The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotles Metaphysics

8/13/2019 The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotles Metaphysics

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The Medieval Receptionof Book Zeta of Aristotles

Metaphysics

Volume


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Studien und Texte

zur Geistesgeschichtedes Mittelalters

Begrndet von

Josef Koch

Weitergefhrt von

Paul Wilpert, Albert Zimmermann und Jan A. Aertsen

Herausgegeben von

Andreas Speer

In Zusammenarbeit mit

Tzotcho Boiadjiev, Kent Emery, Jr.

und Wouter Goris

BAND /

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/stgm
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Galluzzo, Gabriele.The medieval reception of book zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics / by Gabriele Galluzzo.

volumes. cm. (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters ; Band )Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN - - - - (v. & : hardback : alk. paper) ISBN - - - - (e-book). Aristotle. Metaphysics. . Philosophy, Medieval. . AristotleIn uence. I. Title. II. Series:

Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters ; Bd. .

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. Substance in Averroess Long Commentary on the Metaphysics,Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Averroess Interpretation of Met . Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What Z Is About . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Logic and Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Question of Platonism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. The Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. E s s e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Essence in Met . Z 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Z 5s Puzzles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Averroess View on Accidents: Some General

Conc lu s ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Meaning of Met . Z 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Averroess Treatment of Generation ( Met . Z 79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Meaning of Z 79: An Anti-Platonic Argument . . . . . . . . . The Defence of the Synonymy Principle and the Case of

Spontaneous Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De nition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . The Object of De nition in Met . Z 1011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . The Unity of De nition: Genus As Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . Introduction: An Overview of the Section on Universals . .

. . Z 13s General Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Substance As Cause in Met . Z 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Aquinass Understanding of Metaphysics Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I n t r oduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aquinas on the Structure of Met . Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . The Logical Character of Book Z .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . The Anti-Platonic Character of Book Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aquinass General Interpretation of Aristotles Doctrine of

S ubs t ance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aquinass Compatibilism and the Role of the Categories . . . . The Notion of Subject in Met . Z 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. E s s e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Essence of Substance and Accidents in Met . Z 45 . . . .

. . The Identity Thesis ( Met . Z 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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. The Generation of Substances in Met . Z 79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Role of Met . Z 79: An Anti-Platonic Argument . . . . . . .

. . Generation and Substantiality: The Primacy of Composites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De nition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . The Object of De nition ( Met . Z 1011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . The Unity of De nition ( Met . Z 12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . More on the Anti-Platonic Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . Aquinass Interpretation of Met . Z 13: Universality andSubstantiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . Appendix: Aquinas on the Status of Aristotles Forms . . . . . . Substance As Cause in Met . Z 17: A Departure from the

Logical Level? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Albert the Greats Metaphysics, Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I n t r oduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alberts Interpretation of Book Z and Avicennas Doctrine of

E s s e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Treatise 1: A De ationary Account of Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Treatise 2: Anti-Platonism.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Identity Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inchoation of Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Treatises 3 and 4: Essence and De nition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Essence, Form and Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Genus and Matter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Formal Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Treatise 5: Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I n t r oduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Alexanders Commentary. Alexander and

Pau l Compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander and Averroes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . Alexanders Use of Averroes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . Alexander and Averroes on the Ontological Status of Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander and Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander and Paul of Venice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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. Paul of Venice As a Reader of Averroes. The Case of Essence andD e n i t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I n t r oduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Paul of Venices Commentary on the Metaphysics and the Role of Averroess Long Commentary. . . . .

. Met . Z 10 in the Medieval Interpretation. Averroes, Aquinasand Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Paul of Venices Interpretation of Met . Z 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The General Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Points of Detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Met . Z 11 in the Medieval Interpretation. Averroes, Aquinasand Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Paul of Venices Interpretation of Met . Z 11: Aquinas and Averroes Reconciled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summaries of the Text. Paul of Venices Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Book VII, Treatise I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Book VII, Treatise II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Book VII, Treatise III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Behind this book there is a long story, the story of some fteen years of research on Met . Zeta and on the philosophical problems which the book discusses. Many people have been involved in some way or other in thisstoryanditisapleasureformetobeable,onconcludingmye fort,tothank them for their help.

It must have been 1995 or so when Francesco Del Punta scheduled therst of a long series of seminars on Book Zeta. To borrow an Aristotelian

image, just like the water remains the same in spite of the continuouschanges of matter it undergoes, so the seminars on Book Zeta have re-mained the same in form and spirit in spite of the continuous turnover of attendants, students, friends, and colleagues. First of all, I wish to warmly thank Francesco for suggesting the reception of Book Zeta as a themeof research and for guiding me in the drafting of this book. Most of all,however,Iamgratefultohimforencouragingmetocombinetextualityand

philosophy,aninspirationwhichIshallalwaystreasure.Iconsiderthisbook as the point ofarrival ofa uniqueand rewarding intellectualexperienceandso, in some sense, as the last of those old seminars.

I am also very grateful to Fabrizio Amerini, with whom I shared many years of study of the medieval tradition of the Metaphysics. I am also in-debted to him for his precious help in preparing the edition of the text andfor the many suggestions he has advanced to improve the monographicchapters. Our constant exchange of information has always been for mehelpful and reassuring. In 2008 I had the pleasure of following up MatteoDi Giovannis PhD-dissertation Averroes on Substance (at theScuolaNor-male Superiore of Pisa). I owe to him the discovery of Averroes as a consis-tent commentator and an original philosopher. His excellent papers havecontributed much to give content and structure to my Chapter 2. I wishto thank him for his help and support, and for always being a friend. My thanks also go to Cristina Cerami for showing me her French translationfromthe ArabicofAverroess commentaryon Met .Z79aswellasherPhD-dissertationongeneration andcorruption inAverroes. Amos Bertolacci has

generously discussed with me the chapter on Albert the Great and mademany helpful comments. Over the years, I have also learned many thingsfrom him concerning Avicenna and his reception in the Latin world. I takethe chance also to express my gratitude to Alessandro Conti for letting me


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use his transcription of the second part of Pauls commentary on Book Zetaas well as forhis piecesofadviceonPaulof Venice and his sources. I amalso

very grateful to Mario Bertagna for helping me to trace down the sources of Pauls digression, in Treatise 3, on the middle term of a demonstration andfor being of much assistance in revising the nal draft of the book. In spiteof the precious help I received from so many competent people, the book will certainly still contain mistakes and shortcomings for which I am solely responsible.

My thanks go also to Andreas Speer for his constant support and encour-agement, and for believing in this book right from the beginning.

Over the last seven years I had the opportunity to lecture a number of times on the central books of the Metaphysics. I wish to thank all the stu-dents from the Scuola Normale Superiore who have attended my seminars.From their comments and doubts I have learned more than I can say andmore than I am aware of. Last but not least, I wish to thank Giulia for beingalways there through thick and thin. This book is for her.


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INTRODUCTION

I present here a work in two volumes, the second of which is the criticaledition of Paul of Venices Commentary on Book VII (Zeta) of Aristotles Metaphysics, the treatise on substance. The rst volume is an historical anddoctrinal study of the reception of Met . Z in the Middle Ages and conse-quently presents itself as a partial reconstructionof the history ofAristotlesontology. The rst volume contains six monographic chapters, one on thecontent and structure of Met . Z itself, and the others on some main guresin the medieval fortune of the book: Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, Albert theGreat, Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice. The volume is closedby extended summaries of Paul of Venices Commentary on Book Zeta, in which I try to outline the philosophical contents of Pauls writing and tobring into light its internal structure. In the next few pages, I wish to say some words on the general meaning of my book as well as on the connec-tion among its di ferent parts.

1. T P S B Z

At the heart of my enterprise is one of Aristotles philosophical master-pieces, Met . Book Zeta or, as Myles Burnyeat has aptly described it, TheMount Everest of Ancient Philosophy.Over the last fty years or so, Aris-totles book on substance has been at the centre of a large and particularly hot critical debate. No other piece in the Aristotelian corpus has witnessed

sucha boomofscholarly attention and philosophical analysis. Nodoubt theattention is well-deserved and the book is bound to repay scholars e forts.The philosophical issues which Aristotle discusses in Zetasubstances,essence, de nition, explanation, universals, the structure of concrete mate-rial objectshave always been central to any ontological enquiry and stillshape the contemporary philosophical debate. It is an undeniable fact thatthe success of Book Zeta among Aristotelian scholars has somehow runparallel to the rediscovery by contemporary metaphysicians of some major

Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1.


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themes of Aristotles ontology.The case is not infrequent of contemporary philosophers who have put their intelligences to the test in trying to make

senseofAristotles intricate treatise. As I have pointedout elsewhere, I con-sider this course of events as an important cultural fact, whose signi canceshould not be underestimated.The holy matrimony between Aristotelianscholarship and contemporary philosophy has been a happy union from which both scholars of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysi-cians have equally bene ted.

In Metaphysics Zeta Aristotle outlines an anti-reductionist account of material objects, which has been consigned to history by the name of hylomorphism.The world we live in is populated by mid-sized materialobjects: human beings, animals, plants, as well as tables, chairs and bedsare among the things which we encounter in our everyday life and we tendto classify as objects. There are many facts concerning material objectsthat may be of philosophical and scienti c interest: material objects seemto belong to natural or arti cial kinds, have properties, persist in time,undergo changes, come into being and pass away, are involved in causalprocesses. Aristotles main intuition in Book Zeta is that all the relevantfactsconcerningmaterialobjectscanbeexplainedoncewerealisethatsuch

objects are hylomorphic composites, i.e. composites of matter and form.One peculiar feature of hylomorphism is that it forces us to reshape ourintuitive notionofparthood. Althoughmatterand formmay bedescribedinsome sense as parts of a material object, they are clearly not to be confused with the ordinary, physical parts of an object. One reason to keep the twokinds of part distinct is that ordinary parts do not coincide with the objectofwhichtheyaretheparts:thelegsandhandsofananimal,forinstance,arespatiallydistinctfromthewholeanimalinsofarastheyoccupyasub-regionof the region of space occupied by the whole animal. Matter and form, by contrast,coincidewiththewholeofwhichtheyaretheparts:thematterandform of an animal occupy exactly the same region of space as the animaltaken as a whole. On a stricter understanding of part, therefore, matterand form are not parts of a sensible object, but rather principles or con-

Among the philosophers who have been inspired by Aristotles ontology I wish tomention at least the following ones: Anscombe (1964); Loux (1978); Brody (1980); Wiggins

(1980); Lowe (1989) and (1998); Loux (2006a) and (2006b); Lowe (2006). Wilfrid Sellars, Kit Fine and Michael Loux are three striking examples.Cf. GalluzzoMariani (2006).For the revival of hylomorphism in contemporary metaphysics see Oderberg (1999).

For a (sympathetic) evaluation of Aristotles hylomorphism see Fine K. (1994b).


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stituents, i.e. entities we need to posit in order to explain the fundamentalcharacter and typical behaviour of material objects. Aristotles departure

from the ordinary notion of part explains why contemporary supporters of hylomorphism describe their own views as constituent ontologies to mark the di ference between talk of matter and form and talk of ordinary parts.It also explains why some other metaphysicians regard hylomorphism, andconstituent ontologies in general, as meaningless or utterly obscure.

In providing an hylomorphic account of material objects, Aristotle in-tends to resist the idea that material objects are reducible to their materialparts or, to put it otherwise, are just aggregates of their material parts. Inboth Met . Z and H Aristotle defends the view that material objects areneither sums of their material parts nor the sum of their material partsplus some sort of relational tie keeping all such parts together. Aristotlesidea is that neither aggregates nor relational wholes possess the kind of unity that is characteristic of the paradigmatic cases of material objects. Asan alternative, Aristotle presents material objects as structured wholes, theintuition being that one ontological constituent of a material object, i.e. itsform, gives unity and structure to the object and arrange its material partsin the way characteristic of the kind the object belongs to.The constituent

that gives unity and structure to the object is distinct in character fromthe material parts and should rather be understood as an internal principleof activity and organisation. Implicitly, therefore, Aristotle also gives ananswer toa problem muchdebated in contemporaryphilosophy, i.e. the so-called puzzle of material constitution:is a statue identical with the bronzethatconstitutes it? Isa human being identical withthe bodythatconstituteshim or her? However the relationship between matter and form shouldexactlybeconceived,itisclearthatforAristotleastatueisnotunquali edly identical with the bronze that constitutes it; nor is a human being identical with his or her constitutive body. For there is one good understanding of bronze and body according to which a statue is not just bronze, but ratherbronze plus the form of the statue, and a human being is not just his or herbody, but rather the body plus the form of human beings.

Cf. in particular Loux (2006b). For an understanding of parthood which is sensitive to Aristotles hylomorphism see in particular Fine K. (1994c), (1999), (2010). See also Koslicki(2007).

Cf. in particular Van Inwagen (2004) and (2011).For this cluster of ideas see Fine K. (1999).The contemporary discussion of material constitution is particularly vast. See at least:

Wiggins (1980), Lowe (1989), Burke (1992), (1994), Lowe (1995), Rae (1995), Baker (1997), Rae(1998), (2000), Varzi (2000), Fine K. (2003) and Paul (2006a).


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There are many speci c issues where Aristotle puts to use his hylomor-phic account of material objects. Three are certainly of paramount impor-

tance and characterise Book Zeta as a whole: (1) the question of what weshouldunderstandby substance, (2) the theme of essentialism and (3) theproblem of universality and particularity.

(1) Substance. Book Zetas contribution to the understanding of the notionof substance is best understood against the background of Aristotles early ontology, as it is expounded in the Categories. On Aristotles view, being asubstance amounts to being a fundamental entity, the existence of whichis in some sense the ground of the existence of all the other kinds of entity. In the Categories Aristotle identi es primary substances with theconcrete, particular objects of our everyday experience such as particularplants, animals and human beings. Aristotles conviction in the early worksis that all the other kinds of entity depend for their very existence onconcrete, particular objects and so exist only because particular objects do.Properties for instance exist only because they are properties of concreteparticular objects.Even thenatural kinds towhichparticular objects belongexist only because they are instantiated or exempli ed by such objects.

Aristotles conclusion in the Categories, therefore, is that, were particularobjects not to exist, nothing else could exist. One assumption implicit in Aristotles argument for the primacy of particular objects is that there isnothingmorefundamentalthanparticularobjects,thereisnothing,inother words, that can explain and so ground their existence. As we have seen,it is precisely this assumption that is called into question in the so-calledcentral books (ZH-) of the Metaphysics and in Book Zeta in particular.In the hylomorphic framework, concrete particular objects are analysedinto two basic constituents, i.e. matter and form. And it is in terms of these fundamental constituents that many facts about concrete objectsmustbeexplained:familiarobjects, for instance, belongto the natural kindsthey do because a certain relation obtains between their form and theirmatter, because a certain kind of form gives structure and organisation toa certain kind of matter. One of the consequences of the new picture isthat it is no longer clear that concrete particular objects can be regardedas primary entities, as they were clearly regarded in the Categories. Forthere is now something that explains and grounds the existence ofconcrete

objects, their matter and their form. If being a substance means being aprimary or fundamental entity, it seems that the matter and the form of concreteobjects lay betterclaim thanthe objects themselves tobeing calledsubstances.


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As a matter of fact, a leading theme in Met . Z is the claim that theform of familiar concrete objects is primary substance. What do we have

to make of this claim? Do we need to take it at face value and think thatform simply replaces concrete objects in the role of primary substances which the Categories assigned to them? Or is form primary substance in asense di ferent fromthat inwhich concreteobjects are primary substances?These alternatives divide both contemporary interpreters and medievalcommentators. Averroes, for instance, may be interpreted (and this is the way I shall interpret him, in any event) as a supporter of the view thatthere is just one sense of substance and that, according to that sense,form is simply prior to the particular object of which it is the form. Albertsposition is complex, but is close to Averroess. Aquinas, Alexander andPaul of Venice, by contrast, resist such a radical conclusion and hold themore common view that form and the composite of matter and form aresubstances in di ferent senses. Behind the common view there is a concernfor the consistency of Aristotles system: when possible, it is preferable notto attribute to Aristotle inconsistencies or changes of mind. This must alsobe true in the case of the apparent contrast between the Categories andthe Metaphysics. Contemporaryscholarswho donot wish tocreditAristotle

with the view that formis unquali edlymore substance than the compositeusually distinguish between the existential and the explanatory sense of substance, theassumption beingthat theexplanatorysenseofsubstanceis somehow derivative and secondary with respect to the existential sense.The composite, in other words, is substance in the existential sense, i.e. itis an autonomous and independent object, while form is substance only inthe explanatory sense, in that it explains the substantial character of thecomposite. It is interesting to note that the distinction is medieval. It is partand parcel of Aquinass interpretation of Met . Z and is rea rmed by both Alexander and Paul.

(2) Essence. That things have essences is one of the fundamental tenets of Aristotles metaphysical thought. In the Organon, the essence of a thingis conceived of as a set of fundamental properties, the properties, roughly speaking, that characterise the natural kind a certain thing belongs to. Aristotles general idea is that essential properties are explanatory, that is,they explain the necessary traits and the typical behaviour of the thing

that possesses them. A human being, for instance, is capable of doinga certain range of characteristic activities because he possesses certainessential properties, that is, in the nal analysis, because he essentially belongs to a certain natural kind. To conceive of essential properties as


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a nuclear set of fundamental properties, the ones that are explanatory inthe relevant sense, means not to equate essence and necessity: essential

properties are not simply necessary properties, i.e. properties a certainthing could not lose without ceasing to exist, but are that particular set of necessary properties that explain all the others.

Aristotles change of frameworkin the Metaphysicsalsoa fectshisunder-standing of the notion of essence. For one thing, in the Organon Aristo-tle is liberal enough to concede that accidents as well as substances haveessences. In Zeta, by contrast, his views become more exclusive. Strictly speaking, only substances have an essence, while accidents either do nothave an essence at all or have one only in a secondary sense of essence.There is, however, a more conspicuous shift. Without abandoning alto-gether his conception of essence as a set of fundamental properties, Aris-totle progressively rephrases the problem of essence in terms of ontologicalconstituents. The shift is better illustrated by taking the paradigmatic caseoffamiliarconcreteobjects.Sinceconcreteobjectsarecompositesofmatterand form, we may reasonably wonder what contribution matter and formmake to determining their essence. Do the essence and de nition of suchobjects contain both their matter and form? Or do they make reference to

only one of their fundamental constituents, for instance their form? As inthe case of substance, contemporary interpretations of essence are at vari-ance.Notsurprisingly,thequestionoftheessenceandde nitionofmaterialsubstances was much discussed in the Middle Ages. It touches upon somecrucial anthropological questions such as: is a human being essentially asoul or is he a soul and a body (soul and body being paradigmatic examplesofformand matter, thatis, the formand matterof livingthings)?Inthiscaseas well, Averroess interpretation di fers from that of the other commenta-tors I have taken into consideration. The Arabic philosopher consistently maintains that, according to Aristotles doctrine, the essence of materialsubstances is exhausted by their form alone. Averroess interpretation isstrongly criticised by Aquinas in his commentary on the Metaphysics. And

For a particularly illuminating defence of the claim that the notion of essence cannotbe reduced to that of necessity see Fine K. (1994a) and (1995). Fines understanding of essentialism is particularly congenial to Aristotles conception. For a recent criticism of

the irreducibility of the notion of essence and of Aristotelian essentialism see Paul (2006b)(whose source of inspiration is Lewis D. (1986)). For a more neutral positioncf. Kripke (1981).For discussions of the relation between essentialism and modality see Loux (1979b) and(2006b), 153186.

For a contemporary defence of Aristotles constituent ontology see Loux (2006b).


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it is the Dominican Masters reading thatprevailed in the tradition. Itwouldbe a mistake to think that Aquinass position is only due to anthropological

concerns. Aristotles text seems to contain con icting lines of thought con-cerning the essence and de nition of concrete objects, and it was di cultfor medieval interpreters to decide which one to take, just as it is di cultfor contemporary scholars.

(3)Universalityandparticularity.IntheCategories,Aristotleisclearlyareal-ist about universals. Actually Aristotle admits two di ferent kinds of univer-sal, just as he recognises two di ferent kinds of particular. As to particulars,besides theconcrete particular objects of oureveryday experience Aristotlealso recognises their particular properties, i.e. properties that such objectsdo not share (nor could they possibly share) with any other objects such asthe particular paleness of Socrates or the particular paleness of Plato. Cor-respondingly, there will be two di ferent kinds of universal, i.e. the univer-sals whose instancesare familiar concrete objects and the universals whoseinstances are theparticular properties of those objects. The traditionrightly refers to these di ferent kinds of universal as substantial and accidentaluni- versals, respectively.Substantial universals are the species and genera to

which concrete objects belong. Accidental universals, by contrast, are theuniversal properties of which particular properties are instances, such asthe colour white of which the paleness of Socrates is an instance. Of course, Aristotles universals are not Platonic universals: they depend for their exis-tence on the existence of their particular instances. Nonetheless, they arereal entities just like the particulars that instantiate them.

Is Aristotle still a realist in Met .Z?Itmightbethoughtthatheisnot,afterall.For one thing,Aristotle is completely silent inZetaconcerninguniversalaccidents and everything makes us think that he no longer believes in theirexistence. For another, Aristotle explicitly states that species and generaare not substances. Since the only thing that species and genera couldpossibly be is substantial universals, Aristotles statement seems to amountto claiming that species and genera do not exist at all. Thus, the kinds of universals which Aristotle admitted of in the Categories are regarded as

For a contemporary defence of the distinction between substantial and accidental

universals see Lowe (2006). For a criticism of the distinction see Armstrong (1997), 6568. The contemporary literature on the problem of universals is as vast as contemporary metaphysics itself. Seeat least the followingclassicalanthologies:Loux (1970); MellorOliver(1997); KimSosa (1999), 195268. See also Oliver (1996), Loux (2006b), 1783 and (2007) foran illuminating survey of the di ferent positions on the market.


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non-existent in Met . Z. Does this mean that there are no universal entitiesin Met . Z ontology and so Aristotle is some sort of nominalist? Things are

not as easy as that. For Aristotles forms may be thought to be universalentities of some kind at least in so far as one and the same form, i.e. theform typical of a certain natural kind, seems to exist in di ferent pieces of matter. To put it otherwise, if a form is made particular by the di ferentpieces of matter it is joined to, it is a repeatable and so a universal entity. As a matter of fact, no issue has been so discussed in the literature on Met .Z as the metaphysical status of Aristotles forms. Interpreters are equally divided between particularists anduniversalists. Good arguments foreitherconclusion are not missing and the dispute is ongoing.

The Middle Ages is the time of universals and so it is not surprising thatthe problem of the extra-mental existence of universal entities should alsoplay a signi cant role in medieval commentaries on the Metaphysics. Thetopic is usually discussed in correspondence with the section in Met . Z, i.e.Chapters 1316, where Aristotle explicitly raises the question as to whetheruniversality is compatible with substantiality. More surprising is the factthat the favourite theme of contemporary scholars, whether forms are par-ticular or universal, is not explicitly connected by medieval commentators

with the problem of universals. There are various reasons for this anomaly, which I shall try to explain in due course. Su ce it to say for now that, formedieval philosophers, the problem of universals is not so much the ques-tionofthe metaphysicalstatusofforms asthatof the existence oftraditionaluniversals, i.e. species and genera. This does not mean, however, that thecommentators whom I shall be studying in this book do not have a view onthe status of forms. On the contrary, all of them believe that forms are notprimitively particular, but are madeparticularbysomething else, and soareuniversal according to the sense that the contemporary debate attaches tothe term.

In Chapter 1 of the rst volume I shall present a textual and philosophicalguide to Book Zeta. The aim of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, I wish to o fer a section-by-section reconstruction of Aristotles argument soastogiveasenseofthebookscontentsandarticulation.Ontheother,Ishallexamine many of the interpretative and philosophical problems discussedby contemporary interpreters in order to build up a conceptual grid that

will allow us to follow up the medieval proposals as well. As I have already pointed out, and as my analysis will further show, medieval commentatorstackle the sameissuesasmoderninterpretersand their conceptual tools areat the end not so di ferent from the ones we are used to nowadays.


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2. T M C C A

Averroes, Aquinas, Albert and Alexander are the main sources of Paul of Venices commentary on Book VII of the Metaphysics. Thus, it might bethought that the reason why I analysed at length these commentators issimply to shed some light on Pauls background and on his main sources of inspiration.Butthisisjustpartofthestoryand,probably,notthemostinter-estingpartof it. For the authors I have taken intoaccount are ofparamountimportance in themselves in so far as they are the landmarks of the recep-tion of Book Zeta in the Latin world. This is especially true of Averroes. Theprevailing interpretation of Met . VII in the Latin Middle Ages follows very closely what might be called Aquinass paradigm. The paradigm is builtaround the fundamental presupposition that Aristotles ontology is drawnoutonceandforallintheCategoriesandso Met .Zmustbereadasafurtherre nement of the early ontology and not as a replacement of it. Two claimsin particular characterise Aquinass interpretation: that particular objectsare more properly called substances than their ontological constituents;that the essence and de nition of material substances includes both their

matter and their form. Averroess interpretationof BookZeta is signi cantlydi ferent fromwhatI have calledAquinass paradigm.For one thing, Averroes seems tobelievethat there is a signi cant sense in which the form of concrete particularobjects lays betterclaim thanthemtobeing calledsubstance.For another,hisbasicdoctrineseemstobethattheessenceandde nitionofsuchobjectsis restricted to their form alone. The doctrinal signi cance of Averroess Long Commentary on the Metaphysics seems to have been underestimatedby scholars. This is due partly to the historical role that Averroes has playedin making the Metaphysics available to the Latin West and partly to theintrinsic features of theArabiccommentators style of interpretation. In therst part of the XIII century and before Aquinass masterly commentary,

Averroes was the only instrument of which Latin commentators could availthemselves in order to become acquainted with Aristotles Metaphysics.The attention, therefore, was more on the contribution Averroess workscould give to the simple understanding of Aristotles text than on theirown doctrinal implications. As things progressed, Averroess philosophical

thoughtdidnotpasscompletelyunnoticed,buttheconnectionbetweenhis

I have sketched out the two paradigms in Galluzzo (2009a).


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philosophical views and his interpretation of the Metaphysics got more andmore tenuous. The progressive shift from literary commentaries to com-

mentaries per modum quaestionis made the phenomenon more evident by sometimes reducing Averroes to a collection of authoritative quotations tobe thrown in the face of the philosophical adversaries. It seems that con-temporary scholars as well have fallen prey to the same error of perspec-tive and failed to see the philosophical orientation of Averroess interpre-tative activity. Only recently have scholars started to see the close connec-tion between Averroess exegetical work and his own philosophical views. Another important factor has contributed much to obscuring Averroessmerits, that is, the apparent simplicity of his exegetical style. On the face of it, the Long Commentary presents itself as slightly more than a paraphrasisof Aristotles text, where doctrinal digressions are rare and short. In Chap-ter 2 I shall attempt to reverse this historiographical tendencybypresenting Averroess commentary on Book Zeta as a consistent interpretation of Aris-totles theory of substance, dense with philosophical implications. As theanalysis will reveal, Averroess reading of the treatise on substance is all butneutral and has a modern avour about it.

The medieval commentator who saw most clearly the implications of

Averroess Long Commentary is Thomas Aquinas. For all we know, it isunlikely that Aquinass activity as an Aristotelian commentator was moti- vatedbyhis desire to replaceAverroess interpretationwithanew, ChristianreadingofAristotle.Aquinasscommentaries,bycontrast,seemtohavehad,at least at the beginning, a rather private character and mainly served thepurpose ofenhancingtheDominican Masters comprehension of Aristotles writings. In spite of this, it is certain that Aquinas read Averroes carefully and did not fail to voice his disagreement with the Arabic commentatorsinterpretation. Aquinass criticism, in his commentary on Met . Z, of Aver-roess doctrine of form is well-known and testi es to the deep ontological

One exception in this regard is the case of Averroess theory of intellect, which wasright from the beginning at the centre of a hot philosophical debate. In the De unitateintellectus Aquinas also points out that Averroess noetic stems from a certain (wrong inhis eyes) interpretation of Aristotles De anima, besides being motivated by independentphilosophical arguments as well.

See especially Di Giovannis papers, which I examine and make use of in Chapter 2.This view is defended in particular by R.-A. Gauthier in the introduction to his edition

of the Sententia Libri De Anima (ed. Leon., 45.1, pp. 288*294*). Gauthier also makes thesuggestion that Aquinass activity as an Aristotelian commentator may have served as apreparation for the drafting of the di ferent parts of the Summa Theologiae. Although thismay certainly be true, the theological (as opposed to philosophical) character of Aquinasscommentaries should not be overemphasised.


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disagreement between the two commentators. In Chapters 2 and 3 I shallargue that Aquinass reconstructionof Averroess doctrine is fundamentally

correct,butthisisnotthepointIwishtostresshere.Whatismorestrikingisthat even commentators who are more sensitive to Averroess in uence Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice are two cases in pointseemto have little perception of the doctrinal di ference between Aquinas and Averroes. On the contrary, altough in di ferent ways, both Alexander andPaul show a certain tendency to bring Averroess interpretation of Aristotleinto line with Aquinass doctrine, as it is presented in the Expositio Meta- physicorum. Apart from the technical instruments by which reconciliation was achieved, this tendency is in itself an important historical fact, which isin need of some explanation.

As I shall explain in Chapter 5, doctrinally speaking, Alexanders com-mentary is greatly in uencedbyAquinas. It isnot entirely clear why a Fran-ciscan master at the beginning of the XIV century should have recourse to Aquinas for understandingAristotles Metaphysics. The explanation may liein the authority Aquinass commentaries had gained over time as well as inthe intrinsic merits of the Dominican Masters sober and neat exposition.Be that as itmay, ifAquinass in uence on Alexander is strong, Averroess is

pervasive, tosay the least.Not only isAverroes explicitlyquoted throughout Alexanders commentary,but he is also the basis for Alexanders philosoph-ical excursuses. The importance of Averroes does not come as a surprisegiven thegeographical andhistorical context in which Alexander operated. Alexander wrote his commentary on the Metaphysics in between 1305 and1307 when he was lector at the Franciscan Studium of Bologna. It is an his-torical datum that the North of Italy, and Bologna in particular, was in the XIV century one of the major centres of di fusion of Averroess works andthought. And even though the explosion of Averroess philosophy in theNorth of Italy may date back to a few years after the peak of Alexanderscareer, the in uence of the Arabic commentator must have already beenstrong when Alexander drafted his commentary on the Metaphysics. For Alexander, Averroes is simply the point of reference for the interpretationof the Metaphysics. The outcome of these historical factors is that Alexan-ders commentary on the Metaphysics turns out to be a mixture of Aquinasand Averroes. In some sense, it is Averroess thought that gets distorted inthis intellectual operation. Although Alexander occasionally shows himself

aware of some discrepancies between Averroess and Aquinass paradigms,more often than not he attens down the di ferences and reads back into Averroess text some of the fundamental tenets of the Dominican Mastersmetaphysics.


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This general tendency to synthesis is even more apparent in the case of Paul of Venice. Of course, Pauls interest in Averroes may also be explained

by geographical and contextual reasons. In the Padua of the beginning of the XV century Averroes was certainly the main philosophical authority especiallywhenitcametotheinterpretationofAristotlesworks.However,there is something more in Pauls general attitude towards Averroes. Thisemerges clearly if one considers the role that the Arabic commentatorplays in the structuring of Pauls commentary on the Metaphysics. As I shallexplain in some detail in Chapter 6, Averroes is not only the instrument which Paul employs, implicitly or explicitly, for understanding Aristotlestext, but is also an object of his interpretation alongside Aristotle himself.InPauls commentary the expositionof thelitteraof Aristotles Metaphysicsis invariably accompanied by numerous quotations from Averroes. Thequotations are explained, commented upon and philosophically evaluated.Thus, Pauls Expositio Metaphysicorum presents itself as a sort of doublecommentary,wheretheAustinMasterprovidesuswithaninterpretationof both Averroes and Aristotle. In all probability, Pauls attitude is not withoutan explanation. Paul comes at the end of a long tradition of interpretationof Aristotles Metaphysics and sees himself as the collector of di ferent

philosophical and exegetical tendencies, which he wishes to assess andincorporate. His commentary is the testimony of this synthetic orientation.In this context, Pauls tendency to harmonise Aquinass and Averroessphilosophical views is easily understandable. What may appear to us asmajor philosophical di ferences were regarded by Paul as variations withina uni ed tradition of re ection upon Aristotles Metaphysics. There seemsto be some sort of standard Aristotelian doctrine, which both Averroes and Aquinas preserve, although in di ferent ways.

There is an important medieval metaphysician who seems to be under-represented in the picture which I have drawn so far, namely Avicenna. Although Aquinas is certainly inspired by Avicennas thought, the Philoso- phia prima is almost absent from the Dominican Masters commentary onthe Metaphysics. And the same thing is true of Alexanders and Pauls expo-sitions, where Avicenna is quoted only occasionallyand in connection withrather insigni cant points. This might be due to the peculiar nature of Avi-cennas philosophical works. Although Avicenna follows rather closely the

On the other hand, Pauls adherence to Averroess most characteristic psychologicaldoctrines has been clearly overestimated by the interpreters (see for instance: Nardi (1958);Ruello (1978); Kuksewicz (1983)). For a more balanced account see Conti (1992).


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argumentofAristotles Metaphysics,his Philosophiaprimaisnotacommen-tary in the strict sense of the term, butrather a philosophical treatise,where

thewriterexpoundshisownviews. Also fromadoctrinalpointofview,Avi-cenna is a mixed landscape, where Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elementslive in harmony. It is not surprising, therefore, that Avicenna should be lit-tle employed by the literal commentators. This is true, with one importantexception, Albert theGreat.Although Albertdraws extensively on Averroesfor the interpretation of single passages in the Metaphysics, his mainsourceof inspiration when it comes to understanding the notion of substance is Avicenna.As I shall show in Chapter 4, this is particularlyevident in the caseof Alberts commentary on Met . Z, where Aristotles theory of substance isread more in the light of Avicennas doctrine of essence than in accordance with the standard Aristotelian categories (matter, form, the composite of matter and form). In this sense, Albert is somehow at odds with the rest of the tradition of literal commentaries. The comparatively little importancethat Albert plays when compared to Pauls other sources clearly shows the Austin Masters preference for the traditionalAristotelianismand its cham-pions.

3. P V : A N P

As is clear, I am not chie y interested in Paul of Venice as an indepen-dent and original philosopher, but rather as an Aristotelian commenta-tor. Accordingly, I have not attempted in this book any reconstructionof his general philosophical views.Pauls commentary on Book Zeta, forinstance,isinterspersedwithnumerousdoctrinaldigressionsaboutthevar-iousphilosophicalissuesconnectedwithAristotlesargument.InChapter6,

I shall give a list of these digressions and outline brie y their content. Someof themlike the one on divine ideasare rightly famous and testify toPauls peculiar brand of late medieval realism. Although important, suchphilosophical excursuses are not part of my general discourse. What I havebeen focusingonis the way Paulunderstands Aristotles theoryofsubstance

For the structure of Avicennas Philosophia Prima and its position with regard to

Aristotles Metaphysics see the comprehensive analysis in Bertolacci (2006).For an introduction to Paul of Venices metaphysical thought see Conti (1996). Seealso Contis entry Paul of Venice in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paul-venice/.

For a study of Pauls view on divine ideas see Conti (2003).
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paul-venice/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paul-venice/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paul-venice/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paul-venice/


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and so interprets some crucial pieces of doctrine which Aristotle defends inthe text. Thus, the only digression I have analysed in some detail is that on

the essence and de nition of material objects, which Paul presents whencommenting on Met . Z 10. The digression clearly shows Pauls adherenceto Aquinass paradigm as well as his attempt to harmonise Averroess and Aquinass di ferent views.

Theseconsiderations canbe pushedonestep further.Pauls commentary on Met . Zeta is not a particularly original piece of work as compared to itssources. It must be regarded as the point of synthesis of a long traditionof interpretation of Aristotles ontology. And it is precisely in this new light that I wish to present Paul of Venices commentary. I regard, in other words, Pauls writing as the point of arrival of a fascinating philosophicalhistory, the history of the medieval understanding of Aristotles theory of substance. My analysis of Pauls commentary consists of three crucialmoments, which it is better to recall here: (i) the critical edition of Paulstext; (ii) the monographic chapters on the principal literal commentarieson Book Zeta; (iii) the extended summaries of Pauls commentary. There isnot much to say here on the critical edition. The criteria that have guidedit and the limits within which it should be understood will be speci ed

in the introduction to the second volume. I have already explained thegeneral meaning of the monographic chapters. However, let me restateonce again one crucial point: the chapters are not so much presentationsof Paul of Venices main sources as reconstructions of the di ferent stagesof the interpretation of Aristotles ontology. This explains the centrality and the length of the chapter on Aristotle, which remains the main focusof my attention, as well as the importance I have attached to Averroesand Aquinas, who lay down irreconcilable and paradigmatic readings of Aristotles theory of substance.

I wish to say a few words, instead, on the summaries which follow themonographic chapters. The summaries have both a material and a for-mal aspect, as it were, of which the second is by far the more important.Materially speaking, the summaries are supposed to replace a completetranslation of Pauls commentary. There are various reasons why translat-ing Pauls text as it is, is not recommendable in itself. In general, Pauls work looks unappealing to modern eyes. For one thing, Pauls style is par-ticularly heavy and his text is full of references to authorities, as well as

of examples and asides. For another, the technical and scholastic jargon which Paul employs throughout often obscures the real import of the dis-tinctions he draws and of the philosophical points he wants to make. Inthe summaries I have tried to remedy both problems. First, I have dra-


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matically simpli ed Pauls text by focusing exclusively on its essential nervatures and by leaving out, by contrast, those examples and references

that I thought were not essential to understanding the line of Pauls argu-ment. Moreover, I have tried to translate Pauls jargon into a more upto date philosophical language, which might make the commentary moreunderstandable to and more interesting for the philosophical community in general. Besides replacing a complete translation, the summaries haveanother and more important function. They wish to o fer a sort of philo-sophical radiography of the commentary by putting emphasis on its philo-sophical contents. When stripped of its inessential traits Pauls text shouldpresent itself as a stimulating work, where the author discusses both thecentral tenets of Aristotles ontology and the main philosophical issuesof his time. Ideally, a philosophically oriented reader should be able togo through the summaries quite independently of the original text andget a sense of Pauls philosophical preferences. On the other hand, heshould be e fectively guided into the structure and contents of the orig-inal text, should he have the curiosity to go back to it and look by him-self.

The general hope is that the monographic chapters together with the

summaries may give some content to my previous claim that Paul is thepoint of arrival of a long and rich philosophical history.

4. M F P

Thisbookmovesfromafundamentalassumption,whichitisbettertomakeexplicit right fromthe start.The basic idea is that the history ofAristotelian-ism is rst of allif not exclusivelythe history of the interpretation of

Aristotles texts and of the philosophical doctrines which they convey. Toput things otherwise, in order to understand the history and the fortune of Aristotles thought we must rst of all reconstruct the way in which certaincrucial Aristotelian texts have been read as well as the way the doctrinessuch texts present have been understood and philosophically evaluated.This explains the structure of the monographic chapters I have includedin the rst volume. Where possible, the chapters follow very closely thestructure of Aristotles argument: for each of the authors studied (and thisis particularly true of Averroes and Aquinas) I have tried to illustrate indetail how they interpret the single sections of Book Zeta as well as somecrucial passages that divide scholars even nowadays. The aim is to show how the philosophical options which di ferent authors endorse in their


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commentaries have their roots in di ferent understandings of Aristotlestext. With this I do not want to deny that also the converse movement may

take place, that is, that Aristotles texts may be interpreted in the light of independent philosophical doctrines. Neither do I wish to deny medievalcommentators their value and originality. All I want to do is to show how medieval ontology and metaphysics are at least in part the result of a longand unbroken e fort to understand Aristotles Metaphysics.

There are two things which I could not do in this book and which I wishtomention forfurther investigation.Myorientationhasbeen mainly doctri-nal in character. Thus, I deliberately left out of consideration the complex history of the letter of Aristotles Metaphysics, how, in other words, Aris-totles original text has been translated and how translations a fected themedieval understanding of some crucial passages of it. However, the story of the transformations and shifts that Aristotles text underwent over timemust be written. As is obvious, the way a text has been translated from onelanguage into another is not irrelevant to how it is understood, and thisis especially true of Aristotles Metaphysics, whose di culty and technicalcharacter have always ba ed interpreters. In the monographic chaptersI have occasionally pointed to some peculiar features of the Arabic-Latin

or the Greek-Latin translations in order to account for the commentatorsinterpretative choices. But what we need is a systematic work on each sin-gle passage of Aristotles text in order to provide a complete picture of thetext medieval commentators were forced to work with. This picture shouldalso include ananalysis of the di ferent techniques bywhich medieval com-mentators tried to overcome the di culties they were confronted with intheir attempts to make sense of Aristotle. The analysis of the transforma-tions of Aristotles text, in other words, must be tightly linked with a study of the literarygenre ofcommentaries, that is, of the di ferent layersofwhicha literal commentary consists.The divisio textus and the paraphrasis of the littera as well as the exposition of the sententia of the author and thenotanda all represent di ferent ways of approaching the text which is beingcommenteduponaswellasdi ferentanglesfromwhichcommentatorsmay try to expound their personal views. Although in this book I have describedin some detail the di ferent styles of the commentators I have taken intoconsideration, I could not provide, for lack of space, a detailed analysis of how the di ferent styles have an impact on the interpretation of Aristotles

text.

For an overview of this issue see Del Punta (1998).


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There is another area of research which I had to leave unexplored, i.e.thevastlandscapeofcommentaries per modumquaestionis(theonlyexcep-

tion is Alexander of Alexandrias commentary, which contains a series of quaestiones alongside the literal explanation of the text). Given my generalinterestinBookZetaassuch,itisnotsurprisingthatIhavebeenconcentrat-ing on literal commentaries, which present themselves, programmatically I would say, as interpretations of the text which is taken into consideration.Commentaries per modum quaestionis, by contrast, must be handled care-fully in this respect, for the extent towhich theymay be taken toprovide aninterpretationof the text theyare about mustbeevaluated casebycaseandmaydependontheorientationsofthesingleauthors.Thedistancebetweenthe quaestiones and the text they are o cially about may be in some casesrather great and this makes it somewhat arduous to extract from them aclear reading of the text which is being commented upon. This being said,it is clear that the work on the commentaries per modum quaestionis mustbe done to complete the picture I have started to draw in this book. What we need in particular is a detailed survey of the main tendencies of the dif-ferent commentaries as well as of their di ferent relations toAristotles text.It is unlikely, for instance, that Scotuss or Buridans commentaries should

not reveal a consistent understanding of Aristotle, in line with the general,philosophical views of their authors.The researchshouldshowthat, inspiteof the di ference in literary genre, the quaestiones also belong to the history of the understanding of Aristotles ontology.

My hope is to be able to contribute to lling both gaps in the future.


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SUBSTANCE IN ARISTOTLES METAPHYSICS, BOOK ZETA

I

Metaphysics Zeta, Aristotles treatise on substance, has been rightly de-scribed as the Mount Everest of Ancient Philosophy.Not only are thesingle passages of Aristotles text particularly intricate, but there is alsono clarity as to the general, doctrinal meaning of the book. The internalstructure of the writing is also di cult in that it seems to contain a numberof dialectical sections where it is not easy to decide whether Aristotle putsforward his own views or rather advances arguments he wants to refute orsimply discard later on. The di culty of Met . Z is testi ed to by the hugeamount of critical literature on the book that has been coming out overthe last thirty or forty years. No other part of the Aristotelian scholarship

has witnessed a debate so huge and heated as that which has been sparkedby the contemporary interpreters rediscovery of Met . Z. Probably, suchan interesting historical phenomenon can be explained by looking at thecontent of Aristotles treatise. For many themes Aristotle deals with in Met . Zetasuch as, for instance, the structure of sensible objects, essence,universals, individuation, matter and formare in fact issues that havebecome of prominent importance in the contemporary ontological debate,especially in the province of so-called analytic philosophy. Thus, the recentreturn of interest in Met . Z has somehow run parallel to the rediscovery by analytic philosophers of Aristotles ontology and of its signi cance forthe contemporary analytic debate. It is no chance that some of the scholarsinvolved in the controversy over Met . Zs general meaning have also takenan active part in the contemporary debate about the very issues which aretouched upon in Aristotles book.

In this chapter I intend to present a detailed introduction to Met . Zsmain contents and arguments. In light of what I have been saying so far,

Cf. Burnyeat (2001), 1.For a critical overview of the main streams of the contemporary debate surround-

ing Met . Z see GalluzzoMariani (2006). The book pays also attention to the connectionsbetween the rediscovery of Met . Z and the contemporary ontological debate.


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my presentation will have two di ferent sides. On the one hand, I shall o fera textual reconstruction of the di ferent sections of the book, which follows

very closely the ow of Aristotles text and the order according to whichthe di ferent issues are introduced. The aim of my exposition is to try tobring out the nervatures of the text and to o fer a guide to the di ferenttextual and exegetical problems it presents to the reader. On the otherhand, I shall pay special attention to the philosophical issues the treatisedeals with inorder toconvey the sense of the theoretical importance which Aristotles book had in the ancient and medieval worlds and still continuestohaveincontemporaryphilosophy.AlthoughIshallmakeexplicituseonly of those entries in the literature that are of crucial importance to clarify the text, much of the contemporary debate surrounding Book Zeta willbe directly incorporated into my exposition. The aim is to present Met . Zas a philosophical battle eld where radically di ferent understandings of Aristotles ontology come to clash with one another. Moreover, I hope thatthe successive chapters will also show that the philosophical issues whichmedieval interpreters read into Aristotles treatise are not so di ferent fromthosesingledoutbymoderninterpreters.Thus,myintroductiontothebook and its contents should also work as a general grid for understanding the

medieval debate. Met . Z is di cult for another reason, which should be taken into con-sideration when drafting an introduction to the book. The Metaphysics isnot the onlyplace where Aristotle sketches out whatcan be described as anontology of the sensible world. It can be argued in fact that the Categoriesalready presents a su ciently detailed inventory of the inhabitants of oureverydayworld.Thisiscertainlytheviewdefendedbymedievalinterpretersof the Metaphysics, whose main interpretative e fort consists in trying toreconcile Aristotles ontology in the Categories with the more ne-grained views presented in Met . Z. The medieval persuasion seems to be shared by the participants in the contemporarydebate, where the issue of the relationbetween the Categories and the Metaphysics is clearly on top of the agenda. As a matter of fact, Met . Zs analysis of substance seems to depart from theCategories ontological framework in that the latter treatise presents sensi-ble substances as unanalysable (or at least unanalysed) wholes, while Book Zdescribes themascompositesofmatterand form. Thehylomorphic model Aristotle applies in the Metaphysics has considerable consequences for the

question of substantiality as well. For it is not clear that in Met . Z sensi-ble objects may continue to play the role of primary entities the Categoriesassigns to them: the reason is that the ontological constituents in terms of which sensible objects are analysableand in particular their formseem


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to hold some kind of priority over them and so to be better quali ed to bedescribed as primary entities. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that both

medieval and contemporary interpreters have spent some time in trying tounderstandwhetherthe Metaphysicsontologyissimplysupposedtoreplacethe sketchy ontological picture outlined in the Categories or should ratherbe taken to be compatible with it. Opinions are, of course, at variance bothin the Middle Ages and in recent times. As I shall try to show in the follow-ing chapters, for instance, Aquinas seems to be con dent enough that Zsontology does not clash with Aristotles ontological views in the Categories, while Averroes, without explicitly saying so, is clearly of the opinion thatthe Metaphysics marks a major departure with respect to the earlier work.Bethatasitmay,whatisimportantforourpresentpurposesisthatageneralpresentation of the treatment of substance in Met . Z cannot avoid consid-ering the issue of the relationship between Aristotles two main ontologicaltreatises.

In light of the foregoing considerations, I shall devote Section 1 to a shortanalysis of the ontological picture drawn by Aristotle in the Categories.Moreover, in Section 2 I shall outline the main interpretative problems thereading of Met . Z presents, including the issue of the relationship between

Aristotles treatiseand theCategories.InSections38,Ishall nallyo fermy section-by-section reconstruction of Zs argument.

1. T N S C

It is not clear whether Aristotles Categories was meant to be a book aboutontology. Already Porphyry, in his commentary by questions and answers,raises the issue of the aim of the Categories and so of the status of the ten

items listed therein: Do the ten categories represent kinds of being or arethey simplya list of linguistic expressions? As is well known, Porphyry optsfor a compromise solution, which is often labelled semantic. Though notrepresenting kinds of being, the ten categories do not simply classify lin-guisticexpressions,either.Theycertainlypickoutlinguisticexpressionsbutonly in so far as expressions signify things in the world. Such a solution wasambiguous enough to leave room in the Middle Ages for both a linguisticand an ontological approach to Aristotles treatise. Many medieval philoso-phers, thoughrespectingthe letterof Porphyrys solution,maintain that theaim of the Categories is to introduce ten di ferent kinds of being through

Cf. Porphyry, In Cat ., Proem., ed. Busse, pp. 56, 3457, 12.


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an analysis of the linguistic expressions corresponding to them. Aquinas, tomention one, was of the opinion thatAristotle introduces ten distinct kinds

ofbeingbymeansofastudyoftendi ferentkindsofpredicates,i.e.oftendif-ferent ways in which something can be truly said or predicated of concretesensible objects. Whether directly or indirectly, therefore, the Categoriesis a book about ontology, after all. Here, I am not particularly interestedin defending an ontological reading of Aristotles treatise as opposed to alinguistic or semantic one. I shall simply go by the assumption that the Cat-egoriespresupposes a certainunderstanding of the structure of the world as well as a classi cation of the items necessary to explain this structure.

The ten categories, then, can be interpreted as a list of ten distinct kindsofbeing.EvenifAristotleintheCategoriesdoesnotexpresshimselfthus,thetradition quite rightly splits up the ten categories into two distinct groups,substance on the one hand and nine accidental categories on the other,qualities, quantities, relations etc.The basic ideabehind this division is thatsubstancesareprimaryentitiesandaccidentssecondaryones,becauseacci-dents depend on substances according to some relevant sense of depen-dence, while substances do not depend on accidents. This general picturegets complicated invarious ways. The most important one is that substance

as well as accidental categories contain, according to Aristotle, both universal and particular items. In other words, there are individual substancessuch as individual men and horses, as well as substantial universals such asthespeciesmanandhorseandthegenusanimal ,whichallbelongtothecat-egory of substance. By the same token, there exist individual qualities, suchas individual instances of the colour red,asmuchasuniversal ones such thecolourred andthegenericuniversalcolour .Andthesamethingholdstrueof all the other accidental categories. All in all, therefore, Aristotle presents us withafourfoldclassi cationof reality,whichcan besummarisedas follows:

Universal Substances Universal Accidents

Particular Substances Particular Accidents

Cf. Aquinas, Exp. Metaph., Lib. V, lect. 9, ed. CathalaSpiazzi, n. 890.The critical literature on Aristotles ontological views in the Categories is particularly

vast. Among the contributions that bear most directly on the theory of substance and on Met .

Zs themes, I would like to mention at least: Ackrill (1963); Moravcsik (1967a) and (1967b); Jones(1972); Stough(1972); Dancy(1975) and(1978); Frede (1987a) and (1987b); Driscoll (1981)Graham (1987b); Furth (1988).

Cf. Aristotle, Cat ., 2. For a contemporary defence of Aristotles fourfold division of reality see Lowe (2006).


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and colour is said of both red and the individual instances of red. What isparticularly important for our purposes is that Aristotle seems to suggest

that the said of relation implies existential dependence. The items thatare said of other items depend for their own existence on the items they are said of. Thus, one consequence of Aristotles view is that substantialuniversals, i.e. genera and species, depend for their very existence on theexistence of their particular instances. The existence of the species man,for instance, depends on the existence of particular men. Likewise, theexistenceof universalqualities, say colour andred , dependon the existenceof particular instances of those qualities. The existential dependence of universals, be they substantial or accidental universals, on their particularinstances is often referred to in contemporary metaphysics as Principle of Instantiation.

The being in relation, by contrast, obtains between items belonging toaccidental categories and items belonging to the categories of substance.Traditionally, sucha relation is understood in terms of inherence: accidentsinhereinsubstances.Thebeinginrelationisexplicitlyde nedbyAristotlein Cat . 1a2425 as follows:

by in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist

separately from what it is inThere has been a certain amount of debate concerning the way to under-stand the being in relation and the inseparability requirement Aristotleintroduces when he characterises it. The controversy revolves in particu-lar around how we should understand particular accidents, i.e. whetherthey should be taken to be unrepeatable and so absolutely peculiar to theparticular substance they inhere in, or whether they should rather be con-strued as minimally universal properties, properties that can still be shared

bymorethanonesubstance. A particular instanceof paleness,forinstance,could be taken either as an absolutely unrepeatable propertysuch as, forinstance, Socrates paleness as opposed to Platosor as a minimally universal propertysuch as, for instance, a fully determinate and not furtherdeterminable shade of paleness. Depending on which view one takes, thepossibility can be allowed or notallowed of particular accidents inhering in

For discussion of the principle see Loux (2007). Ackrills translation.For the view that individual accidents are repeatable see especially Ackrill (1963) (but

alsoGranger(1980)).FortheopposedviewseeinparticularOwen(1965b)and(withaslightly di ferent, but congenial account) Frede (1987a).


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universal substances, i.e. species and genera. What is clear, in any case, isthat the main relation Aristotle is interested in explaining is that between

particular substances andparticular accidents. Foruniversalaccidentsexistonly because their particular instances do and hence they inhere in partic-ular substances only via their particular instances. Moreover, some creditcan in fact be accorded to the traditional view, which construes particu-lar accidents as unrepeatable entities. On this view, particular accidentsonly inhere in particular substances and not in their species and genera. Whatever position one decides to take regarding the nature of particularaccidents, the general point to be emphasised is that the being in relationimplies, as muchas the said of relation, existential dependence. Accidentsexist only because they inhere in particular substances. Properties, in other words, need a bearer.

It isnow easier tosee how Aristotle isentitled to the claim thatparticularsubstances are those entities upon whose existence the existence of every-thing else rests.Certainly,Aristotle in theCategoriesadmits of the existenceof universal substances, i.e. the (speci c and generic) kinds particular sub-stances belong to. Such kinds express the essence (or part of the essence)of particular substances. However, substantial universals depend for their

own existence on particular substances. For they exist only in so far as par-ticular substances do. They are, therefore, secondary entities and are in factlabelled secondary substances as opposed to particular substances, whichare referred to, instead, as primary substances. Accidents, too, are sec-ondary entities, whose existence depends on the existence of the particularsubstances they inhere in. It is also clear that particular substances play the role of basic or fundamental entities by being the ultimate ontologicalsubjects for everything else there is. For everything else either is said ofparticular substances orisinparticular substances. I deliberatelyrefrainedfromaddingof predicationto the clauseultimate subject, because I wantto insist that the said of and the being in relations should be primarily conceived of as ontological relations. However, since such ontological rela-tions underlie standard instances of essential and accidental predication, we can say with no harm that particular substances play the role of ultimatesubject of predication.

To sum up: Aristotle thinks in the Categories that ordinary particularobjectssuchasmenandhorsesarethebasicentitiesintheworld.Thekinds

suchobjectsbelongtodoexist,butonlyinsofarastheirparticularinstances

Cf. Aristotle., Cat ., 5, 2a1119; 3a810.


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ral kinds depend on their particular instance. We shall see in what followsthat Aristotles commitment to essentialism is of particular signi cance in

understandinghowtheCategoriesontologyisrevisedandmodi edin Meta- physics Z.

2. M , B Z:S G P I

Book Z is the treatise of the Metaphysics speci cally devoted to the notionof substance. Traditionally, Z is grouped together with Books H and to

form a trio of treatises, the so-called central books, which study ontolog-ical issues. The connection between Z and H is uncontroversial. H startso f with a very selective summary of Zs results and for the most part doesnothing but expand on the notions of matter and form, which are one of Zs main concerns. H, therefore, can be regarded as an important appendix, which re nes and completes the analysis of the structure of sensible sub-stances carried out in Z. Less clear is the relationship betweenthe book about potentiality and actualityand the two preceding books. Scholarshave muchdebated how s enquiry is supposed tocontribute toAristotlesanalysis of substance.Leavingasideanyotherconsideration,itseemstobeclear that Book is intended, at least in part, to improve our understand-ing of the notions of matter and form. For in Book H Aristotle somehow explains the relation between matter and form in terms of that betweenpotentiality and actuality. And Book is precisely the place where suchtwo notions are spelt out and analysed in great detail. Thus, to such anextent at least, seems to be part of Aristotles general enquiry into sub-stance.

Although Metaphysics Z considerably re nes and complicates the onto-logical scheme sketched out in the Categories, the book presupposes thegeneral structure of the world laidout in the earlier work. Moreparticularly,it presupposes the division of the world into ten di ferent kinds of beingand the general priority of the category of substance over the accidental

For a particularly insightful discussion of this di culty for the ontology in the Cate- gories see Loux (1991), 1348.

For a reconstruction of Met . that puts weight on the connection between and ZHsee Frede (1994). For a di ferent view see Witt (2003). For an excellent discussion of the roleof Book within the plan of the Metaphysics see Makin (2006).

Cf. for instance: Aristotle, Met ., H 2, 1042b910; 1043a57; a1421; H 6, 1045a2325; b1623.


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categories. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that, as I have already hintedin my introduction, one of the main interpretative problems concerning

Book Z consists in establishing whether Aristotles doctrine in the book clashes with the ontology of the Categories or is, instead, compatible withit. One simple way of highlighting the problem is the following. The Cat-egories assigns the role of primary substances, i.e. the entities on whoseexistence the existence of everything else rests, to the particular objectsof our ordinary perceptual experience. When compared to the Categories,BookZsontological frameworkimmediatelypresentsa macroscopicaspectofnovelty.For particularobjects or substances are now analysed in terms of matterandform,i.e.intermsofthematerialcomposingthemandthestruc-ture or organisation providing them with the functions and activities they perform.Theanalysisintermsofmatterandformiscompletelyabsentfromthe Categories, where particular substances are regarded as unanalysable wholes and not as composites of matter and form. I am not particularly interested here in tracking down the origin of the distinction between mat-ter and form. The traditional story has it that Aristotle came to discoverthe notions of matter and form in the course of a physical enquiry into thegeneration and corruption of sensible substances. For the generation and

corruptionofasensiblesubstancecane fectivelybeexplained,respectively,as the acquisition and the lossofa formonthe partofa materialsubstratum.Be that as it may,what is of interest tous is that theanalysis of sensible sub-stances into matter and form is not without consequences for the questionof substance. For one might reasonably think that it is no longer the casethat, as Aristotle maintains in the Categories, particular objects are primary substances, i.e. are those entities on whose existence the existence of allthe rest depends. For now it turns out that particular objects are analysablein terms of matter and form. Thus, one reasonable suggestion is that mat-ter and form (and, as we shall see, especially form) lay better claims tothe title of primary substance than the particular objects they contributeto analysing. For it seems that the existence of particular objects dependson that of matter and form and hence particular objects themselves can nolonger be regarded as primary in the sense speci ed. In this section I wishto o fer a general introduction to Zs structure and argument. Then, I shallcome back to the relationship between Z and theCategories. In particular, Ishallpresenttwodi ferentwaysofunderstandingsucharelation,whichwill

turn out to be important for understanding the medieval interpretations as well. Met . Z is a book about substance. As such, it belongs to a more general

enquiry into the notion of being. BeingAristotle tells us in Met . and


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reminds us at the very beginning of Met . Z is spoken of in many ways,that is the ways corresponding to the ten categories. Although Aristotle

casts his claim in linguistic terms, what he has to say mainly concerns the world which language describes. Therearesubstances as much as qualities,quantities, relations and so on, and thus being is spoken of in di ferentsenses depending on the kind of being it is applied to.The di ferent kindsof being, however, are grouped around a core or basic kind of being, whichis being in the sense of substance. All the other kinds of being are saidto be because they bear some relation or other to substance: some thingsare said to be because they are qualitative properties of substances, someothers because they are quantitative properties of substances and so onand so forth for all the items belonging to the other categories.Thus, anenquiry into substance is supposed to provide us with an understanding of thenotionofbeingingeneral.Foronceonehasunderstoodthecoreorbasicsense of being, one will be able to understand also what being means forthe things that are beings in the secondary or derivative senses of being.In some sense, therefore, the investigation into the notion of being reducesitself to the investigation into the notion of substance.But what does itmean to enquire into the notion of substance? What does such an enquiry

boil down to?There are two di ferent questions one might have inmindwhen address-ing the issue of substance. Following the literature on Met . Z, I shall callthem Population Question and Nature Question.The population ques-tion is the question as to what substances there are, i.e. what the basicentities are the existence of which is the ground for the existence of every-thing else. An answer to such a question must include at least a list of (the types) of things which are considered to be basic and fundamental.There is no doubt that the Categories mainly addresses a population ques-tion. The treatise provides an inventory of the di ferent kinds of thingsthat existpa

The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotles Metaphysics

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