THE MILITARY GLIDER REVISITED - AJOL

THE MILITARY GLIDER REVISITEDHelmoed-Romer Heitman*

The military glider has, arguably, enjoyed thebriefest life span of any major military equipmenttype - spanning not much more than a decadeand a half from the entry into production of thefirst, to the demise of the concept as such. Dur-ing its heyday, however, the glider was instru-mental in not a few spectacular operations.Thus, it is not really surprising that some of themore iconoclastic military thinkers have, albeitinfrequently, wondered whether there is not stilla place for up to date gliders in modern warfare.

Just over one year ago, Lieutenant McGill Alex-ander addressed this question in an article inMilitaria, reviewing the glider's primary charac-teristics and suggesting that these might meritserious consideration of the glider as a comple-ment to paratroops. Interestingly, he alsotouched on the possibility of employing glidersin the resupply of fast moving mechanisedforces. This article will outline several otherpossible applications of the military glider in theSouthern African context, addressing both lowintensity and conventional war.

Before setting out to do this, it is perhaps as wellto briefly review the glider's salient characteris-tics. In essence, it has many of the capabilitiesof the helicopter which, in fact, largely sup-planted it. Its disadvantage relative to the heli-copter is that it allows only for delivery, a differ-ent means of extraction being required. On theother hand, the glider can project power to muchgreater ranges than even the latest helicopters.Setting out its salient characteristics in pointform, we have:

• Long range, limited only by the range of avail-able transport aircraft and air support;

• Extreme accuracy of placement;• The ability to deliver a concentrated group of

men ready to go into action;• The ability to deliver heavy equipment;• The ability to deliver concentrated supply

loads;• The ability to land on quite rough and very

short unprepared pieces of more or less levelground;

• Relative imperviousness to local weather con-ditions;

• Relative expendability resulting from relatively

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low cost and simplicity, the latter also allowinglocal development and production.

• Little or no requirement for specialised train-ing on the part of the troops to be landed,allowing normal infantry to be so employedafter basic orientation and thereby freeingparatroops for more specialised tasks.

• A degree of immunity to current air defences,having no infrared and only - depending onconstruction - a low radar signature;

• The ability to deliver a measure of suppres-sive fire during the landing phase by meansof fixed or flexibly mounted machine guns 1 orpossibly even underwing rocket pools2.

• The possibility of co-inciding the landingphase with a preparatory air strike, and

• The related ability to land its passengers onthe objective to be assaulted without incurringunacceptable risks.

Applying these characteristics in the southernAfrican situation, we can find applications bothin the external element of COIN operations andin more conventional warfare.

In the former case, one result of our successfulraids against PLAN bases in southern Angolahas been to force their relocation deeper intothat country. The disadvantages of this to PLANare readily apparant, but there are also disad-vantages to ourselves which are less so.

Then, too, we face the situation that distance willincreasingly hamper the employment of heli-borne assault until the stage is reached whereusefully laden helicopters might well be able toreach the objective, but would be unable to re-turn without refuelling. This will then leave us withrather restricted options:

• An entirely overland raid;• A paradrop near the objective;• A heliborne raid relying on refuelling on the

objective or• A combination of any of the above .

None of these will be without serious disadvan-tages.

Thus, an overland raid would inevitably be sowell advertised that, far from achieving any

Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 3, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

/•....' ..".German Tank carrying a glider WW II

worthwhile measure of surprise, the raiding forcecould very well find itself ambushed and/or cutoff by a superior force. Such a force could notonly be superior in terms of size, but also interms of the type of equipment deployed as itwould, in effect, be operating on interior lines.Also, the further such a raiding force penetrates,the greater will be its vulnerability to air attack asthe SAAF's ability to provide a continuous CAPat long range would be limited. At the very best,such a raid would encounter fully prepared andalerted defences. Instead of a short, sharp -almost surgical - strike, we could thus find our-selves faced with a very messy and potentiallycostly imbroglio that would serve only to providethe enemy with a welcome source of propa-ganda material.

A paradropped raiding force could well- by dintof low flying during the approach - achieve ameasure of surprise but would face several otherserious problems. Thus a very low level dropwould go some way towards delaying discoverybut would require extremely accurate navigationand also carry with it a not inconsiderable risk ofserious injury problems. A more conventional

43Example of a Horsa Glider


drop, on the other hand, would almost certainlyresult in the transport aircraft being acquired bythe local air defences, which could prove unac-ceptably costly. Then, too, the sound of the air-craft would in either case serve to alert the garri-son unless the DZ is some distance from theobjective - which would in itself create addi-tional problems.

Once on the ground, such a raiding force wouldbe highly vulnerable to any interference at alluntil it has successfully consolidated. Even then,it will remain painfully vulnerable to any mecha-nised force until and unless at least some heavyequipment can be dropped. Unless the terrainand the enemy situation allow low-level extrac-tion techniques to be employed, this will how-ever, only be possible after the local air de-fences have been neutralised. A paradroppedraiding force might well also experience diffi-culty in overcoming the alerted defences, lack-ing as it would, any integral heavy support.

Finally, there remains the question of extraction,although this could probably be quite readilyhandled by helicopter - if a sufficiently secureLZ can be established. This would be of particu-lar importance if the raid was carried out atextreme range, as the helicopters might thenhave to be refuelled on the ground. In turn, thispresents another set of problems - that of accu-rate (ie within the LZ) fuel delivery and its hand-ling on the ground - should the helicopters notbe able to carry sufficient fuel as cargo on theway to the objective.

The vulnerability of a heliborne raid relying onrefuelling on the objective for its extraction, issufficiently apparant not to warrant further dis-cussion here. Suffice it to say that one majorproblem would be the delivery of the fuel in theabsence - which must be assumed in the caseof a large raid - of sufficient helicopters to trans-port both the raiding force and the necessaryfuel.

While a combination of these approaches wouldgo a little way towards ameliorating some ofthese problems, none would be entirely satisfac-tory as the essential weaknesses would remain:the obviousness of a ground force on a longapproach; the extreme vulnerability of unsup-ported paratroops and the range - and number!- limitations of helicopters. It is in this contextthat the concept of the assault glider would ap-pear to merit serious consideration as an ele-ment of cross-border deep-penetration raids.

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A glider-borne deep-penetration raid might,thus, take the following form:

• An extremely low level approach by the towedgliders to the release point, thereby seeking tounderfly the opposing surveillance system, afighter and/or flak suppression escort beingprovided if deemed necessary;

• An equally low approach by seperate andlater starting successive strike and groundsupport forces;

• Gliders released some ten minutes from theobjective, using JATO type rocket assistanceto 'pop up' to an altitude from which they canacquire and reach the objective3, then divingtowards it, the towing aircraft returning tobase at low altitude;

• A preparatory strike on the objective timed toco-incide with the assault force coming withinearshot of the objective, thereby distractingthe defenders' attention from the sound andsight of the JATO 'pop up' and, if necessary,the sound of the towing aircraft.4 This strikewould employ exclusively cluster, fragmenta-tion (free-fall or rockets), fuel-air or napalmweapons and cannon fire in order to minimisethe danger of significant terrain-deformationwhich could endanger the landing gliders:

• The gliders land on the objective immediatelyafter the preparatory strike and under cover ofground support aircraft which, being relativelymanoeuverable at low speeds could continueto engage the ground defences during thelanding phase. They would use droguechutes and/or retro-rockets to reduce theirlanding run to a minimum.5

• The assault force disembarks and goes intoaction under the continued cover of groundsupport aircraft and using whatever heavyequipment has been brought in in assault orcargo gliders. This could well include heavymortars, light guns and Eland-90s.

• Relieving ground support aircraft stand off,coming in to deal with indicated targets as theassault force proceeds to clear the objectiveof the enemy.

• Once the assault force has accomplished itsmission, helicopters are brought in to extractit, refuelling if necessary from fuel carried ascargo on the run in to the objective or landedin cargo gliders. The gliders and equipmenttoo heavy to be lifted out are destroyed and/orbooby trapped. Ground support aircraft coverthe extraction and, together with fighters, es-cort the returning helicopters. Where sufficientlevel ground is available, undamaged gliderscould be picked up by their towing aircraft,


which would also allow for the extraction ofheavy equipment - such as Eland 90s - andcaptured items of interest.6 In the event of anairfield being available on the objective, ex-traction would, of course, be still more simpli-fied.

In the event of a raiding force being intended tooperate in the vicinity of the objective for sometime, both attack and medium helicopters couldbe operated from the original objective, beingsupplied with fuel and spares by glider or para-chute as convenient or most practical. The re-mainder of the force could then be suppliedsimilarly, with delivery to some elements perhapshandled by the forward based helicopters. Insuch a case, the necessary forward mainte-nance/repair facilities for all types of equipmentcould be provided by flying suitably equippedcargo gliders into the objective.? Covered andproperly equipped and fitted workshop facilitiescould thus be provided, easing the vehicle andequipment maintenance problem and eliminat-ing the need for the forward based helicopters toreturn to their home base for any but major over-hauls.

A raid such as that set out above, would naturallyonly be justified by a major base or base areaand there is probably a lower limit below whichsuch a glider-borne raid might no longer be anefficient approach. This limit will, however, be setas much by the importance of the particular ob-jective as by its simple size. Taking a differentapproach, a glider-borne raid could well alsorecommend itself in the case of an objective thatis within helicopter range but where absolutesurprise is essential. In such a case, a smallraiding party could be inserted by glider, arrivingsilently without a preparatory strike but perhapsenjoying air support once on the objective andthen being speedily extracted by helicopter.Such an approach might, for instance, be usedwhere the intention is to seize a particular pris-oner or item of equipment.

Considering the glider-borne raid in comparisonto the other options outlined earlier, we find that itoffers:

• A greater measure of surprise than any but,perhaps, a direct heliborne assault;

• Potentially reduced vulnerability by compari-son with a heliborne or paradropped raidingforce.

• Greater depth then could be achieved by apurely heliborne assault.

• Considerably less risk of losing irreplaceableaircraft than either a heliborne assault or aparadrop: other than the strike and groundsupport aircraft - which are at equal risk inany event - the only aircraft exposed to the airdefences at the objective are the gliders.These would, in fact, in all probability proverelatively invulnerable to these air defences -they would have no infra-red signature tospeak of (the JATO pods would be droppedwell clear of the objective), are silent in theirapproach and would be flying a rather unex-pected profile which would serve to furtherconfuse anti-aircraft gunners and would in allprobability have a very low radar signature.Once on the ground, their landing run wouldbe extremely and thus unexpectedly shortand the retro-rockets would help cover thedisembarkation phase. Then, too, they coulddeliver a measure of suppressive fire them-selves and their landing could be covered byground support aircraft (which is somewhatmore difficult to achive in the case of a para-drop). Finally, the gliders, if not their passen-gers, would, after all, be expendable. To bringback a glider is nice, to lose one is accept-able; to lose a Puma or a C-130 is far fromacceptable.

Summing up, a glider-borne deep-penetrationraid would offer all the advantages of both aheliborne and a parachute raid while greatly re-ducing their inherent disadvantages.

Considering a possible conventional assault onthe Republic, this situation, too, would appear tooffer not inconsiderable scope for airborne ope-rations. In any of these, the employment of gli-ders could again offer significant advantagesover the more conventional parachute delivery.In this regard it is perhaps as well to recall thatGeneral Student - in effect the founder of theGerman airborne forces - felt that large scaleparachute operations were too costly in lives forthe benefits that they might offer. Another pointthat he made very strongly in this regard, is thatthe formation of large specialised airborne ele-ments has a deletrious effect upon the rest of thearmy by drawing away too high a proportion ofthe best combat personnel. Both of these con-siderations are, of course, to a large measureaddressed by the glider.

The aim of any conventional assault on the Re-public would have to be to engage and destroyour manoeuvre elements, thereby seeking tocreate a favourable situation for a revolutionary

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take-over of power by the selected parties. Therealities of force: space ratios and logistic prob-lems would render any attempt at a more con-ventional invasion/occupation far too costly for itto be worthwhile in the foreseeable future. Wewould thus not face a 1939/45 style war butrather something more closely akin to the earlyoperations by the Boer forces before they al-lowed themselves to be drawn into static warfare- in effect columnar warfare of the type that canalso be found much further back in military his-tory.

In brief, such an assault would seem likely totake the form of multiple high-speed thrusts byarmoured/mechanised forces towards the vitalRand area, thereby drawing and engaging ourmanoeuvre elements. For the destruction ofthese, the attacker would rely on armour superi-ority and the exploitation of his initiative toachieve a defeat in detail. These semi-conven-tional operations would be accompanied bywidespread, thoroughly orchestrated civil dis-obedience, rioting, sabotage, urban terrorismand rural guerilla operations. These would servenot only to distract and hamper us, but also toprepare the way for a takeover once the conven-tional phase is completed. In this way, a rela-tively small attacking force would hope toachieve its aim and, if not swiftly and imagina-tively countered, might in fact be able to do so.Of necessity, the above outline is extremelysketchy and over-simplified. It should, however,suffice to set the scene and it certainly doesmatch with current Soviet doctrine concerningconventional operations.

Two of the major problems facing such an at-tacker would result from the sheer size and fromthe great distance of the southern Africantheatre: an extremely poor force: space ratio andsome extremely long lines of communication. Incombination, these would appear to offer us aplethora of highly lucrative and vulnerable tar-gets. Vulnerable because the enemy will hardlybe able to spare many effective combat ele-ments for rear area security and highly lucrativebecause the aforementioned distances will ren-der him almost uniquely vulnerable to any dis-ruption of his logistics. This, latter, particularlyalso in view of the fact that his force will berelatively smaal by comparison with our overallcapability, which any delay on his part will facili-tate our mobilising and concentrating.

For ourselves, it will be essential that we borrowfrom what is today Soviet doctrine and imme-

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diately engage the enemy over his entire depth.Only in this way can we reasonably expect tobalance out his armoured superiority and to im-pose sufficient friction upon him to allow an ef-fective overall response. Raiding by groundforces is likely to be the most effective way ofachieving this aim.

Some such raids could, of course, be carried outoverland by means of small mechanised combatteams passing into the enemy's rear between hisadvancing columns. One possibility that springsto mind here, would be to employ suitably modi-fied 'long range' Ratel-20s, 90s and 81 s togetherwith the appropriate support vehicles. Resupplyduring the course of such a raid might well be byair, where the glider could play a major role.Over shorter distances, heliborne raids also offerconsiderable potential, although many if notmost of our scarce helicopters would in all pro-bability be fully engaged in supporting the initialcovering-force battles and the later counter-thrusts. Raids to greater depth would in anyevent have to be either parachute or glider in-serted.

Some possibilities for airborne operations of allthree basic types would include:

During the initial defensive phase:

• The movement of forces of varying sizes toseize terrain ahead of advancing enemy co-lumns where time does not allow for overlandmovement;

• The seizure of choke points behind the ad-vancing enemy columns in order to hampertheir resupply and reinforcement;

• Raids against enemy dumps, installations, air-bases and headquarters;

• The positioning of scouts, observation andtarget designation teams in the enemy's rear;

• The insertion of light mobile raiding groups inthe enemy's far rear in order to begin disrup-tion of his logistics and

• The establishment of temporary airheads inthe enemy's far rear to support and controlraiding groups harrassing his lines of com-munication.

During the subsequent counter-offensive phase,possible additional operations might include:

• The seizure of terrain and/or installations vitalto our advance and/or to the enemy's withdra-wei;

• The establishment of expanding airheads on


our axes of advance and/or on the enemy'swithdrawel axes;

• The establishment of expanding airheads inthe enemy's far rear and

• The seizure of airfields in the enemy's rearand the establishment of expanding airheadson these.

In most of these possible operations, gliderscould offer considerable advantages over para-chute delivery both during the initial assault orinseltion and later in the resupply role.

Most importantly, they would allow the employ-ment of normal infantry and other elements,thereby freeing fully trained paratroops for morespecialised missions or for operations beyondhelicopter range but where terrain does not allowthe employment of gliders. The use of suitablegliders could thus greatly expand our potentialfor airborne operations and thereby add consi-derable flexibility to our operations and enhanceour ability to speedily engage the enemy over hisentire depth. The great operational mobility ofgliderborne forces would also allow their deploy-ment from far to the rear which would serve toease our mobilisation problems by freeing for-ward elements from many raiding tasks.

Naturally, such operations would require varyingdegrees of at least temporary local air superiorityif they are to be practicable. In this regard, itmust be remembered that much of the enemy'sair power would, in the opening phase at least,be fully engaged in counter-air operations andthe support of his own advancing columns. As-suming that the enemy does not succeed ingaining air supremacy during this stage, thesituation should, at worst, remain the same dur-ing our later counter-offensive phase; at best, wemight have full air supremacy. At this poi~t itmight be argued that once we have air suprem-acy, there would no longer be any need for suchraiding operations. The reply to this is, of course,that air power alone will not be sufficient - oneneed merely consider the German Army's con-tinued ability to operate in the face of absoluteAllied air supremacy after the 1944 landings orthe October 1973 war.

In any event the application of airborne opera-tions during a counter-offensive phase wouldserve to greatly speed up the enemy's collapse.Not only would this serve to save lives - andmoney! - it might well also serve to preclude theenemy's backers making good their initial false

assessment by rushing in reinforcements, notleast aircraft.

Most of the possible airborne operations listedabove would be more or less conventional inexecution and there are ample historical ex-amples of such raids and operations available.They will, therefore, not be further discussedhere except to once again stress the potentialadvantages of gliders in such operations - ad-vantages that will be apparent from a compari-son of the glider's characteristics with each indi-vidual mission's requirements. Two aspects thatdo seem to merit further discussion, however,are the insertion of mobile raiding forces into theenemy's far rear and the concept of the expan-ding airhead.

As has been discussed above, one of the majorproblems facing a conventional attacker will behis inordinately long and vulnerable lines of com-munication. The effect of small mechanised rai-ding groups roaming the enemy's rear underthese circumstances, can be readily imagined.Unfortunately, overland penetration into the ene-my's far rear will not be a practicable propositionif only because of the time factor - such penetra-tion would take several days before the forcewas far enough in to begin operating; days thatwe will not be able to afford. Given suitable ve-hicles, however, there is no reason why the inser-tion should not be by air. Vehicles such as theEland series or a possible successor familywould seem ideally suited to this role.

While parachute delivery is possible, this wouldnormally require the transport aircraft to climb toan altitude where they might all too easily beacquired by surveillance radars. Low-level ex-traction techniques might be useable but couldresult in unacceptable losses on unpreparedveld. Gliders, on the other hand, would not evenneed to 'pop up' as in the raid previously de-scribed as in this case pinpoint accuracy oflanding would not be required. Consideringsouthern Africa's topography, there should alsobe no shortage of potential landing zones. Thetowing aircraft and any escort, could fly low onboth legs of the insertion. Another advantage ofglider delivery would again be that the vehiclesand crews would be guarranteed to arrive to-gether, which will speed up the reaction to anyunforseen events on the ground. A small path-finder team might have first to be inserted in alow-level drop.

Once landed, such small (perhaps around a

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dozen vehicles) raiding groups would set out toconduct hit and run raids, ambushes and mine-laying over a large assigned area. Potential tar-gets would include road convoys, trains, dumpsand installations, communications facilities andpossibly even rearward airfields. For their secu-rity such forces would rely on:

• Their mobility;• The small size and low signatures of their

vehicles as well as the difficulty the localpopulation would have in telling one light ar-moured vehicle from another;

• The lack of serious opposition;• The low population density in many of the

likely areas and the lack of effective communi-cations and

• Most importantly, the simultaneous operationsby several such groups as well as by otherraiding groups closer behind the actual areaof major operations which, together, wouldconfuse and distract the enemy and hinderhis concentration against anyone of them.

One possible vehicle mix for such a force wouldcomprise Eland (or successor model) 20s, 90s, aturretless version fitted with an 81mm mortar anda few logistic vehicles, probably 1 or 2 tonnetrucks.

As an area becomes untenable or unrewarding,the raiders could move on or be extracted de-pending upon the current situation. During theoperation itself, resupply would be by means ofparadrop or glider as is appropriate in eachcase. Replacements and replacement vehiclescould be similarly delivered. Final extraction andthe extraction of wounded or sick personnelwould present some difficulties which need not,however, be unsurmountable. Depending on thelocation of the force at the time when extractionbecomes necessary, this might well be possibleby helicopter - additional fuel either being deli-vered previously or being carried as cargo bythe helicopters on the way in. This would, ofcourse, entail the abandonment of the vehiclesalthough critical items of their equipment couldbe taken out with the personnel. Casevac mightbe similarly handled.

Should a road or other suitable terrain be avail-able, extraction could be by means of transportaircraft or landed and recovered gliders. In thiscase, the vehicles could, of course, also be re-covered if sufficient time is available. Casualtyextractions could also be handled by light air-craft fitted for long range operation and using

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roads or other flat ground to land on. Othermeans of extraction could be by sea or by theraiders moving under their own power overlandand through the area of main operations back toour own lines. In fact, final extraction might notbe necessary until after the enemy's collapse,when it would be a fairly peaceful exercise. Apartfrom the potential extraction problem, such rai-ding groups would probably be at less risk thanmany of the more conventionally employed units.Where distance/payload factors might precludeeven the insertion of even light armoured ve-hicles, armed and suitably equipped Land-rovertype vehicles could be employed in their stead.These would merely have to be somewhat morecircumspect in their choice of target and meansof engagement.

Suitably orchestrated as a system, the threetypes of raiding forces - long range Ratels pene-trating the combat zone overland and operatingin the enemy's immediate rear, airlanded Elandtype vehicles in his far rear and light vehicles inhis extreme rear - could come close to bringingabout a total collapse of the enemy's zone ofcommunications. This would seriously slowdown the operations - be it his advance or laterwithdrawel - and also force the diversion ofscarce combat elements in an attempt to dealwith the problem. This, in turn, would weaken hisforward forces and could go some way towardsallowing a major thrust by our manoeuvre forces.A relatively small investment of men and equip-ment could, therefore, have a major and lastingeffect on the enemy's operations.

A more ambitious approach would be the estab-lishment of airheads in the enemy's rear as indi-cated above. Where security considerationswould allow the establishment of these for aperiod, they would allow markedly more inten-sive raiding operations to be conducted. In somecases, it might even be possible to fly in helicop-ters to expand the area of operations by ferryingsupplies to the raiding parties or even combathelicopters to operate in their own right. As itbecomes plain that the enemy is about to putserious pressure on such an airhead, it couldeither be totally extracted - by means similar tothose discussed above - or be relocated to asafer and/or more fruitful area. In each case theraiding groups that the airhead has been sup-porting would operate as independant groupsresupplied directly by air until they, too, are ex-tracted or move into the area of another - or therelocated - airhead.


The airheads envisaged here would not be par-ticularly large and would ideally be fully mobile,comprising only the bare minimum of mainte-nance, medical and command personnel neces-sary to control and support the raiding opera-tions in their area. An at least temporarily fixedone would, of course, have advantages. Thus,suitably equipped gliders could be flown in to beused as workshops, dressing stations and com-munications centres and it could even be pos-sible to bring in equipment to level an area largeenough to allow powered transport aircraft toland. The specially fitted gliders would naturallybe extracted and moved with the airhead butwould hardly be worth establishing in an airheadthat moves every day or so. In such a case aminimum of suitably fitted containers/sheltersmight be airlanded during the initial establish-ment and thereafter moved by the attached heli-copters or on light trucks as necessary. Thesame would apply to other equipment such asbladder tanks and some essential vehicles, suchas small front-end loader/forklift combinations.Other vehicles could then move overland.

Security for a new site could initially be providedby one of the raiding groups until the airhead isfully established. It might also pay to keep somearmoured vehicles in the immediate vicinity as amatter of policy in order to assist in the defenceof the airhead should it come under ground at-tack. Air defence would be provided by lightequipment moving with the airhead. Apart fromRedeye/Strela type weapons, truck mounted20mm guns could be inserted, as could moresophisticated types of equipment if available.The initial establishment of such an airheadwould follow much the same sequence for theglider-borne raid except that it would not involveenemy contact. A strike/ground support forceshould none the less be on hand as a precautionunless one or more raiding groups are physicallyon the LZ. The latter approach would also elimi-nate the need for a prior insertion of pathfinders.

Once our manoeuvre forces have gone over tothe counter-offensive, the airhead approachcould be taken a step further by using enemyairfields as the basic site, after an airborne as-sault to seize them. Once established, such anairhead would then even allow for the employ-ment of fixed wing ground support aircraftagainst the enemy's lines of communication.Strike aircraft might even conceivably be re-fueled and armed at such an airhead in order toallow strikes even deeper into the enemy's rearwhile remaining based at their home bases for

maintenance purposes. Taking the airhead con-cept to this extreme would, of course, only be-come feasible once the enemy is clearly seen tobe at his limit or - alternatively - as a desperatemeasure should we be at ours. In the case of allof the airhead type operations, the risks could begreat but they would also be calculable with afair degree of accuracy - the potential rewardscould be well-nigh incalculable. While theywould be possible using conventional parachutedelivery, it would be the use of gliders that wouldmake such operations really practical proposi-tions once given the right conditions.

Having put forward several possible employ-ments of gliders in our defence, it is necessaryalso to briefly look at what types of gliders wemight need. In fact, this could be kept down totwo basic types with some of these then beingfitted out for the various specialised applications:

• A small, highly manoeuvreable assault gliderable to transport ten to twelve troops and theirequipment and possibly a small amount ofadditional cargo. Ideally, this glider wouldhave provision for some limited armament inorder to allow it to participate in the suppres-sion of the defences during an assault land-ing.

• A larger, cargo glider capable of deliveringbetween seven and ten tonnes of equipmentincluding light armoured cars.

Both would need to be sufficiently rugged toallow recovery where this is allowed by the ter-rain. Both might also advantageously be so de-signed as to allow the ready development ofpowered versions should these prove desireableor necessary - in the face of improved enemyair-surveillance/defences for instance, whichwould dictate earlier release. A version of thecargo glider suited to the delivery of containerswould probably also merit serious consideration.Other specialised versions could utilize the basicfuselage, merely incorporating the necessary fit-tings and equipment.

Totally seperate from these, but meriting consid-eration, is the possibility of a small poweredglider for surveillance operations, particularly incouterinsurgency. The basic concept was tried-a'pparantly with some success, in great part dueto its silence - by the Americans in Vietnam andit certainly does seem to offer potential in ourcase. In the long run, one could also foreseeremotely-piloted versions for various tasks.

Almost certainly there will be not a few readers of

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the above who will be certain by now that thewriter has taken leave of his senses - or perhapsthat he is a 'parabat' who has landed on his headonce too often. The writer believes - hopes? _that the former is not the case. As regards thelatter, he has grave doubts as to whether any-thing short of a major disaster would ever per-suade him to exit an aircraft without the benefit ofboarding stairs! Glider operations he would findrather more palatable.

Returning to the serious, some of the above sug-gestions will certainly appear rather wild at firstglance and they will equally certainly bring withthem many problems that the writer has not evenbeen able to conceive of, before they could be-come practicable. On the other hand, those whofirst suggested dropping troops out of aircraft inflight with only a small scrap of silk to slow downtheir descent, must also have caused somedoubts among their contemporaries as, indeed,did the initial backers of the glider. Certainly theone time commander of Eben Emael, should hestill be alive at this time, would be inclined to atleast take a close and serious look at these sug-gestions before - perhaps - casting them into

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the outer wilds of the circular file. Then, too, hemight find some merit in them.

It is the writer's hope that this will be the spirit inwhich they are read - as an initial reconnais-sance of new ground intended to provoke dis-cussion, thought, further writing and, perhaps, inthe long run, some action.

'Helmoed-Romer Heitman, SA (Econ)(UCT), B. Soc. Sci.(Hons)(Pub Adm)(UCT), MA (War studies)(London)

Footnotes1. As was done with several WW II German gliders. The light DFS 230, for

instance was on occasion fitted with a roof-mounted flexible MG and/ortwo fixed MGs in the nose.

2. Although turbulence problems could arise here.3. Several experiments were conducted successfully during WW II with

various similar methods of extending the gliders autonomous flight timealthough this 'pop up' is to the .writers best knowledge, a new approach.

4. The latter will depend on the distance from the objective at which thegliders can safely be released.

5. In the case of the 9 passenger DFS 230, a combination of drogue chuteand three retro-rockets reduced the landing run to between 14 and 18Metres.

6. This was carried out repeatedly during WW II by means of the towingaircraft hooking the suspended - between poles - bridle in a low pass.

7. As was regularly done by the Luftwaffe's tactical and transport units duringWWII.


THE MILITARY GLIDER REVISITED - AJOL

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