The impact and management of the primary and secondary effects of

earthquake activity reflect knowledge, perception and stage of development.

-Impact of primary & secondary effects-Management of primary & secondary effects-How does our knowledge, perception & the

stage of development of earthquakes influence their impact and how we deal with them?

-Case studies:-MEDC Kobe, Japan

-LEDC Gujarat in India (see P.P.6)

Past questions• May 2003• Syn 7.b) With reference to your case study of an MEDC, discuss the major factors

(knowledge, perception and stage of development) affecting the impact and management of earthquake activity. [15]

• May 2005• 7.b) Study Resource 7 which is a newspaper account of an Indian earthquake.• i) Describe the various primary impacts of the event. [4]• ii) What might be the secondary impacts of the event in the weeks and months that

follow? [6]• Syn c) With reference to a LEDC, discuss how the impacts and management of

earthquake activity reflect the country’s knowledge and perception of earthquakes and its stage of development. [15]

• May 2006• 7.b) Study Resource 7 which shows the pattern of casualties following major

earthquake activity.• i) The initial peak in the graph shows the casualties resulting from primary impacts.

Describe the likely causes of these casualties. [4]• ii) What might account for the rise in casualties several days after the earthquake

activity? [4]• Syn c) With reference to case study material from both a MEDC and a LEDC, discuss

attempts to reduce or avoid the impacts of earthquakes. [15]

Perception• Man’s relationship with the environment is indirect in that his

behaviour depends upon the image of the world that each individual person carries inside his/her head.

Objective

environment

Individual Subjective Environment

(the environment perceived by the individual)

Stimuli – we receive 18 separate visual images alone each second & info from other senses

F

I

L

T

E

R

Stimuli are filtered though our emotions and reasoning which are affected by past earning and motivation. Factors acting as filters include:

Past experiences age

Personality sex

Social class occupation

Education cultureThe above factors will determine the individual’s perception of hazards and how they respond to them.

Earthquake in a MEDC:Kobe, Japan, 17Jan 1995

• Also known as the Hyogo-Ken Nanbu Earthquake or The Great Hanshin Quake

• A Tuesday morning at 5.46am

• 7.2 on Richter scale• Along Nojima Fault

where Philippine, Pacific & Eurasian Plates meet – Destructive margin

Primary Effects

• Immediate effects of the earthquake are known as primary effects.

• E.g. collapse of buildings, roads & bridges resulting from the seismic waves shaking the crust.

• During the 20 sec shake the ground moved 50cm horizontally and up to 1 m vertically.

In the Hyogo-Ken Nanbu event, surface rupture of the fault was observed only in a rural area of Awaji Island, with displacements of up to 3 metres. Few structures were near enough the fault to be damaged by the displacement, although underground utilities,

fences, and irrigation ditches were cut. Rice paddies were thrown far out of level.

Effects of liquefaction at the port & wharf area

Liquefaction caused 1.2 – 2 m drop of paved surfaces & local flooding.

Cranes tilted or fell.

120 out of 150 quays were destroyed.

Port building & contents badly destroyed.

The Kobe port, having been constructed on two artificial islands made of

relatively loose fill, and always water saturated, suffered widespread liquefaction and settlement, and was incapacitated for two months. Shipping

was disrupted worldwide.

Transport & industry hit

Any structure built on deep pilings, like this elevated roadway, appeared to have risen a full meter. The world's longest suspension bridge, under construction but having such foundations, was hardly

damaged at all.

Transport badly affectedHanshin Expressway collapsed

Tall concrete stilts collapsed or toppled sideways

Railway lines buckled and many stations closed

• 130km section of Shinkansen bullet train network had to be closed

Tracks

suspended

Services & communication• Electricity, gas, phones• The quake has halted 15 generators in thermal power plants in Osaka.

Electric power supply was cut to over approximately 0.9 million householders at one point, this recovered down to around 0.4 million householders in Kobe and Nishimiya-Cities by the morning of 1/18. But the damage inflicted upon poles is yet to be investigated. When electricity will be fully recovered is unknown.

• Gas supplies are halted to over around 0.83 million householders in Kobe, Ashiya, and Takarazuka-Cities due to more than 2,600 cases of gas leaks in Hyogo and Osaka Prefectures. 6,000 staff of Osaka Gas were called to conduct safety inspection. It will take about one and a half months to restore.

• Around 250,000 telephone lines were paralyzed at one point, which has recovered extensively except for 60,000 lines in part of Kobe City. Communication networks are fragmented here and there, because the telegraph poles and cables were destroyed by the quake and fire. Full scale recovery will take more than a month. In emergency, NTT has provided four wireless satellite phones and 34 public phones in Kobe-City.

Buildings

• Office blocks built in 1960s of steel & concrete collapsed in the middle so that a whole floor was crushed but rooms above and below remained intact.

• Modern buildings designed to be e.q. proof suffered little damage although some were left standing at an angle when the ground beneath them liquefied.

Housing

• Wooden buildings with heavy tiled roofs collapsed

• Wooden building totally collapsed, concrete structure behind survived intact

Collapse of bank buildings

6,300 dead, 35,000 injured

On the first day 30,000 made homeless as 180,000 buildings were destroyed or badly damaged.

The destruction of lifelines and utilities made it impossible for fire fighters to

reach fires started by broken gas lines, sparks from severed electrical cables and fallen paraffin lamps.

Large sections of the city burned, greatly contributing to the loss of life.

Over 150 fires.At least 7,500 wooden homes destroyed.

Water pumped from the bay as pipes broken underground

•

Secondary Effects

• Fires spread – many died in these fires• Homeless rose to 310,000• 30% of Kobe residents were moved to temporary shelter

in camps (in schools, town hall, open parks) – [very cold winter -2C]

• Overcrowded, unsanitary conditions• Food, blankets, medical supplies & clean water in short

supply for first few days• Rebuilding costs £70 billion• Damages (includes lost business) £120 million• Only 3% of population had e.q. insurance• Financial lose had huge impact on individuals

Secondary Effects

• Gas off for up to 3 months – severe underground damage

• Emotional stress among survivors and bereaved for months

• 96,000 moved away from Kobe reducing its population to 1.4 million

• Chaos and congestion on roads• Closure of business• Fear worsened by 1,300 aftershocks

Business• [Banks]

THE SAKURA BANK : On-line system is down for 140 branches.THE HYOGO BANK, Kobe City: complete halt of on-line system.THE HANSHIN BANK, Kobe City: Telecommunication lines are paralyzed.

• [Manufacturers]-The Kobe shipyard, MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES: Majority of workers cannot commute.- Osaka Plant, SUMITOMO METAL INDUSTRIES: The plant is shut down due to gas and water supply cut.- MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC APPLIANCES INDUSTRIES: goods cannot be shipped due to chaos in the transport facilities.- SUMITOMO RUBBER INDUSTRIES: Head office and plants were partially destroyed.- KIRIN BREWERY COMPANY: 1,500 kilo liters of beer effluxed.- KAWASAKI HEAVY INDUSTRIES: Machineries are destroyed and plants are closed down.

Business• [Car Companies]

TOYOTA All factories are closed down and 20,000 cars cut in production.HONDA: 7,000 cars cut in production.NISSAN: 130 cars cut in production.DAIHATSU: 1,600 cars cut in production.MAZUDA: 3,000 cars cut in production.MITSUBISHI: 1,400 cars cut in production.

• [Supermarkets]Distribution routes to transport daily necessities such as water and food are seriously damaged.Hundreds of citizens are queuing up in front of the shops. 20 police guarded some shops.SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN: 7 helicopters were chartered to deliver box lunches from Tokyo.DAIEI: Beverages and food were delivered via ferry boats and trucks from Tokyo, Nagoya, and Fukuoka. But it is still unsure when fresh vegetables will be delivered.

Economic aftershocks

• This earthquake caused over US$100 billion in damage. Most of the losses were uninsured, as only 3% of property in the Kobe area was covered by earthquake insurance, compared to 16% in Tokyo.

• The sheer size of the earthquake caused a major decline in Japanese stock markets, with the Nikkei 225 index plunging by a thousand points in one day following the quake. This financial damage was the chief cause for the collapse of Barings Bank .

Management of primary & secondary effects

The Response

• In the aftermath, both citizens and specialists lost faith in the technology of their early warning systems and earthquake construction techniques.

• The national government of Japan was criticized for not acting quickly enough to save many people, for poorly managing Japanese volunteers, and for initially refusing help from foreign nations, including the U.S., Korea, and the United Kingdom. The language barriers and the obvious lack of Japanese medical licensing by foreign volunteers were cited as justification, but some critics suggested that racism and national pride were stronger factors.

Local government response• Local hospitals (governed by individual wards and cities) struggled to

keep up with demand for medical treatment, largely due to collapsed "lifelines" that kept supplies and personnel from reaching the affected areas.

• Several foreign countries offered to send additional help, volunteers were so widespread that 1995 has been called "Japan's year of the volunteer." Approximately 1.2 million volunteers were involved in relief efforts during the first three months following the earthquake.

• Retailers such as Daiei and Seven-Eleven used their existing supply networks to provide necessities in affected areas, while NTT and Motorola provided free telephone service for victims. Even the Yamaguchi-gumi yakuza syndicate was involved in distributing food and supplies to needy victims.

• By cabinet order, January 17th is now Fire Protection and Volunteer Day across Japan.

Effect on disaster prevention planning

• The earthquake proved to be a major wake-up call for Japanese disaster prevention authorities.

• The national government changed its disaster response policies in the wake of the earthquake, and its response to the Chuetsu Earthquake of 2004 was significantly faster and more effective.

• The Ground Self-Defence Forces were given automatic authority to respond to earthquakes over a certain magnitude, which allowed them to deploy to the Niigata region within minutes.

• Control over fire response was likewise handed over from local fire departments to a central command base in Tokyo and Kyoto.

Effect on disaster prevention planning

• In response to the widespread damage to transportation infrastructure, and the resulting effect on emergency response times in the disaster area, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport began designating special disaster prevention routes and reinforcing the roads and surrounding buildings so as to keep them as intact as possible in the event of another earthquake.

• Hyogo's prefectural government invested millions of yen in the years following the quake to build earthquake-proof shelters and supplies in public parks.

• Elsewhere in Japan, the Tokyo metropolitan government set up an emergency food and water supply network based around petrol stations, which were mostly unaffected in the Hanshin earthquake.

• However, citizens' groups have taken up the bulk of disaster planning, partly out of distrust for the government still held after the disaster in Kobe.

Timescales:• Water, electric, gas & telephones fully working

by July 1995• Railways back by August 1995• A year after quake 80% of port working but

Hanshin Expressway still closed• By Jan 1999, 134,000 housing units constructed• But some still in temporary accommodation• New laws passes to make buildings & transport

structures safer• More instruments installed to monitor movement

Perception – How did Japan’s reputation suffer as a result of the quake?

Did the engineers and government officials have to ‘eat their words’ ?Did all their planning help?

• Although Japan:– Has a worldwide reputation– Was acutely aware of threat– Had taken steps to prepare– Is a MEDC and has spent millions in monitoring & preparation

Both emergency response and search and rescue operations were unsatisfactory though many lives were saved.

Preparations covering school buildings and street signs marking escape routes had preformed well.

Less successful was the investment of £70 mill each year on e.q. prediction:- no warning signs recognised - but noted lack of events over 50 years – hinting at stress build up- on 7 January a researcher recorded radon gas levels in groundwater 12 times the norm in wells near Kobe – unfortunately this was only highlighted after the event

See handout on PERCEPTION relating to newspaper articles

Knowledge, perception and stage of development

• Perhaps were level of development & knowledge is most noteworthy is in the recovery after the event.

– Shopkeepers opened on the pavement the next day

– Within 12 mths 70% of Kobe shops and businesses fully functioning

– By Oct 1996 Hanshin Expressway fully rebuilt

– Port 70% functioning within a year, complete by 1997

Summary

* The quake encouraged new resolve and urgency on strengthening older structures

* Stressed the need to maintain tight building controls

* But Japan still grows and, despite threat of liquefaction, reclaimed land continues to be built on