562 Notes on Recent Elections

11. For a slightly fuller account of the 1996 election see Morriss, P. (1996) The National Assembly elections in South Korea, 1996. Representation, forthcoming.

12. It is perhaps worth mentioning here that, as candidates are chosen by the parties' central leadership, not by the local members, and campaigning in constituencies is restricted by law to the election period itself, of about three weeks, it is not a major practical impedi- ment to the electoral process in Korea if the constituency boundaries are not known until 74 days before the election date. Indeed, anybody with experience of life in Korea will know that Koreans do not decide on anything any further in advance than is absol- utely necessary. This late redrawing of constituency boundaries is simply the 'just-in-time' approach applied to the electoral system.

13. See, e.g., Ahn, Kil and Kim (1988) pp. 38-39 (see Note 1). 14. Brady, D. and Mo, J. (1992) pp. 419-423 (see Note 4). 15. I, rather crudely, group together the six large conurbations and Kyonggi Province as

'urban' and the rest as rural. 16. And also, to a lesser extent, in Taegu and North Kyongsang. I briefly discuss the election

results in these areas in my The National Assembly Elections in South Korea, 1996. 17. See Kendall, M. G. and Stuart, A. (1950) The law of cubic proportions in election results.

British Journal of Sociology 1, 183-197. For extensive discussions of the cube law see Gudgin, G. and Taylor, P. J. (1979) Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organisation of Elec- tions (Pion, London) and Curtice, J. and Steed, M. (1982) Electoral choice and the pro- duction of government: the changing operation of the electoral system in the United Kingdom since 1955. British Journal of Political Science 12, 249-298.

18. This is calculated over just those seats in which the NCNP and NKP came first and second--which is the great majority in Greater Seoul (73 out of 96). Calculating over all seats, the standard deviations rise slightly to 9.1 and 6.6, respectively.

19. More accurately, it shows that if there are some socio-economic factors that influence voting, these socio-economic factors do not affect where people live. But my feeling is that where one resides in Seoul tends to be as affected by the usual socio-economic factors as in any other big city.

20. For a similar case--based on partisan redistricting rather than manufactured marginals-- see Gudgin and Taylor (1979) pp. 158-160 (see Note 17).

The Italian General Election of 1996

STEVEN WARNER

Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

FEDERICO VARESE

Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1N~. UK

On 21 April 1996, Italy c o n d u c t e d its s econd general e lec t ion since replacing the

p ropor t iona l represen ta t ion (PR) electoral system wi th a form of additional m e m b e r

system.* Despi te recur ren t express ions of dissatisfaction wi th this n e w system, and

repea ted demands for fur ther e lectoral reforms, the electoral system remained

u n c h a n g e d f rom the prev ious contest , w h i c h took place on 28 March 1994.

The character is t ics of this system have b e e n discussed in detail e l sewhere . 2 Here,

w e will s imply out l ine the electoral p rocedure . For the Camera dei Deputat i

(Chamber of Deputies) , 475 of the 630 seats are al located th rough a plurality system

(PS) e lec t ion c o n d u c t e d in s ing le-member const i tuencies , wi th the remaining 155

seats awarded on the basis of a regional PR contes t for w h i c h electors cast a separate

N o t e s o n R e c e n t E l e c t i o n s 563

ballot . For the Senato (Senate) , 232 seats are a w a r d e d t h rough a PS e lec t ion , w i th ano the r 83 seats be ing d i s t r ibu ted on a p r o p o r t i o n a l basis by region, bu t w i thou t a separa te vo te be ing cast.

To c o m p l e t e effect ively in the s ing le -member cons t i t uency e lect ions , par t ies mus t make all iances. However , the separa t ion of the t w o bal lots for e lec t ions to the Cam- era a l lows par t ies to ally for the p u r p o s e of con tes t ing this PS stage bu t to c o m p e t e wi th each o t h e r individual ly at the PR stage. As in 1994, the major par t ies of bo th left and r ight took this opt ion .

T h e B a c k g r o u n d to t h e E l e c t i o n

1996 should not have b e e n an e lec t ion year in Italy. That it b e c a m e one is due to several incidents . The first, o f course , was the co l lapse of the Berlusconi g o v e r n m e n t fo rmed after the 1994 elect ion. Silvio Ber lusconi ' s admins t ra t ion was r ende red un tenab le once U m b e r t o Bossi w i t h d r e w the Lega Nord f rom the govern ing coal i t ion in D e c e m b e r and, in con junc t i on wi th the Part i to D e m o c r a t i c o della Sinistra (PDS) and the Parti to Popola re I tal iano (PPI), ins t iga ted a vote of con f idence w h i c h e n d e d wi th the g o v e r n m e n t ' s defeat on 21 D e c e m b e r 1994. 3 Secondly, the in te r im 'care- taker ' gove rnmen t , led by Ber lusconi ' s fo rmer Treasury Minister Lamber to Dini, w h i c h rega rded itself as having a l imi ted manda te focused on managing the na t ion ' s f inances, successful ly de l ivered pa r l i amen ta ry approva l for its p r o p o s e d budget , and so d isso lved itself. Finally, in ter-par ty negot ia t ions i n t e n d e d to es tabl ish a s econd ca re t ake r adminis t ra t ion u n d e r the leadersh ip of Antonio Maccanico, w h i c h was to have a manda te for ins t i tu t ing major cons t i tu t iona l reforms, b roke down , not least because of reca lc i t rance on the part of an e lec tora l ly conf ident Alleanza Nazionale. On 17 February 1996, Pres ident Oscar Luigi Scalforo dissolved par l i ament and cal led a genera l e lect ion.

The Elec tora l A l l i a n c e s

In bo th 1994 and 1996, the e lec t ion was c o n t e s t e d by two major and wide- ranging all iances. However , there w e r e significant d i f fe rences b e t w e e n the s t ruc tures of the 1994 and 1996 al l iances on bo th (centre-) lef t and (centre-)r ight . On the right, the Polo p e r le Liberta ' o f 1996 was signif icantly d imin i shed in c ompa r i son wi th its 1994 p redecesso r . A relat ively minor d i f ference lay in the loss of some m e m b e r s of, and some s u p p o r t for, the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) to the MS-Fiamma. The MS- Fiamma, led by Pino Rauti, is c o m p o s e d of fo rmer m e m b e r s of the Movimento Soci- ale I tal iano (MSI) w h o r e sen ted the t ransformat ion of the MSI into the AN. Unable to con t inue u n d e r the name MSI, they e l ec t ed to use the c loses t available equivalent . (The use of the w o r d 'F iamma' , mean ing ' f lame' , re lates to the fact that the o ld MSI logo inc luded this detai l . ) The impor t an t di f ference, however , was of course the absence from the 1996 al l iance of the Lega Nord. The r ight ' s success in 1994 was great ly d e p e n d e n t on its inc luding bo th the AN and the Lega a longside Ber lusconi ' s Forza Italia. This t r i -part i te al l iance was d e c o m p o s e d into two geograph ica l ly dis t inct hi-part i te alliances: the Polo della Liberta ' (Forza Italia and the Lega) in the nor th and the Polo del b u o n Gove rno (Forza Italia and the AN) in the south. This d e c o m p o - si t ion was centra l in p r o d u c i n g v ic tory for the r ight in 1994. ~ In 1996, the Lega con t e s t ed the e lec t ion alone.

The Polo p e r le Liberta ' also inc luded the CCD-CDU, a un ion of two g roups of

564 Notes on Recent Elections

former Christian Democrats inclined towards the right. As well as facing compet i t ion from the Lega, MS-Fiamma and the parties of the left, the Polo was also 'accidentally' opposed by the Lista Panella-Sgarbi. Vittorio Sgarbi, in fact, never joined the party to which he gave his name, and was eventually elected for Forza Italia. Marco Panella himself a t tempted to wi thdraw his party from active competi t ion against the Polo, calling a press conference shortly before the election in which he sat alongside Berlusconi and advised his electorate to support Polo candidates. The Lista Panella- Sgarbi can perhaps be throught of as a tacit member of the Polo.

The L'Ulivo (Olive Tree) alliance was the major force on the left in 1996. Whilst the PDS was the dominant party in this alliance, its overall ' leader ' was Romano Prodi, a professor of economics from Bologna and a former head of the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), the giant state holding company and major share- holder in RAI, the state-owned television network. The PDS chose Prodi to be the left 's prime minister-elect. In order to accommodate this move, and solely for the purposes of the election, the PPI, composed of leftqearning former Christian Demo- crats, adopted the name of the Popolari per Prodi. Prodi had, prior to the eletoral campaign, formed his own political 'movement ' , which took the names 'Comitati Prodi' and then 'Comitati pe r L'Italia che vogliamo', and travelled the country under the auspicies of this movement in order to 'meet the people ' , a campaigning style which was in clear contrast to Berlusconi's television-orientated approach. However, whilst he declined to convert this movement into a political party of his own with which to contest the election, deciding instead to join the Popolari, Prodi has no established power base in ei ther the PPI or PDS, the leaders of which are Gerardo Bianco and Massimo D'Alema respectively. Nevertheless, the sheer fact that the par- ties of the left had explicit ly designated someone to become Prime Minister in the event of victory was itself a departure from their behaviour in 1994.

By way of contrast with Prodi, Lamberto Dini, the former Prime Minister, con- tested the election at the head of his own party, the Lista Dini, which was also encompassed by L'Ulivo in the PS stage of the election. Dini thus took the risk of tying his fortunes explicitly to his p e r s o n a l populari ty rather than that of an estab- lished party, at least insofar as the PR stage of the election was concerned. The PDS, the Popolari pe r Prodi and the Lista Dini were joined by the Federazione Verdi, the Green Party, and the Partito Sardo d'Azione (PSdAz), a regional party from Sardinia.

The major structural difference be tween the 1996 L'Ulivo alliance and its Progress- isti precursor from 1994 was the absence from the former of Rifondazione Comun- ista, the hardline communists. However, Rifondazione was not entirely excluded. Under an arrangement known as desis tenza, L'Ulivo and Rifondazione agreed be tween themselves not to put up candidates against each other in certain constitu- encies. Where L'Ulivo stood aside to assist Rifondazione, that party 's nominees stood as Progressisti candidates, the implication being that they were not standing purely as Rifondazione members, but rather as representatives of a broader left-wing alliance.

The Election Campaign

Whereas the 1994 election campaign was contested primarily on the basis of issues related to electoral and institutional reforms, corrupt ion and breaking with the past generally, the 1996 campaign centred on the more mundane issue of taxation. This is not to say that the corrupt ion issue played no part in the campaign. A Rome

Notes on Recent Elections 565

judge, Renato Squillante, was accused by magistrates in Milan of having accepted bribes from, amongst others, Cesare Previti, a Forza Italia senator, former Defence Minister in the Berlusconi government and one of Fininvest's lawyers. Accusations against Previti originated with Stefania Ariosto, the partner of Previti's Forza Italia colleague and political rival, Ugo Dotti, the chief whip for the party in the Camera and another Fininvest lawyer. Dotti was precluded from contesting the election as a Forza Italia candidate by Berlusconi as punishment for refusing publicly to discredit Ariosto's accusations. The parties of the left had little need actively to raise corrup- tion as an electoral issue as these events were extensively covered by the press throughout the campaign period. ~

On the issue of taxation, there was a clear distinction between the parties of the left and right. The Polo advocated lower taxes and the simplification of the taxation system, which is notoriously complex. However, the AN did itself few favours by proposing to abolish the taxation of income at source, replacing it with a system based on citizens' willing cooperation. In a country where tax evasion is widespread, most commentators greeted this proposal with scepticism. Nevertheless, Gianfranco Fini, the leader of the AN, received a warm reception from the Associazione dei Commercianti at a meeting held on 3 March, which was attended by the leaders of all the major parties, to discuss the parties' taxation proposalsJ'

For its part, L'Ulivo explicitly rejected calls for lower taxes, with Prodi and his economic advisors suggesting, to considerably less approval from the Associazione dei Commercianti, that the 'overall tax pressure' could not be reduced for at least two years after the elections. 7 However, L'Ulivo did promise to reduce the public deficit and, having also committed itself to defending the provision of welfare ser- vices, L'Ullvo sought to square the circle by focusing on pledges to close loopholes in the taxation system and to combat bureaucratic inefficiency. In contrast with 1994, Rifondazione was well-behaved; it remained generally quiet and refrained from advocating any economic policy which might embarrass the parties of L'Ulivo. It seems that the party had learnt from its ill-advised public advocacy in 1994 that state bonds (BOTs), which are very widely held, be taxed.

Also hotly debated during the campaign was a recently renewed decree, the p a r

cond ic io . This is a Latin term meaning 'equal opportunity', and the purpose of the decree was to provide a legal benchmark for the fair coverage of political parties in the media. Originally issued prior to the municipal elections of 1994, the decree was never converted into law by parliament and was re-issued as decree number 19 on 16 January 1996. Consequently, it was in force at the time of the general election. This decree applied to newspapers and periodicals as well as to both public and private television networks. Amongst its provisions it included demands that these media provide balanced coverage of political parties and their candidates, that they not engage in negative propaganda directed at certain parties or candidates and that television presenters and other media personalities not indulge in suggest- ing how citizens should cast their votes in the elections. It further insisted that, in the final five days of an election campaign, any programme dedicated to discussing economic, social or political issues must invite representatives of all major parties to participate (and treat them fairly). Finally, it barred the publication of any opinion polls taken during the closing 20 days of an election campaign.

As one might expect, this decree was the recipient of some considerable resent- ment from Berlusconi, who was aggrieved to find that the television channels he owned were officially compelled to provide a reasonably balanced output of political

566 Notes on Recen t Elections

coverage . Al though the p a r c o n d i c i o did no t form the basis of any e lec tora l p l edges in the campaign , by its na ture it ac ted as an influential cons t ra in t on the c o n d u c t of the campa ign and the par t ies ' a t t i tudes t owards it cons t i tu t ed a s e c o n d significant axis of d i f fe rence b e t w e e n them. Ber lusconi and Forza Italia also sought to p lay on the ques t ion of ' i deo logy ' to the i r advantage. They r e pe a t e d ly s t ressed bo th that the his tor ical roo ts of the PDS lie in the fo rmer c o m m u n i s t pa r ty ( the PCI) and that Rifondazione Comunis ta was a t t ached to L'Ulivo. However , the e lec to ra te appea r s no t to have b e e n c o n c e r n e d wi th this ques t ion of ideologica l suitabili ty, and the issue d id no t b e c o m e a major po in t of deba te b e t w e e n the two all iances.

T h e R e s u l t s

W h e n the e lec tora l sys tem was r e fo rmed in 1994, it was i n t ended that this change w o u l d c rea te signif icant p ressures for the s impl i f icat ion of the pa r ty system. Given that the re w e r e 251 separa te par t ies reg is te red as c o m p e t i n g in one o r more con- s t i tuencies in the 1996 e lec t ion , this ambi t ion w o u l d a p p e a r to have gone unfulfilled. However , the e lec tora te have clearly focused a lmost exc lus ive ly on the 12 mos t s ignif icant par t ies , of w h i c h 10 ( inc luding Rifondazione) w e r e e n c o m p a s s e d by one or o t h e r of the t w o all iances. Candida tes r ep re sen t ing these al l iances took 85.4 p e r cen t of the votes in the PS stage of the e lec t ion for the Camera. If w e add the results ob t a ined by the Lega to this, w e find that 96.2 p e r cen t of the votes in the PS stage have b e e n a c c o u n t e d for, w h i c h rises to 97.9 p e r cen t w i th MS-Fiamma's share inc luded. A similar s tory is ob ta ined in the PR stage: 87.4 p e r cen t of the votes w e r e ga the red by the var ious par t ies f rom the two all iances, w i th the inc lus ion of the Lega's p e r f o r m a n c e increas ing this f igure to 97.5 p e r cent , and the fur ther inc lus ion of MS-Fiamma's resul ts leaving it at 98.4 p e r cent . The 771,640 PS votes and 625,738 PR votes cast for those par t ies summar ized as 'o thers ' in Tables 2 and 3 are shared b e t w e e n 239 dif ferent part ies . No seats w e r e w o n by these 239 con tenders . More- over, the average n u m b e r of candida tes con tes t ing s ing le -member cons t i tuenc ies for the Camera d r o p p e d f rom 4.5 in 1994 to 3.3 in 1996. Some two- th i rds of these cons t i tuenc ies w e r e con t e s t ed by th ree or f e w e r candida tes , and only 8 p e r cen t o f cons t i tuenc ie s found more than four candida tes on the bal lot paper . ~

Whi ls t the L'Ulivo-Progressist i 'a l l iance ' ach ieved an absolu te major i ty in bo th Camera and Senato, L'Ulivo i tself d id not, falling shor t of this target by one seat in

TABLE 1. Composition of the 1996 Senato

Coalition PS seats PR seats Total seats

L'Ulivo 134 23 157 Progressisti 10 10 Polo per le Liberta' 67 49 116 Lista Panella-Sgarbi 1 1 Lega Nord 18 9 27 MS-Fiamma 1 1 Others 3 3

Total 232 83 315

Source: la Repubbl ica , 23 April 1996. Turnout 82.7 per cent (Ministero dell' interno).

Notes on Recent Elections 567

the Senato and by 32 in the Camera. This is significant, s ince the d e s i s t e n z a arrange- m e n t w h i c h d i s t inguished L'Ulivo f rom the Progressis t i was clear ly more than a mere p resen ta t iona l dec i s ion taken for s t ra tegic e lec tora l purposes . D e s i s t e n z a rep- r e sen ted some real, cons ide rab le and endur ing pol i t ical d i f ferences b e t w e e n Rifond- az ione and the par t ies of the ma ins t r eam centre-left . It was, however , an e lec tora l ly successful a r rangement . This d e s i s t e n z a was app l i ed to 27 cons t i tuenc ies in the PS s tage of the e lec t ion to the Camera and to 17 cons t i tuenc ies in the Senato e lect ion. The cand ida te n o m i n a t e d by the Progressis t i w o n in 15 of the 27 Camera con tes t s and in 13 of the 17 Senato cons t i tuencies .

The a l te rna t ion f rom r ight to left is no t the resul t of an e lec tora l ' ea r thquake ' . The change in g o v e r n m e n t was p r o d u c e d by relat ively minor changes in the distri- bu t ion of votes. The PDS, for example , r ece ived only 0.8 p e r cen t more votes than it had in 1994; l ikewise, Rifondazione saw its share of the vote increase by 2.6 p e r cent , whi l s t the Lega's and the AN's pe r fo rma nc e s i m p r o v e d by 1.7 p e r cen t and 2.2 p e r cen t respect ive ly , w i th Forza Italia suffering a dec l ine of only 0.4 p e r cent . Fur the rmore , i n c o m p l e t e data suggest that the mos t significant changes in the distri- bu t ion of vo tes o c c u r r e d w i th pol i t ical ' families ' , wi th Forza Italia, for example , losing vo tes in 1996 to the Lega and the AN more than to the par t ies of L'Ulivo. ') The largely major i tar ian cha rac t e r of the e lec tora l s y s t e m - - w i t h mos t seats e l ec t ed th rough PS and wi th the PR stage r e sp resen t ing only a weak ly p ropo r t i ona l correc- t i v e - w a s c lear ly cent ra l to the result . In bo th 1994 and 1996, e lec tora l v ic tory w e n t to the c o a l i t i o n w h i c h ach ieved greates t success in the PS stage of the compe t i t i on . In 1996, the par t ies of the Polo r ece ived more vo tes than those of L'Ulivo in the PR stage, whi ls t the Lega, ou ts ide of e i the r coal i t ion, saw its share of par l iamentary seats f a l l wi th the increase in its share of the vote.

TABLE 2. Composition of the 1996 Camera dei Deputat i

Coalition PS seats Parties PR seats Total seats

L'Ulivo 246 284 PDS 26 Popolari per Prodi 4 Lista Dini 8

Progressisti 15 35 Rifondazione 20 Comunista

Polo per le 169 246 Liberta' Forza Italia 37

Mleanza 28 Nazionale 12 CCD-CDU

Lega Nord 39 20 59 Others 6 6

Total 475 155 630

Source: Corriere della Sera, 23 April 1996. Turnout 82.7 per cent (Ministero dell' interno), m

568 Notes on Recent Elections

T h e O u t c o m e

The two e lec t ions c o n d u c t e d u n d e r the p r e se n t e lec tora l sys tem in Italy demons t r a t e that gove rnmen ta l a l ternat ion, absen t for so long f rom Italian poli t ics , is n o w a possi- bility. Al though the a c h i e v e m e n t of a l te rna t ion canno t be a t t r ibu ted ent i re ly to the change in the e lec tora l system, it does seem clear that this sys tem has b e e n con- duc ive to p r o d u c i n g this result . The lesson to be d r a w n f rom the e lec t ions of 1994 and 1996 is that v ic tory canno t be ach ieved w i thou t par t ies es tabl ishing a reasonably d i sc ip l ined and geograph ica l ly e n c o m p a s s i n g alliance.

In 1994, the Polo della Liberta ' was b o t h the m o r e d i sc ip l ined al l iance and encom- passed the d o m i n a n t pa r ty of the n o r t h - - t h e L e g a - - a n d a p o w e r f u l pa r ty of the s o u t h - - t h e AN. The fact that AN candida tes of ten con t e s t ed seats in the nor th agains t the Polo candida tes , as d id the Lega in the south, should no t be taken as a sign of indiscipl ine . Indeed , such over t host i l i ty was s trategical ly impor t an t in rein- forc ing the d e c o m p o s i t i o n of the Polo into two geograph ica l ly d is t inct hi-part i te al l iances, each capab le o f regional success , w h i c h cou ld be ' re - in tegra ted ' in the even t of e lec tora l victory. In 1996, the Polo p e r le Liherta ' was significantly under- m i n e d in the nor th by the Lega's genu ine host i l i ty and compet i t ion . Some es t imates suggest that even its fai lure to e n c o m p a s s the relat ively m i n o r MS-Fiamma in 1996 may have lost the Polo 29 seats to the benef i t of L'Ulivo o r the Progressist i . ~ ~ L'Ulivo had a geograph ica l ly w ide appeal , and avo ided the indisc ip l ine in w h i c h the mem- bers o f the Progressist i , in par t i cu la r Rifondazione, had indu lged in 1994. In contrast , the Polo was hos t to a n u m b e r of pub l i c d i sag reemen t s b e t w e e n Forza Italia and the AN and even wi th in Forza Italia, over the Squillante-Previti-Dotti cont roversy .

An e lec tora l ly successful al l iance is not, however , necessar i ly a sufficient basis for a s table gove rnmen t . The Ber lusconi adminis t ra t ion d e m o n s t r a t e d this point , be ing u n d e r m i n e d by tens ions wi th in the coali t ion. Prodi ' s gove rnmen t , too, has consider- able po ten t i a l for ha rbou r ing poss ib ly fatal in ternal conflicts , even assuming Rifonda- z ione do no t w i t h d r a w the i r s u p p o r t f rom his adminis t ra t ion. Prodi, as w e men- t i oned above, lacks a pe r sona l p o w e r base in any of the par t ies f rom w h i c h his gove rn ing coal i t ion is c o m p o s e d . His fore ign min is te r is Lamber to Dini, w h o s e per- sonal popu la r i t y ga ined his pa r ty 4.3 p e r cen t of the PR votes in the Camera e lect ion. W h e n he found h imse l f in d i sag reemen t wi th the g o v e r n m e n t ' s hea l th pol icy, Dini e x p r e s s e d his d i s appo in tmen t , no t beh ind c losed doors in the Counci l of Ministers, bu t ra ther in an in t e rv iew wi th Corriere della Sera (28 July 1996). His r e sponse to Prodi ' s cr i t ic ism of this behav iou r was telling. He asked w h e t h e r he was to be the only p a r t y leader not to be p e r m i t t e d to vo ice his cr i t ic isms of the government.12

A n o t h e r source o f conf l ic t wi th in the g o v e r n m e n t is the min i s te r of pub l i c works , the fantast ical ly p o p u l a r fo rmer magistrate , Anton io Di Pietro. Di Pie t ro is bo th the mos t we l l -known and best- l iked min is te r in Prodi ' s government : his r ecogn i t ion amongs t the Italian pub l i c s tands at a round 90 p e r cent , w i th his approva l rat ing reach ing 70 p e r cent . ~3 An une l ec t ed appo in tee , Di Pietro has a l ready asser ted his i n d e p e n d e n c e f rom Prodi on at least th ree occas ions . He a p p o i n t e d his o w n d e p u t y min i s te r to take respons ib i l i ty for the organiza t ion of the ce lebra t ions for the millen- n ium w h e n this a p p o i n t m e n t was officially wi th in the gift of the Pr ime Min is te r ) 4 He also engaged in a pub l i c confl ic t w i th Edo Ronchi , the g o v e r n m e n t ' s Minis ter for the Envi ronment and a Federaz ione Verdi represen ta t ive , over the cons t ruc t ion of a p r o p o s e d m o t o r w a y to c o n n e c t F lorence and Bologna. ~s Fur the rmore , he a t t e n d e d an AUeanza Nazionale festival on 28 July, si t t ing in pub l i c nex t to Fini. He

Notes on Recent Elections 569

was e x t r e m e l y wel l rece ived , and he and Fini pub l ic ly e x p r e s s e d mutua l r e spe c t

and u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) 6 L'Ulivo may have en t e r ed gove rnmen t , bu t its pa r l i amenta ry major i ty is d e p e n d e n t

u p o n the c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t o f the Progressis t i and Rifondazione depu t i e s and sena- tors. However , the po ten t i a l w i thd rawa l of s u p p o r t for the g o v e r n m e n t by Rifonda- z ione is no t the only, no r necessar i ly the major , p r o b l e m w h i c h Prodi ' s g o v e r n m e n t faces. Rifondazione has no o t h e r h o m e to go to, and the pa r ty did eventual ly endor se the g o v e r n m e n t ' s e c o n o m i c pol icy. Of course , the m e m b e r s of Rifondazione may yet dec ide to abandon the Prodi gove rnmen t , valuing ideologica l pur i ty over govern- menta l inf luence. If so, the Prodi g o v e r n m e n t might col lapse, a l though there is a lways some poss ib i l i ty that Bossi 's Lega might s u p p o r t the g o v e r n m e n t in p lace of the communis t s . Bossi does no t pos i t i on h imse l f pr imar i ly on the t radi t ional lef t - r ight axis, bu t ra ther on the un i t y - s ece s s ion axis. The r ecen t pol i t ical m o v e m e n t s of the L e g a - - f r o m be ing Ber lusconi ' s pa r t ne r to b e c o m i n g his c o m m i t t e d o p p o n e n t , by w a y of suppor t ing , w i th the left-wing part ies , the in te r im Dini g o v e r n m e n t - - suggests that the Lega 's dec id ing to s u p p o r t Prodi against Rifondazione, Forza Italia and the AN is not imposs ib le . Yet even if the c o m m u n i s t suppo r t remains in place, and the uncer ta in and f lexible suppo r t of the Lega is no t needed , the Prodi adminis- t ra t ion faces in ternal s t ruggles and confl icts , of bo th pe r sona l i ty and pol icy. The Pr ime Minister lacks a p o w e r base in any par ty and is ma in ta ined in p o w e r by a major i ty few of w h o m have any ties or c o m m i t m e n t to h im personal ly . Dissatisfied m e m b e r s of L'Ulivo might be able to oust the Prodi g o v e r n m e n t w i thou t the left 's e i ther losing p o w e r o r be ing c o m p e l l e d to call f resh e lect ions . These var ious factors, w h i c h c o m b i n e to p lace Prodi in a par t icu lar ly vu lnerab le posi t ion, may t o g e t h e r ensure that the Prodi g o v e r n m e n t is ano th e r typical e x a m p l e of I taly 's short- l ived

adminis t ra t ions .

N o t e s a n d R e f e r e n c e s

1. Warner, S. and Gambetta, D. (1994) Le Retorica della Riforma. Einaudi, Torino. 2. See Lo Verso, L. and McLean, I. (1994) The Italian General Election of 1994. Electoral

Studies 14(1), 81-86; Katz, R. S. (1995) The 1993 Parliamentary Electoral Reform. In Ital- ian Politics: Ending the First Republic, eds C. Mershon and G. Pasquino, pp. 93-112. Westview Press, Oxford.

3. Gilbert, M. (1995) The Italian Revolution. Westview Press, Oxford. 4. Gambetta, D. and Warner, S. (1996) The rhetoric of reform revealed. Journal o f Modern

Italian Studies 1(3), 357-376. 5. See, for example L'Espresso, 19 April 1996. 6. See L'Espresso, 15 March 1996. 7. See L'Espresso, 15 March 1996 and La Stampa, 26 March 1996. 8. Sani, G. (1996) I Verdetti del 21 Aprile. I1 Mulino XLV, May-June 1996. 9. ibid. 10. At the time of writing, we have been unable to disaggregate this figure into distinct data

for the Senato and Camera elections. 11. This estimate is due to Renato Mannheimer: Nessum vento di sinistra sulle elezioni, Cor-

riere della Sera, 29 April 1996. Sani (1996) suggests that the exclusion of MS-Fiamma may in fact have cost the Polo 36 seats.

12. See, for example, Corriere della Sera, 30 July 1996. 13. Corriere della Sera, 17 June 1996. 14. See La Repubblica, 23 May 1996. 15. See La Repubblica, 26 July 1996. 16. See Corriere della Sera, 29 July 1996.