Gender role attitudes of migrants – The impact of religion and origin country context Author: Antje Röder, Trinity College Dublin Abstract Gender role attitudes differ vastly across societies, and consequently it can be expected that immigrants in Europe hold different attitudes from natives. These differences may be due to the values prevalent in the origin countries of immigrants, but they are also likely to be linked to religious beliefs. Using multiple origin data compiled from the European Social Survey, this paper analyses in how far these factors influence the gender role attitudes of immigrants in Europe. Both religious denomination and origin country are found to have an important impact on attitudes, with origin country factors having a lesser influence on longer staying migrants and the second generation, indicating that acculturation does take place. The more gender egalitarian values of better integrated migrants seem to be the outcome of processes of acculturation rather than secularisation, in that lower levels of religiosity do not explain the less traditional values observed. Also, religiosity is more important for determining the attitudes of first generation migrants, and Muslims in particular, than those of natives, suggesting that religious beliefs may be less symbolic for some groups.

Introduction Gender roles and the status of women are one of the areas in which societies continue to differ vastly across the globe (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a), and where clashes are most apparent (Esposito, 1998). Practices around gender and sexuality are some of the most fundamental parts of a society’s normative system (Bourdieu, 2001; Okin, 1999), and are hence at the centre of debates around immigrant integration (Prieur, 2002). Indeed gender is one of the most contested issues in discussions of migration and particularly the integration of immigrants of non-Western origins in European societies. The increasing amount of Muslims in Europe especially, which was estimated to be between 8 to 10 million in the mid-1990s, gave rise to fears of conflict (Castles and Davidson, 2000). Discussions taking place in many European countries surrounding the wearing of the hijab are one of the examples of how perceptions of gender roles differ and have the potential to create tensions between different sections of society (El Hamel, 2002; McGoldrick, 2006). Despite the vast media attention and public concerns with immigrants’ gender role attitudes, relatively little empirical work systematically analyses where actual differences lie, how they can be explained and whether they are decreasing over time and generations. This is relevant not only on a theoretical level but also regarding policy, as it has been shown that beliefs related to gender equality are significant in relation to labour market participation and pay (Antecol, 2000; Jaumotte, 2003; Fortin, 2005). In this paper, the focus is on the impact of religion and origin country context on immigrants’ gender role attitudes, as both academic research and public discourse seem to indicate that these factors are of importance in determining people’s stance regarding gender egalitarianism. The former has focused on the impact of religiosity and secularisation more generally with relatively little work concerned with the particular situation of immigrants, whereas the former is especially, and perhaps disproportionately, concerned with the role of Islam in this context (for discussions of this see for example Césari, 2004; Diehl et al., 2009; El Hamel, 2002; McGoldrick, 2006). The impact of religion on gender attitudes is largely argued to be the outcome of religion’s role in legitimating inequalities within societies, so that religious individuals tend to hold less egalitarian values based on the belief that these inequalities are justified and based on a ‘natural’ order (Diehl et al., 2009; Inglehart and Norris, 2003b). Churches play a particularly important role in defining family norms and regulating behaviours around gender and sexuality (Korpi, 2000; Sherkat and Ellison, 1999). In many religions men and women are ascribed ‘natural’ roles that centre on the domestic role for women and the breadwinning role for men. The degree to which this is translated into social reality varies between countries with the same majority religion, so that other cultural patterns also exert an important influence.

Modernization theory would predict change to be relatively linear and unidirectional when immigrants live in a less traditional society (Inkeles and Smith, 1974), but this may not be the case as has been argued more recently (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1995; Prieur, 2002). Indeed migrants make choices that are based on their interests and aspirations that allow them to take advantage of the opportunity structures in their host countries. They are also influenced by the prevalent discourses of the host society, especially if they have prolonged intercultural contact

(Berry and Sam, 1997). At the same time, however, they are also guided by older norms and rules that ‘filter’ the opportunities they take advantage of (Dahrendorf, 1979). Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1995) find that aspects related to a couple’s private choice tend to change more rapidly than those linked to the broader social group and community. This is similar to the argument made by Idema and Phalet (2007) and Nauck (1988) that immigrants’ adaptation to the opportunity structures of the host country occurs more rapidly than the adaptation of values, in particular values related to the family, gender and sexuality.

In the public domain, cultural adaptation proceeds at a faster pace than in the private domain, as it is necessary to adapt to the structures of the host society to succeed. Similarly it would seem that cultural differences are larger for gender-role beliefs than for actual sharing behaviour as Van de Vijver (2007) finds. On the other hand, in a study in the Netherland that compared Dutch people with four immigrant groups, Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver (2009) find that cultural differences were stronger for family and marital values than gender role values. The authors argue that there is stronger pressure from the mainstream society towards more egalitarian gender roles than about family values, and that there is a tendency in public discourse to exaggerate actual differences. Previous research seems to suggest that there are pressures towards adopting more gender egalitarian attitudes, as well as reasons why more traditional values may be maintained.

Much of the previous literature focuses on increasing female labour force participation amongst immigrants, often arguing that migration can be a liberating and emancipating experience for women where cultural role expectations are challenged (Espiritu, 1999; Foner, 2002; Kibria, 1993; Pessar, 1995a, 1995 b, 2003). Others have shown that this is not always a straightforward process, and that gains have been unevenly distributed (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1999), and often depend as much on class as they do on gender (Espiritu, 1999). Comparatively little research explores changing gender roles of migrants, and the literature that does exist is made up of largely small scale studies that describe and analyse the experience of particular immigrants groups in specific host societies. The few studies that employ large-scale datasets are often limited to studying only one host country and one or very few immigrant groups within it. Whilst country specific studies can provide more detailed insights into attitudes of particular immigrant groups residing in Europe, they generally cannot disentangle the impact of country of origin culture, majority religion and individual religious affiliation, for example. This does not suggest that a study such as this can explain the very different experiences of immigrant groups entirely, but rather that some general patterns can be established against which individual groups can then be compared.

This paper investigates firstly the role of religion in shaping gender role attitudes. Not only are immigrants more religious in general, but they often come from less secularised societies and belong to religions that are of minority status in Europe, which may be of importance for determining attitudes. Secondly, country of origin factors are considered to test in how far origin context matters for attitudes, and whether this changes over time. Acculturation to dominant host country beliefs may occur, and may be linked to processes of secularisation. Furthermore, the idea that immigrants’ religion may be less symbolic than that of the native population is explored.

Religious denomination and religiosity The main religions of the world all contain certain ideas about the appropriate roles for men and women in society, and traditionally, this has placed women in the home and men in the ‘outside’ world. This holds true even nowadays, where much change is occurring in societies with increasing female labour market participation and changes in attitudes accompanying this. Religions differ to some extent in this regard, but similar normative claims about men’s and women’s roles are present across all denominations. Whilst Protestant churches in Europe have generally become more progressive than the Catholic Church in terms of women’s role (Korpi, 2000), the Judeo-Christian culture as such is linked to patriarchal gender role orientations (Hofstede, 1980). Nevertheless, data shows that Muslims and Buddhists seem to have less egalitarian gender role attitudes than Jews, Protestants and Catholics even when other factors are controlled for (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b). Islam in particular has been criticised for suppressing women, and gender is probably the area where negative attitudes about Islam are articulated most frequently in Western societies. Whilst much of the public discourse seems to equate Islam with gender inequality, it is important to note that very different gender roles exist within Islam, and that individuals interpret these differently in the context of their own lives (Predelli, 2004; Roald, 2001). Islamic leaders tend to emphasize that man and woman have equal value, but that they have very different roles in society. Muslim feminists, however, challenge this, and demand women to be allowed a public role, whereas men should be more involved in the home and the family (Wadud, 1999), which is similar to discussions in many other societies.

Based on the normative role of religion and the predominantly gender-conservative teachings of most of the main religions, it can be expected that individuals who belong to a religion will be less egalitarian than people indicating that they have no religious affiliation. Higher religiosity, both in terms of level of religiosity indicated by the respondent and frequent attendance at religious services, should equally be associated with more traditional gender role attitudes. Religious attendance is linked to greater exposure to religious doctrine, but also shows that a person is more committed to their particular faith. For homophobia, for example, frequent attendance and interaction with religious people has been shown to be linked to less egalitarian values (Olson et al., 2006), and we can expect a similar effect for gender attitudes.

H1: Individuals belonging to a religion will be less gender egalitarian than respondents who do not belong to a religion.

H2: More religious individuals and frequent attendees at religious services will be less egalitarian than less religious people who attend religious services rarely or never.

Immigrants to Europe may not share the majority religion, but even when they do, they frequently come from countries that are less secularized than their new countries of residence. They are in many cases more religious as has been reported for example in Germany, where Muslims reported a relatively high level of religiosity and attendance in comparison to other religious groups (Haug et al., 2009; Sinus

Sociovision, 2008). Tables 2 and 3 show that immigrants are more likely to attend services frequently, and have a higher level of religiosity on average, which is particularly true for the first generation. Amongst religious groups, Muslims and individuals of other Christian religion report the highest levels of religiosity. The different composition of immigrant groups compared to native populations may explain, at least partially, the difference between natives and immigrants. It can therefore be expected that including level of religiosity and religious attendance will reduce the raw difference between immigrants and natives, as well as the effect of religious denomination.

H3: The effect of religiosity and religious attendance will reduce the difference between natives and migrants as well as the effect of religious denomination.

Immigrants’ socialisation – the role of the origin country Immigrants may belong to different religious denominations than natives and be more religious, but in addition to this many will have been socialised in very different surroundings to the native population. Based on cross-national differences in gender attitudes, it is apparent that the majority of immigrants from outside Europe, but also many within Europe, will come from countries that are less gender egalitarian than their host societies. Having grown up in a less egalitarian country can be expected to have quite a profound impact on immigrants’ attitudes. Previous research has shown that immigrants differ both in the values prevalent in their origin country, and in the level to which they preserve these values in the host country (Min, 2001). Also there is great diversity in gender role attitudes amongst immigrants, not only between different ethnic groups, but also within ethnic groups. Read (2003) shows for example that for Arab-American women, a much greater variation in gender role attitudes exists than popular opinion would generally suggest. Overall, however, findings seem to confirm that groups from gender traditional societies have more conservative gender role attitudes than natives. Traditional gender roles and division of child care and household labour have been found to be quite persistent in Indo-Caribbean families (Roopnarine and Krishnakumar, 2009), and Turks in Germany are found to have more conservative gender roles than Germans (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b). Equally it would appear that Muslim affiliation, once other factors such as ethnicity and immigrant status are accounted for, does not lead to significantly more traditional gender role beliefs for Arab-Americans (Read, 2003), suggesting that origin region, rather than religion, may be more important factors in determining attitudes. Read (2004) also shows that gender traditionalism, rather than Islam alone, explain more of Arab women’s labour force participation in the United States, indicating that gender traditionalism and Muslim affiliation are not synonymous. Indeed Inglehart and Welzel (2005) find that societal context seems to be more important than religion for individuals’ attitudes, as individuals from the same country differed little in attitudes even if they belong to different religions, whereas differences between predominantly Muslim, Catholic and Protestant societies were large.

As immigrants to Europe largely come from less gender egalitarian countries, we can expect their attitudes to be overall more supportive of more traditional gender values. Attitudes and preferences are transmitted through parents and

communities, with the effects frequently continuing beyond first generation immigrants (Fernandez, 2007; Fernandez and Fogli, 2005). For the first generation, at least part of their socialisation will have taken place in a different country, so that the effect can be expected to be stronger than for the second generation, who have been socialised in the host society, but whose families may still transmit values influenced by those prevalent in the origin country.

H4: Immigrants, particularly first generation immigrants, will have less gender egalitarian values than natives.

Having grown up in a very gender traditional country can be expected to have a negative effect on gender egalitarian attitudes. This may even be the case for the second generation, who may still be exposed to these values through their families, but it should be less important for them, as transmission would only be indirect through parents and the wider ethnic community. Gender traditionalism in the origin country should therefore be linked to less egalitarian attitudes amongst immigrants, particularly the first generation.

H5: More egalitarian gender structures in the country of origin/parents’ country of origin will be associated with more egalitarian attitudes of immigrants, and this will be stronger for the first than the second generation, and particularly strong for more recent arrivals.

It has also been established that gender role attitudes are sharply divided across societies depending on majority religion (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), so that some link between religion and origin country values is very likely. It is apparent that Muslim countries have the lowest support for gender equality (Fish, 2002; Ingelhart and Norris, 2003b). As an alternative measurement of origin country context, majority religion is included. It is expected that immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority or another non-Christian majority will have more traditional gender role attitudes even when individual religion is controlled for. Including this factor should weaken the effect of country gender egalitarianism, as both are likely to overlap substantially.

H6: First generation immigrants from a country with a non-Christian majority will have more traditional gender role attitudes than immigrants from Christian countries and those from countries with no religious majority.

Acculturation and secularization Factors besides length of stay will have an impact on how exposed a migrant is to host country values, and also how open he or she is towards these values. Migrants who speak the host country language at home are more likely to be better integrated (Diehl et al., 2009), but also more likely to be proficient in the language, hence more likely to be aware of the prevalent discourses in society as they have access to host country media and can more readily interact with the native population. Migrants with citizenship may equally be more acculturated, as a result of feeling more integrated into the host society, but also because some may actually

have chosen to become citizens because they already felt connected to their country of residence. Therefore both speaking the host country language at home and being a citizen should have a positive effect on support for gender egalitarian values.

Secondly, length of stay is linked to greater exposure to host country values, and more distance to the origin country context. Therefore, longer residence overall should be associated with more gender egalitarian attitudes. Experience of discrimination and minority status, on the other hand, may be linked to less inclusion in the host society, and therefore be associated with more traditional attitudes for all groups. Reporting discrimination on grounds of gender, on the other hand, will have the opposite effect, and is included separately in models, as it measures awareness of gender discrimination, which is likely to be associated with more egalitarian attitudes.

H7: Migrants who speak the official host country language, have citizenship and who have resided in the country for longer are more supportive of gender egalitarianism. Ethnic minorities and those experiencing discrimination, on the other hand, will have more traditional attitudes.

It is of interest, however, if acculturation happens as a result of increased secularisation of migrants, i.e. that the relationship between increased integration into the host society and adaptation to more gender egalitarian values is at least partly due to immigrants’ falling levels of religiosity. In an analysis not presented here, it is apparent that longer staying migrants as well as those who are citizens and who speak the official host country language are less religious on average. Hence it may be that the inclusion of religiosity in the model will weaken indicators of acculturation, such as length of stay, speaking an official language and citizenship, because part of the acculturation process would be explained by falling levels of religiosity amongst migrants.

It is, however, also possible that secularisation does not hold true. Diehl et al. (2009) show for example that migrants do not necessarily become more secular with longer residence and across generations. It may even be the case that ‘reactive religiosity’ occurs similarly to ‘reactive ethnicity’, where groups that experience discrimination or hostile treatment, as is frequently argued for the second generation of immigrants in particular, may re-discover and re-emphasise this part of their identity (Diehl et al., 2009; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). In this case, the effect of length of stay on gender role attitudes would not be an indirect outcome of weakening levels of religiosity, but rather an effect of increasing acculturation and exposure to host country norms. Acculturation variables should then not be affected strongly by the inclusion of level of religiosity in the model.

H8: The effects of length of stay, citizenship and speaking an official host country language will be weakened by the inclusion of religiosity in the model.

‘Symbolic’ religiosity A further issue of interest is whether religiosity has a greater bearing on immigrants’ attitudes. In secularized countries religion has been argued to have less normative power, with individuals building their own belief system that can combine elements

from different denominations (Hervieu-Léger, 1998). Indeed research confirms that religion now appears to have less determining power over the values and beliefs people hold (Scheepers et al., 2002). Others have argued that secularization impacts the public sphere more than the private sphere (Halman et al., 1999), with Voicu (2009) providing empirical evidence for this across European countries. The domestic sphere may therefore be less secularized than the public sphere, and associated beliefs and behaviours may be changing rather slowly. Whilst religion and religiosity were argued to continue to play a role in European societies above based on their normative power over gender roles, it can be expected that there are differences in the impact of religiosity between the native population and immigrants, with the latter largely originating from less secularised societies.

Diehl et al. (2009) for example argue that religiosity and religious denomination are less ‘symbolic’ for immigrants than for natives who have been socialised in more secular surroundings by showing that religiosity has an impact on Turkish migrants’ division of housework but not on Germans’. For natives, religion may have less normative power over their attitudes than for immigrants. Religiosity, in this case, should be linked more strongly to attitudes for immigrants than for natives, as it can be expected to play a more important role in informing opinions. The effect should be weaker and more similar to natives for the second generation, as they were socialised in secular surroundings. The effect of religiosity is therefore assessed individually for each immigrant generation and the native population. Religious attendance is not used here as the importance placed on religious attendance differs between religious denominations and also between men and women for example in the case of Muslims. This effect may be stronger for recent arrivals, who have not been exposed to a secular environment, so that religiosity may have an even stronger impact on more recent arrivals amongst first generation immigrants.

H9: Religiosity has a stronger effect on first generation immigrants’ attitudes than the attitudes of natives and second generation immigrants, and especially on recent arrivals.

The differential impact of religiosity is also assessed for different religions, as there may be a stronger impact on attitudes for some denominations, if beliefs are less ‘symbolic’. Secularisation, as argued above, may lead to people being less strongly influenced by religious teachings despite considering themselves religious (Hervieu-Léger, 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002). Therefore religiosity is expected to have a stronger effect on individuals who belong to a non-majority religion, as religion is expected to be less symbolic for this group.

H10: Religiosity will have a stronger effect on individuals belonging to a non-Christian religion than those belonging to a Christian religion or those without religious affiliation.

Data and dependent variables Data was extracted from Rounds 2 and 4 of the European Social Survey collected between 2004 and 2008, as only these rounds included the relevant dependent

variables. Natives, first generation immigrants, second generation immigrants and respondents with one foreign born parent were included. If parents were from two different countries, respondents were excluded. If only one parent’s country of origin information was available, this was used to classify the respondent. All other cases were also excluded from the analysis. For each dependent variable, missing cases were excluded in the respective analysis. Respondents from Croatia, Cyprus, Israel, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine were excluded. This leaves the EU-15 countries plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. The dependent variables used are ‘men should have more right to a job when jobs are scarce’ and ‘women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of their family’. Percentages of categories for these variables are summarized in Table 1, and it is clear that overall more respondents agree with the statement that women should cut down on work rather than that men should have priority for jobs. Whilst these variables focus only on matters related to female employment, it has been argued that support for statements surrounding work and gender are actually quite accurate in capturing traditional gender role ideas more generally (Fine-Davis, 1983, 1989). These variables are also used for example by Voicu et al. (2009) in a comparative study of gender role attitudes. Indeed it may be the case that voicing concerns about the potential negative impact of maternal employment are one of the few areas where it is still socially acceptable to hold gender unequal attitudes, whereas it is less so regarding areas such as access to education and equality before the law. Table 1

‘Men priority for jobs’ ‘Women cut work’

Agree strongly 6.8% 10.4% Agree 17.5% 33.7% Neither 17.4% 22.4% Disagree 33.7% 24.8% Disagree strongly 24.6% 8.7%

Valid percentages only

Independent Variables Immigrant status was assessed according to the country of birth of the respondent and parents’ country of birth, and includes natives (reference category), first generation, second generation and second generation with one foreign born parent. Demographic variables included are age, gender, income and education. Age is measured in years, education also in years completed and income in bands that are adjusted for each country, i.e. this measurement refers to a respondent’s relative income position in a country rather than an absolute figure. Acculturation. Length of stay is coded into 5 years or less, 6 to 10 years and 11 to 20 years, with immigrants living in the host country for over 20 years being the reference category. In Models with interaction terms with length of stay, a dummy is included for those who arrived within the last 10 year to simplify models.. Speaking one of the official languages at home is measured by indicating one of the official

languages as either the first or second language spoken. Citizenship is included according to respondents’ indication. Discrimination and minority status. Discrimination is measured by the variable that indicates belonging to a group that is discriminated against on grounds of colour, race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality, disability or other grounds are all included. Models including discrimination control for discrimination on grounds of gender, as this is considered to be quite a different issue in relation to gender role attitudes, and can be expected to have a particular effect. Ethnic minority status is based on respondents’ own indication on whether he or she belongs to an ethnic group in the residence country.

Measuring origin country and host country context. The gender related development index (United Nations, 2009) of the origin country and host country are used to assess the prevalent gender power relations there. Figures from 2007 are used to do this. The gender development index in the host country is included in all models as a control variable. To assess majority religion in the origin country, the CIA fact files for relevant countries (CIA, 2010) were consulted. Categories include Christian majority, Islam majority, other religious majority and no majority or agnostic majority.

Religion and religiosity. Religion is measured by a respondent’s indication whether he or she belongs to a religion, and if so, the religious denomination. Categories are simplified into Christian religions, Islam, and other non-Christian religion, plus a category for those who are not affiliated with a religion (reference category). Religiosity is assessed as self-reported level of religiosity on a zero to ten scale, with higher values indicating higher level of religiosity. Religious attendance is measured as frequently for those who attend daily, several times a week or once a week, regularly for those who attend less often than that, and people who never attend. Modelling Individual respondents are nested within their ‘community’ and their country of residence. The community is defined by residence country, origin or parents’ origin country and immigration status. For respondents with only one foreign born parent, this parents’ country of origin is used. The nested structure is accounted for in a three level model as implemented in MlWin 2.18 (Snijders and Bosker, 1999, Rashbash et al., 2002). All models are estimated as ordered logistic regressions with ‘strongly agree’ as the reference category, so that positive coefficients indicate more gender traditional attitudes. Random intercepts on the community and country level are allowed to account for unobserved effects. Lower level variables that are interacted with higher level variables are assigned random slopes. Variance components are reported selectively in some tables, which is indicated, as are sample sizes. Cross-classified models were not feasible due to the inclusion of natives and computational limitations. As an alternative strategy, for models where origin country values were significant in the three level model as specified above, an additional model was run with the relevant generation of immigrants only, in which the origin country is set as the highest level instead of the country of residence. This allowed the estimation of correct standard errors for origin effects, which may be

underestimated in the original model. Findings for this are reported in annotations for the relevant models. Missing cases on the dependent variables are included as a dummy for categorical data, and replaced by sample means for continuous variables with the inclusion of a dummy to indicate missing cases. These dummies are not reported in the tables. All models include a control variable for round 4 in the European Social Survey, which is equally not reported. Findings The composition of the immigrant population differs from that of natives, and this is particularly true for some groups: the second generation has comparatively more males and younger individuals than the native population and the first generation. Muslims seem to be younger on average, more likely to be male, as well as being the group with the lowest educational achievement and income (see Tables 2 and 3). Muslim immigrants tend to be the most marginalised in economic terms in many European countries (Buijs, 2009; Kalter, 2006; Modood et al., 1998), which may serve to explain some of the different attitudes observed.

Therefore, various demographic variables are included in the model to account for these differences. Findings are reported in general for both dependent variables. Only if substantial differences exist they are reported separately. In line with previous research Models 1a and 1b (Tables 4a and 4b) illustrate that women are more gender egalitarian than men (see for example Fan and Marini, 2000; Tang and Dion, 1999). Furthermore, better educated people and those of higher socio-economic status more generally hold more egalitarian gender attitudes (Haddad and Smith, 1996; Read, 2003; Tang and Dion, 1999). Equally, age is included as generational differences are quite likely between younger and older people, who were socialised under very different circumstances in terms of gender roles. Indeed older people agree more with gender traditional attitudes than younger people. On the country level, people living in countries with a high level of gender egalitarianism, as measured with the gender development index, are more egalitarian. To test whether religious denomination has the expected effect on attitudes, Modes 3a and 3b (Tables 5a and 5b) should be consulted. Indeed individuals who do not belong to any religion are more gender egalitarian than those who do. Amongst religious denominations, it appears that those belonging to Islam hold the most gender traditional attitudes. The ‘other non-Christian’ category is too heterogeneous to make meaningful comparisons. Hypothesis H1 is confirmed by the data. Equally, there is support that more religious individuals and frequent attendees are more gender traditional than others, as can be seen in Models 4a and 4b, confirming hypothesis H2. To determine whether including religiosity and attendance at religious services alters the difference between natives and immigrants and between religious denominations, coefficients in Models 3a and 3b should be compared with those in models 4a and 4b respectively. The effect of being an immigrant is reduced by a small amount, whereas that of religious denomination is reduced more strongly. This provides some support for hypothesis H3, but it is important to note that differences

between immigrants and natives and between those who do and those who do not belong to a religion remain important for most groups. Models 0a and 0b (Tables 4a and 4b) show that immigrants are indeed in general more gender traditional than natives, with the exception of those with only one foreign born parent, who are more gender egalitarian. This effect reduces once demographic variables are controlled for in Models 1a and 1b, whereas differences become more pronounced for first and second generation immigrants with the inclusion of control variables. Hypothesis H4 is therefore confirmed for first and second generation immigrants. The origin of immigrants is also important, as Models 7a and 7b (Tables 6a and 6b) show, with first generation immigrants from more gender traditional countries being more gender traditional themselves. However, this effect is not found for other groups with migration background, so that hypothesis H5 is only confirmed for the first generation. Also, as predicted, the effect is stronger for first than second generation immigrants, and for recent arrivals, as can be seen in Models 10a and 10b (Tables 8a and 8b). The stronger effect of origin country gender development on more recent arrivals is only significant for the dependent variable ‘men should have priority if jobs are scarce’, however. In addition to gender development in the origin country, the majority religion of the origin country is included in Models 8a and 8b for first generation migrants (Tables 6a and 6b). Findings show that if the majority is secular or Christian, attitudes are more egalitarian than if the origin religion is Islam or other, although this is not significant in models with the origin country as the highest level for the dependent variable ‘women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children’. The effect of gender development indicators in the origin country reduces, but remains significant, when origin country majority religion is included, indicating some, but not complete overlap of these measurements. Hypothesis H6 is largely confirmed. The effect of length of stay is highly significant and in the expected direction for ‘men should have priority if jobs are scarce’ but less clear for ‘women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children’ as a dependent variable. Largely, however, there is support that longer staying migrants holding more gender egalitarian attitudes than recent arrivals. As expected, first and second generation immigrants who speak an official host country language at home hold more gender egalitarian attitudes than those who do not. This effect is significant for both dependent variables for the first generation, but only significant for the dependent variable ‘men should have priority if jobs are scarce’ for the second generation. For respondents with one foreign born parent, the effect is in the opposite direction for ‘men should have priority if jobs are scarce’ as a dependent variable. Citizenship does not have a notable impact on attitudes, with the exception of first generation immigrants in models with ‘women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children’ as dependent variable, where the effect is in the opposite direction to what was expected. Discrimination has the expected positive effect on the dependent variable ‘women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children’, but an effect in the opposite direction for the other dependent variable. Ethnic minority status, on the other hand, has the expected effect, as does reporting discrimination because of gender. Overall, hypothesis H7 is supported in the data with the exceptions of citizenship, with more acculturated migrants being

more gender egalitarian, and discriminated groups and ethnic minorities being more gender traditional overall.

No support is found for the secularisation hypothesis, as effects of length of stay, citizenship and language only change marginally when religiosity is included (compare Models 3a and 3b with Models 4a and 4b respectively, Tables 5a and 5b). Hypothesis H8 is therefore rejected. There is, however, evidence that religiosity is more important for attitudes of some groups than others, as illustrated by the interaction effects with immigrant status in Models 4a and 4b, and with religious denomination in Models 5a and 5b. Religiosity has a significantly stronger effect for first generation immigrants than for natives and second generation immigrants, which supports hypothesis H9. Religiosity also has a stronger impact on more recent arrivals, as illustrated in Modes 9a and 9b (Tables 7a and 7b). This effect is significant for ‘women should be prepared cut down on paid work if they have children’ as a dependent variable, but remains below conventional significant levels for the other dependent variable. Religiosity most strongly impacts on the attitudes of Muslims, which gives support for hypothesis H10, although the effect is not found for other non-Christian religions. Summary and discussion Religious individuals hold less gender egalitarian attitudes than individuals who do not belong to a religion or those who do, but have lower levels of religiosity and attend less frequently. It does appear to be the case that the more traditional roles assigned to men and women in various religions have an impact on their adherents’ attitudes. Alternatively, it is also possible that people who disagree strongly with the views expressed by religious leaders disengage with a religion, although this is most likely a weaker mechanism. Muslim individuals are the most gender traditional, followed by Christians. Different levels of religiosity, however, do not significantly reduce the difference between natives and immigrants, and the inclusion of religious denomination only weakens, but does not eliminate the difference between immigrants and natives. This suggests that additional factors play a role, and that country of origin may be of importance in addition to religion.

As expected, immigrants from a gender egalitarian country hold more egalitarian attitudes, and this is stronger for more recent arrivals. For the second generation, parents’ origin country no longer has a measurable effect. Transmission from parents to children does not seem to be sufficiently strong for this particular aspect that it can be detected here. Religious majority in the origin country other than Christian or no religion is also associated with less gender egalitarian attitudes, but even when this is included, gender egalitarianism continues to have an effect, but it is weakened, indicating some, but not complete overlap of these measurements.

The generational differences observed already indicate some acculturation to mainstream beliefs across generations. More acculturated immigrants in terms of language use are more gender egalitarian, potentially linked to being exposed more to host country discourse, but also because those speaking the official language tend to be better integrated in other aspects (Diehl et al., 2009). Citizenship on the other hand did not matter. Citizenship acquisition may be more a matter of practical consideration for many immigrants rather than an endorsement of host country

values and a marker or acculturation. Language spoken in many ways is a more ‘voluntary’ decision than acquiring citizenship. Also, host countries differ so much in their citizenship regimes that holding citizenship may mean very different things in different contexts. Over time first generation immigrants become more gender egalitarian, which is in line with previous findings in studies of individual immigrant groups (Jones-Correa and Ajinkya, 2007; Leaper and Valin, 1996; Rosenthal et al., 1996; Yamanaka and McClelland, 1994). Discrimination and minority status, on the other hand, have the opposite effect to integration and acculturation.

No evidence is found for secularisation processes being important in changing gender role attitudes amongst immigrants. Diehl et al. (2009) observed a similar outcome, in that declining levels of religiosity only explained a part of changing attitudes. On the other hand, support is found for the idea that immigrants’ religiosity is less symbolic than that of people who have grown up in more secular surroundings, and where religious belief systems have less normative power (Hervieu-Léger, 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002). As discussed above, religion continues to be important both in terms of belonging to a particular denomination and in terms of levels or religiosity and attendance, which seems to confirm that secularisation in the private sphere is relatively slow (Halman et al., 1999; Voicu, 2009). The impact of religiosity, however, is stronger for first generation immigrants, but not for the second generation, which lends support to the argument that individuals having been socialised in less secularised surroundings are influenced more in their attitudes by religious beliefs. Furthermore, recent arrivals exhibit a stronger effect of religiosity on attitudes, which further emphasizes the socialisation idea. Religiosity has the strongest effect on Muslims, for whom religiosity seems to be even less ‘symbolic’ than other groups. It cannot be determined here whether this is due to Islam being a minority religion, with adherents therefore attempting to preserve particular beliefs linked to their religion, or whether it is a trend that is specifically present for Muslims, where gender role beliefs are often considered to be

This paper shows that religion continues to be important in determining gender role attitudes, and this is particularly true for immigrants, and those Origin country factors, however, are also of importance, and it seems that both together help to explain immigrants’ attitudes. Previous research differs in the importance it attributes to either factor. Read (2003) for example claims that origin region is more important then individual religious affiliation in a study of Arab women. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that societal context and majority religion are more important than religious affiliation of individuals in terms of gender attitudes. Findings here would suggest that both play an important role, with Muslim individuals being the most gender traditional on average, but with origin country context playing an important role in addition to this. What this shows is that it is necessary to differentiate between religion and origin country and not to assume that belonging to a particular religions such as Islam is associated with particular attitudes regardless of origin region. As Read (2004) highlights, gender traditionalism is not synonymous with Muslim affiliation.

This study cannot determine the attitudes of individual immigrant groups, and their trajectory over time in different countries. What it does show, however, is that immigrants’ are influenced by the context in their origin countries, but that this

weakens over time and across generations. Furthermore, religion seems to be a particularly important factor for determining gender role beliefs, with denomination and religiosity playing a large role for both immigrants and natives. But the impact of religiosity on attitudes seems to soften as well with increased acculturation. Yet, larger differences exist between religious denominations, and this would appear to be a stronger division than that between immigrants and natives per se.

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Table 2

Total Natives First generation

Second Generation

One imm. parent

Gender (%female) 53.7 53.7 54 52.7 53.4

Age 47.4 47.8 46.4 41.2 43.8

Education 11.9 11.9 12 12 12.7

Income 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.1 6.6

under 5 years (%) n/a n/a 14.9 n/a n/a

6-10 years (%) n/a n/a 13.5 n/a n/a

11 to 20 years (%) n/a n/a 22.9 n/a n/a

Over 20 years (%) n/a n/a 48.7 n/a n/a

Official language spoken (%) 96.1 n/a 72.5 78.5 93.2

Citizenship 95.6 n/a 43.4 78.7 97.3

Ethnic minority 4.9 2.4 31.4 23.6 6.5

Discrimination 6.3 4.9 18.7 17.7 8.8

Discrimination: gender 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.1

Christian (%) 57.8 59.3 50.9 46.1 45.6

Islam (%) 0.6 0.4 3.2 1.8 0.7

Other religion (%) 1.5 0.6 11.4 9.8 0.8

No religion (%) 40.1 39.7 34.5 42.4 52.9

Religiosity 4.71 4.68 5.39 4.95 4.16

Frequent attendance (%) 15.3 15.6 15.3 14.1 9.3

Regular attendance (%) 51.5 51.3 54.6 54.5 49.8

Never attend (%) 33.2 33 30.1 31.5 40.9

Origin country gender dev. n/a n/a 0.8 0.85 0.90

Host country gender dev. 0.9 0.9 0.91 0.9 0.9

only valid percentages reported; missing cases excluded Table 3

Christian Islam Other religion

No religion

Gender (%female) 57.5 47.2 52.9 48.2

Age 50.2 38.3 42.7 43.5

Education 11.45 10.26 13 12.66

Income 6.29 5.82 6.56 6.6

under 5 years (%) 14.8 17.5 18.3 14.3

6-10 years (%) 13.3 20.4 15.2 11.3

11 to 20 years (%) 22.3 32.7 23.8 20.6

Over 20 years (%) 49.6 29.4 42.7 53.8

Official language spoken (%) 96.4 65.7 85.3 96.5

Citizenship 95.9 70.2 83.1 95.9

Ethnic minority 4.1 62.1 27.8 3.9

Discrimination 5.2 29.6 23.2 6.7

Discrimination: gender 0.5 0.9 1.8 0.9

Religiosity 6.06 6.56 6.15 2.57

Frequent attendance (%) 25.2 22.4 20.9 1.1

Regular attendance (%) 61.5 51.6 49.6 35.3

Never attend (%) 13.3 26 29.5 63.6

Origin country gender dev. 0.82 0.66 0.71 0.83

Gender dev. parents' origin 0.85 0.65 0.8 0.83

Host country gender dev. 0.9 0.89 0.92 0.91

only valid percentages reported; missing cases excluded

Table 4a

Empty Model Model 0a Model 1a

Fixed Part Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Disagree 1.165** 0.109 1.158** 0.126 1.828** 0.095

Neither -0.290** 0.109 -0.299* 0.126 0.117 0.094

Agree -1.093** 0.109 -1.103** 0.126 -0.818** 0.095

Agree strongly -2.572** 0.11 -2.585** 0.126 -2.431** 0.095

First generation (Gen1) 0.258** 0.072 0.346** 0.080 Second generation (Gen2) 0.098 0.088 0.190* 0.096 One immigrant parent (Gen2p) -0.272** 0.073 -0.167* 0.081

Gender -0.476** 0.013

Age 0.018** 0.000

Education -0.111** 0.002

Income -0.039** 0.003

Host country gender development -8.477** 1.513

Random Part

Country Level

Intercept 0.298** 0.087 0.330** 0.095 0.111** 0.036

Community Level

Intercept 0.140** 0.020 0.096** 0.016 0.125** 0.019

All regressions controlled for variable specific dummies for missing values and ESS round; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Men should have priority if jobs are scarce; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed Table 4b

Empty Model Model 0b Model 1b

Fixed Part Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE

Disagree 2.459** 0.098 2.374** 0.112 8.050** 1.445

Neither 0.797** 0.097 0.708** 0.112 6.277** 1.445

Agree -0.123 0.097 -0.217# 0.112 5.261** 1.444

Agree strongly -2.038** 0.098 -2.142** 0.112 3.208* 1.444

First generation (Gen1) 0.364** 0.066 0.410** 0.069

Second generation (Gen2) 0.096 0.082 0.194* 0.086

One immigrant parent (Gen2p) -0.146* 0.067 -0.042 0.071

Gender -0.154** 0.013

Age 0.015** 0.000

Education -0.068** 0.002

Income -0.034** 0.003

Host country gender development -5.899** 1.606

Random Part

Country Level

Intercept 0.233** 0.069 0.259** 0.075 0.133** 0.041

Community Level

Intercept 0.121** 0.019 0.077** 0.014 0.088** 0.015

All regressions controlled for variable specific dummies for missing values and ESS round; case numbers: n1=83,433, n2=1,637, n3=27

Dependent variable: Women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed

Table 5a

Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a

Fixed Part Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE

Disagree 1.828** 0.091 1.68** 0.084 1.683** 0.083 1.689** 0.083 1.685** 0.083

Neither 0.112 0.090 -0.042 0.084 -0.050 0.083 -0.046 0.082 -0.047 0.083

Agree -0.825** 0.090 -0.983** 0.084 -0.996** 0.083 -0.992** 0.082 -0.994** 0.083

Agree strongly -2.441** 0.091 -2.604** 0.085 -2.623** 0.084 -2.617** 0.083 -2.621** 0.084

First generation (Gen1) 0.196# 0.101 0.124 0.093 0.115 0.093 0.089 0.092 0.111 0.093

Second generation (Gen2) 0.459* 0.183 0.343* 0.173 0.306# 0.173 0.288# 0.171 0.298# 0.173

One immigrant parent (Gen2p) 0.432* 0.212 0.453* 0.207 0.434* 0.207 0.454* 0.207 0.436* 0.207

Gender -0.468** 0.013 -0.488** 0.013 -0.527** 0.013 -0.522** 0.013 -0.527** 0.013

Age 0.018** 0.000 0.017** 0.000 0.016** 0.000 0.016** 0.000 0.016** 0.000

Education -0.110** 0.002 -0.108** 0.002 -0.107** 0.002 -0.108** 0.002 -0.107** 0.002

Income -0.039** 0.003 -0.039** 0.003 -0.038** 0.003 -0.038** 0.003 -0.038** 0.003

under 5 years Gen1 0.481** 0.087 0.487** 0.086 0.468** 0.086 0.473** 0.086 0.471** 0.086

6-10 years Gen1 0.295** 0.086 0.276** 0.086 0.264** 0.086 0.262** 0.086 0.266** 0.086

11 to 20 years Gen1 0.163* 0.069 0.143* 0.069 0.134# 0.069 0.138* 0.069 0.141* 0.069

Official language spoken Gen1 -0.177* 0.070 -0.121# 0.069 -0.115# 0.069 -0.106 0.068 -0.116# 0.068

Official language spoken Gen2 -0.354* 0.163 -0.286# 0.159 -0.275# 0.159 -0.263# 0.158 -0.276# 0.159

Official lang. spoken Gen2p -0.449** 0.137 -0.431** 0.135 -0.416** 0.135 -0.426** 0.135 -0.417** 0.135

Citizen Gen1 0.093 0.060 0.088 0.059 0.084 0.059 0.082 0.059 0.085 0.059

Citizen Gen2 -0.018 0.134 -0.019 0.133 -0.007 0.133 0.001 0.133 -0.005 0.133

Citizen Gen2p -0.182 0.187 -0.193 0.187 -0.181 0.187 -0.187 0.187 -0.182 0.187

Ethnic minority 0.315** 0.034 0.242** 0.035 0.231** 0.035 0.236** 0.035 0.233** 0.035

Discrimination -0.072* 0.029 -0.073* 0.029 -0.080** 0.029 -0.077** 0.029 -0.081** 0.029

Discrimination gender -0.900** 0.093 -0.888** 0.093 -0.860** 0.093 -0.857** 0.093 -0.861** 0.093

Christian 0.241** 0.015 0.060** 0.018 0.056** 0.018 0.062** 0.018

Islam 0.774** 0.063 0.588** 0.064 0.597** 0.065 0.467** 0.074

Other non Christian 0.072 0.086 -0.103 0.086 -0.120 0.087 -0.102 0.096

Religiosity 0.029** 0.003 0.026** 0.007 0.029** 0.004

Regular attendance 0.15** 0.017 0.147** 0.017 0.149** 0.017

Frequent attendance 0.352** 0.026 0.356** 0.026 0.353** 0.026

Religiosity x Gen1 0.027* 0.011

Religiosity x Gen2 0.001 0.018

Religiosity x Gen2p 0.006 0.013

Religiosity x Christian -0.004 0.006

Religiosity x Islam 0.070** 0.022 Religiosity x other non Christian -0.002 0.028

Host country gender dev. -8.285** 1.550 -8.313** 1.522 -8.313** 1.488 -8.468** 1.486 -8.339** 1.484

Random Part

Country Level

Intercept 0.122** 0.038 0.121** 0.037 0.115** 0.035 0.116** 0.035 0.115** 0.035

Community Level

Intercept 0.093** 0.016 0.062** 0.013 0.060** 0.012 0.056** 0.012 0.059** 0.012

All regressions controlled for variable specific dummies for missing values and ESS round; variance components reported selectively; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Men should have priority if jobs are scarce; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed

Table 5b

Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b

Fixed Part Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE

Disagree 7.946** 1.472 7.76** 1.474 7.915** 1.500 7.774** 1.498 7.878** 1.497

Neither 6.171** 1.472 5.973** 1.474 6.122** 1.500 5.984** 1.498 6.083** 1.497

Agree 5.151** 1.472 4.948** 1.474 5.093** 1.500 4.951** 1.498 5.056** 1.497

Agree strongly 3.097* 1.472 2.888* 1.474 3.019* 1.500 2.882# 1.498 2.984* 1.497

First generation (Gen1) 0.314** 0.096 0.245** 0.089 0.229* 0.090 0.216* 0.086 0.227** 0.088

Second generation (Gen2) 0.414* 0.175 0.283 0.166 0.228 0.170 0.241 0.163 0.224 0.165

One immigrant parent (Gen2p) 0.208 0.209 0.188 0.204 0.140 0.200 0.149 0.203 0.145 0.204

Gender -0.148** 0.013 -0.173** 0.013 -0.225** 0.010 -0.222** 0.013 -0.225** 0.013

Age 0.015** 0.000 0.014** 0.000 0.012** 0.000 0.012** 0.000 0.012** 0.000

Education -0.067** 0.002 -0.066** 0.002 -0.064** 0.000 -0.064** 0.002 -0.064** 0.002

Income -0.033** 0.003 -0.034** 0.003 -0.033** 0.000 -0.033** 0.003 -0.033** 0.003

under 5 years Gen1 0.138 0.086 0.117 0.085 0.090 0.090 0.085 0.085 0.089 0.085

6-10 years Gen1 0.062 0.086 0.030 0.085 0.008 0.090 -0.001 0.085 0.007 0.085

11 to 20 years Gen1 0.178* 0.069 0.143* 0.068 0.131# 0.070 0.128# 0.068 0.133# 0.068

Official language spoken Gen1 -0.164* 0.069 -0.105 0.068 -0.104 0.070 -0.109 0.068 -0.105 0.068

Official language spoken Gen2 -0.136 0.160 -0.064 0.156 -0.057 0.160 -0.064 0.154 -0.059 0.155

Official language spoken Gen2p -0.083 0.136 -0.023 0.134 0.001 0.130 -0.014 0.133 0..000 0.134

Citizen Gen1 0.142* 0.060 0.135* 0.059 0.131* 0.060 0.126* 0.059 0.132* 0.059

Citizen Gen2 -0.186 0.133 -0.186 0.131 -0.160 0.130 -0.164 0.131 -0.158 0.131

Citizen Gen2p -0.185 0.186 -0.188 0.186 -0.155 0.190 -0.154 0.186 -0.159 0.186

Ethnic minority 0.229** 0.034 0.159** 0.035 0.146** 0.040 0.148** 0.035 0.147** 0.035

Discrimination 0.114** 0.029 0.112** 0.029 0.102** 0.030 0.106** 0.029 0.101** 0.029

Discrimination gender -0.566** 0.083 -0.548** 0.083 -0.517** 0.080 -0.521** 0.083 -0.519** 0.083

Christian 0.327** 0.015 0.108** 0.020 0.105** 0.018 0.124** 0.018

Islam 0.787** 0.063 0.541** 0.060 0.549** 0.064 0.476** 0.073

Other non Christian 0.153# 0.084 -0.068 0.090 -0.075 0.085 -0.062 0.093

Religiosity 0.053** 0.000 0.049** 0.006 0.043** 0.004

Regular attendance 0.084** 0.020 0.080** 0.017 0.089** 0.017

Frequent attendance 0.261** 0.030 0.261** 0.026 0.25** 0.026

Religiosity x Gen1 0.023* 0.011

Religiosity x Gen2 -0.022 0.018

Religiosity x Gen2p 0.006 0.012

Religiosity x Christian 0.016** 0.006

Religiosity x Islam 0.061** 0.022

Religiosity x other non Christian 0.022 0.027

Host country gender dev. -5.793** 1.637 -5.797** 1.640 -5.874** 1.670 -5.711** 1.666 -5.859** 1.665

Random Part

Country Level

Intercept 0.142** 0.043 0.148** 0.044 0.154** 0.050 0.156** 0.046 0.154** 0.045

Community Level

Intercept 0.072** 0.014 0.047** 0.011 0.043** 0.010 0.038** 0.01 0.042** 0.01

All regressions controlled for variable specific dummies for missing values and ESS round; variance components reported selectively; case numbers: n1=83,433, n2=1,637, n3=27

Dependent variable: Women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed

Table 6a

Model 7aº Model 8aº

Fixed Part Coeff SE Coeff SE

Disagree 1.682** 0.084 1.682** 0.082

Neither -0.041 0.084 -0.042 0.082

Agree -0.982** 0.084 -0.983** 0.082

Agree strongly -2.603** 0.084 -2.605** 0.083

First generation (Gen1) 0.135 0.092 0.031 0.103

Second generation (Gen2) 0.361* 0.171 0.353* 0.168

One immigrant parent (Gen2p) 0.473* 0.206 0.478* 0.204

Gender -0.486** 0.013 -0.486** 0.013

Age 0.017** 0.000 0.017** 0.000

Education -0.108** 0.002 -0.108** 0.002

Income -0.038** 0.003 -0.038** 0.003

under 5 years Gen1 0.446** 0.086 0.456** 0.086

6-10 years Gen1 0.230** 0.086 0.230** 0.086

11 to 20 years Gen1 0.099 0.069 0.096 0.069

Official language spoken Gen1 -0.084 0.069 -0.069 0.068

Official language spoken Gen2 -0.296# 0.159 -0.281# 0.157

Official lang. spoken Gen2p -0.453** 0.135 -0.451** 0.134

Citizen Gen1 0.027 0.061 0.026 0.060

Citizen Gen2 -0.003 0.134 -0.004 0.133

Citizen Gen2p -0.192 0.187 -0.195 0.187

Ethnic minority 0.223** 0.035 0.222** 0.035

Discrimination -0.075** 0.029 -0.074* 0.029

Discrimination gender -0.886** 0.093 -0.889** 0.093

Christian 0.240** 0.015 0.241** 0.015

Islam 0.722** 0.065 0.682** 0.068

Other religion 0.048 0.086 0.018 0.088

Christian origin 0.054 0.074

Islam origin 0.345** 0.100

Other religion origin 0.533** 0.186

GD origin Gen1 -1.299** 0.261 -0.839** 0.291

GD origin Gen2 0.222 0.499 0.149 0.493

GD origin Gen2p 0.156 0.357 0.162 0.352

Gender development host -8.305** 1.541 -8.501** 1.543

Random Part

Country Level

Intercept 0.126** 0.038 0.128** 0.039

Community Level

Intercept 0.054** 0.012 0.046** 0.011

All regressions controlled for variable specific dummies for missing values and ESS round; variance components reported selectively; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Men should have priority if jobs are scarce; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed ºModel 7a: origin gender development for first generation effect also significant at 99% level in model with origin country as highest level ºModel 8a: origin gender development effect and Islam origin for first generation significant at 95% instead of 99% level in model with origin country as highest level; other religion origin no longer significant

Table 6b

Model 7bº Model 8bº

Fixed Part Coeff SE Coeff SE

Disagree 7.764** 1.469 7.935** 1.488

Neither 5.978** 1.469 6.146** 1.488

Agree 4.953** 1.469 5.122** 1.488

Agree strongly 2.889* 1.469 3.057* 1.487

First generation (Gen1) 0.269** 0.088 0.200* 0.099

Second generation (Gen2) 0.307# 0.165 0.302# 0.163

One immigrant parent (Gen2p) 0.201 0.204 0.200 0.203

Gender -0.171** 0.013 -0.171** 0.013

Age 0.014** 0.000 0.014** 0.000

Education -0.066** 0.002 -0.066** 0.002

Income -0.033** 0.003 -0.033** 0.003

under 5 years Gen1 0.079 0.086 0.081 0.085

6-10 years Gen1 -0.011 0.085 -0.012 0.085

11 to 20 years Gen1 0.106 0.069 0.109# 0.069

Official language spoken Gen1 -0.076 0.068 -0.066 0.068

Official language spoken Gen2 -0.072 0.156 -0.058 0.154

Official lang. spoken Gen2p -0.045 0.134 -0.042 0.133

Citizen Gen1 0.078 0.060 0.070 0.060

Citizen Gen2 -0.165 0.132 -0.166 0.132

Citizen Gen2p -0.184 0.186 -0.184 0.186

Ethnic minority 0.143** 0.035 0.144** 0.035

Discrimination 0.11** 0.029 0.108** 0.029

Discrimination gender -0.545** 0.083 -0.545** 0.083

Christian 0.326** 0.015 0.327** 0.015

Islam 0.735** 0.065 0.679** 0.068

Other religion 0.129 0.084 0.116 0.086

Christian origin 0.016 0.072

Islam origin 0.334** 0.099

Other religion origin 0.309# 0.184

GD origin Gen1 -1.216** 0.257 -0.772** 0.287

GD origin Gen2 0.255 0.486 0.160 0.482

GD origin Gen2p 0.231 0.342 0.232 0.339

Gender development host -5.799** 1.634 -5.988** 1.655

Random Part

Country Level

Intercept 0.147** 0.044 0.037 0.009

Community Level

Intercept 0.043** 0.010 0.153 0.045

All regressions controlled for variable specific dummies for missing values and ESS round; variance components reported selectively; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed ºModel 7b: origin gender development effect for first generation also significant at 99% level in model with origin country as highest level ºModel 8b: origin gender development effect for first generation also significant at 99% level in model with origin country as highest level; Islam origin and other religion origin no longer significant

Table 7a

Model 9a

Coeff SE

Religiosity 0.043** 0.006

Religiosity x Gen1 0.016 0.012

<10 (Gen1) 0.287** 0.066

Religiosity x <10 (Gen1) 0.03 0.019

Findings reported selectively; model based on Model 2a; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Men should have priority if jobs are scarce; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed Table 7b

Model 9b

Coeff SE

Religiosity 0.060** 0.005

Religiosity x Gen1 0.011 0.012

<10 (Gen1) -0.041 0.065

Religiosity x <10 (Gen1) 0.039* 0.019

Findings reported selectively; model based on Model 2b; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children; reference category: disagree strongly

Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed

Table 8a

Model 10a

Coeff SE

< 10 years 0.268** 0.076

Host gender development -8.269** 1.601

Origin gender development Gen1 -0.997** 0.3

Origin GD Gen1 x <10 -2.002** 0.541

Findings reported selectively; model based on Model 2a; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Men should have priority if jobs are scarce; reference category: disagree strongly Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed ºModel 10a: Origin gender development effect significant at 95% instead of 99% level and origin/length interaction significant at 99% level in model with origin country as highest level Table 8b

Model 10bº

Coeff SE

< 10 years -0.009 0.065

Host gender development -5.741** 1.631

Origin gender development Gen1 -1.522** 0.302

Origin GD Gen1 x <10 -0.657 0.470

Findings reported selectively; model based on Model 2b; case numbers: n1=83,491, n2=1,641, n3=27

Dependent variable: Women should be prepared to cut back on paid work if they have children; reference category: disagree strongly

Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, two-tailed

ºModel 10b: Origin gender development effect significant at 95% instead of 99% level in model with

origin country as highest level