The Intelligence Method: Two Case Studies

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STRIKE AGAINST IRAN?

The Israeli Toolkit

The Target Set

The Strike Aircraft

Execution of the Attack

The Nuclear Option

Looking Ahead

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The Intelligence Method: Two Case Studies

CAN ISRAEL CARRY OUT A UNILATERAL

IN UKRAINE

Wargaming Russia’s Military Operations in Ukraine

What the West Could Do

The Challenges of Deploying Aircraft

What a Deployment Would Look Like

The Time Factor

Potential Outcomes

Russia Weighs the Cost

Examining Russia’s Objectives

The Risk of Escalation

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CAN ISRAEL CARRY OUT A UNILATERAL STRIKE AGAINST IRAN?

If Israel decided to launch a strike against Iran’s nu-clear facilities, it would be a difficult and risky en-deavor but not an impossible one. The risk could

even be somewhat mitigated if Israel’s Jericho ballistic missiles were accurate enough to be used alongside a main strike by Israeli fighter-bombers. Do-ing so would require the aircraft to hit fewer targets, enabling the primary component of the Israe-li Air Force to focus its efforts on Iran’s enrichment facilities.

However, Israel’s lack of long-distance dedicated bombers will limit its ability to conduct a truly massive first strike and maintain a consistent stream of follow-up attacks. Israel also does not have enough long-

range fighter-bombers or tanker aircraft to strike at many targets beyond Iran’s nuclear facilities. There-fore, it is likely that any Israeli offensive against Iran’s nuclear program would cause only temporary damage. Moreover, Tehran would be able to start rebuilding any destroyed locations almost immediately after the strike’s conclusion. All things considered, Israel is far less able to effectively eradicate Iran’s nuclear program than the United States. Instead, an Israeli strike would likely set back the program by at most a few years, though it would more likely stall nuclear activities by only one to two years.

The test-firing of a Sejil 2 medium-range missile at an undisclosed location in Iran, which the country’s leaders say can reach Israel. (VAHI REZA ALAEE/AFP/Getty Images)

Researcher’s Note: This report contains two foundational analyses that elucidate the Stratfor method. Stratfor’s methodology relies on con-straints-based analysis. Politicians, CEOs, and generals may have a lot to say, but the far more important question to focus on is what can they do. In order to accurately assess the likelihood of a major conflict, we must define the mission from a strategic level, then dive into the tactical details of what it takes to carry out that mission. That requires detailed knowledge of an immense number of variables: how long aircraft can go without refueling, how troops will be resupplied, the maintenance cycle on various machinery, and more. Only once the hard work of building that tactical foundation is complete can we derive the forecast.

The following report encompasses two case studies that exhibit Stratfor’s method in tactical deconstruction and constraints-based analysis. The first was completed in June 2013 when the predominant question was when, and not if, the United States and Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear fa-cilities. Our conclusions from that analysis led Stratfor to predict that Israel would not choose to strike, but instead that negotiations would occur — a forecast borne out in the years since. The second was produced in March 2015, when Russia’s precarious position in Crimea and the ongoing separatist activity in eastern Ukraine led to speculation that Russia might choose to invade Ukraine proper. This analysis supported our forecast that no such invasion was likely, another correct call. Our Research Analytics Department curated this report.

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The Israeli Tool Kit In the event of a strike, Israel would probably deploy its arsenal of Jericho ballistic missiles against Iranian targets as a way to supplement an airstrike. Though Israel goes to great lengths to conceal the details of its missiles, the Jericho II and III are believed to have the range needed to hit Iran from within Israel’s borders. That said, the Jericho II theoretically has a maximum payload of 1,000 kilograms (2,204 pounds), which would need to be significantly reduced to reach Iran.

While the Jericho III has a longer range, it is thought to have entered Israel’s arsenal only a few years ago, making it unlikely that Israel has many of them at this time.

Depending on the missiles’ specific range, payload and accuracy, Israel may well have the option of using them to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. The missiles would be especially useful against the less hardened nuclear sites at Arak, Esfahan and Bushehr. However, their limita-tions in terms of both numbers and accuracy make it

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unlikely that Israel could rely on ballistic missiles alone to demolish every target. Instead, Israel will probably be more inclined to couple them with an airstrike. The same is true of Israel’s submarine fleet. Israel owns five Type 800 Dolphin-class diesel-electric submarines that are believed to be capable of using Popeye Tur-bo cruise missiles, which have a range of some 1,500 kilometers (about 930 miles). In theory, Israel could also equip at least some of these cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, giving it a sea-based nuclear deter-rent against Iran. But the submarines are based in the Mediterranean Sea. If they were to be used in a strike against Iran, they would have to cross the Suez Canal to move into a position from which they could launch their payloads at Iranian targets. In doing so, they would provide an early warning to Iran, as was made clear in June 2009 when an Israeli submarine crossed the Suez Canal to participate in exercises in the Red Sea.

It is also difficult to determine what impact the sub-marines’ Popeye Turbo cruise missiles would have on Iranian nuclear facilities, since their accuracy and pen-etration capabilities are also largely unknown outside of Israel. Much like the Jericho missiles, the Popeye Turbo missiles would probably be used within the con-text of a broader offensive rather than on their own if Israel’s submarines managed to maneuver close to Iran.

The Target Set If Israel were to conduct a unilateral strike against Iran’s nuclear program, it would have five publicly known targets that it could target: the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Arak heavy-water plant and eventual plutonium production reactor, the Esfahan nuclear research center and uranium conversion facility, and Iran’s main enrichment facilities at Qom and Natanz.

Of these options, Israel would undoubtedly prioritize the enrichment facilities. However, these sites are well

hardened and surrounded by layers of surface-to-air missile systems. Qom, which produces most of Iran’s uranium that is enriched to 20 percent, is buried inside a mountain, leaving the Israeli Air Force few ways to attack it. Because of this Natanz, which holds the most centrifuges, would likely be Israel’s primary target.

The three remaining sites would be more vulnerable to assault. Israel would probably attack Arak, which has fewer defenses and could someday produce plutonium. Esfahan plays a prominent role in converting uranium and is not as protected as Qom or Natanz, meaning it too would be a likely target. Bushehr, for its part, is a fully operational nuclear plant that is unlikely to contribute to the construction of a nuclear bomb. As a result, it would more likely see collateral damage than become a high-priority target itself.

The Strike Aircraft Israel’s principal strike assets are its F-16I and F-15I aircraft, the most advanced and longest-ranged fight-er-bombers in the Israeli arsenal. The country also has between eight and 13 refueling tankers that it can use to support its aircraft. Given what we know about refueling payloads, distances to targets and past operational examples, we can reasonably assume that 10 refueling tankers could support a mix of about 60 F-16I and F15I aircraft. Because the F-15Is have a greater range and can carry larger bombs than their F-16I counterparts, Israel would likely use all 25 of its F-15Is in a strike.

The F-16I has nine ordnance attachment points, Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN), and targeting pods. All of Israel’s F-16Is also carry a centerline fuel tank and two 610-gallon wing tanks. Since the aircraft’s four outer ordnance attachment points can only hold air-to-air missiles, every F-16I would have to carry at least four such mis-siles for self-defense. Two ordnance attachment points would remain available for weapons dedicated to the main strike, whether anti-radiation missiles for sup-

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pressing enemy air defenses, advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles for countering Iranian aircraft, or precision-guided munitions for hitting ground targets. The F-15I, by comparison, has 11 ordnance attach-ment points. But unlike in the F-16I, their use can vary considerably depending on the munitions the aircraft is carrying and the use of bomb racks. Still, all F-15Is would come equipped with LANTIRN, target-ing pods, two 610-gallon drop tanks and four air-to-air missiles for self-defense. Though the centerline station could theoretically carry another drop tank, it would likely be used to carry a laser-guided bunker-busting GBU-28 bomb instead. If not, the aircraft could carry as many as three laser-guided bunker-busting GBU-27 bombs in its place. Because of its significantly longer range and bigger payload, the F-15I is a much better asset than the F-16I for any Israeli strike against Iran.

Execution of the Attack To successfully reach Iran, Israeli aircraft would have to cross Turkish, Jordanian, Iraqi, Syrian or Saudi air-space. Israel’s refueling tankers would also need a safe place to loiter during an air campaign before bringing the fighter jets home. All of Israel’s potential flight paths carry the risk of significant political complica-tions arising. However, two stand out as Israel’s most likely options: either through Jordan and then Iraq, or, if the Syrian conflict significantly degrades Syria’s air defenses, through Syria and then Iraq.

Depending on the route taken, Israeli aircraft flight paths over hostile territory could vary considerably. Israel’s main targets -- Arak, Esfahan and Qom and Natanz -- form a rough triangle, meaning strike assets would likely be divided into groups. This

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could occur as a larger and secondary group, or as two medium-sized groups if Qom and Natanz are simultaneously targeted. Each group would need to include a defensive count-er-air component and a suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) element. Though every aircraft would carry its own air-to-air missiles for individual self-defense, the groups would likely have dedicated escorts with the flexibility and smaller payloads need-ed to engage in fuel-guzzling flight maneuvers aimed at defeating air threats. This would enable the rest of the group to proceed to the targets without having to make major course adjustments.

In all likelihood, Israel would send at least four aircraft to defend each strike group. At the same time, two or three groups of four F-16Is equipped with anti-radi-ation missiles would be tasked with knocking out en-gagement radars encountered during the strike. (Since Arak has no surface-to-air missile sites nearby, these SEAD flights would be dedicated to opening a path to Esfahan, Natanz and, if necessary, Qom.)

Taken together, some 20 aircraft would be responsible for providing escort or SEAD assistance, leaving about 40 aircraft to handle the primary strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. All of the escort and SEAD aircraft would probably be F-16Is, because they are better suited for the task and could free up the F-15Is for the main bombing effort. Against Iran’s more vulnerable sites, these aircraft will be quite effective. Arak, for example, has little to no defenses; a flight or two of F-16Is carrying bun-ker-busters would be more than enough to level it. The facility also has no visible surface-to-air missile defenses, making it the easiest target to attack. Esfah-

an, though not as compact and fragile as Arak, would also be open to an Israeli strike because of its lack of hardened defenses. A single flight of F-15Is or two flights of F-16Is would be all that would be needed to wreck the complex. Natanz and Qom would be more difficult to destroy. Because of these facilities’ hardened de-fenses, F-15Is carrying GBU-28 bunker-busters would likely have to lead the strike against them. Natanz is covered by at most 30 meters (100 feet) of earth and surrounded by a concrete wall 5

meters thick. Depending on the angle of attack, a GBU-28 bomb

could penetrate either 6 meters of reinforced concrete or 30 meters of packed earth before detonating its 285 kilograms of high explosives. Given Natanz’s defens-es, this suggests that a single GBU-28 bunker-buster could cause significant damage to the facility’s under-ground hall through the creation of shockwaves and great pressure, but it would not necessarily penetrate the hall. Therefore, the Israeli Air Force would proba-bly have to drop several GBU-28s on the same loca-

An Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz, which enriches hexafluoride gas made from uranium ore at the Isfahan facility. (Getty Images)

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tion. The tactic, known as burrowing, is demanding and would probably require more than two bombs to hedge against the possibility of missing. Israel would need to dedicate about five F-15Is to each of Natanz’s two main centrifuge halls to maximize its chances of success.

Qom, on the other hand, is so deeply buried and protected that it is essentially beyond the Israeli Air Force’s capacity to strike. Aircraft may still be tasked with attacking the facility’s tunnel entrances and power stations, but such strikes would cause temporary dam-age at best. If Israel were to decide to degrade Qom as much as it could, it would allocate its remaining 15 F-15Is armed with a mixture of GBU-28s or GBU-27s and GBU-10s to the assault. After the first strike, Israel would have an exceeding-ly difficult time maintaining consistent and lasting large-scale air raids against Iran. The distance between Israel and Iran is so great that the time needed for maintenance and recuperation would be considerable. Iran would also place its forces on full alert, doing all it could to keep a substantial number of air patrols in the sky to intercept any further attacks. The risk to any subsequent strikes on Israel’s part would be much higher. Israel would also face the added problem that its aircraft would have violated the airspace of several countries over the course of the first strike. It would have to contend with the possibility that those coun-tries might forcefully oppose any further incursions. At the same time, Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Territories may retaliate, which would create a need for the Israeli Air Force closer to home. All in all, Israel would be loath to embark on another risky operation once its primary goal of striking Iran’s nuclear sites has been accomplished. Some speculate that the Israeli Air Force could use air bases in Azerbaijan to launch its attack on Iran. In recent years, the Israel-Azerbaijan relationship has

steadily improved, enhanced by energy and arms trade. If Israel did have comprehensive access to Azerbai-jan’s bases, the risks involved in attacking Iran would dramatically decline. For instance, Israel could deploy not only its long-range strike aircraft but also its large inventory of older F-16s. The size of its strike force would be constrained only by the space available in Azerbaijani airfields. Furthermore, Israel could sub-stantially increase the number of sorties it flies over Iran because it would have more aircraft with shorter flight paths to travel at its disposal. With Azerbaijan’s cooperation, Israel could conduct a much more com-prehensive air campaign over Iran, including targeting ballistic missile sites, than it otherwise could from its own distant bases. Still, any notable deployment of Israeli aircraft to Azer-baijan would carry a very high risk of detection. The aircraft would have to fly over a number of countries, several of which are not friendly to Israel. Moreover, Iran is already suspicious of Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel and has consistently sought to build and maintain an elaborate intelligence network there. Unusual activ-ities at Azerbaijani air bases would be a prime target for intelligence gathering. Russia also has considerable military intelligence assets in Azerbaijan, and it could share such information with Iran. Azerbaijan also understands that allowing Israeli aircraft to use its bases would carry the immediate risk of an Iranian reprisal. Azerbaijan shares a land bor-der with Iran, and it is no match for Tehran’s larger military. Since Azerbaijan already has a long-standing enemy to worry about in Armenia, Baku would almost certainly try to avoid creating another major threat to its south without a clear commitment of protection from the United States or Israel. At most, then, the Israeli Air Force can be expected to gain only limited access to Azerbaijan’s air bases. For example, the airfields could be used for emergency landings by Israeli aircraft that are damaged or running low on fuel. Israel could even try to send a small force

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specifically dedicated to combat search and rescue mis-sions in the event that Israeli pilots eject over enemy territory. Such a force would carry a low risk of detec-tion. Some aerial refueling tankers in civilian colors could also conceivably take off from Azerbaijani bases without being spotted.

The Nuclear Option In theory, Israel could also choose to use its nuclear weapons against Iran. Of course, while this option would be far more effective than a conventional strike, it is also a politically intolerable approach.

Though Israel has never officially acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons, estimates put its nuclear arsenal between 40 and 200 warheads. Israel could deliver the warheads with its fixed-wing aircraft, submarine cruise missiles or Jericho ballistic missiles. The latter two avenues would entail little to no risk to Israeli forc-es, especially compared with delivery via airstrike. If Israel decided to use its nuclear weapons as part of an airstrike, the composition of the force would change: With fewer aircraft needed to carry the nuclear weap-ons, more could be given SEAD or interceptor respon-sibilities, theoretically reducing the risk to the strike team as a whole.

A nuclear attack would change the equation in terms of targets as well. Iran’s three less hardened facilities could still be taken out using conventional means, especially since the use of nuclear weapons against them would be considered overkill. However, nuclear weapons would eliminate the need for burrowing at Natanz, making it (and Qom) far more vulnerable. Nuclear detonation would have the most impact below ground, where the resulting shockwave would do massive damage to underground facilities, virtu-ally guaranteeing Natanz’s destruction and making Qom’s fairly certain. By contrast, a surface detonation might not entirely wipe out the Qom facility, but it would eliminate all its supporting infrastructure and

entrances, and the surrounding area would become inhospitable. These factors would effectively render the facility inoperable. From a tactical perspective, of all Israel’s available means, nuclear weapons would accomplish most of its desired ends by neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program. But the political repercussions would be devastating. The use of nuclear weapons would likely generate deep regional hostility against Israel, at a time when it is already being increasingly challenged by its neighbors. The attack would also paint Iran as the victim of a pre-emptive nuclear strike and negate future nuclear negotiation efforts. Last and most important, the move would risk a serious breach with Israel’s only foreign patron, the United States.

Looking Ahead Currently, the United States is in the process of nego-tiating an expanded arms deal with Israel. If finalized, the agreement would provide an unknown number of KC-135 Stratotankers to the Israeli Air Force. These refueling tankers would enable Israel to deploy more aircraft in an offensive against Iran, though how many aircraft the tankers could service would depend on the type of fighter jet deployed and the model of KC-135 involved. Broadly speaking, one of these refueling tankers could support anywhere from four to eight Is-raeli aircraft. If many tankers are added to Israel’s fleet, a strike could become much more likely. But while the supply of aircraft would demonstrate to Iran Washing-ton’s willingness to improve the military readiness of its allies, Washington will also be careful not to give Israel the means to act independently of the United States.

The United States also plans to transfer anti-radiation missiles to Israel as part of the deal. These missiles will probably be advanced air-to-ground, high-speed an-ti-radiation missiles like the AGM-88 or HARM mis-siles, a substantial upgrade from Israel’s current AGM-78 missiles. The weapons would better prepare Israeli aircraft to suppress enemy air defenses by neutralizing

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Iranian radar sites, which would in turn reduce threats to any follow-on strikes by Israel. Details on the number of weapons and aircraft, as well as the timeline for their delivery, are not yet known. However, they will dictate when and how Israel would actually be able to make use of its newfound assets against Iran. Notably, Iraq is also assembling its own air defenses, which would complicate an Israeli assault on Iran.

And while the weapons included in the deal are tai-lored for use against Iran, they will not remove all of the constraints associated with a military strike. Opera-tional limits, including insufficient intelligence on Ira-

nian nuclear sites, remain. Meanwhile, many Iranian targets, including the Fordow facility where Iran is enriching uranium to 20 percent, will continue to have hardened defenses and will be difficult to attack. Israel has the capability to attempt a unilateral strike against Iran’s nuclear program, and a U.S. military aid package will enhance that capability. However, most estimates suggest the effort would set back Iran’s activ-ities by no more than one or two years. This particular analysis also does not take into account Iran’s response to an Israeli attack, the consequences of which Israel would be unable to mitigate without first coordinating with the United States. n

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GAMING A RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN UKRAINE

R ussia’s current military position in Ukraine is very exposed and has

come at a great cost relative to its limited political gains. The stra-tegic bastion of Crimea is defen-sible as an island but is subject to potential isolation. The position of Ukrainian separatists and their Russian backers in eastern Ukraine is essentially a large bulge that will require heavy military investment to secure, and it has not necessarily helped Moscow achieve its larger imperative of cre-ating defensible borders. This raises the question of whether Russia will take further military action to secure its interests in Ukraine. To answer this question, Stratfor examined six basic military options that Russia might consider in ad-dressing its security concerns in Ukraine, ranging from small harassment operations to an all-out invasion of eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper River. We then assessed the likely time and forces required to conduct these operations to determine the overall effort and costs required, and the Russian military’s ability to

execute each operation. To get a baseline assessment for operations under current conditions, we initially assumed in looking at these scenarios that the only opponent would be Ukrainian forces already involved in the conflict.

Wargaming Russia’s Military Options in Ukraine One of the most discussed options is a Russian drive along Ukraine’s southern coast to link up Crimea with separatist positions in eastern Ukraine. For this sce-nario, we assumed that planners would make the front

Research Note: This new report examines scenarios under which Russian and Western forces might come into direct conflict in Ukraine. As part of our analytical methodology, Stratfor periodically conducts internal military simulations. It thus differs from our regular analyses in several ways and is not intended as a forecast. It reflects the results of meticulous examination of the military capabilities of both Russia and NATO and the constraints on those forces. It is intended as a means to measure the intersection of political intent and political will as constrained by actual military capability. This study is not a definitive exercise; instead it is a review of potential decision-making by military planners. In it, we rely on 20 years of Stratfor’s collective experience in providing the highest quality geopolitical intelligence. Curated by our Research Analytics Depart-

ment, it brings us up to 2016, taking into account the latest developments.

A Russian flag flies near pro-Russia militants sitting atop a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howit-zer as a convoy takes a break in the Donetsk region. (VASILY MAXIMOV/AFP/Getty Images)

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broad enough to secure Crimea’s primary water supply, sourced from the Dnieper, and that the defensive lines would be anchored as much as possible on the river, the only defensible terrain feature in the region. This would in effect create a land bridge to secure supply lines into Crimea and prevent any future isolation of the peninsula. Russia would have to drive more than 400 kilometers (250 miles) into an area encompassing 46,620 square kilometers, establish more than 450 kilometers of new defensive lines, and subdue a popu-lation of 2 million. Taking this territory against the current opposition in Ukraine would require a force of around 24,000-36,000 personnel over six to 14 days. For defensive purposes, Russian planners would have to recog-nize the risk of NATO coming to Kiev’s assistance. Were that to happen, Russia would have to expand

the defensive force to 40,000-55,000 troops to hold the territory. Planners must also consider the force needed to deal with a potential insurgency from the population, which becomes decidedly less pro-Russia outside of the Donbas territories. Counterinsurgency force structure size is generally based on the size of the population and level of resistance expected. This naturally leads to a much wider variance in estimates. In this scenario, a compliant populace would require a force of only around 4,200 troops, while an extreme insurgency could spike that number to 42,000. In this particular case, no extreme insurgency is expected, as it would be in cities such as Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv or Kiev. The defensive force could overlap with the counterin-surgency force to some degree if there were no external threat, but if such a threat existed the forces would

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have to be separate, potentially doubling the manpow-er required to secure the territory. A similar scenario that has been considered is the seiz-ing of the entire southern coast of Ukraine to connect Russia and its security forces in the Moldovan break-away region of Transdniestria to Crimea. The logic goes that this move would cripple Kiev by cutting off access to the Black Sea and would secure all of Russia’s interests in the region in a continual arc. In terms of effort required, Russia essentially would be doubling the land bridge option. It would require an attacking force of 40,000-60,000 troops driving almost 645 kilometers to seize territory encompassing 103,600 square kilometers over 23-28 days. The required defensive force would number 80,000-112,000. This would also add a complicated and dangerous bridging operation over a large river. Moreover, the population

in this region is approximately 6 million, necessitating 13,200-120,000 counterinsurgency troops. These first two scenarios have a serious flaw in that they involve extremely exposed positions. Extended positions over relatively flat terrain — bisected by a river in one scenario — are costly to hold, if they can be defended at all against a concerted attack by a mod-ern military force. Supply lines would also be very long throughout the area and, in the scenario that extends beyond the Dnieper River, rely on bridging operations across a major river. A third scenario would involve Russia taking all of eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper and using the river as a defensive front line. When it comes to defending the captured territory, this scenario makes the most sense. The Dnieper is wide in most places, with few

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crossings and few sites suitable for tactical bridging operations, meaning defending forces can focus on cer-tain chokepoints. This is the most sensible option for Russia if it wants to take military action and prepare a defensive position anchored on solid terrain. However, the operation would be a massive military undertaking. The force required to seize this area — approximately 222,740 square kilometers — and defeat the opposition there would need to number 91,000-135,000 troops and advance as much as 402 kilometers. Since the river could bolster defensive capabilities, the defensive force could remain roughly the same size as the attacking force. However, with a population of 13 million in the area, the additional troops that might be required for the counterinsurgen-cy force could range from 28,000 to 260,000. Russia has approximately 280,000 ground troops, meaning

that the initial drive would tie down a substantial part of the Russian military and that an intense insurgency could threaten Russia’s ability to occupy the area even if it deployed all of its ground forces in Ukraine. One positive aspect would be that this operation would take only 11-14 days to execute, even though it involves seizing a large area, because Russia could ad-vance along multiple routes. Still, the operation would require such a vast mobilization effort and retasking of Russian security forces that Moscow’s intent would be detectable and would alarm Europe and the United States early on. Two remaining options that we examined were varia-tions on previous themes in an effort to see if Russia could launch more limited operations, using fewer resources, to address similar security imperatives.

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For example, we considered Russia taking only the southern half of eastern Ukraine in an effort to use decidedly less combat power, but this left the Russians with an exposed flank and removed the security of the Dnieper. Similarly, a small expansion of current separatist lines to the north to incorporate the remain-der of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to make the territory more self-sustaining was considered. Both operations are quite executable but gain little in the grand scheme. The final scenario we considered was the most limited. It involved Russia conducting small temporary in-cursions along the entirety of its border with Ukraine in an effort to threaten various key objectives in the region and spread Ukraine’s combat power as thin as possible. This would be efficient and effective for the Russian military in terms of the effort required. It could accomplish some small political and security ob-jectives, such as drawing Ukrainian forces away from the current line of contact, generally distracting Kiev, or increasing the sense of emergency there, making the Ukrainians believe Russia would launch a full invasion if Kiev did not comply.

For all of the scenarios considered, the findings were consistent: All are technically possible for the Russian military, but all have serious drawbacks. Not one of these options can meet security or political objectives through limited or reasonable means. This conclu-sion does not preclude these scenarios for Russian decision-makers, but it does illuminate the broader cost-benefit analysis leaders undertake when weighing future actions. No theoretical modeling can accurately predict the outcome of a war, but it can give lead-ers an idea of what action to take or whether to take action at all.

What the West Could Do

The Russian military options in Ukraine would not take place in a vacuum. Apart from opposition by Ukrainian forces, the Russian military would have to account for a potential response from the United States or a coalition of NATO countries. Whether or not the United States would be willing to go to war over an invasion of Ukraine, Russia cannot afford to ignore the possibility when examining its options and estimating their potential for success.

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Strategic Deployment of U.S. Air Force Assets to Eastern Europe

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If the United States and/or NATO were to respond to an overt Russian offensive in Ukraine, the quickest and possibly only desirable means of deploying firepower would be to use air assets. Although NATO and the United States have substantial ground forces that could be deployed to Eastern Europe and into Ukraine when needed, transporting these forces and their equipment to the theater would require a great deal of time. Even then, ground forces probably would not be commit-ted without the achievement of air superiority. For this reason, our study of potential Western counter-actions hinges on the ability to deploy a considerable amount of air power into Ukraine to halt or roll back a Russian offensive. Such an operation would be complex, involving the deployment of air assets to airfields near Russian forc-es, arranging logistical support for that deployment, conducting operations against Russian air defenses and eventually launching a ground campaign to reduce Russian military capabilities inside Ukraine. As Russia evaluates its military options, it will have to account for a worst-case scenario in which NATO countries in Eastern Europe open up their air bases to a con-siderable deployment of the U.S. Air Force and offer logistical support.

The Challenges of Deploying Aircraft Before being able to initiate full-scale air operations against the Russian forces, the United States and its European allies would need to deploy a massive num-ber of fighter aircraft near Ukraine. These aircraft not only would have to deplete Russian ground-based air defenses ahead of a ground attack, but they would also be facing significant Russian air assets deployed to sup-port the offensive operations. This means the highest possible number of advanced fighter aircraft would be required to achieve the strategic weight needed for a difficult air superiority effort.

European air forces are already relatively close to the Ukrainian theater, but forward deployment to airfields closer to Ukraine would still be required to limit flight time to targets and to reduce the strain on aerial refuel-ing capabilities, which will already be stretched thin in an operation of this size and scope. However, the Unit-ed States faces the additional challenge of a strategic deployment of air assets from the continental United States to Eastern Europe. Various factors, such as the availability of aerial tankers and the strategic airlift and airfield capacity at the destination or intermediate landings, influence the rate at which these aircraft can be deployed. The U.S. Air Force would be able to deploy its first aircraft in theater relatively quickly, mostly because of the pre-positioning of several fighter squadrons at air bases in Europe. Three F-15 squadrons stationed at the Royal Air Force Base Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, two F-16 squadrons stationed at the Aviano Air Base in Italy, and an F-16 Squadron stationed at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany could be deployed to airfields in Eastern Europe within the first 48 hours of the deployment. However, these squadrons alone would not be suf-ficient to begin a large-scale air operation against Russian ground-based air defenses and air superiority fighters. They would have to await reinforcement by many other squadrons from the continental United States. The reinforcing squadrons would be deployed one by one to avoid congesting the air bases they would need to move through in Europe, accompanied by transport aircraft carrying maintenance supplies and crews as well as aerial refueling aircraft to facilitate the long flights.

What a Deployment Would Look Like Assuming a best-case scenario, the entire deployment of about 22 fighter squadrons would take approxi-

18STRATFOR •

mately 11 days. Priority likely would be given to the latest-generation air superiority fighters and aircraft specializing in suppression of enemy air defenses, since these roles would be dominant in the first phases of the air campaign. Other platforms, such as the A-10 ground attack aircraft, likely would be deployed in the last phase of the deployment because their mission would become feasible only after a significant deterio-ration of Russian air defenses. Rotary wing assets could also follow at that point to increase ground attack capabilities, but great numbers are unlikely to be committed until air superiority is established and advanced air defense systems no longer pose a threat. Unmanned aerial vehicles would also be expected to make up a significant share of the intelli-gence, surveillance and reconnaissance effort support-ing the operation. These would be deployed early on and would include both tactical systems with relatively low footprints and shorter ranges or loitering times and higher-level systems that can operate from air-fields beyond the theater. They could also be used in a limited ground attack capability, but the requirement for reliable intelligence on Russian movement and po-sitions means the drones likely would be reserved for an intense surveillance effort during the early phases of the campaign. U.S. and allied air power would be able to stage out of the numerous air bases available in Eastern Europe. Staging would focus on more than 30 military airfields in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgar-ia, with many more available in Italy and Germany, farther from the theater. Strategic aircraft such as aerial refueling tankers and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets could make use of the airfields in Germany and Italy, while the tactical squadrons could deploy closer to Ukraine. A deployment to airfields in western Ukraine could be possible, but the threshold would be lower for Russia to strike at these airfields, whereas the political and military cost for Russia would outweigh the benefit of disrupting operations at airfields in NATO territory. The same risk of esca-

F-16CG

F-16C

F-15E

F-16CG

F-15C/D

F-15E

F-22A

F-16CJ

F-16CJ

F-16CJ

F-22A

F-15E

F-16CG

F-22A

F-15E

F-16C

F-22A

A-10

A-10

A-10

A-10

A-10

24

24

18

24

24

18

18

24

24

24

18

18

24

18

18

24

18

24

24

24

24

24

24

25

26

32

34

50

56

74

90

98

114

122

138

146

162

170

186

194

210

218

234

242

Aircraft type

Number of aircraft

Time of arrival in theater (hr)

The selection of fighter squadrons to be deployed was done based on the needs of the mission and maintaining a U.S. Air Force presence at home and in Asia.

This table indicates the estimated time between the initial order for strategic deployment and the time of arrival of separate U.S. Air Force assets in Eastern Europe.

Copyright Stratfor 2016 www.stratfor.com

Fighter Deployment to Eastern Europe

19STRATFOR •

lation would likely limit U.S. and NATO intent to conduct operations inside Russia proper. Because of the massive numbers of aircraft that would need to be deployed for this endeavor, the United States would also deploy aircraft carriers, likely to the Aegean Sea (the Montreux Convention prevents air-craft carriers from entering the Black Sea, where they would be easier targets for Russian attacks). Thus, at least two carrier wings could be deployed to the theater in as many weeks, and a third could join during the fourth week of the deployment.

The Time Factor Because of the time needed to deploy various U.S. air assets into the theater, full-scale operations could realistically begin only after Russian offensive oper-ations had already achieved most of their objectives. This means that Russia would have been able to move mobile air defenses into the theater, and the air cam-paign would be aimed at deteriorating Russian defen-sive capabilities in Ukraine rather than blunting its initial attack. However, prior to the completion of the massing of aircraft in Eastern Europe, preparatory operations could occur using air-launched standoff missiles or sea-launched cruise missiles to target Russian air defenses, supply depots and potentially airfields used by Russian aircraft inside Ukraine. The next phase would then likely lean heavily on the F-16CJ “Wild Weasel” and any available allied aircraft equipped with radar-seek-ing missiles that home in on active radar signals from ground-based air defenses. These aircraft would be used to significantly damage the Russian air defense network, or at least limit the use of active radars, which would significantly deteriorate the Russians’ ability to target U.S. and allied aircraft operating in the airspace over the battlefield. At this point, the main Russian threat to air superiority would be its aircraft fleet, and air combat would likely result in significant attrition on both sides.

Potential Outcomes The exact outcome of this phase is difficult to predict but is likely to favor the larger number of NATO air-craft with more advanced capabilities than the Russian force. Nonetheless, both sides have notable advantages and disadvantages that would influence the outcome of the air combat. The Russian air force would have the advantage of operating close to home and out of its own air bas-es, enabling it to conduct a higher rate of sorties per aircraft than the forward-deployed NATO aircraft. However, the air fleet that the United States and its European allies could assemble is substantially larger than the fleet the Russians could field, and as a result the total amount of possible sorties per day would still be higher for NATO. Russia would have the advantage of operating over its own ground-based air defense network. By this point in the operation it would be significantly diminished, but the air defenses would still threaten NATO aircraft and force them to carry radar-seeking missiles and ground attack ammunition, while Russian aircraft would be able to limit their loads to lighter air-to-air packages. The NATO forces, on the other hand, would benefit from better stealth capabilities and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. U.S. and NATO forces would also have the benefit of having more experience in expeditionary deployments in the past decade. Not only do pilots have more com-bat experience, but ground crews and commanders also have extensive experience conducting maintenance and logistics on a large scale. Interoperability between NATO partners has also been strengthened during deployments in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Russian forces have not operated under that kind of pressure. From the perspective of Russian planners in this sce-nario, the uncertainty of Russia’s ability to maintain

20STRATFOR •

air superiority means that any gains it makes could be unsustainable. Obtaining air superiority would enable the United States and NATO to conduct a devastating ground attack campaign that by itself could destroy the combat effectiveness of Russian units deployed into Ukraine. It is also important to keep in mind that at this point in the scenarios, with at least several weeks having passed, U.S. and European ground forces would have had plenty of time to complete deploy-ments to Eastern Europe. With the possibility of the deployment of significant ground forces, and NATO air assets achieving air superiority, Russian military planners have to presume that if their offensive op-erations were to be contested militarily, they would be unsustainable.

Russia Weighs the Cost

Besides considering the constraints and achievable ob-jectives of various military options, as well as the poten-tial responses to them, Russian policymakers will have to decide whether any of the scenarios meet their political requirements. The goal is not simply to be left with options that are feasible but to find options that serve an actu-al strategic purpose. Russia clearly has the military capability to put immense pressure on Ukraine if it chooses to, but the results would not necessarily rise to meet Moscow’s higher geopolitical ob-jectives. The Ukrainian question needs to be seen in the broader context of Russia’s need for a buf-fer against the European powers and NATO to its west. Ukraine is critical because it covers a wide landmass in the Intermarium, the area between the Baltic and Black seas.

Apart from the actual geopolitical achievements avail-able in these scenarios, Russian policymakers would also have to consider the consequences of a large-scale U.S. or NATO intervention. Such an intervention would likely doom the Russian offensive. But the question is whether an intervention would be a favorable course of action for the West. The United States and NATO have no commitment to defend Ukraine if it were to face an overt Russian offensive. As with Russia, broader geopo-litical imperatives will drive the West’s actions. In fact, it is more likely that NATO would not directly intervene, but Russian planners must consider all the risks. A more realistic means of retaliation or dissua-sion would be for the West to impose sanctions more significant than those currently in place, which could bring the Russian economy to its knees. Stronger sanc-tions would come with a cost for the West, but Russia’s weak economy amplifies the political threat.

300 mi

600 km

Copyright Stratfor 2016 www.stratfor.com

The Intermarium

Russia

NATO

21STRATFOR •

Examining Russia’s Objectives We approach Russia and Ukraine’s current situation, the point at which these scenarios come into play, in the context of recent changes that have threatened the Russian imperative of preserving Ukraine as a buffer zone. As the Ukrainian crisis unfolded, Kiev veered toward the West. Any moves toward further integra-tion with Europe or NATO would significantly threat-en Russia’s goals and could move NATO’s borders to within 435 kilometers (270 miles) of Moscow. At this point, despite Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military actions in eastern Ukraine, Kiev seems to be growing even closer to the West, and Russia is left without its buffer in this section of the Intermarium. In examining military options and the political and material cost that would come with each scenario, the payoff for Russia would be restoring this buffer,

or strategic depth. Several of the scenarios we studied have little to offer in this regard. For example, although a land connection to Crimea seems perfectly feasible from a military perspective and could guarantee freshwater supplies for the peninsula, it achieves little in terms of strategic depth. It would cause severe economic damage to Ukraine, especially if occupation extended beyond the Dnieper River to Transdniestria. But crippling Kiev economically does not guarantee Russia’s security imperatives. In fact, do-ing so could lead Ukraine to depend more on Western financing and, as a result, to become further integrated with Europe. The territories in eastern Ukraine that separatists have carved out with substantial support from the Russian military give Russia’s Volgograd and Rostov regions some added strategic depth. This is not insignificant —

these Russian regions form the connection to Russia’s southern border in the Caucasus — but the loss of the rest of Ukraine as a buffer still puts the West closer to Moscow. Even if the separat-ists and their Russian backers were able to take the entire re-gions of Donetsk and Luhansk, a gap in the buffer would remain at Kursk. Given that Ukraine has committed a considerable por-tion of its combat power to the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, an operation to take the entirety of those regions could destroy Ukraine’s military capabilities. It would be well within Russia’s abilities to significantly reduce the combat effectiveness of the entire Ukrainian military. How-ever, this would not eliminate the possibility of Kiev aligning with the West and, much like

300 mi

600 km

Copyright Stratfor 2016 www.stratfor.com

Russia

NATO

UKRAINE

Hypothetical Situation Following a Russian Invasion Toward the Dnieper River

22STRATFOR •

crippling Ukraine’s economy, crushing its military could push Kiev even closer to the West by forcing it to depend on the United States and NATO for assis-tance in rebuilding its military capabilities. The only military option for Russia that we examined that would both be within its capabilities and signifi-cantly improve its strategic depth is the scenario in which the Russian military advances across eastern Ukraine to anchor itself on the Dnieper. The manpow-er required to carry out this operation would consti-tute a considerable portion of Russia’s ground forces. By committing this force, Russia would not only have to repurpose many of its existing security forces, but it would also likely have to increase the size of its military through recruitment and extensive mobilizations of re-serves, especially if it wanted to maintain a presence in other areas along Russia’s border and in its periphery. The state of the Russian economy would hinder such efforts. A significant mobilization would require Russia to increase its already tight defense budget, although defense has been an exception to the government’s budget cuts. Even if Russia managed to launch the op-eration, its success could not be guaranteed. Moreover, a NATO intervention in Ukraine could not only quash Russia’s efforts to reach its objectives, it could also serve a crippling blow to Russia’s military capabilities.

The Risk of Escalation A U.S. and NATO intervention against an overt Russian offensive in Ukraine would be a substantial escalation in and of itself. However, in the case of such an intervention, the threat of military operations and retaliations expand-ing into the Baltics, or inside Russia, would be very real. As part of the strategic level of warfare, both sides could seek to strike infrastructure and military assets beyond the Ukrainian theater using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or airstrikes. Such actions could rapidly devolve into all-out war, and at that point the possibility of nuclear retaliation

would bring an unpredictable dynamic into the conflict, making military victory a moot point. Of course, Russian policymakers could consider the risk of escalation as a deterrent to U.S. or NATO intervention against any offensive they might conduct in Ukraine. But if Russia did carry out an operation that enabled its forces to anchor along the Dnieper River, the condition Ukraine would be in may not be desirable for Russia. Even if no direct military response from the West materialized, the western part of Ukraine would remain as a state, and the West’s current inhibitions about arming Ukraine or deploying forces in its support could evaporate quickly. Essentially, a new Iron Curtain would emerge along the Dnieper River, with Russian and NATO forces staring each other down from opposing riverbanks. Although Russia could consider this a net gain compared to losing all of Ukraine to the West, it is a significant loss compared to a whole but neutral Ukraine. If Russia were to seize eastern Ukraine, it would be trading a buffer zone about 800 kilometers wide for about 320 kilometers of extra depth within its own borders. Granted, the geography would be more defensible, but NATO would probably end up right on Russia’s border, with no buffer remaining. The conclusion reached from matching up these scenarios with Moscow’s strategic imperatives is that no obvious options stand out. All of the scenarios are logistically feasible, though some would come at an incredible cost, few of them actually meet Russia’s needs, and none of them can be guaranteed to succeed as long as the possibil-ity of a U.S. or NATO military response remains. If the prospect of such a military engagement deters the West from taking direct action against a Russian offensive, the West’s option to subsume the remaining parts of Ukraine significantly minimizes the benefits of any military oper-ation Russia might consider. As Joshua, the computer in the 1983 movie WarGames, observed, “The only winning move is not to play.” n

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