T H E L O G I C O F R A T I O N A L I T Y

SHARON RYAN

The following argument is intended to defend the view that the best interpretation we can give to the term "true belief" is any belief which coheres with one's stock of beliefs. It is thus a defense of the coherence theory of truth against the objection that, on that theory, people who have conflicting beliefs which are nevertheless coherent with their own respective stocks of beliefs must be held to have true but contradictory beliefs an unacceptable result. For example, if S believes that p, and p is coherent with S's stock of beliefs, while R believes that p, and p is coherent with R's stock of beliefs, then it appears that, on the coherence theory of truth, both p and p are true, which is absurd. But the coherence theory is refuted only if such beliefs call them CC beliefs, can exist. Here is the argument which shows that CC beliefs cannot exist. Each step in it is followed by a justification. t. "Coherent belief'completely justified belief. This definition

obviously implies a strong idea of coherence. But there are reasons for having such a strong definition. Of course, coherent beliefs hang together more than merely logically consistent beliefs. My belief that broccoli is a vegetable and my belief that people have rights, though they are mutually consistent, do not bear a coherence relation. Rather, amongst coherent beliefs there is a network of justificatory relations, as well as relations of logical consistency. Furthermore, these justificatory relations, while they need not be logical entailments, must be strong, such that the coherent beliefs are the ones which are completely justified. We would not want to call one belief "coherent" with the rest of our beliefs as long as amongst our beliefs there were reasons to

525

SHARON RYAN

believe it might be false. But this is just to say that as long as a belief is not completely justified, it cannot be considered coherent with our stock of beliefs.

2. No belief which is subject to reasonable but unanswerable objection from other members of the epistemic community is completely justified. We would not want to call S's belief, b, justified if R provides reasonable objection to b but S has no response which would dispel the doubts of R and any other reasonable member of the epistemic community. If the reasons for S's belief are better than R's objections, then b is more justified than its denial. But as long as there are reasonable doubts that b is true, b isn't completely justified. For example, suppose a scientist, Q, believes that her research proves that beta carotene prevents cancer and argues as much to the community of scientists. Suppose also that other researchers argue to the contrary produce some evidence that shows that those who consume high amounts of beta carotene have cancer rates at least as high as to those who consume low amounts. If Q simply is silent upon being confronted with the objection, or if Q merely repeats her previous argument, then Q fails to answer the objection. Consequently, while Q's reasons may be compelling enough to merit further research, we would not consider Q's belief to completely justified.

3. "Conflicting beliefs" inconsistent beliefs which collective inquiry cannot in principle decide which is true and which false. The force of the objection against the coherence theory of truth is that it allows for the possibility that there exist CC beliefs that both of two inconsistent beliefs be true, as long as both are completely justified on their respective stock of background beliefs. But no belief is completely justified as long as bilateral, collective inquiry cn conclude that it is false. So, the notion of conflicting beliefs entails that the beliefs in question are the subject of unresolvable dispute.

4. The class of beliefs which are conceivably examples of CC beliefs is the class of those beliefs over which at least two members of the epistemic community, S & R, disagree. This step is obvious.

526

THE LOGIC OF RATIONALITY

S's belief that broccoli is a vegetable and R's belief that beta carotene prevents cancer cannot be CC beliefs, since there is no conflict. But S's belief and R's denial of it are candidates for CC beliefs.

5. If a belief, b, is held by S but claimed to be false by R, then b either is or is not subject to reasonable but unanswerable objections from R. This step is logically true, since it is a conditional in which the consequent is a logical truth.

6. If b is subject to reasonable but unanswerable objections from R, then b is not completely justified. This step follows directly from step 2.

7. If b is not subject to reasonable but unanswerable objections from R, then b is in principle decidable by collective inquiry. This step just explains what it means to say that a dispute over the truth of a belief has been settled by rational inquiry. Inquiry comes to a close when all reasonable doubts about a proposition have been examined and either dispelled by research and argument or shown to rest on an error. As long as reasonable doubts linger, there is more work to be done in order to decide whether a belief is true.

8. If b is in principle decidable by collective inquiry, then b is not a conflicting belief. This step follows from by the definition given in step 3.

9. If b is not subject to reasonable but unanswerable objections from R, then b is not a conflicting belief. This step follows from steps 7 & 8 as the conclusion of a conditional syllogism.

10. If a belief, b, is held by S but claimed to be false by R, then either b is not completely justified or b is not a conflicting belief This step follows from steps 5, 6, & 9 as the conclusion of a conditional syllogism with a disjunctive consequent.

11. If b is not completely justified, then it is not a coherent belief. This step follows from the definition given in step 1

12. If b is not a coherent belief, then it is not an example of a CC belief. This step follows by identity. Part of the meaning of "CC belief" is "coherent belief". (Notice that by "coherent belief" we refer to a belief that is coherent with other beliefs, not one that is simply not self contradictory.)

527

SHARON RYAN

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

If b is not completely justified, then it is not an example of a CC belief. This step follows from steps 11 & 12 as the conclusion of a conditional syllogism. If b is not a conflicting belief, then it is not an example of a CC belief. This step follows by identity. Part of the meaning of "CC belief" is "conflicting belief". If a belief, b, is held by S but claimed to be false by R, then b is not an example of a CC belief. This step follows from 10, 13, & 14 as the result of a conditional syllogism with a disjunctive consequent. There can be no example of a CC belief in the class of beliefs which are conceivably examples of CC beliefs. This step follows from steps 4 & 15. It just says that, the only candidates for CC beliefs, namely those beliefs over which at least two people disagree, cannot in fact be CC beliefs. There can be no CC beliefs. This step follows directly from step 16. If there can be no CC beliefs in the class of conceivable candidates for such beliefs, then there can be no CC beliefs. The argument presented here demonstrates that one important objection to the coherence theory of truth that it entails an absurdity rests upon a mistake, namely that there can be CC beliefs. Of course, nothing said here will settle all reasonable doubts about the truth of the coherence theory of truth. My argument shows only that one important objection to that theory, the objection pertaining to CC beliefs, has serious difficulties. Henceforth, proponents of the correspondence theory of truth will have to show that this argument is unsound or show that the coherence theory of truth is mistaken for other reasons.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY MORGANTOWN, WV 26506

USA

528