic cooperation plan has led to an uptickin bilateral economic activities. In particular,Sekō has drawn attention to a licensingagreement between Japan’s OtsukaPharmaceutical and Russia’s R-Pharm, as wellas growing cooperation between Japan’sNational Centre for Child Health andDevelopment and Russia’s Dmitry RogachevNational Research Centre of PediatricHematology, Oncology and Immunology(Ponomareva 2018). In April, it was alsoproposed that a Russia-Japan FriendshipMedical Centre be constructed in Moscow,serving as a trial for the provision of Japanesemedical services within Russia (Fedotova2018). Other featured projects includeJapanese companies’ efforts to improve Russianurban infrastructure. These include NikkenSekkei’s “master plan” for Vladivostok, whichwould reduce congestion and improve touristfacilities, as well as NEDO and KyōsanElectric’s work on introducing smart trafficlights in Voronezh. Sekō has also highlightedJGC and Chiyoda Corporation’s involvement inthe construction of part of the Yamal liquefiednatural gas plant in Russia’s far north, a projectsupported by the state-controlled Japan Bankfor International Cooperation (Ponomareva2018).

Each of these projects no doubt has merits, butso far the results of the 8-point plan are modestand they certainly do not seem to justify theappointment of their own cabinet minister. Ithas also been reported that, of over 100

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agreements signed between the sides, only40% are actually being considered forimplementation (Ōmae 2018). This slow pace ofprogress is causing frustration on the Russianside, with most politicians seeming to havelimited interest in the small-scale practicalschemes being proposed by Japan andpreferring to emphasise ambitious megaprojects, such as a proposed rail bridgebetween Sakhalin and Hokkaidō (Interfax2017). One apparently promising infrastructureproject was the participation of a Japaneseconsortium in the modernisation of Khabarovskairport. Yet, despite being presented as asymbol of bilateral economic cooperation, itwas revealed in early May that the Japanese bidhad been rejected (Tōkyō Shinbun 2018).

A sense of disappointment is also discernibleamong Japanese investors who feel that notenough has been done to ease their concernsabout operating in Russia. This sentiment wasexpressed by Asada Teruo, head of Marubeniand chair of the Japan-Russia economiccommission for Keidanren, Japan’s businessfederation. Addressing the Russia-Japan Forumin April, Asada described the strength of theeconomic relationship as unsatisfactory andpointed to the need for infrastructureimprovements in the Russian Far East(Mainichi 2018). This suggests that the Abeadministration’s enthusiasm for economiccooperation with Russia is not shared byprivate Japanese business. Indeed, according tofigures quoted by Foreign Minister Lavrov, theannual volume of direct Japanese investment inRussia has actually fallen from $757 million in2012, at the start of Abe’s tenure, to just $18million in 2017 (TASS 2018c).The Japanesegovernment could certainly supplement thesefigures by directing more public moneytowards Russia, yet it has been reluctant to doso out of fear of provoking a popular backlash.

Given this context, it is probable that Abe’sattendance at SPIEF will not be accompaniedby the signing of transformational, billion-dollar

deals. This may be a point of regret for bothsides, yet it is not necessarily that much of aproblem for Abe since the economic dimensionof his “new approach” has always beenpresented as a means to securing politicalends. As such, if agreement can be reached onimproving Japanese access to the islands andfinalising the legal basis for the joint economicactivities, the summit would still constitute asuccess for the Japanese leader.

With regard to the territorial dispute, someprogress should be relatively easy. Specifically,there should be few problems in agreeing toconduct further flights to the islands andcontinuing to operate the additional maritimeentry point near Habomai, at least while theJapanese former residents remain alive.Further details about the five priority projectsmay also be announced and it may be agreedthat a third joint survey visit will be conductedlater in 2018. However, as noted, the crux ofthis issue is the legal question and there areserious doubts that the Russian government isreally willing to permit Japanese entities tooperate on the disputed islands under a systemdistinct from Russian law.

Despite optimistic Japanese assessments of theagreement reached in December 2016, therehave long been indications that the Russiangovernment’s understanding of the “specialarrangement” under which joint economicactivities would be conducted is not the sameas Japan’s. Indeed, at the very time theagreement was announced, Kremlin foreignpolicy aide Yurii Ushakov insisted that theseprojects would be conducted under Russian law(Takenaka and Golubkova 2016). Morerecently, Foreign Minister Lavrov has statedthat “We do not see the need to create sometype of supranational body,” placing emphasisinstead on “the current regime, including thebenefits of the Vladivostok Free Port and theregime of the territory of advanced socio-economic development” (TASS 2018a). Thisindicates that the Russian leadership wishes

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the joint economic activities to be conductedwithin its special economic zones (known asTORs), which operate under Russian law. Onesuch TOR was created on the island of Shikotanin August 2017. Generally, however, Lavrovwas reluctant to address legal specifics, sayingthat “The focus should not be an obsession withthe legal side of the matter but, above all, onjoint economic activity - this is the essence ofthe agreement.” (TASS 2018a). A bilateralworking group was convened on 11 April toaddress the evident gap between the sides onthis matter, but it failed to achieve concreteprogress (Mainichi 2018a).

Russia has therefore shown little inclination tocompromise on the most important legalquestion. Instead, Russian politicians havesought to encourage Japan to invest underRussian law, warning that, if Japan does notproceed quickly, Russia will solicit investmentfrom other countries (Podobedova 2018). Thisthreat appeared to be carried out when, inMarch 2018, Sakhalin Governor Kozhemyakoannounced that an unnamed U.S. firm hadagreed to invest in a diesel power plant on theisland of Shikotan (News24.jp 2018). TheRussian side also appears eager to pressforward with the details of the joint economicprojects, thereby making it harder for theJapanese side to walk away if their legaldemands are not met.

Island of Shikotan, where Russia hasestablished a special economic zone.

( S o u r c e : w w w . r e g n u m . r u(http://www.regnum.ru)).

Despite employing these tactics, the Russianauthorities can have little expectation that theJapanese government will agree to invest injoint economic projects on the islands if theyare subject to Russian jurisdiction. This wouldrepresent a reversal of decades of Japanesepolicy. Instead, the Russian leadership willknow that some form of compromise will berequired if the economic projects are actuallyto go ahead. One possible model is the bilateralfishing agreement of 1998. This allowsJapanese fishing boats to operate in the waterssurrounding the disputed islands in accordancewith annual agreements that set quotas andlevels of payment. Crucially, this agreementincludes an article specifying that,

“Nothing in this Agreement, nor any activitiesconducted in accordance with this Agreement,nor any measures taken to implement thisAgreement nor any activities or measuresrelated thereto shall be deemed as to prejudicethe positions or views of any Party with respectto any issues of their mutual relations.” (MOFA2001).

This serves to clarify that the agreement doesnot constitute Japan’s acknowledgement ofRussian sovereignty, though it also highlightsRussia’s continued rejection of Japan’s claims.

Although a similar clause would help facilitatethe joint economic projects in 2018, the issue ismore complex when it relates to activitiesconducted on the disputed land itself. Not least,there is the matter of passports and visas. Toaddress this problem, Russian officials recentlyfloated the idea of creating a visa-free zone thatwould apply to all of Hokkaidō and the Sakhalinregion, which administers the disputed islands(Hokkaidō Shinbun 2018; TASS 2018b). Suchan arrangement would eliminate manyproblems. It would enable Japanese citizens tofreely visit the islands without acknowledging

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Russian sovereignty, thereby achieving Abe’sgoal of maximising access and helping realisethe proposed joint economic projects. It wouldalso ensure that the system is reciprocal,providing local Russian citizens with visa-freeaccess to a G-7 country. There is even a usefulprecedent in the visa-free zone that hasoperated since 2010 for the border areabetween Norway and Russia. Under thatsystem, Norwegian and Russian citizens of theborder area can apply for a special three-yearpermit that entitles them to visa-free travelwithin a radius of 30 kilometers on either sideof the border.

Such a visa-free zone really would betransformative, yet it would be an enormousstep for Prime Minister Abe to agree to such amechanism, especially given Japan’s traditionalaversion to immigration. The total population ofthe Sakhalin region is approximately half amillion and many Japanese citizens would beconcerned that there would be an influx ofRussians into Hokkaidō. Some Japanese mightbelieve that this would lead to an increase incrime and that, even with official time limits,the Russian visitors might seek to settlepermanently. There would also be no easy wayof preventing Russian visitors from travellingon from Hokkaidō to elsewhere in Japan.

Domestic critics would also point to the factthat Russia has recently proceeded withstrengthening its military presence on thedisputed islands and has conducted severalmilitary exercises in the area this year,including in April (Sherunkova 2018). In thesame month, it was also reported that theJapanese Self-Defence Forces scrambled jets on390 occasions in fiscal 2017 to interceptRussian aircraft, an increase of 89 from a yearearlier (Johnson 2018). In this context, those inJapan who do not share the prime minister’spassion for relations with Russia would arguethat Japan is rewarding Russia despite itsunwillingness to make real concessions on theterritorial issue and despite its continuation of

hostile activities in the vicinity of Japan. This isto say nothing of the likely response fromWestern powers who are already frustrated bythe softness of the Abe administration’s stanceon Russia.

It is impossible to entirely rule out a surpriseoutcome at the May summit. In particular, theRussian side may judge it expedient to permitJapan to make some gains. This would give Abesomething to sell domestically, thereby raisingthe chances of his pro-Russian policycontinuing. However, given the legal obstaclesand the fact that Abe is unlikely to agree to anextensive visa-free zone, the most likely resultis a summit that delivers little beyond a fewsymbolic images, some vague economicpromises, and an agreement to continueworking on the joint economic activities. This isan outcome that is largely satisfactory to theRussian side since they remain in control of theislands and they gain a certain internationallegitimation by Abe’s diplomatic efforts. Bydrawing out the dispute for as long as possible,the Russian leadership also ensures that Japanwill continue to have reasons to court Russiathrough promises of economic cooperation andby distancing itself from Western policydesigned to isolate Russia. This lack of urgencycan be observed in the comments of DeputyForeign Minister Igor Morgulov who stated atthe start of May that “Real progress inresolving this issue is possible in the context ofthe comprehensive development of Russia-Japan ties, and the formation of an atmosphereof genuine mutual trust and partnership. Weare only at the very beginning of this process.”(Izvestiya 2018).

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A breakthrough remains unlikely when Abeand Putin meet for the 21st time in May2018. (Source: TASS).

Conclusion

Coming two years after the introduction of his“new approach” and timed to coincide with theYear of Japan-Russia, Abe’s visit to StPetersburg and Moscow at the end of Mayrepresents the moment of truth for his Russiapolicy. Driven by concerns about theincreasingly close ties between Russia andChina as well as by Abe’s desire to leave hispersonal stamp on history, the “new approach”has sought to achieve a breakthrough in thedispute over the Southern Kurils/NorthernTerritories by lowering Japan’s initial demandsand offering economic incentives as well asexpanded political engagement. The Japaneseleader has also shown determination in stickingwith this policy despite it leading to frictionswith Japan’s Western partners, especially overthe Skripal incident. And yet, for all the effortsthat have been made in building up to thissummit, the likelihood is that Prime MinisterAbe will return disappointed.

The Japanese government will be sure to put apositive spin on even the most meagre resultsand preparations will begin soon for Abe’s nextvisit to Russia. This is anticipated to be inSeptember to attend the Vladivostok EasternEconomic Forum for the third year running.

There is also speculation that Abe will invitePutin to visit Japan in May 2019 (Japan Times2018). However, if nothing of significance isachieved this time, there is no reason to thinkthat things will be different during thesesubsequent summits. Indeed, with Abe’s starfading, the May summit could already be hislast opportunity to visit Russia as primeminister.

In the short term, Russian diplomats can feelpleased at having extracted some economicconcessions from Japan and induced thecountry to distance itself from Westernpartners, while not making concessions inreturn. However, viewed in the longer term,subsequent Japanese leaders will look at Abe’sfailed “new approach” and judge that noamount of engagement will lead to Russianconcessions on the territorial issue. As a result,it is likely to be a long time before Japan hasanother leader as committed to relations withRussia as Prime Minister Abe.

James Brown is Associate Professor inPolitical Science at Temple University, JapanCampus. His main area of expertise is Russia-Japan relations. His research has previouslybeen published in International Affairs,International Politics, Politics, Asia Policy, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism,Europe-Asia Studies, and The Asia PacificJournal: Japan Focus. His book publicationsinclude Japan, Russia and their TerritorialDispute: The Northern Delusion (Routledge,2017) and Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia,which he edited with Jeff Kingston (Routledge,2017).

Related articles

• James D.J. Brown, Abe’s 2016 Plan to Breakthe Deadlock in the Territorial Dispute withRussia (https://apjjf.org/2016/04/Brown.html)

• James D.J. Brown, Not Even Two? Newdevelopments in the territorial dispute betweenR u s s i a a n d J a p a n

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(https://apjjf .org/-James-Brown/4378)

• Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, Breakingthe Impasse in Japan-Russia Relations(https://apjjf.org/-Tsuneo-AKAHA/2049/article.html)

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James Brown is Associate Professor in Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus.His main areas of expertise are Russian-Japanese relations and international energy politics.

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His research has previously been published in the following academic journals: InternationalPolitics, Politics, Asia Policy, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, Europe-AsiaStudies, and The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. His recently completed book, Japan,Russia and their Territorial Dispute: The Northern Delusion, is to be published by Routledgeon 11 March 2016.

Notes1 The two largest of the islands are known as Iturup and Kunashir in Russian, Etorofu andKunashiri in Japanese. The smaller islands of Shikotan and the Habomais have the samenames in both languages. The Habomais are actually a group of islets but, for convenience, itis customary to refer to a four island dispute.2 Announced in May 2016, the eight-point plan envisages increased Japan-Russia cooperationin “(1) Extending healthy life expectancies, (2) developing comfortable and clean cities easyto reside and live in, (3) fundamentally expansion [sic] medium-sized and small companiesexchange and cooperation, (4) energy, (5) promoting industrial diversification and enhancingproductivity in Russia, (6) developing industries and export bases in the Far East, (7)cooperation on cutting-edge technologies, and (8) fundamentally expansion [sic] of people-to-people interaction” (MOFA 2016a).3 Even when the charter flight did eventually take place in September, it did not proceedsmoothly. As scheduled, the plane took half of the Japanese visitors to Kunashir/i, beforeproceeding with the rest of the group to Iturup/Etorofu. However, due to bad weather, thereturn flight from Iturup/Etorofu had to divert to Sakhalin, leaving half of the party strandedon Kunashir/i where they had to spend the night, before returning to Hokkaidō by boat.4 At present the population of the disputed islands is around 17,000 (Brown 2017: 145).