The Mizo Uprising (1966-1971)

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The Mizo Uprising


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The Mizo Uprising:

Assam Assembly Debates on the Mizo Movement,1966-1971

By

Dr. J. V. Hluna and Rini Tochhawng


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The Mizo Uprising:

Assam Assembly Debates on the Mizo Movement, 1966-1971,

by Dr. J. V. Hluna and Rini Tochhawng

This book first published 2012

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright 2012 by Dr. J. V. Hluna and Rini Tochhawng

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,

or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or

otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-4042-4, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4042-2


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Illustrations .................................................................................... vii

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................viii

Foreword .................................................................................................... ix

Preface........................................................................................................ xi

Introduction .............................................................................................. xiii

Abbreviations ......................................................................................... xxiii

Chapter One................................................................................................. 1

Outbreak in the Mizo Hills: Reasons and Responsibilities

Chapter Two.............................................................................................. 32

Laldenga vs. the Government of India

Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 66

Aizawl Cleared

Chapter Four............................................................................................ 100

Bombing

Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 133

Aizawl Burning

Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 157

The Reign of Terror

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 193

Grouping of Villages

Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 218

Unprotected Citizens: Every Mizo a Suspect


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Table of Contentsvi

Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 255

Administering the North East and the Mizo Hills

Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 284

Weakening of the MNF and On to Peace

Epilogue................................................................................................... 320

Appendices .............................................................................................. 329

Notes........................................................................................................ 366

Index........................................................................................................ 374


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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Map of Mizoram, India2. A view of the old Aizawl town3. Prime Minister Nehru at Aizawl, April 19654. Chief Minister B.P.Chaliha and MNF supremos Laldenga and

Lalnunmawia

5. Prime Minister Shastri, Home Minister Nanda and DeputyCommissioner T.S. Gill

6. M.P. Swell and MLAs Nichols-Roy and J.F. Manliana7. Armed members of the MNF8. Cadres of the Mizo National Army9. Leaders of the Mizo Union10.Assam Rifles Quarter Guard at Aizawl11.An Indian Air Force plane in Mizo skies12.Toofani over Aizawl and recovered bomb shells13.Crush Them14.Mother Child15.Aizawl Burning- Stories of Loss16.Bara Bazar, Aizawl, 196417.Citizens of Aizawl for Peace18.Brig. T. Sailo & Lal Thanhawla19.Ambassadors of Peace20.Forlorn Hope21.Village Grouping in Progress22.Villagers being taken to Grouping Centres23.March 5, 196624.Vehicular Convoy en route to Aizawl25.Prime Minister Nehrus warm welcome, April 195326.Indira Gandhi at Aizawl, 197227.Jubilant Welcome to MNF returnees28.Hnam Sipai- Mizo Soldiers return29.Laldenga Casting his vote at the first Mizoram State Elections, 198730.Agreement between Laldenga & the Indian National Congress31.

Signing of the Mizoram Accord32.Aizawl Today


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My heartfelt gratitude to the Speaker of Mizoram Assembly Pu

Lalchmliana who forwarded my request to use the Assam Assembly

Library, to the Speaker of the Assam Assembly Shri Tanka Bahadur Rai,

and the Secretary Shri Gauranga Prasad Das, with whose permission the

Assembly Reference Library was utilized. I also express my thanks to

Amylya Kalita, Caretaker at the Library for his tireless help. My deepestappreciation to the help rendered by my good friend, Pi Heleni (d/o Late J.

F. Manliana, former Assam MLA) who followed up with great efficiency,

every small request I expressed in my efforts to obtain these important

documents. Some of the contents of these Debates were recorded in

Assamese and Bengali, as they were spoken by the Honourable Members.

These records have been translated into English by my colleagues Shri

Prafulla Gohain and Dr D. K. Barkataki whose help I hereby acknowledge

with gratitude.

Dr. J. V. Hluna

This book could not have become, were it not for the grace of the

Almighty, in whose hands all things rest and by whose Will all things are.

A special word of acknowledgement to APa and Vana, whose help in the

production of this book has been invaluable. And I salute all whose liveshave borne meaning for us who are alive today.

Rini Tochhawng


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FOREWORD

It was the midnight of 28th February 1966 when the Christian calendar

was slowly changing to 1st March 1966. As per a well planned strategy the

Mizo National Army, the armed wing of Mizo National Front in an

attempted civilian coup de etatattacked the key Government installations

in the Lushai hills district of Assam, and hoisted the MNF flag in place of

Indian National Flag at the Assam Rifles Head Quarters. The objectivewas to severe its ties with India and declare itself sovereign. The MNF

declared independence and formed the Government of Mizoram. It shook

the Government at Shillong and Delhi. There was no intelligence report of

the imminence of such an eventuality. Immediately on receipt of

information, the Government of Assam sent a team of officers, consisting

of the Commissioner of the Division, the Inspector General of Police

(Assam Rifles) and a Senior Officer of the Indian Army to Aizawl to study

the situation and suggest ways and means to quell the rebellion. It

suggested that the area be handed over to the army. On 2 March 1966 theGovernment of Assam declared the district a Disturbed Area. On 5 th

March there were air raids on various parts of Aizawl by the Indian Air

Force. On 6 March 1966 the MNF was declared unlawful. The Extra

Ordinary Gazette Notification of the Government of India published on 6March 1966 declared the activities of MNF prejudicial to the security of

the Mizo district in the state of Assam and the adjoining parts of the

territory of India. The Central government by effecting necessary

amendment ordered that Rule 32 of the Defense of India Rule 1962 Rule

shall be applicable to the MNF. The army reached Aizawl on the eveningof 6 March. The security forces gained control of the district headquarters

after which the army marched towards Lunglei and the other besieged

posts. In the ensuing operation all the important towns and posts were

cleared of the influence of the MNF armed forces. The MNF volunteers

took to the jungles of Pakistan and Burma to continue their struggle from

foreign countries. Thus began the story of another Insurgency afterNagaland in north east India.

Although the Naga movement has received wide publicity and been

extensively written about in the last sixty years, very little was available

on the Mizo uprising both in terms of information and understanding. It


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Forewordx

was the movements in Kashmir and Nagaland that were prominent in the

history of dissent in modern India. Even after the uprising, the struggle of

the Mizos found very little attention except few pieces in theEconomic

and Political Weekly which were critical about the states gross violation

of human rights in the Lushai Hills. It did not talk much about the actual

happenings. The Mizo uprising of 1966 was the result of discrimination,

deprivation, abdication of responsibilities by the state, of abandoning a

people in times of a grave crisis, helplessness of a tiny tribe in the face of a

natural disaster, settling personal political scores by leading political

leaders of the state and fight for political survival of a small constituenttribe in a big nation-state. A set of documents that reveal this intricate web

of circumstances that created the Mizo crisis was the Legislative Assembly

Proceedings of the province of Assam of which Lushai Hills was a

District. The prolonged debates and deliberations actually reflect the

developments and in the absence of other official records, it unveils the

chronology of events.

Dr J V Hluna and Rini Tochhawng have painstaking collected the

Assembly Proceedings which chronicle the sequence of developments in

the hill state and how they were viewed, questioned and debated by the

legislators. It also recorded the Governments response to the crisis. Dr J V

Hluna is a very Senior Mizo Historian who not only has actually seen thetroubled times but has meticulously collected and preserved the documents

of the period which were destroyed during army raids in their original

office. Dr Hluna has already written extensively on various aspects of the

twenty year insurgency period and is a known name in Mizo history. This

time he is joined by his worthy daughter Rini Tochhawng and jointly they

have put together this immensely important volume of documents which

recorded the developments. It is an invaluable piece of work for the

researcher and a repository of information for the general readers. I

congratulate the authors for rendering this service to the discipline ofhistory and strongly recommend it to the growing community ofresearchers on the history and politics of north east India.

SAJAL NAG

PROFESSOR IN HISTORY

ASSAM UNIVERSITY, SILCHAR.


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PREFACE

Shouts of The MNF have come home, Long live Laldenga! and

the sound of drums, crackers and blaring music are the memories that

make up my recollection of the night of June 30, 1986. I was then still too

young to understand the significance of that day, and much too

uninformed to even know who Laldenga was, or what was so special about

those they called the MNF that their coming home could garner such

joyous celebrations. Little did I realise that many whose lives may have

touched mine at some point, with whose children I might one day have

been friends, had given their lives in the course of a 20-year insurgencythat had crippled the hills I called home. The only time I remember ever

seeing Laldenga in person was at Church when he had shared his thoughts

as he struggled against cancer- I cannot recall his words nor do I

remember the sound of his voice but the impact his presence had on the

congregation was all too obvious. I remember thinking, So this is the man

whose face has been on peoples tee shirts and that made me happy.

Twenty five years later, I find myself reading all available literature on

the Mizo insurgency, talking to people who went through the trauma of

uncertainty for two decades and writing their stories down. The MNF

uprising has left an undeniable impact on the lives of every Mizo, whetherliving then or now. More than anything else, it was the first Zoram Ni

observed on March 5, 2008 to mark the bombing of Aizawl and other

places in Mizoram 42 years before, which piqued the interest of a girl who

had not lived through the years of insurgency.

People spoke of what had happened and how they had happened; it

was remarkable to see how many re-lived those trying years with words

that were only too fleeting. Many had stories they wanted to tell but the

problem with the 20-year insurgency period in Mizoram was, and remains

just this- they are actually stories, oral tellings of experiences that cannot

be substantiated by written records on most accounts. For twenty years,

the Mizo people had lived in fear of being branded rebels, and for twenty

years, they refrained from writing diaries, creative outpourings or recordsof experiences because the dreaded soldiers who could not read the


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Prefacexii

language were wont to brand these as MNF documents. Much of what

has been reproduced in this book has been taken from oral re-telling of

events as they were remembered; and more from written sources of suchaccounts. These stories have been added with the full understanding that

some of them may only be partially true because the human memory can

play tricks on its bearer at any time. But that does not make them any less

sincere nor is the need to tell the story any less urgent. A lot of literature

written before and during the years of Insurgency was burnt either by the

soldiers or by the writers/ owners themselves for fear of arrest or other

worse consequences. It will forever be difficult to fill this gap.

The debates in the Assam Assembly specially pertaining to the Mizo

issue at the time have been accessed and reproduced in their original form

in the ten Chapters of the book. The Mizo issue dominated the Assembly

debates in the period before the creation of the Mizoram Union Territory

on February 21, 1972. The issue covers the conducting of air raids against

their own citizens, the atrocities committed on the Mizo women and on the

Mizo people in general by the armed forces who failed to make any

attempts to discern the rebel factions from innocent citizens. An important

consequence of the Mizo Uprising was the creation of the seven North-

Eastern states from the erstwhile large state of Assam by the North-East

Areas Re-organisation Act, 1971. No editorial changes have been made inthe text of the debates except to group them in readable paragraphs, and

highlight some of its contents in bold format. Old names of places,

including that of Aijal (Aizawl) and Lungleh (Lunglei) have also been

retained in their original. Although the debates only cover the years

from1966 to 1972, the texts have been supplemented with events covering

the entire period of the Insurgency with the hope that this will give a

clearer picture of the movement. Attempt has been made to coordinate the

events and issues mentioned in the debates with the preceding text in each

Chapter, for which chronology had to be sacrificed on many counts.

It has been said that the stories told about ones past shapes ones

future. We hope that the contents of this book will prove to be useful

materials for the younger generations, especially research scholars in the

field. It is left to the readers to discern the whys and hows of the Uprising,

feel the pulse of those who were in the thick of it, and glean lessons, if

there are any, from the struggles that now form a part of Mizo history.


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INTRODUCTION

Mizoram was formally brought under British administration on 6th

September, 1895.1 Since then the people had turned to paths of peace,

forsaking their inter-tribal wars and frequent attacks on neighbouring

Assam. It was a country where widows or orphans never lacked helping

hands. Even the poorest could bury their heads in their own homes by

merely expressing the wish even if that meant a four or five days journey.

No dacoit party even existed nor did locks adorn the doors of the villages.

Even the so-called criminals were so faithful and honest that their guards

could leave them alone in jungles to collect firewood while they wentabout their own business. Never was it necessary, in the entire history of

administration, to impose curfew on the citizens before the 1966 uprising.

How is it then that such a peace loving people suddenly rose up with arms

against the Government of India? What made the professed followers of

the Prince of Peace to resort to such wide-spread acts of violence? What

were the factors that promoted the rapid growth of the MNF party, whichwithin five years, could gain enough weapons and smuggled arms from

foreign sources to stage a revolt against the armed might of India?

Political Background

The critical question at the time of Indias independence were:-what

should be the future status of the country (Mizo Hills), whether it should

join hands with India, Burma or Pakistan; choose to be a Crown Colony

under the British or become an independent state. If the people had

demanded with one voice, one might suppose that it would have been

possible, through a referendum like the one held in Sylhet District, for the

Mizo Hills to break its relations with India or opt for other alternatives.But the Mizo Union, the first political party, was in favour of joining

hands with India.2 Under their influence, all representatives and outstanding

leaders made the decision to join Indian union on condition that the Mizos

1 A. G. McCall, The Lushai Hills Districit Cover (1931-43), Tribal researchInstitute, Aizawl, 1980, p 11.2 Mizo Union Memorandum, 26 April, 1947.


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Introductionxiv

would have a right to opt out the Indian Union after ten years if they wish

to do so.3

Social Background

The Mizo people and other Hill tribes were not satisfied with the

provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. To add to their

disappointment, opinions were expressed among the politicians of Assam

to remove the special provisions for the Khasis and the Mizos as they were

considered sufficiently advanced to march on equal footing with the rest of

India. Moreover, the tribals became even more alienated when the

Assamese language movement started and Mr Chaliha, the then ChiefMinister of Assam, was forced by mob pressure to make Assamese as theState official language. These things precipitated and gave momentum to

the demand for the creation of a Hill State.

In Mizo district, people got more frustrated with the District Councils

lack of interest over various issues. They failed to give sufficient attention

to the increasing number of students studying outside the District and

neglected to safeguard the interest of their people in the neighbouring

districts. These led to a general disappointment in their leadership. The

time was ripe for the emergence of a new party and opportunity came

when theMautam Famine hit the district in 1960. Laldnga took over the

leadership of the Anti-Famine Organization and moulded it into a political

organization, changing its name to Mizo National Front (MNF) and

propounded a separate nation theory. Within three years of its existence

the MNF party captured two of three seats for Mizo District in the State

Assembly4 and proceeded to proclaim an independent Sovereign State ofMizoram.5 When Delhi was unwilling to grant the desired independence,

the MNF chose to create power by force and this they did, giving birth to

the twenty-year insurgency that followed.

That the Nagas, the Mizos or other hill tribes of north east India are

ethnologically different from the rest of India, is a scientific and historical

fact. They are of Mongolian stocks and are physically, culturally,

3 Proceedings of a Meeting of the Accredited Leaders of Lushai Political Parties

held at Aizawl on 14th August 1947 (J.V. Hlunas Church & Political Upheaval

in Mizoram, 1985 appendix IV4 Lalnghakliana, The Country we love best, Cyclostyled copy Aizawl, 1982, p53.5MNF Declaration of Independence, 1. 3. 1966(Church & Political Upheaval in

Mizoram, 1985 appendix VII).


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The Mizo Uprising xv

religiously and linguistically different from that of Aryans or Dravidians.

While India claims to be a strictly secular State at the top, the man in the

street is not very much conscious of it. Questions of whither lies the so-called mainstream of national life in Hindi or Hindu or whether in one

political party through which the Government of India tries to create

national integration-were raised.

Religious Background

In their declaration of Independence, the MNF made several accusations

against the Government of India one of which deals with religious

discrimination. The Government often conducted public examinations onSundays and official dignitaries visited Mizoram on Sundays these wereinterpreted as deliberate attempts to restrict the freedom of public worship

for those involved officially. Nehru himself visited on a Sunday on 3rd

April 1953.6 The restrictions on entry of missionaries into their District

was interpreted as an attempt to restrict Christian enterprise.7 The MNF

brought out the religious issue and painted India to be a land of Hindus

and Mizoram of the Christians.8

Neglect and Indifference

The financing of the Government development schemes worked in

such a way that schemes would be drawn up and approved, but financial

sanction would not come until towards the end of the year. The scheme

then had to be completed before the end of the financial year so that a

certificate of utilization with which to draw the money can be obtained..

So, certificates of completion were supplied (perhaps even without the

scheme having been started) and the money drawn. Many schemes were

abandoned on receipt of funding, creating a restlessness for easy money.

Officials found more corruption in Silchar-the Mizo Hills only gateway to

India, creating exasperation and a desire to deal as little as possible with

Vais.9To add to this, the Cachar Forest Department claimed a portion of

land measuring about 509 Sq. miles of Lushai country. This portion of

6 Rev. Saiaithanga, Mizo Kohhran Chanchin, Regional Theological Literature

Committee, Aizawl, 1969, p 8.7Ibid, p 149.8 R. Vnlawma, Ka Ram leh Kei, p 186.9Originally believed to have come from the Hindi word bhai meaning brother,the term is now used to refer to people from the plains of India and had gained

derogatory connotations during the insurgency.


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Introductionxvi

land was known as the Inner Line Forest Reserved.10 Absence of clear

boundary demarcation between Mizo District and Cachar District led to

border disputes. When the Mizo District Council gave permits to someMizos settled in land falling within this Inner Line belt, the Assam

government objected and evicted them and went to the extent of harassing

and arresting some of them.11 An issue of this magnitude could be

explosive and the MNF lost no time in stirring the Mizo sentiments against

the Vais in all issues.

Education was in the hands of the Missionaries for a long time. TheBritish administration paid little or almost no attention to the education of

the tribes. They objected to higher education for Mizos for fear of

producing unemployed black-coated gentlemen. When the Indian

Government took control of all educational programmes, they opened

more educational institutions but neither the missionaries nor the Assam

Government introduced Science and Technical education. Of the 40 odd

MNF Senators over half of them were either unemployed graduates or

those discontent in the posts they held. On the matter of health, there were

only two Hospitals and six dispensaries to serve 8,000 square miles with a

population of nearly three lakhs.12 Before 1960 there were never more than

12 doctors at a time in the entire district. If the people had felt neglected at

all, it was in this department that the neglect was felt most.

The rivers in Mizoram were not considered suitable for navigation or

for hydro power projects. Railway lines or Air transport were out of the

question and no good roads were established. The main supply line,

Silchar-Aizawl road, was little more than a country path during the

Mautam Famine of 1960. Nirmal Nibedons witty remark on the

Governments new road project goes:

If the bridge of the Brahmaputra came up only after a Chinese aggressionand the Border Roads Task Force went all out in building roads in the

Naga Hills after the insurgency, again it would be rebellion in the Mizo

Hills which could infuse a new sense of urgency into the road building

programmes. It was only in May 1967 that a project was launched to

intensify road construction activity in the strive-torn mountains.13

10 Govt. of Assam, Gazette Notification No. 5 dt. 17. 10. 1878.11 R. Vanlawma, Ka Ram leh Kei, p 186.12

Rev. Zairema, Gods Miracle in Mizoram, Aizawl, 1978, p 25.13 Nirmal Nibedon, North East India: Ethnic Explosion, New Delhi, 1981, p38.


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The Mizo Uprising xvii

Laldngas trump card was demand for Mizo integration, i.e. union

with the Mizos of Manipur, Tripura in India and in Burma and Pakistan.

The strategy made him the hero of romantic reaction and mobilized theextremist elements. The Indo-Park War of 1965 opened up opportunities

to rise in rebellion. Throughout February, 1966, there were reports of

MNF actively carrying arms and organizing hostile propaganda about the

district. Near midnight on February 27 a hand-grenade exploded. Few took

serious notice of it but this incident was followed by the outbreak on the

next midnight, i.e. 28. 2. 1966.

Insurgency as Means of Self-Determination

Every society seeks a place of pride in the world and desires its identityand self-esteem to be recognized by others. History reveals that for the

sake of identity and self-esteem, societies can go to any extent, not to

speak of violence alone. Although democracy presupposes that people

would decide their own political destiny, history has recorded innumerable

instances of denial of this basic democratic right to assert their existence.

But the issue involved here is: Does the end (self-determination) justify

any means including insurgency?

Self-Determination has been explained by both Liberals as well as

Marxists in their own ways. Liberals view that people of a society demand

self-determination in order to get due recognition to their ethnic, cultural

and other forms of identity. So, if it can be achieved through peaceful and

democratic process (which is usually time consuming) people will go for

that. If it is not possible, people vent their grievances through

unconstitutional means. So, insurgency is one of the mechanisms toachieve self-determination. However, it is difficult to draw the conclusion

that insurgency will, with all certainty, bring about the desired goal.

Marxists, on the other hand, attribute the cause of self-determination to

economic imbalance and exploitation. Generally, economically deprived

section of the society is ignored by the affluent class. Due to class

consciousness, the de-privileged section becomes aware of the fact that

their identity is being suppressed and they are marginalized by the

dominant group. Revolution is the usually accepted method to achieve the

goal. Hence, insurgency has its admirers in Marxist thinking. But the

reformists in Marxist school do not ignore (rather emphasize on) the

democratic means to achieve self-determination. From a differentperspective, insurgency and self-determination have the same objective,


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Introductionxviii

namely, socio-cultural, political and economic freedom without external

super-imposition. It can only be achieved when the voiceless and

marginalized mass will be given their due place in a socio-political set-up.

These conceptual explanations are of immense relevance when applied

to the context of Mizoram. In an endeavour to assert ethnic and cultural

identity under the dominant political set up of Assam, people of Mizoram

strived to curve out a place of their own. When it was realized by a section

of the Mizo leadership that the assertion of Mizo identity was not possible

within the state of Assam or even under the Indian Union, insurgency wasadopted as a better alternative for Mizo nation building. Of course, in later

years, prudence and contextual conveniences took the place of ideology

and principle, as a result of which Mizo leadership was reconciled to the

statehood under Indian Union.

On the mid-night of February 28, 1966, Laldnga and the other fifty-

nine MNF leaders made a 12-point declaration blaming the Government of

India for various wrongs perpetrated against the Mizo people.14

The Governments Response

The Mizo District was declared a disturbed area by the Government

of Assam under the Assam Disturbed Area Act 1955. The extra-ordinary

Gazette Notification published on 6th March, 1966 declared MNF as an

unlawful organization. Though martial law was not officially declared, the

Central Government entrusted the responsibility of law and order in the

hands of the army by applying the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur)

Special Power Act, 1958 and by Rule 32 of the Defence of India Rules,1962, they also proclaimed emergency in the area under article 352 of

Indian Constitution.

The Army was asked by the Central Government to deal with the

situation The overall responsibility for the army operations as well as

liaison with the Government of Assam was given to Major General (later

Lt Gen) Sanghat Singh, GOC 101 Communication Zone with Headquarters

in Shillong. The first Army battalion (8th Sikh) advanced from Silchar into

the hills on 3rd March and after some minor skirmishes on the way, linked

up with the besieged Assam Rifles garrison at Aizawl on March 7. Aizwl,

14MNF Declaration of Independence, reproduced by J. V. Hluna in Church &Political Upheaval in Mizoram,Aizawl, 1985, p194.


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The Mizo Uprising xix

Hnahln, Khawzwl, Sangau, Tuipuibr, Marpar, Pkpui and Tlabung

and some other villages came under air-attacks with incendiary bombs and

air-strike on 5th & 6th March, 1966 which demoralized the MNFvolunteers. On March 8, 2nd/11th Gurkha Rifles moved towards Champhai

and 3rd Bihar towards Lunglei. Lunglei was secured by the Indian Army

on March 14 and Champhai on March 15. On March 14-15, 5th Para-

troopers were flown in by helicopters into Lunglei. They made a dash for

Tlabung on the East Pakistan border and took over this area on March 17.

The Army commanders were instructed to fight as in war time but to

function strictly in aid of civil power and to protect civilians.15

A scheme to group villages in the hope of cutting hostiles off from the

population was cleared by the Government of India on December 5, 1966.

In the period between 1967 to 1970, the grouping of villages was carried

out in three phases and by 1972, there were 102 group centres

accommodating 2,40,000 persons, more than 80 percent of Mizo Hills

population of 2,85,000. The remaining 45,000 people lived in Aizawl,

Lunglei, Saiha and a few ungrouped villages in the Pawi & Lakher Region

in the South.

Meanwhile, the Security Forces carried out large scale offensive

operations against the MNF to consolidate whatever they had gained fromthe grouping of the villages. They first combed the depopulated areas on

both side of the road to destroy possible hideouts and hidden stocks of

food grain. There were also regular smaller operations undertaken by the

Security Forces posted in the interior that emphasized vigorous patrolling

and ambushes. Major operations involving employing troops from

different sectors as well as helicopter-borne troops, were also conducted in

the interior.

Refugees and Atrocities

Hundreds of Mizo families sought refuge in Shillong and other places

in Assam and Manipur to escape the chaos at home, and a further and

much larger migration of Mizos caught between two fighting armies was

feared. There was scarcity of food and other essential commodities in the

district as most non-tribal shopkeepers had run away and no fresh goods

were finding their way into the district. The convoys being run to bring in

food and other goods under security force protection were few and far in

15Animesh RayMizoram:Dynamics of Change,New Delhi,1982,p.154.


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Introductionxx

between because of the frequency of ambushes and heavy Security Force

casualties. And to add to the governments discomfiture, there were

reports of serious human and civil rights violations and maltreatment ofcivilians in the hands of the Security Forces.

The MNF Dilemma and Peace

The Army operations and grouping of villages dealt a severe blow to

MNF morale. In August 1968, the Government of India took advantage of

her military superiority and offered amnesty to the underground MNF.

This resulted in 60 insurgents surrendering with weapons and 1,464

without weapons. The insurgents who surrendered revealed that the MNFmorale had been shattered by the combined effect of the latest operations,very high incidence of sickness, particularly malaria, and inability to get

adequate food from the population, general disgust and disillusionment in

the rank and file of the MNA and volunteers. The news of low MNF

morale encouraged the government to make several amnesty offers during

1969-70, though the renewed offer did not always elicit the desired level

of response. The majority of the guerrillas escaped into East Pakistan,

leaving Mizo Hills relatively free from military activity for years, with the

exception of some isolated and minor skirmishes. During this period the

MNF movement faced many internal problems. They were divided into

two factions because of differences of opinion in political ideology. At the

beginning they were bound together by one and the same ideology and

cherished the hope of achieving independence. Ever since the leaders

including the President gave up their hope in despair, they could no longer

have the same idea about the future programme. The leaders all seemed to

be willing to come to terms with India, yet one faction was arrested andsuppressed on charges of finding solutions with India. Later on, while

Laldenga was in Karachi (Pakistan) and subsequently in New Delhi (he

entered New Delhi on 24th January, 1976) mass arrests of one faction by

another faction and counter-arrests took place in quick succession.

While his opponents were gradually kicked out from their hideouts,

Laldenga held on to his position of power through the personality cult he

had earned out of his charismatic leadership. Within ten years he could

manage to persuade the mass of the MNF underground to accept a

settlement within the framework of Indian Constitution. The terms of

agreement may not be the best a rebel leader could ever sign under the

mercy of his opponent. So, it was thus on 30th June, 1986, the final


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The Mizo Uprising xxi

settlement was made and, therefore, Mizoram became an integral part of

India and the 23rd State of India.

Concluding Observation

While the world is now strongly committed to freedom and self

determination of all nations, large or small, and to the promotion of

Fundamental Human Rights; and while the Indian leaders are strongly

wedded to the principle particularly over developing domination and

colonization of the weaker nations by the stronger, advocating peaceful

co-existence, settlement of international disputes of any kind through the

medium of non-violence and in condemning weapons that can destroy theworld, and in general wishing of good-will towards mankind, the Mizopeople firmly believe that the Government of India and their leaders will

remain true to their policy and that they shall take into practice what they

advocate, blessing the Mizo people in their aspiration for freedom and

independence per principle that no one is good enough to govern another

man without that mans consent.

While the British were quitting, the Mizo Union in 1947 had already

expressed that the Mizos have never been under the Indian Government

and never had any connection with the policies and politics of the various

groups of Indian opinion. Contrary to Mizo aspirations, the Government of

India had adopted the British colonial strategies. To suppress the

independence movement they employed a massive deployment of infantry

and air-power and grouped the people in settlement centres to ensure

physical and political isolation of the population form the insurgents.

Whether in its more extreme form, as practiced by the Nazis against theJews, or in moderate form of varying degrees as adopted in Malaya,

Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia or in Mizoram,

patterns of control of population through concentrating in camps display

certain discomforting similarities. The strategies the British had always

been using against people who are racially or ethnically different in

Kenya, Aden, Oman, Cyprus and Malaya and which had at one time been

decried most vehemently by our national leaders were used by them

against some of their own people in the post independence era. One hopes

that Indian Government would not allow use of such outdated colonial

military strategies while dealing with her own ethnic minorities who have

not been able to finally settle their terms of political association with India.


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Introductionxxii

The problem in the nations internal wars against terrorists and

insurgents is that it is very often not the culpable segment of the

population that suffers the most. Those who had set up insurrections inNagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur and Assam soon become fleeting,

elusive shapes, like phosphorescent creatures of the deep ocean, directing

their confused struggles from the safety of foreign sanctuaries, while the

village folks, most of whom knew very little about anything, have received

the brunt of an exasperated, and often clueless, system of governance. It is

with hope, therefore, that the Mizo people continue to look at the

Government that has claimed them as their own, to honour theirsentiments and take lessons from the war that almost wiped this people

clean of their own history.


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ABBREVIATIONS

APHLC- All Party Hill Leaders Conference

CBI- Central Bureau of Investigation

CEM- Chief Executive Member

CM- Chief Minister

EITU- Eastern India Tribal Union

IGP- Inspector General of Police

MHDC- Mizo Hills Autonomous District Council

MIS- Military Intelligence Service

MLA- Member of Legislative Assembly

MNA- Mizo National Army

MNF- Mizo National FrontMNFF- Mizo National Famine Front

MNV- Mizo National Vounteers

MP- Member of Parliament

MU- Mizo Union

NEC- National Emergency Committee

RAW- Research & Analysis Wing, Indias external Intelligence agencySDO- Sub-Divisional Officer

SF- Security Forces

SIB- Special Investigation Bureau

SRC- States Reorganisation Commission

SSA- State Security AgencyST- Scheduled Tribe

VCP- Village Council President


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Figure 1. Map of Mizoram, India


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Figure 2. A view of the old Aizawl town


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CHAPTER ONE

OUTBREAK IN THE MIZO HILLS:

REASONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Political awareness and activity had made a rather late entry due to the

non-involvement of the common people in the administration of their land.

The first sign of a political movement was in 1926 when a group of fiveyoung men from Aizawl travelled to Shillong in the hope of finding a way

to join the Assam Council. On their return, they were arrested by N.E.Parry, the then Superintendent of the Lushai Hills. It was to be another

twenty years before the next political activity of note took hold upon the

Mizo mind and the first political party, the Mizo Common Peoples

Union, later renamed Mizo Union was born on April 9, 1946.

The movement for Indias independence did not directly touch life in

the Lushai Hills nor was there active participation or widespread

awareness among the people. However, young people who had joined the

British Army during the two World Wars observed the changing tides and

were itching for action in their homeland. During the 1st World War, the

Lushai Hills military police battalion supplied 103 officers and men for

the army. They also sent 101 oficers and men to Manipur. Throughout the

war, the battalion supplied men to the Gurkha Brigade. A labour corps of2100 men also went to France in 1917. In the 2nd World War, about 3550

Lushai men and women were enlisted in different branches of the militaryand medical services.1 These young men and women were no longer

satisfied with the District Conference constituted by the British where the

minority population- the chiefs, and the commoners were equally

represented. In 1946, on the eve of Indias independence was thus born the

first political party named the Mizo Common Peoples Union. When the

then Superintendent A.G. McCall revived the District Conference in 1946

with the objective of framing a constitution for Mizoram and proposing for

the Lushai Hills, the status of a protectorate state under the British, the

Mizo Union demanded a two-third representation for commoners in theConference to ensure their participation. This was rejected resulting in the


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Outbreak in the Mizo Hills - Reasons and Responsibilities2

partys boycott of elections to the District Conference leading to its

eventual collapse. Chaube quotes a Mizo Union veteran as saying, At the

end of the war when the talk of Indian Independence was in the air, theMizos like the Nagas would have demanded the Mizo independence but

for one reason they did not do so. 2 The people of the Lushai Hills had

only experienced limited direct colonial domination and exploitation so to

them the tribal chiefs appeared more oppressive than the colonial masters.

Independence or the status of a Crown Colony could only imply further

perpetration of chieftainship- an unacceptable situation to the rising

middle class.

The first general assembly of the party in September, 1946 debated

over three options for the future of the Lushai Hills- joining the Union of

Burma, becoming independent or remaining with India. The option of

remaining with India found favour among the majority, who were also in

favour of abolishing chieftainship. This led to a split in the partys ranks

with the dissidents forming the United Mizo Freedom Organisation

(UMFO) having the object of joining Burma but this programme was

short-lived. When the Constituent Assembly Advisory Committee underGopinath Bordoloi met with the Mizo Union leaders on April 18, 1947,

the Mizo Union leaders submitted a memorandum in favour of an

Autonomous District Council for the Lushai Hills, with a change in thename from Lushai to the more inclusive Mizo. This was finalised in the

July meeting of the Bordoloi Committee at Shillong attended by the two

co-opted Mizo members- Khawtinkhuma and Ch. Saprawnga. A meetingcalled by the Superintendant on August 14, 1947 at Aizawl and attended

by representatives of political parties, chiefs and other accredited leaders

accepted the fait accompli of the Lushai Hills inclusion in independent

India with a 10-year stipulation. The meeting resolved to demand the

continuation of the Chin Hills Regulation and the Bengal Eastern Frontier

Regulation. The meetings resolution No. 3 reads-

That the Lushais will be allowed to opt out of the Indian Union when they

wish to do so subject to a minimum of ten years. 3

The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India creating Autonomous

District Councils accomodated many demands and the Mizo Hills District

was formally constituted on April 25, 1952.


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Chapter One 3

Mautam and the birth of the Mizo National Front

Mizoram witnesses a cyclic ecological phenomena every 48-50 yearscalledMautam- bamboo death, where the bamboos covering nearly half of

the forested area flowers, leading to a huge rise in rat population. The rats

feed on the seeds of the flowering bamboos and then raid stored grains and

paddy fields once the seeds are depleted causing severe famine. The

records of the British Government in India indicate that Mizoram suffered

severe famine in 1862 and again in 1911- preceded on both occasions by

the flowering of bamboos. When this phenomenon hit the hills again in

1958-59, the state government of Assam dismissed local forecasts as

superstitious raving, and was unprepared to fight off the rodents or provideadequate relief for the massive food shortages that followed.4 The Mizo

District Councils request to the Assam state government for an advance

of Rs 1, 50,000 for preparatory measures was rejected. When famine

actually struck, it took the government more than Rs 190 lakhs to provide

relief measures, which, by then, were too late to avert the many deaths and

hardships suffered by the population.5

This apparent indifference of the state government made the people

bitter towards the vai

6

rulers especially since they recalled how even thecolonial rulers had made concerted efforts to help the people during an

earlier occurrence. This was the first time that the periodic famine had had

such adverse effects and to the Mizo people, the blame was to be firmlyplaced on their Indian rulers who appeared uncaring and utterly oblivious

to their plight. It appeared as though the Mizo Unions belief that joining

the Indian Union and securing the status of an autonomous district was

best for the Mizo people had been proven otherwise. The Mizo Cultural

Society had been formed by enlightened young men and women in 1955

and this organisation proved to be a godsend in the time of famine. Thename of the Society was changed to Mautam Front in March 1960 and to

Mizo National Famine Front in September 1960. They went about

collecting and distributing relief measures and soon became a popular

body recognised and respected by the general population. By October 22,

1961, the Famine Front under the dynamic leadership of Laldengaconverted itself into a political party, doing away with Famine and re-

christening itself as Mizo National Front.


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Outbreak in the Mizo Hills - Reasons and Responsibilities4

The aims of the Mizo National Front (MNF) were-

1.

To serve the highest sovereignty and to unite all the Mizos to liveunder one political boundary.

2. To uplift the Mizo position and to develop it to the highest level.3. To preserve and safeguard Christianity.7

These avowed aims of the Front were propagated with great

enthusiasm and the Fronts earlier popularity during the famine was

worked to the highest advantage. Moreover, the dynamism of its leadersand their apparent conviction to causes that were so dear to the Mizo

people soon brought them a large and enviable following. The territorial

demarcations made by the British had never been acceptable to the Mizo

people because it had caused the separation of the people into different

political boundaries, worsened by the separation of Burma in 1937, the

partition of India in 1947 and the demarcation of hill states within India,

causing national and international boundary lines to run between erstwhilebrothers. Developmental activities in the Hill District were also few and

far between, much below what the people had been led to expect. The

devastating effects of the Mautam famine also led the people to believe

that the Assam state and the Union Government of India were completely

indifferent to their plight and unsympathetic towards their suffering.

Another point propagated by the MNF and strongly advocated by their

leaders was that their Christian faith was being threatened by the Hindu-

dominated Indian Union. Hluna quotes Lalthangliana: The Indian

officials intentionally used Sundays for their official visit of Mizo Hills so

as to render the Mizo Christians unable to observe their prayers. They

want us to pay less regards to our sacred days.8

Growth of the MNF

Encouraged by the overwhelming response, the MNF contested the

1962 District Council elections with dismal results. By 1963, however,they managed to win two out of three seats in the Assam Assembly bye-

elections- J.F. Manliana from Aizawl West and Lalmawia from Lunglei.

In the same year, they also captured 145 Village Council seats out of 411

in the Aizawl sub-division. A separate Mizo nation continued to be thebastion of the MNF call and the party initially professed non-violence as a

t hi thi i L ld t

The Mizo Uprising (1966-1971)

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Transcript of The Mizo Uprising (1966-1971)