The Italian Military Enigma

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4/8/2015 The Italian Military Enigma http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/HEG.htm 1/51 White Papers Magazines Subscribe Now ! Sign In Job Opportunities Home :: Military :: Library :: Reports :: 1988 :: Further Reading MILITARY The Italian Military Enigma CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA General THE ITALIAN MILITARY ENIGMA Eric G. Hansen Major, USMC 2 May 1988 Command and Staff College Education Center Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Title: The Italian Military Enigma Author: Major Eric G. Hansen, U. S. Marine Corps Date: 2 May 1988 Italy as a nation is famous for, among other things, its art, fashion, racing cars and beautiful women. Throughout its history great geniuses from da Vinci to Marconi have contributed immeasurably to the well‐being of mankind. From Italian soil have emerged great Roman legions and military giants such as Napolean, Machiavelli and Garibaldi‐men who have shaped the very course of history. In view of this great cultural and military heritage, one of the great enigmas, at least to the casual student of military history, is that of modern Italy's failure to produce a military system capable of effectively projecting the country's national policy. But more than that, why is it that Italy, among all those countries which have been relatively unsuccessful militarily, been singled out as being particularly inept? Has this judgment been passed just by Americans who base their views on hearsay, bad jokes and shallow knowledge, or is it also shared by other countries who base their criticism on the hard facts of history? In reality, one is not justified in making a definitive judgment of anything important without having delved into the facts of the matter. This seminar will therefore examine the Italian military system from its inception in the mid 1800s under a unified government to its present status as an important NATO ally. To that end, analyses and opinions of foreign as well as domestic Italian writers will be included in this seminar to provide a broad base of study. Political and social influences will be addressed in an attempt to determine their effect on Italian military performance. Perhaps the most important aspect of this seminar will be to determine if Italy has learned from its past mistakes and has corrected perceived and actual deficiencies. Along with the purpose of broadening the military officer's capability through the study of an important history, this seminar will make a judgment as to Italy's current capability of assisting in the defense of NATO's southern flank. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER TITLE PAGE Introduction 2 I The 19th Century and Italy's Unification 8

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    TheItalianMilitaryEnigmaCSC1988SUBJECTAREAGeneralTHEITALIANMILITARYENIGMAEricG.HansenMajor,USMC2May1988CommandandStaffCollegeEducationCenterMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommandQuantico,Virginia22134Title:TheItalianMilitaryEnigmaAuthor:MajorEricG.Hansen,U.S.MarineCorpsDate:2May1988Italyasanationisfamousfor,amongotherthings,itsart,fashion,racingcarsandbeautifulwomen.ThroughoutitshistorygreatgeniusesfromdaVincitoMarconihavecontributedimmeasurablytothewellbeingofmankind.FromItaliansoilhaveemergedgreatRomanlegionsandmilitarygiantssuchasNapolean,MachiavelliandGaribaldimenwhohaveshapedtheverycourseofhistory.Inviewofthisgreatculturalandmilitaryheritage,oneofthegreatenigmas,atleasttothecasualstudentofmilitaryhistory,isthatofmodernItaly'sfailuretoproduceamilitarysystemcapableofeffectivelyprojectingthecountry'snationalpolicy.Butmorethanthat,whyisitthatItaly,amongallthosecountrieswhichhavebeenrelativelyunsuccessfulmilitarily,beensingledoutasbeingparticularlyinept?HasthisjudgmentbeenpassedjustbyAmericanswhobasetheirviewsonhearsay,badjokesandshallowknowledge,orisitalsosharedbyothercountrieswhobasetheircriticismonthehardfactsofhistory?Inreality,oneisnotjustifiedinmakingadefinitivejudgmentofanythingimportantwithouthavingdelvedintothefactsofthematter.ThisseminarwillthereforeexaminetheItalianmilitarysystemfromitsinceptioninthemid1800sunderaunifiedgovernmenttoitspresentstatusasanimportantNATOally.Tothatend,analysesandopinionsofforeignaswellasdomesticItalianwriterswillbeincludedinthisseminartoprovideabroadbaseofstudy.PoliticalandsocialinfluenceswillbeaddressedinanattempttodeterminetheireffectonItalianmilitaryperformance.PerhapsthemostimportantaspectofthisseminarwillbetodetermineifItalyhaslearnedfromitspastmistakesandhascorrectedperceivedandactualdeficiencies.Alongwiththepurposeofbroadeningthemilitaryofficer'scapabilitythroughthestudyofanimportanthistory,thisseminarwillmakeajudgmentastoItaly'scurrentcapabilityofassistinginthedefenseofNATO'ssouthernflank.TABLEOFCONTENTSCHAPTERTITLEPAGEIntroduction2IThe19thCenturyandItaly'sUnification8

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    IIItalyEntersWorldWarI17IIIItalySeeksHerNationalIdentityUnderMussolini:TheTragedyofWorldWarII39IVOperationsInNorthAfrica57VNeartheEnd71VIConclusion80Endnotes87Bibliography90INTRODUCTIONThroughouthistory,Italyhasheldgreatfascinationbothforitswouldbeconquerorsanditsinnocuoustourists.ItsimportantgeographiclocationintheMediterraneanhasmadeitatargetofinvadingarmiessincethebeginningofrecordedhistory.Infact,Italianlanguageetymologyreadilyidentifiestheinfluencethattheseoccupyingforeigncultureshaveexertedonmoderndayspeech.However,tostudyItalianlinguisticsisnotthepurposeofthispaper,butrathertodeterminewhy,inlightofitsparticularlystrategiclocation,Italyfailedtoproduceamodernmilitarysystem(atleastfromthemidl800sthroughWorldWarII)whichwascapableofachievingitsgovernmentsforeignpolicieswhentheresorttoforcerequiredit.Andwhy,amongallthosecountrieswhichhavebeenrelativelyunsuccessfulmilitarily,hasItalybeensingledoutasbeingparticularlyinept?.TheItalianmilitaryhas,infact,beenthesubjectofhistorians'criticism,pastallies'irritationandcurrentAmericanhumor.EventhosewhoknowverylittleaboutmilitaryhistorycanreadilyproduceajokedealingwithsomeaspectofItalianmilitaryinability.Thereiscommonreference,forexample,toItaliantankswhichhaveoneforwardandthreereversegears,ortousedItalianmilitaryriflesforsalewhichhave"beendroppedonlyonce".Ethnicjokesare,ofcourse,common,arenottoldmaliciously,andmanyareadmittedlyfunny,butthisparticularnegativeassociationbetweenItaliansandmilitarycapabilityneverthelessraisesinterestingquestions.MartinBlumenson,thehistorian,inhis1988addresstotheMarineCorpsCommandandStaffCollege,saidthatforhistorytobeproperlywritten,itmustfirstbeobserved,thenidentifiedandfinallyjudged.IfweweretotakeItalianmilitaryhistoryatfacevalueandsimplyaddedupbattleswonandlost,withoutapplyingMr.Blumenson'sformula,wewouldfindittobeverycruelindeed.Asheindicates,thereismoretostudyingmilitaryhistorythansimplydeclaringwinnersandlosers.Akeyissueforthestudentofhistoryiswhywarsandbattlesarewonandlost.WhywastheUnitedStates,forexample,sosuccessfulinWorldWarII(especiallytheUSMarineCorps)andyetsofrustratedandultimatelyunsuccessfulinVietnam?Whydidwewinmostofthebattlesandyetlosethewar?Todetermine,then,ifanarmyiscapableorinept,onemustdelvenotonlyintohowthatarmyoperates,butalsointotheimportantperipheralmattersofitspoliticalandpopularsupport.Thepurposeofthisstudy,then,istobetterunderstandtheItalianmilitaryforcesaswellastounderstandthepoliticalandsocialsystemswhichdeterminethepoliciesfortheirimplementationandthenthrustthemintobattle.Asstated,thesethreeareasareinseparableandmustbestudiedinparallel.Therearetwowaysofapproachingastudyofthistype.Onecouldselectasignificantbattle,operationorwar,andstudyindepthitscommandstructure,operationsorders,training,logistics,personnellosses,etc.Suchadissectionservestolookintotheheartofthemilitarymachineandallowadetailed

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    understandingofitsfunction;however,atthecompletionofsuchastudy,onecanonlypresumehowthemilitarysystemhasfunctionedorwillfunctioninotherbattles.Becausecommanderschange,andbecausenotwosituationsinwarareexactlythesame,narrowselectiveanalysesfromwhichgeneralizationsaredrawnlimitunderstandingofthebroaderissue.Forthatreason,IelectedtocoverabroadspectrumoftimewiththepurposeofpursuingamoregeneralstudytodeterminetrendsbothinItalianmilitaryoperationsandinthepoliticalsupportstructure.Withthisapproach,itwillbereadilyapparentthatdetailsofbattlesarenotprovided(thiswillbepursuedinfuturestudies);rather,averygeneraloverviewwillbegiven,followedbymyanalysisorthatofmilitaryorpoliticalfiguresofthecountriesinvolved.Thetimeperiodselectedforthisstudybeginsin1848andendsin1945.ThisperiodissignificantbecauseitencapsulatesasegmentofItalianhistorywhichisparticularlytumultuous.Thisisnottosaythatperiodspriorto1848andsubsequentto1945werenotalsowroughtwithconfusionandinstability,butforthepurposeofstudyingmilitaryhistory,thisperiodisrepresentativeofthedifficultiesthattheItalianmilitarysystemhasalwaysfaced:Itmustbesaidattheoutsetthatnoearthshaking,NobelPrizewinningdiscoveriesweremadeduringthisresearchsuchasawarlosinggenefoundonlyinItalianchromosomes.Butseriousdeficienciesbothinthemilitaryandpoliticalstructuresurfacedthroughoutthistimeperiod,andtheyarebothveryinterestingandverydidactic.Whenstudyingtheexternalinfluenceswhichaffecttheefficiencyofamilitarysystem,racial,regionalandethniccultureareimportantfactors.Thepointisthat,culturalinfluencesaffectthebehaviorofthesoldieronthebattlefield.Someculturesinstillaggressiveness(orevenfanaticism)incombat,whileothersseemtoinstillamorepassivebehavior.Iranisperhapstheprimaryexampleoffanaticismonthebattlefieldtoday.Religiousextremismcombinedwithunrelentingstatepropagandaresultinaculture,theyouthofwhicharewillingtosacrificethemselvesinsuicideattacksagainsttheenemiesofthatculture.IncontrasttothisfanaticalextremearenonviolentsocietiessuchasIcelandorCostaRicawhichbelievethathavingmilitaryforcesinvitesaggression.Theythereforepossessnoforcesandcanonlyhopethattheirallieswillcometotheirrescueintheeventofenemyattack.MostculturesandcountrieslikeItaly,aresomewhereinbetweenthesetwoextremes.Itisinthesemoremoderatecultureswhereindividualismprevailsandwheretheinfluencesofthestateoroftheprevailingreligionarelesspronounced.Itisobviousthatculturalandsocietalinfluencesmaybecyclicalandmaychangesignificantlyfromoneyeartothenext.Iranis,again,theprimeexample;havingtransitionedfromasemiwesternsociety(atleastinlargecitiesandatthetopofthesocietalpyramid)toastrictIslamiccultureinamatterofmonths,ithasassumedatotallynewidentity..AlthoughItalyhasseenagreattransitionfromcitystates,toprincipalities,andfinallytotheunificationofthepeninsulainthelastseveralhundredyears,theculturehasnotmadesuchdrasticchanges.TheCatholicChurchhasremainedagreatunifyingforceandcommonthreadamongItaliansespeciallysincethefinalunificationofItalyin1870.Thecommonlanguage,eventhoughsomewhatmodifiedfromdialecttodialect,alsobindstheItaliansinacommonheritage.And,finally,thesenseofisolationengenderedbythelargepeninsulaprotectedfromthe

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    restofEuropebytheAlpsgivestheItaliansacommonidentity.ButthegreatdichotomyoftheItaliancultureisthat,despitetheseunifyingfactors,therehasalwaysexistedadivisiveregionalismwhichhasbeenviewedasacursetobothmilitarysuccessandpoliticalstability.Andso,thefactremainsthattheItalianculturehasnotanddoesnot,becauseofthisregionalism,lenditselftomilitaryfanaticismoreven,inmanycases,toanyinterestinastrongnationalmilitarysystem..Fascism'sattemptatmilitary,socialandeconomicglorificationwasforcedonapopulationwhich,aswillbeseen,waswillingtoacceptsomeofitsbenefitsbutrejecteditsprecepts.Wewillalsosee,though,thatsomeaspectsoftheculture,suchastheparticularlyclosefamilytieswhicharesotypicaloftheItalians,hadabearingontheoutcomeofatleastoneofItaly'swars.TheItalianhasneverhadanyrealinterestinpoliticsorgovernmentexceptastheydirectlyaffecthimandhisfamily.Thisisnottosaythatthereisn'talsoasenseofnationalismundertheItalianflag,butregionalloyaltieshavealwaysbeenstrongandremainso.ItaliansthemselvesadmitthattheItalianvictoryinthe1986SoccerWorldCuppromotedgreaternationalpridethananyothereventinrecenthistory.AproblemassociatedwiththestudyoftheItalianmilitarysystemisthatofstereotyping.Morethananyothermilitary,thatoftheItaliansisassociatedwithfailure.Admittedly,theItalianshavelostmanymorebattlesthantheyhavewon,andthereisthecuriousphenomenonofwhatoftenseemstobeearlysurrenderinmanybattles.TheresultisthatthecasualobserverofhistoryautomaticallyequatestheItalianmilitarywithweaknessandtheindividualsoldierwithcowardice.Suchconclusionsareerroneousandarefalselydeduced.Thatisnottosaythat,justasinanyotherarmy,therearenotweaknessesandindividualsoldierswhoarelessthancourageous,butbeforeovergeneralizing,anentiresystemincludingthepolitical,mustbestudiedtodeterminewhvanarmyfunctionsasisdoesandwhythesoldiereitherfightstothedeathorsurrenderswithoutusingeverymeansathisdisposaltoavoiddefeat.Herewithisanattemptatsuchananalysis.CHAPTERITHE19THCENTURYANDITALY'SUNIFICATIONIn1848,Italywasstillseekingitsnationalidentity.SincetheNapoleonicwarswhichbroughttheFrenchArmyacrossthenorthernplainsofItalyin1796,manyprominentItaliansfromallpartsofthebigbootwereseekingunificationofthemanydivergentstateswhichwereboundtogetherbynothingmorethanageographicallyisolatedpeninsula,byacommonlinguisticheritageandbytheinfluenceoftheChurch.ThelanguagecommonalitywasculturallybindingandyetthevariousItaliandialectswerediverseenoughtopromoteregionalprideandmicroculturaldiversity.TheregionsofcentralItaly,forexample,werequitesimilarlinguisticallyandwere,infact,thebirthplaceofmodernItalianasitisspokentoday,whereasthereisagreatdifferencebetweenthedialectsspokeninthenorthandthosespokeninthesouth.ThoseofthenortharemoresimilartotheEuropeanlanguageswhosecountriestheyjuxtapose,whilethoseofthesouthresembleinsomewaysthelanguagesoftheinvaderswhichancientlyoccupiedtheirlandssuchastheArabsandtheSpanish.Suchwasthelinguisticflavorandregionaldiversityin1848,when,promptedbyterritorialdisputes,thenorthernstateofPiemonte(Italianspelling)declaredwaronAustria.Thiswasthefirsttimethatthesesomewhatdivergentstateshadunified

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    themselvesagainstanexternalfoe,andtheventurewas,forthemostpart,enthusiasticallysupported.On23March,troopsofthePiemonte,(whichwasapowerfulandautonomousstate)supportedbyNeapolitanandotherarmies,pushedintoAustrianoccupiedLombardia(northcentralItaly)andVenezia(intheNortheast).Thewarwentwellforthefirsttwomonths,butbyJuneandJulythe"Italian"forceshadsufferedmanyseriousdefeatsandwereforcedtowithdrawtheirforcesbacktotheiroriginallines.Therewereseveralreasonsforthisdefeat.AmongthemwerePopePius'IXwithdrawalofsupportforthecauseofthestruggleagainstAustria(whichwasaCatholicstate),thewithdrawalofNeapolitanforcesfromthewar,andthefeelingbyotherItalianstatesthatPiemonte'scausewasnotforItalybutratherforselfaggrandizement.Thefinalreasonforthismilitaryfailurewasthatofanillcoordinatedandineptmilitarycommand.1InMarch1849,therewasstillgreatItalianhatredfortheAustrianswhowerenowholdingVeniceundersiege.WithrenewedsupportfromotherItalianstates,thePiemontesiagainresumedhostilitiesagainsttheAustrians,butinjustthreedaystheyhadsufferedamajordefeatatNovara.AlthoughcourageousintheirstandagainstthedetestedAustrianinfluence,thissecondfailureofItalianarmspointedtotheneedforforeignalliances.HadtherenotbeensuchpoliticalturmoilwithinItaly,itispossiblethatthemotto"L'Italiafaradase"(Italywillgoitalone),couldhavebeenareality.ButhowcouldthearmyfunctioneffectivelyaloneagainstawellestablishedenemywhenthePopehadpulledhissupportforfightinganotherCatholiccountry?Andhowcouldasoldierfeelanyobligationtofightforanationalcausewhentheredidnotappeartobeone?BorderdisputescontinuedwithAustriaupto1859andinMarchofthatyearwarbrokeoutagain.AfterseveralbloodybattlesinwhichtheItaliansfinallydominated,anarmisticewassignedinwhichsometerritorieswererealigned.Butmistrustandhatredwouldnotallowprotractedpeace;however,theresultofthearmisticeandbriefrespitefrombattleprovidedtimeforimprovedpeninsularaffairsandtheofficialunificationofItalyin1861althoughnotallstateswereincluded.Wouldthisunificationnowmeanthatthemilitaryforceswouldbeunitedwiththefirmsupportofasolidpoliticalsystem?Amazingly,by1866perhapsbecauseofthefailuretoeverreallydecisivelydefeattheAustrians,aunifiedItaly(atleastofficially)onceagaindeclaredwaronitsnorthernneighbor.TheresultofthiswarwasthefamousbattleofCustozzainwhichtheItalianswereagaindefeatedonthesamesitewheretheyhadbeendefeatedinthefirstbattleof1848.PerhapsthegreatestembarrassmenttotheItalianforceswasthefactthattheyhadoutnumberedtheAustrianstwotoone.Thisisnottosaythatduringthisbattle,orthoseprevious,someItalianunitsdidnotfarequitewell.ThegreatGiuseppeGaribaldi,forexample,withhis40,000manindependentcorpsofPiemontesevolunteers,foughtverysuccessfullyusingguerrillatacticsduringCustozzaandsomewhatvindicatedthepoorshowingoftheregularItalianArmy.Inthemidstofthecontinuinginternalandexternalpoliticalturmoil,Garibaldiwasoneofthefewwiththeleadershipabilityandbravadotounifyhistroopsagainstacommonfoe.HistorytellsusthatthattypeofleadershipwasgenerallylackingduringthebattleofCustozza.Attributedtothedefeatwere,"divisionoffieldcommand,confusionofplansandpoorstaffwork."2TheItalianArmywasnotaloneinthisfailure.ThefleetalsosufferedadefeatintheAdriatic,presumablyforthesameshortcomings.

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    ThisisaverysimplisticreviewandanalysisofthisperiodofItalianhistorybutthebasicprobleminconductingmilitaryoperationsisselfevident.BecauseoftheinternalturmoilandregionaldifferencesduringitsunificationandconflictswithAustria,therewasnosoundpoliticalbasefromwhichtodirectawelldefinednationalcause.andcompoundingtheproblemwastheineptitudeofthemilitaryleadershipingeneral.Thesedifficultieswerestillnotsolvedbytheendofthe19thcentury.Theywere,rather,intensifiedinaperiodofturmoilwhichwasnottoberivaledinmodernItalianhistory.ThiswasaperiodofsocialandpoliticalreformwhichsawthebirthofItaliansocialismandtheadventofforeignadventurismandcolonialisminAfrica.ThisadventurismwouldreturntohaunttheAxispowersinWorldWarIIwhentheywouldbeforcedtospreadtheirforcesthininthedesertsofNorthandEastAfricatoprotecttheirholdingsfromtheAllies.TheItalianswereinitiallyfairlycomfortableandsuccessfulinmanagingtheirholdingsinEritrea,thenorthernprovinceofAbyssinia(Ethiopia).TheyhadalsobeensuccessfulinmilitaryskirmisheswiththeAbyssinianstothesouthandthusfeltconfidentinsendingexpeditionsintotheheartofAbyssiniatoseekadditionallands.ButpoliticalandmilitaryoverconfidencebroughtwithitthedestructionofatwothousandmanadvanceforceofItaliansoldiersandnativelevies.Theendresultofthegovernment'smiscalculationofenemystrength(theItalianswereoutnumbered80,000to14,500)wastheItaliandefeatatAduwain1896(inAbyssinia)inwhich8000of14,500menwerekilledorwounded.Twogeneralswerekilledand2,000menwerecaptured.TwoaspectsofthisbattlewereparticularlydifficultforItaliansathometoaccept.Thefirstwasthatthewithdrawaloftheremainderofthetroopswassodisorderlythatchargesofcowardiceresulted,andthesecondwasthefactthattheircapturedcountrymenwerebrutalizedbytheAbyssinians,anactforwhichtheItalianswouldreturnyearslaterforvindicationandrevenge(aswellasforanexcusetocontinuetheircolonialexpansion).WhatisthesignificanceofthebattleofAduwainlightoftheanalysisalreadymadeofpreviouswarsagainstAustria?AbasicdeficiencyinpoliticalunityandforeignpolicystillexistedwhichcreatedasituationunfavorabletotheItalianmilitaryforces.InanalyzingactualItalianmilitarycapabilitiesoftheperiod,theydonotappeartobetoodifferentfromthoseofotherEuropeanarmies.Italy'sconscriptionandnationalservicepolicieswere,infact,verysimilartothoseofGermanyandFrance.Inhisbook,ArmiesofAsiaandEurope,EmoryUptondescribesindetailtheprescribedrequirementsfornoncommissionedandcommissionedofficerselectionandtrainingasitappliedin1875.Again,itwasverysimilartothatofotherarmies.OneweaknesswhichUptonnotedintheItalianacademysystemwasthat,becauseofthegreatneedforofficers,only3percentwereattritedforacademicorotherfailure.ItaliantacticswerealsoconsideredstandardforaEuropeanarmy.TheywerebasedontheGermanmodelsinceGermanywasconsideredtobethesuperiormilitaryforceatthetime.Upton'sstudyreveals,then,noseriousflawsintheItalianmilitarysystem;however,hedidnotaddressmorale,orculturalaspectswhichmighthaveaffectedthefightingeffectivenessoftheArmy.AnimportantaspectoftheItalianofficercorpswasthefactthatparentswererequiredtopayforthecadets'education

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    (unlessthecadet'sfatherhadbeenanofficerkilledinbattle).Thismeantthatonlyaverysmallpercentageofthemalepopulationcouldfinanciallyqualifyforacademytraining.Thisrestrictionobviouslyexcludedthegreaterpercentageofthepopulationfromwhichmuchtalentundoubtedlycouldhavebeendrawn.NotonlywaspoliticalimprudenceaprobleminAbyssiniabutalsogeneralship.GeneralBaratieri,whowasincommandofallforcesinAbyssiniahadlearnedthathehadfallenfromfavorbypoliticalcirclesinItalyandthatanotherGeneralwasenroutetoreplacehim.Determinedtoenterbattlebeforehisreplacementarrived,hemarchedhisforcestoAduwa,wascutoffanddefeated.Asidefromthepoliticalandmilitaryreasonsforthisdefeat,theeconomicsituationathomeinItalywouldhavemadetheprospectofconductingaprolongedwarinEthiopiaagreatstruggletosaytheleast.Manycountrieshavecreatedwarsostensiblytostimulateeconomicgrowth.Inthiscase,ItalyenteredAbyssinia,partlytodivertattentionfromitsindustrialproductionproblems,itsfinancialcrisesanditsdomesticdisorders.Theendgoalwouldhavebeencontinuedcolonization,additionalmarketsforgoodsproducedathomeandincreasedtotalagriculturalproduction.However,theeffort,atleastinAbyssinia,wasselfdefeatingandItalywasforcedtopullbacktoitsoriginalpositionsinEritreaandSomaliland.DuringtheconductofoperationsinEastAfrica,therewasmuchdebatebothinternallyandabroadregardingthelegitimacyofItaly'spresenceinthatarea.InhisdiscoursetotheItalianparliamenton12May1888,FrancescoCrispi,whoheadedthegovernmentfrom1887to1896,repliedtodemandsthatItalywithdrawfromtheregion.Thefollowingisanexcerptfromthatdiscourse.Thecommentsinparenthesesarethoseofthemembersoftheparliamentinattendance:Gentlemen,Italyarrivedfartoolateinthefamilyofgreatpowers.ShehadthehonorofdiscoveringAmericabutdidnothavethestrengthtoimposeherdominionthere...Coloniesareanecessityofmodernlife.Wecannotremaininertandallowtheotherpowerstooccupybythemselvestheportionsoftheworldasyetunexplored.Ifthisweretooccur,wewouldbeguiltyofagreatcrimetowardhistorybecausewewouldtherebycloseforevertheavenuestoourshipsandthemarketstoourproducts.(Good!).Since1860Italyhasbeeninastateofcontinuouseconomicprogress,andthedaymaycomewhenweshallhaveneedofeasyandsecuremarkets.Weshallnothavethemexceptbyunfurlingourflagonalltheseasoftheworld.Someonehasthoughttoaskus:ButwhatwillyoudoatMassawa?Whatmaterialprofit,whatbenefitshallwehaveaftertheexpensesanddangerswehaveundergone?Gentlemen,inthepublicshopsbenefitsarenotcountedinlireandcents.Greatnationshavetheneedtoassertthemselvesinthevariouspartsoftheworldfortheprotectionoftheircommerceandfortheperformanceofthatcivilizingmissioninwhosetriumphweareobligedtoparticipate.(Bravo!)Isaidthatwebegintoday(incolonialendeavors),andwewouldbeginverybadlyifatthefirstsetback[asatDogaliin1887)weweretoflee

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    fromtheplaceswehaveoccupied.(Verygood!Bravo!Livelysignsofapproval).Wewouldgiveaverypoorshowofourselvesifweweretotiresoeasilyandfailinperseverance.Thispolicyoflookingonlytomaterialinterestsistoobourgeois.(Good!Bravo!)Thereissomethingmuchgreater:itisthedignityofthefatherlandandtheinterestsofcivilization.(Verygood!Bravo!)WeareatMassawa,[areainEritreaalreadyheldbytheItalians]andweshallstay".3WehavealreadydiscussedwhathappenedtotheItalianspreciselybecauseoftheirattemptedexpansionbeyondMassawa.ThereferenceinCrispi'sspeechtoDogaliisthesiteabout18kilometerswestofMassawawhereEthiopiansdestroyedanItaliancolumnof500menwhowereattemptingtopenetrateintocentralEthiopia.ThisparticularspeechofCrispiiscitedbecauseitillustratesthemoodoftheItaliangovernment(andpeople)atthetime.Italsodemonstrateshowthegovernmentforgedaheadblindlyandcreatedamilitarydefeatwherenoneshouldhaveoccurred..PerhapsitwasablessingindisguisethatItalydidnothavetoconductaprotractedwarbecause,althoughitwasadevelopingcountry,itdidnothavetheresourcestosustainitselfindefinitely.WiththedefeatatAduwawhichresultedinCrispi'sdownfall,Italyturnedinwardandconcentratedonitscontinuingpoliticalturmoil.ThemilitarywouldnotseeanysignificantactionagainuntiltheLibyan(ItaloTurkish)warof19111912.Thisparticularconflictwillnotbediscussedinthisstudy.SufficeittosaythattheItaliansdidthrowtheTurksoutofTripolitaniaandestablishedacolonythere.But,ashistoryhasshown,LibyawouldbecomejustanotherbattlefieldwhichwouldlatertrythepoweroftheAxis.CHAPTERIIITALYENTERSWORLDWARIBy1914,practicallyallofEuropewasembroiledindisputesoverpolitics,boundaries,andeconomics.Italy'sproblem,amongotherthings,washerrelationshipwithAustria.ItwasastrangerelationshipinthatshehadbeenamemberoftheTripleAlliancewithAustriaandGermanysince1896andyetborderdisputesandbasicenmitybetweenthetwoneighborscausedcontinualmistrustandtensionwithintheAlliance.TheTrentinoandTriesteareasofNortheasternItalyhadbeenindisputeforyears.ItalyfeltthatsincethisregionwasontheItaliansideoftheAlpsandsincethepeoplelivingtherespokeItalian,itshouldnot,therefore,belongtoAustria.Andso,withthemajorpowersofEuropeformingopposingalliancestodobattle,Italyhadtomakethedecisiontoeitherremainneutral(theprudentthingtodo,consideringherratherweakmilitarystatus)ortocomeinonthewinningsideandhopefullyregainwhatshefeltwereherrightfulterritories.On3August1914,Italyannouncedthatshewouldremainneutralintheconflict.Therewerethreereasonsforthisdecision,themostimportantbeingthathermilitaryforcesweresimplynotprepared.Thesecondwasconcernfortheinternalunrestcausedbyunrulysocialist,republicanandrevolutionaryfactionsinthecountry,andthethirdwasthegovernment'sfeelingthattheItalianpeopletrulywantedpeace.ItwasfeltinParliamentthatItalytechnicallyhadalegitimatereasonfornotenteringthewaronthesideoftheAlliancesinceAustriahaddeclaredwaronSerbiawithoutfirstnotifyingItalyasrequiredbytheAlliance.Inaddition,Germany'sdeclarationof

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    waronRussiaandFrancenullifiedthepactsinceArticleIIofsamespecifieditsdefensivenature.1Forninemonths,debateragedintheItalianparliamentonwhetherornottopersuadeAustriatocededisputedterritoriestoItalyincompensationforthelatter'scontinuedneutrality,ortosimplyenterthewaronthesideoftheEntente(whichwasapactbetweenEngland,FranceandRussia)andhopetowinthespoilsofthevictor.TofullyexplaintheconfusedpoliticalsituationinItalywhichhad,naturally,adirecteffectonthefightingperformanceofhermilitary,anexcerptmustbeincludedhereof"L'intervento(1915):RicordiePensieri"(TheIntervention(1915):MemoriesandThoughts)ofAntonioSalandrawhowasItalianheadofstateatthebeginningofWorldWarI:"Bytheendof1914twocurrentsofopinionhadgraduallyformedandbecomepronouncedinthecountry,whichhadreceivedwithalmostunanimousfavorthedeclarationofneutrality.Onecurrentwasforremainingindefinitelyinthepositionofspectatorsintheenormousconflagration;theoldalliancebeingbrokeninfactifnotinlawcausedtheothercurrenttofavorinterventionasquicklyaspossibleonthesidethathadbecomereputedtobetheonlyonesuitabletoItaliansentimentsandinterests....Thosewhospokeandwrotethatis,theactiveminoritieswhichineverygreatcountrycarryalongwiththemthementallyinertmajoritybecamedividedbetweeninterventionistsandneutralists.Thesetwocurrentswerenurturedbyreasons,passions,recollections,andconnectionsofvariednature,andintheirrankstheremetpoliticalgroupsthatuntilthenhadbeeninspiredbycontrastingidealities.Andso,NationalistsandFreemasonshadferventlyadoptedthecauseofintervention,whereasirreligioussocialismjoinedwithpoliticalCatholicisminpropoundingthecauseofabsoluteneutrality.Itwasthearduousbutindeclinabledutyofthegovernmenttoconsiderthesituationandtheinterestsofthecountrywithcourageousserenity,tosetagoalforitself,andtopreparethemeansforitsrealization.AfterthefirstbattleoftheMarne(September1914)andaftertheRussianinvasionofEastPrussiawasarrestedatTannenbergandtheMasurianLakes,bothsidesinthewarwerestrippedoftheirillusionsaboutaquickendtotheconflict.TimewasnecessarilyinfavoroftheEntentewhich,althoughmuchlesspreparedattheoutbreakofwar,wasricherinmenandmeans;butthesehadtobepreparedandbroughtintothefield.Meanwhile,noone,noteventhemosttenaciousneutralistsdaredmaintainthat,whilethehurricaneofwarragednotfarfromitsbordersandagitatedtheseassurroundingit,Italycouldremainidlyatrestanddisinterestedinthedevelopmentandoutcomeoftheworldconflict.Everyoneunderstoodthatthewarwouldleadtoaprofoundchangeininternationalrelationsandthatanhistoricalcrisiswasdevelopinginwhichwecouldnotavoidbecominginvolved.Thisconvictionnaturallyarousedtheinnerpatrioticpassionofthemeninchargeofthegovernment,althoughitwasourdutytomasterthispassionandcontrolitsexpression.Wethought,wefeltthatperhapsneveragainfor

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    generationsandcenturieswouldtheoccasionariseforcompletingthetaskoftheRisorgimentobyacquiringthosefrontierswhichnaturehadgiventotheItalianpeopleandbyestablishingsupremacyonourseas.Consequently,asIhaveshown,wechoseourperilousbutinescapablepathandwepreparedtofollowit.Butalthoughwehadcommittedourselvestoeachother,aslongaswaspossibleweabstainedfromcommittingourselveswithothersbecausewecouldnotexcludethepossibilitythatunexpectedeventsandnewconditionsmightarisetomodifythedecisionswehadreached.Wehadreachedthesedecisionsfullyawareoftheirenormousgravityandwithoutpretensionsofinfallibility.Thereforewestillretainedfullfreedomofactionwhilepreparingforintervention,whichwethoughtinevitableinthespringof1915."2Readingthispassagegivesonetheimpressionthat,althoughtheItalianswantedpeaceandfeltthatneutralitywasrightfor*"Risorgimento"referstotheperiodinItalybeginninginthe18thCenturyandendingin1870withherfinalunification.thecountry,fatewassomehowpropellingthemintothe"greatconflagration".ItisindeedsurprisingthatItaly,fullyconsciousofitsmilitaryinadequacies,decidedthat"now"wasthetimetotakeitsrightfulterritories.Theymusthavefeltthatluckalonewouldassurethemvictory.ContinuedverbalconflictwithAustriaresultedinthePactofLondonofApril26,1915inwhichItalyseparatedherselffromAustriaHungaryandenteredtheTripleEntentebysidingwithGreatBritain,FranceandRussia.ThiswasapoliticaldecisionwhichresultedinthesuspicionothercountriesfelttowardItalybothpoliticallyandmilitarilyduringthisperiod.Theindecision,andthensuddenchangefromAlliancetoEntentecouldnotpossiblyhaveinspiredandcultivatedfutureinternationalrelationships.Letuslooknowattheconflictfromthemilitaryperspective.ItshouldbenotedthatallItalianarmedservicesArmy,AirServiceandNavywereinvolvedinWorldWarI,and,asstatedpreviously,manyunits,especiallythoseoftheNavy,performedadmirably;however,thegeneralperceptionofItalianforces,basedontheirperformanceinbothworldwars,islow.PartoftheproblemfacedbyItalianunitsofWorldWarIwasthepoliticalsituationinwhichtherewasalackofunanimityamongyariousfactionsofthegovernment.Asforthetroopsonthebattlefield,itisundeniablethattheyhadnotestablishedawinningtradition.ThereweremanyreasonsfortheItalians'poorperformanceonthebattlefieldandtheywillbeaddressedlater,butasforthementalpreparationofthetroops,thewinningspiritwassimplynotcultivatedinmostthemastheyenteredtheconflict.In1917,whenFirstLieutenantErwinRommelfirstmarchedwithhismountaintroopsthroughAustriatowardItaly,thatnationhadalreadybeeninthewarfortwoyears.Rommel'ssuperbbook,Attacks,describesfirsthandhisexperiencesinbattleagainsttheItalians.Hiscommentaryseemstobeunbiased,ashepraisesand,inturn,criticizeshisenemyashefeelsappropriate.HerewithareRommel'sownwordsashebecamepartoftheAustroGermanoffensivewhichendedinthegreatItaliandefeatatIsonzo(knownasCaporettointheUnitedStates)ofOctober1917:ItwasearlyOctoberinthemagnificent

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    countrysideofCarinthiawheretheWurttembergMountainInfantryBattalionhadbeensentbytheroundaboutwayofMacedoniawhenIagainassumedcommandofmydetachment.WehadnoideawhattheArmyHighCommandhadinstoreforus.TheIsonzofront?SinceItaly'sentryintothewarinMayof1915,thechiefoperationalobjectiveoftheItalianarmyhadbeenthecaptureofTrieste.Inthecourseoftwoyearsofwarfare,tenbattleshadtakenplacealongthelowercourseoftheIsonzo,duringwhichtheAustrianforceshadslowlybutpersistentlybeenpushedbackwards.InthesixthbattletheItalianshadgainedafootholdontheeastbankoftherivernearGoriziaandhadtakenthecityitself".FortheeleventhIsonzobattle,whichbeganinAugust1917,GeneralLuigiCadornapatternedhisoffensiveontheWesternFrontmodel.Supportedby500guns,50divisionsattackedonthenarrowfrontbetweenGoriziaandthesea.ByfinefightingtheworthyAustriantroopsnullifiedtheItalians'initialsuccess,butinthesecondpartofthebattletheItalianscrossedthemiddlereachesoftheIsonzoandtookthehighplateauofBainsizzawhere,byexertingtheirsupremeefforts,ouralliessucceededinhaltingtheattack.ThisalloutattacklasteduntilthebeginningofSeptemberwhenthingsquieteddownandCadornabegantogetreadyforthetwelfthIsonzoBattle.ThenewlywonterritoryeastofthemiddlereachesoftheIsonzomateriallyimprovedtheItalianprospectsforthenextbattleandtheirobjective,Trieste,wasfinallywithinreach.TheAustriansdidnotfeelequaltoieetingthisnewattackandtheywereobligedtoaskforGermanhelp.Inspiteofthetremendousexpenditureofforcesinthebattlesinthewest(FlandersandVerdun),theGermanHighCommandsentanarmyconsistingofsevenbattletrieddivisions.AcombinedGermanandAustrianoffensiveontheupperIsonzofrontwastoeffectthedesiredrelief.TheobjectivewastothrowtheItaliansbackacrosstheimperialboundary,and,ifpossible,acrosstheTagliamento.SuchwasthestrategicbackgroundasinterpretedbyRommelasheandhismountaintroopspreparedforthebattle.BasedonRommel'sassessment,theItalianArmyinitiallydidquitewellinsystematicallypushingtheAustriansbacktothepointwherethey(theAustrians)feltitimperativetoseekassistancefromtheGermans.ItshouldbeunderstoodthattheAustrianArmy,atthebeginningofthe20thCentury,wasoneofthesignificantmilitarypowersoftheworld,whereasthatoftheItaliansstillsufferedfromtheimbalanceofinfancy.But,althoughitappearsthattherewasinitiallyacertainunityofItalianeffort,Rommel,inhisdescriptionsofbattleonthesmallunitlevel,indicatesthatthereweregraveshortcomingsincommandand,inmanycases,afatallackofwillamongthetroops.Initially,accordingtohisaccount,theyfoughttenaciouslybutthenbegantoinexplicablysurrender.Thefollowing,then,areexcerptsfromRommel's,Attacks:...Thescoutsdidnotenjoyfavorableprospects;fortheenemy,[Italians)obviouslyunshaken,wasfromtimetotimetraversingthebaregrassyslopesinfrontofhiswirewithburstsofmachinegunfireinvariousdirections.Thislocalenemygarrisonappearedtobe

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    onitstoesandwasnotinclinedtosurrenderatanyprice....IntheAlpinecorps,theBavarianInfantryLifeGuardsandtheWurttembergMountainBattalionwerefightingatthecornerstoneofthethirdItalianpositiononHill1114.Schoerner'scompany(12thLifeGuards)heldthepeakproper,buttheItaliansheldtheirsurroundingpositionsandwereattemptingtoregaintheirlostpositionsbycounterattacks.The1stJagerRegimentofthe200thDivisionwasstillfightingforthesecondItalianpositionintheregionofHill732...4AftersomeoftheseencountersinwhichRommelprobablydeterminedthathecouldcertainlynotunderestimatethisenemy,hehadseveralexperienceswhichpuzzledhimsuchasthefollowing:...Whatwasgoingon?Thesoldiersattheheadofthe2dCompanyhaddiscoveredsomeItaliansasleepinaclumpofbushesdowntheslope.InsideofafewminutestheyhadroutedoutanItaliancombatoutpostoffortymenandtwomachineguns.Notashot,notaloudwordwasheard.Tobesure,afewhostilesentriesfleddownhillasfastastheirlegscouldcarrythem;butfortunatelyintheirexcitementtheyforgottowarnthegarrisonofthepositionsabovebyshotsorshouts.Imadecertainthatnoonetriedtoshootthemastheyfled......Itrequiredallourstrengthtoclimbupoutofthehollowandacrossthesteepslope.Inafewmomentsthehostileobstacleswerereachedandpassedandthenwemovedacrossthehostileposition.ThelongbarrelsofaheavyItalianbatteryloomedbeforeusandinitsvicinityStreicher'smenwerecleaningoutsomedugouts.AfewdozenItalianprisonersstoodneartheguns.LieutenantStreicherreportedthathesurprisedtheguncrewswhiletheywerewashingthemselves......Downontheright,onthenorthslope,handgrenadesburstastheassaultteamfromLudwig'scompanyfoughtitswayalongthehostileposition.TheItaliangarrisonclungtenaciouslytoeverynookandcranny,andourtroopsmadeslowprogresseventhoughtheywereattackingdownhill...5ThereweremanvinstancesinRommel'sexperiencewhereItaliansoldiersweresimplycaughtunawareandwereeithercapturedortriedtoescapeasinthefollowingexcerpts:...Meanwhile,toourgreatastonishment,ItaliantrafficstartedupagainontheLuicoSavognaroad.Fromnorthandsouthsinglesoldiersandvehiclescameunsuspectinglytowardus.Theywerepolitelyreceivedatthesharpcurvesoftheroadbyafewmountainsoldiersandtakenprisoner.Everyonewashavingfunandtherewasnoshooting.Greatcarewastakenthatthemovementofthevehiclesdidnotslackenonthecurvestherebyalertinganywhatmightbefollowing.Whileafewmountaintroopstookcareofthedriversandescorts,othersseizedthereinsofthehorsesormulesanddrovetheteamstoapreviouslydesignatedparkingplace.Soonwewerehavingtroublehandlingallthetrafficthatcamefrombothdirections.Inordertomakeroom,thevehicleshadtobeunhitchedandmovedclosetogether.Thecapturedhorsesand

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    muleswereputinasmallravineimmediatelybehindourbarricade.Soonwehadmorethanahundredprisonersandfiftyvehicles.Businesswasbooming......TheheadofmydetachmentreachedthevalleyamileandahalfsouthwestofLuicoat1230.Thesuddenapparitionoftheleadingsoldiers,amongthemLieutenantsGrau,Streicher,Wahrenbergerandmyself,whosuddenlyrosefromthebushesahundredyardseastoftheroad,petrifiedagroupofItaliansoldierswhoweremovingunsuspectinglyalong,partlyonfootandpartlyawheel.TheyweretotallyunpreparedtoencountertheenemytwomilesbehindthefrontatGolobiandtheyfledattopspeedintothebushestothesideoftheroad,probablyexpectingtobefiredonatanymoment...6AttheendofanoperationonMountKuk,Rommelgavehisusualdidacticobservations:ThedecisionoftheItaliancommanderonKuktostoptheGermanbreakthroughintheKolovratpositionbycommittinghisnumerousreservesfordefenseinseverallinesontheeastslopeofKukwasincorrect.HegavetheRommeldetachmenttheurgentlyneededrespite(fororganizationofthedefense,reassembly,bringingupofsupport).ItwouldhavebeenmoreadvantageoustousetheseforcestorecaptureHill1192.ThenecessaryfiresupportcouldhavebeengivenfromthenumerouspositionsonthenorthslopeofKuk.IfthehostilecommandhadsucceededingettinganattackgoingfromtheeastagainsttheRommeldetachment,thelatterwouldhavebeeninaverydifficultposition.Further,itwasnotprofitabletolocatethethreepositionsonthesteep,bareandstonyeastslopeofKuk(forwardslope).InhoursofworktheItaliansoldiersbarelysucceededindentingthegroundeventhoughtheirworkwasnotdisturbedbyanyharassingfire.ReverseslopepositionsonthewestslopeofHill1192wouldhavebeenmuchmorefavorablefortheenemysincetheywouldhavebeenoutofreachofourartilleryandmachineguns.Furthermore,theenemydelayedinblockingtheridgeroadonthesouthslopeofKukandincoveringthebareslopesbelowtheridgeroadwithfire.AtthestartoftheattackagainstKuk,twoorthreeItalianbattalionsopposedtheRommeldetachmentwithnumerousmachinegunsincommandingpositions,inpartwelldeveloped;inparthastilyinstalled.Thedetachmentfirstattackedonlywithtwoassaultteamsof16meneachunderthefiresupportofonemachineguncompany,sixlightmachinegunsandtwoheavybatteries.TheseteamsfeltoutthepossibilitiesofapproachingtheenemyandIthenusedthemainbodytoencircletheentireKukgarrisonwhichwascapturedduringthelaterhoursofthemorningassaultandunitsfromWurttembergMountainBattalionandacompanyoftheBavarianInfantryLifeGuards.Intheattacktheeffectsofthemachinegunandheavyartilleryfireagainstthehastilyentrenchedenemyprovedtobeespeciallystrong.Inmanyplacestheenemywasunabletostandupunderthisseverenervousstrain.ThisfirewouldhavehadlittleeffecthadtheItaliansbeenproperlyentrenched.

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    OurownmachinegunfirefromHill1192provedtobeamagnetandattractedtheentireattentionoftheItalianfireunits,thuspermittingourinitialassaultteamandthentheentiredetachmenttoreachtheeasternslopeofKukwithoutsufferinglossesbymeansofthecamouflagedroadwhichwasopentoenemyobservation.Aregimentofthe4thBersaglieriBrigade,inmarchcolumn,unexpectedlybumpedintoourroadblockinthenarrowvalley.Eventhoughtheleadingunitswerepinneddownbyfire,therearwardunitscouldhavemasteredthesituationbyattackingontheslopestotheeastorwest.Clearthinkingandvigorouscommandwerelackinghere.7AsidefromsomeoftheinattentionandpoorcommanddecisionsnotedherebyRommel,therewereincidentswhichraisequestionsabouttheItalianleadershipofWorldWarI.OneofthemostcuriousiscontainedinthefollowingaccountofRommel'sattackonMountMrzli:...AlreadyduringourattackwehadobservedhundredsofItaliansoldiersinanextensivebivouacareainthesaddleofMrzlibetweenitstwohighestprominences.Theywerestandingabout,seeminglyirresoluteandinactive,andwatchedouradvanceasifpetrified.TheyhadnotexpectedtheGermansfromasoutherlydirectionthatis,fromtherear......ThenumberofenemyinthesaddleonMrzliwascontinuallyincreasinguntiltheItaliansmusthavehadtwoorthreebattalionsthere.Sincetheydidnotcomeoutfighting,Imovednearalongtheroad,wavingahandkerchief,withmydetachmentechelonedingreatdepth.Thethreedaysoftheoffensivehadindicatedhowweshoulddealwiththenewenemy.Weapproachedtowithinelevenhundredyardsandnothinghappened.Hadhenointentionoffighting?Certainlyhissituationwasfarfromhopeless!Infact,hadhecommittedallhisforces,hewouldhavecrushedmyweakdetachmentandregainedMountCragonza.OrhecouldhaveretiredtotheMatajurmassifalmostunseenunderthefiresupportofafewmachineguns.Nothinglikethathappened.Inadensehumanmassthehostileformationstoodthereasthoughpetrifiedanddidnotbudge.Ourwavingwithhandkerchiefswentunanswered...Wedrewnearerandmovedintoadensehighforestsevenhundredyardsfromtheenemyandthusoutofhislineofsight,forhewaslocatedaboutthreehundredfeetuptheslope.Heretheroadbentverysharplytotheeast.Whatwouldtheenemyuptheredo?Hadhedecidedtofightafterall?Ifherusheddownhillwewouldhavehadamantomanbattleintheforest.Theenemywasfresh,hadtremendousnumericalsuperiority,andmoreoverenjoyedtheadvantageofbeingabletofightdownhill......Wereachedtheedgeoftheforestunhindered.WewerestillthreehundredyardsfromtheenemyabovetheMatajurroad;itwasahugemassofmen.Muchshoutingandgesticulatingwasgoingon.Theyallhadweaponsintheirhands.Upfrontthereseemedtobeagroupofofficers..Withthefeelingofbeingforcedtoactbeforetheadversarydecidedtodosomething,Ilefttheedgeoftheforestand,walkingsteadilyforward,demanded,bycallingandwavingmy

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    handkerchief,thattheenemysurrenderandlaydownhisweapons.Themassofmenstaredatmeanddidnotmove.Iwasaboutahundredyardsfromtheedgeofthewoods,andaretreatunderenemyfirewasimpossible.IhadtheimpressionthatImustnotstandstillorwewerelost.Icametowithin150yardsoftheenemy!Suddenlythemassbegantomoveand,intheensuingpanic,sweptitsresistingofficersdownhill.Mostofthesoldiersthrewtheirweaponsawayandhundredshurriedtome.InaninstantIwassurroundedandhoistedonItalianshoulders."EvvivaGermania"[LongliveGermany]soundedfromathousandthroats.AnItalianofficerwhohesitatedtosurrenderwasshotdownbyhisowntroops.FortheItaliansonMrzlipeakthewarwasover.Theyshoutedwithjoy.TheItalianofficersbecamepugnaciousseeingtheweakRommeldetachmentandtheytriedtoreestablishcontrolovertheirmen.Butnowitwastoolate.SomecapturedItalianshadtoldmeshortlybeforethatthe2ndRegimentoftheSalernoBrigadewasontheslopesofMatajur;itwasaveryfamousItalianregimentwhichhadbeenrepeatedlypraisedbyCadornainhisordersofthedaybecauseofoutstandingachievementsbeforetheenemy.Theyassuredmethatthisregimentwouldcertainlyfireonusandthatwewouldhavetobecareful.Theirassumptionwascorrect.TheheadoftheRommeldetachmentnosoonerreachedthewestslopeofMrzlithatstrongmachinegunfireopenedupfromHills1497and1424.Thehostilemachinegunfirewasexcellentlyadjustedontheroadandsoonsweptitclear.8WithoutfurtherusingRommel'sdescriptionofevents,ithappenedthatthehighlypraisedSalernoBrigade,too,laiddownitsarmsapparentlyagainstthewillofitscommandingofficer,forasRommelstated,"Hesatattheroadside,surroundedbyhisofficers,andweptwithrageandshameovertheinsubordinationofthesoldiersofhisonceproudregiment.9OtherItalianunitswerecapturedinasimilarmannerbytheRommelDetachmentduringthebattleforMountMatajur.Inhisusual"endofparagraph"observations,hetellsofhis"bag"andanalyzeshissuccess:...IntwentyeighthoursfivesuccessiveandfreshItalianregimentsweredefeatedbytheweakRommeldetachment.Thenumberofcaptivesandtrophiesamountedto:150officers,9000men,and81guns.NotincludedinthesefiguresweretheenemyunitswhichaftertheyhadbeencutoffonKuk,aroundLuico,inthepositionsontheeastandnorthslopesofMrzlipeak,andonthenorthslopesofMountMatajur,voluntarilylaiddowntheirarmsandjoinedthecolumnsofprisonersmovingtowardTolmein.Mostincomprehensibleofallwasthebehaviorofthe1stRegimentoftheSalernoBrigadeonMrzli.Perplexityandinactivityhavefrequentlyledtocatastrophes.Thecouncilsofthemassunderminedtheauthorityoftheleaders.Evenasinglemachinegun,operatedbyanofficercouldhavesavedthesituation,oratleastwouldhaveassuredthehonorabledefeatoftheregiment.Andiftheofficersofthisregimenthadledtheir1500menagainsttheRommeldetachment,MountMatajurwouldsurelynothavefallenonOctober26.

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    InthebattlesfromOctober24to26,1917,variousItalianregimentsregardedtheirsituationashopelessandgaveupfightingprematurelywhentheysawthemselvesattackedontheflankorrear.TheItaliancommanderslackedresolution.Theywerenotaccustomedtooursuppleoffensivetactics,andbesides,theydidnothavetheirmenwellenoughinhand.Moreover,thewarwithGermanywasunpopular.ManyItaliansoldiershadearnedtheirlivingsinGermanybeforethewarandfoundasecondhomethere.TheattitudeofthesimplesoldiertowardGermanywasclearlydisplayedinhis"EvvivaGermania!"onMrzli.10Rommel'slastpointcouldcertainlybeargued.WerethetroopsshowingsomekindofendearmentforGermanyorweretheyhopingforsurvivalinthehandsoftheircaptors?ItalianevaluationofthedefeatatCaporettoindicatesthat,infact,therehadbeenheavye,nemypropagandaandthatthetroopshadbeeninsufficientlypreparedtodealwithit.ItmustbenotedherethatRommelgivesfurtherpositiveevaluationofsuccessiveencounters:"AfewweekslaterthemountainsoldiershadItaliantroopsopposingthemintheGrapparegion,whofoughtsplendidlyandweremenineveryparticular,andthesuccessesoftheTolmeinoffensivewerenotrepeated".11Asanexampleofthis,RommeltellsofaviolentfirefightagainsttheItaliansinwhichhewasnearlycapturedandhisDetachmentnearlylost:AgroupofhowlingItalianscamedowntheroadandIdidnotknowwhethertheywereattackersorprisoners.Ihadnoideaofwhathadbecomeofmyleadingelements(3dCompanyandthemachineguncompanyofthe26thRifleRegiment).Idecidedtouseacoupleofflaresandclearupthesituation.Ifiredthemjusttotherightofthehighwaybridgenearthelowwasleadingtothemilland,intheirlight,IsawacloselypackedmassofhandkerchiefwavingmenrushingtowardPirago.Theheadofthegroupwasascanthundredyardsawayandthelightoftheflaresmademeanexcellenttarget.TheshriekingItaliansdidnotfireashotastheyapproached,andIwasstillundecidedregardingtheirstatus...WhentheenemywaswithinfiftyyardsIshouted"Halt!"anddemandedtheirsurrender.Theansweringroarwasneitheraffirmativenornegative.Noonefiredandtheyellingmassdrewnearer.Irepeatedmychallengeandgotthesameanswer.TheItaliansopenedfireattenyards.Almostallwhowereontheroadfellintotheenemy'shands.TheItaliansracedalongtheroadtothesouth....Atthelastmoment,IescapedcapturebyjumpingovertheroadwallandIracedtheItaliansmovingalongtheroad....ThehostileadvancesloweddownimmediatelyandtheItalianmachinegunsbegantorattle,sprayingtheirfireagainstthewallswhichshelteredtheStyriantroops.Theenemyappearedtobeattackingtorightandleftoftheroad.Athousandmenwereyelling"Avanti,avanti!"("Forward!").12Withoutquotinghim,RommelcontinuesthedescriptionofthisandotherbattlesintheGrapparegion.ThebattleswiththeItaliansarecharacterizedbyheavyItalianartilleryactivitywhichwasalwaysdescribedasveryeffectivebyRommel,andbysignificantclosecombatandhandtohandfighting.TherecontinuedtobelargegroupsofItalianssurrenderingundertheweightoftheGermanAustrianadvance;however,therearein

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    Rommel'saccountnootherrecurrencesofsurrenderwithoutfighting.InanalyzingwhytheItaliansfailedinthismajoroperationofthewar,onekeypointemergesthatofunityofpurpose.ItseemsthatalargenumberoftheItalianforceswerenotsufficientlyconvincedthattheyshouldbefightingfortheircountry;hence,theshoutbysurrenderingtroops,"Evviva,Germania".WasthisthefaultoftheItalianofficercorpswhichsomehowdidnotcommunicatetotheirtroopsthesignificanceoftheirmission?Orwasitaproblemwithastillrelativelyyoungandrecentlyunifiedcountrywhichdidnotknowwhatitsforeignpolicywasandwhoitshoulddesignateasfriendandfoe?BasedonRommel'sdescriptionofItaliantroopsoverpoweringtheirofficers,itwouldappearthat,insomecasesatleast,therewasalackofconfidenceofthetroopsintheirofficers.AnotherconsiderationinanalyzingCaporettowasthetremendousamountoftime(twoyears)thattheItaliansspentagainsttheAustriansintheIsonzocampaign.Therewereatotaloftwelvebattlesfoughttherewithonlyveryslowprogresstoshowfortheirefforts.Whateffectdoesconstantbattlehaveonmenwhenfightingundersuchcircumstances?Inthebook,FaceofBattle,JohnKeeganstates:Thereisnosuchthingasgettingusedtocombat'...Eachmomentofcombatimposesastrainsogreatthatmenwillbreakdownindirectrelationtotheintensityanddurationoftheirexposure...psychiatriccasualtiesareasinevitableasgunshotandshrapnelwoundsinwarfare....Mostmenwereineffectiveafter180oreven140days.Thegeneralconsensuswasthatamanreachedhispeakofeffectivenessinthefirst90daysofcombat,thatafterthathisefficiencybegantofalloff,andthathebecamesteadilylessvaluablethereafteruntilhewascompletelyuseless...Thenumberofmenondutyafter200to240daysofcombatwassmallandtheirvaluetotheirunitswasnegligible"13WeretheItaliantroopswhofacedRommeljustsuchcasualties?Hadtheylostthewilltofightbecauseofexcessiveexposuretodangeranddeath?ConsiderthatatCaporettotheItalianSecondArmywith25divisionsfaced37AustroGermandivisionsandlost10,000dead,30,000wounded,293,000prisoners,and350,000missinginthefirsttwoweeksofthebattle..Itwouldseemthatthisincrediblybloodycampaignwouldindeedtakeitstollinpsychologicalcasualties,especiallywiththeaforementionedlackofleadershipandinsufficientinculcationofthespiritofnationalisminthesoldier.TheItalianArmyChiefofStaff,GeneralLuigiCadornawasoutragedbythedisasterandsaidinhismilitarybulletinof28October,"LackofresistanceonthepartofunitsoftheSecondArmycowardlyretreatingwithoutfightingandignominiouslysurrenderingtotheenemyhasallowedtheAustroGermanforcestobreakourleftflankontheJulianfront."14ItmustbenotedherethattheItalians,withthehelpoftheirBritishandFrenchallies,finallystoppedtheAustroGermanadvanceatthePiaveRiverinDecember.Eventually,theItalians,underGeneralArmandoDiaz,succeededinsplittingtheAustroGermanforcesanddefeatingthem.Despitethisfinalcontainment,though,theItaliangovernmentviewedtheIsonzo(Caporetto)asadefeat.ItwouldbeusefulheretoreviewexcerptsoftheItaliangovernmentCommissionofInquiryrelatingtothebattle:

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    TheeventsofOctoberNovember1917thatledtothewithdrawaloftheItalianarmyfrombeyondtheIsonzoRivertobehindthePiaveRiverhavethecharacterofamilitarydefeat.Thedeterminingcausedofamilitarynature,bothoftechniqueandofmorale,certainlypredominatedoverthoseotherfactors,alientothearmedforces,whoseallegedinfluencethisreporthasshowntobeexaggerated.Somepersonshaveattemptedtodeducefromtheinfluenceoftheseotherfactorsthattheeventsinquestionaretobeattributedlargelytopoliticalcauses.Inadditiontolocalandchancecauses,thedefeatderivedalsofromtheconfluenceofcomplexfactorsofamilitarynaturewhichhadbeenactinguponthearmyforsometimeandwhich,becauseofexceptionalcontingencies,wereabletoexerciseamosteffectiveinfluence,demoralizingthearmyanddestroyingitsverycohesion.Amongthosecauseswhicharejudgedtohavebeenbeyondhumancontrol,whosepresenceandinfluencehavebeenascertainedwithcertaintybytheCommissionandwhichmitigatepersonalresponsibilities,arethefollowing:Thepowerandcapacitiesoftheenemy.TheAustroGermansundertooktheOffensiveanimatedbyaspiritofemulationandsustainedbyanirresistibleimpetusderivingfromthegreatmilitarysuccessesobtainedagainstSerbia,Rumania,andRussia...Theywereperfectlyinformednotonlyofourtechnicalmilitarypreparationbutalsoofthestateofourmorale;theywereabletoexploiteveryingeniousexpedientandeveryconsummatestratagemofwartoconcealtheirveryrapidmovementofforcesaswellasthedirectionoftheirattack,toallayourvigilanceinthesectorsoftheattack,andeverywherepossibletoweakenourresistancebymeansofadebilitatingpropaganda...Withtheserenitywhichmaybegrantedusbyreasonofourultimatevictory,wemustacknowledgethattheenemy'splanwastheworkofgeniusandmostboldandthatitwasputintooperationwithenergyandintelligence,andwiththeemploymentofmethodsnewtous.Theresultwasthattheenemywasabletoachieveasurprise,notsomuchwithregardtotimeandplace,astomethodsemployed;andsurpriseistheprincipalfactorinvictory.*"Theconditionsofinferiorityofourcountryandourarmy.Theseconditionsderivedfromourgeographicalsituation,...fromhistoricalevents,fromtheparticularcircumstancesinwhichthecountryenteredthewar,andfromthedevelopmentofoperationsintheothertheatersofwar.Amongtheseconditionsofinferioritythefollowingseemparticularlynotable:thestrategicallymostunfavorablenatureofourfrontierwithAustriaHungary;ourscanteconomicpotentialanddifficultiesinmuchofoursupplies,withtheresultthatwelackedanabundanceofcertain*ThisselfanalysisjibesperfectlywithRommel'snumerousaccountsofcatchingtheItalianseithersleeping,washingthemselves,orsimplywalkingalongaroad"intherear"withoutanyconsciousnessoftheirimminentdanger.RommelgivesnoaccountofpropagandausedagainsttheItalians.Perhapsathislevelhewouldhavebeenunaware

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    ofanysucheffort;however,thiswouldaccountforthehugenumbersoftroopswhosurrenderedtohimtroops,who,asalreadymentioned,probablyreceivedlittleorineffective"counterpropaganda"fromtheirofficers.Warmaterialsandthushadtoundergogreatersacrificesinthestrugglethandidothercountriesandarmies;Italianpolicyofthelastfewdecades,resultinginourarmybeinglesswellpreparedthatothers;themilitarycollapseofSerbia,Rumania,andfinallyandverygravethatofRussia,resultingintheconcentrationofmostAustroHungarianforcesonourfront.Weatherconditionsquiteunfavorabletous,suchas,amongothers,thebadweatherprevailingduringthemonthofOctoberwhichmadelandandairobservationmoredifficult;thefog,whichnotablefavoredtheAstroGermanartillery,aimedatknownandfixedtargets,aswellastheadvanceofenemyinfantryinmanysectorsoftheattack,butmadedifficultandattimesimpossibleourdefensivebarragesandtheadequatemaneuverofoursupportandreserveforces;therainsfromOctober24to27...andthefullnessoftherivers,whichobstructedthemovementofourveryheavycolumnsinretreatandthecrossingoftherivers...Thefollowingmustbenumberedamongthefactorswhichdidindeedexerciseaninfluencebutonlyinsofarasmilitaryconditions(andparticularlytheconductandtheresultsofthewaraswellasthemanagementofthearmy'spersonneluntilOctQber1917)madepossiblethegrowthofthesefactorsandtheirevilinfluence,whichotherwisewasnogreaterthantheaveragelevelinfluenceexercisedonotherarmiesandpeople:Thenaturalandpronouncedrepugnancefeltbymanytowardsacrifices,harmanddiscomforts,aswellasfamilytiesthatattimeswereevenunhealthy.Theconfluenceofsomepartiesincondoningandfavoringthelessdesirabletendenciesandactivitiesofthemasses;therefusalonthepartofthesepartiestoacceptresponsibilityforthewarwhenfatewasunkindtothefortunesoftheEntente.(Thisandtheprecedingfactorconstitutetheessenceofthatpartofdefeatismnotnurturedbytheenemy.)Theenemy'sintelligentandcunninglyeffectivepropagandainthecountryaswellasamongthetroops.Certainpoliticalevents,suchastheRussianrevolution,andpublicmanifestationsoccurringwithinabriefspanoftime,suchastheremarkmadebytheHonorableDeputyTrevesinParliament*,theSocialistassembliesattendedbyRussianemissaries,theTurin*OnJuly12,1917,ClaudioTreves,OfficialSocialist,hadappealedtoallgovernmentsofEuropetohearkentothe"ultimatumoflifetodeath:bythecomingwinter,notamaninthetrenches."riots**andthePope'snoteonpeace.***Andtheattitudeassumedbyapartofthepresswhich,bydirectingpublicopiniontowardanexaltationoftheHighCommand,contributedtotheweakeningofthegovernment'sfunctionofcontrolovermilitaryoperations.Themilitarycausesofthedefeatmaybedividedintotwocategories,inaccordancewiththeirinfluence

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    ontheeventsinquestion.Thefirstofthesecategoriesisoflesserimportanceandconsistsofthetechnicalmilitarycauses.Theseare:Defectsinthemilitaryapparatus.Althoughincertainrespectsthesedefectswerenotableatthebeginningofthewarandexercisedaninfluenceonoperationsinthefirstseveralmonths,theywereintimelargelyeliminated.Errorsintheconductofthewar,inoperationsaswellasinthemannerinwhichtroopswereemployed.Hadtheseerrorsbeenavoided,ourarmywouldhavebeenabletomeettheenemyattackbetterpreparedwithmenandequipmentandwithstrongermorale.Faultsinthedeploymentofdefensesandinthearrangementofreserves.Someimprovidenceinlogistics,especiallyinthearrangementanddeploymentofcommunicationsandtransport.Thislackofadequateprearrangementhadrepercussionsinthedifficultiesencounteredandlossessufferedduringthewithdrawal.Thesecondcategoryincludesmilitarycausespredominantlyofamoralenature.InthejudgmentoftheCommission,thesecauseshadatrulyefficienteffectinthedisaster,butresponsibilityforthemisnotlimitedtothemilitarycommanders.Inseveralinstancesresponsibilityfallsalsoonthegovernment,whichdidnotalwaysinterveneattheopportunemoment.Insubstance,theseappeartobethetruecauses,whereastheonesnotedabovearerevealedasconcomitantcausesorfacilitatingcircumstances.Thesetruecausesare:Personaldefectsrevealedinthemannerofcommandofseveralgenerals,andtherepercussionsthesedefectshadamongtheirsubordinateofficers.Adeformationinthefunctioningofthemilitaryhierarchy.Thisdeformationwasparticularlyevidentintherelieffromcommandofanexcessivenumberofofficersandintherelationsbetweensuperiorsansubordinates.Theserelationshadbecomecharacterized**LateinAugust1917breadriotsbrokeoutinTurinwhichwererepressedbythemilitarywith41dead,152woundedandinjured,andover600arrests.***PopeBenedictXV'sNoteofAugust1,1917,appealedtoallbelligerentstoendthe"uselessslaughter."byfear,suspicion,insincerity,andattimeswereevenspiteful.Errorsinthemaintenanceofdisciplineandmoraleamongthetroops.Theseerrorswererevealedparticularlyintheinconsistencywithwhichdisciplinewasapplied;inthetoofrequentdisregardoftheregularproceduresofmilitaryjustice;intheapplicationofnotalwaysjustifiedsummaryexecutions;andinthescantconcernshownforthemoraleoftroopsandforadequateindoctrination.Failuretoeliminatecertaininjusticesanddisproportionsinallottingtheburdensandsacrificesofwar;and,ontheotherhand,failuretoengageinpersuasiveactiontofightthewidespreadandmostexaggeratednotionsregardingtheblightofdraftevasion.*Discouragementoccasionedbythewidespreadconvictionnomatterwhetherjustifiedor

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    exaggeratedthatthebloodsacrificesalreadyperformedandthosethatmightcomehadbeenandwouldbefruitless.Withpersonalregardtopersonalresponsibilitiesandaccordingtotheabovementionedcauses,theCommissionholdsthatresponsibilityshouldbeassessedagainst:GeneralCadorna,forimpropersuperintendenceofcadresbyeliminatinganexcessivenumberofgeneralandseniorofficers,byinspiringmeasureswhichwerefrequentlyandinopportunelycoerciveandwhichinconsequencedisturbedthemoraleoftheofficercorpswithout,ontheotherhand,producingtheappropriateimprovementinmilitarytechniquethatmightjustifythemoralsacrificesincurred;fornottakingappropriatecareineconomizingthephysicalandmoralenergiesofthetroopsand,especially,fortoleratingunrewardingsacrificesofbloodandforincitingfrequentdisregardoftheregularproceduresofmilitaryjustice;andfinallyfornothavingattacheddueimportancetotheproblemofmaintainingthecohesionoftheseveralpartsinlargemilitaryunits.GeneralCapello,forhavingemployedintheSecondArmyasystemofpersonalcoercionwhichattimesreachedthepointofvexationandwhichaggravatedtherepercussionsensuingfromGeneralCadorna'smannerofsuperintendence;andforhavingcontributedtothedepressionofthetroops'moralebyexcessivelydrainingtheirphysicalandmoralenergiesandbybeingprodigalwithbloodindisproportiontotheresultsachieved.*AccordingtorumorsthencurrenttherewereperhapsasmanyasahalfmilliondesertersanddraftevadersbyJune1917.GeneralPorro[DeputyChiefofStaffoftheArmyunderCadorna,fornothavingperformedhisdutiesinsuchawayastomoderatetheexcessiveeliminationofofficersandfornothavinginquiredintoandmadeknownthosefactorsthatdepressedthemoraleofthetroops,thusbeingremissinhisdutytoprovidetheChiefofStaff[Cadorna]withthatcontributionnecessarytoinducethelattertotakemeasurestopreventdegenerationinthefunctioningofthemilitaryhierarchy,tocorrectthesuperintendenceofthetroops,andtomaintaintheorganiccohesionofthearmedforces.TheCabinetheadedbytheHonorableBoselli,fornothavingperformedinapropermeasureitshighdutyofsupervisionandcontrolofthearmy'smoraleandfornothavingtakenthemeasuresappropriatetothisend".15TheabovequotedexcerptsfromthecommissionsreportisveryinterestinginthatitsupportsRommel'sobservationsonthebattlefield.TheItaliangovernmentdidattempttocorrecttheproblembyreplacingCadorna.Cadornahad,infact,relievedanexcessivenumberofofficersandhisrapportwiththeCommanderoftheSecondArmy,GeneralLuigiCapello,wasverypoor.Concernedwithprospectoftotaldefeat,thecountry'sanypoliticalpartiesralliedbehindthecauseandwiththearrivalofalliedreinforcements,ItalywasabletocontaintheenemyatthePiaveRiver;however,bytheendofthe11thIsonzobattle,despiteitsrecognitionoftheaforementionedproblems,the

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    ItalianArmyhadlost40.000dead,108,000woundedand18,000missingallwithnegativeresultsinterritorygained..So,byitsownadmission,theItaliangovernment,ItalianpoliticsandveryseniorofficersweretheculpritsinthepoorperformanceoftheItalianArmyinWorldWarI.Canone,then,blametheItaliansoldierforthefailingsofthesystemthatsenthimtowar?Anadditionalissuerelatingtothe"ignominy"ofdefeatisthatofsurrender;specifically,whenisitacceptabletolaydownone'sarmsandcapitulatetotheenemy.Isthereastandardbywhichonecanmeasurecourageandcowardiceinthefaceofbattle?Whatisthesignificanceoftheterm"meanstoresist"inthefightingman'scredowhenreferringtothealternativeofsurrender?Thesearerhetoricalquestionswhichshouldbeconsideredbythereader.Asbitterapillasitistoswallow,therehashardlybeen,ifever,acountrywhosemilitaryforcesorunitsofitsforceshasnothadtodealwiththeproblemofsurrender.ThepointisthatitisnotlegitimatetopointthefingerinblameattheItaliansoldierforhisratherreadysurrenderwithoutconsideringallthefacts,manyofwhichwehavealreadyexamined.TheItalianarmedforces,bythebeginningoftheFirstWorldWar,hadnotestablishedatraditionofvictoryinbattleaspreviouslydiscussed.Withthatlackofconfidenceinthesystemandinthatbaseofsupport,especiallywhenalargesegmentofthepopulationwasopposedtothewar.itmusthavebeenexceedinglydifficulttoinspirethecommonsoldierwithanaggressivespirit.ThePopealsoexertedatremendousinfluenceinthedailylivesofthetheItalianpeople.Wouldnotthecommon,faithfulsoldierhavebeeninclinedtoobeythePope'sedictandthrowdownhisrifleasanalternativetoriskinglifeandlimbforacausewhichwasnotclearlydefinedorsupported?ThesethoughtsarenotconveyedtosomehowexculpatethemanyItalianarmyunitswhichappeartohavesurrenderedprematurely.Theyareaddressedforthepurposeofdemonstratingtheeffectsofexternalinfluencesonmilitaryperformance.Withoutdwellingontheeventsofthelastdaysofthewarorthedifficultiescreatedbythearmisticewhichwassignedbythecombatants,sufficeittosaythatthepoliticalcriseswhichgeneratedthewarwerenotsolvedinEuropeorwithinItaly.Aftertheendofthewar,Italycontinuedtosufferfrominstabilityandfromradicalismonbothendsofthepoliticalspectrum.ThischaospavedthewayfortheriseofFascismandultimatelyforthenextworldwarwhichsodevastatedthepeninsula.CHAPTERIIIITALYSEEKSITSNATIONALIDENTITYUNDERMUSSOLINI:THETRAGEDYOFWORLDWARIIIn1921,theradicalFascistPartyofyoungBenitoMussolinigainedafootholdintheItalianParliament.ByOctober31,1922,theFascisterabeganwhenhebecamePrimeMinister(aswellasMinisteroftheInteriorandMinisterofForeignAffairs).Onthesurface,Mussolini'sgovernmenthadtheappearanceofamoderatecoalitioninthat,besidesFascism,therewasrepresentationbytheNationalists,SocialDemocrats,andthePopularParty.Butby1924,Mussolinihadbecomeadictatorinitstruestsense,andwiththattransitiontodictatorship,Italywasonherwaytowarunderthetenuousleadershipoftheblackshirts."Waralonebringsuptoitshighesttensionallhumanenergyandpatsthestampofnobilityuponthepeopleswhohavethe

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    couragetomeetit".1SuchwasMussolini'sutteranceashetriedtomakehispeopleunderstandtheir"destiny".Butwithorwithouttheirconsent,hewouldattemptmakethatdestinycometopass.In1935,Ethiopia,thelastunclaimedlandbytheEuropeanpowersinAfrica,becamethetarget.PartlyoutofrevengeforthedisasteratAduwain1896,andintheorytoestablishanoutletforherexcesspopulationandtobindthevariousclassesofthenationtogether,Mussolini,withtheconsentofothermajorEuropeanpowers,movedhisforcesintopositionfortheattackagainstthepoorlyequippedbitverywarlikeEthiopians.Europeanobserversbelievedthat,consideringthedesolatetheaterofoperations,theenemyadvantageoffightingontheirownsoil,andthegreatdistancefromhome,itwouldtaketheItalianstwoyearstowintheirwar.ButItalywasabletofairlyquicklyovercomethenativeforcesinatwoprongedattackfromEritreaandSomaliaandproceedtoAddisAbabawithinsixmonths.Granted,EthiopiadidnothavemuchofanAirForceandtheItaliansusedtheiraircrafteffectively(sometimesemployingmustardgas),butthetriumphofthiswarwasintheefficientuseofengineering,technologyandlogistics.AstheItaliansmovedtowardAddisAbaba,theirengineersconstructedroadsforlogisticalsupplyandtelegraphforcommunications;therefore,theywereabletomoveaheadsurefootedlybutrapidly.ManywouldarguethattheEthiopianswerepushovers,especiallyinviewoftheirowninternaldiscordandlackoftotalunityagainsttheirforeigninvader.(ManywentovertotheItaliansideformoney).Buthoweverviewed,thiswasawellplannedandwellexecutedmilitaryoperation,atleastcomparedtopreviousfiascos..AsaresultofthissuccessItaliansathomefeltvindicatedfrompastfailuresandcouldnowholdtheirheadshighintheneighborhoodofEurope;however,thisnewfeelingofpower,invincibilityandtrustinMussoliniwasshortlived.TheoperationinEthiopiacreatedfalsehopeandconfidenceintheItalianarmedforces.OperationsatthebeginningofWorldWarIIquicklydemonstratedtheactualcapabilitiesoftheItalianarmedforces,andtheyleftmuchtobedesired.In1936,MussolinibeganagenuinecampaignoftroublemakingintheEuropeanMediterraneanarea.Hemadepactswithothernationsandthenignoredthem,heengagedinapropagandawaragainstGreatBritaintoundermineherinfluence,andhesenttroopstoSpainbothassupportforFranco'sfellowFascistrevolutionandasaprovinggroundforhistroopsandweapons.In1939MussoliniswiftlytookthecountryofAlbaniaandshortlythereaftersignedapactof"aggression"(waralliance)withHitlerwhich,however,stipulatedthatnomajorcrisiswouldbeinitiatedpriorto1942.WhenHitlerranacrossPolandin1939andtheSecondWorldWarbeganinSeptemberofthatyear,MussolinideclaredItalyanonbelligerent.HisintentwastwofoldtoallowmoretimeforhisarmedforcestorecoverfromtheiradventuresinEthiopiaandSpain,andtowaitforeasyvictoriesasGermany'swarunfolded.In1940,itappearedthatGermansuccessesinPoland,FranceandNorwaywouldbringthewartoarapidclose.ConcernedthatItalymightlosehershareofthespoils,RomedeclaredwaronBritainandFrance.MussoliniorderedattacksonBritishpositionsinEastAfricaandcoastalEgypt,buttheseoffensiveswerebroughttoahaltrelativelyquicklybecauseofinadequateequipment.ButPerhapsoneofthegreatestmiscalculationsofthewar

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    wasMussolini'sdecisiontoinvadeGreeceinanattempttosnatchupasmuch"easy"landaspossiblebeforetheconflictended.TheGreekcampaigntypifiesItalianpoliticalblundering.inthattheFascistregimemisreadthestrategicsituationandgotthearmedforcesinvolvedinanunwinablewar.ItalycertainlyhadthemanpowertosupporttheFascists'ambitionsbutitsindustrialbaseanditspreparationinmilitaryequipmentcouldnotsupportaprotractedwaragainstaresoluteenemy.SinceMussolini'srisetopower,hehadsurroundedhimselfwithmenwhofearedtocounterhiswill.Mussolinidecidedalmostautonomously,thathewantedtheGreekIslandsofZante,CephaloniaandCorfu,aswellasSalonikawithhisfinalobjectivebeingtheoccupationoftheentirecountry.Mussolini'simpetuousnessisindicatedbyhisstatementtohisstaff,"Havingthusdefinedtheissue,Ihavealsodecidedthedate,[oftheinitialattackonGreece],whichinmyopinionmustnotbepostponedevenbyanhour;thatis,the26thofthismonth.Itwouldseemthat,inordertoplanfortheinvasionofaforeigncountry,morethanpassingconsiderationshouldbegiventothestrategicinfluenceofneighboringstatesaswellastotheresponseofenemyforcesofthetargetcountry;however,the"Duce"wantedandreceivedonlycursoryinformationonboth.FortheGreekoperation,theDuce'sstaffthoughtthatitwouldbewisetoinvolveBulgaria,Greece'sneighbortothenorthtohelptieupGreekforceswhileItaliantroopsattackedtothesouth,butasimportantasitwas,itwasonlyconsideredinpassingintheplanningstages.ConfidentthattheBulgarianswouldrespondintheaffirmativetohisrequest,Mussolinipostponedhisapproachtothem.Estimatesofenemyresistancewerealsotoosketchyandnotseriouslystudied.MussoliniwastoldbyhisstaffthattheGreeksweremanifestlyindifferenttoaninvasionoftheircountrybutinthecamemeetingtheyqualifiedthatwith,"Frominformationsuppliedbyourinformantsitappearsthat,whiletwomonthsagotheGreeksdidnotseeminclinedtoputupseriousresistance,nowtheyseemdeterminedtoopposeouraction".3Mussolinididnotwanttohearofanydifficultiesintheoperationandpersistedindraggingoutwordsofencouragementfromhistimidstaff.CountGaleazzoCiano,MinisterofForeignAffairs,finallystatedthat,"ItappearsthatthegreatmassoftheGreekpopulationisindifferenttoeverything,includingtheprospectofourinvasion".MussoliniwasalsotoldthattheGreekswerenot"peoplewholikefighting"Whatisamazing,however,isthatduringtheplanningforthisoperation(crudethoughitwas)otherinformationwascominginfromreliablesourcesattheItalianministryinAthens.Grazzi,theministerinAthenssaid,ItisincomprehensiblethatCountCiano,whomusthavereadmyreports,letters,andtelegrams,shouldhavespokenofasharpdivisionbetweenthepeopleandtheleadingpoliticalandplutocraticclass,andthatheshouldhavestatedthat,apartfromthisrestrictedclassofbureaucrats,therestoftheGreekpeoplewereindifferenttoalleventsthatmighttakeplace,includinganinvasionbyus.Ifthereweregoodreasonsforsupposingthatourinformationwassototallyfalseasnottodeservesomuchascomparisonwiththatsuppliedfromothersources,onlytwohypothesesarepossible:eitherwewerecompleteidiotsorweactedinbadfaith.Ineithercasethe

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    questionariseswhythegovernmentcontinuedatgreatexpensetomaintaininAthensadiplomaticmissionstaffedbyidiotsortraitors".4Thereason,though,thatthislegitimateinformationregardingtrueGreeksentimentstowardanItalianinvasion,wasignored,wasduetothepoliticaljealousiesandpersonalambitionsofMussoliniandhisgenerals.MussoliniviewedhimselfasinaracewithHitlerforprestigeandhisgeneralswerecompetingwithoneanotherforpromotion.TheirattackonGreecewouldbebasedstrictlyonhope,luck,andcontrivedreportsofGreekweaknessandlackofwill.Duringthecourseofthismeeting,ViscontiPrasca,theGeneralwhowastoleadtheinvasionofGreece,wastoldbyMussolininottoworrytoomuchaboutcasualtiesandthathemustcontinuetheattackeveniffacedbya"division".(ThatverystatementdemonstratedafatalunderestimationofGreekresistance).WhenthesubjectaroseofthenumberofDivisionsrequiredtotakeAthens,theresponsefromPrascawasfiveorsixdivisions.AndwhenaskedhowmanydivisionswouldberequiredtooccupytheterritorybetweenItalyandAthens,Prascastated,"duringtheinitialperiod,withthreemountaindivisions".5AnindicatorofMussolini'sgeneralstrategiclackofunderstandingisalsoseeninareplywhichhemadetohisForeignMinistryregardingthepotentialoftheUnitedStatescounteringItalianandotherauthoritarianpowers.Hestated,"Americahasnomilitaryimportance".ButdespiteMussolini'sblindnesstoforeignaffairs,hehadanaggressiveandfightingspirit.Heconstantlyexhortedhisgeneralstoattackwithdeterminationandviolence.Hischarismaandaggressivenessdidseemtohaveaneffectonthetroopsinthefieldandonhisstaunch,highrankingfascistfollowers;however,therewasstillmuchreservation,thoughmostlyunexpressed,inlaunchingtheGreekcampaign.MarshallPietroBadoglio,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff,himselfhadverystrongreservationsabouttheoperationthatitwasillconceived,buthewasnotresoluteenoughtoexpresshisfeelingstoMussolini.Badogliodidconfide,however,intheforeignminister,CountGaleazzoCianotoexpresshisconcern.Cianoreferredtothemeetinginhiswritings:MarshallBadogliocametoseemeandspoketomeveryseriouslyabouttheoperationinGreece.Thethreechiefsofstaffareunanimouslyopposedtoit.Hesaidthatthepresentforcesareinsufficient,andthenavydoesnotbelieveitwillbeabletocarryoutanyunloadingatPreveza,becausethewateristooshallow.TherewasapessimisticnoteaboutBadoglio'swholespeech;heforeseesaprolongationofthewar,andwithittheexhaustionofourmeagerresources7"Ciano,whowantedwar,disregardedBadoglio'sconcernsaswellasthoseofthe"experts"suchasGeneralCavagnariwhosaidthathewouldneedthreemonthstotransfermoredivisionstoAlbania,andGeneralPricolowhosaidthathewouldnotbeabletodeployforcesbeforeNovember.CianooftenactedasabufferbetweenMussolini'sGeneralsandtheDucehimself.CianoreportsofonemeetingwithMussoliniwhereinhewrote,IwenttoseetheDuce.IntheantechamberIfoundSoddu[oneofhisGenerals]whohadspokentoBadoglio,whosaysthatiftheGreekoperationtakesplace,he[Badoglio]willresign.IreportedallthistotheDucewhowasalreadyinaveryillhumorbecauseoftheGrazianiaffair.HehadaviolentoutburstofangerandsaidhewouldgotoGreeceinpersonto

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    witnesstheincredibleshameofItalianswhowereafraidoftheGreeks.Heintendstomarchatallcosts.andifBadogliohandsinhisresignation,hewillacceptitonthespot.ButnotonlydidBadoglionotsubmithisresignation,hedidnotevenrepeattoMussoliniwhathesaidyesterdaytome.InfacttheDucesaidthatBadolglioinsistedonlyonafewdayspostponement,atleasttwo".8Finally,onOctober28,1941,warwasdeclaredonGreece.Amajorblowwasfelt,however,whenonlyshortlybeforethedeclarationofwar,wordwasreceivedfromBulgariathatshewouldnot,infact,assistItalyinherendeavor.Mussolinihadfeltsoconfidentofhimselfthathehadonlypursuedthisassistance16dayspriortotheassault.Inthefinalanalysis,thereweretwofatalblunderswhichaffectedtheoutcomeofthewarwithGreece.OnewasthisillconceivedrelianceonBulgariatotieupGreece'snorthernflank.ThesecondwasthattheattackwasbasedonfalseandcontrivedinformationrelatingtounstableGreekinternalaffairsandcorruptionamongitsgenerals.MussoliniandhisclosestblackshirtswerecompletelyblindedbythepleasantprospectofconqueringtheGreekswithlittleornoeffort.Butoncetheassaultbegan,itbecameplainlyclearthatthepredictionsandconcernsofthegeneralswerejustified.TheattackonGreecewasimmediatelyboggeddown.ThegreatoffensivewhichMussolinihadenvisionedwasmetwithadeterminedGreekdefensewhichlefttheillequippedItalianArmyinstaticpositions.ThepatheticandseeminghalfheartedeffortmadebytheItaliangeneralswasfrustratingtoMussoliniandhecontinuallyblamedthemforhavinggivenhimincorrectinformationandfortheirdemonstratedlackofaggressivespirit.Inreality,itwashewhowastoblameforthisoperation.Anditwashewhohadclosedhiseyestotherealityofthesituation.ThefollowingisanexcerptofadiscussionthatMussolinihadwithhisDeputyChiefofStaffwhichdemonstrateshisfrustrationwiththewareffort:MUSSOLINI:TheGreeksnowhaveatenmilesalient.ThesalientmaneuverIhavebeenhearingaboutforsuchalongtimemustbecarriedoutwithoutdelay.Wehavegottomaneuver.BARTIROMO:Ordershavealreadybeengiven.MUSSOLINI:Wehavegottostartmaneuvering,engagingtheenemy'sattention,wemustputanendtothispassivity.BARTIROMO:Yes.MUSSOLINI:ButthemaneuveringIhaveheardtalkedabouthasneverresultedinourcounterattackinginanydirection.BARTIROMO:Unfortunatelyithasneverbeenpossibletoassembletheforces.MUSSOLINI:Butyouhavedivisions.BARTIROMO:Theyarenotcomplete.MUSSOLINI:Aretheremanyprisoners?BARTIROMO:Wehavenonewsofthe77thInfantry;Ithinksomehavebeenlost(onJanuary16the19thBattalionoftheGreek15thDivisionhadsurprisedthe77thRegimentbelongingtotheLupidiToscanaDivisionandhadtakenabout300prisoners).MUSSOLINI:Bartiromo,thereisonlyonewayout.Attack,attack!Ihavebeensayingthatfortwoweeks.BARTIROMO:IknowthatthatishisExcellencyCavallero's[CavallerowasChiefofStaffatthistime]

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    intention,butsomethinghasalwaysbeenlacking,inparticular,ammunition.MUSSOLINI:Theytellmethatshiploadsofammunitionleftyesterday.BARTIROMO:Ihavebeeninformedthatsomethinghasleft.MUSSOLINI:Bartiromo,wemustcounterattack,wemustbreakthespellthatforthepastninetydayshasbeenmakingusloseground,positionafterposition.Ifitgoesonlikethis,weshallfindourselvesinthesea,andtherewillbenomoreposition.TheGreekswillsoonreachtheSkumbi,whichtheyaremakingfor.BARTIROMO:Thereisnotimetolose.MUSSOLINI:Inshort,forcesmustbeassembledontherightprinciples.Wemustmaneuverandavoidthispassivity.BARTIROMO:Thatiswhatwearedoingandhavealwaysbeentryingtodo.MUSSOLINI:IamgoingtoGermany.ThefirstquestiontheywillputtomeiswhetherIshallbeabletoholdthepresentline.WhatamItoanswer?BARTIROMO:HisExcellencyCavallerotoldtheGermancolonelthathewasconfidenthewouldbeabletoholdon.MUSSOLINI:Thereisonlyonewayout.Attack!BARTIROMO:Thatistrue,anditishisExcellencyCavallero'sintention.MUSSOLINI:ReportwhatIhavesaidtohisExcellencyCavallero.9BothMussolini'sfrustrationandBartiromo's"passivity"arequiteapparentinthisdialogue.Butagain,itwasMussoliniwhohadforcedthewaronhisgeneralswithoutallowingthemsufficienttimetoprepare.Thatisnottosay,though,thatthegeneralswouldhavebeencompletelysuccessfulevenwithadequatepreparation.Aswillbeseen,theywereoftenflawednotonlyindeterminationbutalsointactics.Agreatprincipleofleadershipisfoundintherelationshipbetweenleaderandandfollower;thatis,theremustexistbetweenthemmutualconfidence,respectandloyalty.FortheItalians,thisprinciplewaslackinginthisandothercampaigns.MussolinineverhadrespectforthefightingspiritoftheItalianpeople.HisfeelingsarereflectedinastatementfromCountCiano'sdiary:"Grimfacedandnervy,heisshakenbythenewsfromAlbania.Nothingdramatichashappened,butagainwehavewithdrawnandleftmanyprisonersintheenemy'shands.ThemostseriousthingisthattheunitconcernedwastheLupidiToscana,adivisionofexcellentreputationandgreattradition,recentlyarrivedinAlbania,onwhichgreathopeswerebased.Hetalkedatlengthaboutallthis;hereiteratedhispessimismabouttheItalianarmyandpeople.Hecannotexplainthereasonforthings.Herepeatedseveraltimes:"IfonOctober15anyonehadpredictedwhathasactuallyhappenedsince,Ishouldhavehadhimshot".Asthestalematecontinued,moreItalianDivisionsarrivedinAlbaniaasthejumpingoffpointfortheoffensive.ItwashopedbyMussolinithatthisincreaseinmanpowerwouldhaveallowedhimtocontinuetheassaultthroughGreece;however,majorproblemsprecludedthis.Themajorlimitationwasinthetrainingofthesoldierssenttothisverydifficultterrainunderextremelydifficultweatherconditions.Thetrainingof

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    thereservebattalionssentinwasdescribedbyCavalleroasbeing"summaryornil".Buteventhethemosthighlytrainedbattalions,suchasthepreviouslymentionedLupidiToscana,werenotabletoaccomplishtheirmissions.ThefieldgradeofficerssenttoGreeceasreplacementswereequallyweakincombattraining.Manyhadbeenpulleddirectlyfromcivilianlifeandwereexpectedtoperformunderthemostdifficultofcombatconditions,andyetforthemostparttheydidnotevenrememberbasictactics.Theywerecalledupontoleadmenwhomtheydidnotknow,againstanenemyaboutwhomtheyknewnothinginacountrywithwhichtheywerecompletelyunfamiliar.Thetacticsthatthesemenwereforcedtoemploywerecreatedatthetopbygeneralswhobothsufferedfromlackofjudgementandwhowereafraidtorisktheircareersbymakingboldmoveswhichmighthavefailed.SuchfailuresinjudgementandlogicareevidencedinCavallero'stacticofattackingtheenemy'sstrongestpointto"wearhimdown".Hisson,whowaswithhiminAlbaniasaidofhisfather:"TheoffensiveintheSesnizzaValley,thevalueandprospectsofwhichweredeniedbythetabletopstrategists,hadthedefiniteaimofrelievingthepressureonthedefenseintheadjoiningValonasector,notbymakingourmaximumeffortattheenemy'sweakestpoint,whichistheclassicalaimofeveryoffensiveoperation,buybystrikinghimwherehewasstrongestinordertoweardownhisstrength.12MarioCevo,authorofthebook,TheHollowLegionsalsosaysthefollowingofCavalleroandtheItaliangenerals:Cavallerohadatlastconstructedhis"wall".Hehadtakenoverabankruptsituationandhadmanagedtostaveofftotaldisaster.Havingsucceededinthat,herelapsedintothedefensivementalityofItaliangenerals,alwaysovercautiousandterrifiedofriskingtheirepauletsbyanalloutattack.TherewasoneItaliangeneralwhohadtheimpulsivenessofaRommel,andthatwasViscontiPrasca,butimpulsivenesswastheonlyqualityofRommel'sthathepossessed.Theothergenerals,almostwithoutexception(oratanyratewithoutnoticeableexceptions),likedgood,solidfronts,massedwithmennotwithmaterials,whichwerealwaysshort...Cavallerointendedtoensurethatnocatastrophehappenedtohim.13GeneralGastoneGambaraoftheItalianVIIICorpsplannedforalimitedoffensiveduringtheendofFebruarywiththeintentofbreakingtheformidableGreekline;however,despitehisaggressivenessandgoodintent,thefailureofproperlogisticalplanningresultedinshortagesofpackanimals,artilleryandgeneralsupplies.AnadditionalproblemwasthatGambaraintendedtomakethebreakthrough"atapointwheretheGreekswerenotonlystrongbutaggressivelypoised".Basedonthisandotherevents,thereseemedtobeafundamentalflawintacticalandlogisticalthinkingbytheItaliangenerals.Despitereservationsintheprospectofsuccess,"offenses"continuedtobeplannedandfought,althoughneverwiththedriveandenthusiasmthatMussoliniwanted.OnesuchdrivewasthatconductedbytheIV,VIIIandXXVCorpswhichwastofinallygettheItalianArmymovingontowardAthens.ButasMussolinilookedon,hisDivisionsagaingotboggeddowninattacksandcounterattacks,manyofwhichwerefoughtwithgrenadesandbayonets.OneDivisioncommanderwas"ill"onthedayoftheoffensivewhichpromptedMussolinitosay,

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    Thesegeneralswhoaretakenillonthedayofanoffensivemakeonewonder.Don'tyouthinkthatthesegeneralswouldshowalittlespirit,alittleelan,andaboveallhavealittleinitiative?LookatRommel,whoisrestoringthesituationinLibyawithasingledivisionandareconnaissancegroup".14Cervicharacterizesthebattleofthenextdayasanoffensivewhichhad,..."becomearoutine,abloody,heroic,desperate,kindofafuriousknockingatadoorthatrefusedtoopeninsteadofablowwithabatteringramthatknockeditfromitshinges".Mussolinicontinuedtorantandraveathisgeneralstryingtogetthemtomove.PriortodepartingbacktoItaly,hesaidtoGeneralGeloso:Itisabsolutelynecessarytopersist.Theoperationalplancannotbechangedafterfourdays.Hill1308ontheTrebescinesanditseasternslopesmustbeneutralized,andthentheattackingcolumnsmustgoforward.Wemustattacktomorrow,otherwisethetroopswillbegintogetrootedtothegroundandthinktheoperationisover.TheGreeksmustbekeptunderfireallday.Theanswertothemortarisrapidmovement.Wemustinsistontheplanaslaiddown.AmilitaryvictorybeforetheendofthemonthisabsolutelyessentialtotheprestigeoftheItalianarmy.IhavealwaysdoneeverythinginmypowertokeepthereputationandprestigeoftheItalianarmyhigh,butnowabreakthroughisabsolutelyessential.IhaveinstructedhisExcellencyGuzzonitosendherealltheammunitionthereisinItaly,becausetheItalianarmyishere,thewarishere,anditisherethatwemustwin"15Andso,despiteonlyaveryremoteprospectofsuccess,Mussolini'sarmycontinuedtoflailfarawayfromhome.ThedescriptionofbattlebythosewhofoughtinGreeceisagraphicportrayalofdefeat.Itisapictureofpitifulpreparedness.Thiswasanarmywhosepoliticalleadershadthrownitintothebreachonlyhopingsomehowthatitwouldendure.CaptainFernandoCampione,whowasattachedtotheSienaDivision,describesonsuccessivedatesinhisdiaryhow,overashortperiodoftimehisDivisionwadtransformedfromanenthusiastic,althoughcautiousgroupofsoldiers,toadisillusionedbandofmenfightingtheelementsandenemybulletsfortheirveryexistence:[Datenotindicated]"Cavalry,mingledwiththeinfantry,withdrawalongtheslopesoftheseruggedmountains,andthissuddenandunexpectedretreatisnotunderstoodbythesevaliantmen,whocannotunderstandthereasonforthischangeofdirection.Anotherinfantrymanislyingontheroad.Hishandsarecontracted,ashellsplintertoreopentherightsideofhisstomach,wheretheclottedbloodhadformedahugedarkfilthystainonhisjacket.Hewillbeburiedthisevening,probablybesidetheriveratthefootofasmallisolatedmountain."21November...withdrawaloftheSienaDivisiongrewhastierandlessorderly,assumedtragicandgrotesqueaspectsofallwarepisodes.Inspiteofthebehaviorofafewundisciplinedmen,thetroopsasawholearemaintainingorderandhavefoughtwell.29November"Somesoldiersaredraggingthemselvesalonglimping,othershaveputtheirknapsack,rifle,cartridgepouchonamason's

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    pushcart...Theyaremarchingheavily,slowly".2December"Whatwithkilled,wounded,missing,sick,etc.wehavemorethan2,000menoutofaction".4December"Thesightofourretreatingtroopsissadderthanever,becauseofthepainfulsightoflongcolumnsoftired,tatteredsoldiersslowlydraggingthemselvesalong".14December"morethanninetymulesarelyingalongtheroad,eithersinglyoringroupsoftwoorthreeatvariousintervals;theycollapsedfromexhaustionandwereabandonedonthespotwithalltheirload.Themajorincommanddragshimselfalongwithhisfeetaffectedbythebeginningoffrostbite.Hisserious,emaciated,lividfacebetraysthetragedyofthedaysandnightspassedinthecoldandsnow.Hecoughscontinually,andinspiteofhisstateofobviousexhaustion,hisserenityisadmirable.17December"Signsofdisintigrationinunitsofthe32ndInfantryRegimentcreatepanicandalarmatheadquarters.Therearenoreserves,thereisnothingtofallbackon.Sowehadtoturntothedivisionalcarabinieriandaguardcompanyconsistingofoldermenrecalledtothecolors.Muledrivers,truckdrivers,everyoneavailablehasbeenthrownintothedefense,thewholegarrisonofHimarahasbeencollectedunderthecommandofacolonel.Intheareawherethesnowis,itissaidthatfortymenarefrozentodeathdaily.Itisnotthefightingthatkills,butexhaustionthatbringsterrorandhumiliation.16ThiskindofsufferingwaspracticallyuniversalforItaliantroopsfightinginGreece.Thesupplysystemhadfailedtheresultbeinglittlefoodandinsufficientclothingagainstthecold.Simplereplacementforbootsanduniformswhichbecameshreddedbytheelements,wasnonexistent.Nevertheless,theItaliansfoughtwithwhattheyhad,asintheaccountofSecondLieutenantPeppinoAntoliniofthe5thAlpiniDivision:"...Weareonreducedrations...MydetachmentisprotectedbyCaptainAdrianoAuguadri'sNo.44Company;AuguadriisalibrarianatComowhomIshouldliketotalkaboutforalongtime,becauseheisthemostcompletesoldierIhaveevermet.HeattackedHills2109and2110onGuriiTopit.TheGreeksweretakenbysurprise.Iwasslightlywoundedbyhandgrenadefragments,andmysergeantgotabulletonhisforehead,fortunatelydivertedbyhishelmet.Sohegotawaywithastreakonhishairyhead.AGreekleaptatmewithhisbayonet,whichcutthesleeveofmywhitewindjacketwithouthurtingme.Ifiredmypistol,andmywindjacketwasreddenedwiththepoordevil'sblood.Wealsotookabouttenprisoners.Incrediblebuttrue,wewerethenorderedtoleavethepositionswehadgained.SotheGreeksreoccupiedthetwoheights.Iamsureweshallpaydearlyforthatcrazyorder".17ThenumerousaccountsofclosecombatandofthebraveryoftheItaliansoldiersdespitetheaforementioneddeficienciesspeakswellforthem.Inspiteoftheirefforts,however,tosupportthewilloftheDuce,theywereabletodonomorethanholdthelineandtheypaiddearlyfornothing12,000casualtiesandnogaininterritory.ItisarathersadcommentaryontheItalianpeoplethat,despitethesacrificesthatthesecommonsoldiersmadeto

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    fulfillsomehollowdestiny,MussolinisaidofthemashedepartedforItalyonMarch21,"Iamdisgustedbythisenvironment.Wehavenotadvancedonestep.Theyhavebeendeceivingmetothisveryday.Ihaveaprofoundcontemptforallthesepeople.18Perhapsby"thesepeople"Mussoliniwasreferringtohisgeneralswhomheusedasscapegoatsforthefailureofthewar.Butonecanreadilyseethat,despitetherhetoricandthebombasticspeechestothepeopleinwhichheexaltedthemandtheItaliannation,hesecretlyhadnoconfidenceinthem.Onecanonlyguesshowthewarwouldhaveprogressedhadthegeneralsreceivedtheextratimetopreparethattheyhadinitiallyrequested.Thiswillremainunanswered,butashasalreadybeenstated,asidefromlogisticproblems,theyweredeficienttacticallyandlackedaggressiveness.Mussolinicouldsubjecthisarmytothishumiliationonlysolong.Asrepugnantadecisionasitwas,MussoliniwasforcedtoacceptthehelpoftheGermanArmytorescuehimfromwhatwouldhavebeenanendlesswarofattritionifnotatotaldefeatatthehandsoftheGreeks.Itisinterestingtonotethat,duringtheearlieryearsofHitler'sandMussolini'srisetopower,HitlershowedagreatdealofadmirationfortheDuce'sadministrativeabilityandhisapplicationofFascisminrunningItaly;however,asaresultofMussolini'militaryfailuresinFrance,Greece,YugoslaviaandNorthAfrica,HitlersooncametoviewItalyasanally,withmixedfeelings.Asthewarcontinuedonseveralfronts,theSupremeHeadquartersinGermanynowwatchedcarefullyasItalyconductedoperationsinNorthAfrica.Strategically,NorthAfricawasviewedasanItalianaffair,andaccordingtoGeneralmajorEckhardChristianoftheSupremeHeadquartersOperationssection,Thedecisioninthespringof1941todispatchGermantroopstoItalianNorthAfricawasnotbasedonaspecialmilitaryobjectiveoronastrategicplanonbroadlines.ItspranginitiallyfromthenecessityofsupportingtheItalianMediterraneanposition,checkingtheBritishadvancetoTripoliandpossiblyregainingCyrenaica.19DespiteHitler'sotherwisediabolicalqualities,hewas,atleastloyaltohisallies,includingMussolini;however,accordingtoGeneralChristian:AdolfHitlerhadforalongtimecorrectlyappraisedtheactualworthoftheItalianWehrmacht.Hedistrusteditsleadership,particularlythecorpsofgeneralsandtheroyalhouse.HefeltcontemptforItalianmilitarymorale,criticizedtheirequipmentandderidedtheirtactics.HoweverhedidnotpermitthattheseviewsofhisshouldreachtheDuceorthatGermantroopcommandersintheItaliantheatersofwarshouldadoptexcessivelydrasticmeasuresindealingwiththeirItalianbrothersinarms.HedemandedthatItaliansensitivitiesandvanitybeaccordedconsiderationunderallcircumstances".20Mussolini'sinitialhopeofconductinganindependentand"parallelwar"alongsidehisAxispartnerfaded.AstheGermansmovedintoItalytoassisttheItaliansintheconductoftheirwarintheMediterraneanandNorthAfrica,ItalyfeltthedominationofGermanpower.ThegreatquestioninItalynowbecame"Whoistheenemy?"CHAPTERIVOPERATIONSINNORTHAFRICAInfightinghis"parallelwar",Mussolinihadintendedfor

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    HitlertokeephisforcesintheNorthwhilehe


Enigma 1 Enigma Enigma 2 Enigma Developed and patented (in 1918) by Arthur Scherbius Many variations on basic design Eventually adopted by Germany.

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