THE MID-CENTURY REVOLUTIONIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY REVISITED

by

RAYMOND A. MOORE, JR.

What were the underlying causes of thisrevolution and what are its dimensions andimplications today? According to Professors

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION

yet stayed out of a major conflict that wecould reasonably have been expected toavoid.

The isolation of the United States has,essentially, been a myth. Butisolationism-that is, the belief that theUnited States could stay out of the maincurrents of world history-has not been amyth. It has been real and it has influencedour policy of nonalignment. UntH 1945 theUnited States had never promised to aidanother country before she was attacked. Wefollowed a policy of "no prior commitments"and "no entangling alliances."

When the French Alliance was abrogatedby Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of1793, the United States formally inaugurateda policy which ended only when the UnitedStates joined the United Nations, signed theRio Pact, inaugurated the Marshall Plan,promulgated the Truman Doctrine, andinspired the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization.

When World War II was ended, the UnitedStates, for the first time in her nationalhistory, entered international politics fully inpeacetime as well as during a war. She madeprior commitments and entangling alliances.She entered the fray before the outbreak ofhostilities. This willingness of the UnitedStates to commit herself to the defense ofother nations before the outbreak of war (toover 42 nations at present, exclusive of ourUN commitment) constituted a fundamentalrevolution in American foreign policy.

*****

(Editor's Note: From the AmericanRevolution until 1945, the United Statespursued a foreign policy devoid of priorcommitments. As a result of World War II theUnited States reversed her historic policiesand began to play a full-scale role in worldaffairs. The dimensions and meaning of thischange are discussed in the article thatfollows, and an attempt is made to evaluatethe significance of this mid-century revolutiontoday after a quarter-century 's experience as agreat power.)

Understanding the intricacies ofin ternational politics is important forAmericans today because the United States isso deeply involved in international politics,despite a belief in some circles that we arebecoming more isolationist. Since the Peaceof Westphalia in 1648, the great world powershave been involved in 12 wars (13 if weinclude the war in Korea, and 14 if we includeVietnam, the longest in US history).Moreover, the United States has been involvedin mmor wars since colonial days, andalthough her degree of involvement hasvaried, it has tended to increase. We have not

Dr. Raymond A. Moore, Jr., Henry L. StimsonProfessor of Political Science at the Anny War College,1972-73 received his Master ofArts and Doctor of Philosophydegrees in InternationalRelations and AmericanGovernment from ColumbiaUniversity. He is presently onleave from the University ofSouth Carolina where is aprofessor of government andinternational studies.

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Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in the presence of President Truman, signingthe United Nations Charter on June 26, 1945.

~,.

European culture in varying fonns ofassociation, such as the European Coal andSteel Community, the Commonwealth ofNations and the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization. This has produced the challengeof the Common Market and New Europe, theGaullist reaction, and the Commonwealthdilemma over Britain's role in Europe andabroad.

6. The new necessity, especially for thesuperpowers, to do things in peacetime whichmany states fonnerly did only in war:

maintaining a high level of defensemobilization; engaging in coalitionmilitary planning; financing a massiveforeign aid program; and developing avigorous psychological warfare strategy.These involve such problems as thechallenge of high taxes; the need fordisciplined social and political action; anoverriding patience, forbearance, and yetdetermination to sustain policies whichwill protect the country, but still repel-ifnot defeat-real or potential enemies.

These six transfonnations, coupled withthe impact of two major world wars, had sochanged the environment of internationalpolitics that by 1945 it became apparent thatthe best chance for the United States to avoidanother world conflict was to help preventone. And the best chance the United Stateshad to survive a war was to so conduct herselfthat she did not lose a war before the actualfighting began.

THE WORLD WAR" WATERSHED

World War II was a major watershed in ournational history. This watershed created thefollowing major consequences for the UnitedStates:

1. The United States and the USSRemerged as genuine superpowers withworldwide interests which eventually clashedin 1947 and thereafter.

2. Our traditional European allies, Britainand France, were weakened, making itnecessary for the United States to help themin the postwar period.

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3. The defeat of Germany, Italy, andJapan and their ensuing loss of power createdvacuums and economic problems with whichthe United States was forced to deal.

4. The general political collapse of Europemade it necessary for the United States toplay a major role in postwar reconstructionand defense.

5. The triumphs of revolutionarynationalism in Asia, the Near East, and Africacreated immense problems concerning "theRevolution of Rising Expectations"; the newnations' role in world affairs and the UnitedNations; the population explosion; thegrowing gap between rich and poor countries;and the proper US policy towards theseemergent, developing regimes.

WORLD WAR II WAS A MAJORWATERSHED IN OURNATIONAL HISTORY.

6. The effects of the fall of ChiangKai-Shek's government and the Communisttakeover of China are only beginning to befully realized by the United States.

7. The Atomic Age fully arrived with itsawesome problems of the control,proliferation, and testing of weapons.

8. New international organizations wereformed to help build a better world andresume the Great Experiment to organize apeaceful world through the United Nations.

9. The US Government and its people hadto learn that war alone does not solve politicalproblems, but as Von Clausewitz well knew,war was but the continuation of state politicsby other means.

In light of her World War II experience, theUnited States reversed her historicnonalignment policy and proceeded toundertake a series of major commitments inwhich she pledged herself to defend manyareas and nations:

I. Helped to found the Organization ofAmerican States in 1948 which encompassesall the Latin American States except Cuba.

2. Organized the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization of 1949 covering the majorstates of Western Europe.

3. Created the Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization in 1954 to help defend that areaagainst aggression and subversion.

4. Affiliated herself with the CentralTreaty Organization in 1955 to defend the

lending agencies and now helps support 22international operating agencies at a cost of1/3 of a billion dollars annually.

8. Attends over 500 internationalconferences annually covering subjects fromatomic energy to zinc and conservation ofAtlantic tuna to control of desert locusts.

Perhaps, indeed, as Harlan Cleveland has

With President Truman looking on, Secretary of State Dean Acheson signs theNorth Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949.

over 56 internationalexclusive of international

Northern Tier of the Middle East, Turkey,Iran, and Pakistan, against attack.

5. Negotiated the ANZUS pact of 1951with Australia and New Zealand.

6. Mad e bilateral treaties with thePhilippines in 1951; Japan in 1951; SouthKorea in 1953; The Republic of China in1955.

7. Joinedorg an izations

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suggested, the goal of postwar Americanforeign policy was "to make the world safefor diversity."

IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES

Lincoln Gordon has pointed out that theimpact of World War II and the Cold War, andthe emergence of new nations from oldempires, when superimposed on a long-run

... THE GOAL OF POSTWARAMERICAN FOREIGN POLICYWAS TO MAKE THE WORLDSAFE FOR DIVERSITY.

Harlan Cleveland

trend toward increased participation ininternational politics, have expanded the olddimensions and introduced major newdimensions into US foreign relations. 2 Asnever before in a so-called time of peace,international problems hold the attention andinterest of the public, the Congress, and widesectors of the Executive Branch of theNational Government. Foreign policy loomsever larger in our elections, and recentPresidents have testified to the fact that mostof their energies are devoted to foreignrelations.

Administratively, the war and postwaryears saw the creation of many new agencies.Old agencies were transformed with theaddition of new branches. Other effortsconcentrated on strengthening the structureand staffing of long-established departments.In yet other instances, new methods and newinstitutions were set up to handle criticallyurgent tasks-the Defense Department, theCentral Intelligence Agency, and the NationalSecurity Council being cases in point. Someagencies subsequently disappeared; otherswere consolidated into older departmentalstructures; and still others have becomeseemingly permanent. As a consequence ofthe changed position of America in the worldmany policy concerns, once consideredexclusively domestic, now have internationalrepercussions that must be taken intoconsideration.

Even as these things occurred, theachievement of independence in the formerEuropean colonial areas greatly increased thenumber of countries in which the overseasfunctions of the US Government wereperformed. According to the US GovernmentManual for 1971-72, the United Statesmaintains official missions in 117 countries,

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more than double the number on the eve ofWorld War II. In addition, we maintain 167Consulate Generals, 9 Special Missions, 55Consulates, 4 Special Offices, and 9 ConsularAgencies. And in many of the regions whereour official overseas representation is still justgetting started, notably in Africa, the MiddleEast, and South and Southeast Asia, only afew Americans had previous acquaintancewith the peoples and cultures, which areprofoundly different from those of Europe orLatin America.

One indicator of the postwar problem ofoverseas representation is the sheer growth insize of civilian government employmentabroad. According to Lincoln Gordon, if theDepartment of Defense and the closelyrelated American Battle MonumentsCommission and Veterans Administration areex eluded, the number of US civilianemployees-American and alien-in foreigncountries expanded from 4,600 on the eve ofWorld War II to almost 43,000 in mid-I 963.Of this total, some 14,500 were Americancitizens.3 Since then, with the expansion ofthe Peace Corps, the Agency for InternationalDevelopment (A.I.D.), and the Alliance forProgress, the figure has risen still more. TheState Department alone now accounts for11,000 to 12,000 persons, of which about4,200 are Foreign Service officers, 3,500 arein administrative and consular positions, andanother 3,500 are engaged in clerical and staffwork. 4 A.I.D. employs 15,000 people, andthe Peace Corps has trained from IS ,000 to20,000 who have served in some 40 countries.

While there is probably no way ofmeasuring the corresponding increase in thenumber of Washington officials concernedwith foreign affairs, it can safely be assumedto be in proportion. Even by mid-1963, theState Department (including the Agency forInternational Development) accounted foralmost 10,000 employees in Washington, towhich must be added large segments of theDepartments of Defense, Commerce,Agriculture, Treasury, and other agencies.

The State Department alone now receivesup to 10,000 messages a day (over 400,000telegraphic words) from 179 differentpolitical entities, and its desk officers see

John Quincy Adams

CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE,CONSTANCY OF POLICY

In spite of all this change and growth it iswell to remind ourselves that although thecircumstances under which the Americannation must conduct its foreign relations havealtered radically, the purposes of the foreignpolicy remain remarkably constant.

John Quincy Adams, one of our greatestSecretaries of State, once remarked that "heknew of no change in policy, only ofcircumstances." Though circumstances haveso changed now as to alter our historicnonalignment policy, the underlying purposesof the Nation have not.

Today, as before, the foreign policy for theUnited States is the vehicle for theaccomplishment of goals set by (I) the

gave even further emphasis to foreignassistance as a long-range instrument ofAmerican foreign policy. New direction wasgiven to the program in the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961 by shifting towardlong-run development assistance, while stillpreserving past military and defense supportprograms. A Peace Corps was begun whichprovided opportunities for thousands ofyoung Americans to serve overseas asvolunteers in technical-assistance work indeveloping countries. Within the WesternHemisphere, a la-year Alliance for Progresswas proposed by President Kennedy toaccelerate badly needed economic and socialdevelopment. This was subscribed to by 20 ofthe American Republics in the Charter ofPunta del Este in August 1961.

Evidence for the spectacular growth of theUS commitment in the field of foreign policysince World War II could be extended almostindefinitely. Suffice it to say that therevolution which began in the closing days ofWorld War II had now come to fruition.

CHANGE INOF CIRCUM-

I KNOW NOPOLICY, ONLYSTANCES.

from 250 to 350 documents daily. It also is inreceipt of over 100,000 letters a year andsends out over 1,000 speakers a year toexplain its policies. Its annual budget nowexceeds $250 million. This is a far cry fromthe days in the 1880's when a Secretary ofState could tell President Hayes that therewere just two rules at the State Department:the first was that no business was conductedoutside of business hours; and the second wasthat no business was conducted duringbusiness hours. No doubt there are sometoday who wish the same rules still applied.

The growth of the Defense Department hasbeen even more spectacular. From a prewarArmy of 150,000 and combined forces under250,000, the present pefense Departmentemploys approximately 3 million people withbudgets running in excess of $75 billion. ThePentagon alone employs 25,000 people,including 350 generals and admirals. Care forveterans now costs $5 billion annually, morethan an entire prewar military budget.

Today over 50 agencies of the governmentare involved in the formulation and executionof US foreign policy.

From 1951 on, there was a steady trendtoward recognition that economic, technical,and military assistance would be importantelements of American foreign policy for manyyears to come. Legislative authorization forthese programs was provided annually underthe title "Mutual Security Program" and thesuccessive versions of Congressionalendorsement of the long-term character ofthese efforts. There were variations in theproportions of military and economicassistance, in the regional distribution, and inthe relative emphasis on internationalinstitutions and bilateral programs, but in oneform or another, the programs continue,providing resources in the range of $3 to $7billion per year. According to A.I.D., from1945 to 1968 the total figures for foreignassistance and loans amounted to $130billion, of which $38 billion went intomilitary aid. The Chairman of the HouseForeign Operations Subcommittee of theAppropriations Committee set the amount atmore than $171 billion.

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations

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country's historic traditions, (2) its currentfonnulation of the national interest, and (3)by objective physical conditions.

The chief purpose of that foreign policy, aswith that of any nation state in mid-20thcentury world society, is to preserve theindependent existence of the nation-itsterritory, its people, its institutions, and itsway of life. To achieve this purpose, a secureinternational environment was required, andin the postwar period the protection of theland, sea, and air approaches to the UnitedStates became a necessity. Protection againstair attack was sought through themaintenance of military bases in Greenlandand the Aleutians, plus an alliance withCanada. Protection against sea attack wasundertaken by the establishment of bases inthe Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and in theCaribbean Sea. The military and foreignpolicy army of the Government madecommitments accordingly. The security of theNation was widely thought to require that thecountry maintain either friendly and/ordominant relations with Canada and Mexico.For this reason, among others, the UnitedStates was a leader in the founding andsubsequent activities of the Organization ofAmerican States which requires its membersto come to the defense of any member nationattacked from inside or outside the WesternHemisphere. Because the security of theWestern Hemisphere may not in and of itselfbe sufficient protection for the United States,the defense frontiers have been extended toother areas where dominance by anunfriendly country, such as the USSR orCommunist China, would threaten to upset anexistent balance of power and thereforejeopardize the security of the United States.The Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines wereintended to extend a shield of militaryprotection to such vital areas as Greece,Turkey, and the Middle East, where thecountries concerned requested such aid. Inessence, then, the United States, for the sakeof its own security, sought to preserve afavorable balance of power in the WesternHemisphere and to maintain the existence ofa balance in Europe and Asia which woulddeter the USSR and Communist China fromestablishing hostile hegemonies.5

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POSITIVE GOALS

Although the protection of theindependence and security of the Nationconstituted the most fundamental goal of theUnited States in world affairs, it was by nomeans the only one. Other, more positivegoals-the preservation of peace, theextension of democracy and freedom, theeconomic advancement of the Free World,and the promotion of generalcommerce-took on added significance oncethe minimal goal was partially realized. Thoseaspects of foreign policy mentioned inconnection with the minimal goal do, ofcourse, often promote more positive aims aswell. Other efforts had an even more dualfunction-promoting both kinds-all of whichpoints up the interrelatedness of the variousaspects of US foreign policy. The morepositive goals stemmed, at least in part, fromthe active faith that democratic institutionsand the benefits of the modern-styled mixedeconomic system as they spread-would helpbuild peace, stability, and growth. There wasa n A merican conviction that theMarxist-Leninist predictions about the failureof the capitalist system had been proved false.The conviction was that the system, operatingin a climate of freedom, had accommodateditself by the development of devices formoderating satisfactorily the more violentvicissitudes of uncontrolled free enterpriseand had progressed far toward eliminating themore blatant aspects of a class-based society.With this conviction, the United Statessupported (and supports) internationaleconomic agencies-the World Bank, theInternational Monetary Fund, the technicalassistance programs of the United Nations,reciprocal trade agreements, the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, and some150 other organizations concerned withregulating and promoting commerce.

US programs of aid for allies and friendswere primarily for economic improvementrather than military aid-$20 billion toWestern Europe between July I, 1945 andSeptember 30, 1950, for example, and over$100 billion in economic aid since World WarII. Aid programs became an integral part ofUS foreign policy. At the same time, private

American capital was encouraged to expandits investments abroad and, in the process,help in the opening up of new resources andthe creation of industries through whichforeign standards of living would advance.Classic postwar American foreign policy, inbrief, encompassed the assumption that thecontinued economic progress of free peoplewas the strongest possible force for peace andstability.

These more positive goals of US foreignpolicy were further advanced by theGovernment's participation in the UnitedNations, which it recognized as anindispensable, if somewhat fragile, agency inthe preservation of peace. Experiencedemonstrated that the purpose and methodsof this international organization coincided toa substantial extent with the major outlines ofthe policy of this country. While it was not aseffective as America desired, it proved itsusefulness as an instrument for deterringdisruptive tendencies in such places as Korea,the Congo, and Cyprus; for dampeningcontroversies such as the Egyptian-Israelidisputes; and for focusing publiccondemnation upon the oppression visitedupon Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in1968. Other goals were also furthered by theadvancement of the program to harnessnuclear power to an "Atoms for Peace"agency within the United Nations; the testban treaty; the non-proliferation treaty, bythe dissemination of information through theUnited States Information Administration;and through efforts to expand culturalexchanges with Communist countries in thebelief that exposure to American institutionsand ideas would shake the certainty of thescientists, industrial managers, and educatedclasses of the Communist world.

The achievement of these postwar goals ofAmerican foreign policy in the latter half ofthe 20th century also demanded thatdomestic tranquility be maintained within theUnited States with a relatively high degree ofunity behind the broad policies of theGovernment. An expanding economy ofnearly full employment was thought requisite,as was an adequate defense establishmentprepared for both general and limited wars.

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One of the chief problems of US foreignpolicy, besides the maintenance of unity andprosperity at home and among her allies,involved its relations with the Communistnations. These nations, especially the SovietUnion and Communist China, were thoughtto constitute a serious threat to the securityof the United States because of the fusion ofa hostile revolutionary doctrine ofMarxist-Leninist Communism with theenormous expanse of the Russian and Chinesestates. Further, the USSR and China provedcapable of producing intercontinental ballisticmissiles and nuclear weapons ofunprecedented power. These were augmentedby the strength of historic Russian andChinese nationalism which could constituteproblems for America today, even withoutCommunist ideology. Leaders of the SovietUnion regarded the "principal characteristicsof our epoch" as "the emergence of socialisminto a world system." They declared that"capitalism has proved impotent to hinderthis worldwide process." Such sentiments,harnessed to a population of over 240 millionon an area three times the size of the UnitedStates, and with the second largest industrialcapacity of any nation, plus one of the largeststanding armies in the world, aloneconstituted a major challenge to America. Butwhen this challenge was compounded by thatrepresented by a hostile Communist Chinawith its enormous population, large landmass, expansive ambitions, and growingmilitary power, then the dangers werethought to be immense.

Coupled with this problem came theanticolonial revolutions in Asia, Africa, andthe Middle East. Nationalism in these areaswas often utilized and exploited byCommunists for their own purposes. TheUnited States looked at the growth of theseunderdeveloped areas with a sympathy rootedin the memories of her own origins. But theproblems of encouraging and aiding thesejustifiably impatient peoples to acquire thestability and· strength they needed to preservetheir independence, freedom, and theeconomic gains they desired so greatly-andyet to remain friendly with the UnitedStates-were incredibly complex, as the

United States learned to her sorrow inVietnam.

How the United States resolved theseproblems, and others, determined the successand the failures of her foreign policy for theyears following World War II.

THE REVOLUTION REVISITED

Now it seems justifiable to ask, as manyobservers, academic and otherwise, aredoing: 6

Has this revolution in foreign policy whichpropelled the United States into a place ofprominence among the world's superpowersbeen a blessing or a curse-for the Americanpeople and for those affected by herleadership? Has it protected and enhanced ourcherished institutions or has it weakenedthem and subtly made us into an imperialisticpower, as Ronald Steel argues in PaxAmericana?

Professor John Spanier in his bookAmerican Foreign Policy Since World War II,7juxtaposed two conflicting points of view byquoting Senator Fulbright, a leadingcongressional critic of US policy, and therenowned Canadian scholar of internationalaffairs, Lionel Gelber.

Senator Fulbright said early in 1968.

To that school of political thinkers whocall themselves "realists" it is irrelevantsentimentalism to question the primacyof power politics in terms of its costs,purposes and human rewards. There is-sothey tell us-no choice involved....

Power politics is practiced underdifferent names.... No empire stoodlonger and prouder than the BritishEmpire a hundred years ago: today weare witnessing its sad, fmal sunset.

Can America escape the same fate?Accepting the gloomy determinism of the"responsibilities of power," in effect ourpresent policymakers tell us that itcannot. They do not, of course, predictour decline and fall, only the extension ofpower, the drain of material and humanresources, and the neglect of domesticrequirements that precede and precipitatethe fall of empires.

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I do not think we are condemned tothis. . .. Nations, like individuals, have,some freedom of choice and America ofall nations is equipped to exercise it....If we do not, it will not be becausehistory assigned to us an imperial role. Itwill be because we chose to believe suchpompous nonsense, because power wentto our heads like a superdose of LSD,leading us to betray our history and thepurposes for which this nation wasfounded.

On the other hand, Mr. Gelber, writing tothe Yale Review in the fall of 1967, saw theproblem in the following light:

I have yet to hear of any viablealternative to what the United States hasbeen doing on the world stage. Even iffree countries wished to reject Americanleadership in theory, they could not do soin practice: the United States herselfcannot throw it off. For the Americanrole is shaped by the nature of the worldin which we live. And the nature of thatworld is ignored when there is talk aboutthe American role as that of aself-appointed global gendarme. Such ajibe appears to suggest that a custodian ofworld order is needed.... But what ittends to suggest, above all, is that themilitancy of others has not been thedanger in our times. Caprice in leadershipby the United States-that, presmnably, isthe source of trouble.

Yet under altered conditions, theUnited States, as leader of the West, hasonly been taking a leaf out of the Britishbook. Britain's own role, after all, was a"se1f~appointed" one when freecommunities (including the UnitedStates) developed overseas under theshelter of British sea power; when ideasof freedom took root among people notyet free; when, too, Britain stood alonebetween civilized society and itsdebasement by the Nazis. It is odd that inthis day and age such truths have to berestated. They would not have to berestated if, at the heart of the West, awoeful incomprehension of the forces inplay did not exist.

While many may doubt the lack of otheralternatives and question some of the finerpoints raised by Senator Fulbright and LionelGelber, their words nevertheless confront usnow with the main conflicting interpretationsof the crisis of conscience and policy thatsears the minds and souls of so manyAmericans and America's friends. Which viewof the contemporary role of the United Statesin world politics is correct? Each mustnaturally detennine this for himself. Yet onbalance, it seems to many that while SenatorFulbright's strictures are useful warningsabout the dangers involved in The Arroganceof Power,8 Mr. Gelber's words about whatGeorge Ball has called The Discipline ofPower9 bespeak a truer and deeper meaningabout the present implications of America'spostwar revolution in foreign policy.

Yet irrespective of any personal views wemay entertain, it is clear that a fierce struggleis going on in the American body politicabout whether this revolution in foreignpolicy has been extended too far, whether ithas become imperialistic and oppressive, andwhether it is self-defeating and should becurtailed by a counterrevolution, returningpolicy to more restrictive boundaries. Thisstruggle involved, but transcended, theelection campaign of 1968.

As Spanier himself points out:

As the war therefore continuedwithout an end in sight, as it escalatedand raised the specter of Chineseintervention, and as massive Americanfire power iucreasiugly destroyed thecountry it was defendiug, pressure for anend to the war by deescalation mounted.Two candidates, Senators EugeneMcCarthy and Robert Kennedy,contested President Johnson'srenomination within the DemocraticParty, but the President announced thathe would not seek a second term. In thewords of the astute politicalcommentator Tom Wicker in the NewYork Times, Lyndon Johnson's tragedywas that he "came iuto office seeking aGreat Society in America and foundiustead an ugly little war that consumed

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him." What Wicker failed to mention wasthat this was the second time a limitedwar and the resultiug domestic divisionshave consumed an incumbent President:Korea ensured that President Trumanwould not seek a second term asPresident, and it won the 1952 electionfor peace candidate Eisenhower. Thus thewar and President Johnson's fate raisedthe fundamental question, which only thefuture can answer, whether the publicwould tolerate "another Vietnam orfrontier war" -in short, whether it wouldcontinue to support an "imperial" policyor whether this support for the roleAmerica has played in the postwar worldwould erode.! 0

From 1968 to the present this debate grewand flourished and became a central, if notthe core, issue of the Presidential election of1972. In that election the proponents of a"corne horne" liberal isolationism wereresoundingly defeated, at least at thepresidential level. A strong majority of theelectorate seemed to share Philip Quigg'smisgivings that, "what is disturbing aboutmuch current comment is that it seems toanalyze not what our responsibilities are buthow we can contract out of them." Quiggfurther remarks in words that appearreflective of the country's mood:

Those who see our blunders in Vietnamin moral terms and wish to retreat iusackcloth and ashes ignore the needs of aworld smolderiug with tensions andfunctioning at a fraction of its capacities.Those who see our failures as purelypolitical and military and who now wishto redefine our national interest in thenarrowest possible terms are taking aperilously parochial view of the world.Together they are denying responsibilitiesand necessities which we have longaccepted, which others expect of us, andwhich Vietnam has in no way altered.!2

While it is apparent that the advocates of anew"corne horne" philosophy have sustaineda decisive short-run defeat, it is by no means

clear that they have lost the long-run debate.However, it seems probable that as changescontinue to occur in our foreign policy thatthey will, at least until 1976, be along thelines of a more modest retrenchment policysuch as outlined in the limitationist NixonDoctrine. Whether the new revisionists willtriumph in the long run, or whether theNix 0 n Doctrine or its successor canaccommodate change without the withdrawalof the United States from a leadershipposition in world affairs, is a question thatwill influence the course of US and worldhistory profoundly for decades to come.

In the fashioning of new post-Vietnamalternatives and/or consensus on foreignpolicy, it should not be forgotten that if theevents of the past quarter-century are anyindex to the future, then the broad outlinesof postwar US policy, forged in the fires ofWorld War II and the postwar confrontationwith the Communists, will in many and subtleways continue to have a marked influence onthe foreign policy of the American Nation forthe foreseeable future.

There are many observers, among them theauthor, who are inclined to agree with GeorgeLiska's generalization that "America's foreignpolicy in the first two decades of the ColdWar has been a striking success, judged bynormal standards of national security andpower."13 While the Vietnam imbroglio hassomewhat dimmed this optimistic picture,even a skeptic like Milovan Djilas hassuggested, "The United States won the ColdWar because of the internal disintegration ofcommunism. Because you [the United States]remained strong you were able to acceleratethis inevitable process. Nixon's Peking andMoscow trips were a result."14 Djilas furtherpoints out:

But the U.S. should neither overestimatenor underestimate that victory. You wonbecause you are a nonideological countryand thus were able to avoid a stalematelike that which prevailed betweenChristianity and Islam after their wars, avictory for neither side.

The New Left and those influenced by

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it think the U.S. is wracked by crisis butthe so-called crisis in American society islargely imaginary. Race and class andgeneration gaps do exist but there is nofundamental crisis. The crises you haveare aspects of the difficulty of adjustingto the electronic and technologicalrevolutions of our time.

But you have emerged stronger on theworld scene because the Conununistworld divided into factions while, at thesame time, the United States succeeded inenlarging some of the basic democraticideas-like individual human rights-thushelping to erode the Conununist system.

And economically you succeeded inpressing the Marxist world intocollaboration with you. You proved thetruth of your theory that no economicsystem can develop isolated from others.And you stayed strong enough.!5

Dj ilas may be overstating the case when hedescribed the United States as having "won"the Cold War and underestimating thedimensions of the domestic crisis which hasforced the United States to seriouslyreconsider the size, scope, and dimensions ofits overseas commitments. Nevertheless, hesees achievements in our postwar policy thathave often escaped some of its more stridentcritics. These achievements were the subjectof a speech last year by former UnderSecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson in whichhe not unexpectedly defended ourachievements against the now fashionablerevisionist critics.

In his assessment, Johnson found:I. Our bitterest enemies of three decades

ago are now among our closest friends. Andsurely it is better to have strong friends thanstrong enemies.

2. The dreadful prospect of another worldwar, this time between the Communist andnon-Communist powers, seems now moreremote than at any time since the mid-1940's.

3. The American people have prospered toan unprecedented degree during this period.

4. More than 60 free nations came intobeing in the remarkable and largely peaceful

President and Mrs. Nixon shown while visiting tbe Great Wall during tbeir February 1972 trip to Cbina.

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liquidation of some 400 years of colonialhistory. (Not a single one of these nations haschosen the Communist system.)

5. A new sense of the interdependence ofnations has grown in only a few decades frombeing a bitterly disputed premise to acommonplace statement of the obvious.

6. We have kept the atomic genie in his

economic system which has resulted in anexplosion in trade between nations on a scaleunprecedented in history, with immeasurablebenefits to the people of the world, includingour own.l 6

As Johnson rightly observes, "These arenot neglible accomplishments, they are, infact, historic accomplishments. I do not think

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signing an agreement during the President's summitvisit to Moscow in May 1972. The document opens new possibilities for the development ofpeaceful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and the USSR.

bottle and have made significant progress inestablishing international limits which lessenthe atomic threat to mankind-and enhancethe potential of the atom's beneficial use.

7. We have made a singular contribution tothe economic recovery of the world fromWorld War II and have witnessed record levelsof prosperity in large parts of the world.

8. We have helped create an international

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that we need be apologetic, or defensiveabout them."!?

Certainly it is not necessary to agree withall that these men have to say about theaccomplishments of postwar US foreignpolicy, but it is incumbent on critics to firstrebut their arguments before dismissing themout of hand. All too often in the "GreatDebate" over the past, present, and future

contours of US policy, these beneficentresults of the mid-century revolution inAmerican foreign policy have beenoverlooked, neglected, or ignored. IS

NOTES

I. W. T. R. Fox, The American Study ofInternational Relations, Studies in InternationalAffairs Number 6, Institute of International Studies,University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C.:University of South Carolina Press, 1968, pp. 16-17.

2. Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., ed., TheRepresentation of the United States Abroad, Rev.ed., New York: Praeger, 1965. Here in the nextseveral pages I have followed Lincoln Gordon'streatment as presented in his chapter on "TheGrowth of American Representation Overseas," pp.13-46.

3. Ibid., p. 17.4. The New York Times, 8 August 1972.5. Bernard Gordon, Toward Disengagement in

Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy, NewJersey: Prentice·Hall, 1969. See his excellent chapteron "Interests, Objectives, and Policies," pp. 31-43.

6. See, for example, J. William Fulbright, TheArrogance of Power, New York: Vintage, 1966;Gabriel KoIko, The Roots of American ForeignPolicy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose, Boston:Beacon Press, 1969; Harry Magdoff, The Age ofImperialism: The Economics of us Foreign Policy,Washington, D. C.: The Monthiy Review Press, 1969;George McGovern, A Time of War, A Time ofPeace,New York: Random House, 1968; Ronald Steel,PaxAmericana, New York: The VIking Press, 1967;

Robert W. Tucker, The Radical Left and AmericanForeign Policy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,.1971, and A New Isolationism, Washington, D. C.:Potomac Associate Books.

7. John Spanier, American Foreign Policy SinceWorld War II, 4th rev. ed., New York: Praeger, 1971,Preface, pp. IX, X.

8. J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance ofPower,New York: Vintage, 1966. See also his The CrippledGiant: American Foreign Policy and Its DomesticConsequences, New York: Random House, 1972.

9. George Ball, The Discipline ofPower, Boston:Little, Brown, 1968.

10. Spanier,op. cit., pp. 272-273.I I. Philip W. Quigg, America the DutifUl: An

Assessment of u.s. Foreign Policy Since World WarII, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971, p. 27.

i 2. Ibid.13. George liska, Imperial America: The

International Politics of Primacy, The WashingtonCenter of Foreign Policy Research of the JohnsHopkins School of Advanced International Studies.Studies in International Affairs Number 2, Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Foreword.

14. Quoted by C. L. Sulzberger from Interviewwith Milovan Djilas, New York Times, 18 August1972-

15. Ibid.16. Washington Post. 15 August 1972.17. Ibid.18. See Charles Gati. "Another Grand Debate:

The Limitalionist Critique of American ForeignPolicy." World Politics, October 1968, pp. 133-151;and J. L. Richardson. "Cold War Revisionism: ACritique." World Politics. Summer 1972, pp.579-612. II

ii!1l"

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