The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy

8/20/2019 The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy

1/14

Peter

Della Santina

The

Madhyamaka

and

modernWestern

philosophy

INTRODUCTION

The task

of

comparative

hilosophy

resupposes

more or

less

intimate

c-

quaintance

with he

philosophies

r

philosophical

raditions

o be

compared.

Whilethewriter f this

rticle

mayperhapspretend

o a

reasonable

familiarity

with

he

Madhyamakaphilosophy,

e

cannot

pretend

o a similar

amiliarity

with he

Western

hilosophical

radition. his s

said not as an

excuse,

butas

a

justification

or

the

approach

that is

proposed

for

adoption

in this

article.

Moreover,

n

the case in

hand,

it is

proposed

not

simply

o

compare

one

philosophy

with nother

hilosophy,

utrather

philosophy

ith

philosophi-

cal

tradition

which s

by

no means

homogeneous.

ince

it is

in

any

case

not

practicable

o

attempt

o

considermodernWestern

hilosophy

n

its

entirety,

certain

ignificant

ovements ithin he

radition illbe dealtwith

nstead,

nd

reference ill

be made to

specific ystems

nly

nsofar s

they

erve

o illustrate

thesemovements rphilosophical ttitudes.n this ontext,t mustbe saidthat

the

task of selection

as been

made easier

by

the

fact hat n this

entury,

here

have

been a

number f

attempts

o

identify

estern

ounterparts

f the

Mad-

hyamaka

philosophy.

his s

of

particular

nterest hen

he

question

f

critique

is to be

approached,

because it will be

of

greater

alue

if

the

Madhyamaka

s

evaluated

n

relation o

philosophies

which

t

least on the

surfacehave

some

claim o

share he

ameuniverse

f

discourse.

he

examination fwhat

might

e

the

Madhyamaka

critique

f

the

thought

f Kant

and

Wittgenstein

s

more

promising,

ecause

these

philosophies

o bear

some

resemblance

o the

Mad-

hyamaka,

nd have

been

recognized

s

such

by

modern

cholars.

Nonetheless,

f

comparison

nd

critique

re

to be

something

more

than

merely

n arid

in-

tellectual

xercise,

t

will

be

necessary

o

ook not

only

t the

enets f

the

ystems

to

be so

treated,

ut also

at their

ntecedents

nd their

purpose.

Finally,

n

concluding

his

preamble,

et

t

be

said that

philosophical

omparisons

ave

all

too often

n

the

past

been

undertaken

with the

idea of

securing

nhanced

philosophical

espectability

or

ne of

the wo

ystems

nvolved. hat this

hardly

does

justice

to the

ntrinsic

alue,

such

as it

is,

of the

system

whose

status

s

sought o beenhancedneed carcely e said.Alternatively,omparisonsmaybe

undertaken

ith

view

o

facilitating

he

understanding

f

given

hilosophy

n

an

alien

universe f

discourse.

While

this

objective

s

undoubtedly

orthy,

ne

must

guard

gainst

acile

nd

superficial

quations

which

may

do

more o

foster

misunderstanding

han

to

promote

omprehension.

t

is

therefore

mperative

that

genuine

differencesot

be

glossed

over

in

the

excitement

f

discovering

apparent

arallels.

PeterDella Santina eceived isPh.D. in

Buddhist

tudies

rom

he

Universityf

Delhi,

nd s

a

part-

time

ecturer t

the

National

University

f

Singapore.

Philosophy

ast

and West

6,

no. 1

January, 986).

©

by

The

University

f

Hawaii Press.All

rights

eserved.

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2/14

42

Della

Santina

PHILOSOPHY: EAST AND

WEST

Before

roceedingny

further,

t

may

be useful orme

to restate

omething

hich

may

eemobvious o thosewho are

used

to

these

nvestigations,

utwhich s

yet

so

important

hat

t

may

profitably

e

reiterated

f

only

because

t

nforms uch

ofwhatwillbe said ater: amely,hat henature ndhistoryf hephilosophical

enterprise

n

the

East,

specifically

n

ndia,

has been

very

ifferentrom hat

n

the

West.

t

may

be

said without ear

f

arousing

much

ontroversy

hat

hilosophy

in

ndia has

alwayspartaken

fwhathas

come to

be called

n

theWest

religion,

and,

conversely,

hat

eligion

n

ndia

has

always

partaken

f whathas come

to

be

called

n

the

West

philosophy.

o

put

t

another

way,

he

distinction

etween

philosophy

nd

religion,

hich

as

until ather

ecently

een

o

sharply

rawn

n

the

West,

oes not

by

nd

arge pply

o the

ndian

tradition.

ndian

philosophy,

therefore,

as

always

ontained nd often een

haracterized

y

a

soteriological

preoccupation.

his is

not,

however,

o

say

that t

thereby

eases to be

philo-

sophy.

On the

contrary,

t

may

be

argued

hat

t s

philosophy

ar

excellence,

philosophy

with n existential

elevancewhich

hilosophy

n

theWest

has

not

until

very

ecently

nd even

now

not

fully

ecured.

Moreover,

his

existential

relevance

f

ndian

philosophy

as not

been

purchased,

s some

would

ike

to

think,

t

the

ost

of

ntellectual

larity

r

even

cientific

igor.

In

the

West,

the

story

f

philosophy

has

been

something uite

different.

Although

he

philosophical

nterprise

itnessed

promising

tart

n

Greece,

t

soonfell ntodisreputeargelys the esult fthegrowthfChristianrthodoxy.

Philosophy

id

not

accord

well either

with

Semitic

monotheism

r

with

the

Christian

mphasis

n

faith.

espite

occasional

nd furtive

lirtations

ithNeo-

Platonism,

s

for

nstance

n

Augustine,

hristian

rthodoxy

emained

tead-

fastly

ary

f

reason nd

gnosis.

mallwonder

n a

tradition

hich ad

nherited

the

Judaic onviction

f the

absolute

otherness

nd

inaccessibility

f God

and

which

was anxious o

preserve

he

uniqueness

f Christ

nd

of faith

n Christ

s

the sole

means of

bridging

he

gulf

between

he

absolute

and man.

Although

Neo-Platonism

id

to

some extent

ubvert

hristian

rthodoxy

n

the

hape

of

mystical

xperience,

he ccommodation etweenheJudeo-Christianradition

and

a

gnostic

oteriology

as

always

n

uneasy

ne.

Mysticism,

hanks

erhaps

to ts

soteric

uality,

managed

o

survive

n the

hostile

limate

f

orthodoxy,

ut

philosophy

ell

by

the

wayside.

It

was

notuntil

he

dvent

f

modern

cience

nd the

European

nlightenment

that

Western

hilosophy

gain

dared

o

raise ts

head,

nd when

tdid

so,

t

found

itself

n

the

unenviable

osition

of

being

neither

ere

nor

there,

n

a sort

of

halfway

ouse

between

eligion

nd

science.

t

could

not

spire

o the

oteriolog-

ical content nd existentialelevance freligion, utneitherould itpretend,

despite

ometimes

ervent

fforts,

o the

ntellectual

igor

f science.As a

result,

philosophy

n the

West

remained

ntil

very ecently

n academic

diversion,




3/14

43

parlor

game

for he

ducated

ew

who neither ere alled

to the hurch

or

hose

to follow

heutilitarian

ay

of science.

The effectsf

the

imitation

f the

wider

and,

one

might

well

argue,

egitimate

ole

of

philosophy

re still

very

much

evident

n

the

hought

f Kant

and

in

that f

his

contemporaries

nd

immediate

successors.

ndeed,

t was

not until

this

century

hat

philosophy

n the

West

begantoshow igns frecoveryrom he rippling xperienceforthodoxynd

an

inclination

o

resume ts lassicalrole

as a whole cience

of

becoming)

with

soteriological

oncern

nd an existential

elevance.

RATIONALISM

AND

EMPIRICISM

The

history

f

modernWestern

hilosophy egan

with

he

onflict etween

atio-

nalism nd

empiricism.

t

is

an

accepted

fact hat

ven

the

philosophy

f

Kant

(which

will

be

dealt

with

t some

ength resently)

as an

attempt

o resolve

his

early

and

apparently

nsoluble

problem

of Western

philosophy.Briefly,

he

conflict

evolves

roundthe

question

f

whether

ertain

eneral

ropositions-

that

A is A

and not

non-A,

and

that

every

vent

must

have a

cause,

and so

forth-are a

priori

acts

bout

reality

r

merely

posteriori

onventions.n

the

first

lternative,

uch

propositions

re

assumed

o

be

innate,

he

result f direct

rational

nsight

nd so

universally ecessary.

n

the

econd

lternative,

hey

re

derived rom

xperience

nd

therefore

erely

ontingent.l

The

Madhyamaka,

nd

ndeed

Buddhists

n

general,

ave

no

difficulty

ealing

with

he

problem

f

general

ropositions

hich

ppear

to be innate

r a

priori-

that s,nottheproducts f mmediatexperience.hey re abletodo so because

of the

conception

f

rebirth.n

the

Buddhist

view,

this

ife s

the

effect f a

countless

eries f

earlier

ives.The

totality

f

experience

ccumulated

hrough-

out these

xistences

esults

n

what

are

termed

mental

ormations

r

predispo-

sitions

samskdra).

or

Buddhists,

uch

predispositions

ontain

not

only

static

element

ut

also a

dynamic

ne,

forwhich

eason theterm

s

sometimes

rans-

lated s

volitions.

n

other

words,

he

otality

f

ccumulated

xperience

ot

only

supplies

he

pattern

f

experience,

ut lso

inclines

ne

to act

n

a

particular

ay

according

o

habitual

tendencies.

owever,

here

t

is

the

static

more

than the

volitional

spect

ofmental ormationshat s of

nterest,

nd Buddhists

ave

a

specific

word

for

this

static

aspect

of

intentionality.

t is

vdsana,

mental

m-

pression

r

propensities.

ental

mpressions

re

the

habitual

patterns

reated

n

the

mind

byrepeated

xperience.

agarjuna

s

quite

pecific

bout

ascribing

he

appearance

f

the

world

o

mental

mpressions.2

o

what

f

priori

ropositions?

For

Buddhists,

hey

re a

priori

n

the

ense

that

hey

re

not

derived

rom

he

experience

f

this

ife

lone;

n

other

words,

hey

re

with ne

at

birth.

Nonethe-

less,

hey

re

not

a

priori

n

the

ense

hat

hey

re

notthe

result

f

what

has been

called rational nsight, utare rather ltimatelyheoutcomeof accumulated

experience

ver

nnumerable

xistences. or

are

they

necessary.

his

last does

not

concern

Buddhists

ecause

they

have

never

een

exercised ver

how

things




4/14

44

Della Santina

must

be

in

all

possible

worlds,

ut

on

the

contrary,

heir

oncern

s

withhow

things

re

here

nd

now.

IDEALISM

AND

REALISM

If the

history

fWestern

hilosophy

as been oloredfrom

he

beginning

y

the

conflict etween ationalism

nd

empiricism,

here s also another

onflict hich

has

been

perhaps

of even

greater mportance.

hat is the conflict etween

idealism nd

realism. ike the onflict etween ationalismnd

empiricism,

he

conflict etween dealism nd realism

may

be traced o an ambivalence

n

the

attitude f

Descartes,

ut

unlike hefirst-mentioned

onflict,

hat etweendeal-

ism and realismdid

have a similar

history

n the Buddhist

hilosophical

ra-

dition.

Descarteswas able

to

hold

that ational

nsight

upplies

necessary

ruth

about

reality

despite

he

devil,

who

nduced

him o doubt

the

very

xistence f

the xternal

orld)

nly

ecauseofhis onfidence

n

the

goodness

fGod.3

While

the attermayhave constituted satisfactoryolution orDescartes, hedoubt

whichhe so

unambiguously

rticulated as to

dog

philosophy

or

very ong

time

n

the

West.

Naive realism

s content o

acceptthings

orwhat

they ppear

to

be;

it s

the

attitude

f

theman

n

the treet.

ut

philosophers

re often ot

content

o eave

things

lone.

If

they

were,

hey

would

not be

philosophers,

ut

tradesmen

r

agriculturists.

n

addition,

ertain bvious

xamples

f

llusion,

uch

s

themoon

appearing

arger

t

the

horizon

hat t

the

enith,

may

have

contributed

o the

growing

reoccupation

ith he

question

f

the

reality

f

the xternalworld.

This led

to the

emergence

f

representative

r critical

ealism,

notoriously

unstable

philosophical

osition.

Briefly,

t affirmed

hat

lthough

he external

world

xists,

erception

oes not

provide

irect ccess to

t.

All

that

perception

provides

s

acquaintance

with he

epresentations

r effects

f

he

xternal

orld.

The

problem

s

that

f one is never

irectlycquainted

with he

external

world,

but

only

with

ts

representations

r

effects,

ow

s

one

to know

for ertain

hat

t

exists

t all.

The

inescapability

f this

uestion

nce

again

brought

hilosophy

face

to

face

with

Descartes'

devil.

The

only

obvious

solution

was idealism

f

eitherhedogmatic r thepragmatic ariety. he inevitabilityf thisprocess s

clearly

llustrated

n theWest

by

Locke

and

Berkeley.

The

history

f theevolution

f Buddhist

chools

n India is also not

without

examples

of the

movement

romnaive realism

to

representative

ealism

to

idealism.

he

firsts

nicely

llustrated

y

the

Vaibhasika

chool,

perhaps

he

first

systematic

ormulation

f

the

philosophy

f

the

Buddha.

The

Vaibhasika

nter-

pretation

ould

not,

however,

emain

unchallenged

or

long

in

the

critical

environment

f

the Buddhist

radition,

nd

soon it

was

supplanted

by

the

Sautrantika

chool,

a

species

of

representative

r

critical ealism

which

had a

muchgreaterole oplay nthe volution fBuddhisthoughtn ndia.Nonethe-

less,

the

nherent

nstability

f

the

Sautrantika

osition

was not

ong

to endure

unnoticed.

he

Yogacara

or

Vijiinnavada

esponded

o theSautrantika

iewof




5/14

45

representative

ealism

y

ettisoning

he

externalworld.

This

was

easy

for

he

Yogacarins,

because

they,deeply

nfluenced s

they

were

by

the

model

of

meditative

xperience,

ad

no

particular

ove

or

use for xtra-mental

eality.

The

foregoing

iscussion

resents

tidy

icture

f a scholastic

hilosophical

evolutionwhich its

erynicely

ntothe

pattern

f naive

realism,

epresentative

realism,

nd

idealismmentioned

arlier,

ut s this

ll

that

Buddhist hilosophy

offersn

reply

o theWest?

What

of the

Buddha's

own

attitude nd what

of

the

Madhyamaka,

which,

t will be

argued, epresents

he

systematicxpression

f

theformer?

The

Buddha

was

preeminently

oncernedwith

experience.

His

rejection

f

metaphysical peculation

s

well-documented

nd

has

been

acknowledged

y

scholars.4 o

was the Buddha an

empiricist?

ot

so far as

the term

has

been

accepted

within he Western

hilosophical

radition.

Why?

Because

he

recog-

nized ll

experience

o

be

essentially

nd

finally

mental.

he

sense

organs

do

not

see, hear, nd so forth, ivorced romonsciousness. o theBuddha wasnotan

empiricist

n the

Western ense of the

term,

lthough

t

may

be

argued

hathis

attitudes more

genuinelympirical

han hat

f

theWestern

mpiricist,

ecause

the

assumption

f

an

extra-mental eferents

hardly ustified

y experience;

rather t s moreof

thenature f

dogmatism.

ut what

of

the

nature

f

reality?

Quite

simply,

he

Buddha was not

interestedn

questions

bout

the

ultimate

natureof

reality.

He

was

not

interested

n

describing

t.

He

rejected

ven

the

categories

f

existence

nd

nonexistences

ultimatelyredicable

f

reality.5

So what

s

one

to make of

a

philosophy

whichdoes not

concern tselfwith

describing

heultimate ature f

reality?

number

f

answers o this

uestion

have

been

proposed.

One

common,

lthough

ow

somewhat

utdated,

nswer s

thatthe

Buddha was

not a

philosopher

t

all.

According

o this

view,

he

was

interested

n

ethics.Another

more

modern

iewholds

that he

Buddha did not

teach

philosophy,

ut

psychology. lthough

more

satisfying

han

the

former,

this

nswer,

ike

he

irst,

egs

he

uestion.

he

real

point

t ssue s the

definition

of terms.

How is one

to deal

with n

intellectual radition

which

does not fit

comfortably

nto

he

ategory

f

either

hilosophy

r

religion

s

they

ave been

understood ntheWest?Like theproblem ftheconflict etween ationalism

and

empiricism,

nd like

o

many

ther

roblems

hat tem

rom

hat

ttempt

o

apply

alien

conceptual

modelsto a

tradition

hich

s not

constrained

y

them,

the

onflict etween

hilosophy

nd

psychology

oes

notoccurfor

Buddhists.

f

all

experience

s

essentially

nd

finally

mental,

hen

system

f

oteriology

hich

provides

or

he

realization f

an

existentially

esirable

mode of

experience

must

also

resolve he

problem

f

reality.

he

pragmatism

f

the

Buddha

did

notallow

him

o

concern

himself

ith

he

question

f

the

nature f

a

reality

which n

fact

was not

experienced,

eing

extra-mental.

his is

the

point

of the

rejection

f

metaphysicalpeculation s notconducive o edification,s exemplifiednthe

parable

of the

woundedman.6

The

important

act o

remembers

that,

s

the

Yogacarins

realized,

his

attitude

oes

not

for

practical

purposes

alter one's




6/14

46

Della Santina

picture

f

the

everyday

orld.

One can

very

well

go

on

acting

s

if

there

were

external

bjects,

ecause that

s

the

way

t all

appears

o

one,

without

ssuming

their xtra-mental

eality.

The

Madhyamaka,

t s

argued,

mbodies

hat

pragmatic

nd

antimetaphys-

ical attitudewhichwas the

real

heart of the Buddha's

teaching.

As

such,

t

acknowledgeshefact hat llexperiencesmental ndthatmetaphysicalpecu-

lation is

soteriologicallyounterproductive.

his is

evident

n

the works of

Nagarjuna.

He

has

said,

This

world of

llusion,

delusion

of

consciousness,

comes

not

from

nywhere,

oes

not nor

really tays.

The

wheel f

becoming

is

producedthrough

he

propensity

vasana)

for

erroneous

onceptualisation

(vikalpa).

Since

regarding

hat

very

ame

object

one

s

desirous,

nd

regard-

ing

hat

very

ame

object

one s

malevolent,

nd

regarding

hat

ery

ame

object

one is

deluded;

herefore

hey

desire,

malevolence,

nd

delusion)

re

produced

through onceptualization.

onceptualization

lso

is,

n

reality,

ot existent. 9

The afflictionsklesa) and action karman) rise from onceptualizationnd

this

from

onceptual

onstructions

prapanca).

10

As

the

painter

ainting

terrible

monster

s

himself

rightenedhereby,

o is the

fool

frightened

ith

transmigration.

1

All

phenomena

re

interdependently

riginated

s shown

through

he

examples

of

magical spells,

drugs,

nd

illusion.

Therefore,

hey

are

ultimately roved

to be

perfectly

eyond

xistence nd

non-existence.

2

Ultimately,

hisworld

s

beyond

ruth nd

falsehood,

herefore,

he Buddha

does

not ssert

hat t

really

xists

r does not....

How could

the mniscientne

say

t

has

imits

r no imits r has both

r neither? 3

Those whothink

n

terms

ofexistence nd

non-existence

o

not

grasp

he ruth

f theBuddha's

teaching.

The

Buddha

repudiated

oth

he

hought

hat

omething

xists nd that

ome-

thing

oes

not.

4

Know that

he mbrosia

ftheBuddha's

teaching

s

the

pro-

found

nd

uncommon

octrine

oing

ar

beyond

xistence

nd

non-existence. 5

Here attention

hould

be

drawn

o

three

ey

erms:

ropensities,

onceptuali-

zation,

and

conceptual

constructions.

he

first

f

these

has

already

been

encountered.

he

second,

onceptualization

vikalpa),

as sometimes een

rans-

lated

s

imagination

r

as

Sprung'6

does)

hypostatizing

hought.

ven n

the

Sautrantika iew,twasresponsibleor henotions fthe elf, hewhole, ndso

on,

but

n the

Madhyamaka,

t

is

responsible

or

he

totality

f the

objects

of

experience.

inally,

onceptual

onstructions

prapanca)

has

been a source

of

difficulty

or

ranslators

nd

nterpreters

f

he

Madhyamaka

hilosophy.

his

s

perhaps

n

part

because

n

the

Brahmanical

radition,

thas an

ontological

lavor.

Even

Sprung

ranslates

t

as the

manifold

f

named

things,

which

s at

best

ambiguous

ecause

one s not

ure

whether

he

mphasis

hould

be on named

r

on

things.

The Tibetan

exegetical

radition

olds

that

the

term

ught

to

be

understood

n

the ense

f

expressing

he

objectively

xperienced

ounterpart

f

conceptualizationvikalpa)-in otherwords,the crystalizednd objectified

aspect

of

conceptualization.

t

is

interesting

o

note

that

Cheng,

basing

himself

on

an

early

hinese

Madhyamaka

radition,

grees

with

his

nterpretations.17

t




7/14

47

would

be

remarkable

f

his

nterpretation

fthe ermwerenot

correct,

iven

he

fact

hat wo

recognized,

ndependent,

nd venerable uddhist raditions

gree

upon

it.

Significantly,

his

nterpretation

voids

going

beyond

the

exclusively

mental ature

f

xperience

nd

does not

ontologize

he

bject.

At the ame

time,

however,

t can

deal with he

object

s if t

were

real

for

practical

urposes.

So istheMadhyamakaphilosophyeducibleo dealism; nd what hen sthe

distinction

etween

he

Madhyamaka

nd the

Yogacara,

the

recognized

chool

ofBuddhist

dealism?

ndeed,

t s

argued

n the

basis

ofthe

passages

ust

quoted

that

the fundamental

ttitude

of the

Yogacara

was

already

mplicit

n the

Madhyamaka

and

even

more

n

the Buddha's

own utterances.

his much s

supported y

the

nterpretation

f

Santaraksita,

ounder

f the

ynthetic

chool

of

the

Yogacara-Madhyamaka,

who,

it is

contended,

nly

made

explicit

nd

systematic

he endencies

lready

vident

n theworks f

Madhyamaka

uthors.

Nonetheless,

he

Madhyamaka

s

not dealism

n

the

metaphysical

r

ontological

sense.This s infact hepointuponwhich heMadhyamaka nd theYogacara

split.

The

Yogacara, according

o

the

Madhyamaka

view,

err nsofar s

they

make consciousness ntoa

real,

n

existing, hing,

n

ontological

r

metaphys-

ical

entity. hey tray,

oo,

from

heBuddha's

way

n

thatrather han

voiding

thealternativesf existence nd

nonexistence,

hey

ssertboth the

existence f

consciousness nd the

nonexistence

f the

object.

The

Madhyamaka,

while

acknowledging

he

fact

hat ll

experience

s

mental,

an

yet

void

the

pitfalls

f

metaphysical

ogmatism,

ecause

this

act eads

t not to

metaphysical

ssertion

and

negation,

utrather o

soteriological

reedom.

he

Madhyamaka ndeed,

s

Candrakirti

oints

out,

has no

difficulty

n

employing

he

attitudes

f

realism,

idealism,

nd so

forth,

ecause all

these formulations re

just

pedagogical

devices,

oteriological

ools,

not

ontological

ssertions.18

TRANSCENDENTAL

IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM

In the

West,

mmanuelKant

attempted

o resolve he onflict etween ational-

ism

and

empiricism,

nd themore

fundamental

ne

between ealism nd ideal-

ism,

by

means

of

his

critique

f

pure

reason.

It

has been

suggested

hat

his

solution aisesmoreproblemshan tsolves, ndithas sometimes eenregarded

as

skepticism.19

t

is

ironic hat the

Madhyamaka

has been

compared

o this

system.

t

may

be

ventured hat certain

ffinity

n

philosophical

ttitude

nd a

striking

oincidencewith

egard

o a setof

philosophical

roblems rompted

his

comparison.

ike the

Madhyamaka,

Kant's characteristic

hilosophical

method

is

critical nd

dialectic, nd,

ike he

Madhyamaka,

his

philosophy

s

ostensively

opposed

to

metaphysical

peculation.

he

antinomies f

Kant

correspond

xact-

ly

to

the

ets

of

metaphysical roblems

ejected

s not

tending

o

edification

y

the Buddha.20

Notwithstanding

hese

similarities,

t will

be

argued

that the

analogybetween he views ofMadhyamakaand Kant is moreapparent han

real.

Kant arrived t

his

characteristic

hilosophical tandpoint hrough

n

examination f the

mind

or

reason.

For

this,

he

has been credited

y

T. R. V.




8/14

48 Della

Santina

Murtiwithwhathas beentermed he

Copernican

evolution

n

philosophy.21

n

other

words,

e

focused

he

ttention

f

philosophy

pon

the

ubject

ather

han

the

object.

But Kant was unable to

dispense

with

he

assumption

f an extra-

mental

reality.

ndeed,

he

sought

to

explain knowledge

s the result

f

the

combination

f the

data

given

n

experience

ith

heforms

f ntuition

nd

of

understanding:pace, ime, ubstance,ndcausality. hisbeing he ase,all that

is

known,

ll that an

ever

be

known,

s

phenomenal-that

s,

what

s

presented

to the

knowing ubject

hrough

he tructures

f

hemind.

he

absolute,

hings

n

themselves,

he

noumenal,

an

never e known ut

an be assumed ecause

ense

data,

ccording

o

Kant,

must

have cause which

s not he

ubject.

he effects

f

the

unknown

hings-in-themselves

hich

nfluence

ensibility

re

representa-

tions.

The

purpose

of

Kant's

critique

was to

limit

he

domain

of

knowledge

o

the

mpirical.

n

this

way,

he

hoped

to

expose

the

pretensions

f

metaphysicians

who

vainly

eekto

say

something

bout

theunknowable

oumenal.

hereby

e

intendedo makeroomfor aith hrough isallowingeason n the phere fthe

absolute,

essentially

he

same concern

hat

had

animated

he doctors

of the

Church

t

Nicaea

more han

millenniumarlier.

From

the

Madhyamakapoint

of

view,

Kantian

philosophy

s riddled

with

difficulties.

espite

being

dialectical,

t

s

dualistic

nd

ontological,

ven

meta-

physical,

s

Chengpoints

ut.22

ynthesis

s

not

a

solution,

s

is clear

from he

Madhyamaka

critique

f

the

Jaina

philosophy.

n

ascribingknowledge

o

a

combination

f

objective

ense

data and

the

ubjective

orms

f the

mind,

Kant

betrays n ontologicalcommitmento both

the

object

and the

subject.

n

addition,

he

ssumption

fan

extramental

eality

equires

hat

he

gap

between

subject

and

object

be

bridgedby

a

representative

heory

f

perception,

he

instability

fwhich

has

already

een

pointed

ut.

Moreover,

heradical

polarity

between

he

ontological

haracter

f

Kant's notion

of

the

noumenal

nd

the

phenomenal

re

foreign

o

the

Madhyamaka.

Finally

nd

significantly,

he

end

of

Kant's

critique

s

trivial

rom he

Madhyamaka

point

of

view.

Kant's

system,

s it has

been

said,

grew

out

of

the

attempt

o resolve

he

conflict

etween

ationalism

nd

empiricism-a

conflict hich

id not exist

or

theMadhyamakanor ndeedfor nysystemf ndianthought,or hereasons

explained

arlier.

Again,

Kant

sought

o

resolve

he

ontroversy

etween

deal-

ism

nd

realism

y

ascribing articular

unctions

o the

ubjective

nd

objective

components

n the

formation

f

knowledge.

n the

process,

ant

had to resort

o

a

representative

heory

f

perception.

lthough

he

history

f

Buddhist

hought

in

ndia

did

nclude

phase

of

ritical

ealism

n

the

ourse

fwhich

representa-

tive

heory

f

perception

as

entertained,

he

Madhyamaka

never

had to

face

this

predicament,

ecause

it

never

ssumed

an

extra-mental

eferent

f

expe-

rience.

hese

onsiderations,

owever,

hough

elling

nough

n

themselves,

ave

never,

o theauthor'sknowledge, eenconsidered ythosewho liketo find

parallels

between

he

Madhyamaka

and

Kantian

philosophy.

Here,

too,

they

shall

not

be treated

t

length,

ecause

it is

when

the

real heart

of Kant's




9/14

49

philosophy,

hedoctrine f the noumenal nd

the

phenomenal,

s reached

hat

there

s

a

greater

emptation

o see

apparent

oincidences

nd

yet

n

even

greater

danger

hat facile

dentification

f

actually

iverse

hilosophies

will

engender

misunderstanding

ather han

ppreciation.

The

Kantian

noumenal

nd

phenomenal

ave been

termed

he

absolute

nd

therelative,ndthese erms avebeen mposed s itwere pontheMadhyamaka

conceptions

f

ultimate

ruth

paramdrtha-satya)

nd conventional

r

appa-

ritional ruth

vyavahdra

r

samvrti-satya).

he

Madhyamaka's dvocacy

of

the

ultimate ruth as ed T.

R.

V. Murti o

call

t bsolutism.

lthough

n

all

fairness

itmust

e said that

he

does so

in

order o

save

the

Madhyamaka

from

he

harge

of

nihilism,

oes

he

do it

ustice

n

clothing

t

with nother hreadbare

arment

from

he wardrobe f

philosophical

abels which

s,

to

say

the

east,

ll-fitting?

Surely

Murti knows

that

the

translation f

paramdrthaliterally, ighest

nd,

purpose,

or

meaning)

s absolute can

scarcely

be

justified

tymologically.

Similarly,hetranslation f the ermsvyavahdrarsamvrti literally,onven-

tion,

usage, anguage

or

obscured, overed,

eiled)by

relative tandson

no

firmer

round.

What, hen,

ther

han

fascination ith

conceptual nalogy,

could

induce

a

competent

cholar

to

adopt

these

terms orthe

Madhyamaka

conceptions

fthe

ultimate nd conventional

ruths;

nd

yet,

whole

generation

of

ranslators,

nfluenced

y

his

ame

fascination ith

conceptual nalogy,

ave

adopted

these erms

nd

have

characterizedhe

Madhyamaka

s

absolutism.

On

the

evidence

f

the

Madhyamaka's

own

texts,

oo,

the

ultimate

ruth as

nothing

o do

withKant's

things-in-themselves.ndeed, hedivision etween he

ultimate nd

conventional

ruths,

or he

Madhyamaka,

s

nothing

more

han

pedagogical

device.23

mptiness

sunyatd)

s

said to be the

ultimate

ruth,

ut

emptiness

s

not an

ontological

ategory,

ut a

soteriological

herapy.24 mpti-

ness,

the

relativity

f

all

things,

s

itself

elative.The

ultimate

ruth,

ike the

conventional,

s

devoid

of

ndependent

eing.

This

muchhas

been

ndicated lso

by

Cheng.25

What then

of the

things-in-themselves,

ant's

absolute,

his

nou-

menal?

They

ould

perhaps

be

likened

o

the

uniqueparticulars

f theSautrant-

ikas,

the

onception

o

elaborately xplained

y

Th.

Stcherbatsky,26

ut

hardly

to theMadhyamaka onception femptinessrtheultimateruth.

Now

what

of

Kant's

notionof

the

phenomenal,

he

absolutely

nknowable

things-in-themselves

nown

through

he

forms f

time,

pace,

substance,

nd

causality?

Kant

believed

hese

forms

o be

necessary

nd

unalterable,

nd so

from

he

Madhyamaka

point

of

view

inescapablyontological.27

or

Kant,

empirical

knowledge

was

true,

unlike

metaphysics,

ecause

here,

reason

was

limited

o its

proper

phere.

This

was

natural

nough

for

one

who

wished

to

guarantee

he

philosophical

oundations

f

science,

ut

for

he

Madhyamaka,

the

onventional r

apparitional

ruth

s

neither

ecessary

nd

unalterable,

or

s

empirical nowledgerue.Thefirstfthese onsiderationsas

important

ami-

fications or

the

results f

the

Kantian

and the

Madhyamaka

philosophical

exercises,

espectively,

nd the

econd,

pplied

to themore

recent

ttempt

o see




10/14

50 Della Santina

similarities

etween

he

Madhyamaka

and the school

of

language analysis,

disallows

nother

opularmisconception

f the

Madhyamakaphilosophy.

Kant's

philosophy ields

ew xistential

enefits,

ecause

n

consonancewith

theWestern

hilosophical

raditiont s concernedwith

escription

ather han

with

hange.

As Hume was

pleased

to

go

back to

playing

ackgammon

fter

having ndulged

himselfn

philosophical iversions,

o

Kant

was

resigned

o

continuing

o live

n

a world

of

llusion,

inally

nd

unalterably

ondemned o

ignorance

f

he

bsolute,

he

higher

ruth,

xcept erhaps hrough

aith. hus

he

damned

man

through

hilosophy

n

order o save

him

hrough eligion,

ut no

such

maneuvers re

necessary

or

he

Madhyamaka.

The

only

positive

esult f

Kant's

critique

f

metaphysics

hich oes

not

dependupon

revelation,

s that t

ostensively

urbs

he

pretensions

f

metaphysicians

nd

limits

nowledge

o the

empirical.

As a

consequence,

hilosophers

re

warned

o

avoid the

forbidden

ground

f

rational

sychology,

peculative osmology,

nd natural

heology

nd

areencouraged o concentrateheir escriptivealents,uch s theymaybe,on

the

phere

f the

mpirical.

For the

Madhyamaka,

heforms

f

experience-space,

time,

ubstance,

nd

causality-are

neither

ecessary

nd

unalterable,

or

are

they

ntrinsically

rue

even

on the evel

f

conventional

ruth.

y

the

ame

token,

heultimate

ruth,

r

emptiness,

s

not

n

principle

nknowable.

he forms f the

mind,

pace,

nd so

on are

for the

Madhyamaka

the

result

f

conceptualization

onditioned

y

mental

mpressions

nd

corresponding

o

conceptual

onstructions;

hey

re,

n

other

words, bjectifiedoncepts.

he

habitual

endencies

hat

give

rise o these

forms

f

experience

an

be

self-consciously

ltered,

nd

this ndeed

s the im

of

the

Madhyamaka philosophy.

The ultimate

ruth,

nlike

Kant's

things-in-

themselves,

s knowable

not

onlyby

nondual

perception

ouchsafed

y

medita-

tion,

ut

lso

by

nference,

or

By

the

eason

hat unders

onceptualisation,

he

ultimate

s

known

mediately. 28

he result

f

this

knowledge

f the

ultimate

mediately

nd

mmediately

s the

progressive

ransformation

f

experience

rom

the

undesirable

o the

desirable.

his

s

possible,

or he

Madhyamaka,

ecause

neither

he conventional

or

the

ultimate

s set

up

as an

ontological

ntity

existings it wereobjectivelynd in itsownright. othare rathermodesof

experience,

he

latter

preferable

ecause

psychologically

nd

soteriologically

desirable.

n other

words,

hat

which

makesone

free

s the

truth.

It

is of course

not

suggested

hat

Murti s oblivious

to

all or

any

of

these

considerations.

What is

suggested

s

that,

persuaded

by

the

fascination

f

a

conceptual

nalogy,

istreatment

fthe

Madhyamaka

hilosophy

n relation

o

Kantian

concepts

nd

his

iberal

se

of

Kantian

terminology

nexorably

ead

to

the

mergence

f

a

somewhat

istorted

icture

f

the

Madhyamaka.

This s not

to

deny

he

lluminating

haracter

f much

of what

Murti

has to

say

about

the

Madhyamaka. t is to warnofthedanger facceptinghe pplicabilityfalien

concepts

nd

terminology

o

a

system

f

thought

o

patently

ifferent

n

its

orientation

nd

fundamental

oncern.




11/14

51

LANGUAGE ANALYSIS

The

Madhyamaka,

as

it

has been

suggested,

s a

system

f

soteriology.

he

system

works

by

the

application

of

progressive egations

f

(perhaps

better)

correctives. hus the

ultimate ruth

egates

r

corrects

he

conventional,

hile

theultimate ruths tself egated rcorrectedyenforcingherecognitionf ts

therapeutic

unction

o

the xclusion f

any

ontological

laim

on

itsbehalf.

t

is

suggested

hat he Kantian

nterpretation,

y

making

he

Madhyamaka

nto

a

kindof

transcendental

bsolutism,

mphasizes

he

negation

f

the

onventional,

while he

nterpretation

long

the ines

uggested y

modern

anguage

nalysis,

by

making

he

Madhyamaka

nto

kindof

positivism,mphasizes

he

negation

of the

negation

f the conventional

ruth,

hat

s,

the

negation

f the

ultimate

truth.

owever,

he

negation

f

a

negation

or he

Madhyamaka

does not

mean

the

reinstatementf

the

riginal ypothesis.

hen

t

s

said that he

herapy

s

no

longer eededonce thedisorder as beencured, his s nottoaccept hedisorder

as it

was before he

therapy

was

applied.

Streng

nd

Gudmunsen ike

to

emphasize

hefact

hat,

ike

Wittgenstein,

he

Madhyamakarejects

he notionof

an

extralinguistic

eferent

f words.

This

is

indeedto

say very

ittle hat s new or

revealing

bout the

Madhyamaka.

The

theory

hatwordsmust

efer o

objects

was

chiefly

dvocated

by

the

Naiyayikas

in

ancient

ndia, and,

like the whole

of their

philosophy

f naive

realism,

t

was a

favorite

bject

of

refutation

or

the

Madhyamaka.

However,

does

the

Madhyamaka's rejection f the notionof an extralinguisticeferentfwords

mean that t

endorses he

everyday

se of

anguage

s somehow

valuable

n

its

own

right?

oes

it

mean,

as

Gudmunsen

uggests,

hat

he

result

f

the Mad-

hyamaka

ritique

s

to

leave

everything

ore

or less as it

s?29The latter n

fact

refers o the

Zen

story

which

uns,

Before

you

have

studied

en,

mountains re

mountains nd

rivers re

rivers;

while

you

are

studying

t,

mountains re no

longer

mountains

nd

rivers re no

longer

ivers;

ut

once

you

havehad

Enlight-

enment,

mountains

re once

again

mountains nd

rivers re

rivers.

0

Waldo

goes

so far

s to claim

that

rdinary

anguage

tatementsre

paradigms

f what

wecalltrue ndcoherent,3so is tthen he nd oftheMadhyamakaphilosophy

simply

o

et

veryone

o

back

to

playing ackgammon

r

the

ordinary

anguage

game

with

he

assurance hat

here

ies

truth?

Wittgenstein,

ike

Kant,

was

interestedn

securing

egitimacy

hrough

elimi-

tation.

Kant

wanted o

rescue

hilosophy

rom

isrepute

hrough

imiting

eason

to the

mpirical.

his

enabledhim

o

disallow

metaphysics

nd

so

open

the

way

for

eligion.

Wittgenstein

anted

o

rescue

hilosophy

rom

onflictnd

perplex-

ity

hrough

imiting

he

philosophical nterprise

o

the

description

f

anguage

and

language

tself

o ts

everyday

ather han

ts

metaphysical

se.

In

this

way,

hebelievedhecoulddissolve

hilosophical

roblems.

Whileboththese

philoso-

phers

re

concerned

with

aving

omething

f

the

descriptive

unction

f

philo-

sophy,

he

Madhyamaka

has

nothing

o

save,

neither

he

metaphysical

or

the




12/14

52 Della Santina

ordinary

se of

concepts

nd

language.

The

Madhyamaka

s not interested

in

description,

ut

in

freedom,

hich nterests after ll a reflectionf their

respective

raditions.

If

Wittgenstein

iffersrom ant

n

his

ttitude

owards

he oleof

philosophy

in

personal

ife,

t

s

n

that

he

no

onger

eels

otally

ound

o

eave

religion

lone,

to divorce tas itwerefrom hilosophy. hisperhapsreflectsheprogressive

liberalization

n

the

Western

hilosophical

radition

hich ccurred etween

he

eighteenth

nd

the

twentiethenturies.

onetheless,

hediscernible

oteriolog-

ical

flavor f

some of

Wittgenstein's

tterancesan

hardlyustify

he

complete

redefinitionf

philosophy

within he

Western

radition.

t

may

be

true,

s

Gudmunsen

uggests,

hat

Wittgenstein

ith

his

religious

oncern

its ather

uncomfortably

nto

a

philosophical

radition otable

for ts ack of existential

relevance,32

ut

Nagarjuna's

position

s

a

so-called

philosophical

writer

n

a

religious

radition

s

by

no means similar.

Wittgenstein

s

something

f an

anomalyntheWesternradition,utNagarjuna'sphilosophy ccupies central

place

in

what

can

easily

be termed

he

predominant

uddhist

eligious

radi-

tion.

Moreover,

Wittgenstein's

ilt

oward

oteriology,

efreshing

s

it

s

in

the

context

f heWestern

hilosophical

radition,

upplies

nly

shallow nd

timid

suggestion

f

freedom

ompared

with hedramatic

nd radical

ransformation

of

experience

ffered

y

the

Madhyamaka.

So

what f

he

Wittgensteinian

laim

madeon

behalf f he

Madhyamaka

hat

the

end of

the

philosophical

xercise

s

to leave

everything

s

it

s?

Nagarjuna

neverdenied therelevance f the wholegamut

of ethical nd

psychological

practices

ffered

y

the

Buddhist radition

s

effective

eans of

altering

he

undesirable

haracter

f

experience

onditioned

y negative

nd dualistic

ro-

pensities

nd so

of

realizing

he transformed

ode of

experience

nown

as

enlightenment.

f

the nd

of

the

process

s the

discarding

f

the

pparatus

s

in-

dicated

n

works ike

he

Mulamadhyamakakdrikd,

t s

analogous

o thediscard-

ing

f

he

aft nce

the iver as

been rossed.33

t

s

not

antamount

o

remaining

on

thenear ide

of

theriver

r,

worse,

eturning

o

t.

s

ittherefore

redible

hat,

for

he

Madhyamaka,

he

nd

of

soteriology

hould

be

a return o

the

mode of

experienceftheman nthe treet,nacceptance f he rdinaryseof anguage

as

a

paradigm

f

truth?

f there

s a

return or he

Madhyamaka,

t s

a

return

dictated

y

he

equirements

f ltruistic

oteriology,

ot

by

positive

valuation

of

the

ordinary

se of

anguage

nd the

ordinary

mode

of

experience.

For

the

Madhyamaka,

anguage

nd

ordinary

xperience

re

neither

rue

nor

false.34

f the

Madhyamaka

esorts

o

ordinary

modes

of

expression

n

order

o

suggest

he

transformed

ode of

experience

hich s

the

goal

of

the

oteriolog-

ical

process,

t is

merely

concession

o a conventional

sage

sustained

y

a

prevalent

llusion.

The

Madhyamakas

are

very xplicit

bout their

ondem-

nationofordinaryinguisticonvention. ll these onventionsre determined

by

a

fundamental

rror,

henature f

which s

likened o a

mirage,

dream,

nd

a

magical

llusion.35




13/14

53

CONCLUSION

The

Madhyamaka

eaches

he

middle

way,

philosophical

ttitude

nshrined

n

the

very

ame

of

the

ystem.

he middle

way

s

soteriologically

esirable ecause

it

prevents ntanglement

n

extremes-that

s,

n imited

ositions

which

mpede

freedom.No doubt the

Madhyamaka

makes use

of

positions

and

even

of

propositionsntheworkingutof ts oteriology.he literaturef the ystems

replete

with

such

formulations:

ealism,

dealism,

self,

not-self,

nd so

on.

Nonetheless,

o

interpret

he

system

y

choosing

to

emphasize

ny

of these

formulations-the

egation

f the

ordinary

mode,

the

negation

f the

negation

ofthe

ordinary

mode-to

interpret

t

as

absolutism, ihilism,

r

positivism,

s

to

miss

hereal

point

fthe

ystem

nd to

gnore

hedifferenceetween

hilosophy

and

soteriology.

t

is for his easonthat he

nterpretation

f the

Madhyamaka

in

terms f Kantian or

Wittgensteinian

hought

s

hardly atisfactory.

There s no doubt thatphilosophyntheWest s beginningo showsignsof

transcending

he

constraints hich

he

history

f

ts

origins

nd

earlydevelop-

ment

mposed

upon

t.

A

number

f

ndicationswhich

may

be

gleaned

from he

approaches

dopted by

anguage nalysis,

xistentialism,

henomenology,

nd

post-structuralism

re all evidence

of

the dawn

of a new attitude

n

Western

philosophy.

espite

all

this,

n

the

opinion

of the

author,

Western

hilosophy

has

yet

to

produce

a

system

f

thought

hat

successfully

nitesthe

rigor

of

philosophy

with he

relevance f

religion

n an

integratedystem

f

soteriology

capable

of

providing

ccess to freedom

n

its fullest

nd most

complete

ense.

Such a systems available ntheMadhyamaka.36

NOTES

1.

John

Hospers,

An

ntroduction

o

Philosophical nalysis

London:

Routledge

nd

Kegan

Paul

Limited,

956),

pp.

183ff.

2.

L.

Jamspal

nd

P.

Della

Santina,

The

Heartof

nterdependent

rigination,

heJournal

f

the

Department

f

Buddhist

tudies

University

f

Delhi,

1974),

verse and

commentary.

3.

Ibid.,p.

496.

4.

Majjhima

Nikdya

,

pp.

426-432

(Sutta 63);

pp.

483-484

(Sutta 72);

Samryutta

ikdya

II,

pp.

257ff;

arhyutta

ikaya

V,

pp.

374-403

Vacchagotta

amyuttam

nd

Avyakata

amyuttan).

5.

Sarhyutta

ikaya

I,

p.

17.

6.

Majjhima

Nikdya

,

426ff

Cila Malufikya

utta).

7.

Nagarjuna,

RatndvalT

I,

verse113.

8.

The Heart

of

nterdependentrigination,

erse

5 and

commentary.

9.

Nagarjuna,

Sunyatdsaptati,

erse50

author's

ranslation).

10.

Nagarjuna,

Malamadhyamakakdrikd,

hap.

18,

verse

5.

11.

Nagarjuna,

Mahdydna

Viizaka,

trans.

by

Susumu

Yamaguchi,

n

The

EasternBuddhist

,

no.

2

(Kyoto, 1927),

verse10.

12.

Quoted

from

the

Vyavahdra

iddhi

of

Nagarjuna

in

the

Madhyamakalahkarapanjikd

f

KamalaSila author's ranslation).

13.

Ratndval

I,

verses104-106.

14.

Mulamadhyamakakdrikd

V,

verses and 7.

15.

Ibid.,

,

verse 2.




14/14

54 Della Santina

16. M.

Sprung,

ucid

Exposition

f

theMiddle

Way

Boulder,

Colorado,

Great

Eastern,

980).

17.

Cheng,

Hsueh-Li,

Nagarjuna,

Kant

and

Wittgenstein:

he San-Lun

MadhyamikaExpo-

sition f

Emptiness,

ournal

f

Religious

tudies

7

1981):

79.

18.

Candrakirti,

rasannapadd,

ommentary

o

Mulamadhyamakakdrikd

VIII,

verses and 8.

19.

Hospers,

ntroduction

.

185.

20.

MajjhimaNikdya

,

pp.

426ff

Cula Malunkya

utta).

21.

Murti,

T. R.

V.,

The Central

hilosophy

f

Buddhism

London: George

Allen and

Unwin,

1955),pp. 123-124.

22.

Cheng, Nagarjuna,

Kant

and

Wittgenstein, .

75.

23.


XIV,

verse

10.

24.

Ibid.,

XIII,

verses

and

8;

XXII,

verse11.

25.

Cheng,

Nagarjuna,

Kant and

Wittgenstein,

.

68.

26.

Th.

Stcherbatsky,

uddhist

ogic,

vol.

1

New

York: Dover

Publications,

962).

27.


V,

verse .

28.

Madhyamakdlankdrakdrikd,

erse

5

(author's

ranslation).

29.

C.

Gudmunsen,

Wittgenstein

nd

Buddhism

London:

Macmillan,

977),

p.

44.

30.

Ibid.,

p.

69.

31. I.

Waldo,

Nagarjuna

and

Analytic

hilosophy, hilosophy

ast and

West

8,

no. 3

(July

1978).

32.

Gudmunsen,

Wittgenstein

nd

Buddhism,

p.

68-80.

33.

Majjhima

Nikdya,

.,

p.

135

Alaguddupama

utta).

34.

RatndvalT,I,

verses 04-106.

35.

Muilamadhyamakakdrikd,

II,

verse 4

Sunyatdsaptati

erse).

36.

Prasannapadd,

CIII,

verse

;

and

XXII,

verse

16

author's

ranslation).

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