The Joint Multinational Training Command Training Journal 5

URNALOJ URNALOJ

www.hqjmtc.army.mil spring 2011

JOIN

T MU

LTINATIONAL TRAINING COM

MAN

D

7TH UNITED STATES ARMY

THE 7TH U.S. ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

T R A I N I N GT R A I N I N G

Never leave afallen Comrade:

Personnel RecoveryOperations

in Afghanistan

Never leave afallen Comrade:

Personnel RecoveryOperations

in Afghanistan

Special Feature:Voices of moderate Islam

Special Feature:Voices of moderate Islam

Being the Enemy:Lessons from the

Opposing Force

Being the Enemy:Lessons from the

Opposing Force

COIN and COMBAT:support, no excuse

not to Soldier

COIN and COMBAT:support, no excuse

not to Soldier

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL SPRING 2011

Commanding GeneralU.S. Army, Europe

Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling

Commanding General 7th U.S. Army JMTC

Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar

is an unofficial publication of the7th United States Army Joint

Multinational Training Command (JMTC)at Grafenwoehr, Germany

Circulation is 5,000 copies.

Editorial views and opinions arenot necessarily those of the

Department of the Army.

Correspondence may be sent to:HQ 7th Army JMTC

Attention: Public Affairs Office,Building 127, Room 105

APO AE 09114

or via Bundespost:HQ 7th Army JMTC

Attention: Public Affairs OfficeLager Grafenwoehr, Geb. 123

92655 Grafenwoehr

Telephone: DSN 475-7776or commercial 09641-83-7776

email: [email protected]

The 7th United States Army JointMultinational Training Command

Public Affairs Officer Maj. Jennifer R. Johnson

Deputy Public Affairs OfficerDenver Makle

JMTC Public Affairs SpecialistsChristian Marquardt

Michael BeatonSgt. 1st Class Lyttleton Yates

J M T C C O M M A N D

JMTCPUBLIC AFFAIRS

URNALOJT R A I N I N GT R A I N I N G

URNALOJ

photo: sgt sean p. casey982d combat camera abn

1

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

joint multinational training command

Cover photo: Spc. Theodore Schmidt, 173rd ABCT

2letters from the command

Command Sgt. Maj. Dennis A. Zavodsky and Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar

4 & 5jmtc web watch

6never leave a fallen comrade:

personnel recovery operations in afghanistanBy Maj. Steven Williams

8deliberate recovery operations at jmrc…

a brigade fightBy Col. D. Greg Anderson and Maj. Derek W. Hoffman

10coin and combat: support, no excuse not to soldier

By 1st. Lt. Phillip M. Hoffman

12being the enemy:

lessons from the opposing forceBy Denver Makle

14helping afghans build accountable governance,

the people’s development fundBy Maj. Scott Strickler and Dr. Jay Baker

163-159th arb adds realism to training experience

for u.s. and nato By Denver Makle

18analysis of intelligence development in the

romanian – american battle groupBy Capt. Krisjand Rothweiler

20ncoa and small group discussion

facilitate lessons-learnedBy Denver Makle

21 on the same frequency, a complicated game

By Denver Makle

22 - 26special feature: voices of moderate islam

By Maj. Matthew J. Yandura

28itam viewer is now available with historical imagery

By Christian Marquardt

URNALOJT R A I N I N GT R A I N I N G

URNALOJ

On April 14, 2011, I became the Command Sergeant Major of the 7th U.S. Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC). I have spent the past 25 years taking care of Soldiers and their families and that is what I I will continue to do at the JMTC. I have never been stationed in Europebefore. However, I consider myself extremely fortunateand blessed to have this opportunity to be a part of the JMTC, and a member of the U.S. Army Europe(USAREUR) community. I can think of no other time in our Army’s history that has offered as many opportunities, as well as, challenges for our Soldiers and their Families. As an Army and a nation we’ve been tested by an amorphous and dangerousenemy who has used a myriad of threats and fighters tochallenge the U.S. and our allies on a global scale. Sincethe attacks of September 11th, we have fought throughan era of persistent conflict,overcoming all obstacles. Since arriving, I’ve had the opportunity to observe theCounter-IED Train-the-Force Baseline Course at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, which is offered by theBadger Team, the dedicated C-IED training team. My participation in this event confirms that the JMTC is successful at developing the tools to train U.S. and Multi-national Soldiers for the mission in Afghanistan. I’mpleased and impressed to see the level of support pro-vided by agencies such as the Joint Improvised ExplosiveDevice Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which has fundedprojects that directly effect our Soldiers ability to succeedin theater. The JIEDDO is an important stakeholder and partnerin the fight against the IED, and the dividends are seenin training. Every Soldier leaves here with an understand-ing of what to expect and a clear starting-point for Defeating-the-Device, Attacking-the-Network andTraining-the-Force. The new Multi-cultural Mobile Counter ImprovisedExplosive Device Interactive Trainer (McMCIT), anothertool funded by the JIEDDO, and offered exclusively inEurope, because of its language capabilities is also valuable. The successful employment of the Badger team, theMcMCIT and the many C-IED courses available here is a

2

JMTC Command Sergeant MajorCommand. Sgt. Maj. Dennis C. Zavodsky

direct result of partnership and collaboration ,which is filling voids within the international community, and is atestimony of JMTC’s value and worth as a training leader. The JMTC is performing a critical and important ongoing multifaceted mission that continuously demon-strates our capabilities as an Army and as a nation. This endeavor highlights the resiliency of our Soldiers and their Families. Leadership and training are like winning; they are nota “sometime” thing, they are an “all-the-time” thing. As a Noncommissioned Officer, I take leadership, training, standards and discipline very seriously. I know this sounds cliché, but it is a fact. It is who I am, and who we are as a group of professional leaders. I have a sacred trust and bond with the Soldiers of our nation. I also have an obligation and a responsibility to promulgateour same institutional values, standards and capabilities to our partner nations who are developing and trainingtheir own NCO corps’. I believe in the Army Family, and I know from personalexperience that it’s the bedrock that keeps our war-fighters in the fight for the long haul. I have the utmostrespect and admiration for our military Families, andwill do all I can to support programs and policies thatmake families stronger. I know that this assignment is going to be bothchallenging and rewarding, and I look forward to servingwith each and every one of you, as well as our multi-national partners. There is no question that JMTC is a truly remarkableplace to live and work; for me, this is exactly the righttime to be here. I will strive to uphold the legacy of strong NCO leader-ship and professionalism that the JMTC has earned, notjust in our Army but across the armies of the world.

Dennis C. ZavodskyCommand Sergeant Major, USAJMTC CSMArmy Training Network


This year has beentransition, marked by transition, a new Chief of Staff and Sgt. Major of the Army, and Commander of U.S. Army Europe. J However, the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) continues to build partner capacity as U.S. and allied forces prepare for the fight in Afghanistan. As we transition at home, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment and the 615th Military Police return, and the 18th Engineers and the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade prepare for deployment. This edition of the JMTC Training Journal highlightssignificant contributions made by the 173rd AirborneBrigade Combat Team (173rd ABCT) and the 12th CombatAviation Brigade (CAB), during their rotations in Iraq andAfghanistan. There is no better place to train for Afghanistan! Here, in Europe, units train among International Security Assist-ance Force (ISAF) and coalition partners. No Combat Train-ing Center replicates the current operational environment better than the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC),using role-players multinational Afghan National SecurityForce (ANSF) replicators, and ANSF from Afghanistan, andMultinational Special Operations Forces. And, there islive-and-virtual coalition training, close-air support andintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance training available. The JMTC is the only training command equipped with Centrix-ISAF to communicate on the Afghan MissionNetwork, which enables our capability to “train as we fight.” We also have the Army’s only 360 degree combat outpost live-fire training facility. And, in February 2011, the JMTC fielded the only multicultural mobile counter-IED (C-IED)trainer. We've also published a C-IED training strategythat includes the Combined Arms Training Center’s C-IEDMaster Trainer course. Another transition, our 1st Bn., 4th Inf. Regt. (1-4), to Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) completed its five-year mission in Afghanistan. Gen. Petraeus, commander of ISAFgave specific mention of their accomplishments, and manypopular images document their extraordinary contribution. It’s a legacy continued as they serve as Europe’s professionalopposing force. Recently, Admiral James G. Stavridis, the Commander ofthe U.S. European Command and Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling, 3

VISIT JMTC ONLINE AT WWW.HQJMTC.ARMY. MIL

the USAREUR commander, called JMTC, a “crown jewel.” The value and utility of its training areas, ranges and facilities is complimented by our greatest tool in the fight. The ability to apply lessons learned, while training to standards set by the ISAF and NATO. The JMTC usesthe feedback of returning units to make the difference between unit success and mission failure. Additionally, as we strive to prevail in the current fight, we are continuing to prepare for the next fight. Existingcounter-insurgency training is being incorporated into full-spectrum operations (FSO), which meets the Army’s next objectives. Soon, the 173rd ABCT will be the first to train in new FSO and Hybrid Threat scenarios. The operational environment, developed by the JMTC,is leveraging resources provided by JMRC and Joint Multi-national Simulations Center, and the Training Support Activity Europe to create a complex, live, virtual and con-structive event with our multinational partners serving as host-nation opposing and coalition forces. This full-spectrum training environment trains the brigade in both wide-area security and combined-arms maneuver. We're excited about this opportunity to once againlead our Army into the future, as we develop the tactics,techniques and procedures of our new doctrine. My thanks to the 173rd ABCT and the 12th CAB for theirarticles, thereby documenting their outstanding contri-butions to ISAF and the nation. And, best wishes for thoseunits, Soldiers and Families facing an upcoming deployment.We wish you well, and look forward to your safe return. Finally, my sincerest gratitude to the entire JMTC teamfor their professionalism and commitment to making ourforces in Europe and our Allies, among the best trainedin the world. Ready Thru Training!

JMTC Commanding GeneralBrig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar

Steven L. SalazarBrigadier General, U.S. ArmyCommandingArmy Training Network


w e b w a t c h

The Army’s only Multi-cultural Mobile CounterImprovised Explosive Device Interactive Trainer,teaches Soldiers to identify visual indicatorsof an IED and react to a suspected IED. Thesystem is fully-mobile and can be used at home-station or abroad.

Virtual Counter-IED system enhancestraining in Europe

www.army.mil/article/55172

Soldiers from Poland, Slovenia, Serbia, Romaniaand Hungary complete the Counter-ImprovisedExplosive Device Train-the-Trainer Course at theJMTC’s Hohenfels Training Area. The students be-come IED-defeat instructors, who train counter-IEDmeasures at their units prior to deployment.

Coalition partners train-to-trainCounter-IED tactics


To foster unity of effort among ISAF partners,the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC),recently hosted a nine-day Counter Insurgency course, to build partner capacity and overcometerrorist networks.

JMTC trains NATO, ISAF partners inCounter Insurgency

www.hqjmtc.army.mil/article/59161

lessons learned by a brigade combat teamCOUNTERINSURGENCYI N A F G H A N I S T A N

Read “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” an article authored byCol. John M. Spiszer, Commander of the Joint Multinational Readiness Centerin Hohenfels, Germany. The article shares personalobservations and actions taken during leader reconnaissance, training, and the execution ofcounter-insurgency operations in the Nangarhar,Nuristan, Konar, and Eaghman provinces fromDec. 2007 to July 2009 by Task Force Duke, the 3rdBrigade Combat Team, 1st Inf. Div. The articlewas featured in the Jan./Feb. edition of MilitaryReview, a publication that supports the education,training, development and integration mission ofthe combined arms center. The article is availableonline in the JMTC news archive at www.usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MREditions2011

by col. john m. spiszer,jmrc

4

(Photo: Denver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs) (Photo: Spc. Lauren DeVita, 123rd Public Affairs)(Photo: Capt. Robert Burnham, 114th Public Affairs)


An international student provides medical care,during the Combat Life Saver course at the JMTC’sMedical Simulation training Center (MSTC) at Grafenwoehr, as part of his unit’s pre-deploy-ment training for Afghanistan.

U.S. and multinational Soldierslearn life-saving skills pre-deployment


For the first time, aviators of both countriesparticipate in a coordinated live-fire trainingexercise with the U.S. and its rotary, aviationassets. They used the U.S. AH-64, Apache AttackHelicopter and Germany’s new Eurocopter TigerAttack Helicopter.

U.S. and German aviators test newattack helicopter in Grafenwoehr


Military Police Officer Spc. Mark Gordy leashesLexa, a MP dog with the 615th MP Co. After an attack demonstration, NATO and CoalitionSoldiers received training on Counter-IED tacticsand the uses of military canine units for searches.

Working Dogs perform IED “Searchand Find” demonstration for Multi-national Partners

www.flickr.com/photos/7armyjmtc/sets

jmtc spotlight on soldier resiliencesoldier 360° takes shape, adds more extensive physicalreadiness training by denver makle, jmtc public affairs

5

SOLDIER 360o

LEADER COMPREHENSIVEFITNESS COURSE

As drill sergeants at Initial MilitaryTraining schools introduce new Soldiers to the Army’s Physical Readiness Training(PRT), the staff and faculty of Soldier 360°, a military leader development course offered exclusively in Europe providesseasoned NCOs instruction on the newstandards. “Soldier 360° provides direct, hands-ontraining in all areas of health and wellnessfor military leaders. We develop the NCOs’“muscle memory”, and provide them toolsto identify, respond, and manage physical,psychological, relationship, marital, andfinancial challenges,”said Col. Mary S. Lopez,

director of Strategic Initiatives for theBavarian Medical Command. “Everything we do is based on research and reflectscutting-edge approaches.” During the first week, the NCOs are re-moved from day-to-day work and homeenvironments to receive instruction on painand anger management, stress reductionand the “mindful” use of alcohol. Spouses are integrated during the second week ofthe training to practice communication skills. For more information on the Soldier 360° program visit www.army.mil/article/56995

(Photo: Sgt. Whitney Hughes, 114th Public Affairs) (Photo: Sgt. Richard Frost, 114th Public Affairs) (Photo: Spc. Lauren DeVita, 123rd Public Affairs)


6

FEATURE

On July 24, 2010, at 7 a.m, during an ongoing, Squadron-level mission in support of the Brigade’s counter-insurgency(COIN) fight, two U.S. sailors were missing in Afghanistan.The pair were absent since the evening before, after travelingin an up-armored sport utility vehicle south from Kabul,along the main North-South highway through Logar Province,about 80 kilometers south of Kabul. The 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (TF SABER) of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (TF BAYONET) deployed to Logar during Dec. 2009 to support OperationEnduring Freedom X. No one knew the events on July 23,would set off a chain-of-events teaching the unit and leader-ship valuable lessons in intelligence, planning, logistics, and airsupport. A Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown (DUSTWUN)was declared. The recovery operation quickly became the priority intheater. Multiple organizations brought personnel and otherresources to assist in the effort. A continuous, multi-dayoperation ensued to find the service members. They wereassumed to be alive, but time was short. Evidence revealedthe personnel were traveling alone in Kabul, and traveledoff-course early in the day. In a few hours, they had madetheir way out of the city, off the paved highway, and past aremote bazaar in Charkh District of Logar where they were ambushed in an enemy dominated area. They were last seenin TF Bayonet’s area of responsibility and the 173rd wasassigned the personnel recovery mission.

INTELLIGENCE “We were dealing with four to seven more collection assets than those during steady-state operations; all on-station at the same time for the duration of the DUSTWUN,” said 1st Lt. Thomas Clark, TF SABER’s intelligence (intel) officer “For lethal targeting the DUSTWUN provided an opportunity to apply collection and action arm assets fluidly in pursuit of the service members. By the end of the DUSTWUN, we had captured more than thirty detainees, including a few top priority targets, which were exploited. It drastically changed the enemy situation in the short-and-long term.” The DUSTWUN began amidst an already increasedsquadron operations tempo, with some constrained resources, personnel and otherwise. The unexpected change of mission forced leaders toexecute decision-making in the midst of limited and incom-plete information, while continuously orienting and deployingforces from outside TF Saber’s battlespace into the fight. “Every day, during the DUSTWUN event, there wereadditional units entering our battle space, and another unitunit leaving,” said Capt. Norm Christie, the unit’s plans

Never leave a fallen Comrade:Personnel Recovery Operations in AfghanistanBy Maj. Steven M. Williams 1-91 Cavalry Squadron, 173rd ABCT

officer, “Keeping the incoming units informed of the situationand debriefing the outgoing units as well as synchronizing our operations had to occur within a very short window of time.” Officials said there wasn’t a lot of information available initially. “There was so little information we began the searchlooking for the service members’ vehicle, described as a‘white S.U.V.’ [Sport Utility Vehicle], and as reports from intel functions flooded in, three distinct and competing storylinesemerged,” said 1st Lt. Thomas A. Clark of TF SABER. “Wehad to decide and advise on a focused course of action, whilesimultaneously tracking and reconnoitering the alternatives.” Piecing together the intel required deciding which infor-mation was reliable, then advising the commanders so theycould act decisively. “Both the lack of information in the beginning and the over-whelming amount of competing information in the end could have been paralyzing,” said Clark. “Evaluating informationfor credibility and putting it into context is the job of the intel section. They [intel ] must be prepared to be decisive.”

PLANNING AND LOGISTICS “Under normal conditions, we were planning logistics for700-800 people at established locations, said Capt. Matthew Booth, the TF SABER Forward Support Troop Commander. “During the DUSTWUN, it rapidly increased to 1500-1800 people from multiple units across multiple remote locations.As time passed, we were planning for even more, as increasing levels of assets were being lined up.” Planners tracked what units were doing hour-to-hour andplanned not only the resupply, but anticipated and developedpackages for emergency contingencies, he said. “We couldn’t wait for them [units] to call and requestsupplies, since the timelines were short. The normal restrictionsfor resupply operations had decreased from two weeks foran air drop to a few hours,” said Booth. “We had to lookbeyond the standard way of moving supplies.” Normally, supplies were moved by Chinooks helicopters[CH-47s], with slings or a standard Combat Logistics Patrolpackage, which requires slower, convoy movement of supplies.The Chinooks were busy carrying large groups of personnel.TF SABER had to consider alternatives like non-standard rotary wing usage, including “jingle” air, which usually onlyresupplied the combat outposts; and “green” air, such as Blackhawks, UH-60s, for moving small teams. “We also used fixed wing, which executed smaller, non-standard drops,” he said. “Keeping the communication channels open all the way to Division was critical in keepingall levels informed and prepared to handle the bigger andnon-standard requests.”


7

AIR SUPPORT It was important to have air plannersfrom the supporting aviation unit availableto support the mission, to ensure 24-hourcoverage, said Christie. “There were three-to-five air assaultsconducted every day for five days, with mostof the units not organic to our Squadronor Brigade,” said Christie. “Having an airplanner with extensive familiarity of all theaviation assets in the Regional Command-East and knowing who to call to get thoseassets, was crucial.” The plans section was engaged. Since additional assets and units required air support and resupply operations to ensure timely execution, having an air planner present reduced the turnaround time. They helped distribute the workload, Christie said. “Bidirectional information sharing is crucial and maximizescommunication with higher headquarters, so informationaffecting search efforts is distributed quickly and accurately,”he said. During the DUSTWUN, the clock was ticking andthe unit was already at least 13 hours behind the enemy.

Above: The ambush site in Charkh District with the exploited material depicted. U.S. Army Photograph, 173rd Airborne Brigade.

The recovery mission, July 24-28, 2010, challenged TF SABER, during its most intensive period of combatoperations. The operation recovered the service members’bodies, and effected the enemy’s command structure and operational capability. The enduring take-away was a longlist of lessons-learned.

Blast of thesuspected RPG

Item RF-16Blood-stained napkin

Item RF-13Cloth with blood

Item RF-12MBITR part

Item RF-4Interior plastic vent cover

Item RF-3Tail light fragments

Item RF-4APlastic Gatorade bottle

DUTY STATUS WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN

What else did 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (TF SABER) learn?

• Develop a plan to rotate units from remote locations (blocking positions,observation points, checkpoints, traffic control points) as well as those unitsconducting clearances.

• Set a minimum number of days of supply early and use it for planning.

• Contain the entire area of operation. Estimate where the service members could be located, based on elapsed time, traffic and mode of transportation.

• Focus the search based on information available, and apply overwhelming assetsto clear those areas. Returning later to search areas more thoroughly wastestime and resources.

• At a minimum, host an FM frequency Battle Update Brief with the Troop Commanders (TCs) every 12 hours.The planning cycle of the staff increases considerably, affecting the TCs need for updates to effectivelyemploy their assets.

• Recognize an overwhelming force as a trade off for proper planning. Know it may be the right choice because of the limited time forces are dispersed to unfamiliar locations for unknown and extended periods of time.


8

FEATURE

Deliberate recovery operations at JMRC…a brigade fightBy Col. D. Greg Anderson and Maj. Derek W. Hoffman, JMRC Adler Team

FEATURE

One of the most complex, yet under trained operationsa Brigade Combat Team conducts is the deliberate recoveryof a damaged or destroyed vehicle. These operations are usually necessary because of enemy-attack, lack of contractedlift and haul assets, and the rugged terrain. These operations can last several days, some even severalweeks, while roads are cut into the mountain to recover avehicle blown-off the road and down into a steep ravine. For example, for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT),1st Inf. Div. (3/1ID IBCT), their first major deliberate recoveryoperation began with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED)strike on a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle(MRAP). The Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) sent to recover the MRAP overturned enroute, sliding several meters down a hill resting upside-down ina ravine. “The BCT and engineers had to cut a road down to theoverturned, but largely undamaged wrecker,” said Col. John M. Spiszer, commander of the Joint Multinational ReadinessCenter (JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany. “The wrecker was righted using a local national 30-ton crane, and then driven-upa ramp, and taken back to the Forward Operating Base. The crane went on to recover the MRAP.” Vehicle recovery operations are dangerous in the combat environment, said Spiszer. During the recovery, one medic lost a hand and foot when a secondary, anti-personnel mine exploded unexpectedly, and another Soldier lost a foot when the crane lifted the MRAP exposing another uncleared mine. This deliberate four-day recovery mission was a brigade-level operation, and required the use of the Shadow UnmannedAerial Vehicle, Apache helicopters, engineers and ultimately the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) Recovery Team. Spiszer’s JMRC has successfully resourced a Recovery Centerof Excellence to train deploying units to recover combatvehicles on terrain similar to what they will experience whendeployed. “The mission ensures that the first time units execute a deliberate recovery mission was not in theatre on an un-familiar vehicle and under fire. The Adler team acquiredthree battle damaged MRAP hulls, one Stryker hull, andtwo locally fabricated hulls that match the specifications of dimension, weight, and hook-up points of the MRAP and Stryker,” said Chief Warrant Officer Jason Stribling, a main-tenance technical observer, controller, and trainer (O/C-T)at the JMRC. “Couple these training aids with the restrictive road network, slopes and vertical rises of the Hohenfelsterrain, and the JMRC provides a tough, realistic trainingenvironment ideally suited to conduct deliberate recoveryoperations.”

The first day of training is devoted to academics on equip-ment capabilities and the technical aspects of deliberaterecovery operations. The O/C-Ts ensure safe operations, andhelp with technical questions. Once O/C-Ts and unit leadership are sure the students have adequate competency in thoseskills, the students move to hands-on training at the recoverycenter, which is led by unit leaders. This phase is a series of multi-echelon situational training exercises, lanes that testtactical and technical skills. “Normally, the lanes consist of two non-kinetic and two kinetic engagements, and the recovery operation,” saidSgt. 1st Class James Boston, the lead recovery trainer. “The challenge is to conduct hasty decision-making processes,and produce a solid order that integrates enablers for thecompany to execute.” Spizer said, the training scenarios were inspired by real-world experiences. Another problematic recovery began whenthe 3/1ID IBCT had an MRAP get stuck in a dry river bed,under fire, 6 km above a problem valley. The local unit HEMTTwrecker broke down, also under fire, about 2 km away, andthe local crane contracted in that area stalled making a turnthrough a village. “We had to employ the BSB Recovery Team to the nearestCOP [Command Outpost], 100 km away, to assess thesituation, and drag all three vehicles out,” said Spiszer. “This operation took three-full days to complete, maximize, and exploit our tactical night vision advantages. We did the majority of the work over the course of two nights.” At JRMC, the deliberate recovery process is taught to the individual Soldier, up to the BCT combined-arms-operationlevel. The training scenarios highlight a few of the challengesunits can expect to face related to battle-damaged, destroyed,stuck or broken vehicles in Afghanistan. The culminating event for BCT training at JMRC happens during the final days of the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). In the scenario, an MRAP variant vehicle encounters an IED, while on patrol. The IED destroys the vehicle, and createscasualties of various severities, which the patrol must treatand evacuate. By adding a scenario with casualties, the cadrestress the importance of proper Company-Level Evacuation and Recovery (CLEAR) team training and resourcing. The unit must properly evacuate the casualties, using ground and air medical evacuation procedures to the appropriatelevel of care. The O/C-Ts replace the actual vehicle with a replicate hull. The hull is placed in a position that takes hours and moreresources than available to recover. During this operation,the BCT must employ enablers, a Quick Reaction Force,Unmanned Aerial Systems, an Air Weapons Team, a RouteClearance Package, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and


JOIN

T MU


MAN

D


9

(Clockwise from left) Soldiers from 172nd Forward Support Battalion (FSB) attach winch cables, while preparing a mechanical advantage systemto extract a vehicle during a deliberate recovery mission as part of the mission Readiness Exercise at The Joint Multinational Readiness Center(JMRC) in Hohenfels. Soldiers attach the cable to the replicated vehicle hull. Sgt. Ceasar Reyes, a maintenance NCO of Co. B, 172nd FSB, attaches the cable during training. U.S. Army Photographs courtesy of JMRC PAO

theater transportation to secure the site and consolidaterecovery assets to complete the destroyed vehicle recovery. During the recent 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade MRE thedeliberate recovery operation was a 36-hour, multi-echelon event, lasting from the time of the IED strike to the MRAP hull being returned to the unit motor pool. Several critical decisions were made, all impacting brigadeoperations during the training event. Once the MRAP was returned the unit motor pool, the maintenance company conducted an estimated cost of damage worksheet. The CLEAR team was employed toclean the hull to the proper environmental standards re-quired for turn-in. The supply and logistics staff completed a

battle damage/battle loss packet and the Financial LiabilityInvestigation of property loss for items damaged or lostduring the IED strike. Once the unit accomplishes thesetasks and submits the paperwork to the Brigade Logisticsstaff, the O/C-Ts evaluate the completed paperwork andallow the vehicle and personnel to reenter training, whichcompleted the cycle. Since the deliberate recovery of a damaged or destroyed vehicle is one of the most complex, yet undertrainedoperations a BCT conducts in Theater, the JMRC providesDeliberate Recovery Training to give Soldiers experience managing the tools and resources needed to successfully overcome the challenges.

For more information on thiscourse contact the JMRC AdlerTeam at DSN (314) 520-5339 orCommercial 09472-83-5339.Stateside: 0049-9641-83-5339


10

FEATURE

One look at the 173rd Brigade Support Battalion’s(BSB) (Airborne) unit crest, which includes a wingedbayonet, and it’s easy to understand that the Paratrooper’stake their secondary mission to fight as infantrymen seriously.In addition to their deployed sustainment mission, the 173rdBSB served as battle-space owner (BSO) and terrain managerof an operationally significant area including the Brigade Head-quarters, Command and staff. From November 2009-2010, the173rd BSB was the only BSB in theater, and was the primarysustainer for the 24-hour safety and security of a major ForwardOperating Base (FOB). This required the BSB to conduct daily patrols and key leader engagements with local nationals,while also performing their critical wartime logistics functions.

“Our 1st Sgt. was the key to how well we adapted, he trainedus for everything,” said Sgt. Eduardo L. Torres, squad leaderfor Co. A, “He really put us in the mindset that we were goingto war and to expect anything.” Soldiers who joined the Army to pump fuel or operate cargo trucks hardly thought they would dismount and engagewith the locals. The unit rehearsed basic battle drills and used established SOPs to set a base for Soldiers and Leaders. Once on the ground the Soldiers quickly learned how fast things could change. First, as the mission evolved into a complex COIN andsecurity operation, the Soldiers, who would conduct dis-mounted night patrols or provide security at observationpoints needed to become proficient on key pieces of equipment,such as, the Common Remotely Operated Weapon System, aweapon station that allows the operator to acquire and engagea target while inside a vehicle, and the Mine Roller, equipmentthat allows service-members to adapt to changing IED threats.

The training was conducted in theater. The Soldiers said theywould have profited from having this training before deployment. The second initiative launched an aggressive COIN offensive that disseminated Information Operations (IO) themes and messages using words, deeds, and images ofour Afghan allies and our Sky Soldiers in support of our unit IO objectives.

COIN and combat: support, no excuse not to SoldierBy: 1st. Lt. Phillip M. Hoffman, TC, Platoon Leader

1st LT Harold Castaneda, Quartermaster and 1st Platoon leader,with Company A, talks to local civilians about recent enemyactivity in the area. Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion.

BSB Paratroopers from 3rd Platoon, Co. A set security positions andclear corners before entering a local bazaar in western Pul E AlamPhotograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion

Conducting logistical operations in support of a combat brigade is a monumental task. Paratroopers of the BSBaccomplished this while patrolling and securing a growingoperational environment, which ultimately covered 33 villagesand more than 365 square kilometers of human and physicalterrain. During the deployment training, the Battalion’s focus wassustainment operations. When Soldiers arrived in Afghanistan,BSOs and sustainers began conducting daily key leader engagements, ‘Shuras’, with key Afghan communicators in local dialects to develop the intelligence picture. With that information, the Battalion built an effective security oper-ations plan including tactics, techniques, and procedures forconducting mouted and dismounted movements, lethal operations, surveillence and reconnaissance of named areas of interest in outlying areas around the FOB. Veteran officersand NCOs ensured that the BSB paratroopers embraced theirdual role as area ambassadors, warfighters, and sustainers.

As the deployment continued,the COIN mission grew more complex

as enemy activity increased.

(continued on page 13)


11

COIN “BIG TEN”While preparing units for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) fight, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center evaluates the proficiency of a Soldier’s skills,using the COIN “Big Ten”. These skills provide feedback to rotational units, ensuring readiness to operate in the current operational environment.

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT

Not Done. Risks identified but not reduced,no control measures, process not

conducted to standard.

Risk Management (safety focused) process conducted to standard & briefed.

Tactical & Safety risk mitigated inplanning process. CRM used in all phases of mission.

Risk considered and updated during mission.

Risk is considered in the AAR andLessons Learned are incorporated into

future planning.

PCC/PCI

Not conducted. Not conducted to standard or notconsistently conducted.

PCC/PCI's conducted toArmy Standard by lowest level leaders.

Leaders at every level involved inPCC/PCIs, all critical deficiencies corrected.

Unit is a learning organization and incorporates lessons learned into

PCI/PCC Process

ROE

No understanding of ROE. ROE understood & trainedto the Leader level.

ROE understood and trained to theSoldier level. Soldiers have Smart Cards

on them and reference them.

ROE is considered in theplanning process.

Lessons learned collectedand distributed to the soldier level.

EOF (ESCALATION OF FORCE)

No understanding or EOF training. Equipment and procedures trained tosquad leader level, equipment on hand

but not distributed properly or used correctly,Language cards/electronic interpreters on hand.

Equipment and procedures trainedto soldier level. Equipment properly

distributed and used correctly.

Smart-Card/SOPs enforced.Mitigates an EOF incident into the

planning process, and accurately reportswhen an EOF incident occurs.

Thorough and complete investigationis conducted within 72 hours of an

incident being reported andexecutes an IO battle drill EOF.

NEGOTIATION AND ENGAGEMENT SKILLS

Training not conducted or observed.Unit or Soldier does not understand concept of Engagement nor purpose

for conducting it.

Engagement hastily conducted,w/o Info/Intel Preparation of

Environment (IPE), does not meetminimum performance standards.

Adequate performance.Engagement conducted to minimum

performance standards, includes basic IPE,identifies target audience (TA).

Mission success possible, but limited pay-off.

Engagement exceeds performancestandards; IPE well developed; TA identified;

ZOPA/negotiation points identified;BATNA and effects considered; leaders

prepared; outcomes wargamed.Mission success likely.

Thorough IPE; negotiation pointsintegrate staff into targeted planning

process; end state and assessment criteriaclearly identified; incorporates Infor-

mation Operations and Intel enablers;knowledge management executed.

LANGUAGE CAPABILITY

Majority of Soldiers have nobasic language knowledge,

no training conducted

Some formalized individual orcollective training conducted. Majority of

Soldiers don't have or aren't using languagecards/aids or translation tools.

Majority of Soldiers have receivedbasic phrase training, have phrase

card with common phrases, recognize,understand and can articulate basic

greeting, courtesies, respects,and parting phrases.

All Soldiers use language tools when interacting with locals. Leaders enforce key

phrase memorization. Unit identifies languagerequirements during mission analysis.

Language capability used in pre-combatchecks and inspections.

Identifies language requirements during analysis and mitigates

limitations when planning; rehearsestalking points & phrases withinterpreters; communicates

effectively verbally and in writing.

CULTURE UNDERSTANDING / SOLDIERS AS AMBASSADORS

No basic understandingof the culture or how to interact.

No formalized individual or collectivetraining on the culture conducted.

Soldiers briefed on the concept but notadequately trained or prepared. Soldiers

don't have or aren't using language cards/aids.Not considered as part of planning process.

Soldiers have a basic understandingof the culture in which they are

operating and are trained on cultureand appropriate interaction, haveresource material to reference.

Soldiers have understandingof the culture they are operating in andincludes cultural considerations in their

planning and execution. Leaders enforcekey phrase memorization.

Cultural Lessons-learned collected and disseminated; Soldiers are pro-active

with messages; assesses and incorporatesfeedback into patrol/targeting cycle and

disseminates; integrates linguists andcommunicates effectively with locals.

EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR/TACTICAL QUESTIONING/EVIDENCE COLLECTION

No understanding of tacticalquestioning or Information

Requirements at the soldier level. No basic understandingof evidence collection.

Smart cards on-hand, not standardor fully distributed; understanding of JUMPs;

understanding of TCP Screening info, developed, but not effectively disseminated;

limited knowledge of evidence collection;Unit misses some opportunities to collect.

Briefs IR & IO talking points to lowest level; provides smart cards;systematically and routinely conducts

patrol preparation; info is continually updated concerning 4Bs, ROE/EOF;

evidence collection process used.

Soldiers study and memorize HVI,BOLO lists, & IR; understands environment

(knows normal vs. abnormal); All Soldiers are proficientwith interpreter, communication aids, or

target language; performs debrief after patrol;considers evidence collection during planning.

Feedback assessed and incorporatedinto next patrol/targeting cycle.

Information from patrol is recordedand disseminated.

Understands relationship betweenevidence and intelligence.

COUNTER-IED

No knowledge of active or passivecounter measures or current hotspots;

No knowledge of CREW implementationand Patrol/Convoy planning relatedto CIED; No CIED equipment on hand.

Equipment on hand not distributed or used properly; Non-specificknowledge of IED indicators;

Knowledge of 5 C's, 5 & 25s but notconsistently conducted to standard.

Equipment on hand anddistributed properly, Soldiers

understand how to useC-IED equipment, soldiers are

conducting 5 & 25s to standard.

Leaders know of Tier 1 hotspotsand IED indicators; Personnel calls TOC

prior to FOB departure for latest IED info.Soldiers know established observationsguidelines. Unit attacks the network.

Soldiers know Tier 1 hotspotsand IED indicators; Patrols/convoysdebriefed upon returning; conducts

effective blast analysis &IED exploitation; IED info distributed.

HOST NATION FORCES (HNF)DEVELOPMENT

Unit has little or no interactionwith HN Forces.

Unit has some interactionwith HNF, brings them on

MSNs conducted but MSN isstrictly U.S. planned & executed.

Unit includes HNF in planningprocess as well as an active

participant in execution

Actively mentors & partners with HNF. Conducts TNG with the unitand teaches them TTPs for mission

planning, preparation, and execution.

Partners with HNF in all aspectsof their operations, conducts combinedplanning; forms combined TOCs, sharesreleasable Intel; puts partners in the lead.


12

During the summer of 2010, Co. D, of the 1st Bn.,4th Inf. Regt. (1-4), a unit stationed at the Hohenfels TrainingArea (HTA) in Hohenfels, Germany, found itself alongside Afghan and Romanian counterparts locked in a battle forterrain with a hardened enemy high above the mountainsof Northern Zabul Province in Afghanistan. “I’ll always remember my first firefight there,” said Capt.Matthew K. Hilderbrand, the company 2nd Platoon Leader.“We had got caught in a close ambush, and 1st Lt. Daniel Meegan, the 1st Platoon Leader, called for mortar fire againstthe Taliban on a ridge line, while we fought the Taliban in the orchards around us. About thirty seconds later, mortarswere landing so close we were showered with dirt and bitsof tree branches,” he explained. “I yelled to 1st Lt. Meegan, ‘Hey man, we need to push our mortars further away from us.’He looked at me and yelled back ‘Those aren’t our mortars!’“That’s when I realized that it was going to be a long day.” Since 2006, 1-4 —the only conventional unit to maintain a consistent presence in Afghanistan partnered with and aug-mented the Romanian Land Forces (ROULF) with personnel,enablers, and operational experience. During the partnership,the ROULF developed new capacities, which later increased commitment to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the deployment of an additional Romanian battalionand brigade tactical command post to Afghanistan this year.

At the Jan. 13, 2011, ceremony highlighting the achieve-ments of the unique partnership the ROULF chief of StrategicPlanning Directorate, Romanian Maj. Gen. Alexandru Rus said, the special relationship between the U.S. and Romanian Soldiers successfully reinforced a vital economic corridor and met strategic objectives set by the Commander of ISAF. "You can be very proud," said Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar, commanding general of the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC). "You served your nation, ably supported the Romanian Task Force, and provided hope for the Afghan people of Zabul province." Each ISAF rotation, the 1-4 deployed a company-sized element.More than 1400 Soldiers served in Afghanistan as part of thatmission. In the unit’s classroom are citations of valor awardsfrom the past five years. Eleven soldiers were killed-in-action. “More than any other conventional unit, 1-4 knows theintricacies of the counter-insurgency fight in Afghanistan,and it is uniquely situated to provide this knowledge forother units,” said Meegan. “It [the unit] understands how asimple vehicle breakdown can lead to a six-hour firefight, howa skilled mortar team can mean the difference between victoryand death, how technology can only augment skill, not replace it.”Meegan said, the 1-4 Soldiers learned in Afghanistan a singleIED, when properly placed, can stop a unit for days.

(continued on page 27)

Being the enemy:lessons from 1-4 InfantryBy Denver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs

Soldiers at the Hohenfels Training Area train regularly in advanced tactics, techniques and procedures for countering IEDs. Leaders say lessons-learned,while in theater, during the past five years, is what makes JMRC the premier training center U.S. and multinational forces in Europe.U.S. Army photo: Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini.

FEATURE

JOIN

T MU


MAN

D


See “Being the Enemy: lessonsfrom 1-4 Infantry” on page 12,for information on the successfulRomanian-American partnershipin support of International SecurityAssistance Force in Afghanistan.

13

“Success wasn’t measured in the number of SIGACTS [significant activities], the number of projects completed, or the number of key leader’s engagements executed, said Lt. Col. Curtis A. Johnson, battalion commander. “We measuredour effectiveness on whether or not the local populace trustedtheir local government and took an active role in securing a safeand secure environment allowing governance and develop-ment to take hold.” The IO themes pushed by the Battalion, Afghan NationalArmy (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) was aimedat self-empowerment of the local populace, ensuring securitycame from within instead of from the U.S. Military. As the deployment continued, the COIN mission grew morecomplex as enemy activity increased. During the summer, thefighting season, the overall size of the operational environmentincreased to include highly contested terrain to the west of their FOB, where a round-the-clock, counter Indirect Fire (IDF) mission was conducted by the Battalion. At this time, Co. A had three Platoons dedicated to IDF. New TTPs were emplaced at the platoon-and-squad levelto react to the changing enemy conditions. Conditions drove each platoon to adjust the original SOPs and adopt new tacticsto create a high offensive posture in the battle space. “We dismounted a lot, sometimes we drove through fieldsto avoid setting patterns, when we had to we used mine detectors to clear our own routes, detainee operations alsocame into play,” said Staff Sgt. Earnest Lockett, a motor trans-port operator and Platoon Sergeant, from Co. A. “Every Soldierhad to know proper detainee handling.” September brought on one of the Battalion’s culminatingmissions with the provincial elections. “Despite the increased enemy threat, we found great successduring this year’s elections,” said Capt. Mary K. Fullenkamp,company commander. “The local populace were not deterredfrom voting and showed their faith in both the governmentthat they were voting for, as well as, their faith in the local military forces that protected their right to do so.” After looking back, it is clear the 173rd BSB leadershipembraced the COIN philosophy that ‘Every Soldier is aRifleman and an Ambassador.’ Although initially the focuswas on its doctrinal sustainment mission, the BSB adaptedto unique mission requirements. As a BSO, the 173rd BSB succeeded in sustaining the force, helping legitimize the local Afghan government, while protecting the lives of BSBparatroopers, and disrupting enemy operations in Logar province.

1st Lt. Aaron Gatrell, 2nd Platoon Leader with Co. A., directsmovement at a Traffic Control Point in Western Pul E Alam. Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion.

A BSB leader from 3rd Platoon, Co. A., assigns a sector offire while his machine gunner scans for enemy.Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion.

BSB Paratroopers from 2nd Platoon, Co. A., cross a shallow stream to reach a local village.Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion.

COIN and combatcontinued from page 10



14

FEATURE

When the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (173rdABCT), arrived in Logar and Wardak provinces in Afghanistanin late November 2009, local radio stations were inundatedwith callers complaining the U.S. military was not doingenough to improve roads, infrastructure, and governmentservices. When the Brigade re-deployed a year later, localcallers were still complaining. However, Afghans living inthe provinces were no longer asking the U.S. military to solve their problems. Instead, Afghan citizens were callingon their elected leaders and government officials, demandingimprovements in government services. What contributed to the change in the local opinions? Why were provincialand district governments behaving more responsibly andproactively? Part of the answer is a program the 173rdABCT called the People’s Development Fund (PDF). In the aggregate, PDF proved effective as provincial-and-district governments listened and responded tothe concerns of local citizens (see illustration page 15). The efforts of the local governments to meet the most pressing needs within their communities, because of PDF, contributed to perceptions of progress and accountabilityat the district level where the counter-insurgency fight iswon or lost. An increase in Afghan-provided services anddevelopment projects by local governments to their con-stituents correlated with actual increased governmentcapacity and local perceptions of their government’s abilityto meet local needs.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM Over the past decade, with no tax base in Afghanistan andinternational donors providing funds to fill the void, a “donorculture” developed across the country. For many Afghans,seeing U.S. forces rebuilding their country created a “cultureof expectation.” The U.S. military spent billions of dollars rebuilding Afghanistan, project-by-project. In 2009, within the provinces, the U.S. military and the Department of State did most of the heavy lifting when it came to development, and personally executed spending initiatives. Local Afghan govern-ment capacity to manage a budget and execute local develop-ment solutions had atrophied as a result of well-intentionedU.S. development zeal. Our plan was to reverse the trend withthe PDF program, to use “Money As-a-Weapon-System (MAWS).”

“MONEY-AS-A-WEAPON” In the counter-insurgency fight, money is a weapon system.Who has the money, has the power and legitimacy. In short, PDFwas a block-grant program that used a Commander’s EmergencyResponse Program (CERP) seed money to empower govern-ments, by giving leaders accountability and managementover a budget for social and civic projects within their

communities. The program began as an initiative calledCERP-as-a-Budget, originally developed by Task ForceMountain Warrior. The 173rd ABCT adopted and improvedthe original program to incorporate more robust transparencyand accountability features. The fundamental difference between the PDF andother CERP-as-a-budget programs was provincial governorsand district sub-Governors were not only provided funds tomanage, but given full responsibility for the accounting andtransparency of the monies they were issued. In acceptingthe PDF funds, they accepted the responsibility to account tothe local population an expenditure of the funds. Allegationsof corruption, all too familiar in Afghanistan, was now the sole responsibility of the Afghan government, not the U.S. military, U.S .donors, or an international contractor.The governors were allowed to succeed or fail in their admin-istration of the fiscal responsibilities. Accountability wasprovided via the Afghan media and Afghan citizens, whowere aware, for the first time, of the money their localgovernments had to spend, and of how the governmentwas spending it. The PDF program sought to create an organized and effective cadre of Afghan leaders at the sub-national level ofgovernment to transfer learned skills , such as, work to supportdisaster relief, elections and judicial reform. By havinga clear command vision for change, recognizing the needfor external expertise, and a willingness to accept risk, PDFincorporated non-traditional elements of national power. The PDF proved an effective and versatile tool at developing real human capitol in the Afghan Leaders of Provincial and District Government.

BRINGING OUTSIDE EXPERTISE INTO THE BRIGADE Dr. Dennis de Trey, a 30-year World Bank veteran whoserved on contract as the 173rd’s Global DevelopmentAdvisor, helped the Brigade design a development andgovernance program. It was de Trey who proposed the name “People’s Development Fund,” during a meeting with one ofthe provincial governors. He often traveled across Afghanistan selling the merits of the program to senior U.S. and Afghan audiences, including Gen. Petraeus, Commander of Inter-national Security Forces Afghanistan. de Trey insisted the PDF be used explicitly to give purpose and power toleaders of sub-national government. He felt these leaderswould be empowered by a budget that they would controlin its entirety. “PDF strengthens bonds between people and theirlocal governments by giving those governments financial resources, the freedom to select projects, and making them accountable to their citizens for delivery, said de Trey.

Helping Afghans build accountable governance,the People’s Development FundBy Maj. Scott Strickler, civil affairs officer with significant contributions by Dr. Jay Baker


15

To be eligible for the program, provincial-and-district level governments had to participate and be certified in the PDF Cycleof Transparency process. The sequential PDF process is outlined here:

Step 1.Announce receiptof PDF funds tolocal Afghancommunity throughvarious media.

Step 2.Host a Shura, announcinga local government meeting,where the PDF budget wasdeveloped with participationfrom elected officials andthe Afghan public. The dateand times had to be officiallyannounced.

Step 3.Announce chosenbudget projects to the public.

Step 4. Announce contractaward to the public.

Step 5. Announce the finalaudit results of thePDF funds to thepublic, and explainwhere the PDFmoney was spent.

Requirement successfullymet by Government.

Requirement partially met,acceptable.

Requirement not met, pastsuspense or unacceptable.

Requirement not initiated,not past suspense.

TF SABER AO BAYONETAFGHANISTAN

Baraki-Barak

Kherwahr

Charkh

Logar PDC

Paktiya

Logar

Wardak

Paktiya

Wardak

GhazniGhazni

Pul-E’AlamPul-E’Alam

Logar

Left: U.S. Soldiers of the Ghazniprovincial reconstruction teamand their interpreters conducta Shura, April 14, 2010 withvillage elders in the town ofJaghatu in Ghazni, Afghanistan.The 173rd ABCT adopted andimproved the People’s Develop-ment Fund (PDF) program toincorporate transparency and accountability, by giving leaders responsibility and management budgets for social and civic pro-jects within their communities.The program strengthend tiesbetween the citizens and theirlocal governments.U.S. Air Force photo courtesyof Tech. Sgt. J. T. May III.

THE PDF “CYCLE OF TRANSPARENCY” PROCESS


16

FEATURE

As the Veteran’s Day ESPN celebration began atGrafenwoehr’s parade field with the “Star-Spangled Banner,”helicopters flown by aviators from Company G., of the 1stBn., 214th Aviation Regiment (General Support AviationBattalion) delivered American heroes, landing in the centerof the field before more than 400 spectators. The event wasbroadcast to more than 19 million viewers. These Soldiers hadrescued German paratroopers, members of the ParachuteBattalion 373, during an April 2, 2010, fight in Afghanistan. What television viewers saw wasthe expression of gratitude betweenSoldiers, U.S. and German troopsembracing after sharing a harrowingcombat experience that many hopeto never face. It was an experiencethat would never be forgotten, threeGerman Soldiers died that day and eight were injured. What wasn’t visible to the viewerswas the training required to successfully complete such a mission. For example, in the months prior to deployment, the 3rd AttackReconnaissance Battalion (ARB) of the 159th Aviation Regiment ,“Quickstrike,” provided essential training support for multipleunits, U.S. and multinational, in various stages of training.In 2010, the 159th ARB supported Mission Readiness Exercises(MREs), Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises (CALFEXs), AerialGunnery, and completed various Combined Arms Training Center(CATC) courses to maintain proficiency that ensured both U.S. andmultinational forces were ready for combat operations in Afghanistan.

“Being forward deployed in Europe allows unique trainingopportunities for aviation Soldiers,” said Capt. James P. Welchof the Headquarters Company of the 3-159th ARB. “The “Quickstrike” Battalion supported numerous trainingevents all year at the Joint Multinational Training Command(JMTC) to help U.S., multinational and NATO Forces preparefor deployment.” “As the only Attack Helicopter Battalion available in Germany,the “Quickstrike” Soldiers add realism,” said Welch. The JMTC’s Hohenfels Training Area is the only U.S. facility that can train ground troops and aviation assets together. Aviators may conduct load planning and insertions, and they can be incorporated into a training package that simulates what happens during a deployment in Afghanistan. “Scout helicopters can conductreconnaissance of potential landing zones,” said ErnestL. Roth, JMTC maneuver coordination officer. “While atthe same time other aviators can insert ground troops orsupplies.” Conducting integrated air mission planning allows staffplanners to anticipate the kind of support they may needto provide when in theater, said Roth. During the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment’s pre-deploymenttraining, aircrews provided medical evacuation escort, convoysecurity, quick reaction force capability, and air assault security.

March 2010The Quickstrike Battalionsupports the 2nd StrykerCavalry Regiment. Aircrewsprovide medical evacuationescort, convoy security,quick-reaction force andair-assault security.

May 2010During aerial gunnery training, aircrews engagedtargets with 30mm cannon fire, 2.75 in folding finaerial rockets, and Hellfire missiles, while the Dis-tribution and Armament platoons refueled and rearmed the aircraft to make each engagement possible. Petroleum Supply Specialists from 1-214thGeneral Support Aviation Battalion and the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade filled manpower shortages.These Petroleum Supply Specialists trained to refuel.

THE TRAIN UP:

Aviators add realism to training experience for U.S.and NATO By Denver Makle, Joint Multinational Training Command PAO

“When he called me that day, he saidthe LZ (landing-zone) was pretty hot,”

“I said to him that it wascold-enough for me.”

Chief Warrant Officer Jason J. LaCrosse, Company G, 1st Battalion, 214th Aviation Regiment


17

“Our overall mission was to provide Aerial Weapons Team support to the ground forces during their missions to enhance air-to-ground communication,” said Sgt. Yogesh Pillai ofCompany D. “We provided combat lifesaver support during anattack, which contributed to making their training more realistic.” This is similar to the events experienced by members of the 5th Bn. of the 158th Avn. Regt. of the 12th CAB, based in Ansbach, Germany, on that fateful day in April. “When he called me that day, he said the LZ [landing-zone] was pretty hot,” said Chief Warrant Officer Jason J. LaCrosse, the pilot. “I said to him it was cold-enough for me.” On Good Friday, that day, the Germans had foughthard for five hours trying to secure the LZ when MasterSgt. Patrick Bonneik, a joint terminal attackcontroller (JTAC) in the German Army made the call for back-up and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). “He [LaCrosse] told me he was going to land right next to the wounded,” said Bonneik.“He felt safe because we defended his helicopter.That’s how we managed to kill seven Talibanthat tried to encircle us.” The decision was made between pilot andJTAC, a second Blackhawk would provide suppressing fire from the air instead of the usual security for the first aircraft. The Germanscontinued the fight to protect their wounded, while the medics provided the medical care.LaCrosse is now an observer, controller, and

trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels,Germany. “I believe being able to train before a combat deployment with your counterparts is important,” said LaCrosse. The JMRC trained more than 12,000 U.S. and multinationalSoldiers as part of brigade rotations last year. However, during the first two quarters of this Fiscal Year, the JMTChas exceeded the number of International Military Studentstrained during last fiscal year at Grafenwoehr and HohenfelsTraining Areas. This is in large part due to multinational unitsrequesting pre-deployment training prior to their deploymentsto Afghanistan. “Knowing how each other operates can cut down timeon MEDEVACs and ultimately save lives,” said LaCrosse.

June 2010Company B of the 3rd Battalion-159th AttackReconnaissance Battalion (ARB) in Illesheim,Germany, deployed with support personnelto Grafenwoher Training Area to participatein a Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise insupport of Company C of the 1st Bn., 4th Inf. Regt. During their culminating predeploy-ment training event. The 3-159th aircrewsprovided the Air Weapons Team (AWT) coverageto enhance warfighting abilities for infantry Soldiers.

September 2010The Quickstrike Battalion supported the 170th InfantryBrigade Combat Team in it’spre-deployment Mission Rehearsal Exercise. 3-159thaircrews honed their Air Assault planning skills andprovided Close Combat Attacksupport for Air Assaults andAWT security for German Air Force lift aircraft.

August 2010While at the Hohenfels Training Area, aircrewsfrom Company B con-ducted air-to-groundintegration briefings forground forces to demon-strate the effectivenessand lethal power of theApache Longbow aircraftwhen used in concertwith ground forces.


MILITARY CASE STUDY

One of the key functions of the U.S. Army, aside fromfighting wars, is the mission to partner with foreign forcesand provide training, effects and capabilities. This functionranges from training newly-developed indigenous forces todefend themselves, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, to partneringwith modern militaries to share lessons-learned from conflictsand peace-keeping operations. Since 2006, the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) has pro-vided support to the Romanian Army through combined de-ployments in Zabul Province in Afghanistan to complementand enhance the war-fighting capabilities of this allied nation. Of all the enablers provided, U.S. Intelligence (Intel)personnel are among the most valuable, allowing thispartnered force access to the broad menu of assets that theU.S. military has available, while enabling Romanian forces to conduct effective operations to defeat the shared enemy.

MISSION BACKGROUND In summer 2006, U.S. European Command agreed to aug-ment the Romanian Land Forces with a U.S. Infantry company,Naval Explosive Ordinance Disposal team, Joint TerminalAir Controllers, a Mortar Platoon, and Operations and Intel personnel to support a Battalion task force duringa deployment in support of the International SecurityAssistance Force in Afghanistan. This company-team wasattached to the Romanian Battalion, and remained throughDec. 2010, providing operational and logistical augmen-tation, training and support. Over the years, the responsi-bilities of the Task Force ranged from the entire Zabul Province to more focused missions including security ofAfghan Highway 1, and securing and building the capability ofthe Afghan Security Forces and key population centers withinthe province. Similarly, the scope of duties for the attachedIntel personnel have evolved from leading the Battalion IntelSection, through operational planning and analysis processesto supporting the Romanian Intel staff from the “right seat”,and augmenting them with assets they would not normallyhave access to during operations.

TRAINING One of the most valuable parts of the mission for theIntel section were the training events hosted at HohenfelsTraining Area (HTA), in Hohenfels, Germany, and those atthe Romanian Land Forces (ROULF) Combat Training Centerin Cincu, Romania. It was during training that the processes needed during the deployment were established and personal bonds between the Romanian and U.S. personnel could be formed. It also allowed Intel personnel to assesstheir counterparts and ensure individual training, whichfollowed the Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs), would trulydevelop the skills needed to compliment the Romanians’skill sets. Since timelines for deployment varied between the Romanians, the U.S. company and those elements attachedto the company, not everyone participated in the MRE’s,including some Intel personnel. From the Intel perspec-tive, not attending the training event was a significantdetractor to the partnership. Aside from sharpening criticalskills and the individual training received on certain computersystems and software, this hindered the ability of thosepersonnel to develop good-working relationships for bothU.S. and ROULF personnel. During the MREs attended byU.S. Intel personnel, each side developed an understandingof the other’s capabilities, strengths and weaknesses,which led to a division of labor and internal cross-training of skill sets. For example, where the Americans provided digital systems and technical capabilities, the Romaniansoffered previous area experience and effective analog systems (which would prove useful during power and network outages).An observation of the previous teams’ after-action reviewsrevealed that those rotations, where the U.S. and Romanian personnel both attended, showed the greatest cooperation during combat missions. The second phase of the pre-deployment training plan wasindividual training, including instruction on systems, such asthe Distributed Common Ground System – Army and TacticalGround Reporting Network and processes such as Intel,Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) employment, Collection Management and Analysis in support of tactical units.

Analysis of Intelligence Development in theRomanian – American Battle Group

Prepared by: Capt. Krisjand Rothweiler, scenario writing team leader at the Joint Multinational Simulations Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany,Rothweiler was the U.S. Intelligence Officer- in-Charge of the combined 812 Romanian Battalion and Company D of the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, TaskForce in Zabul, Afghanistan. Rothweiler has a Master of Science in Information Assurance from Norwich University and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Maine.

Notice to Reader

18

Information gathered in this case study was obtained primarily by the personal experience of the author,discussions with previous U.S. Intelligence personnel and post-deployment debrief. The Information studied wasdated between mid-2007 (approximate) and September 2010. This case study was edited for compilation inthe JMTC Training Journal, a publication of the 7th United States Army Joint Multinational Training Command.

JOIN

T MU


MAN

D


See “Being the Enemy: Lessons fromOpposing Force that deployed forfive-years,” on page 12, for more in-formation on the Romanian-Americanpartnership in support of InternationalSecurity Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

While this training was useful in reinforcing the skills of American personnel, it would have been more valuable for the Romanian staff, who because of non-specialization in their Armydo not receive such training. Incorporating the individualtraining could have increased the capabilities and ensuredinteroperability with U.S. forces. U.S. and Romanian personnelwould be empowered to work together, eliminating an un-equal reliance on the U.S. element.

COMBAT OPERATIONS The integration of the American-Romanian elementsduring numerous rotations ranged from complete and co-dependent operation to independent and fragmented duties within the section. In the best cases, a close-working relationship in the section was established because of a conscious decision on both sides to support each other, whilethose sections that appeared fragmented were lessconscious and displayed a lack of understanding of each other’s capabilities, both inside the Intel shop and amongthe rest of the combined staff. Towards the end of the partnership, when the units should have been most cohesive,certain duties, almost by default, usually fell to either the Americans or the Romanians. The ISR, for example, was almost a solely American duty, mainly due to the greaterunderstanding that U.S. forces had of the assets and capabil-ities. Some might say that a specialization of duties withinthe section is a positive attribute, and it can be, but that doesnot relieve the need for a certain depth of knowledge amongthe rest of the team. Until late 2009, the U.S. forces of the Romanian - AmericanBattle Group controlled the bases north of Highway 1 in dehChopan, Mizan and Arghandab, while the Romanian Army provided security along the highway in Qalat, Tarnak-wa-Jaldak and Shajoy Districts. Although the mission of the U.S. attachments to the Romanians was to support them with certain enablers, this was not a direct contact relationship below the Battalion headquarters because of geographic limitations. This, in conjunction with the inability to traintogether in the Intel section, compounded some of the problems experienced between Romanian and Americanpersonnel. As other forces arrived, U.S. units were alsoallowed to support the highway mission,which broughtthe priorities of both nations to a common goal. This commoninterest allowed not only the U.S. and Romanian companies to operate together, but enabled cooperation among thestaff so that the elements became mutually supportive,encouraging greater cooperation between the U.S. and Romanian staff sections. As U.S. and Romanian units beganto share battle space, missions and facilities to a greater

and greater degree, the Intel personnel also coalescedinto more of a single unit than two separate ones. The 2008and 2009 MREs between the U.S. Company Teams, Co. A,and Co. D, of the 1st Bn; 4th Inf. Regt., and the Romanian Battalions, the 280th Inf. Bn. and the 33rd Posada MountainBn., were two of the few training exercises where the attached Intel personnel attended. Here, many skills were developed that led to immediate increased capacity for the Romanians once deployed, and the quick integration of theU.S. Intel attachments into their headquarters as they arrived.While some things had changed between training and de-ployment, the teams and Intel attachments arrived knowingtheir colleagues on a social and professional level. As previously stated, some divisions of labor continued, even with the combined mission, but they did so based on an individual’s strengths, rather than nationality, and in a manner that fostered interoperability. Tasks that had oncebeen solely “American duties” or “Romanian duties” became shared efforts. Tasks from major operational planning to routine briefings combined the efforts of American andRomanian personnel, both added and presented information to the commander. During the parliamentary elections of 2010,for the first time in four years, the Romanians led the planningand coordination of the ISR, supporting the main effort inZabul Province. This could be conducted in a vacuum, and although each person in the section had “their task,” it requiredthe cooperation of many personnel to accomplish these duties.The positive result was a noticeable increase in the qualityof the section’s products and increased capabilities overall.Duplicate efforts ceased and the section moved beyonddiscussing what had happened in the past to allowing theIntel to drive operations to get there. While many enablers provided by the Americans to theRomanian-American Battle Group were indispensable, theIntel section allowed the Battle Group to move from main-taining a presence to expanding their influence. The cooper-ation between the personnel left a mark on both, as eachside learned new techniques and processes, and developeda greater understanding of the coalition environment andthe capabilities brought by allied nations. The successdemonstrated by the betterment of Zabul Province wasachieved through a combination of the technical capabilitiesof Americans and the tactical knowledge and experienceof the Romanians.

19



20

FEATURE

Nowadays, a typical promotable Army Specialist (E-4), might have a few deployments under his belt. He attends theWarrior Leader Course (WLC) with a wealth of knowledge to share. The WLC, Army Noncomissioned Officer Academy (NCOA)in Grafenwoehr, Germany, is a 17-day course, a basic leader-ship course for Solders, from Private 1st Class to Staff Sergeant. The enlisted Soldiers acquire leader skills, know-ledge, and the experience needed to lead teams and squad-size elements. The instructors or Small Group Leaders (SGLs) assess the student’s leadership potential, and evaluate their ability to apply lessons-learned, while effectively leading peers in a garrison environment. During Oct. 2010, a new curriculum introduced three major areas of instruction: leadership, training and war-fighting. The new program of instruction facilitates smallgroup discussions between students and instructors, andshifts the teaching methodology from “what to think” to “how to think,” placing the responsibility on the student tolearn through group participation. “This method fosters team building, and provides trainingreinforcements based on the wide range of backgrounds andprofessional experience. Through these small group dis-cussions students gain insight on how command decisionsare enforced,” said Sgt. 1st Class Tony T. Towns, the NCOA operations sergeant. “Recently re-deployed Soldiers share the challenges they faced. It is through this learning processwe’re able to bridge the gap between combat experiencedSoldiers, and those that haven’t deployed. They share differingviewpoints, and gain practical knowledge from their peers.” The approach creates an atmosphere where students feelcomfortable exchanging ideas on any subject, and use collective reasoning when solving problems, said Towns. The NCOA’s WLC is open to U.S. Soldiers stationed withinthe U.S. Army Europe’s area of operation. However, WLC inEurope is unique because the course can host up to 20 inter-national military students per class from NATO, partnered orallied nations. “This is unique because we are training with countriesthat deploy in support of regional stability,” said 1st Sgt. Jon Otero, the 7th Army NCOA’s chief of training. “The benefits of that experience are invaluable.” So far, this fiscal year, Oct. thru May, the 7th Army NCOA graduated 38 foreign students, in addition to 2,106 U.S. Soldiers.The International students come from countries such as,Turkey, Serbia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, State of Israel, Poland,Moldova, Namibia, Slovenia, Romania, and the Czech Republic. Michael J. McLean, international military student officer,says some countries are sending larger number of students to WLC than in the past. For example, in the first weeks of April,11 Polish NCOs graduated from the WLC, completed the

combat lifesaver course, and the Multinational Counter-IED Baseline Train-the-Trainer Course, two courses taughtat Grafenwoehr; Additionally, 12 Polish students did the same thing in May and June following the WLC. “The course was relevant because it expanded our know-ledge,” said Sgt. Giovanni Pascascio, a recent WLC graduate.“Through dialogue with class members with numerousdeployments to Afghanistan, it provided a different perspective.” The Small Group Leaders’ method of instruction allows instructors to introduce a topic, ask lead questions and facilitate discussions to a predetermined end-state. Instructorsfacilitate role-modeling, counseling, coaching, learning,and team building in the small group environment. “As a Team Leader in Afghanistan,” asked one student of Staff Sgt. Jimmy Martin, an instructor assigned to Co. C, atthe 7th Army NCOA. “How do I get my Soldiers to follow me when the orders that are given are not cut and dry?” Martin re-introduces the question and opens it up for group discussion, as part of the Situational Training Exercise. Out of 16 Soldiers, seven-to-eight raised their hands to provide insight. Although Martin could easily providethe Soldier with an answer, it would have only been from his perspective. By allowing students to discuss the topic,several viewpoints were shared using real lessons-learned. “The students make it easy for me to be enthusiastic,” said Staff Sgt. Jesus Serrano, an instructor from Co. B. “Myknowledge base is greatly increased because of the experi-ences shared by the students.” Serrano said the experience is about give and take. “At this time there is no better wealth of information andimmeasurable experience than our junior leaders, who have experienced it first-hand through numerous combat operations,”said Towns. “The WLC is greatly enhanced by the interaction, and the quality of instructors, and the men and women, who are willing to share and grow from each other’s combat experiences.”

NCOA and small group discussion facilitatelessons-learnedDenver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs

U.S. Army photo courtesy of Joshua Rocha, JMTC NCOA.


“Was the Prowler [EA aircraft] role decisive? We will neverknow,” said Lt. Col. Scott A. Cooper, the executive officerof the Marine Aircraft Group 14 at the Marine Corps AirStation in Cherry Point, North Carolina. Cooper was the com-mander of the Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1,while deployed. In his paper, “Airborne Electronic Warfare in Counterinsurgency Operations”, he said, “Perdue’s actions – hisconstant, relentless pursuit of the enemy’s communicationsplan, and his ability to intercept, interfere, and deny it at the right moments on March 11, 2010, are worth noting.” In the article, “The Future of Electronic Warfare, In Support of COIN Operations,” Warrant Officer Clifford Blackmore,said, “Synchronization of all aspects, kinetic or not, is the key tomaintaining positive momentum. Second, third, and fourthorder effects can destroy everything before a victory is declared.” Perdue believes the planning responsibility is two-fold,intel,security,plans and operations leaders should under-stand the capabilities and limitations of the ES aircraft. He says, leaders should know how they work to exploit newlydetected frequencies , or herd the enemy to specific frequenciesto make collection easy. He says, it would bridge the gap,and cultivate a beneficial relationship. “It is important for EWOs at all levels, and especially at the Battalion level to work hand-in-hand with intel, security and planners to ensure there is a integrated plan for EA and ES,” said Perdue battalion EWO. “If EWOs understand the cap-abilities and limitations of the ES aircraft, they can adjust their jamming so it doesn’t cause interference, and the collection platform is still able to collect. It is not so much adeconfliction plan, as it is an integration plan.”

21

FEATURE

In the information age, it’s not just bullets and bodiesthat matter on the battlefield. It’s a complicated game ofchess, and a movement of computer applications and fre-quency that allows information to be fed-to or withheld-fromthe enemy, but always with the intent of protecting the forceson the ground, while obtaining the information needed tomaneuver assets in theater. Blacksheep Company of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd ParachuteInf. Regt. conducted operation Mountain Protect IX, a missionincorporating counter-insurgency (COIN), intelligence,non-kinetic fires, while proving the value of jamming andcollecting functions of Signals Intelligence (Intel) andCommunications Intel. The mission exploited Electronic Warfare (EW) methods and techniques valuable to missionsuccess, March 31-April 1, 2010, in Konar Province, Afghanistan. Collectors want to gather and store information, while theElectronic Warfare Officer (EWO) wants to shut-down communi-cations, limiting the enemy’s access to information. Previously,the train of thought was to choose one mode, but never both. “Sgt. 1st Class Jason M. Perdue not only understands thevarious frequencies to target, but just as important, when totarget those frequencies,” said Capt. Joseph A. Sanfilippo, Battalion Fire Support Officer for 2nd Battalion of the 503rdParachute Infantry Regiment. “Collection of enemy fre-quencies is a vital part of the friendly scheme of maneuver, and he has never hesitated to hold-off on jamming a specific frequency to allow a collection asset the opportunity to gather critical enemy information.” Sanfilippo viewed Perdue’s skill as an asset when deployed.He says it’s value added, when a signal professional under-stands when to deny or not deny the enemy? One musthave an extensive understanding of the frequencies totarget, but also, when to target those frequencies to supportoperations. During the operation, EW assets were on station, includ-ing two Electronic Support (ES) aircraft. By having the aircraft adjust their jamming, it was demonstrated to one ES aircraft could still collect. Then, three-four minute tests were conducted with the other ES platform, which did not causeinterference, or cause them to lose their link. Throughout the operation, insurgents discussed locationsof Coalition Forces, while attempting to coordinate attacks.Through the cross-cueing of assets, the EA aircraft preventedinsurgents from passing location and disposition of CoalitionForces, and from receiving guidance from their commandersand organizing attacks. Coalition Forces were not attacked in the valley, or duringtheir movement out.

On the same frequency, a complicated gameSignal professionals should work together in theaterBy Denver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs

173rd ABCT paratroopers set up a tactical satellite communi-cation system (TACSAT). Photograph Sgt Russell Gilchrest.


22

SPECIAL FEATURE

“This is not a war for hearts and minds. This is a battleof words, deeds, and images. We, and our Afghan allies,must win all three.” - Maj. Matthew J. Yandura, Brigade S-7, 173rd ABCT

It was as audacious an idea as it was controversial.If successfully implemented it could have game-changingimplications for our area of operations in Afghanistan. The mission: send 35 Afghan key communicators to Amman,Jordan for a 10-day intensive religious study, debate, and tour seminar, then facilitate their pilgrimage to Mecca, SaudiArabia for the Umra, or lesser Hajj, during the last ten-days of Ramadan. At the conclusion of the experience the attendees would travel back to Afghanistan bearing the honorific titleof Haji. Upon returning, each participant would share, un-scripted, the story of their tremendous life-changing journeywith family, friends, and fellow Afghans. The operation woulderode the credibility of a major thread of the insurgentnarrative. The end state of this operation was three-fold:demonstrate respect for Islam and Afghan culture; exposeAfghan key communicators to Islam in the context of a modern and religiously tolerant Jordanian society; facilitatean Afghan-to-Afghan narrative.

KNOW THY ENEMY In May 2009, during mission analysis the Brigade developedvisualization tools to understand the enemy situation.One of the key documents developed was the “Cycle ofFrustration.” [See illust. 1, page 23]. The cycle described theprevelant, underlying conditions across Afghanistan. Weassessed these as the causes that led many Afghans to jointhe insurgency [see illust. 2, page 25]. The cycle describedthe enemy’s “radical suppressive ideology” as the source oftheir power. To that end, countering-threat ideology wasmy job as the Information Officer. I had to figure how to makethe insurgent ideolgy irrelevant, but how?

COMMAND FOCUS The staff was assembled in the Brigade Conference Roomfor our MRX concept-of-the-operation brief. The Battalion Commanders were also in attendance. During the brief, theCommander unexpectedly said, “Information Operations (IO) was our decisive operation and most significant line ofeffort during the exercise and deployment.” My jaw hit the floor. In short, my commander had delivered an IO officer’sdream scenario, a fast-track,first-class ticket into the fight.The commander had a vision for this deployment, but nowthe pressure to perform was on and school-house theory hadto be applied.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS During our tour of duty, the 173rd was partnered with threeallied nations, two provincial reconstruction teams, one fromTurkey, the Czech Republic, and one light infantry battalionfrom Jordan. However, it was the Jordanian contingent underthe dynamic leadership of U.S.-trained Jordanian SpecialForces Col. Aref Alzaben, who proved decisive to the Brigade’sIO efforts. Unbeknownst to the 173rd, Alzaben would arrive intheater with an entire IO campaign (IOC) he developed,while serving at the National Defense University. It wasbased on the five pillars of Islam. One of the pillars calls forall able bodied Muslims to make the Hajj once in their lifetime.Alzaben’s IOC, as he would refer to it, dove-tailed perfectlywith two upcoming Brigade operations, operations NoktaiTagheer I and II.

OPERATION TIPPING POINT I It was March 2010, and the Brigade was in theater just more than three months. We still didn’t have the detailed pictureof local influencers necessary to conduct effective, locally-informed operations. We were responsible for partnered U.S.-Afghan security, development, governance, and infor-mation initiatives in Logar and Wardak provinces, an arearoughly the size of Rhode Island. With the Commander’s guidance, we conducted the brigade-level information oper-ation Noktai Tagheer I, Pashto for “Tipping Point,” which wasnamed after Malcolm Gladwell’s book of the same title.Tipping Point I identified the key communicators in eachBattalion Task Force’s area of responsibility, down to the village level. The idea to send select Afghans to Jordan wasfirst discussed during mission analysis for Noktai Tagheer I.However—we had a lot of homework and coordination todo first; the time was not right to act on the idea then. At the conclusion of Noktai Tagheer I, the brigade had amuch better understanding of who the formal and informalinfluencers were, and where they were located. Previously,they were unidentified. Now with this data, how were wegoing to exploit it? What were we going to do? Enter NoktaiTagheer II, the next step.

OPERATION TIPPING POINT I I If Noktai Tagheer I solved the question, Noktai Tagheer II provided the answer. In Tipping Point II, we used our deeperunderstanding of the human terrain within Logar and Wardak to conduct a series of deliberate Afghan key communicatoroutreach initiatives to empower Afghans to take-on in-creasing levels of responsibility for community security,governance, and development. During this time, the Brigadeformalized its program for reintegrating local Taliban fightersor leaders back into Afghan society using a community-

Voices of Moderate IslamBy Maj. Matthew J. Yandura, 173rd ABCT information Operations Officer

This is the abbreviated version of how the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team conducted an initiative dubbed Voices of Moderate Islam.


23

based approach. More importantly, Noktai Tagheer II provided the impetus to conduct the Voices of Moderate Islam (VoMI)initiative.

IDEOLOGY VERSUS IDEOLOGY The only way to defeat ideology is with a counter-vailingideology. But what does an Army Brigade IO officer employto counter a radical suppressive form of Islam? And moreover, how would we actually go about doing it? In meetings, the Brigade Military Information Support Operations (MISO) planner, who was a Pakistan-born, naturalized-US citizen, the senior Department of State (DoS)officer assigned to the Brigade, and respected senior-Afghan officials discussed how most Muslims practiced a moderate, tolerant version of their faith. However, we agreed fightingradical Islam, within the context of an Afghan counter-insurgency, required Islam to play a critical role, and police itself. Likewise, it was decided that correcting a radical form of Islam with “Afghan patriotism” or “Nationalism,” was the wrong course of action in this case.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR VoMI In 2004, King Abdullah II of Jordan sought to answer for once and for all the question: what is Islam? and, what actions represent Islam, and which do not? To that end, the King wrote and issued the Amman message, a document supported by more than 500 leading Muslim scholars from 50 countries. In addition,six other international Islamic scholarly assemblies gave their formal approval in July 2006, culminating with unanimous support by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of Jeddah. The Amman message created a strategic breach in the enemy’s ideology, and we had to exploit that breach with VOMI. An untruth propagated by the Taliban is that the U.S. andCoalition Forces are in Afghanistan to destroy Islam. Thatnotion led many Afghans to become active or tacit Talibansupporters. In other cases, Afghans assumed a position ofambivalence or isolationism. There is a great deal of misunderstanding regarding the continued U.S. and Coalition presence in Afghanistan. TheTaliban and local criminal networks exploit local ignorance witheffective and highly decentralized information operations.

Illustration 1

- Lack of Political Voice- Percieved Injustices- Economic Disparity- Perceived Deprivation

- Lack of Internal Security- Lack of Basic Services- No Rule of Law

- INS Sponsors- Tacit / Active Support- Internal Political Risk- Criminal Activity

- Ideology- Political- Financial

- Increase Recruiting- Influence the Fringe- Ideological Justification

- Finance- Movement- Communication- Intelligence

- Leadership- Weapons- Personnel

- Acquisition- Transportation- Utilization

AFGHAN POPULATIONTACIT SUPPORT

ACTIVE SUPPORT

INSURGENTSRadical

SuppressiveIdeology

1.Establishment of aShari State

COREMOTIVATION

SUCCESSFUL INS

OPERATIONS

WEAPONS OF

MASS TERROR

UNDERLYING

CONDITIONS

INCAPABLEDISTRICTS

UNWILLING

DISTRICTS

NETWORK

LINKS

2.Destroy WesternConnections

THE AFGHANISTAN CYCLE OF FRUSTRATION


24

The offices of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for policy and Deputy Secretary of Defense ultimately gave theirapproval to proceed with the initiative. This operation was one of the biggest moments of our deployment. We needed help, and in the end, we got it.We couldn’t have initiated this operation without the helpof alot of committed individuals.

THE BEGINNING OF THE JOURNEYand THE IMPORTANCE OF FIRST IMPRESSIONS All 35 attendees trekked across our two provinces tomeet at Forward Operating Base Shank (FOB Shank). At the FOB, we received them as honored guests. Some flew via helicopter with their Task Force sponsors, others arrived as passenger-guests in U.S. military convoys, whileothers arrived using local transportation. Every detail ofthe reception and onward movement was meticulouslyplanned. We communicated with word, deed, and image,our respect for Islam and Afghan culture. This would be apositive life-changing experience for the attendees. Weknew this was the first time most of the VoMI attendeeswere inside a U.S. FOB, the first time they had flown in a plane, and their first time traveling to a foreign country. At FOB Shank, attendees were treated to a special Ramadan meal arranged by our Jordanian battalion. Following the meal the Jordanians hosted a pre-departure Shura, or meeting, with the participants and a small portion of the IO team. After opening remarks, without prompting, the par-ticipants got up, one by one, and spoke: “I can speak forus all when I say, we never knew that American bases herehad mosques on them, or that you had Muslim soldiers in your Army, or that you would allow them to pray, and observe Ramadan,” said one attendee. “I thought youwere only about killing— but now, I see so much more.” Another participant declared: “This journey is our life.When we return, we will tell others what we saw here,”he said. “We will tell others what you did for us. Everyonewill know of the respect you’ve shown us.” The last to speakwas the eldest of the group. He was a frail-looking tribalelder with a wispy white beard. He stood with the assistance of those seated next to him. His voice was raspy, but stillhad power, “This is the first time that I do not feel like aprisoner in my own country,” he said. “Thank you. I neverthought I would see this day.” The sentiments boded well for the journey ahead, andthe program had just begun.

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 23

Voices of Moderate Islam

Islam is steeped in tradition, and local Afghans view theHajj attendance as the ultimate journey a Muslim can makein their lives. In fact, hundreds from a village and tribe maygather to see a pilgrim off. Likewise, thousands may greethim when he returns. VoMI exploited this socio-religious phenomenon to tap into a network-of-networks reachingbeyond our two provinces. Word-of-mouth, often facilitated by cell-phone and radio,was the most credible source of information. We knew news of our initiative would spread quickly and credibly, if the right participants were chosen. The VoMI candidate selection process was delegated to our Task Forces. They knew their communities best, and we trusted them to find suitable prospects. However, we neededmoney, lodging, Visas and transportation for 35 Afghans,and two U.S. and Jordanian escorts. Selection guidance was simple: identify formal or informalAfghan leaders within respective AO’s, whom you believe through their participation in the program could bring about a significant, positive change in security, governance, develop-ment, or information. There was no restriction on gender,and current and former Taliban members were also legiti-mate candidates for selection.

DEPARTMENT OF STATEand DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT We knew this operation required major assistance and support from the DoS and the embassies in Afghanistan,Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The DoS representative made us aware of a DoS Public Diplomacy grant program that could assist with the funding. He explained that if our request was under $100,000, a DoS approved non-governmental organiz-ation (NGO) could sponsor the initiative, and get a major portion of the funding. Time was against us; and the word “impossible” was uttered by those ideologically opposed to the operation, or those who saw time as a significantchallenge. In short, we found a supportive NGO partner inthe Hashemite Charity Organization. We drafted, submitted, and got approved a proposal for approximately $65,000. The extensive billeting, transportation,VISA, and oversight issues were worked out. We receiveda huge boost of support from General Petraeus, his staff, Ambassador Eikenberry, King Abdullah II, and several other key DoS and DoD officials. In the end, final approval for the request lift assets for VoMI were routed from our Brigade, through in-country Command channels to U.S. Central Command,the DoS in Washington, DC, and up to the White House fordeliberation, and back to the Pentagon.


25

FROM AMMAN TO MECCA AND BACK The attendees departed on August 25, 2010, for Amman,Jordan. Our Deputy Commander made a public appearanceannoucing the program to the Jordanian media the returned to the FOB. The Jordanian Commander and his senior Imam,a religious scholar, and two senior Muslim U.S. Noncommis-sioned Officers accompanied the group for the duration. Thegroup returned to Afghanistan on September 15, 2010, four days later than planned. Nevertheless, the experiencein Amman, Jordan and Mecca was filled with experiences the group will never forget. On the second day of the arrivalin Amman, King Abdullah II personally invited the attendeesto join him and the Royal court, along with the senior officers from the Jordanian Armed Forces to share in a Ramadan prayer and meal. King Abdullah spent an unprecedented 20 minutes with the attendees at the event. In the spirit of charity duringthe Ramadan season, the King gave each Afghan participant1500 Jordanian Dinars, a gift, to cover additional personalexpenses incurred while in Saudi Arabia.

The Afghans were overwhelmed by the kindness and generosity. During the Amman phase, the attendees spent a day en-gaging in lectures and debate with respected religious figuresfrom Jordan and Egypt, who are known for their moderate views.They discussed and debated: What is the Amman Message?What is moderate Islam? Why does it matter? What is aMuslim? What are the duties of Muslims? What is Jihad?The Amman portion of the program called for a day of dis-cussion, then travel to sites of religious significance. In Amman, during the visit to the King Hussein I Mosque, the Afghans were surprised, not at the site of this massive and beautiful mosque, but at the site of the Christian Coptic Church directlyacross the street. From where they were standing, they couldsee the mosque’s minaret with its crescent moon on top and the crucifix from the dome of the church—side-by-side.“From this example, we learn Islam and Christianity canco-exist in harmony and with respect for one another,”

Illustration 2

CAMPAIGN VISUALIZATION

P O P U L A C EGAINING AND MAINTAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL AFGHAN PEOPLEIS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF EVERY ACTION WE TAKE.

LINES of EFFORT

- Anti-GIROA- Anti-Coalition

ADVERSARIALADVERSARIAL

DISRUPT

- Separate INS from the people.- Reduce INS Influence.- Disintegrate the INS networks.

- Progressive- Supprts GIRoA- Supportive partners

REFORMISTREFORMIST

MAINTAIN

- Empower moderate voices.- Stress self-governance.- Sustain development.

- Alienated- Undecided- Subject to INS coercion

AMBIVALENTAMBIVALENT

SECURE / CO-OPT

- Partner with local Leaders.- Meld local iniatives into development programs.- Educate.

- Geographically Separated- Traditionalist- Autonomist

iSOLATIONALISTISOLATIONALIST

OVERWATCH

- Overwatch and engage only as required.- Provide development to support strategic goals.

A C T I O N

SECURITYSECURITY

INFORMATION OPERATION

DEVELOPMENTDEVELOPMENT

Embedded partnerships protect Afghan people by, with, and through ANSF.

Communicate tangible and recognizable progress.

The Afghan people accept GIRoA working for thier interest.

Sustainable development through economic growth.

GOVERNANCE

Increased local community

capacity to fullfillbasic needs of the

Afghan people.

END STATEFIGHT THE ENEMY’S STRATEGY FIRST, ATTACK HIS FORCES ONLY WHEN THEYTHREATEN THE POPULATION AND GET IN THE WAY OF OUR PARTNERED SOLUTION.

AFGHAN POPULATIONTACIT SUPPORT

ACTIVE SUPPORT

INSURGENTSRadical

SuppresiveIdeology

1.Establishment of aShari State

COREMOTIVATION

SUCCESSFUL INS

OPERATIONS

WEAPONS OF

MASS TERROR

UNDERLYING

CONDITIONS

INCAPABLEDISTRICTS

UNWILLING

DISTRICTS

NETWORK

LINKS

2.Destroy WesternConnections

INFORMATION OPERATION


26

said the Senior Jordanian Imam. After several more days in Amman, attendees boarded a Jordanian Armed Forces C-130Hercules, one of three in the inventory, and flew to Mecca with special permission from the Saudi Arabian Government.The next five days was a whirlwind of activity as the attendees,now pilgrims of the Hajj, went to Mecca and Medina to makethe journey as the prophet Muhammad had done. Thousandsof pictures were taken. Hours of video were shot. These imagesfrom all the attendees were collected, and produced into avideo presentation of the entire trip, and given as a gift tocommemorate their VoMI experience. As the attendees, prepared to return to Afghanistan, the Brigade IO teamwas ramping up for the opportunity phase, and the realinformation operation began.

“IO HELLFIRE MISSILES” As the Afghan attendees returned home, the Brigade Commander ensured his Task Force Commanders understood the opportunity before them. “The Brigade S-7 has provided each of you the equivalentof IO hell-fire missiles. Partner with your VoMI returnees “ASAP.” Help get them into your local communities and to public events where they can share their story,” he said.“This is their biggest moment and ours.” [See illust. 3].

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF VoMI The program exceeded our expectations. For example, After returning, a former Taliban VoMI attendee encouraged one of Afghanistan’s most wanted criminals to turn himselfin to Coalition Forces without a single bullet being fired. Likewise, calls into our Community Safety Phone Number, a local 911 line we had set up, had spiked; local Afghanswere self-organizing, and meeting with the newly returned pilgrims, by the hundreds, to hear their stories. Finally, a month later, we hosted a “Reunion Shura.” The Brigade Commander invited the 35 attendees to each bring five guests,“friends or family. We expected no more than 185 Afghan guest, but, more than 400 showed up for the event. The reason for the turn-out? They heard about VoMIand believed in the program. It seemed as if they respected what the U.S. and Jordanians were trying to do. They had decided that God willing, they would make the VoMI journey themselves. The Afghan provincial Governors attended, and spokeduring the Shura. Senior leaders from the Afghan UniformedPolice, Afghan National Army, hundreds of local Afghan tribal elders, and religious leaders also attended. All the major media outlets from Kabul covered the event.

Several of the attendees, including an Afghan radio broadcaster passionately addressed the assembled audience. The Audience members showed emotion and spoke openly. VoMI had changed their lives forever. The veil was lifted. They said the Taliban had lied. The U.S. does respect Islam and the Afghan people. VoMI had proved it. “May there always be a program like VoMI. May its blessingsreach other Afghans like it has reached us”, one participantsaid. “God will bless Coalition Forces a thousand times for athousand lifetimes for what they’ve done here, and whatthey’ve done for us”.


Voices of Moderate Islam

Illustration 3

VOICES OF MODERATE ISLAM (VoMI)VoMI FACT SHEET: 35 Afghans from Wardak and Logar provinces attended VoMI; the NGO, Hasemite Charity Organization, funded the program, as an implementing partner.

Three-phase operation: FOB Shank to Amman, then engagement phase.

International Interagency Team Effort: The White House, Commander of ISAF, 173rd ABCT, US Embassy-Kabul, U.S.-Embassy Amman, His Majesty, King Abdullah II, the Jordanian Ministry of Health, Jordanian Armed Forces, Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foriegn Affairs,U.S. Under Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

VoMI RETURNEE ENGAGEMENT PLAN: Attendees employed in key leader engagements: shuras, reintegration events, official events, ceremonies, tactical radio broadcasts, school madrassa outreach initiatives, and religious observations.

His Majesty, King Abdullah II of Jordan (left), receives VoMI partici-pants in Amman, giving them a warm welcome, upon their arrivalto the Hashemite Kingdom in August 2010. The King hosted a specialRamadan meal honoring the Afghan VoMI attendees.Photo: U.S. Army photo courtesy of the 173rd ABCT.

Az Zarqa

Al Karak

Ma’ an

Al ‘Aqabah

AMMAN

Irbid

SAUDI ARABIA

SYRIA

ISRAEL

EGYPT

JORDAN

IRAQ

JOIN

T MU


MAN

D


O P F O R ACADEMY

How does the OPFOR sustain its proficiency? At Hohenfels Training Area the OPFOR Academy trains-the-trainers to train the forces, maintain warrior competencies, and disseminate combat lessons-learnedto make the training experience as realistic as possiblefor training units. “The OPFOR Soldiers receive training that replicates thecontemporary operating environment. OPFOR Academy educates both 1-4 Infantry and augmented Soldiers. The trainers receive guidance on safety, rules of conductin the training area, and also cultural classes, said Staff Sgt. Muhammadun Abdallah, OPFOR Academy instructor.“When we are replicating the Afghan insurgency, we not only teach their tactics, techniques and procedures.We also teach a little bit of Afghan history and culture,with an emphasis on Pashtunwali, which is the code of the Pashtun people, so Soldiers know how to reactto any engagement dealing with Afghan civilians.Abdallah said, it is important to properly interact with women in the Afghan theater. This would be a good example of a potential non-lethal engagement, becausewhat we as Americans take for granted in our culture, could be extremely offensive in the Afghan culture and could lead to conflict and mistrust from the locals.

What’s new for the OPFOR Academy?

“We are starting to train for the full-spectrum operations,which means there will be a major attack, followed by COIN operations with stability and peace operations,”said Abdallah. “This kind of training ensures units regain and maintain their battle-craft, keeping up to speed with counter-insurgency operations. Abdallah is a 1-4 veteran from Company B, that led asquad for two deployments, each six months at ForwardOperating Base Lane and Mizan in the Zabul Province ofAfghanistan. Abdallah is a native of Chicago, IL., who has lived for 18 years in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He currently is the OPFOR Academy instructor. He shares his knowledge of Middle Eastern and Islamic cultures with students.“The better we replicate it here, the better the units deal with the situations when they deploy, he said.”

For more information on theOPFOR Academy contact JMRCat DSN (314) 520-5339 or Commercial 09472-83-5339.

27


Being the enemy:lessons from 1-4 Infantry

As the 1-4 continues to serve as Europe’s professional Opposing Force (OPFOR), Soldiers training at the HTA receiveadvanced tactics, techniques and procedures for countering-IEDs. It’s those lessons learned during the past five years, and in theater that make JMRC the premier center for training U.S. Army units in Europe, and those of allied andpartner nations bound for Afghanistan, leaders say. Last year, the unit provided first-hand knowledge and battlefield expertise to more than 4,000 U.S. and foreign troops.

“I think we did well against the Taliban because wealways thought ‘how could we kill ourselves?’” says Staff Sgt. James T. Wade, platoon sergeant. “The 1-4 forces BLUFOR[training units] to make hard decisions in training, and toaccept the less attractive parts of their jobs.” Downrange units take casualties, receive spectacularattacks, and wage information operations and HumanitarianAid campaigns against a determined OPFOR, he said. Wade, Hildebrand and Meegan bring their personal ex-periences to the training. It’s not uncommon for units toexperience scenarios including Taliban ambush, tactics,techniques, and procedures for IED emplacement, andTaliban manipulations of the civilian population to ensure realism in every training rotation. When a unit leaves HTA, and on their longest day the enemy’s mortars are in close-range, the lessons taught by the1-4 become important and life-saving. January 2011, marked the 1-4’s official completion of the five-year mission in Afghanistan. Today, the unit is back to being U.S. Army Europe’s full-time OPFOR. The unit has paid its dues and is well-equipped to train the thousands that come through the training center each year, says Hilderbrand. “Beating the OPFOR at Hohenfels is tough, and clear victoryis elusive. The lessons-learned in the box come cheap comparedto the price the Taliban will extract if the skills aren’t taught priorto deployment,” said Hilderbrand. “A Mission Rehearsal Exerciseat Hohenfels is invaluable for helping units see themselves in thefight they are about to enter.”

“More than any other conventionalunit, 1-4 Infantry knows the

intricacies of the counter-insurgency�ght in Afghanistan, and it is

specially situated to provide thisknowledge for other units.”



28

This is a dramatic comparison of Grafenwoehr Training Area’s Range 201, provided by the Training Support Activity Europe’s (TSAE) Geographic Information Systems (GIS) office in Grafenwoehr, Germany. “This is imagery that really shows how the training lands in Grafenwoehr have evolved during the years because of focused planning and management,” said Nate Whelan, ITAM Program Manager. The ITAM Viewer is a DVD-based software collection of geospatial data for all U.S. Army Europe’s (USAREUR’s) training areas and ranges. It also includes maps of host nation-controlled training areas located throughout Europe and Africa that are used by U.S. forces. GIS maintains geographic imagery and data as part of USAREUR’s Sustainable Range Program (SRP). The data is used to update mapsof all Army training lands in Europe, and provides baseline spatial information used by various U.S. and local national stakeholders to determine the most sustainable uses for those lands. For the first time, the SRP’s Integrated Training Land Management (ITAM) program includes historical aerial imagery of Grafenwoehr andother USAREUR training areas on its ITAM Viewer DVD library. The maps are a combination of aerial and satellite photos from 1945 to the present. The ITAM Viewer, free Army-network approved software and data DVDs can be requested by authorized users on the USAREUR SRPwebsite: https://srp.usareur.army.mil or by contacting the ITAM office in Grafenwoehr at DSN 475-ITAM.

INTEGRATED TRAINING AREA MANAGEMENT (ITAM)

Historical imagery Available usingITAM viewerBy Christian Marquardt, Joint Multinational Training Command PAO

Grafenwoehr Training Area - 1963Range 201

Grafenwoehr Training Area - 2010Range 201

ITAMIntegrated TrainingArea Managment


The 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (12th CAB) is currently basedin Ansbach, Germany, residing at both Illesheim and KatterbachArmy Airfields. In 2007, the 12th Aviation Brigade (Combat) becamea separate brigade under V corps, and deployed to Iraq in Support ofOperation Iraqi Freedom. In Feb. 2005, the 12th CAB deployed toAfghanistan in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and to Pakistan insupport of International Earthquake Humanitarian Relief Operations. In 2006, aviation assets of the 1st Inf. Div. merged with the 12thAviation Brigade and the former 11th Aviation Group, and reflaggedto form the 12th CAB. The unit has a long and distinguished history, dating back to June 18, 1965, when it was first organized as the12th Aviation Group at Fort Benning, Ga. The unit first deployed toVietnam as a command element for non-organic Army aviation units.Assigned to the III Military Region, it was the largest unit of itstype to serve in combat. Its colors, emblazoned with 18 campaignstreamers, gives lasting testimony of its service in the Vietnam War.

Visit the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade on the Web at:www.12cab.army.mil/

The 173rd Infantry Brigade was first activated at Okinawa, onMarch 26, 1963, as the 173rd Airborne Brigade and served as the quick reaction force for the Pacific Command. The unit earned the nickname “Tien Bien,” or “Sky Soldiers,” by Nationalist Chinese paratroopers. Deployed to Vietnam in May 1965, the Brigade was the U.S. Army’sfirst major ground combat unit to serve there. The 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) was deactivated on January 14, 1972 at Fort Campbell, Ky. Then on June 12, 2000, on Caserma Ederle in Vicenza, Italy, where it currently serves as U.S. European Command’s only conventional Airborne strategic responseforce, the brigade was renamed the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (173rd ABCT) in 2006. The 173rd ABCT has deployed to bothIraq and Afghanistan. In the fall of 2009, the unit began its third deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation EnduringFreedom X.

Visit the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team on the Web at:www.173airborne.army.mil/

29

the history of the

12th Combat Aviation Brigadethe history of the

173rd Infantry Brigade

postage andfees paid by

u.s. departmentof defense

OFFICIAL MILITARY MAIL

TH

E 7t

h u

nit

ed

st

at

es

ar

my

join

t m

ul

tin

at

ion

al

tr

ain

ing

co

mm

an

d

hq

. 7th

ar

my

jmt

cp

ub

lic

af

fa

irs

of

fic

eb

ld

g.12

7, r

oo

m 10

Un

it 2

813

0A

PO

AE

09

114

ww

w.h

qj

mt

c.a

rm

y.m

il

JM

TC

JU

RN

AL

OJ

UR

NA

LO

JOINT MULTINATION

AL TRAINING COMMAND

7TH UN

ITED STATES ARMY

T R

A

I

N I

N G

RE

CY

CL

E

The Joint Multinational Training Command Training Journal 5

Documents

Transcript of The Joint Multinational Training Command Training Journal 5