The Influence of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra on ...

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The Influence of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra on Jung’s Red Book; Phylogenetic Recapitulation, the Eternal Recurrence, and Being and Becoming

Contents 1.0 Introduction P. 2-3

1.1 Thus Spoke Zarathustra P. 3-4 1.2 The Red Book P. 4-7

2.0 The Foundation of Jung’s Psychology P. 7-11

2.1 The Eternal Recurrence P. 12-15 2.2 Jung’s Knowledge of Kant and Early Understanding of Nietzsche P. 15-21

3.0 Identification and Virtual Reality P. 21-25

3.1 Practice: The Shadow and Inferiority P. 25-35 3.2 Theory: The Libido and the Archetypes – Aesthetics and Religion,

Fantasy and Ethics P. 35-45 4.0 Nietzsche and Jung’s Mirrors and Masks P. 45-47 5.0 Conclusion P. 47-48 6.0 Bibliography P. 49-50

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1.0 Introduction The influence of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) philosophy on the psychology of Carl Jung (1875-1961) is undeniable. Yet the extent of Nietzsche’s influence is not easily definable. Naturally, a number of scholars have investigated the topic, with one of their primary areas of research being analyses of Jung’s interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. However, much of this scholarship was authored prior to the eventual publication of The Red Book in 2009 and thus could not take into account the most important link between Jung and Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra during perhaps the most formative years of Jung’s personal and professional life. This dissertation will therefore attempt to build upon existing scholarship by confronting some aspects of this sizeable lacuna. More specifically, it will investigate the development and subsequent justification of Jung’s psychological theories as a response to his interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra during this period by considering The Red Book as the arena in which many of these developments and justifications originated. This will be undertaken according to the following five steps:

1) An introduction to both Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Red Book, focussing particularly on the personal and professional conditions each book was written under.

2) A description of what I consider to be the practical and theoretical foundational points of Jung’s psychology, and the manner in which these informed his interaction with Nietzsche’s philosophy.

3) A comparative practical analysis of key sections of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Red Book. This analysis will be followed by applying its findings to explain theoretical differences between Jung’s major academic publications that bookend The Red Book – namely, The Psychology of the Unconscious and Psychological Types. An important aspect will be to take Jung’s later seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra – which took place intermittently between May 1934 and February 1939 – into account, as an instructive indicator of Jung’s subsequently more developed opinion on the book.

4) An analysis of key omissions from Jung’s aforementioned seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, with the intention of examining Jung’s later presentation of Nietzsche in relation to his experiences as recorded in The Red Book.

5) And, finally, a summary of the overall findings. In terms of methodology, of the existing scholarship previously mentioned, three books in particular have shaped this dissertation. In chronological order: Paul Bishop’s 1995 book The Dionysian Self: C.G. Jung’s Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche; Patricia Dixon’s 1999 book Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night; and Lucy Huskinson’s 2004 book Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites. All these authors analyse Nietzsche and Jung’s attempts to create a truly whole and inclusive self – the reconciliation of the conscious and unconscious aspects of an individual – from various, yet similar, perspectives. As would be expected, Bishop focusses on their interpretations and identifications with the Dionysian and subsequent relationship with the Apollonian, with a methodological emphasis on examining Jung’s marginal notes in his copies of Nietzsche’s works. Dixon’s thesis has a similar focus on the reconciliation of opposites yet suggests that – despite his criticisms – Jung tried to translate Nietzsche’s abstract philosophy into analytical psychology, misunderstanding him in the process. And, finally, Huskinson’s work examines how Nietzsche and Jung attempted to define – and subsequently attain – a cohesive whole in

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terms of the human self. As a central aspect of this, Huskinson plays her interpretations of Nietzsche and Jung against each other at every stage of her investigation with interesting results. All of these books have been useful, not least because of their differing and complementary approaches. However, Bishop and Huskinson’s books will be primarily referred to. The reason is simple: Dixon mainly focusses on Jung’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s more traditionally philosophical works; while, on the other hand – and although still taking Jung’s utilisation of Nietzsche’s philosophical works into account – Bishop and Huskinson focus more on Nietzsche and Jung’s personal developments. Accordingly, Thus Spoke Zarathustra is frequently analysed in their publications as a predominantly psychological work along with Jung’s seminars on the book – an approach more conducive to the purpose of this dissertation. 1.1 Thus Spoke Zarathustra Firstly, a brief introduction regarding the background of the books concerned. Thus Spoke Zarathustra was written in four parts between 1883 and 1885, during the last decade of Nietzsche’s intellectual life. As Dixon has noted, beginning with health problems in 1879 that forced him to resign his academic position in Basle, Nietzsche’s personal and professional lives became increasingly lonelier as he haemorrhaged friends and acquaintances.1 The publication of The Birth of Tragedy in 1872 began this gradual process of attrition after extremely critical reviews effectively ostracised him from the academic community. The subsequent publication of Human, All Too Human in 1878 alienated many of Nietzsche’s remaining supporters, including his greatest friend, the composer Richard Wagner (1813-1883), whose friendship Nietzsche would never find an adequate replacement for. Indeed, Nietzsche’s attempts to alleviate his sorrow at the loss of his friendship with Wagner ended in further alienation when his friendships with Lou Salomé (1861-1937) and Paul Rée (1849-1901) – who were inclined towards somewhat unconventional open relationships – disintegrated in 1882 after Nietzsche proposed a more traditional relationship with Salomé. To be sure, Nietzsche maintained correspondences with various other people, for example the Protestant theologian Franz Overbeck (1837-1905) and his occasional scribe Johann Köselitz a.k.a. Paul Gast (1854-1918). Yet, despite their friendships, from Nietzsche’s perspective they could not provide the same personal and intellectual stimulation as a Wagner or a Salomé. As Nietzsche stated in a letter to his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche (1846-1935), dated the 20th of May 1885:

I have never had a confidant and friend with whom I could share what occupies me, distresses me, or elevates me… I have found nobody who could have the same distress of heart and conscience that I have.2

1 Patricia Dixon, Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999), 255-258.

2 Dixon, Nietzsche and Jung, 257.

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Regardless of other contributory factors, Dixon theorises that this loneliness was a significant contributor to Nietzsche’s eventual mental collapse in 1889.3 It can also be interpreted as the primary motivational factor behind Nietzsche’s authorship of Thus Spoke Zarathustra – an attempt to locate and attract like-minded individuals on both personal and professional levels via a unique and startling book. Of course, any attraction would have been predicated on understanding the ultimate message of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which was nothing less than a warning of what Nietzsche considered the greatest imminent threat to the general future of humanity – albeit from a predominantly European perspective – namely, the encroachment of human nihilism. This threat took many forms in Nietzsche’s work but, at least in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, his primary concern was the Last Human Being – a theoretical and somewhat exaggerated future condition of human nihilism posed in ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’, where humanity is characterised as wholly complacent, safe, passive, valueless, with no existential challenges, where nothing out of the ordinary ever arises. 1.2 The Red Book The Red Book was written by Jung during a similar timescale, between the years of 1914 and 1917, although embellished from notes originally recorded in The Black Books between November 1913 and June 1916. Its authorship occurred during a period of what would transpire to be a personal and professional midlife crisis, which appears to have had three main causes, all with their supposed origin in Jung’s dreams and other fantasy experiences. Perhaps the most significant was Jung’s apprehension of an armed conflict in Europe during the months leading up to the First World War. As Wouter Hanegraaff has pointed out, one did not need powers of premonition to intuit the dangerous situation that was developing.4 Nevertheless, in October 1913, Jung assigned great importance to a vision he experienced when travelling by train from Zürich to Schaffhausen to visit his mother-in-law on the occasion of her seventy-fifth birthday. In Jung’s own words:

I saw a terrible flood that covered all the northern and low-lying lands between the North Sea and the Alps. It reached from England up to Russia, and from the coast of the North Sea right up to the Alps. I saw yellow waves, swimming rubble, and the death of countless thousands.5

As Sonu Shamdasani notes, this is the first of Jung’s dreams or fantasy experiences that he regarded as a premonition of WWI, and it was clearly something that preoccupied him. Indeed, Shamdasani has identified up to eleven further dreams or fantasy experiences which Jung could have interpreted as premonitions of the onset of WWI.6 One might contend that such an understandable trepidation regarding extreme human conflict is contradictory to Nietzsche’s railing against the Last Human Being. But, although Nietzsche

3 Dixon, Nietzsche and Jung, 257.

4 Wouter Hanegraaff, ‘The Great War of the Soul: Divine and Human Madness in Carl Gustav Jung’s Liber

Novus’, 2. 5 Carl Jung trans. Mark Kyburz, John Peck, and Sonu Shamdasani, The Red Book: Liber Novus (New York &

London: W.W. Norton, 2009), 231l. 6 Jung, The Red Book, 202l.

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could have had no premonition of WWI, a hubris similar to that which Jung identified as the precursor for WWI7 was nevertheless condemned by Nietzsche – firstly in The Birth of Tragedy in general terms,8 and later in Human, All Too Human in relation to Napoleon9 – as another extreme form of human nihilism. This nihilism shares an essential quality with the nihilism of the Last Human Being – namely, passivity. But, in this case, passivity manifests as a fatalistic belief in one’s own inevitable success – struggle and self-criticism are supplanted by a complacency and passivity similar to that of the Last Human Being. Another significant contributor to Jung’s midlife crisis began in 1912, with his eventual personal and professional break from Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Although the reasons for the break are numerous and complex – the publication of The Psychology of the Unconscious in 1912 essentially ensured a reconciliation was impossible – one particular example of their correspondence during the same year is relevant. Jung had begun to experience a series of dreams that neither he nor Freud could supposedly interpret. However, the first of these has a rather obvious and superficial explanation which Jung later clarified in The Black Books. Again, in Jung’s own words:

I was in a southern town, on a rising street with narrow half landings. It was twelve o'clock midday – bright sunshine. An old Austrian customs guard or someone similar passes by me, lost in thought. Someone says, "that is one who cannot die. He died already 30-40 years ago, but has not yet managed to decompose." I was very surprised. Here a striking figure came, a knight of powerful build, clad in yellowish armor. He looks solid and inscrutable and nothing impresses him. On his back he carries a red Maltese cross. He has continued to exist from the 12th century and daily between 12 and 1 o'clock midday he takes the same route. No one marvels at these two apparitions, but I was extremely surprised.

I hold back my interpretive skills. As regards the old Austrian, Freud occurred to me; as regards the knight, I myself.

Inside, a voice calls, "It is all empty and disgusting." I must bear it.10

The entire passage has been quoted at length to demonstrate, both the rather obvious symbolism that the decrepit Austrian customs official and the powerful knight represent, but also the symbolism that is borrowed from Thus Spoke Zarathustra and which is also obvious to anyone with a familiarity with the book. This symbolism concerns the knight’s repeated daily existence between 12 and 1 o’clock and his relation to the Austrian customs official. In fact, midday or noon is often invoked in Nietzsche’s writings. The most relevant explanation for the importance of this time can be found in his 1888 book Twilight of the Idols. Here, Nietzsche caricatures the ideal Platonic forms as undergoing a series of errors and degradations until finally reaching the embarrassing stage of an obsolete figure blushing with shame in the morning sunlight of the material world. However, when noon arrives, so

7 Carl Jung trans. Richard and Clara Winston, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Random House, 1989),

235. 8 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy in Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Ronald Speirs, The Birth of Tragedy and

Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 74. 9 Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Gary Handwerk, Human, All Too Human I: A Book for Free Spirits (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1995), 126. 10

Carl Jung, The Black Books, vol. 2, 25-26 in Jung, The Red Book, 198l fn.35.

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begins the triumphant “moment of shortest shadow; end of longest error; high point of humanity; incipit Zarathustra”.11 By aligning his dream with one of Nietzsche’s most recognisable proclamations, Jung appears to be confrontationally positioning Freud and himself as the Last Human Being and Overman respectively. As Bishop notes, it is unknown whether – despite both of their unlikely public statements to the contrary – Freud privately admitted to Jung that he was indeed familiar with Nietzsche’s writings.12 Yet, assuming this dubious circumstance was the case, it is possible that Jung was characterising his growing discontent with Freud with one that also reflected his burgeoning interest in Nietzsche; one intended – maybe provocatively – to induce a recognition from Freud of a familiarity with Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Indeed, Huskinson accepts this basic premise – namely, that Jung’s unreciprocated interest in Nietzsche significantly contributed to the end of their relationship, but also provided Jung with a figure to fall back on once their relationship had concluded and his midlife crisis had begun.13 A precursor to this can be seen in a letter Jung wrote to Freud on the 3rd of March 1912, wherein he quotes the following inflammatory lines from Thus Spoke Zarathustra when discussing the imminent publication of The Psychology of the Unconscious:

One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil. And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels? You respect me; but how if one day your respect should tumble? Take care that a falling statue does not strike you dead! You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me. Thus do all believers--. Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you.14

The final contributor to Jung’s incipient midlife crisis also had its origin in a dream from 1912. In this case, the contents of the dream are of lesser importance as they are rather nebulous – what matters is Jung’s interpretation. And, ultimately, his conclusion was to interpret the dream as permission to embark on an affair with Toni Wolff (1888-1953) who would, during this period, become Jung’s closest confidant. Emma Jung (1882-1955), Carl Jung’s wife, seems to have grudgingly tolerated this emerging triangular relationship, although it necessitated some further significant sacrifices on her behalf. Since she rarely knew when Wolff would be present at their house, she could not invite friends or relatives to visit as frequently as before her husband’s extra-marital relationship had begun. Furthermore, Jung’s break with Freud removed the only person she could converse with on this delicate matter, as the Jungs’ social position coupled with Carl Jung’s professional connections made such confidential friendships in Switzerland essentially impossible. It is,

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Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer in Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Judith Norman, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 171. 12

Paul Bishop, The Dionysian Self: C.G. Jung’s Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche (Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 1995), 195. 13

Lucy Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites (Hove & New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2004), 148. 14

William McGuire ed. Ralph Manheim & R.F.C. Hull trans. The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 491.

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therefore, unsurprising that, despite maintaining public appearances, Emma is described as having “seethed with an anger” that she would not discuss or explain.15 Thus, beginning in 1912, Jung’s personal and professional lives experienced a substantial degree of turmoil. His relationship with Freud was irreparably damaged, with the majority of his professional contacts choosing to cleave to Freud;16 his relationship with his wife was being severely strained; and, finally, the immanent and eventual outbreak of WWI was a deeply traumatic psychological experience for him. Therefore, while Dixon contrasts Nietzsche’s torturous loneliness with Jung’s comparative fame,17 the difference between their circumstances is not as far removed as she – or Jung – portrays it. Indeed, in his (semi)autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung presents his family and career as a bulwark that prevented him from fully succumbing to something similar to Nietzsche’s madness.18 However, this circumstance is somewhat doubtful, considering the distances that were developing between Jung and his family and professional contacts. Yet, as Barbara Hannah, Jung’s personal secretary, states in her 1976 biographical memoir: “I think he was doubtful that he could have survived this most difficult of all journey had he been entirely alone in it”.19 In this context, it is perhaps relevant to mention that Wolff was the only contemporary allowed access to The Black Books and, therefore, prevented Jung from being “entirely alone”.20 In any case, while it is indeed true that Jung’s personal relationships and fame far exceeded those of Nietzsche, the three factors mentioned above diminished these until Jung began to identify with Nietzsche – loneliness is relative, after all – to the point where Jung worried about losing his sanity in a similar manner. It is from this perspective that Jung’s most significant interaction with Nietzsche begins.

2.0 The Foundation of Jung’s Psychology In the previous section, a number of convergent personal and professional crises were described as leading to a situation whereby Jung began to identify with Nietzsche. However, for Jung, identifying with Nietzsche extended beyond a simple affinity for an influential individual. As this section will demonstrate, Jung gradually began to assimilate a number of influential individuals into his self, many of which preceded and accompanied significant innovations regarding his conceptualisation of psychology. Indeed, this section will contend that the psychological assimilation of influential individuals became the primary foundational point of Jung’s psychology from a practical perspective. Such a practice’s importance can be observed with varying degrees of clarity in both The Psychology of the Unconscious and Psychological Types yet, throughout his entire oeuvre, Jung rarely mentions it in relation to himself. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the same concept of assimilating influential individuals is later described by Jung during the latter half of his career in relation to his patients. Accordingly, a degree of transposition can be applied

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Deirdre Bair, Jung: A Biography (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 250-251. 16

Carl Jung, Introduction to Jungian Psychology: Notes of the Seminar on Analytical Psychology Given in 1925 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 25. 17

Dixon, Nietzsche and Jung, 255. 18

Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, 189. 19

Barbara Hannah, Jung, His Life and Work: A Biographical Memoir (New York: Perigee Books, 1981), 120. 20

Bair, Jung, 249.

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between Jung and his patients, who ultimately appear to act as proxies through which Jung explicated his theories without betraying too much personal involvement. As Jung states in his 1925 ‘Seminar on Analytical Psychology’:

I drew all my empirical material from my patients, but the solution of the problem I drew from the inside, from my observations of the unconscious process.21

And indeed, as Jung would also state in the same seminar, during the events leading up to his midlife crisis in 1912, he was unconsciously assimilating aspects of his case-studies into his self. Perhaps the most significant of these was the case of Miss Frank Miller, a woman Jung never met but whom he encountered in the works of fellow psychologist Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920) and whose fantasies subsequently provided the foundation upon which The Psychology of the Unconscious was built. Essentially, Jung’s conclusion of the Miller’s fantasies describes a woman clinging to an internal childlike world of fantasy while simultaneously denying the challenges posed by external adult society. In other words – and with the retrospective utilisation of later terminology – Jung suggested that she was over-attached to a particular archetype and repressing others, with the projected result being the general detriment of her mental health. However, as Jung stated seven years later during his ‘Seminar on Analytical Psychology’, he retrospectively judged himself to have been suffering from a somewhat inverse, although equally repressive, condition. As a rigorously intellectual thinker, Jung summarised his early opinion of fantasy as something “repellent… a form of thinking I held to be altogether impure, a sort of incestuous intercourse, thoroughly immoral from an intellectual viewpoint”.22 Yet, after analysing the Miller fantasies, Jung notes that he subsequently began to analyse his own hitherto repressed fantasy function alongside that of Miller’s. After adapting Miller’s fantasies into a symbolic mythological framework conducive to his own personality, Jung successfully assimilated the previously repressed fantastical aspect that Miller represented into his self. Thus, according to a rather conceited statement, Jung considered himself to have:

...found a lump of clay, turned it into gold and put it in my pocket. I got Miller into myself and strengthened my fantasy power by the mythological material.23

Furthermore, Jung came to believe that the body and soul of an individual contain ancestral components of the collective unconscious that stretch backwards through time, from the present day, through the Middle Ages and classical antiquity, until finally reaching primitivity.24 In The Psychology of the Unconscious, this psychological heritage is introduced regarding Freudian dream analysis to suggest a phylogenetic link between the fantastical and mythological thinking of primitive cultures and children. As Jung states:

This train of thought is not a strange one for us, but quite familiar through our knowledge of comparative anatomy and the history of development, which show us how the structure and function of the human body are the results of a series of embryonic changes which correspond to similar changes in the history of the race.

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Jung, ‘Analytical Psychology’, 34. 22



Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, 235-236.

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Therefore, the supposition is justified that ontogenesis corresponds in psychology to phylogenesis. Consequently, it would be true, as well, that the state of infantile thinking in the child's psychic life, as well as in dreams, is nothing but a re-echo of the prehistoric and the ancient.25

The references to ontogenesis, phylogenesis and embryonic development are obviously terms borrowed from the biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919). One of Haeckel’s most important propositions was the now-rejected hypothesis of the theory of recapitulation, which contended that during the embryonic development of an animal, the embryo progressed through the evolutionary stages of its ancestors until birth or hatching. As Joseph Cambray has stated, Haeckel’s theory of recapitulation was central to Freud’s understanding of psychology.26 It is, therefore, hardly surprising that Jung also utilised Haeckel’s theory – indeed, Cambray notes many similarities between specific mandala paintings in The Red Book and examples of Haeckel’s rather artistically stylised depictions of nature.27 But, by transposing Haeckel’s theory of recapitulation from the biological to the psychological, Freud and Jung re-oriented what was an automatic and linear process for Haeckel – fertilisation to gestation – into an active interaction with history. One of the major milestones of Jung’s phylogenetic approach to psychology as a recapitulation of history, is that of Meister Eckhart (1260-1328), whom Jung later credited with anticipating the discovery of the unconscious.28 It is perhaps telling that, in the same 1925 seminar where Jung divulged his assimilation of Miss Frank Miller’s personality into his self, he also reinterpreted the dream from 1912 that heralded his split with Freud. Here, the “knight of powerful build” that confronts the “old Austrian customs guard” is not Jung, per se, but Meister Eckhart himself. Jung describes this knight/Eckhart as representing a time “when many ideas blossomed, only to be killed again, but they are coming again to life now”.29 And, indeed, in Jung’s 1951 book Aion, Eckhart and his theories are described in the following manner:

Well might the writings of this Master lie buried for six hundred years, for "his time was not yet come." Only in the nineteenth century did he find a public at all capable of appreciating the grandeur of his mind.30

Although Jung never described himself as having recapitulated anybody, including Nietzsche or Meister Eckhart, the integral role of such a process regarding Jungian psychology is explicitly described during the later alchemical stage of his career in relation to Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) – another great Germanic figure whose recapitulation was necessary for psychological development. The importance of psychological recapitulation can be seen,

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Carl Jung trans. Beatrice Hinkle, The Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido; A Contribution to the History of the Evolution of Thought (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1949), 28. 26

Joseph Cambray, ‘The Red Book: Entrances and Exits’, in Thomas Kirsch & George Hogenson eds., The Red Book: Reflections on C.G. Jung’s Liber Novus (New York: Routledge, 2014), 40. 27

Cambray, ‘The Red Book’, 43-45. 28

Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung vol. 9 part II – Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, 2

nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1968), 193-194.

29 Jung, ‘Analytical Psychology’, 39.

30 Jung, Aion, 194.

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firstly in his insistence that Boehme and Paracelsus irreparably divorced Protestant mysticism and natural science, thus removing the symbolism of alchemy from the academic and wider public consciousness;31 and secondly, in a more practical manner, during his 1934 lecture ‘A Study of the Process of Individuation’ (and which was substantially revised in 1950). This study contains one of Jung’s most important exemplars: a fifty-five-year-old Danish patient – Miss X – whom Jung began treating in 1928;32 and is perhaps most famous for the 24 paintings that Miss X painted, which Jung contextualised as her gradual process of individuation and which have, to a certain point, become emblematic thereof. Essentially, Jung suggests that, before any progress can be made, Miss X must experience and recapitulate the psychological states that served as progenitors to the conditions of her contemporary society. A vital aspect of this process of recapitulation is the necessity for evolution and subsequent re-orientation of previous psychological states – what was previously acceptable is not necessarily so for the present. And, accordingly, Jung re-orients what was the final rubedo stage of Boehme’s alchemical speculations to the initial nigredo stage of Miss X’s process of individuation.33 Taking his description of Miss X and Boehme into account, by coming to equate a character he had previously identified as himself with Meister Eckhart – crucially, only the anticipator of the unconscious, not the discoverer – it would seem that Jung is aligning his own individuation with this process of phylogenetic recapitulation. This is especially so, as Jung’s understanding of Meister Eckhart appears to be intimately connected to his eventual comprehension of the Miller fantasies and his assimilation of the fantastic symbolic properties that, from his perspective, she personified. As Jung states in his 1921 book Psychological Types (although developed during the relevant period of 1913 to 1917/1918):34

…symbols are shaped energies, determining ideas whose affective power is just as great as their spiritual value. When, says Eckhart, the soul is in God it is not "blissful," for when this organ of perception is overwhelmed by the divine dynamis it is by no means a happy state. But when God is in the soul, i.e., when the soul becomes a vessel for the unconscious and makes itself an image or symbol of it, this is a truly happy state.35

In other words: when one is dominated by the fantastic archetypical properties of the unconscious, one ends up a neurotic, like Miss Miller; on the other hand, when one assimilates an archetype via an external compartmentalising symbol, one is strengthened as Jung considered himself to have been. Accordingly, although Jung’s phylogenetic process of psychological development was not as advanced in Psychological Types as later demonstrated by his explication of Miss X’s process 31

Carl Jung, ‘Religious Ideas in Alchemy’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 12 – Psychology and Alchemy, 2

nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1968), 227 & 450.

32 Carl Jung, ‘A Study in the Process of Individuation’ in Jung, Collected Works, vol. 9 part I – The Archetypes

and the Collective Unconscious, 2nd

edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1969), 290-291. 33

Jung, ‘A Study in the Process of Individuation’, 300-302. 34

Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung vol. 6I – Psychological Types (New York: Princeton University Press, 1976), v. 35

Jung, Psychological Types, 251.

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of individuation, it is presented in a slightly more developed manner in contrast to The Psychology of the Unconscious. This can be seen when Jung introduces two figures whom he considered to have directly and substantially influenced the contemporary psychological situation as he perceived it – namely, Wagner and Nietzsche. In Jung’s opinion, both gathered insight from the Middle Ages but, whereas Wagner is condemned for having retreated into a historic fantasy world of grail legends, Nietzsche is judged to have seized upon the heroic Medieval concept of a master caste and morality and propelled it into the future. Jung found it significant that both Germanic visionaries returned to the Middle Ages for inspiration, which gives him cause to propose Meister Eckhart as the catalyst for this mystical Germanic tradition, seemingly through osmosis alone. It seems that, by describing Wagner and Nietzsche in this manner, Jung is suggesting that both attempted to recapitulate aspects of the Middle Ages – consciously or otherwise – before ultimately failing for different reasons. These reasons are quite nebulously described – Wagner because he overemphasised love to the detriment of power and Nietzsche vice versa – but lead to one of the more important points in Psychological Types: because of their failures, a return to the Middle Ages was necessary for Jung, as it was an “age [that] left behind a question which still remains to be answered”. This unanswered question is also afforded only a vague description as “possibly… the germ of a new orientation to life, in other words, a nascent symbol”, yet is stated in relation to Meister Eckhart’s “purely psychological and relativistic conception of God and of his relation to man”.36 Indeed, Jung’s preoccupation with the Middle Ages, unanswered questions, and the relativistic psychological relationship between god and humanity is not a particularly new innovation and can be traced to his earliest writings from his student lectures some twenty years previously.37 As Jung states in relation to Miss X, while a conscious realisation of the internalisation of psychological ancestors is not required, the evolving nature of an individual’s relationship with these figures – or, at least, the psychological states they represent – has a profound effect on the manner in which the archetypes are understood and expressed. For example, Jung explains Miss X’s apparently unconscious utilisation of the archetypical figure of Mercury in her paintings as a “spontaneous emergence” of Boehme’s characterisation of Mercury, rather than coincidence or cryptomnesia.38 This would seem to make the psychologised recapitulation of historical figures – and addressing what he identified as the unanswered questions they left behind – the foundational point of Jung’s psychology in practical terms. For Jung himself, the most immediate of these ancestral figures in 1912 was, of course, Nietzsche. And, as will be seen, Nietzsche provided the basis for Jung’s understanding of the imagoes (the precursors of the archetypes) and libido in The Psychology of the Unconscious – something which is reflected during the first two-thirds of The Red Book. However, this focus on Nietzsche is eventually and quite dramatically departed from during the last third of The Red Book, after a specifically stated intention to return to the Middle Ages. In fact, this intention is described as a necessity – one born from having only indirectly experienced the Middle Ages through others, by which Jung’s allusive description of Nietzsche’s attempted recapitulation is presumably meant.39 Although

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Jung, Psychological Types, 241-242. 37

Carl Jung trans. Jan van Heurck, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung: Supplementary Volume A – The Zofingia Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 94. 38

Jung, ‘A Study in the Process of Individuation’, 308 fn. 61. 39

Jung, The Red Book, 330r.

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Meister Eckhart is never directly referred to in The Red Book, it will nevertheless become apparent that Eckhart was an influential figure, who informed significant developments between Jung’s psychology as recorded in The Psychology of the Unconscious and Psychological Types. However, as Hanegraaff correctly notes, The Red Book contains no references to many of the staples of later Jungian psychology – for example, the collective unconscious, archetypes, and so on.40 Yet, on a superficial level, the fact that they are never mentioned is perhaps not such a sizeable issue. After all, in his private recordings, why would Jung feel the need to enter into lengthy and ultimately superfluous clarifications of constructs he was encountering and – to an extent – familiar with, when there was no wider audience intended? Indeed, already integral terms of Jungian psychology – in particular, the libido and imagoes – are also completely unmentioned. Thus, despite the absence of any academic terminology whatsoever, this dissertation will contend that The Red Book nevertheless appears to be the arena in which Jung encountered and explored concepts such as the imagoes/archetypes and the collective unconscious which, as stated, were shaped by the internalisation and recapitulation of the historical and culturally specific figures Jung considered essential for one’s individuation. 2.1 The Eternal Recurrence Unlike any other historical figure Jung refers to in the context of a psychological recapitulation, there was one major aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy that presented a significant difficulty – namely, the eternal recurrence. Despite Jung emphasising Nietzsche’s supposedly forward-thinking nature in Psychological Types, one could equally classify Nietzsche’s thought as largely “backwards-looking” as, for example, Judith Norman does in her introduction to Nietzsche’s autobiography Ecco Homo (written in 1888, but not published until 1908).41 The tension between these perspectives permeates Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence, which he himself considered to be “the basic idea of [his] work” in Ecce Homo.42 However, as with much of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the precise manner in which the eternal recurrence was proposed to function was never explained in detail. Initially, the eternal recurrence was proposed by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in a chapter entitled ‘The Convalescent’, although previously hinted at in ‘On the Vision and the Riddle’. Here, the animals in Zarathustra’s cave embellish Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s rudimentary description of the eternal recurrence with the following words:

‘Now I die and disappear,’ you [Zarathustra] would say, ‘and in an instant I will be a nothing. Souls are as mortal as bodies.

But the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs – it will create me again! I myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence.

40

Hanegraaff, ‘Great War of the Soul’, 6. 41

Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are in Nietzsche trans. Norman, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, xviii. 42

Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 123.

13

I will return, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this snake – not to a new life or a better life or a similar life:

– I will return to this same and selfsame life, in what is greatest as well as in what is smallest, to once again teach the eternal recurrence of all things –

– to once again speak the word about the great earth of noon and human beings, to once again proclaim the overman to mankind.

I spoke my word, I break under my word: thus my eternal fate wills it – as proclaimer I perish!

The hour has now come for the one who goes under to bless himself. Thus – ends Zarathustra’s going under!’ –43

This quote would seem to suggest that Nietzsche considered the significance of the eternal recurrence to be a realisation and affirmation of an absolute property of a mechanistic philosophy. Indeed, although none of his published works explicitly make this claim, it is revealed in his unpublished notebooks that Nietzsche initially attempted to prove the eternal recurrence in a scientifically objective manner before ultimately abandoning the task.44 The repercussions of such a literal repetition regarding Jung’s proposition of experiencing and recapitulating a Nietzschean state of psychology are potentially quite dangerous. This is especially so if one ascribes, as Jung did, Nietzsche’s philosophical and psychological beliefs as being solely responsible for his mental collapse. Simply put: if one is intending to experience such a Nietzschean state, complete with a literal interpretation of the eternal recurrence, what prevents one from repeating Nietzsche’s madness? Of course, the point of recapitulating various figures was not to repeat psychological states as an automatic biological practice, but to address what Jung considered to be fundamental psychological mistakes at the heart of individuals’ theories. Yet, for example, while Jung may have diagnosed Boehme as being responsible for a number of significant psychological issues, Boehme never suffered a permanent mental collapse. Thus, while experiencing Boehme may indeed lead to a number of painful crises, recapitulation is nevertheless possible as one is still mentally cognisant, something juxtaposed by Nietzsche’s eleven years of infirmity prior to his eventual death. In contrast, the eternal recurrence is presented differently in the second, re-drafted version of The Gay Science (published in 1887, after both Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil):

The heaviest weight. – What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this

43

Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Adrian Del Caro, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 178. 44

Lawrence Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence (New York & London: Routledge, 2005), 8.

14

moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!’ Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine.'45

In this case, the prefix “what if” suggests a hypothetical question, symbolic of cultivating an abstract ideal, rather than an absolute mechanical certainty. These two quotes from Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Gay Science present a small example of typical Nietzschean imprecision, indicative of a larger trend that has, of course, resulted in a multitude of differing interpretations. Perhaps the most interesting investigation of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence is Lawrence Hatab’s 2005 book Nietzsche’s Life Sentence. To establish the premise of his book, Hatab summarises what he identifies as the three typical interpretations of the eternal recurrence:

1. Those that concede eternal recurrence as some kind of literal claim about the world, but that see such a claim as either false or injurious to other basic elements of Nietzsche’s thought.

2. Those that redescribe eternal recurrence as a metaphorical or symbolic expression of some insight or philosophical position that has nothing to do with literal repetition.

3. Those that construe eternal recurrence as an ethical imperative that can guide action.46

In relation to the previously given examples from Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Gay Science, the former quite clearly corresponds to Hatab’s first mode of interpreting the eternal recurrence. The latter is less obvious, but corresponds to Hatab’s second mode of interpretation, where the eternal recurrence is relegated to the level of a hypothetical thought experiment – one that removes the literal aspect and thereby transforms it into what is effectively an abstract, contemplative practice. Hatab’s third and final mode of interpretation is slightly more difficult to describe but is contextualised as potentially complementing either of his first two modes of interpretation. In short: the eternal recurrence is proposed to act as an individualistic version of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) categorical imperatives. According to this rather unorthodox interpretation, instead of attempting to formulate universal imperatives, one should rather concentrate on the ethical validity of one’s individual actions as personal imperatives to be eternally repeated. As Hatab states:

Unlike a Kantian test of universality and rational consistency, the concentrating effect of repetition can simply generate a powerful focus on an individual’s choices and possibilities; it can thus prompt a reflective posture that overcomes careless or

45

Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Adrian Del Caro, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 194. 46

Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence, 9.

15

thoughtless behaviour because of the psychological impact of considering the eternally repeated “record” of a certain course of action.47

Of course, the intensity of this “psychological impact” depends on whether one understands any repetition of action literally or symbolically. Ultimately, the first two typical interpretations of the eternal recurrence Hatab poses are ostensibly mutually exclusive, yet he presents an intriguing and convincing argument for their reconciliation. The manner by which Hatab attempts this reconciliation is greatly relevant to Jung’s understanding of the eternal recurrence in The Red Book and will accordingly be explored in more detail in section 3.0. However, for the present, it is perhaps sufficient to mention only that such a reconciliation between these two seemingly diametrically opposed interpretations of the eternal recurrence can, in fact, be observed in Nietzsche’s own work. Indeed, Hatab identifies Thus Spoke Zarathustra as the primary arena for this reconciliation48 – the previously cited quote is, while unequivocal in its proposition of a mechanistic interpretation of the eternal recurrence, only the statement of Zarathustra’s animal disciples and, after all, not the man himself. Due to the poetic nature of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the nuances that allow this interpretation can be difficult to identify yet are more easily apparent in Nietzsche’s unpublished works. Thus, for example, the following example from Nietzsche’s notebooks relates more directly to Hatab’s three typical interpretations:

My teaching says: Live in such a way that you must desire to live again; this is the task – you will live again in any case! He for whom striving gives the highest feeling, let him strive; he for whom rest gives the highest feeling, let him rest; he for whom ordering, following, and obeying gives the highest feeling, let him obey. Only provided that he becomes aware of what gives him the highest feeling and that no means toward it are avoided or feared. Eternity is at stake!49

The first exhortation to “live in such a way that you must desire to live again” suggests a symbolic interpretation; the subsequent declaration of “you will live again in any case” suggests a literal interpretation; while the remaining text suggests the interpretation of developing personal imperatives. Ultimately, it is arguable that the difficulties inherent in reconciling the literal and symbolic interpretations of the eternal recurrence persisted throughout Jung’s career, as even in 1937 during his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Jung declares that he “cannot quite understand [the eternal recurrence]”, thus betraying a degree of continuing uncertainty.50 However, despite Jung’s apparent uncertainty, this dissertation will contend that, much as the Middle Ages presented Jung with an unanswered question, Nietzsche presented an

47

Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence, 121. 48


Friedrich Nietzsche eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Sämtlicher Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe vol. 9 – Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880-1882 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), 505 in Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence, 122. 50

Carl Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1934-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 1044.

16

unanswered question to Jung in The Red Book. Furthermore, although Jung makes use of differing terminology, this dissertation will contend that his and Hatab’s solutions are, nevertheless, quite similar. 2.2 Jung’s Knowledge of Kant and Early Understanding of Nietzsche However, before examining the similar manner in which Hatab and Jung attempt to reconcile the literal and symbolic, it is worth exploring Hatab’s influences regarding his third typical mode of interpreting the eternal recurrence. This is particularly so as, although Hatab does not make it explicitly clear, it is nevertheless obvious that the neo-Kantian philosopher Georg Simmel (1858-1918) is amongst his primary sources in this regard. And, as this third typical mode of interpretation concerns a rather unorthodox mixture of Kant and Nietzsche, it is also directly relevant to Jung’s student lectures which, as this section will contend, present the theoretical foundations of Jung’s psychology. The establishment of this theoretical foundation begins on the 18th of May 1895, when Jung became a member of the Zofingiaverein, the Swiss student union, to whom he subsequently delivered five lectures between November 1896 and January 1899. The first two of these Zofingia lectures predominantly concern Jung’s rather unorthodox interpretation of Kant. As might be expected, Jung predicated his lectures on the debate between mechanistic and vitalistic philosophies, with Jung decisively supporting the latter. Despite this support, it would appear that Jung suggests the metaphysical can, in fact, be investigated in a scientific manner. To demonstrate this, Jung completely misinterprets the sarcastic tone of Kant’s 1766 book Dreams of a Spirit Seer to be a positive description of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) and his spiritualism.51 For example, Jung predicates his first lecture on two quotes selected from Dreams of a Spirit Seer:

“For every substance, even a simply material element, must possess an internal activity as the cause of its external operation.” And: “Whatever in the world contains a principle of life appears to be immaterial in nature.”52

Jung utilises these quotes to suggest that the mechanistic sciences have, in fact, already subsumed a number of metaphysical principles into the natural sciences – for example, Jung contends that the transcendental properties of ether were physically revealed by the then-recent invention of the X-Ray in 1895.53 However, as a budding Kantian, Jung concludes his first lecture by asking the question:

But can we conceive of an immaterial body without immaterial properties? Yes, indeed, for nowadays virtually the entire scientific world is doing just that. But we do not want to go along with the crowd. What we want is to allow the immaterial to retain its immaterial properties.54

51

Bishop, The Dionysian Self, 31. 52

Jung, The Zofingia Lectures, 7. 53


Jung, The Zofingia Lectures, 19.

17

Although the meaning of this last passage is far from clear, Bishop interprets it as Jung suggesting that an artificial barrier between the physical and metaphysical should be strictly enforced, despite the apparent possibility of it being overcome mechanistically. Bishop’s interpretation continues by suggesting that the final sentence alludes to Jung positing psychology as the correct arena for the metaphysical to be investigated in a scientific manner.55 This contention would appear to be supported by the following statement made during Jung’s second lecture: “The laws governing our mental universe… [emanate] from the metaphysical order”.56 Such a statement is quite significant, as there are many occasions in Jung’s subsequent academic work where he borders on a psychologised interpretation of metaphysics, only to profess his ignorance of metaphysics and defer to others.57 Nevertheless, the fact that Jung repeatedly approaches the boundary between the psychological and metaphysical with little resolution in an academic capacity seems to be indicative of his personal beliefs as demonstrated by his early student lectures. Indeed, the vitalistic principle of the soul that Jung describes during his second lecture corresponds quite well with the basic outline of his later academic definition of the self – it is described as being necessarily phylogenic and contributes the unconscious aspect towards an individual’s self, one that is comprised of both conscious and unconscious aspects in roughly equal measurements.58 However, Jung subsequently exceeds his later boundaries by making the metaphysical claim that this vitalistic soul is “independent of space and time” and directly identifies it with the Kantian thing-in-itself.59 Naturally, such an identification of the soul with the thing-in-itself also exceeds Kant, something reflected by Jung’s subsequent re-orientation of the categorical imperative as primarily for the happiness or psychological health of the individual, rather than for the greater universal good.60 Proceeding from this first major disagreement with Kant, in his fourth lecture61 Jung suggests that the Kantian categories be reduced from twelve to the aforementioned space and time – despite neither being among Kant’s original twelve categories – along with causality.62 How Jung interprets causality is not easy to ascertain, yet Bishop describes it as referring to an instinctual and developmental mediation between the conscious and unconscious aspects of the self that were posited earlier.63 However, to ensure that neither the conscious nor unconscious aspects of the self attain a position of dominance, Jung eventually begins to draw upon Nietzsche. Jung states that philosophy should not be based on recourses to various types of reason, but from immediate experience – one must directly interact with the unconscious, not draw inferences from consciousness.64 In doing so, Jung

55



An early and relevant example being: Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, 146-147. 58

The term “self” is an anachronism borrowed from Jung’s later work. However, for the sake of clarity and conciseness, it has been utilised here and elsewhere in this section. 59

Jung, The Zofingia Lectures, 31-32. 60

Jung, The Zofingia Lectures, 65-66. 61

Jung’s third lecture was his inaugural address upon assuming the chairmanship of the Zofingiaverein. It is significantly shorter than his other lectures and predominantly concerns the union itself and the geopolitics of the day. 62


Bishop, The Dionysian Self, 35-36. 64

Jung, The Zofingia Lectures, 68.

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essentially describes his interpretations of the Kantian causation and thing-in-itself/soul along Fichtean lines – as a temporary limit with the possibility of being overcome.65 Ultimately, at the end of this fourth lecture, Jung denies – with a particularly Nietzschean turn of phrase – the applicability of opposites struggling for supremacy, as “no diversity can develop without the existence of its opposite”.66 The fifth and final Zofingia lecture that Jung presented confirmed his turning away from professing a purely Kantian perspective. Here, Kant is directly criticised for negatively limiting the concept of the thing-in-itself/soul;67 and indirectly, via Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889), for denying the possibility of direct revelation from god, mysticism, and ultimately an unio mystica.68 Indeed, one of Jung’s primary concerns during this last Zofingia lecture was explicitly Nietzschean – namely, the erosion of values by Christianity. However, this is presented as a Christianity predicated on Kantian reason eroding a Christianity derived from mysticism. Accordingly, during the conclusion, Jung quotes the following from Eduard von Hartmann’s (1842-1906) 1874 book The Religion of the Future:

“The world of metaphysical ideas must always remain the living fountain of feeling in religious worship, which rouses the will to ethical action. Whenever this fountain dries up, worship becomes petrified and turns into a dead, meaningless ceremony, while religious ethics wither into a dry and abstract moralizing or a sentimental phrase-mongering which holds no attraction for anyone!”69

A few paragraphs later, Jung concludes his final lecture by urging Christians to contemplate the possibility of a metaphysical unio mystica with the following statement:

Anyone who wishes to hold fast to the metaphysical reality of the elements of Christian faith… must never lose sight of the fact that Christianity represents nothing less than the break with an entire world, a dehumanization of man, a “revaluation of all values” (Nietzsche).70

Bishop suggests that Jung’s interpretation of Nietzsche in a Christian manner indicates that Jung was, at this stage, still relatively unfamiliar with Nietzsche’s work.71 However, while this is likely to be the case, Jung nevertheless closely linked Nietzsche with Christianity during his later academic career.72 Indeed, while Jung’s interpretation of Kant and Nietzsche is certainly unconventional and occasionally confusing, it should not be dismissed out of hand as a misplaced youthful enthusiasm. In an admittedly inexperienced manner, they exhibit what I consider to be the theoretical foundations of Jung’s psychology – foundations that persisted throughout his entire career, yet are most apparent in his more personal works, eventually epitomised by The Red Book.

65








For example, the following and relevant statement from his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “Nietzsche was in a secret way more Christian than anyone would expect”: Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 158.

19

Firstly, in Jung’s first two lectures, he presents his interpretation of Kant which resulted in:

1) Jung considering it possible for metaphysics to be interpreted through psychology. 2) Consequently, Jung identified the Kantian thing-in-itself with the unconscious aspect

of an individual’s self – the soul – ultimately re-orienting the universal absolute categorical imperative into something primarily concerned with an individual’s relative psychological health.

Secondly, in Jung’s last two lectures, he introduces some nascent Nietzschean aspects which resulted in:

3) The relatively equivalent importance of the conscious and unconscious, established in terms of neither being understandable without the other. Furthermore, direct interaction with the unconscious is advocated, in contrast to drawing on inferences from consciousness and reason.

4) Consequently, the metaphysical or unconscious part of an individual must be utilised as the foundation of ethics – one that will encourage a “revaluation of all values”.

Jung’s interpretation of Kant and Nietzsche – particularly regarding the metaphysical – is, however, not as unique or outlandish as might be supposed. This is particularly so when one considers the similarities between what Jung proposes in his Zofingia lectures and the contents of Simmel’s 1907 book Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Of course, Simmel’s book was published some eight years after the last of Jung’s Zofingia lectures, yet Simmel concisely presents something consistent with what Jung eventually began to describe, albeit with a greater philosophical rigour. And, while I have been unable to find any indication that Jung was familiar with any of Simmel’s works, it is nevertheless possible that Simmel’s book provided Jung with a more comprehensive summary of ideas similar to his own. Without entering into overly-specific details, in the space of a handful of pages Simmel presents the following:

1) Metaphysics and psychology are directly equated as arenas that allow logical impossibilities to co-exist – for example, the finite and infinite, being and becoming etc. – and therefore “cannot reasonably be expected to meet the demands of other scientific approaches”. In other words: metaphysics and psychology are the only manners by which the Kantian boundary of reason can be surpassed.73

2) Consequently, Simmel advocates reinterpreting the categorical imperative individualistically by attempting to formulate personal imperatives by concentrating on the ethical validity of one’s individual actions. This is presented in a Fichtean manner, by imagining one’s actions as contributing towards the development of a methodically developing personal eternal law.74

In addition to potentially presenting Jung with a more philosophically rigorous summary of ideas similar to his own, it is also possible that Simmel contributed to Jung’s understanding of Nietzsche. Such a possibility particularly concerns the eternal recurrence which, perhaps due to the lack of familiarity Bishop suggests, is completely absent from Jung’s Zofingia

73

Georg Simmel trans. Helmut Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein and Michael Weinstein, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 175. 74

Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 172.

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lectures. However, the eternal recurrence is the lynchpin of Simmel’s mixture of Kant and Nietzsche, and accordingly informs Simmel’s initial proposition of personal imperatives, which continues with a complementary second interpretation:

3) Namely, the eternal recurrence is interpreted as the repetition of circumstances that an individual experiences, rather than a repetition of the individual itself. Ultimately, Simmel considered it futile for an individual and the circumstances they experience to repeat alongside one another for the sole reason that, if one is unaware of past repetitions, one cannot learn from their consequences. Simmel therefore considers a more insightful interpretation of the eternal recurrence to involve a developing ego positing increasingly more refined responses by experiencing the recurrence of identical situations.75

4) Ultimately, Simmel’s ethical and metaphysical interpretations interact reciprocally in the arena of psychology to facilitate the continuing development of the Overman.76 Particularly relevant regarding any possible influence on Jung is that Simmel argued that the psychological power of the eternal recurrence existed in it being considered an abstract symbol.77

Particularly regarding these last two points, Simmel’s interpretation of the eternal recurrence would seem to require the acknowledgement of at least two internal egos, albeit on a temporary basis – the current state of the ego re-experiencing the situation, and another that effectively provides a snapshot of the ego’s original state during the initial encounter with the situation. While there are obvious differences, the practice of a dynamic ego internalising the static conclusion of a previous ego does bare some similarity to Jung’s psychological recapitulation. In other words: by becoming conscious of experiencing a Nietzschean psychological state – an ancestral component of the collective unconscious contained within his body and soul – Jung is capable of utilising Nietzsche’s prior example to derive a more refined solution. And, while Simmel strongly criticises what he describes as recapitulation, he is referring to an automatic biological recapitulation similar to that of Haeckel, rather than the interactive psychological recapitulation that Freud and Jung would later propose.78 Regardless of any potential influence Simmel may have had on Jung, it is apparent that Jung began to study Nietzsche in more detail soon after the completion of his student lectures, yet this was preceded by a considerable degree of trepidation. The coincidence that Jung was studying at Basel – where Nietzsche had taught philology before his fragile heath necessitated him to retire – was significant for him, as was the generally dismissive attitude of the academics at the university, which motivated Jung in a contrarian manner. However, as Jung states:

I was held back by a secret fear that I might perhaps be like him, at least in regard to the "secret" which had isolated him from his environment. Perhaps – who knows? –

75

Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 173-174. 76

Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 175-179. 77

Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 172 78

Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 174.

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he had had inner experiences, insights which he had unfortunately attempted to talk about, and had found that no one understood him.79

This is quoted from Jung’s (semi)autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections, and seems to be conflating his later experience of being rejected by Freud with an early reticence towards reading Nietzsche. Ultimately though, Jung read Thus Spoke Zarathustra and was immediately struck by Zarathustra being, not only Nietzsche’s second personality, but perhaps, in some way, his own. Indeed, during his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Jung considered Zarathustra to be an aspect of Nietzsche’s personality, one that Nietzsche was frequently identical with.80 It would even seem that Nietzsche was conscious of this identification when, for example, he describes his and Zarathustra’s tasks as being identical in Ecce Homo.81 Thus, Jung seems to be describing a situation where Zarathustra represents both a repetition of an aspect of Nietzsche’s personality, but also an aspect of his psychological ancestry via the collective unconscious. More worryingly though, Jung identified Zarathustra as a morbid personality which, in his words:

…filled me with a terror which for a long time I refused to admit, but the idea cropped up again and again at inopportune moments, throwing me into a cold sweat, so that in the end I was forced to reflect on myself.82

Indeed, it is apparent that Jung closely read Thus Spoke Zarathustra. As part of his medical dissertation, which he presented in 1902, Jung saw fit to investigate a supposedly cryptomnesial link between a passage in Justinus Kerner’s (1786-1862) periodical Leaves from Prevorst (published between 1831 and 1839) and the ‘Of Great Events’ chapter of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Jung was so convinced of this link that he began a correspondence with Förster-Nietzsche who confirmed that, between the ages of 12 and 15, both Nietzsche children were exposed to the Leaves from Prevorst.83 As Bishop notes, as a result of their quite in-depth correspondence, Förster-Nietzsche ultimately invited Jung to Nietzsche’s funeral.84 Although there is no evidence that he accepted or attended, the invitation must have been quite an uncanny experience for Jung, who was just beginning his simultaneous identification and struggle with Nietzsche/Zarathustra.

3.0 Identification and Virtual Reality To briefly summarise so far:

1) Although Jung had encountered Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a student and was captivated by the book, it was not until the key year of 1912 that he directly confronted Nietzsche/Zarathustra as the threatening reflection of his potentially morbid second personality.

79


For example: Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 131 81

Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 133. 82


Carl Jung, ‘On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomenon’ trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung vol. 1 – Psychiatric Studies, 2

nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1970), 102-103. 84

Bishop, The Dionysian Self, 21.

22

2) A number of coincidental circumstances accompanied this – namely, the imminent onset of WWI, Jung’s affair with Wolff, and the conclusion of his relationship with Freud – all of which isolated Jung in both personal and professional capacities, and effectively ensured a stressful and relatively lonely condition. As Jung’s interest in Nietzsche was a significant bone of contention between Jung and Freud, it is unsurprising that in Jung's mind Nietzsche initially assumed the place of an intellectual surrogate.

3) Jung’s experience with Miss Frank Miller appears to have encouraged him to encounter the unconscious via direct internal interactions, the limit of which was regulated by the psychological ancestor being recapitulated.

4) Jung’s subsequent recapitulation of Nietzsche and the inherent difficulties of the eternal recurrence worried him with the possibility that he would, in some manner, succumb to the same mental collapse.

To continue, the primary issue here is one of identification. Specifically: to what extent did Jung believe an identification with Nietzsche/Zarathustra was necessary, when considered as a confluence of his ideas regarding psychological recapitulation and the eternal recurrence? This section will therefore examine how identification is understood, particularly regarding Nietzsche and Jung’s conceptions of internal interactions with psychological ancestors. This examination will involve the beginnings of a more detailed reading of Jung and Nietzsche, while also returning to Hatab’s synthesis of literal and metaphorical interpretations of the eternal recurrence. In ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’, Nietzsche uses the metaphor of a tightrope-walker to describe humanity’s continuous struggle, one that progresses from humanity’s primate ancestors in the direction of the Overman. Indeed, in its present condition, humanity is described as “more ape than any ape”. In exhorting his audience to will the Overman into being as the ultimate meaning on earth, Zarathustra does not deny humanity’s predecessors – nor, indeed, the predecessors of the Overman – despite referring to them as “pollution”. Instead, Zarathustra makes an analogy between the Overman and the sea, where one must be large enough to absorb the polluted rivers of primitive humanity without becoming polluted in turn. There is even the suggestion that this pollution – specifically, an accurate understanding of it – is necessary. For example, during ‘On Virtue that Makes Small’, Zarathustra returns from a journey out onto the ocean with the ostensible intention of returning to his cave in the mountains. However, his first act upon reaching land is to assess the state of humanity in order to contextualise his own relationship with the generic level of human development. Although much of the above is stated by Nietzsche in a somewhat negative manner, it nevertheless bears a similarity with Jung’s phylogenetic psychology, where figures such as Boehme and Meister Eckhart must be confronted as being responsible for having established the cultural norms and psychological problems that permeate any given society. Indeed, it is likely that, along with Haeckel, Nietzsche was a significant influence upon Jung in this regard. In The Psychology of the Unconscious, Jung immediately follows the previously mentioned allusion to Haeckel (see this dissertation, pages 8-9) with a corresponding quote from Human, All Too Human:

23

The perfect clarity of all dream representations, which presupposes an unconditional belief in their reality, reminds us again of the conditions of an earlier humanity, in whom hallucination was exceptionally frequent and sometimes seized upon whole communities, whole peoples at the same time. Therefore: in sleep and dreams we go through the lessons of earlier humanity once again.85

More positive descriptions can be found in Nietzsche’s 1873 article (although only published in 1896) ‘On Truth and Lies in an Nonmoral Sense’, where he describes the unconscious or instinctual aspects of humanity as “an accumulated ancestral estate in which everyone has a share”.86 This is indeed one of Nietzsche’s more obscure articles, but a similar idea can be found in his 1886 book Beyond Good and Evil, albeit less explicitly.87 In any case, it would seem that Jung also endorsed “going through the lessons of earlier humanity” up to and including Nietzsche. This is, however, not a simple and automatic repetition. The clearest example is, once again, found in Jung’s explication of Miss X’s mandala paintings. Here, Jung describes Miss X’s individuation as reaching its nigredo stage in relation to Boehme’s rubedo stage – what was the highest point is now the lowest. Similarly, what was the pinnacle of Nietzsche’s individuation as presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is now Jung’s lowest and most dangerous point. In this sense, the Overman is not an attainable goal, per se, but rather a constant developmental impulse – a continuous oscillation between being (which must be passively and unconditionally accepted as an inherent component of oneself) and becoming (which must be actively projected into the future). Such a developmental impulse inherently requires the Overman to be a constant Nietzschean overcoming and re-evaluation of values. Both of Nietzsche and Jung’s above examples would seem to coincide with Hatab’s aforementioned second typical interpretation of the eternal recurrence – a metaphorical or symbolic expression that avoids a physical repetition. However, as introduced in section 2.1, Hatab combines the metaphorical interpretation with a literal component. To do this, Hatab draws on the traditional Greek concept of mimesis when interpreted as an audience member or performer’s identification with a dramatic performance,88 which was a particular concern for Nietzsche in his 1872 book The Birth of Tragedy. Here, poetry is identified with the Apollonian and is something that projects a more consciously individuated world.89 In contrast, music is identified with the Dionysian and is something that overwhelms conscious individuation.90 However, since both are co-ordinated in tragic drama, Nietzsche states that a mimetic effect is produced whereby one acts as if one had literally entered into another

85

Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human I, 22-23. This is unfortunately not the exact quote Jung utilises, which is significantly longer and not as focussed. The footnote in The Psychology of the Unconscious does not direct to anything in Human, All Too Human that could be said to correspond with the quote in question. However, the section I have utilised is – as far as I can tell – the only section in Human, All Too Human that presents similar ideas in a more concise manner. Ultimately, this could be an issue regarding different versions of Human, All Too Human and the differences between newer and older translations. 86

Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ in Daniel Breazezle, Philosophy and Truth: Selection from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s (New York & London: Humanities Press, 1979), 95. 87

Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Judith Norman, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20. 88

Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence, 95-96. 89

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 35-36. 90

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 33.

24

body or another character.91 In this sense, the mimesis created by the interaction of the Apollonian and Dionysian is described by Nietzsche as “a magnificent illusion”,92 which Hatab brings up to date by describing tragic drama as a virtual reality.93 Implicit in Hatab’s understanding of virtual reality are the complementary qualities of “making belief” and “suspending disbelief” – the former creates a fiction, while the latter ensures the fiction is interpreted as if it were reality. Perhaps the clearest illustration of such a scenario can be found in the Wachowskis’ Matrix series. When Neo enters the matrix, he enters a virtual reality where everything is written in code. Yet, despite knowing that the matrix is only a virtual reality, it is convincing enough that any damage sustained is inflicted upon Neo’s physical body. As Neo’s knowledge increases, he discovers that the matrix’s code can be re-written. For example, Neo’s first lesson is to repeat an impossible jump between two buildings until he himself makes the jump a possibility – what is initially written is not necessarily the truth or an inevitability. Morpheus is, of course, Neo’s mentor in gradually exceeding the initially written boundaries of the matrix, beyond even the boundaries that Morpheus himself understands. And, in a similar manner, Zarathustra addresses his animal disciples in ‘On Poets’:

“Since I have come to know the body better” – Zarathustra said to one of his disciples – “the spirit is only a hypothetical spirit to me; and all that is ‘everlasting’ – that too is only a parable.”

“Thus I heard you speak once before,” answered the disciple, “and at that time you added: ‘But the poets lie too much.’ Why then did you say that the poets lie too much?”

After a short interjection, Zarathustra continues:

“But supposing that someone said in all earnestness that the poets lie too much: he is right – we lie too much.

We also know too little and are bad learners, thus we simply have to lie. And who of us poets has not watered down his wine? Many a poisonous

hodgepodge took place in our cellars, much that is indescribable was enacted there.”94

However, the illusions of a tragic drama or virtual reality cannot – or, rather, should not – continue indefinitely. According to Hatab’s interpretation, the mimetic acts of making belief and suspending disbelief are inherently contrasted with a “real belief”. And it is in this sense that anything learned during mimetic or virtual experiences must be integrated into everyday experiences to elevate them with an extraordinary aesthetic purpose.95 In terms of the above example from the Matrix series, Neo's extraordinary aesthetic purpose could be considered to be his eventual utilisation in the real world of the skills he has learned in the

91

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 44. 92

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 115. 93


Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 99-100. 95

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 115; Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence, 95; & Ellen Dissanayake, What is Art For? (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1990), 92.

25

virtual world of the matrix. For Jung, such a purpose would seem to be answering the question posed by a psychological recapitulation of Nietzsche and similarly applying it to the real world. In other words, everyday experiences must eventually trump virtual experiences, with the result that the latter are no longer interpreted as reality and once again considered to be a fiction. In Hatab’s terms, this presents the virtual reality of the eternal recurrence as a training arena, the results of which are to be integrated into the reality of the physical world,96 a circumstance which necessarily involves Simmel’s postulation of a developing ego positing increasingly refined responses by experiencing the recurrence of identical – or, at the very least, similar – situations. At this point, the issue becomes one of recognising when and how Jung departed from Nietzsche/Zarathustra as an inherent liar and author of a “poisonous hodgepodge” and, subsequently, re-oriented his approach from passively receiving being to actively projecting becoming. 3.1 Practice: The Shadow and Inferiority 3.1.1 Simply put, I consider the beginning of Jung’s departure from Nietzsche to occur during the last paragraphs of Liber Primus in a chapter entitled ‘Resolution’. Until this point, much of The Red Book has reflected Jung’s extreme apprehension regarding the onset of WWI yet, in this chapter, Jung begins to actively yearn for this very occurrence. Jung’s rationale is that the horror of war would “become so great that it can turn men's eyes inward, so that their will no longer seeks the self in others but in themselves”. Jung believes this is necessary because the “spirit of the depths has seized mankind” – a spirit that has also naturally seized Jung himself. However, instead of passively receiving the spirit of the depths and allowing it to surface externally by engaging in war, Jung seeks to actively redeem this influence internally; instead of simply complying with the spirit of the depths, Jung states his intention to turn it inward upon itself.97 Although Jung does not name the spirit of the depths, in his 1936 article simply entitled ‘Wotan’, Jung describes the Dionysian – of which the eponymous Wotan is identified as a Germanic “cousin” – as being responsible for the outbreak of WWI. And, although Jung lists a number of contributory examples, his primary case-study is, of course, Nietzsche.98 Accordingly, in ‘The Red One’ – the second chapter of Liber Secundus – Jung encounters the titular character whom he initially suspects to be the devil. However, the Red One’s characteristics are an obvious representation of Nietzsche – among other things, the Red One’s dancing is a clear reference to Zarathustra’s dancing99 – whom Jung recognises as his personal devil. Jung and the Red One have a slightly awkward but cordial conversation, with

96

Although the intention of Morpheus’ aforementioned lesson is to train Neo for the virtual reality of the matrix, Neo ultimately utilises these skills in the physical world, thereby integrating the virtual with the real. 97

Jung, The Red Book, 254l-r. 98

Carl Jung, ‘Wotan’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 10 – Civilization in Transition, 2

nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1970), 179-184.

99 Jung, The Red Book, 260r fn. 11.

26

Jung concluding that recognising and understanding his devil’s standpoint is the correct manner by which to avoid signing a pact with him and thereby becoming him.100 Much of the above is presented in religious terms – for example, by turning the spirit of the depths upon itself, Jung considers himself to be performing a self-sacrifice and becoming “a Christ”. However, while the topic of religion is an issue for Jung and his devil – “religion is precisely what the devil and I cannot agree about” – as previously stated in section 2.2, Jung did not consider Nietzsche to be as antithetical to Christianity as might be supposed. Indeed, ‘The Images of the Erring’ – the first chapter of Liber Secundus – begins with the following verses from The Book of Jeremiah:

["Hearken not unto the words of the prophets that prophesy unto you: they make you vain: they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord." (Jeremiah 23: 16)] ["I have heard what the prophets said, that prophesy lies in my name, saying, I have dreamed, I have dreamed. How long shall this be in the heart of the prophets that prophesy lies? Yea, they are prophets of the deceit of their own heart; Which think to cause my people to forget my name by their dreams which they tell every man to his neighbour, as their fathers have forgotten my name for Baal. The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully: What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord" (Jeremiah 23: 25-28)]101

Jung’s selection of Bible verse seems intended to draw attention to the fallibility of prophets – a sentiment which bears a notable similarity to Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s declaration that poets lie. The exact nature of Jung’s issue with Nietzsche/Zarathustra therefore appears to be his necessary lies. As these lies are inseparably intermingled with Nietzsche’s work, this section will contend that key chapters of Liber Secundus appear to be Jung’s attempt to psychologically recapitulate the events of equally key chapters of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in order to recognise, understand, and ultimately improve upon, “the lessons of earlier humanity”. Furthermore, the Red One’s uncharacteristically serious concluding remarks to Jung in the form of a riddle concerning the Red One’s “province” – “it’s conceivable that there is some third thing for which dancing would be the symbol” – would seem to provide the unanswered question that Jung considered necessary to address.102 As previously mentioned, while dancing is strongly associated with Zarathustra, it is also occasionally utilised by Zarathustra’s animal disciples to represent the eternal recurrence itself.103 In other words: the primary intention of Liber Secundus would appear to be the identification of this “third thing” – the correct manner by which to utilise the eternal recurrence. 3.1.2

100

Jung, The Red Book, 261l. 101


Jung, The Red Book, 260r. 103

For example – and most prominently – in ‘The Convalescent’.

27

To begin with, by taking Jung’s seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra into account, this section will examine the events contained in the chapters listed below in order to best demonstrate Jung’s process of psychological recapitulation:

Thus Spoke Zarathustra Liber Secundus

‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ ‘One of the Lowly’

‘On Passing By’ ‘The Magician’

Throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra interacts with numerous characters – either learning from them, instructing them, or otherwise treating them as a pollution that must be understood and accordingly assimilated into the sea of his self. However, in ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ – at the very start of Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s journey – Jung identifies a partial denial that, while not judged to be irreversible at this early stage, later becomes so in ‘On Passing By’. The source of this denial concerns the appearance of a jester who firstly appears when one of Zarathustra’s audience members interprets his metaphor of a tightrope-walker to describe humanity’s continuous struggle – one that progresses from humanity’s primate ancestors in the direction of the Overman – in a literal manner. However, after beginning in earnest to traverse a tightrope, he is soon pursued by the jester who threatens to tickle him and ultimately causes him to fall. As the fallen tightrope-walker lays dying upon the ground, he is comforted and even revered in his last moments by Zarathustra, who carries him from the village and finally buries him with his own hands. During his journey from the village, the jester re-appears to somewhat superfluously urge Zarathustra to continue leaving the village, on account of its inhabitants’ lack of understanding and ridiculing of Zarathustra. Jung’s analysis is manifold. Firstly, Jung considers Zarathustra and the tightrope-walker to respectively be the superior and inferior aspects of Nietzsche’s personality.104 Secondly, Jung considers Nietzsche/Zarathustra to have accepted his inferior aspect by respecting the tightrope-walker when comforting and burying him. Thirdly, Jung considers Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s acceptance of the jester’s advice to leave the village to be a denial of the Shadow. As Jung states:

The shadow personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself and yet is always thrusting upon him directly or indirectly – for instance, inferior traits of character and other incompatible tendencies.105

Because of the conscious refusal to acknowledge negative or inferior characteristics, Jung states that the Shadow forces one to confront these characteristics via the unconscious in dreams or other fantasy experiences.106 Yet, as Jung states on many occasions, the Shadow does not give clear advice and – perhaps counterintuitively – by accepting the jester’s superficial advice and leaving the village, Nietzsche/Zarathustra remains separated from his

104

Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 159-164 & 1394-1396. Although Jung does not state this explicitly, it becomes apparent when a number of separate statements are considered as a whole. 105

Carl Jung, ‘Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 9 part I – The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, 2

nd edition (New York: Princeton

University Press, 1969), 284-285. 106

Jung, ‘Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation’, 285.

28

Shadow. However, despite this, Jung considers Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s rejection of the Shadow as the jester to not be a wholly negative result, as it induced Nietzsche/Zarathustra to recognise and accept his inferior aspect.107 In other words: Nietzsche/Zarathustra has partially accepted his Shadow by accepting the inferior directly in himself, but not indirectly in others. Indeed, Jung considered the events in ‘On Passing By’ to offer an opportunity for Nietzsche/Zarathustra to rectify the denial of the inferior in others and thus fully accept his Shadow. This chapter concerns Zarathustra’s return to his cave after having journeyed out onto the sea. Here, Zarathustra encounters a figure known as Zarathustra’s ape – so named because he has memorised some of Zarathustra’s teachings and can approximate his mannerisms. Zarathustra’s ape attempts to persuade Zarathustra from entering “the big city” by launching into a tirade that characterises the city as an essentially hopeless case where Zarathustra has “nothing to gain and everything to lose”. Eventually, Zarathustra interrupts his ape and condemns his despising as a simple and petty revenge for the city’s inhabitants’ lack of flattery. Yet, after this condemnation, Zarathustra pauses before passing the following judgement:

“I am nauseated too by this big city and not only by this fool. Here as there nothing can be bettered, nothing can be worsened.

Woe to this big city! – And I wish I already saw the pillar of fire in which it will burn!

For such pillars of fire must precede the great noon. But this has its own time and its own destiny. –

Meanwhile, you fool, I give you this lesson in parting: where one can no longer love, there one should – pass by!” –108

This judgement is, therefore, one of a number of significant occasions where Zarathustra adopts or confirms the advice or teachings of those he nevertheless considers inferior in some manner. However, unlike previous examples – while accepting the advice of Zarathustra’s ape – the act of passing by is a total denial. None of the pollution of the big city – or, indeed, Zarathustra’s ape – is absorbed by Zarathustra. In this sense, it is interesting that Zarathustra’s ape has such a name – apes are, of course, amongst the precursors listed in ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ as integral to the continuing development of the Overman. Indeed, Jung considers Zarathustra’s ape to be a re-appearance of the jester – and, therefore, the Shadow – from ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’. During his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Jung analyses the link between these two characters and the circumstances of their arrival in depth. Firstly, Jung diagnoses Zarathustra’s repeated returns to various inferior human populations as indicative of an 107

Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 159-164 & 1394-1396. Regarding this passage, Jung’s analyses of ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ and ‘On Passing By’ in his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra are occasionally unclear. However, I consider the most useful manner in which to interpret them is to assess them as a complementary whole, despite being separated by over 1,000 pages and 4 years. This is because, somewhat counterintuitively, it seems the negative impression Jung has of the events in ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ is a reflection of later events in ‘On Passing By’, while the positive impression Jung has of the events in ‘On Passing By’ is the reverse circumstance. 108

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 142.

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unconscious identification with them.109 Secondly, Jung considers the advice of the jester and Zarathustra’s ape to actually be very helpful – the Shadow is simply instructing Zarathustra not to revile the inhabitants of the city in ‘On Passing By’ as he had previously done to the inhabitants of the village in ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ because, in doing so, he is simultaneously reviling himself. But, as the Shadow is inherently cryptic, Jung contends that Nietzsche/Zarathustra repeatedly misunderstands the message, with consequences of varying degrees of severity.110 Ultimately, Jung believed that Nietzsche/Zarathustra should have undertaken the task of accepting his Shadow by not only accepting the inferior aspect in himself, but also in others – as represented by the various human populations he encounters. In Jung’s terms, while Zarathustra’s ape cryptically encourages Nietzsche/Zarathustra not to revile the inhabitants of the city for their inferiority, the jester had previously offered the same advice with similar terminology regarding the inhabitants of the village. However, Jung considers Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s initial acceptance of his own inferior aspect to offer a protection against the denied Shadow as the jester – a circumstance not offered during the second appearance of the Shadow as Zarathustra’s ape.111 Indeed, the return of the jester as Zarathustra’s ape is described by Jung to be a manifestation of the eternal recurrence – in Simmel’s terms, the eternal recurrence has offered Nietzsche/Zarathustra another chance to accept the Shadow by accepting the inferior in others. Accordingly, Jung describes the information garnered from Nietzsche’s previous experience with the jester to be used in the manner of a compass for navigation – a compass, of course, providing only rough directions.112 While Nietzsche/Zarathustra attempted to utilise this compass, Jung considers that he misread it, thereby foretelling his own fate by definitively rejecting the Shadow and the inferior in others.113 Although it is never stated, such a judgement would seem to make ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ and ‘On Passing By’ the most psychologically important chapters of Thus Spoke Zarathustra for Jung. Of course, in terms of his experiences as recorded in The Red Book, Jung’s seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra have the benefit of twenty subsequent years of analysis, yet his criticisms present an interesting retrospective. The following paragraph succinctly summarises Jung’s opinion regarding Nietzsche’s relationship with his Shadow and the inferior in others:

The shadow appeared as a dangerous demon and Nietzsche used every imaginable trick to defend himself against its onslaught. He belittled the shadow, he made light of him, he ridiculed him, he projected the shadow into everybody. And now in these chapters he criticizes and accuses everybody, the mediocrity of the world and of all those qualities which adhere to Nietzsche himself. For instance, he says it is the sincerest wish of all those mediocre people not to be hurt. But who was more susceptible to being hurt than Nietzsche himself?114

109

Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 1389-1391. 110

Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 1395. 111

Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 160-161 & 1397. 112



Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 1361.

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3.1.3 Towards the conclusion of his analysis of ‘On Passing By’, Jung states that he additionally considers the act of carrying a corpse to symbolically represent the assimilation of a psychological ancestor into one’s self. However, as one’s ancestors are the “makers of illness” and general troublemakers, this is a frequently contentious process.115 A vital aspect of the integration of ancestors is to firstly understand and then depart from their erroneous example – in Nietzsche’s terms, their “pollution” or “poisonous hodgepodge” of lies. Jung emphasises this by noting that it is “utterly futile to go on repeating the same thing” – which appears to apply to the possibility of Jung duplicating Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s two denials of his Shadow and the inferior in others, but also what Simmel described as the senselessness of automatically repeating prior examples without learning from them.116 Ultimately, it would appear that Jung’s perception of Nietzsche was such that, although Jung considered Nietzsche to have recognised the Shadow, Jung judged that Nietzsche failed to incorporate it into a truly inclusive union of opposites by only focussing on his own inferior aspect while simultaneously maligning the inferior in others. Jung’s dream encounter during ‘One of the Lowly’ – the third chapter of Liber Secundus – seems designed to counter this. During this chapter, Jung encounters a tramp whilst walking home; he has dirty clothes, has not shaved, has a chronic cough, and has lost an eye. The tramp engages Jung in conversation about mundane situations: his lack of a job, his nomadic lifestyle, his preference for city life, his love of cinema, his generic hatred of tyranny and concurrent love of freedom, his affection for a woman, and so on. Jung and the tramp’s discussion is interrupted when they arrive at a village’s country tavern where Jung is, naturally, recognised as a “gentleman” and provided with a fittingly superior space at the table. The tramp sits at the other end of the table yet looks at Jung expectantly. Jung quickly decides to have him served a proper meal and they resume their conversation, whereupon Jung immediately inquires about the manner in which the tramp lost his eye. It transpires that this occurred during a brawl over a woman for which the tramp spent six months in a prison, a circumstance that he seems – at the very least – content with, and one that he possibly enjoyed. The tramp describes the prison as beautiful, states that he worked – although, not a huge amount, apparently – and that there was enough to eat. Jung’s immediate reaction is one of fleeting embarrassment – he believes he is in “well-to-do” company and checks to see if anyone has noticed a gentleman conversing with a former convict. However, after his initial instinctual reaction, Jung considers that:

…mustn’t it be a particularly beautiful feeling to hit bottom in reality at least once, where there is no going down any further, but only upwards beckons at best? Where for once one stands before the whole height of reality?117

Consequently, Jung immediately becomes more attentive, noting that “something can be learned from this man”. However, once Jung and the tramp go to their respective rooms to sleep, Jung hears the tramp coughing, senses something amiss and rushes to the tramp’s

115




31

room where he finds him coughing up blood. Jung attempts to help the tramp, but this is futile, and the tramp dies in his arms. Jung’s interpretation of this is that he is destitute, but not destitute enough. The tramp serves as a guide for Jung – one who reveals the bottommost depths and, ultimately, “the knowledge of death”. This bottommost depth is of paramount importance for Jung as, without it, one is incapable of contextualising the heights. Thus, a man who “can no longer climb down from his heights is sick, and he brings himself and others to torment”.118 Jung’s reassessment of his initial embarrassment when conversing with the tramp is a vital aspect of this – he is no longer a distinguished gentleman on a mountain, but an unashamed member of a common life. Much as Zarathustra characterises apes and humans as tributaries that lead into a large ocean, Jung describes this depth as an ostensibly stagnant swamp, albeit one that has a continuously developmental relationship with the sea. When analysing ‘One of the Lowly’, it is worth noting the similarities between Nietzsche and the tramp. Firstly, although obviously never a tramp nor a convict, Nietzsche led a somewhat nomadic life and was often out of stable work. Secondly, although he never lost an eye in a brawl, Jung would later equate Nietzsche with Wotan – a Germanic representation of the Dionysian – who had only one eye; while his aforementioned relationship with Salomé could be considered to have been undercut by Rée in some manner. And, thirdly and finally, Nietzsche suffered from chronically bad health. Jung’s apparent characterisation of the tramp as Nietzsche is relevant because, while Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s tightrope-walker and Jung’s tramp are roughly parallel figures representing the inferior aspects of both of their personalities, Jung has additionally incorporated Nietzsche/Zarathustra as a psychological ancestor into his understanding of inferiority. Although never directly named, the eternal recurrence is present during this scene. It is mentioned most clearly when, after the tramp dies, Jung looks towards the moon and wonders how many times it has witnessed such events. However, there is also a subtler reference during the exegesis of his dream, when Jung describes himself as a pathetic figure wallowing in the swamp:

…long[ing] for the sun, for light air, for firm stones, for a fixed place and straight lines, for the motionless and firmly held, for rules and preconceived purpose, for singleness and your own intent.119

The key words here are “straight lines”, which is one of a few significant motifs for the eternal recurrence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Consequently, when comforting the dying tramp as Zarathustra had the tightrope-walker, Jung notes that the blood is not only “the life blood of your brother”, but also “your own blood”.120 In this case, the tramp is simultaneously representative of Nietzsche’s denial of the Shadow and inferior aspect in others, but also of Jung’s cognisance of being a cultural and psychological heir of Nietzsche. And, while Jung never carries the tramp’s corpse, the respect Jung shows when holding the

118




32

tramp’s body in his arms would appear to demonstrate the acceptance of Nietzsche as a psychological ancestor to be assimilated into his self before being departed from. Of note is that there is no equivalent of the jester character in ‘One of the Lowly’. However, as previously mentioned, Jung’s appraisal of Nietzsche’s relationship with his Shadow was critical of Nietzsche’s external projection of the Shadow into everyone else in order to ridicule it. Jung’s fleeting embarrassment at being associated with the tramp demonstrates the existence of the dichotomy between superiority and inferiority on some level. That this impulse comes from within Jung suggests that he is actively attempting to incorporate the Shadow into a union of opposites, and that the closeness of this union places the Shadow within Jung himself. Nevertheless, Jung’s embarrassment – however fleeting – indicates the persistence of his superior aspect. And, from this point onwards, key sections of Liber Secundus deal with Jung’s acrimonious battle with his own ego in order to attempt the union of opposites between himself, and the Shadow and the inferior aspects. The conclusion of this battle can be seen in ‘The Magician’ – the last chapter of Liber Secundus – where Jung encounters Philemon and Baucis. Here, Jung has a temperamental exchange with the modest magician Philemon whom he considers sedentary and riddlesome, before eventually leaving with the maddening feeling of not knowing whether he has actually learned anything or not. But, as he had spent some considerable time conversing with Philemon, Philemon’s neighbours consider Jung to be his student and, consequently, one admitted into the secrets of magic. However, harking back to the necessity that poets and prophets necessarily tell lies – and presumably realising that he has not fully understood the nature of magic – Jung categorically refuses to teach the people without an absolute knowledge and remains silent.121 In his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Jung mentions that, had Zarathustra remained in the village in ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ – instead of simply complying with the jester and leaving – he could have convinced the villagers of his wisdom.122 In other words, Jung seems to be suggesting that Zarathustra could have become a teacher to the village’s inhabitants.123 By extension, when confronted by Zarathustra’s ape and the inhabitants of the city, Jung would seem to be suggesting that Nietzsche/Zarathustra should have engaged with them instead of denying the inferior in others. However, becoming a teacher is precisely what Jung now avoids by refusing to engage with Philemon’s neighbours and instead focusing inwards upon himself. While recognising that lies are inherent in Nietzsche’s work, Jung seems to abhor the possibility that his own work would equally contain inherent lies. Accordingly, by focusing upon himself, Jung builds a tower – with the aid of the Cabiri – representing what he believes to be an absolute and inerrant knowledge. Yet, upon completion of the tower, Jung appears to realise that the “lower nature” the Cabiri embody – the inferior in others – have no place in his newly constructed absolute knowledge.124 Indeed, as this absolute knowledge has arisen on a purely internal basis, Jung

121



Indeed, although taken from his analysis of ‘On Priests’, teaching others is a particular concern for Jung: Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 1006. 124


33

therefore sacrifices the Cabiri and fulfils their function with his own inferior aspect – “I serve myself and I myself serve”.125 However, after refusing to teach Philemon’s neighbours, Jung immediately begins a confrontational and insulting dialogue regarding what he has learned with a projection of his own soul onto a serpent. As previously stated in section 2.2, in Jung’s student lectures, the soul is described as comprising the unconscious aspect of an individual’s self. And, in his 1939 article entitled ‘Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation’, Jung describes the Shadow as the primary focal point by which the unconscious makes itself known to the conscious. Indeed, in this capacity, the Shadow is described as the “personal unconscious”.126 It would therefore seem that, by projecting his own Shadow onto a serpent for the purpose of ridicule, Jung has succumbed to the very habit he would later condemn Nietzsche for. Nevertheless, in spite of the ridicule it is subject to, the Shadow continues in its advisory function by attempting to bring Jung’s denial of the Shadow and the inferior aspect in others to his attention, albeit with limited success. Indeed, when his soul proposes “a union with all humanity” – thereby representing a union of Jung and the inferior in others – Jung responds that it is “sinful”, to which his soul counters that he has barely begun to consider the idea.127 3.1.4 At this point in ‘The Magician’, Jung begins to rant in a basically megalomaniacal way:

I set foot on new land. Nothing brought up should flow back. No one shall tear down what I have built. My tower is of iron and has no seams... Just as a tower surmounts the summit of a mountain on which it stands, so I stand above my brain, from which I grew. I have become hard and cannot be undone again. No more do I flow back. I am the master of my own self. I admire my mastery. I am strong and beautiful and rich. The vast lands and the blue sky have laid themselves before me and bowed to my mastery. I wait upon no one and no one waits upon me. I serve myself and I myself serve. Therefore I have what I need.128

Such a finality is, of course, contrary to Jung’s earlier realisation that one must maintain some link with the depths – the water of the sea must ebb and flow back to the swamp. This egotism is also very similar to that which Jung diagnosed as the cause of Nietzsche’s madness, effectively demonstrated by the chapter titles in Ecce Homo that include ‘Why I am So Wise’, ‘Why I am So Clever’, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’ and ‘Why I am a Destiny’. However, before his interactions with the Cabiri, Nietzsche re-appears as Satan – Jung’s personal devil – in an unsuccessful attempt to remonstrate with Jung regarding the dangers of such declarations of absolute knowledge.129 Finally, it is Nietzsche as Satan and Jung’s soul/Shadow as the serpent – along with a number of other characters – that combine forces to induce Jung to recognise the mistake of rejecting the Cabiri as representatives of the inferior aspect in others with the following statement:

125


Jung, ‘Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation’, 284-285. 127



Jung, The Red Book, 320l.

34

Fear has befallen me. Whom did you carry to the mountain, you Cabiri? And whom have I sacrificed in you? You have piled me up yourselves, turning me into a tower on inaccessible crags, turning me into my church, my monastery, my place of execution, my prison. I am locked up and condemned within myself. I am my own priest and congregation, judge and judged, God and human sacrifice.130

As Huskinson’s analysis of Jung’s seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra shows, Jung argued that Nietzsche’s proposed internal reconciliation of opposites failed due to an ironic identification with one of the said opposites and subsequent neglect of the other due to the lack of an external third unifying symbol.131 Indeed, in psychologically recapitulating Nietzsche, it would appear that Jung has committed the same error. By isolating himself in a tower and attempting to reconcile the opposites of superiority and inferiority in himself, Jung has – by focussing on accepting his inferior aspect – ironically emphasised the superior, maligned the inferior in others, and declared himself to be his own god. However, as Huskinson continues, it appears that Jung contends that, while Nietzsche actually formulated this external third unifying symbol, he simply did not utilise it correctly.132 Indeed, by returning as Satan, Nietzsche is re-directing Jung’s attention to the question he presented in the similar guise of the Red One at the beginning of Liber Secundus – “it’s conceivable that there is some third thing for which dancing[/the eternal recurrence] would be the symbol”. This “third thing” would appear to be an externalised understanding of the eternal recurrence. In Hatab’s terms, an externalised understanding of the eternal recurrence is, of course, a virtual reality – an arena wherein a fiction is created, interpreted as if it were reality, until finally concluding with the integration of the virtual experiences with everyday experiences. In Jung’s terms, his fantasy experiences are interpreted as if they are reality, until eventually being departed from by integrating them into his everyday experiences. A vital aspect of everyday experiences concerns the acceptance of the inferior aspect in others – in contrast to myopically focusing on oneself – and this is precisely what Jung resolves to do:

I loved the beauty of the beautiful, the spirit of those rich in spirit, the strength of the strong; I laughed at the stupidity of the stupid, I despised the weakness of the weak, the meanness of the mean, and hated the badness of the bad. But now I must love the beauty of the ugly, the spirit of the foolish, and the strength of the weak. I must admire the stupidity of the clever, must respect the weakness of the strong and the meanness of the generous, and honor the goodness of the bad.133

Therefore, in contrast to Jung’s earlier method of confronting the spirit of the depths as stated in ‘Resolution’ – namely, by focussing entirely on oneself – this is now realised to have been only half of the battle. Furthermore, by resolving to accept the lies of others, Jung has equally realised that he is capable of committing lies himself. And, if one is capable of committing lies, one cannot declare oneself to be a god of absolute knowledge. Accordingly, ‘The Magician’ concludes with Jung encountering his ascending god (or soul in

130

Jung, The Red Book, 326r-327l. 131

Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung, 88-89. 132

Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung, 96. 133

Jung, The Red Book, 329l.

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The Black Books) and consenting to the unsettling prospect of relinquishing his godhood. On its departure, Jung’s god/soul simply say:

Do you see the sun, how it sinks red into the mountains? This day's work is accomplished, and a new sun returns. Why are you mourning the sun of today?... Why Lament? It is fate.134

I would argue that the departure of Jung’s god/soul – particularly the setting of one sun and the dawning of another – signifies the integration of Jung’s fantasy experiences into his everyday experiences, while simultaneously preparing for another fantasy experience to begin. As Hatab states, while temporarily interpreted as reality, virtual experiences must eventually be departed from by once again realising them to be fiction. And, indeed, Jung has previously demonstrated in ‘Second Day’ the capability to declare his god a fantastic aspect of his imagination – a fiction – thereby allowing Jung to carry him with greater ease. Jung even describes this process as putting his god in his pocket which, as stated in section 2.0, is the same manner by which he describes assimilating his previously repressed fantasy function as represented by Miss Miller into his self.135 Ultimately, in his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Jung states that Zarathustra is the spirit – or the god – of Nietzsche the human, for whom Nietzsche is supposed to act as a tool for continued development as part of a mutually beneficial relationship. Indeed, Nietzsche describes such a developmental relationship between himself and Zarathustra in Ecce Homo.136 However, aside from a few fleeting moments, Jung judges Nietzsche to have fully identified himself with Zarathustra – Nietzsche has confused his soul with his god.137 Indeed, the discrepancies between The Black Books and The Red Book regarding the soul/god character perfectly demonstrate Jung having briefly succumbed to the same condition in his tower. However, the ability to declare his god a fiction and thereby separate his soul from his god prevents Jung from remaining in his tower and attempting to reconcile opposites within himself, as he considered Nietzsche to have done; the eternal recurrence, when interpreted as a temporary virtual experience, allows Jung to re-experience the question posed by a situation in order to develop an increasingly more refined answer. To conclude this section, I would argue that answering the Red One’s question concerning the eternal recurrence indicates Jung believed he had successfully recapitulated Nietzsche as a psychological ancestor and was now ready to depart from Nietzsche's path. As Hanegraaff summarises, the direction is fairly easy to ascertain on a practical level – namely, an exhortation for humans to grow up and take responsibility for their own actions.138 Indeed, as will be examined in the following section, taking responsibility for one’s actions corresponds quite well with Hatab’s third complementary mode of interpreting the eternal recurrence – that of developing personal ethical imperatives.

134



Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 145. 137


Hanegraaff, ‘Great War of the Soul’, 31.

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3.2 Theory: The Libido and the Archetypes – Aesthetics and Religion, Fantasy and Ethics 3.2.1 Before demonstrating the manner in which Jung proposed utilising the fantasy experiences of the eternal recurrence on an ethical basis, the consequence of Jung departing from Nietzsche as described in the previous section will be examined in relation to the differences between his psychology as expounded in The Psychology of the Unconscious and Psychological Types. Key to this examination will be interpreting the construction of Jung’s tower and the differentiation between his soul and god in ‘The Magician’ according to the psychological structures presented in both books. To begin with, the primary intention of The Psychology of the Unconscious is Jung’s re-orientation of the libido away from Freud’s purely sexual definition towards a generalised creative force. To do this, Jung proposes that the libido is channelled into a variety of different characteristics, with sexuality being relegated to an aspect of the said characteristics.139 These characteristics are Jung’s nascent archetypes – the imagoes. In The Psychology of the Unconscious, Jung’s understanding and definition of the imagoes is indeed at an early stage of development, as only two are explicitly referred to as such – the mother and father, and collectively as the parental imagoes – despite the presence of other characteristics which would later be classified as archetypes, such as the child and the hero. Due to the polemical nature of the text and the great deal of overlaid mythological symbolism Jung utilises throughout The Psychology of the Unconscious, it is quite difficult to locate specific passages where his ideas are fully expounded. Nevertheless, it is clear that Jung primarily links the mother with destructive properties, and the father with creative properties. In spite of this, both are capable of adopting their opposite properties – for example, the father is equally capable of being destructive.140 Critically, Jung seizes upon the primary characteristics of the mother and father imagoes to describe an oscillating process of being and becoming.141 He then identifies the libido as the driving force behind this developmental process of individuation, one which Jung contextualises by suggesting that it might even be the foundational principle of human consciousness.142 Remarkably, despite the frequent invocation of Nietzsche and the multiple mentions of both Apollo and Dionysius throughout The Psychology of the Unconscious, neither are directly mentioned in relation to each other. However, despite this notable absence, Bishop persuasively correlates Jung’s understanding of the father and mother imagoes with Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian principles respectively, in addition to linking the libido with the Overman’s constant overcoming and re-evaluation of values.143 At this stage, Jung makes a rather surprising decision regarding the manner in which the libido is to be conceptualised – namely, as the father imago also contains aspects of the

139

Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, 150-151. 140

Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, 128. 141



Bishop, The Dionysian Self, 95-96.

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mother and is therefore both the creative god and the destructive devil, Jung aligns the libido primarily with the father imago.144 This alignment is significant, as Jung considers the parental imagoes to be symbolic of the libido itself145 – the father as conscious reason146 and the mother as the unconscious depths from which it originates.147 In other words, the imagoes in The Psychology of the Unconscious would appear to represent the self, albeit with one significant difference to Jung’s previous and successive works – rather than complementing each other in roughly equal measures, the father as conscious reason dominates. The manner in which Jung suggests that the libido (as the superior father and the inferior mother) guides the process of individuation is via an introversion.148 However, the primary focus is not on the mother and father themselves, but rather the various characteristics into which the libido can be channelled. Indeed, Jung states that it is only when an over-attachment to one of these characteristics develops – when conscious reality is repressed in favour of unconscious fantasy – that the parental imagoes arise in an attempt to rectify the situation by replacing the over-attached characteristic with a primitive imago surrogate.149 As previously mentioned, the 1912 publication of The Psychology of the Unconscious presents the logical theoretical point of departure for Jung’s experiences as recorded in The Red Book. And, accordingly, a particularly important passage in The Psychology of the Unconscious is the following. When summarising the oscillating process of being and becoming as represented by the mother and father imagoes, Jung states in a positive manner that:

The stern necessity of adaptation works ceaselessly to obliterate the last traces of these primitive landmarks of the period of the origin of the human mind, and to replace them along lines which are to denote more and more clearly the nature of real objects.150

Fittingly, given Jung’s later association of Nietzsche with the character, Jung utilises Wagner’s Wotan as an exemplar of this approach. And, indeed, the message and tone of this passage bear a striking resemblance to Jung’s megalomaniacal rant atop his tower in ‘The Magician’. Notably, Jung’s stated intention to “obliterate the last traces of these primitive landmarks of the period of the origin of the human mind”, is strongly reminiscent of Jung’s decision to sacrifice the Cabiri as an obsolete and inferior “lower nature”. By defining individuation as a process where the libido as the superior father and the inferior mother is introverted, Jung is actively – and even violently – rejecting that which is inferior in others. In the terms utilised in the previous section: Jung has accepted the inferior aspect as personified by the Shadow in himself, but not in others.

144







Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, 427.

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Perhaps suspecting complications regarding such an introverted drive for individuation, Jung makes the paradoxical statement during one of the more important sections of The Psychology of the Unconscious that the father’s striving for consciousness is, in fact, also a simultaneous striving towards the unconscious depths of the mother. This paradox is characterised by Jung as a consequence of a monomaniacal channelling of the libido, resulting in an over-attachment with a particular characteristic. In this case, the father’s desire for conscious individuation actually results in the unconscious fantasy world of the mother and a subsequently unconscious over-attachment with a characteristic.151 Jung’s primary case-study involves such an over-attachment with the hero characteristic. As Jung notes, one of the initial results of a patient experiencing such an over-attachment with the hero is to blame the parents. And, inasmuch as Philemon is a father-figure, this is precisely what Jung does during ‘The Magician’ when he initially blames Philemon for the construction of his tower.152 Eventually though, Jung states that, should such an over-attachment arise, the ideal situation would be for suspicions of shirking one’s duty to develop, thereby resulting in the ultimate collapse of the heroic fantasy. In other words: the removal of the hero characteristic into which the dominant father imago had directed the libido.153 As previously stated, Jung considered it necessary for a primitive imago surrogate to replace an over-attachment to a characteristic. And, in this regard, it is significant that Jung identifies the libido with the soul, with the father imago occupying a clearly dominant position.154 Thus, when Jung witnesses the departure of his soul – along with its promise to return – in The Black Books, Jung would appear to be describing an intermediate stage of the process of removing an over-attached characteristic and its replacement with a primitive imago surrogate. Jung ultimately describes the demise of such infantile heroic fantasies as one that separates the mother and father, therefore allowing enough space for the developmental oscillation of being and becoming to continue. Indeed, Jung continues that, to do otherwise, would result in a totally empty and meaningless existence in a manner that seems intended to be deliberately reminiscent of the nihilism Nietzsche describes in Human, All Too Human – namely, as a fatalistic belief in one’s own inevitable success.155 Yet the differentiation between Jung’s soul and god towards the conclusion of ‘The Magician’ demonstrates a dissatisfaction with merely restarting the scenario of conducting the father and mother imagoes – his superior and inferior aspects – via an introversion. For example, due to the introverted nature of channelling the libido, the process of individuation as described in The Psychology of the Unconscious is entirely amoral – concerns beyond an individual’s self are simply irrelevant. As the father imago contains aspects of the mother and is therefore both the creative god and the destructive devil, Jung positively exemplifies such an amorality

151




Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, 128. In his student lectures, Jung had previously described the soul as the unconscious aspect of an individual’s self. Yet, presumably because the unconscious mother imago is subsumed by the conscious father in The Psychology of the Unconscious, the soul now seems to be conflated with the self. 155

Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, 434-435.

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with God’s behaviour in The Book of Job.156 However, by the conclusion of ‘The Magician’, Jung has realised that which he had previously suspected in ‘One of the Lowly’. By becoming his own “God and human sacrifice” – the libido as both an individual’s self, but also as the over-attached hero characteristic – he only “brings himself and others to torment”. Consequently, Jung resolves to act in a more responsible and ethical manner. 3.2.2 Scrutinies, therefore, assumes a rather different tone, evidencing a departure from the process of individuation as recorded in The Psychology of the Unconscious, in favour of that of Psychological Types. Indeed, just as Jung suggested Nietzsche/Zarathustra become a teacher to others in his analysis of ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’, the introduction to Scrutinies addresses Jung’s behaviour as such an authority figure. Perhaps the most important passage is the following:

You play at modesty and do not mention your merit, in the certain hope that someone else will do it for you; you are disappointed and hurt if this doesn't happen.

You preach hypocritical composure. But when it really matters, are you calm? No, you lie. You consume yourself in rage and your tongue speaks cold daggers and you dream of revenge.157

This is, of course, very similar to the accusation Zarathustra levels against his ape in ‘On Passing By’. Here, though, the emphasis is reversed. Jung appears to be criticising himself as Nietzsche’s ape for simply accepting Nietzsche’s teachings at face value and expecting to be congratulated for it – as, for example, Jung’s previously mentioned correspondence with Freud could be construed – without either truly understanding or attempting to progress them further. And, indeed, Nietzsche is utilised in an almost obsequious manner in The Psychology of the Unconscious – after making major points, Jung frequently declares Nietzsche to be the paramount example and quotes large quantities of text as a demonstration. Of course, one attempting to facilitate the continuing development of the Overman must necessarily continue to re-evaluate one’s values – and this is precisely what Jung does in Psychological Types. The beginning of this re-evaluation is demonstrated by Jung’s change of opinion regarding the introversion of the libido. Formerly, introversion was the manner by which the mother and father imagoes as symbols of the libido directed the process of individuation. But, in Psychological Types, such an introversion is described as preventing opposites from interacting by directing the libido towards the self, ultimately resulting in an unconscious fantasy world arising.158 Furthermore, the libido is divorced from having any inherent symbolic representations, such as the mother and father imagoes. Indeed, although neither the mother nor the father are explicitly referred to, Jung’s introduction of the archetypes as inborn characteristics and specific modes of behaviour present in all humans as the collective unconscious, reclassifies the Mother and Father as archetypical properties into which the libido can be channelled. More importantly, Jung returns to

156



Jung, Psychological Types, 114-115.

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differentiating between the conscious ego on the one hand and, on the other, the self as the totality of a person’s conscious and unconscious properties.159 A significant consequence is that, unlike with the father imago, the impulse of the creative god (when understood, imprecisely at this stage, as an abstraction of the conscious ego) and the soul (when understood again as the unconscious aspect of an individual’s self) are not united by the Father archetype. There has, therefore, been a dramatic separation of things that were conflated in The Psychology of the Unconscious – namely, the libido, the imagoes/archetypes, and the conscious and unconscious aspects of an individual’s self. Indeed, in Scrutinies, Philemon reveals to – or, rather, reminds – Jung that he and his soul are not identical. Yet, despite merely being a “powerless man”, Philemon contextualises Jung’s new role as the following:

You are your soul's eunuch, who protects her from Gods and men, or protects the Gods and men from her. Power is given to the weak man, a poison that paralyzes even the Gods, like a poison sting bestowed upon the little bee whose force is far inferior to yours.160

Here, Jung is simultaneously the most inferior, but also the most superior – a true union of opposites – one who ensures the protection of the various aspects of his self, and indeed others, via his ego’s mediation. The relationship between Jung’s ego and ascending god is most effectively demonstrated in relation to the introvertive and extravertive types for which Psychological Types is named. For the introvert:

His god, his highest value, is the abstraction and conservation of the ego. For the extravert, on the contrary, the god is the experience of the object, complete immersion in reality.161

Both types are stated to exist within a person, although one dominates as the conscious while the other is unconscious.162 In this way, the types are clearly intended to replace the mother and father imagoes in relation to the libido, although with a number of significant differences. Firstly, in line with the separation of the libido and imagoes described above, there is no correlation between the introvert and extravert, and the Father and Mother archetypes. Secondly, neither has an inherent primacy over the other as the father imago had in relation to the mother. Therefore, although a libidinous axis of being and becoming remains, the archetypical properties of the imagoes are divorced from it. The primary factor regarding the relationship between an individual’s introvertive and extravertive types concerns fantasy – in the introvert, fantasy represents repressed unconscious extravertive impulses and vice versa.163 Indeed, in contrast to The Psychology of the Unconscious, where the removal of an over-attached characteristic also removed the fantasy such an over-attachment caused; in Psychological Types, Jung identifies the fantasy

159



Jung, Psychological Types, 91. 162



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caused by the repression of introvertive or extravertive impulses as the arena in which their oppositions are ultimately reconciled.164 However, should an introvert over-attach oneself with their dominant introvertive type, two circumstances can arise. Firstly, by rejecting the extravertive, an introvert is in danger of completely removing their inferior aspect – or extravert type – thereby resulting in a psychological sterility.165 Secondly, an “inferior extraversion” can arise, whereby an introvert’s resistance to a union of opposites with the extravert type does not necessarily preclude such a union from occurring in a distorted manner. As Jung states, such a union:

…detaches the individual entirely from his ego and dissolves him into archaic collective ties and identifications. He is then no longer "himself," but sheer relatedness, identical with the object and therefore without a standpoint. The introvert instinctively feels the greatest resistance to this condition, which is no guarantee that he will not unconsciously fall into it.166

As Jung previously stated in The Psychology of the Unconscious, the father imago’s striving for consciousness is, in fact, also a simultaneous striving towards the unconscious depths of the mother. Similarly, in Psychological Types, the introvert’s striving towards his god as “the abstraction and conservation of the ego”, is also in a striving towards the extravert’s god as “the experience of the object, complete immersion in reality”. From the perspective of inferior extraversion, Jung describes the introvert’s conscious “abstraction and conservation of the ego” to be an attempt to delineate an absolute law from every situation. However, while the conscious laws of the introvert prohibit experiences of certain objects, the extravert unconsciously develops a partial identity with – and eventual dependence on – the said objects. Jung quotes Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) to characterise attempts to break this dependence as finding it necessary to “impart form to matter; [the introvert] must externalize all within, and shape everything without”. However, as Jung’s states, such attempts result in the introvert suffering in his “godlikeness”.167 Jung’s behaviour in ‘The Magician’ would appear to be indicative of such an inferior extraversion – by constructing his tower and sacrificing the Cabiri, Jung has externalised all within and shaped everything without. Indeed, when Jung projects his soul into a serpent, his soul notes that Jung has forgotten who he is. Therefore, despite Jung’s statement in ‘Resolution’ to become a Christ via a self-sacrifice, he is “no longer himself” – he has instead become Odin, i.e. Wotan,168 the spirit of the depths and the very thing he strove to avoid. Just as Jung considered Zarathustra to be the spirit or god of Nietzsche – with whom he was predominantly identified with – Wotan as the spirit of the depths would seem to occupy the same role for Jung.

164


As this first circumstance is not expanded upon, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what Jung is referring to here. However, it is possible that Jung is referring to a situation similar to the removal of an over-attached characteristic in The Psychology of the Unconscious. As previously stated, such a removal also removes the fantasy caused by the over-attachment which, in terms of Psychological Types, prevents the developmental process of individuation – a psychological sterility. 166




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However, an important property of the fantasy arising from the interaction between an individual’s introvertive and extravertive types is the simultaneous arrival of the archetypes, which act as symbolic representations of aspects repressed by an individual.169 Jung continues by stating that the archetypes are reserves of knowledge that contain the accumulated experiences of all humanity, which form the inherited foundations of the unconscious. By forming such a foundation, the archetypes are able to provide an insight into contemporary problems and, ultimately, information helpful to their resolution. Thus, while Jung reacts to an over-attachment to a particular characteristic/archetype in The Psychology of the Unconscious by removing and replacing it with a primitive imago surrogate; in contrast, Jung combats such an over-attachment in Psychological Types by introducing an oppositional characteristic/archetype in an attempt to affect an inclusive union of opposites. For example, the deployment of the Shadow archetype to temper excesses of the Hero archetype. In many ways, the archetypical repository of knowledge Jung describes is very similar to Nietzsche’s description of the unconscious aspects of humanity as “an accumulated ancestral estate in which everyone has a share” in ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense’. However, a significant difference between Nietzsche and Jung’s understanding of this unconscious ancestral estate is Jung’s insistence that the archetypes are a priori constructs.170 As Huskinson argues, Jung’s archetypes act as external compartmentalising symbols in a very structuralist manner that direct towards an ordered and logical reconciliation between already given opposites – Mother and Father, Hero and Shadow etc. – something completely antithetical from Nietzsche’s perspective. While recognising that Nietzsche posed opposites himself – being and becoming, Apollonian and Dionysian etc. – Huskinson notes that they are of a more abstract nature and create opposites independently as a result of their own actions.171 An additional consequence of Jung’s definition of the archetypes would appear to be the subordination of psychological recapitulation to – and ensuing dependence upon – the fantasy experiences arising from the interaction between an individual’s introvertive and extravertive types. As Jung states, the ancestral knowledge contained within the archetypes is “inaccessible to experience” – the only manner by which to access it is via fantasy.172 Indeed, a conscious realisation of this process is not necessary as it is now an inherent aspect of fantasy. As stated in section 2.0, Jung’s explication of Miss X’s psychological recapitulation of Boehme reveals that he considered it possible for this process to occur spontaneously and without a conscious realisation. In any case, just as Jung considered Nietzsche to be the intended tool to act as a vehicle for his and Zarathustra’s mutual development, Jung’s understanding of psychological recapitulation benefits Jung and furthers Nietzsche’s theories. Here, Jung is not using psychological recapitulation to identify and obliterate primitive landmarks as in The Psychology of the Unconscious, but rather to address their psychological mistakes and contribute something to the archetypical reserve of knowledge.

169





43

3.2.3 As previously mentioned, in Psychological Types, Jung describes the emergent arena of fantasy created by the interaction between the introvertive and extravertive types – even in cases of inferior extraversion – as “pre-eminently, the creative activity from which the answers to all answerable questions come”.173 The pre-eminent “answerable questions” that Jung was considering applying “fantasy” to revolve around what he identifies as aesthetic and religious interpretations. In contrast to his rather fawning utilisation of Nietzsche in The Psychology of the Unconscious, Jung now identifies what he considers to be a significant issue with Nietzsche’s oeuvre. According to Jung, this issue is ostensibly Nietzsche’s removal of the religious component and subsequent focus on the aesthetic which:

…immediately converts the problem into a picture which the spectator can contemplate at his ease, admiring both its beauty and its ugliness, merely re-experiencing its passions at a safe distance, with no danger of becoming involved in them. The aesthetic attitude guards against any real participation, prevents one from being personally implicated, which is what a religious understanding of the problem would mean.174

However, less than a hundred pages previously, Jung describes an identical situation regarding institutionalised Christianity providing “stereotyped symbolic concepts” for followers to safely interact with.175 Indeed, Jung’s previous acceptance of the amorality of God in relation to The Book of Job in The Psychology of the Unconscious could be construed as admiring both beauty and ugliness in a religious manner. However, in his 1916 article ‘The Transcendent Function’, Jung simply states that a danger particular to the aesthetic approach is the possibility of being distracted by artistic concerns.176 Jung’s primary grievance therefore appears to be the manner in which fantasy is engaged with on an individual level, regardless of whether an aesthetic or religious approach is favoured. As ‘The Transcendent Function’ lacks the polemical tone against both Freud and Nietzsche in Psychological Types, it is rather more measured and precise in its descriptions. Indeed, it is in this article that the “third thing” first mentioned in ‘The Red One’ is presented in an academic capacity – the eponymous transcendent function. Here, fantasy as the transcendent function – the external third unifying symbol – is described as making a reconciliation between the conscious and unconscious possible. Jung states that the fantasy is not to be interpreted literally, but rather treated as a dialogue between the conscious and unconscious aspects of the self as two equals, ultimately necessitating a number of sacrifices on both sides before a reconciliation can be realised. This reconciliation between the conscious and unconscious is analogised with the relationship between the real and imaginary numbers of mathematics.177 Unfortunately, besides a simple mention, Jung does

173




Carl Jung, ‘The Transcendent Function’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 8 – The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 2

nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1969), 84.

177 Jung ‘The Transcendent Function’, 69.

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not expand on this analogy. But, for example, an imaginary number (bi) can be added to a real number (a) to form a complex number (a + bi), whereupon both the imaginary and real numbers are now technically defined as real numbers. Written at the height of a war that Jung had dreaded and then accepted as inevitable, ‘The Transcendent Function’ demonstrates a distinctly ethical quality regarding the reconciliation with the “other” of the unconscious. Instead of simply noting down one’s fantasy experiences and analysing them intellectually, one must apply lessons learned in everyday experiences.178 As Jung would later state in Psychological Types:

Instead of using the term "creative fantasy," it would be just as true to say that in practical psychology of this kind the leading role is given to life itself; for while it is undoubtedly fantasy, procreative and productive, which uses science as a tool, it is the manifold demands of external reality which in turn stimulate the activity of creative fantasy.179

In Hatab’s terms, a fiction has arisen, is temporarily interpreted as if real in a virtual reality, before being finally declared a fiction and used to imbue everyday experiences with an extraordinary aesthetic – or, as Jung would say, religious – purpose. And, perhaps more than in any other place, Jung’s purpose here is particularly concerned with the manner in which fantasy can contribute towards ethical development and its everyday application. 3.2.4 As stated in section 2.0, Jung seems to suggest in Psychological Types that both Nietzsche and Wagner attempted to recapitulate aspects of the Middle Ages, yet ultimately failed. Exactly what Nietzsche and Wagner’s attempted recapitulation entailed is unexplained, yet the primary subject of Scrutinies – a book explicitly concerned with returning to the Middle Ages – concerns Jung’s attempt to separate himself from his god. As previously mentioned, Jung would later describe Nietzsche as being predominantly identified with Zarathustra as his spirit or god. It would therefore appear that, in addition to finding the correct manner by which to utilise the eternal recurrence, Jung is also attempting to unravel Nietzsche’s failed recapitulation of the Middle Ages. As one of Shamdasani’s footnotes in The Red Book demonstrates, the separation of one’s soul and god in Meister Eckhart’s work was of particular interest to Jung.180 This separation especially concerns Eckhart’s conception of the “relativity of god”, which Jung describes in Psychological Types as arising from “an accumulation of energy in the unconscious” before eventually resulting in:

…a point of view that does not conceive of God as "absolute," i.e., wholly "cut off" from man and existing outside and beyond all human conditions, but as in a certain sense dependent on him; it also implies a reciprocal and essential relation between

178

Jung ‘The Transcendent Function’, 87-90. 179


Jung, The Red Book, 339 fn. 39.

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man and God, whereby man can be understood as a function of God, and God as a psychological function of man.181

As previously mentioned, Jung describes the introvert’s god as an “abstraction and conservation of the ego” which, in cases of inferior extraversion, results in attempts to delineate an absolute law from every situation. Accordingly, Jung identifies Kant as exemplifying the introvertive type.182 Yet, despite the absolute nature of Kant’s maxims, Jung does not describe him as having undergone an inferior extraversion. I would argue that, as stated in section 2.2, this is indicative of Jung interpreting Kant on a more individualised basis along the lines of Simmel. Instead of attempting to formulate the absolute imperatives of an absolute god, Jung seems to be proposing the formulation of the personal imperatives of a relative god. As Jung’s relative god has its explicit origin in the “energy of the unconscious”, it is therefore beyond the Kantian boundary of reason. And, as also stated in section 2.2, both Jung and Simmel considered psychology to be a manner by which the Kantian boundary of reason could be surpassed. Thus, in his student lectures, Jung described an understanding of a vitalistic conception of the soul – identical to the Kantian thing-in-itself – that comprised the unconscious aspect of an individual’s self. Similarly, in Psychological Types, the archetypes – the foundational reserves of knowledge of the unconscious – are described as the Kantian noumena, a term Jung is apparently using synonymously with the thing-in-itself. However, Jung’s approach has gained a greater nuance. As the archetypes are the noumena, when they are perceived by an individual, it is not their pure form, but an image they themselves provide – a vessel.183 To re-quote the following passage from Psychological Types:

When, says Eckhart, the soul is in God it is not "blissful," for when this organ of perception is overwhelmed by the divine dynamis it is by no means a happy state. But when God is in the soul, i.e., when the soul becomes a vessel for the unconscious and makes itself an image or symbol of it, this is a truly happy state.184

In other words: “when the soul is in God” – when the conscious father imago dominates the unconscious mother, when Jung declares an absolute knowledge atop his tower and forces it on others – one undergoes an inferior extraversion. On the other hand: “when God is in the soul” – when the fantasy that arises due to the interactions of the introvert and extravert types allows the unconscious aspect of the self to become a vessel for the archetypical reserves of knowledge, i.e. the collective unconscious – the developmental process of individuation can proceed in a psychologically healthy manner for both oneself and others. Jung prefaces the passage quoted above with the following: “…symbols are shaped energies, determining ideas whose affective power is just as great as their spiritual value”. And, as the eternal recurrence is perhaps the ultimate symbol – the external third unifying symbol that guides the reconciliation between the conscious and unconscious aspects of an

181





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individual’s self – its affective power on life extends beyond an individual’s happiness to have profound ethical implications.

4.0 Nietzsche and Jung’s Mirrors and Masks As a postscript, of sorts, to the primary message of this dissertation, this section will examine key omissions from Jung’s seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra and their ensuing implications regarding Jung’s recapitulation of Nietzsche during Liber Secundus. Until the outbreak of the Second World War prevented the continuation of Jung’s seminars, almost every chapter of Thus Spoke Zarathustra had been analysed. However, six chapters remained entirely unanalysed, with a seventh being almost totally ignored. That six of these chapters occur consecutively – from ‘Of Self-Overcoming’ to ‘On Poets’ – is immediately suspicious, a suspicion compounded by Jung’s otherwise rigorous analysis. Jung’s explanation characterises these chapters as making him “bored stiff, chiefly by the style”, which therefore motivates him to cherry-pick only a few interesting paragraphs for the sake of his audience members.185 Yet, when the content of these chapters is examined, one finds numerous – and, in terms of the content of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, relatively uncommon – references to mirrors and masks as instruments of personal discovery. As Huskinson notes, all of these references have obvious applications regarding Jungian psychology.186 During ‘Of Self-Overcoming’, the first two of these chapters, Nietzsche/Zarathustra expounds on his understanding of the nature of good and evil. This is an understanding he glimpses in a “hundredfold mirror” and concerns the relationship between the domination of the powerful over the weak. Nietzsche/Zarathustra states that, despite the dominance of the powerful: “Along secret passages the weaker sneaks into the fortress and straight to the heart of the more powerful – and there it steals power”. This power is revealed to be the essential quality of the Overman – the constant overcoming and re-evaluation of values. As one would expect, Nietzsche/Zarathustra states that he “would rather perish than renounce this one thing”.187 Therefore, in this small but significant passage, Nietzsche/Zarathustra has aligned his most important message with his inferior aspect. In the following chapter, ‘On the Sublime Ones’, Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s concern is again inferior beings – in this case, the creatures that exist at the bottom of his sea. As previously mentioned, Nietzsche/Zarathustra required his sea to be able to absorb pollution, yet here his intention is an active transformation. As Nietzsche/Zarathustra states, one pursuing the Overman:

…must also unlearn his hero’s will; he shall be elevated, not merely sublime – the ether itself shall elevate him, the will-less one!

He subdued monsters, he solved riddles, but he should also solve his own monsters and riddles; he should transform them into heavenly children.188

185



Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 89. 188


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From the perspective Jung has established in the remainder of his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a superficial interpretation of these chapters would appear to confirm Jung’s suggestion that, not only did Nietzsche recognise his inferior aspect as part of his Shadow, but that he was also committed to accepting them as integral parts of himself as one pursuing the Overman. Furthermore, transforming one’s monsters into heavenly children could easily be equated with Jung’s understanding of the recapitulation of problematic psychological ancestors. Therefore, the question is presented: why did Jung seemingly ignore these highly compelling chapters? Simply put, I consider the answer to this question to concern the contents of the following two ignored chapters, ‘On the Land of Education’ and ‘On Immaculate Perception’. These chapters are very much integrated with the previous two chapters yet, while mirrors are indeed mentioned, the focus is switched to masks. As Nietzsche/Zarathustra states:

With fifty blotches painted on your face and limbs, thus you sat there to my amazement, you people of the present!

And with fifty mirrors around you, flattering and echoing your play of colors! Indeed, you couldn’t wear a better mask, you people of today, than that of

your own face! Who could recognize you! Written full with the characters of the past, and even these characters

painted over with new characters: thus you have hidden yourselves well from all interpreters of characters!189

As stated in section 3.2, Jung’s introduction of the archetypes in Psychological Types effectively established a mediatory barrier between an individual and the collective unconscious. Instead of an internally chaotic experience in striving for the Overman, Jung proposes a logically ordered structuralist progression; instead of an abstract reconciliation of opposites, Jung presents a priori regulatory constructs. Indeed, Nietzsche’s descriptions of masks could easily be interpreted by Jung’s audience as an incredibly potent criticism of Jung’s archetypes, which frequently overlaid numerous historical or mythological figures in an attempt to prove, if not the universality of a particular archetype, then at least its culturally specific application. It is ultimately for this reason that I suspect Jung may well have ignored these chapters, as they could be construed as coincidentally criticising that which formed one of the central tenets of his psychological theories. Not only that, they promote something that is similar to Jung’s theories as a competitive alternative. In relation to this, it is worth noting that the sixth and final chapter that Jung ignores is ‘On Poets’ – the chapter where Nietzsche/Zarathustra admits the lies inherent in his own work. Indeed, Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s realisation that his own work is fallible has its origin in the following passage from ‘Of Self-Overcoming’:

Whatever I may create and however I may love it – soon I must oppose it and

my love, thus my will wants it. And even you, seeker of knowledge, are only a path and footstep of my will;

indeed, my will to power follows also on the heels of your will to truth!190 189

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 93. 190


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Indeed, Jung begun Liber Secundus with a statement similar in sentiment to that of ‘On Poets’ and ended it by realising the dangers of declaring an absolute knowledge. Nevertheless, during his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Jung has behaved in a somewhat disingenuous manner. While not declaring an absolute knowledge, by omitting these chapters from his analysis, Jung has removed from his students’ curriculum a significant potential avenue for the criticism of his own theories.

5.0 Conclusion Although this dissertation has, by no means, provided an exhaustive analysis, I consider it to have focussed upon Jung’s most important interaction with Nietzsche. And so, in order to conclude this dissertation, I would like to provide a basic summary of the manner in which its thesis-statement developed:

1) Jung considered psychological recapitulation to provide a means by which to understand and ultimately address the problems caused by psychological ancestors.

2) At a time of great personal and professional stress, Jung considered the imminent outbreak of WWI to be caused by a spirit of the depths that had seized mankind – a spirit he identified as Nietzsche.

3) Accordingly, Jung resolved to address the problems caused by Nietzsche in Liber Secundus, a book that begins with the Red One – an obvious representation of Nietzsche – urging Jung to find the correct manner by which to utilise the eternal recurrence, the “third thing”.

4) During his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Jung identifies Nietzsche’s primary mistake as partially denying the Shadow by only accepting the inferior aspect in himself, but not in others. However, while recapitulating Nietzsche, Jung commits the same mistake. Yet, during the last chapter of Liber Secundus, Satan – another obvious representation of Nietzsche – re-appears to criticise Jung for rejecting the inferior aspect in others.

5) Following Huskinon’s analysis, Jung also states during his seminars on Thus Spoke Zarathustra that Nietzsche’s reconciliation of opposites failed due to the lack of an external third unifying symbol. Without this “third thing”, Jung considered the reconciliation of opposites within oneself to inherently result in an identification with one opposite and a subsequent neglect of the other. Indeed, in psychologically recapitulating Nietzsche, Jung also attempted to reconcile the opposites of superiority and inferiority in himself yet maligned the inferior in others.

6) Jung mentions the “third thing” – fantasy as the transcendent function – in his academic work but does not provide much explanation. However, by applying Hatab’s interpretation of the eternal recurrence as a virtual reality to Jung’s understanding of fantasy experiences, it is possible to see how Jung utilised the eternal recurrence – namely, as a means by which to interpret a fiction as if it were reality, gain an insight into a particular problem, declare the fantasy to once again be a fiction, and subsequently apply the lessons learned to everyday experiences.

7) Thus, when Jung resolves to accept the inferior aspect in others during the final passages of Liber Secundus, it is to be reflected in his everyday experiences. A vital aspect of this reflection is refraining from declaring an absolute knowledge and

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imposing it on others. Indeed, based on Jung’s individualistic interpretation of Kant from his student days, Simmel’s neo-Kantian interpretation of the eternal recurrence was applied to demonstrate Jung’s turn away from proposing an absolute god in favour of continuously developing relative gods.

8) As consequences of his psychological recapitulation of Nietzsche and answering the question of the eternal recurrence, the evolution of Jung’s opinion regarding fantasy and ethics can be observed in many of the key differences between The Psychology of the Unconscious and Psychological Types.

As previously mentioned, even while restricting its focus to a few chapters, this dissertation has not provided an exhaustive analysis. Indeed, while Shamdasani has correlated a number of Jung’s statements in The Red Book with Nietzsche’s works, multiple passages – such as, for example, those assigned to the Red One and Satan – are open to further analysis on a line-by-line basis. And, while I consider the primary external figure of importance in Liber Secundus to be Nietzsche, he is by no means the only such figure. Indeed, in terms of the chapters focussed upon, the importance of the Cabiri in ‘The Magician’ demonstrate a clear influence from Friedrich Schelling’s (1775-1854) 1815 article ‘On the Deities of Samothrace’, which Jung is known to have been familiar with. In other words: a huge amount of work remains to be done regarding analysing the content of The Red Book and integrating it with the remainder of Jung’s oeuvre.

6.0 Bibliography Articles

Joseph Cambray, ‘The Red Book: Entrances and Exits’, in Thomas Kirsch & George Hogenson eds., The Red Book: Reflections on C.G. Jung’s Liber Novus (New York: Routledge, 2014).

Wouter Hanegraaff, ‘The Great War of the Soul: Divine and Human Madness in Carl Gustav Jung’s Liber Novus’.

Carl Jung, ‘Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 9 part I – The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, 2nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1969).

Carl Jung, ‘On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomenon’ trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung vol. 1 – Psychiatric Studies, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

Carl Jung, ‘Religious Ideas in Alchemy’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 12 – Psychology and Alchemy, 2nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1968).

Carl Jung, ‘A Study in the Process of Individuation’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 9 part I – The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, 2nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1969).

Carl Jung, ‘The Transcendent Function’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 8 – The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 2nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1969).

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Carl Jung, ‘Wotan’ in Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 10 – Civilization in Transition, 2nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1970).

Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ in Daniel Breazezle, Philosophy and Truth: Selection from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s (New York & London: Humanities Press, 1979).

Books

Deirdre Bair, Jung: A Biography (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2003).

Paul Bishop, The Dionysian Self: C.G. Jung’s Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche (Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 1995).

Ellen Dissanayake, What is Art For? (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1990).

Patricia Dixon, Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999).

Barbara Hannah, Jung, His Life and Work: A Biographical Memoir (New York: Perigee Books, 1981).

Lawrence Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence (New York & London: Routledge, 2005).

Lucy Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites (Hove & New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2004).

Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung vol. 9 part II – Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, 2nd edition (New York: Princeton University Press, 1968).

Carl Jung, Introduction to Jungian Psychology: Notes of the Seminar on Analytical Psychology Given in 1925 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Carl Jung trans. Richard and Clara Winston, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Random House, 1989).

Carl Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: Notes of the Seminar given in 1934-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung vol. 6I – Psychological Types (New York: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Carl Jung trans. Beatrice Hinkle, The Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido; A Contribution to the History of the Evolution of Thought (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1949).

Carl Jung trans. R.F.C. Hull, The Collected Works of Carl Jung vol. 15 – The Spirit in Man, Art, and Literature (New York: Princeton University Press, 1966).

Carl Jung trans. Mark Kyburz, John Peck, and Sonu Shamdasani, The Red Book: Liber Novus (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 2009).

Carl Jung trans. Jan van Heurck, The Collected Works of Carl Jung: Supplementary Volume A – The Zofingia Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

William McGuire ed. Ralph Manheim & R.F.C. Hull trans. The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

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Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Judith Norman, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy in Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Ronald Speirs, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are in Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Judith Norman, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Adrian Del Caro, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Gary Handwerk, Human, All Too Human I: A Book for Free Spirits (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Adrian Del Caro, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer in Friedrich Nietzsche trans. Judith Norman, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Georg Simmel trans. Helmut Loiskandl, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991).

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