The Professional Geographer, 54(2) 2002, pages 241–258 © Copyright 2002 by Association of American Geographers.Initial submission, April 2000; revised submissions, December 2000; August 2001; final acceptance, September 2001.

Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

The Local Articulation of Policy Conflict: Land Use, Environment,

and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia*

Cynthia S. Simmons

Central Michigan University

The Brazilian government has promoted development in Amazonia for over forty years. Nevertheless, improvementof rural conditions has been limited. Although tropical deforestation has been the premier concern in discussionsabout Amazonia, this article focuses instead on the human dimensions of development and the apparent failings of so-cial policy in the region. In so doing, the article argues that what we observe today represents the consequence of con-flicting development strategies, brought about by shifting national priorities that were influenced, in part, by interna-tional pressures. The article makes this argument by first presenting an overview of development strategies pursuedsince the mid-twentieth century, followed by a description of shifting national priorities linked to pressures from theinternational community regarding indigenous rights and environmental concern. Finally, this article presents a GIS-based case study focused on the state of Pará, demonstrating the spatial articulation of contradictory policies andshowing the overlap and conflict between competing interests. These spaces of conflict are supported by actual ac-counts of disputes at the local level.

Key Words: Amazonian development, environmental policy, GIS and re-mote sensing, indigenous rights, land conflict.

Introduction

evelopment efforts in Amazonia havespanned more than four decades, involv-

ing agroindustrial ventures, large-scale infra-structure improvements, mineral exploration,and small-farmer colonization schemes. Nev-ertheless, development has done little to im-prove conditions in rural areas. Available socialwelfare indicators reveal that land concentra-tion has intensified (Almeida 1992; Hoffman1998; McCracken et al. 1999), infant mortalityrates have risen (Schneider 1995), and malnu-trition levels are higher than the national aver-age (INAN 1989; Cardoso and Helwege 1992).Indeed, conflict now pits colonists againstranchers and Amerindians against loggersthroughout the region, and fatalities associatedwith violent land disputes have alarmed theworld community.

Although tropical deforestation has been thepremier concern in discussions about Amazo-nia, this article focuses instead on the humandimensions of development and the apparentfailings of social policy in the region. In sodoing, it argues that what we observe today

represents the consequence of conflicting de-velopment strategies, brought about by shift-ing national priorities that were influenced inpart by international pressures. On the onehand, the Brazilian government encouraged in-migration to the Amazon basin by promotingcolonization and the construction of a massivehighway network, thereby dramatically in-creasing the demand for land. On the other, de-velopment strategies supported land-extensiveand capital-intensive production activities (e.g.,livestock and mineral extraction), thus intensi-fying competition for accessible land resources.Complicating all of this, the international com-munity applied pressure on the government toset land aside for indigenous reserves and natu-ral areas protection. The sum effect was thatsignificant tracts of land were removed fromthe available resource pool, creating an artifi-cial form of scarcity.

This article addresses what I refer to as com-petition for land resources, engaging a varietyof actors. The literature on such competitionin Brazil tends to focus on conflict betweenlarge landholders and landless farmers. Recentstudies of conflict in Amazonia have attributed

D

* This research was made possible with support from the Dean’s Office in the College of Social Science, the Department of Geography, and theBasic Science and Remote Sensing Initiative at Michigan State University. I would like to thank Noemi Creagan and Xiomara Cordoba atMichigan State University for their valuable research assistance, and Dave Patton at Central Michigan University for his help with the final figures.Also, I am grateful to Robert Walker for his critical review of the article, and Pedro Mourão de Oliveira at the Superintendency for theDevelopment of Amazonia, Marcellus Caldas at the Federal University of Bahia, and Eraldo Matricardi at Michigan State University for theirvaluable insight into the processes at work in Amazonia. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the reviewers for their valuable criticism.Inspiration for the GIS analysis came from Almeida’s (1994) book,

Carajás: A Guerra dos Mapas

(Carájas: A war of the maps).

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the struggle to a failure of tenure institutions(Mueller et al. 1994; Alston, Libecap, andSchneider 1995; Alston, Libecap, and Mueller1997, 2000) and the conflictive nature of pro-duction and exchange relations (Foweraker1981; Wood 1983; Walker and Homma 1996;Walker 1999; Walker, Moran, and Anselin2000). Competition has also been explained interms of struggle between classes differentiatedby material wealth and ability to mobilize polit-ical power, with outcomes of conflict contin-gent on the changing alignment of economicand political factors (Schmink and Wood1992). Many assert that the government favorsrich and powerful interests at the expense ofthe rural poor (IDESP 1992; CPT 1996; CIMI2000); consequently,

bureaucratic inefficacy

and

political inertia

are seen as intentional strategiesto perpetuate the process of accumulation inthe countryside (Foweraker 1981).

Several authors have addressed the contra-dictory nature of Amazonian development ef-forts (Ianni 1979; Mahar 1979; Hecht 1982;Browder 1988; Moran 1989; Santana et al.1997), while others have looked at the prob-lems of environmental policy (Fearnside 1989;Foresta 1991; Guimarães 1991; Redwood1993; Hall 1997) and indigenous rights in Bra-zil (Medina 1977; Pallemaerts 1986; Turner1996; Moore and Lemos 1999). This article ex-amines the contradictory nature of develop-ment in a comprehensive fashion by recogniz-ing the interaction of development, indigenousand environmental policy, and the influences ofnational and international interests.

The article is organized as follows. The sec-ond section provides an overview of develop-ment strategies pursued in Amazonia since themid-twentieth century and shows how nationalpriorities were linked to pressures from the in-ternational community regarding indigenousrights and environmental protection. The thirdsection presents a GIS-based analysis of thecontradictory development objectives that re-sulted, while the fourth section examines spe-cific cases in which these contradictions haveled to outright conflict. The final section pre-sents conclusions and considers policy implica-tions. Although the general discussion treatsthe entire Amazonian region, the analysis fo-cuses on the eastern section of the Amazon ba-sin, namely the state of Pará (see Figure 1), thesite of much of the early development interest

and the ongoing advance of the agriculturalfrontier.

Amazonian Development, Environmental Policy, and

Indigenous Rights

The explanatory framework implementeddraws from the regional political economy ap-proach, which suggests that local circum-stances and phenomena (e.g., conflict) repre-sent local outcomes of processes funnelingfrom and interacting across a multiplicity ofscales (global, national, regional, and local) andthrough time. Figure 2 illustrates how the eco-nomic priorities of international actors influ-enced development in Brazil (i.e., livestock andmineral exploration), and how global concernfor both indigenous rights and environmentalconservation pressured Brazil to set land asidefor these purposes. In addition, the figureshows that at the national level, developmentstrategies were aimed at satisfying the compet-ing needs for both land reform and economicgrowth. The demand for land was further ag-gravated by drought in the northeast, whichleft many landless farmers in dire straits. Theallocation of land at the regional level resultsfrom these competing interests funnelingacross spatial scales, and manifests today in acomplex pattern of large ranches, small-farmersettlement, and indigenous and conservationreserves.

This article suggests three main processesinfluencing resource scarcity (and conflict) atthe local level: the unfolding of Amazonian de-velopment, the evolution of ecopolitics, andthe elaboration of indigenous rights. Each pro-cess will be discussed in turn.

The Unfolding of Amazonian Development

Amazonia was virtually disconnected from theBrazilian economy until concern over nationalintegration emerged on the political agenda inthe 1950s. Efforts at regional incorporationwere hastened with the military government’sOperation Amazonia and the creation of theSuperintendency for the Development of Am-azonia (SUDAM), which has been the primarydevelopment agency for the Amazon since itsinception in 1966. Table 1 summarizes devel-opment efforts from this point forward, identi-fying the main initiatives, time frame, targeted

Development, Environment, and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia

243

interest groups, and actual beneficiaries of pro-grams. Many have described in elaborate detailthe evolution of development in Amazoniasince the mid-1950s (see, for example, Mahar1979; Hecht 1985; Browder 1988; Hall 1989;

Foresta 1991; Santana et al. 1997), so this arti-cle will only briefly describe these efforts in or-der to emphasize their conflicting nature.

Development of Amazonia was initiatedwith the First National Development Plan

Figure 1 The State of Pará, Brazil.

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from 1967 to 1971 (PND I), designed to stim-ulate economic growth by providing a broadrange of fiscal incentives, including a varietyof tax exemptions, and subsidized credit forland acquisition and agricultural development,

while simultaneously promoting managed in-migration (Mahar 1979; Browder 1988; Hall1989). Despite initial concern for permanentsettlement and small-scale agriculture in theregion, development during the 1960s resulted

Figure 2 The Brazilian Amazon: Scales of influence, competing interests, resource scarcity, and conflict.

Table 1

Brazilian Development Strategies for Eastern Amazonia (Post-WWII)

Program

Time

Frame

Target Interest

Group

Actual Beneficiaries

(Outcome)

Operation Amazonia 1966–70 Commercial/populist Commercial (land consolidation)

•

First National Development Plan (PND I)

National Integration Program (PIN) 1970–74 Populist Commercial (land consolidation)

POLOAMAZONIA 1975–79 Commercial Commercial (land consolidation)

•

Second National Development Plan (PND II)

Grand Carajas Program (PGC) 1980–85 Commercial/populist Commercial (land consolidation)

•

Mineral/industrial development

•

PGCA—agricultural development Geopolitical Military

Projecto Calha Norte (PCN) 1985 Commercial/populist Commercial

First Amazonian Development Plan—PDA I 1986–90 Commercial/populist Commercial

PDA II—sustainable development 1990s Populist Commercial

Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Norte

(FNO)

1990s

Development, Environment, and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia

245

in the monopolization of land and governmentsubsidies for commercial and speculative pur-poses (Ianni 1979; Mahar; Branford and Glock1985; Hall 1989). The principal beneficiaries ofgovernment funding were cattle ranching ac-tivities, which increased from 4 projects in1966 to 162 by 1969. SUDAM’s emphasis oncattle activities reflected global interest in thethird-world livestock sector, in which theWorld Bank and InterAmerican DevelopmentBank invested heavily (Hall 1989). Althoughproposed colonization efforts received littlegovernment attention, the opening of Amazoniaresulted in the spontaneous in-migration of anestimated 174,000 (Martine 1980) to 320,000(Katzman 1977) settlers from 1960 to 1970.

The focus of Amazonian developmentshifted from commercial interests to populistissues. This shift came about in part due to hu-manitarian concerns aroused by drought in thenortheast in 1970. The new populist emphasiswas realized in the National Integration Plan(PIN), designed to integrate the Amazon withthe national economy of Brazil and to provideland and job opportunities for the burgeoninglandless peasantry in the northeastern andsouthern parts of the country. The main strate-gies of PIN included the development of an ex-tensive highway network, an elaborate systemof central places, and small-farmer settlementschemes meant to provide land for landlesspeasants, seasonal labor for extractive indus-tries, increases in food production, and, finally,security on the frontier through demographic“occupation.” In 1971, to facilitate occupationof the Amazon, the military government en-acted Decree 1164 (04/71), shifting jurisdictionof a 100-km strip of land on both sides of allfederal highways in the Brazilian Amazon fromthe state to the federal government and givingadministrative responsibility for a 10-km set-tlement buffer along the federal highways tothe National Institute of Colonization andAgrarian Reform (INCRA) (IDESP 1996).Nevertheless, PIN fell far short of its desiredobjectives, an outcome attributed to numerousstructural, institutional, and environmentalfactors (Mahar 1979; Smith 1982; Bunker1985; Hall 1987, 1989; Moran 1989; Browderand Godfrey 1997).

In 1975, PIN was abandoned and develop-ment policy shifted abruptly to emphasizeagroindustrial ventures, reflecting the political

power of both foreign and domestic interests.The Second National Development Plan(PND II), from 1975 to 1979, stressed the im-portance of the national economy and resourceextraction in Amazonia as a means for generat-ing foreign exchange (Mahar 1979; Hall 1987,1989; Browder 1988; Santana et al. 1997). De-velopment efforts focused on the Programa dePólos Agropecuários e Agrominerais daAmazônia (POLOAMAZONIA), a strategy forattracting capital to growth poles by providinga wide range of government subsidies and taxincentives. An important activity targeted inEastern Amazonia was cattle ranching, particu-larly by corporate interests (Hecht 1982, 1985).As a result of these initiatives, cattle productionintensified and expanded. During the 1970s,INCRA sold 17,000 km

2

of land to large cattleranches, twice as much as was distributed tosmall farmers up through 1974 (Hall 1989;Santana et al. 1997).

Cattle ranching was an obvious investmentchoice, given the existence of plentiful, inex-pensive land and high world beef prices, threetimes the price in 1960 (Mahar 1979).

1

How-ever, political pressure from both foreign anddomestic actors also influenced the approachadopted (Hall 1989). On the domestic front,the Association of Amazon Businessmen (AEA),a São Paulo–based group, exerted pressure onSUDAM to subsidize livestock interests (Bun-ker 1985). In the international arena, mecha-nized agriculture and cattle-ranching activitiesin Latin America were heralded as a means foralleviating world hunger and, as a result, re-ceived tremendous financial support fromvarious international donors including theWorld Bank, the Food and Agriculture Orga-nization (FAO), and U.S. industrial and finan-cial corporations.

2

By the end of the decade, the importance ofcattle ranching as a national development strat-egy declined and Amazonian policy shifted to-ward a greater emphasis on mineral extraction.In 1980 the Programa Grande das Carajás(PGC) was formally established, promotinglarge-scale, capital-intensive, export-orientedmineral and agricultural exploration and theexpansion of related industrial activities. Anarea of about 900,000 km

2

, or approximately 11percent of Brazil’s territory, from the states ofMaranhaõ, Pará, and Goiás, was designated asthe PGC development region.

3

The primary

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objective of the PGC was the servicing of Bra-zil’s growing foreign debt (Hall 1989; Santanaet al. 1997). In return for good loan terms, Bra-zil signed contracts with many countries agree-ing to provide iron ore at favorable pricing be-low the market.

4

The PGC was divided into two principalcomponents, one focusing on mineral explora-tion, and the other, Programa Grande das Car-ajás Agricola (PGCA), concentrating on agri-cultural activities. The stated goals of thePGCA were to increase agricultural produc-tion and employment opportunities, and re-verse the trends toward land concentration bycreating a class of small family farms within thePGC region (Hall 1987, 1989). Nevertheless,the project was biased toward large-scale, capi-tal-intensive endeavors, and by 1987 approxi-mately 51 percent of the PGCA region wasdominated by .7 percent of the landowners,those with greater than 1000-hectare plots(Hall 1987, 1989).

The focus of economic development in Am-azonia changed little with the shift to a demo-cratic government in 1985. The regimeadopted a traditional strategy directing re-sources at productive activities with the expec-tation that benefits would trickle down to themasses, thereby redistributing income, alleviat-ing poverty, and providing for basic needs(Santana et al. 1997). Land reform was deemeda top concern and, as a result, the NationalAgrarian Reform Plan of the New Republicwas enacted under Law 91.766 in October of1985 (IDESP 1992). The First Amazon Devel-opment Plan of 1986 cut subsidies and tax incen-tives, focused on potential extractive reserves,and attempted to address land redistribution.However, growing national and internationalawareness of the importance of the Amazonforest to global carbon cycles and biodiversityand concern for the preservation of indigenouslands constrained the strategies implemented.Land redistribution efforts were stymied andfurther paralyzed by the land reform policy of1988, which limited the legal basis for land ex-propriation (IDESP 1992). Nevertheless, pop-ulation in the region, both urban and rural,continued to increase, doubling between 1970and 1990 to approximately nine million people(Schneider 1995).

The international rhetoric of the 1990scalled for sustainable development intended to

balance economic growth with environmentalprotection (Santana et al. 1997). The 1990switnessed much in the way of socially and envi-ronmentally friendly legislation, but limitedconcrete results (Guimarães 1991; Santana etal. 1997). To address the social concerns out-lined in the development plan, the Fundo Con-stitucional de Financiamento do Norte (FNO)was created and charged with the advancementof socioeconomic development by financingproductive sectors, such as cattle ranching,mineral extraction, industry, and agroindustry,with special consideration given to small farm-ers. In response, programs were created to pro-vide assistance to ensure the economic sustain-ability of small-farmer households and financesettlement of small farmers in INCRA-approved projects (see Santana et al. 1997 andToni 1999 for detailed discussions). However,despite the objectives outlined in the plan andthe efforts of FNO, development in Amazoniahas remained focused primarily on the exploi-tation of natural resources and has served pri-marily to benefit large commercial interests(Toni 1999; Laurance et al. 2001).

In general, development strategies have con-flicted, with intended priorities vacillating be-tween commercial interests on the one handand populist concerns on the other. The over-whelming recipient of development aid duringthis period was the commercial sector. From1960 to 1994 cattle herds in Pará grew by an es-timated 792 percent, and pastures expandedtwo-fold to 75,000 km

2

in 1995 (IBGE 1996).In addition, as of 1991, more than 40,000 km

2

of land had been set aside for government-owned economic activities such as the PGCand hydroelectric operations, and nearly70,000 km

2

had been designated for the mili-tary (IDESP 1992). In contrast, the small-farmer sector received relatively little benefitfrom development efforts. Although land wasmade available along the development high-ways for small-farmer settlement, as of 1992only about 12,800 of the anticipated 100,000families had been formally settled, a mere 13percent of the plan’s objective (IDESP 1992).Furthermore, most colonization projects re-main isolated, lack essential infrastructure, ru-ral credit, and technological assistance, and suf-fer from land-titling disputes (IDESP 1992).Despite the expressed intent of developmentefforts to promote agrarian reform, Gini coef-

Development, Environment, and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia

247

ficient indicators reveal that land concentrationhas in fact increased from .871 in 1967 to .889as of 1998.

5

Indicators reveal that landownersin Pará with greater than 1,000-hectare hold-ings, representing 10 percent of all establish-ments, occupy nearly 88 percent of the settledland (Hoffman 1998). Despite the failure ofplanned settlement schemes, the constructionof the development highways and colonizationroads (

travessões

) opened the region to massivespontaneous in-migration of farmers, miners,loggers, and ranchers. A prime incentive forsmall-farmer migration stems from the Brazil-ian constitution, which provides usufruct rightsto squatters who occupy public land, or

terrasdevolutas

, for one year and a day.

6

The Evolution of Ecopolitics

An additional factor compounding competi-tion for land in Amazonia is the local articula-tion of shifting national priorities regardingenvironmental and indigenous concerns. Brazilhas a long history of environmental activismand legislation dating as far back as the early1930s. Most early national environmental con-cerns focused on externalities associated withindustrialization, particularly pollution, whichdirectly affected residents in large cities insouthern Brazil. Nonetheless, the first ForestryCode of 1934 (Federal Constitution, Article 5,1934) established forest reserves for future ex-ploitation, and in 1965, under Legal Decree4.771 (15/09/65), the code expanded protectedareas to include national parks and biologicalreserves designed to preserve ecosystemsrepresentative of the Brazilian landscape(Machado 1995). National attention to envi-ronmental issues such as deforestation began tosurface later, in response to growing nationaland international concern in the late 1960s andearly 1970s. Many identify the United NationsStockholm Conference of 1972 as the land-mark in global environmental awareness andpolicy (Guimarães 1991; Wilbanks 1994; Liv-erman 1999). However, Brazil did not simplyrespond to international pressure created bythe Stockholm conference, but instead actedpreemptively by organizing national confer-ences to set its environmental position and byparticipating in preconference meetings to en-sure their agenda was included in the debates tocome.

One such important event was the 1971

meeting of the Panel of Experts on Develop-ment and Environment in Founex, Switzer-land. Many of the developing nations that par-ticipated saw international preoccupation withthe environment as an affront by the industrial-ized world and a hindrance to development.Whereas the core countries viewed develop-ment as a cause of environmental problems, thedeveloping world saw it as the cure (Guimarães1991, 150). The Stockholm Conference of1972, and the subsequent Stockholm Declara-tion (United Nations 1972) that led to thefounding of the United Nations EnvironmentProgram, adopted much of the sentiment fromthe meeting in Founex, stressing the sovereignright of nations to pursue environmental objec-tives and economic development in accordancewith their own national priorities. By actingpreemptively, Brazil ensured that its positionon economic development and the environ-ment became part of an internationally ac-cepted view that economic growth and indus-trialization were essential, not ancillary, toconservation and rational use of environmentalresources.

In the aftermath of the Stockholm Confer-ence, Brazil created the Special Secretariat ofthe Environment (SEMA) in 1973, formulatednational conservation priorities in 1976, andincorporated environmental objectives and im-pact assessment in the national planning pro-cess for Amazonia. By 1979, an elaborate zon-ing scheme of land uses (agriculture, ranching,forest extraction, etc.) and conservation unitsfor Amazonia had been established. Althoughmuch legislation and development rhetoricemphasized environmental concerns, the ac-tual implementation of environmentally sensi-tive development was rare. The economic de-mand for natural resource exploitation tookpriority, especially when it came to developingthe Amazon. Indeed, in 1975 two national de-crees, Legal Decrees 1.413 and 76.389, explic-itly advocated economic growth at the expenseof the environment by revoking the right ofstate and local governments to intervene whereeconomic activities pose a threat to the envi-ronment (see Machado 1995). Furthermore,even though the Ministry of Interior requiredthat all development plans perform environ-mental impact assessments, SEMA and otheragencies had little power to enforce the laws(Guimarães 1991).

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In the mid- to late 1980s, the environmentalcrisis brought on by the alarming rate of defor-estation in Amazonia became a focal point inthe international environmental debate, whichin turn impacted the course of developmentand environmental policy (Wetterberg, Prance,and Lovejoy 1981; Ledec 1985; Pallemaerts1986). Policy changes in Brazil concerning de-velopment and the environment mirror changesoccurring in the international arena, especiallychanges to World Bank operating procedures.This is not surprising, given that as of 1991Brazil was the third largest recipient of WorldBank aid in terms of both actual dollars andnumber of projects (Redwood 1993). For ex-ample, the requirement of environmental im-pact assessment reports (RIMAS) on all devel-opment projects was enacted shortly after theWorld Bank included such assessments forBank work. Furthermore, in response to theBrundtland Report of 1987 (formal title:

OurCommon Future

; World Commission on Envi-

ronment and Development 1987), which em-phasized the need for sustainable developmentthat meets basic human needs and recognizesenvironmental limits, the Brazilian govern-ment formalized the nation’s position on envi-ronment. This environmental focus was lateraffirmed in the Constitution of October 1988.

In addition to rising foreign concern aboutthe environment, national ecopolitics intensi-fied with the legal recognition of the GreenParty in 1988. The party sponsored a “Save theAmazon” demonstration later that year, andthe subsequent assassination of Chico Mendes,the world-renowned advocate for the rightsof the Brazilian rubber-tappers, further in-flamed national and international consterna-tion regarding the region’s ecological and socialproblems. In response to pressure from variousactors, financial incentives for ranching activi-ties, which were viewed as the leading cause ofdeforestation, were eliminated and land reformsuspended, and, in preparation for the Rio

Figure 3 The establishment ofindigenous reserves and con-servation units in the state ofPará, Brazil, 1960–99. Source:ISA (2000).

Development, Environment, and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia

249

Summit in 1992, Brazil hastened its conserva-tion efforts by establishing natural areas re-serves (Hall 1997).

The momentum surrounding environmentalconcern and sustainable development that be-gan during the 1980s and intensified as a resultof the Rio Summit of 1992 greatly influencedefforts toward development in the 1990s. ManyAmazonian development projects, such as Plano-flor and Projeto do Sistema de Vigilância daAmazônia (SIVAM), emphasize the importanceof the environment. Furthermore, interna-tional aid has tied environment and develop-ment together, and many new programs havebeen funded to support this concern. Most no-table is the G7 Pilot Program to Conserve theRainforest, which is funded by the RainforestTrust Fund financed by the German govern-ment, the World Bank, and the United NationsEnvironment Program (UNEP).

A clear consequence of this greening of de-velopment policy has been expansion of naturalconservation areas. As of 1999, over 110,000km

2

of land in the state of Pará—the majorityof which was designated after 1980 (see Figure3)—were reserved for conservation of naturalareas (ISA 1999). Although land has been de-clared for natural-areas conservation, the ac-tual fate of the environment concerns many inthe national and international communities,who are skeptical about Brazil’s capability andwillingness to protect these areas (Pallemaerts1986; Guimarães 1991).

7

The Elaboration of Indigenous Rights

Similar to Brazil’s changing stance on environ-mental issues, and for many of the same rea-sons, the nation’s position on indigenous rightshas oscillated from one of neglect to one whichsupported the rights of native peoples in the1980s, and finally to an antagonistic position inthe mid-1990s that concerns human-rights ad-vocates. Historically, Brazil’s policy has beenone of assimilation, emphasizing the necessityof absorbing indigenous peoples into the dom-inant social, cultural, and economic system ofBrazil (Medina 1977; Pallemaerts 1986; Turner1996). Unlike indigenous peoples in NorthAmerica, native tribes in Brazil have neithertreaties nor, until recently, legal recourse to en-sure that their rights were protected (Davis1988; Corntassel and Primeau 1995). The onlylegal agreement that considered the rights of

indigenous peoples was the I.L.O. Convention107, created in 1957, signed by Brazil, and rat-ified in 1966, concerning the integration andprotection of Indian populations (InternationalLabor Organization 1953). Shortly after theconvention was signed, Brazil established theServicio de Proteção aos Indios (SPI) to serveas guardian of indigenous peoples, and in 1967,one year after Brazil ratified the convention,the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) wascreated to replace the SPI.

In 1968, British press reports of government-sponsored genocide in Amazonia inflamedgrowing international criticism of Brazil’streatment of indigenous peoples (Pallemaerts1986). In response, the military governmentincluded provisions concerning indigenousrights in the Constitution of 1969. Neverthe-less, the Brazilian position remained one of as-similation, or integration, as referenced in Arti-cle 8 of the Constitution. Although Article 198allowed indigenous peoples usufruct rights toland, ownership and control remained with thefederal government. Article 89, which empow-ered the National Security Council to controlland use and economic activities in areasdeemed within national interests—which inAmazonia during this period amounted tomuch of the indigenous territory—further af-fected native peoples’ claim to land.

In the 1970s, several pieces of national legis-lation re-emphasized the government’s posi-tion on indigenous rights. For instance, theBrazilian Civil Code of 1973 (Legal Decree6001 19/12/73), referred to as the Indian Stat-ute, stressed usufruct rights, and Legal Decree76.999 (01/08/76) stipulated the process fordemarcating indigenous reserves.

8

However,on the global scene, many national and interna-tional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)were organizing and forming alliances to fo-ment the struggle against injustice (Moore andLemos 1999). Three important internationalmeetings occurred during this period: the 1977International NGO Conference on Discrimi-nation Against Indigenous Peoples, held inGeneva, Switzerland; the 1979 World Confer-ence to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimi-nation; and the 1981 International NGO Con-ference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land,held in Geneva.

During the 1980s, the government’s positionon indigenous land rights, coinciding with

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changes in environmental policy, shifted con-siderably in a direction favorable to native peo-ples. This policy shift resulted from several in-tervening forces. One important factor was thepressure asserted by a coalition of internationaland national NGOs, which affected Brazil di-rectly by rallying the cry for democracy aroundthe struggle of native peoples, and indirectly byinfluencing the international donor commu-nity to include indigenous concerns in fundingdecisions (Turner 1996; Moore and Lemos1999). Indigenous organizations were particu-larly mobilized in the Amazon region, and by1989 the Coordenação das Organizações Indí-genas da Amazônia Brasileira (COIAB) hadbeen created to coordinate actions of numer-ous local and regional groups. Another force—possibly the most important—was the eco-nomic crisis that impeded development effortsand alleviated pressures on the land from com-peting interests (i.e., developers and coloniz-ers), effectively leaving land open for indige-nous reserves and natural areas protection. Themost important piece of legislation during thisdecade was Article 231 of the 1988 FederalConstitution, which legally recognized indige-nous rights to land ownership, nullified otherclaims to the same land, and put in motion theprocess of reserve demarcation to be com-pleted within a five-year time envelope (Minis-try of Justice 1996). In 1991, the position of na-tive peoples was further strengthened withConstitutional Decree 22, which declared in-digenous rights to land based on aboriginalhabitation (Ministry of Justice 1996).

During the 1990s, much attention focusedon indigenous rights. Highlights of this periodincluded Chapter 26 of Agenda 21 stemmingfrom the Rio Summit (United Nations 1992),recognizing the connection between indige-nous peoples and the environment, the declara-tion of 1993 as the International Year of theWorld’s Indigenous Peoples, and the 1997 Sec-ond International Indigenous Forum on Biodi-versity in Madrid, Spain. Solidifying interna-tional recognition of indigenous rights is thepending draft of the InterAmerican Declara-tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples pro-claimed by the Organization of AmericanStates.

9

On the domestic front, the Conselhode Articulação dos Povos e Organizações Indí-genas do Brasil (CAPOIB) was established in1995 to unite and coordinate the efforts of the

indigenous peoples across the country. The ef-ficacy of this national mobilization was evi-denced by the demonstration and march toBrasilia in April of 2000, formally referred to as“Brazil: 500 Years of Indian Resistance.” Thegrowing concern for indigenous rights has hada significant effect on the course of develop-ment in Amazonia. For example, World Bankpolicy has included indigenous and environ-mental concerns in program development.One such project is the 1996 Indigenous LandsProject, part of the G7 Pilot Program to Con-serve the Rainforest financed by the RainforestTrust Fund with contributions from the WorldBank, G7 nations, and Germany.

Although enthusiasm surrounding indige-nous rights was strong, some suggest that thegovernment’s resolve began to deteriorate inthe aftermath of the Rio Summit (Turner 1996)and in the face of economic hardship duringthe 1990s (Moore and Lemos 1999). In 1996,President Cardoso signed Legal Decree 1775/96, which many believe amounted to a dra-matic reversal of policy. In effect, the decreeopens indigenous land claims to contestationby outside interests, both private and local gov-ernment, who can demonstrate rights to the land,and leaves the minister of justice and thepresident as the sole arbiters of disputes. Thegovernment argues that this right to contestland claims is necessary to ensure the constitu-tionality of indigenous reserves and to protectthem against contrary claims (Moore and Le-mos 1999). However, skeptics argue that thenew decree was a concession from Cardoso tothe conservative congressmen from the north-ern states of Amazonia for their political sup-port (CIMI 1997a). Regardless of the rationalefor this new decree, confusion around landrights has resulted, and many suggest that therise of violence against indigenous peoples hasstemmed from a misinterpretation of Decree1775 as permission to invade indigenous lands(Moore and Lemos 1999). Decree 1775 repre-sents another example of a national policy shiftthat reflects the historical tendency of the gov-ernment to vacillate between human rights andenvironmental issues on the one hand and com-mercial and economic interests on the other.

All told, national policy shifts regarding in-digenous rights have resulted in a significantnumber of indigenous reserves declared. As of1996, over 500 reserves had been designated,

Development, Environment, and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia

251

comprising nearly 1 million km

2

of land, anarea representing 11 percent of Brazil’s terri-tory (CIMI 2000). Most of these reserves weredemarcated between 1985 and 1990, reflectingthe changing national policy in favor of indige-nous peoples (see Figure 3). Currently, thestate of Pará contains forty-one reserves en-compassing nearly 310,000 km

2

, an areagreater than a quarter of the state (ISA 2000).However, the security and integrity of theselands are questionable, especially in light ofDecree 1775, and it is estimated that someform of encroachment (e.g., small farmers,miners, and loggers) has affected 80 percent ofthe indigenous reserve areas.

10

Outcome of Conflicting Development and Policy Objectives

The interactions between development pro-grams and policy initiatives over nearly half acentury have resulted in a complicated patternof land allocation. As Table 2 shows, 44 percentof the land area of the state of Pará is reservedfor conservation, indigenous lands, and federaland state government use (including land forthe armed forces). By far the largest amount isheld in indigenous areas, comprising about 25percent of the entire land area. The govern-ment holds the second largest amount of land,with the greatest share designated for natural-areas conservation, an area representing 9 per-cent of the state. Finally, the recent agriculturalcensus shows that nearly 18 percent of the landin Pará is in agricultural use. Of this area, an es-timated 51 percent is in holdings greater than

1,000 hectares, and nearly half of that land is inextremely large holdings greater than 10,000hectares (IBGE 1996). In contrast, small farm-ers with less than 100-hectare plots, represent-ing 82 percent of all establishments, occupy alimited 19 percent of the agricultural land.

Despite the government’s initial plan to openthe Amazon for land reform, inequitable distri-bution of land elsewhere in the country was ac-tually replicated in this region (Almeida 1992;McCracken et al. 1999). Furthermore, al-though significant strides were made to expandconservation areas and indigenous territories,the integrity of the borders are dubious becauseof the governments’ inability and unwillingnessto moderate disputes and ensure legal claims.Overall, this insecurity has created a volatilesituation at the local level.

Conflicting Spaces: A GIS Approach

A prime argument of this article is that con-flicting development strategies and shifting na-tional priorities concerning environmentalprotection and indigenous rights created com-petition for land resources at the local level. Iattempt to demonstrate this through an analy-sis of land allocation to various social objec-tives, namely, federal and state conservationunits, indigenous reserves, and small-farmersettlement. This analysis is limited to land allo-cated along the federal highways in the state ofPará, and does not consider land disputes oc-curring along PA-150 in a region referred to asthe south of Pará that is notorious for violent

Table 2

Land Allocation in Pará, Brazil

Purpose of Land Declaration

Land Area

(km

2

)

As a

Percentage of

Pará Land Area

1. Natural lands conservation

1

110,145 92. Armed forces

2

69,091 63. Government—economic activities

2

41,930 44. Indigenous reserves

1

308,079 255. Total agricultural establishments

3

225,202 18

Small farmers: less than 100 ha

43,281 3.5

Medium farmers: 100–1,000 ha

67,351 5.5

Large landholders: 1,000–10,000 ha

60,787 5

Very large landholders: greater than 10,000 ha

53,692 46. Land unaccounted for

a

469,812 38

Total Land Area in Pará

1,224,259

100

Sources:

1

ISA 1999;

2

IDESP 1992;

3

IBGE 1996.

a

This category includes all the remaining land in the state not considered in the table: urban areas; public land not held in reserve, often referred to as

terras devolutas;

and land occupied but not recorded in the IBGE census.

252

Volume 54, Number 2, May 2002

land conflict between large landowners andsmall farmers.

11

Although contradictory devel-opment policies discussed in this article havecontributed to conflict there, other factors pre-ceding federal efforts to develop the region,and actions by the state—which cannot be de-picted in this analysis—have complicated mat-ters. Much has been written about land conflictin the south of the state (see, e.g., Foweraker1981; Hall 1989; Schmink and Wood 1992;Almeida 1994; Barata 1995; Alston, Libecap,and Schneider 1995; Alston, Libecap, andMueller 1997, 2000). This study considers thecompetition for land resources in federally de-clared indigenous and conservation reserves.

This analysis implemented digital maps andGIS overlay functions to depict the spatial ar-ticulation of the various processes discussed.The strategy of the analysis is as follows. First,spatial representations of policy were obtainedand used to generate coverages. The coverageswere next overlaid to observe areas of overlap,as shown in Figure 4, and were then linked toaccounts of conflict. The coverages used in thisanalysis include the federal highway network,land accessible for small-farmer settlement,colonization roads (

travassões

) used by the set-tlers and extended by loggers, indigenous re-serves declared by FUNAI, and federal andstate conservation areas.

12

The federal highway network layer used inthe analysis was digitized from a map producedby the Brazilian Ministry of Planning for 1998.As can be seen in Figure 4, the coverage differ-entiates between federal paved, unpaved, andplanned highways. Two buffers were createdaround the federal highways to represent landunder federal jurisdiction and land designatedfor small-farmer settlement. According to PINand Legal Decree 1164, 100-kilometer bandson both sides of the federal highways—boththose already constructed and those plannedfor the future—were declared to be under fed-eral jurisdiction. In the state of Pará this in-cludes the Transamazon (BR-230), Belém-Bra-silia (BR-010), and Santarém-Cuiabá (BR-163)highways. Within this area, the decree also al-located a 10-km strip of land along both sidesof the highways for small-farmer settlement tobe distributed by INCRA. Because settlementmaps are difficult to acquire, a 10-km buffer onboth sides of the federal highways was used toestimate the land accessible for settlement.

13

The colonization/logging roads shown inFigure 4 were digitized from satellite imagescovering that part of the Transamazon High-way from Marabá west to Ruropolis, and alsothe Santarém-Cuiabá Highway south fromSantarém to the southernmost border of thestate.

14

These areas constitute the prime settle-ment frontier of eastern Amazonia. Initially thegovernment constructed penetration roads tofacilitate settlement; however, loggers and in-migrants later extended these roads. As Figure4 reveals, the colonization roads extend beyondthe original 10-kilometer settlement bufferplanned by the government by almost 6,000 ki-lometers.

15

The data for the indigenous reserve and con-servation coverages came from FUNAI and theIBAMA, respectively. Unfortunately, the digi-tized version of the indigenous reserves cover-age did not match the boundaries of papermaps depicting the same indigenous areas (ISA2000). The paper maps suggested that most ofthe indigenous boundaries were physical onesfollowing the course of rivers; consequently,the imprecise boundaries of the digital cover-age were replaced with new boundaries derivedfrom a stream coverage for the state providedby IBAMA. The revised map shown in Figure 4closely resembles the official indigenous landsmaps of FUNAI and IBGE. Although not ex-act, the coverage reveals the relative locationand size of indigenous areas, which is the pur-pose of this exercise.

16

Finally, the conservationareas in Figure 4 show all federal and state con-servation areas in Pará, but do not include pri-vate and municipal lands amounting to about476 km

2

, mostly located in urban areas.

Spaces of Conflict

This section examines incidents of potentialand realized conflict resulting from resourcecompetition involving indigenous peoples,small farmers, miners, fishermen, loggers,ranchers, and government interests. To facili-tate the discussion and connect it with Figure4, each incident of conflict is cross-referencedwith an identification number in the articlecorresponding to an identification number onthe map in Figure 4.

Figure 4 reveals an intricate pattern of com-peting and overlapping interests. Competitionis most obvious along the Transamazon High-

Development, Environment, and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia

253

way between Altamira and Ruropolis. Here,colonization roads that were originally built 6to 10 kilometers long by the government to fa-cilitate small-farmer settlement have been ex-tended, in some cases up to 80 kilometers, andnow severely encroach upon the indigenous re-serves that run parallel to this region. Overall,at least 1,000 kilometers of road have been ex-tended into indigenous lands.

17

Many of thesepenetration roads were constructed by timber

interests, but they have subsequently facilitatedthe movement of small farmers and miners intoremote areas, often areas designated for indig-enous reserves and/or nature conservation.

The Cachoeira Seca do Iriri (ID# 1) indige-nous reserve in this region has been the mostseverely affected. In May 1999, the Ararapeople of the reserve captured eight loggers at-tempting to construct a road to connect theTransamazon Highway to the Iriri River in or-

Figure 4 Spaces of conflict in Pará, Brazil.

254

Volume 54, Number 2, May 2002

der to facilitate their illegal activity (

O Liberal

1999b). That same year, federal police in Alta-mira discovered an illegal timber operation onthe Bacajá Trincheira indigenous territory(ID# 2). The loggers used aerial photos to sur-vey the area and camouflaged an estimated100,000 m

3

of hardwood as bridges to keep theload concealed until they were ready for trans-port (

O Estado de São Paulo

1999). Because of itscloseness to the highway and overlap with thesettlement areas, the Arara reserve (ID# 3) hasalso experienced much encroachment fromboth small-farmer invasions and illegal loggingactivity.

Pronounced encroachment is also occurringalong the Santarém-Cuiabá Highway south ofRuropolis. One case in point is the intense con-flict occurring in the Baú indigenous reserve(ID# 4) of the Kayapó. As the figure shows, nu-merous roads penetrate the area facilitating en-croachment. In July 2000, the Kayapó capturednineteen tourists who were fishing on the Cu-ruá River within the boundaries of the Baú in-digenous reserve. After six days of tense nego-tiations, the hostages were released with thepromise that the state would demarcate the re-mainder of their reserve. However, less thanone month later an injunction was filed, andtensions have once again risen (CIMI 2000).

Although much of the conflict reported hereoccurred on indigenous lands, invasions arealso occurring in conservation areas. However,supporting accounts of encroachment into nat-ural areas are limited. The main reason for thisis that government officials responsible forthese areas are too few in number to monitorthe more than 11 million hectares of land instate and federal conservation areas. Incursionsinto these areas frequently go undetected orunderreported. Nevertheless, Figure 4 showscolonization/logging roads penetrating the Al-tamira (ID# 5), Itaituba II (ID# 6), and TapajosNational Forest (ID# 7). According to thisanalysis, at least an estimated 106 km of roadcurrently penetrate conservation areas in thestate of Pará.

Another area of intense conflict is the Para-kanã indigenous reserve (ID# 8) in southernPará. Although Figure 4 does not show the col-onization/logging roads penetrating the re-serve because satellite data was not available, itis still apparent that the reserve overlaps the10-km settlement buffer. Because of their prox-

imity to the major development highways, theParakanã lands have recently experienced en-croachment from many different actors. InApril 1999, INCRA officials discovered the ex-istence of a 13,000-hectare ranch within the re-serve that had no registration records. A fol-low-up investigation by the Ministry of Laborand Federal Police revealed that the ranch kept182 workers in slave conditions (

O Liberal

1999a). Overall, it is estimated that 15 percentof the 980,000 hectares in reserve have been in-vaded by loggers, miners, ranchers, and settlers(CIMI 1997b).

Figure 4 highlights many cases where landuses contradict and competition leads to con-flict, but it does not reveal the totality of threatsto indigenous lands and people, which haverisen dramatically in the last several years(CIMI 1997a). According to a report by theConselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI), in1996 the rate of invasions rose 95 percent fromthe previous year, with 109 invasions involving31,000 invaders on eighty-six indigenous re-serves nationwide (CIMI 1997a). In the after-math of Decree 1775, a reported 1,749 claimscontesting the demarcation of ninety-one in-digenous reserves were filed with the govern-ment in 1996. Included in this report are ac-counts of encroachment into reserves in Pará.Accordingly, three reserves (Alto Rio Guamá,Mãe Maria, and Munduruku II) were invadedby squatters, miners, loggers, and ranchers in-tent on settling the region, who subsequentlyfiled claims contesting the reserves in accor-dance with Decree 1775. That same year min-ers invaded six reserves (Apyterewa, KayabiGleba Sul, Cuminapanema/Urucuriana, Mun-duruku II, Turé-Mariquita-Tembé, and Tembé-Turiwara). In the case of the Munduruku reserve,more than 10,000 miners claiming rights to landinvaded the area. Both the Turé-Mariquita andTuriwara reserves of the Tembé Indians wereinvaded by large corporate interests who notonly extracted minerals from the reserve, butalso constructed over 30 km of road to facilitatetransportation of minerals. Finally, eightreserves recorded illegal logging activities(Alto Rio Guamá, Apyterewa-Parakanã, Arara,Araweté-Igarapé Ipixuna, Cachoeira Seca doIriri, Koatinemo, Bacajá/Trincheira, Xikrindo Cateté) and commercial fishermen invadedfour reserves (Arara, Kararaô, Koatinemo, andKayabi).

Development, Environment, and Amerindian Rights in Eastern Amazonia

255

Although not explicitly represented in Fig-ure 4, two government projects threaten tocause severe environmental and social impactsin both indigenous and conservation areas. TheTapajos Roadway-Waterway, intended to facil-itate transportation routes to the capital ofBelém, cuts across a 100-kilometer stretch ofthe Munduruku indigenous areas in the south-western portion of the state. Despite a tempo-rary injunction imposed in 1997 due to thenegative impacts of the megaproject, the gov-ernment is continuing efforts (CIMI 1997c).The Araguaia-Tocantins Waterway, one ofmany federal projects in the realm of AvançaBrazil, is intended to widen the river system tofacilitate transportation of agricultural prod-ucts from the midwestern part of the country tothe major ports of Belém in Pará and São Luisin Maranhão. Experts and local indigenousgroups protest that the project will have severerepercussions for numerous indigenous peo-ples and conservation areas along the projectedcourse of construction. In the state of Pará, theKarajá, Parakanã, and Xikrin reserves, and theconservation areas of Floresta Nacional doTapirapé-Aquiri, Reserva Biologica do Tapi-rapé, and Area de Proteção Ambiental IgarapéGelado will be impacted (ISA 1999).

Discussion and Conclusions

The analysis presented in this article suggestsan additional source of conflict (as opposed toan alternative cause)—namely, the unfoldingof contradictory government policies—and fo-cuses on competition occurring on federalreserve lands for indigenous rights and conser-vation purposes. By promoting conflicting de-velopment activities, by shifting resources andefforts away from small-farmer settlement infavor of corporate interests, by establishing ex-tensive reserves, and by vacillating when itcomes to indigenous land claims, the govern-ment has created a volatile situation on theground in which various groups are competingfor the same land. As a result, indigenous re-serves are being invaded, natural areas are be-ing encroached upon, and land conflict haserupted between all involved—native peoples,landless peasants, ranchers, miners, loggers,fishermen, and police.

The Brazilian government has promoted de-velopment in Amazonia for over forty years,

and has invested much in the way of technicaland financial resources. Clearly, planners andpolicymakers for frontier areas such as the Bra-zilian Amazon must take a long-term view ofdevelopment and must consider the nature ofpolicy interactions. Otherwise, social conflictmay result, setting back the development clock,which in the Amazonian case appears to becompromising prospects for social and ecolog-ical sustainability.

As this article has demonstrated, policies im-plemented in Brazil have often been in conflict,and it is not surprising that outcomes have notmet expectations. The article shows that colo-nization, indigenous concerns, and the interestof conservation have not been interwoven intoa coherent development strategy. This has re-sulted not only in confusion for the people inthe region, but in many cases in violent dis-putes and bloodshed. j

Notes

1 From 1975 onward, annual livestock productionwas expected to exceed one million head, 70 percentgreater than the 1970 production for both Northand Central Western regions of Brazil combined(Mahar 1979).

2 In 1970, the Latin American Agribusiness Develop-ment Corporation, comprising thirteen major U.S.industrial and financial corporations, was estab-lished with funds from Bank of America for financ-ing ranching activities, and the U.S. encouragedoverseas investment by allowing tax deferments un-til profit repatriation occurred (Hall 1989).

3 The PGC centered on the iron-ore mining and pro-cessing complex in Carajás, Pará.

4 The PGC received U.S.$600 million from theEEC, U.S.$500 million from Japan, U.S.$305 mil-lion from the World Bank, U.S.$250 million fromU.S. banks, and U.S.$60 million from the USSR(Hall 1987, 1989).

5 Hoffman (1998) calculated Gini-coefficients usingthe fifteen land-size classification reported byIBGE.

6 In addition, Article 191 of the 1988 Constitutiondictates that individuals who occupy private landand keep it under production for more than fiveyears without opposition from the owners can ob-tain title through “adverse possession.”

7 The greatest challenge the Brazilian Institute ofEnvironment and Natural Resources (IBAMA) offi-cials face is to protect the nearly 62 million hectaresof reserve land in Amazonia with limited resources,especially personnel.

8 See Medina (1977) for Brazil’s earlier position onindigenous people.

9 This document is still pending. The committee on

256 Volume 54, Number 2, May 2002

Juridical and Political Affairs is convening a specialsession of the working group in Washington, DC,on 11–15 March 2002. For more information, seeOrganization of American States (2000).

10 Many small farmers view indigenous reserves asterras devolutas, especially in light of Decree 1775,and therefore available for occupation as permittedby the Constitution.

11 In particular, the Poliginos dos Castanhais, an areaof Brazil-nut extraction located in this region, hashistorically been exposed to violent land conflict.

12 All coverages were georeferenced using real-worldcoordinates and sinusoidal projection in ArcInfo.

13 This GIS-generated value is approximately 85,500km2, or 8 percent of the land area in Pará.

14 Analysis included nine Landsat 7 enhanced the-matic mapper (ETM) images from August andSeptember of 1999, and two Landsat thematicmapper (TM) images from June of 1996.

15 Due to variability of soils and access to water, thegovernment constructed roads of less than 1 km insome cases and others of up to 15 km. On average,roads were 6 to 10 km in length (INCRA official,personal communication, March 2000).

16 A serious criticism of land demarcation in the Bra-zilian Amazon for indigenous reserves, conserva-tion units, and private property is that the bound-aries are unclear and some overlap. Becauseground-truthing of the boundaries was not feasi-ble, I relied on the final government sources.

17 This actually represents the lower bound, becausenot all colonization/logging roads were digitizedgiven data and time constraints.

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CYNTHIA S. SIMMONS is an Assistant Professorin the Department of Geography, Central MichiganUniversity, Mount Pleasant, MI 48859. E-mail:cynthia.simmons@cmich.edu. Her research interestsfocus on social and environmental consequences ofeconomic development in Latin America.