The Illinois Association of Defense Trial...

The Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel

Third Quarter 2014 l Volume 24, Number 3 l ISSN-2169-3668

Beth A. Bauer — HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville

Lindsay Drecoll Brown — Cassiday Schade LLP, Chicago

Roger R. Clayton — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Catherine A. Cooke — Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., Chicago

James L. Craney — Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Edwardsville

Thomas G. DiCianni — Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni &

Krafthefer, P.C., Chicago

Joseph G. Feehan — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Stacy Dolan Fulco — Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, LLC, Chicago

Scott L. Howie — Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago

M. Elizabeth D. Kellett — HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville

Seth D. Lamden — Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Chicago

David H. Levitt — Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago

David A. Perkins — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Bradford J. Peterson — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Urbana

Dina L. Torrisi — HeplerBroom LLC, Chicago

Michelle M. Wahl — Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, Chicago

COLUMNISTS

CONTRIBUTORS

PRESIDENTDAVID H. LEVITT Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, ChicagoPRESIDENT-ELECTTROY A. BOZARTH HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville1ST VICE PRESIDENTR. MARK MIFFLIN Giffin,Winning,Cohen&Bodewes,P.C., Springfield2ND VICE PRESIDENTMICHAEL L. RESIS SmithAmundsen LLC, ChicagoSECRETARY/TREASURERBRADLEY C. NAHRSTADT Lipe, Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt & Pontikis Ltd., Chicago

DirectorsLAURA K. BEASLEY Joley, Nussbaumer, Oliver, Dickerson & Beasley, P.C., BellevilleJOSEPH A. BLEYER Bleyer and Bleyer, MarionR. MARK COSIMINI Rusin Maciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., ChampaignBRUCE DORN Bruce Farrel Dorn & Associates, ChicagoJOSEPH G. FEEHAN Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., PeoriaROSSANA P. FERNANDEZ Fernandez and Associates, LLC, ChicagoTERRY A. FOx SmithAmundsen LLC, ChicagoEDWARD K. GRASSÉ Busse, Busse & Grassé, P.C., ChicagoJENNIFER GROSZEK Resolute Management, Inc., Midwest Division, ChicagoJENNIFER K. GUST Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, ChicagoSTEPHEN G. LOVERDE LawOfficeofStevenA.Lihosit, ChicagoPAUL R. LYNCH Craig & Craig, LLC, Mt. VernonWILLIAM K. MCVISK Johnson & Bell, Ltd., ChicagoNICOLE D. MILOS Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, LLC, ChicagoDONALD J. O’MEARA, JR. Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, ChicagoAL J. PRANAITIS Hoagland, Fitzgerald, Smith & Pranaitis, AltonSCOTT D. STEPHENSON LitchfieldCavoLLP, ChicagoTRACY E. STEVENSON Robbins Salomon & Patt, Ltd., ChicagoPATRICK W. STUFFLEBEAM HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville HEATHER R. WATTERSON CNA, Chicago

ExECUTIVE DIRECTOR Sandra J. Wulf, CAE, IOMPAST PRESIDENTS:RoyceGlennRowe • JamesBaylor • JackE.Horsley• John J. Schmidt •Thomas F.Bridgman •William J.Voelker, Jr. •BertM.Thompson • John F. Skeffington • JohnG. Langhenry, Jr. • LeeW.Ensel •L. Bow Pritchett • John F.White • R. Lawrence Storms • John P. Ewart •RichardC.Valentine•RichardH.Hoffman•EllisE.Fuqua•JohnE.Guy•LeoM.Tarpey•WillisR.Tribler•AlfredB.LaBarre•PatrickE.Maloney•RobertV.Dewey,Jr.•LawrenceR.Smith•R.MichaelHenderson•PaulL.Price•StephenL.Corn •RudolfG.Schade, Jr. •LyndonC.Molzahn •DanielR.Formeller •GordonR.Broom•CliffordP.Mallon•AnthonyJ.Tunney•DouglasJ.Pomatto•JackT.Riley,Jr.•PeterW.Brandt•CharlesH.Cole•GregoryC.Ray•JenniferJeritJohnson•StephenJ.Heine•GlenE.Amundsen•StevenM.Puiszis•JeffreyS.Hebrank•GregoryL.Cochran•RickHammond•KennethF.Werts•AnneM.Oldenburg•R.HowardJump•AleenR.Tiffany

illinois Association of Defense trial counsel

WWW.IADTC.ORG

Stacy E. Crabtree — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Brian S. Ebener — SmithAmundsen LLC, Chicago

Donald P. Eckler — Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago

Brad A. Elward — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Brad W. Keller — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Mark D. Hansen — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Jennifer A. Heydemann — HeplerBroom LLC, Chicago

Brittany L. Kaspar — Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, Chicago

Steven M. Puiszis — Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago

Matthew S. Sims — Cassiday Schade LLP, Chicago

Matthew F. Tibble — Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago

J. Matthew Thompson — Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Russell M. Ware — SmithAmundsen LLC, Milwaukee

http://www.iadtc.org

Monograph M-I The Attorney-Client Privilege in Malpractice Claims, by Donald P. Eckler and Matthew F. Tibble

Feature Articles 10 Pre-Mediation Telephone Conference with a Mediator—an Important Tool for Counsel, byRussellM.WareandBrianS.Ebener

29 WhenEmployersBecomeHumanTraffickers:AnOverviewofthe TraffickingVictimsProtectionAct, by Stacy E. Crabtree

60 Understanding Illinois’ New Ediscovery Rules, by Steven M. Puiszis

Columns 40 Appellate Practice Corner, by Scott L. Howie

71 Association News

15 Civil Rights Update, by David A. Perkins and Brad A. Elward

33 Construction Law, by Lindsay Drecoll Brown and Matthew S. Sims

8 Editor’s Note, by Beth A. Bauer

44 Employment Law, by James L. Craney

12 Evidence and Practice Tips, byJosephG.FeehanandBradW.Keller

26 Health Law, by Roger R. Clayton, Mark D. Hansen, and J. Matthew Thompson

2 IDC 2014 – 2015 Board of Directors

4 IDC 2014 – 2015 Committee Chairs and Vice Chairs

79 IDC 50th Anniversary Gala Celebration

91 IDC Membership and Committee Applications

89 IDC / MODL Comparative Law Seminar

88 IDC New Members

56 Insurance Law Update, by Seth D. Lamden

18 Medical Malpractice Update, by Dina L. Torrisi and Jennifer A. Heydemann

48 Municipal Law, by Thomas G. DiCianni

90 North Central Trial Academy 2014

6 President’s Message, by David H. Levitt

52 Property Insurance, by Catherine A. Cooke

21 Recent Decisions, by Stacy Dolan Fulco

37 Supreme Court Watch, by M. Elizabeth D. Kellett

24 Workers’ Compensation Report, by Bradford J. Peterson

69 Young Lawyer Division, byMichelleM.WahlandBrittanyL.Kaspar

Third Quarter 2014 | IDC QUARTERLY | 1

iDc QuArterlyEDITORIAL BOARD

Beth A. Bauer,Editor-in-ChiefHeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville

[email protected]

Brad A. Elward,ExecutiveEditorHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

[email protected]

Edward J. Aucoin, Jr., Associate EditorPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago

[email protected]

John F. Watson, Assistant EditorCraig & Craig, LLC, Mattoon

[email protected]

Tara Wiebusch Kuchar, Assistant EditorHeplerBroom LLC, [email protected]

J. Matthew Thompson, Assistant EditorHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

[email protected]

The IDC Quarterly is the official publication of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. It is published quarterly as a service to its members. Sub-scriptions for non-members are $100 per year. Single copies are $25 plus $5 for postage and handling. Requests for subscriptions or back issues should be sent to the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel headquarters in Rochester, Illinois. Subscription price for members is included in membership dues.

Manuscript PolicyMembers and other readers are encouraged to submit manuscripts for possible publication in the IDC Quar-terly, particularly articles of practical use to defense trial attorneys. Manuscripts must be in article form. A copy of the IDC Quarterly Stylistic Requirements is available upon request from The Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel office in Rochester, Illinois. No compensation is made for articles published, and no article will be considered that has been submitted simultaneously to another publication or published by any other publication. All articles submitted will be subjected to editing and become the property of the IDC Quarterly, unless special arrangements are made.

Statements or expression of opinions in this publi-cation are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Association or Editors. Letters to the Editor are encouraged and welcome, and should be sent to the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel headquarters in Rochester, Illinois.

Editors reserve the right to publish and edit all such letters received and to reply to them. IDC Quarterly, Third Quarter 2014, Volume 24, No. 3., Copyright © 2014 The Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

THE ILLINOIS ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL • P.O. Box 588 • Rochester, IL 62563-0588800-232-0169 • 217-498-2649 • FAX 866-230-4415 [email protected] • www.iadtc.org

SANDRA J. WULF, CAE, IOM, Executive Director

IN THIS ISSUE

http://heplerbroom.com

http://heylroyster.com

http://stouffer.com

http://craiglaw.net



http://iadtc.org


mailto:[email protected]







2 | IDC QUARTERLY | Third Quarter 2014

President-ElectTROY A. BOZARTH

HeplerBroom LLCEdwardsville

First Vice PresidentR. MARK MIFFLIN

Giffin, Winning, Cohen& Bodewes, P.C.

Springfield

Second Vice PresidentMICHAEL L. RESISSmithAmundsen LLC

Chicago

Secretary/TreasurerBRADLEY C. NAHRSTADT

Lipe Lyons Murphy Nahrstadt & Pontikis, Ltd.

Chicago

PresidentDAVID H. LEVITT

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago

2014-2015OFFICERS and DIRECTORS

LAURA K. BEASLEYJoley, Nussbaumer,

Oliver & Beasley, P.C.Belleville

BRUCE DORNBruce Farrel Dorn & Associates

Chicago

JOSEPH A. BLEYERBleyer and Bleyer

Marion

JOSEPH G. FEEHANHeyl, Royster, Voelker &

Allen, P.C. Peoria

R. MARK COSIMINIRusin Maciorowski & Friedman, Ltd.

Champaign

TERRY A. FOXSmithAmundsen LLC

Chicago

ROSSANA P. FERNANDEZFernandez and Associates, LLC

Chicago

EDWARD K. GRASSÈBusse, Busse & Grassé, P.C.

Chicago


JENNIFER B. GROSZEKResolute Management, Inc.,

Midwest DivisionChicago

JENNIFER K. GUSTHinshaw & Culbertson LLP

Chicago

PATRICK W. STUFFLEBEAMHeplerBroom LLC

Edwardsville

PAUL R. LYNCHCraig & Craig, LLC

Mt. Vernon

DONALD J. O’MEARA, JR.Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered

Chicago

HEATHER R. WATTERSONCNA

Chicago

SCOTT D. STEPHENSONLitchfield Cavo LLP

Chicago

WILLIAM K. McVISKJohnson & Bell, Ltd.

Chicago

AL J. PRANAITISHoagland, Fitzgerald & Pranaitis

Alton

STEPHEN G. LOVERDEAllstate Insurance Company

Chicago

TRACY E. STEVENSONRobbins Salomon & Pratt, Ltd.

Chicago

NICOLE D. MILOSCremer, Spina, Shaughnessy,

Jansen & Siegert LLCChicago

AMICUS COMMITTEE

Craig L. Unrath, Chair Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria 309-676-0400 [email protected]

John F. Watson, Vice Chair Craig & Craig, LLC, Mattoon 217-234-6481 [email protected]

CIVIL PRACTICE COMMITTEE

Adam C. Carter, Chair Cray Huber Horstman Heil & VanAusdal LLC, Chicago 312-332-8505 [email protected]

Donald Patrick Eckler, Vice Chair Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago 312-578-7653 [email protected]

COMMERCIAL LAW COMMITTEE

John J. O’Malley, Chair Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Chicago 312-460-5514 [email protected]


David G. Wix, Vice Chair Tarpey Wix, LLC, Chicago 312-948-9093 [email protected]

CONSTRUCTION LAW COMMITTEE

Patricia J. Hogan, Chair Cassiday Schade LLP, Chicago 312-444-1665 [email protected]

Mark J. McClenathan, Vice Chair Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Rockford 815-978-4773 [email protected]

EMPLOYMENT LAW COMMITTEE

Denise Baker-Seal, Chair Brown & James, P.C., Belleville 618-355-5105 [email protected]

James L. Craney, Vice Chair Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP Edwardsville 618-307-7290 [email protected]

2014-2015COMMITTEECHAIRSandVICECHAIRS


http://craiglaw.net

http://cassiday.com

http://crayhuber.com

http://stouffer.com


http://tarpeywix.com

http://bjpc.com

http://seyfarth.com

http://lbbslaw.com











EVENTS COMMITTEE

Jeremy T. Burton, Chair Lipe, Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt & Pontikus, Ltd., Chicago 312-448-6233 [email protected]

INSURANCE LAW COMMITTEE John D. Hackett, Chair Cassiday Schade LLP, Chicago 312-641-3100 [email protected]

Mollie E. Werwas, Vice Chair Kopon Airdo LLC, Chicago 312-506-4450 [email protected]

LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE

William K. McVisk, Chair Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicago 312-984-0229 [email protected]

C. William Busse, Jr., Vice Chair Busse, Busse & Grassé, Chicago 312-750-1212, x201 [email protected]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW COMMITTEE

John O’Driscoll, Chair Tressler, LLP, Chicago 312-627-4000 [email protected]

Dustin S. Fisher, Vice Chair Judge, James & Kujawa, LLC, Park Ridge 847-292-1200 [email protected]

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE

PatrickW.Stufflebeam, Chair HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville 618-656-0184 [email protected]

TORT LAW COMMITTEE

Justin K. Beyer, Chair Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Chicago 312-460-5957 [email protected]

Mandi Ferguson, Vice Chair HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville 618-656-0184 [email protected]

YOUNG LAWYER DIVISION

Gregory W. Odom, Chair HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville 618-656-0184 [email protected]

Elizabeth K. Barton, Vice Chair Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, Chicago 312-782-7606 [email protected]


http://lipelyons.com

http://cassiday.com

http://koponairdo.com


http://judgeltd.com

http://seyfarth.com

http://jbltd.com


http://bussepc.com


http://tresslerllp.com

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David H. LevittHinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago

President’s Message

“TrialLawyer.”Tothepopularpressand thegeneralpublic, thatphrasehascome to mean lawyers who represent plaintiffs in personal injury litiga-tion. Some years ago, this Association changeditsnamefrom“IllinoisDefenseCounsel” to “IllinoisAssociation ofDefenseTrialCounsel” because thereare at least two sides to every case, and one of those sides is represented bya trial lawyer for the defense.Those“triallawyers”thatpeoplereadaboutaretryingthatcaseagainstsomebody—andthat somebody is us.The public, andourclients,needtoknowthattheIDCispopulatedbymemberswhosetrialanddispute resolution skills are second tonone,bothinsideandoutsideofIllinois.

Westilluse“IDC”becausewearetruetoourroots.Thoserootsaredeep;IDCcelebratedits50thAnniversaryinJune 2014.Since its inception, one oftheIDC’sprimarypurposeshasbeentoeducateandinformthedefensebar.TheIDC Quarterly is the most respected publicationof itskind in thenation. Itis essential reading for every defenseattorneyandeveryIllinoisjudge.AsitsformerEditor-in-Chief, I have read itfromcovertocover,andcanattesttotheremarkablebreadth,depth,nuance,andscholarshipthatappearsineveryissue.

Ourseminarsaresimilarlyimpres-sive. They are lead by experiencedspeakers who know their topics indepth and who impart cutting edgeinformation and knowledge availableonlyfromthoseatthetopoftheircraft

whowork in the trenchesdaily. Ifyoumissed our recent SpringSymposiumfocusingonconstructionlitigation,youmissedlearningfromthebest.Eventhosewhose practice is primarily elsewhere wereabletogleanvaluableinsightsthatwill serve them well in their respective areasofpractice.WeprovideeducationinprogramslargeandsmallthroughoutIllinois, in our annualSurveyofLaw,and in our regular committee newslet-ters.OurupcomingseminaronIllinois’newconcealedcarry law—atopic thathasreceivedremarkablylittleattentionsinceitbecamethelawofIllinois—willprovide in depth advice on the rights and liabilities of businesseswhomustrespondtothispotentialnewexposure.Thisisnotanissueofthepartisanpoliticsof gun control, but rather a practicalguidetothosewhonowhavetodealwiththepossibilityofgunsintheirplacesofbusinessandontheirpremises.

Westilldoallthat—peerlessly—butwehavecometodosomuchmore.Someyearsago,theIDCleadershipembarkedon a journey to increase the relevanceofIDCwithinthestate,bothtoprovidemorevaluetoourmembersandtohavea positive impact on the environment in whichwework.Wehavemadeconsider-ableprogress.But,asweembarkonour50thyear,theIDCplanstoredoubleitsefforts to remind everyone, the courtsbefore whom we appear, opposingcounsel,thelegislature,andourcurrentandprospectiveclientsoftwothings:(1)thatthebestdefenselawyersinIllinois

aremembers of the IDC, and (2) thatIllinoishasaconsiderablewaytogotoreach thestandardsof fairness thatweexpectfromourjusticesystem.

Havingpracticedinthisjurisdictionfornearly35years,IamsorrytosaythatIllinois isnot fair for the lawyerswhorepresent defendants and their clients.Thelawmaygiveplaintiffsthetechni-cal burden of proof, but too often theplayingfieldistiltedintheirfavor.Ourcorevaluesincludepromotingthefair,expeditiousandequitableresolutionofdisputes,andincreasingtheroleofIDCasthevoiceofthedefensebarinIllinois.Toooften, theresolutionofdisputesisnot fair, expeditious, or equitable.Toooften, the law is skewed in favor ofplaintiffs.Casesinpoint,amongmany:

• Thejuryistoldabouttheeffectoffindingaplaintiffmorethan50%atfault, but not told about the effecton a defendant’s joint and severalliabilityifitisfoundtobemorethan25%at fault.There isnoarguablelegitimatereasonforthisdistinction,beyond the rawplaintiff-favorablepolitics atworkwhen these lawswere enacted. Every defense trialattorney has a story about a jurythat found a plaintiff only 49%atfaultbecausethejuryknewthattheplaintiffwouldrecovernothingifitfoundtheplaintifftobe51%atfault.

• Similarly,mostareawareofocca-sionswhen a jury thought itwasdoingthe“rightthing”byfindingadefendant onlyminimally at fault,without realizing that its 25.1%findingmeantthatthedefendantwasonthehookforeverything.Thereisnogoodreasonthejuryshouldbetold onebut not the other.This isinequitabletodefendants.


— Continued on next page

• Also,whyshouldthedeterminationof the plaintiff ’s percentage ofcomparativefaultconsiderthefaultofeveryoneinvolvedintheincident(including the plaintiff’s employerand thosenot amenable to serviceinIllinois),butthedeterminationofadefendant’spercentageoffaultforseveral liability be limited to onlythosewhoremainasdefendantsatthe time of trial, excluding fromconsideration such entities as theemployerandsettlingparties?When735ILCS5/2-1117wasfirstenacted,itwas a compromise between theplaintiff and defense bars, but theplaintiff’sbarhasnotkept itspartofthebargain,firsteliminatingtheemployer’s fault by statute, andthenasettlingparty’sfaultbya4-3,party-line vote in the Illinois Su-premeCourt.Theideathatadrunkdriverwithasmallinsurancepolicyand no personal assets can settle and leaveaminimallyatfaultdefendantholding the bag,without allowingthejurytoevenconsiderthedrunkdriver’s percentage of fault, all atthediscretionofwhetherandwhenthe plaintiff decides to settlewiththe drunk driver, is the complete

oppositeof fairnessandanaffronttotheveryconceptthatthebillwasdesignedtoeffect.Thinkthisisanextreme, far-fetched hypotheticaldreameduptomakeapoint?Read,Ozik v. Gramins345Ill.App.3d502(1stDist.2003),wherethisprecisefactpatternoccurred.

• Noristhereareasonablejustificationfor the enactment of the IllinoisPrompt Settlement Payment Act, 735 ILCS 5/2-2301.As the IDCpointed out before its enactment,no empirical evidence was ever presentedindicatingthatdefendantswereunreasonablydelayinginsend-ingproposedreleasedocumentsorinpayingsettlements.Thebillcreatedarbitrarytimelines,failedtotakeintoaccountthecomplexitiesofresolv-ing civil litigation, unnecessarilycreatedariskofsubsidiarylitigation,and put both defense counsel andtheirclientsatriskforlienswithoutpropersafeguards.

• Similarly, there is no legitimate justification for puttingdefendantsatrisktopaymedicalbillsthatnoonewas ever liable for, least of

which the plaintiff. The numberon the “invoice” that plaintiffsintroduceintoevidenceisafantasy,unrelated to anyone’s obligationto pay it. Even the “reasonablevalue” rule established by Illinoiscourtsdoesnot approachanything“reasonable”—it assumes that themedicalproviderwasunreasonablein agreeing to accept less.

• Theimposition,over theobjectionofvirtuallyeverydefenseattorneyinCookCounty, of simultaneousexpert disclosure, even in a PilotProgram,wasalsoinherentlyunfairtodefendants.TheIDC’sWhitePa-per opposing this program detailed the inequities of the simultaneousexpert disclosure project, and de-tailedwaysinwhichtheplaintiff’sbar,thedefensebar,andthejudgescouldworktogethertofindsolutionsthat work for everyone,movingcasesalongmorequicklyandget-tingmatterstoresolutioninamorecost-effectivemanner.

• Inmany jurisdictions, the failureofaplaintiff towearaseatbelt isadmissible as evidence either toshowcomparative fault or lackofproximatecause.Thatwasthelawin Illinois too,until the legislatureenactedthemandatoryseatbeltlaw.Somehow, a sentence was added to the statute barring admissionof evidence that plaintiffwas notwearingaseatbelt.

These rules, andmanymore likethem, are unjust and counterintuitive.They turn the burden of proof on itshead.Toooften, principles of politics,notjustice,arethereasonthatsuchrules

[A]s we embark on our 50th year, the IDC plans to

redouble its efforts to remind everyone, the courts

before whom we appear, opposing counsel, the

legislature, and our current and prospective clients of

two things: (1) that the best defense lawyers in Illinois

are members of the IDC, and (2) that Illinois has a

considerable way to go to reach the standards of

fairness that we expect from our justice system.


President’s Message | continued

exist.Onother occasions, such as theCookCounty Pilot Project for simul-taneous expert disclosure, ruleswereimposedwithoutanymeaningfulefforttoengageindialogwiththedefensebar.Weworkinthesystemeveryday,andarecommittedtoworkingwithallinterestedgroupstomakethesystemmoreefficientandeffectiveforeveryone.Butdialogisa two-waystreet—it requiresgiveandtakeandappreciationoftheinterestsofall sides.

TheIDCis1,000individualmem-bers strong andgrowing. Itsmemberspractice throughout the state, and areinvolved in both their practices andtheir communities.But, being an IDCmembermeans somethingmore—itmeansacommitmenttoourcorevalues,keepingupon the latestdevelopmentsin the law, and developing a skill setvalued by our clients and the systemthatweserve.Timeaftertime,Icannothelp but be impressed and humbledby the dedication and knowledge thatIDCmembers exhibit repeatedly.TheIDCmembershiplistremainsthego-todirectory tofind thebestandbrightestwhofulfillourmissiontobe“thepremierassociationofattorneysinIllinoiswhodevote a substantial portion of theirpracticetotherepresentationofbusiness,corporate, insurance, professional andotherindividualdefendantsincivillitiga-tion.”Asweenterournext50years,joinusincontinuingtofulfill thatmission,andbecountedamongthosewhomakeadifference.

Beth A. BauerHeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville

Editor’s Note

Iron sharpens iron. Over the past fewyears,IDC Quarterlyhassoughttosharpenitsmembers’skillsbyencourag-ing columnists and authors to includenotonlythequalityanalysisofthelawthis publication is known for, but alsopracticaladviceforlawyers.ThisissueoftheQuarterly does not disappoint on eitherfront.

IntheInsuranceLawcolumn,Neal,Gerber&EisenbergLLPattorneySethLamdenexplorestheinterplaybetweeninsurancecompanybillingguidelinesandanattorney’sethicaldutyofloyaltyandindependentprofessionaljudgmenttotheinsured.Specifically, thecolumnques-tions if litigation guidelines regardingthefeesandexpensesaninsurerwillpayrestrictsanattorney’sability todefenda case effectively.He offers practicaladvice on handling the ethical concerns oflawyerssubjecttoaninsurer’sbillingguidelines thateffectivelycontrolhowindependent counselmanages a case.Healsoanalyzeswhetheraninsurancecompany’suseofbillauditorsdestroysthe attorney-client privilege.

PatEckler andMatthewTibbleofPretzel&Stouffer,Chartered,wroteaninformativemonograph on attorney-client privilege issues that arisewhena current or former client accuses anattorneyoflegalmalpractice.Themono-graphgivesarefresherontheattorney-client privilege in Illinois related to individuals and business entities.The

authorsalsoexplainIllinoiscourts’viewof the subject-matterwaiver doctrineandthefiduciary-dutyexceptiontotheattorney-client privilege. Importantly, they also devote an entire section ofthe monograph to practical application of the attorney-client privilege in themalpractice context.

Both the Medical Malpractice and Evidence&PracticeTipscolumnstackleissuesregardingexperts.DinaTorrisiandJenniferHeydemann ofHeplerBroomLLCprovide a refresher course on theFrye standard.They alsooffer strategictipsonhowtouseFrye toyouradvantage.JoeFeehanandBradKellerofHeyl,Roys-ter,Voelker&Allen,P.C.,authorsoftheEvidence&PracticeTipscolumn,remindusoftheimportanceoffollowingwithoutfailRule213’sexpertdisclosurerequire-ments. In Fraser v. Jackson,2014ILApp(2d)130283,theappellatecourtbarredamedical expert as a discovery sanction. In addition,theircolumnalsosetsforththelatestinformationonthetypeofevidencethatsubstantiatesthereasonablenessofaplaintiff’smedicalbills.

ScottHowieofPretzel&Stouffer,Chartered, wrote Appellate Practice Cor-ner,whichisusefulreadingevenifyoudo not handle many appeals. Scott helps clarifytheapplicabilityinthetrialcourtofthedecisionsofthevariousappellatedistricts. He answers questions like:Does Illinois have one appellate courtorfive?And,whatweightofauthority


does a Second District opinion have in the Third District?

Also, keep an eye on SupremeCourtWatch,authoredbyBethKellettofHeplerBroomLLC,thatalertsreaderstoWilliamsv. BNSF Railway Co., et. al, 2013IllApp(1st)121901.Williamswill determinewhenthetimetoappealrunsfromanoral ruling that theclerk laterrecordsonthecourt’sdocket.

Thesearticlesandmanylikethemwillsharpenyourskillsbyhelpingyoustayabreastofchanges in the lawandidentifying strategies that can be usedinyoureverydaypractice.But,theIDC Quarterly does not stop there. This issueincludesseveralcolumnsthatwillsharpenyourskillsasacounselor,notjustasanadvocate.

For example, Stacy Crabtree ofHeyl Royster highlights how law-abidingemployersmayfindthemselvesdefendingalawsuitundertheVictimsofTraffickingandViolenceProtectionActof2000.Pub.L.No.106-386,114Stat1464,DivisionA(codifiedasamendedinscatteredsectionsof8U.S.C.,18U.S.C.,&22,U.S.C.).Notonlydoessheexplainthe lawbut also notes howemployerscan protect themselves against this type of litigation by communicatingwithpotential foreign employees beforeemploymentbeginsandbycounselingsupervisorsabouthowtocommunicatewithforeignworkers.

The Employment Law column,

written byLewisBrisboisBisgaard&Smith, LLP, attorney James Craney,also provides useful information forthose assisting clients with wage and hour issues.Jamesexplains theUnitedStatesSupremeCourt’spronouncementaboutwhether time spentdonning anddoffingjob-relatedgeariscompensabletime.ConsiderhowJames’analysisofSandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,134S.Ct.870,874(2014)canassistyourclientsindecidingiftheiremployeesdonninganddoffingtime,orothertimeoflikekind,iscompensable.

Even theHealth Law column byRoger R. Clayton,MarkD.Hansen,andJ.MatthewThompsonalsoofHeylRoyster,touchesonemploymentissues.TheauthorsdetailtheHome Star Bank and Financial Services v. Emergency Care and Health Organization, Ltd., 2014 IL115526 (2014), decision.The

regardingstaffingcodecallsandphysi-cians’ contracts.

LindsayBrownofCassidaySchadeLLP,warns in theConstruction Lawcolumnthatageneralcontractorclientmaybe liable for injuries arising froma sub-contractors’ work. Lindsay’scolumn is undoubtedly useful to helpgeneral contractor clients understandhow theymay be exercising controloveraworksite,sometimesunintention-ally,which could result in liability forinjuriesthatoccurontheworksite.Thecolumnexplainskeycasesonthisissueandnotes the importanceofprotectingclients through contractual languageandmonitoringof general contractors’actionsandpresenceataworksite.

ThequalityofmaterialsubmittedforthisissueofIDC Quarterly isoutstand-ing. The legal analysis and practical tips shared by theQuarterly’s authorswillsharpenallofourskillsandmakeeachofusbetterattorneys.Itisapleasureandanhonortoworkwiththeseauthors,includ-ingregularcolumnists,monographandfeaturearticleauthors,andtheeditorialboard,whoallvolunteertheirtimeandtalentstothispublication.IlookforwardtoservingastheEditor-In-Chiefforthe

We are all like pieces of iron: Indeed, the IDC

membership prides itself in sharpening one another by

sharing experiences, expertise, and practical advice.

This issue includes several columns that will sharpen

your skills as a counselor, not just as an advocate.

IllinoisSupremeCourtfoundthatemer-gency room physicians who respond to in-hospitalcodecalls,butdonotchargethepatientstreatedduringthecode,arenotprotectedbytheGoodSamaritanlaw.Theauthorsproposethatthisrulingmaysignificantly affect hospitals’ policies

IDC Quarterly. Weare all like piecesof iron: Indeed, the IDCmembershipprides itself in sharpeningone anotherby sharing experiences, expertise, andpracticaladvice.ContinuethattraditionbysubmittinganarticleforinclusioninIDC Quarterly.


Feature ArticleRussell M. WareSmithAmundsen LLC, MilwaukeeBrian S. EbenerSmithAmundsen LLC, Chicago

About the Authors

In many cases, all parties and their counsel come tomediation optimisticabouttheprospectsforsettlement.Typi-cally, the parties expect that settlement will be achieved, and are preparedto exchangemeaningful and realisticproposals andcounter-proposalsuntil ameetingofthemindsisreached.Butinother cases, the parties are so divided on legalandfactualissuesthatneitherpartyis motivated to negotiate a settlement. Whenthishappens,counselhaslittleornoexpectationforasuccessfuloutcome.

There is a third categoryof cases:where legal and factual issues are notnovel such that settlement atmediationshouldbeachievablebutcounselknowsofspecialbarrierstosuccessatmediation.Inotherwords,counselknowsinforma-tion that if not dealtwith properly atmediationwillmakeanotherwiseachiev-ablesettlementunlikely. In thesecases,dealing appropriately with these special featureswillmakethedifferencebetweensuccessandfailureatmediation.Whatcanalawyerdoinpreparationforamediationwheresettlementseemsachievablebutaspecial impediment exists? A well planned andexecutedpre-mediationtelephonecalltothemediatormaybetheanswer.

Counsel would never initiate ex partecontactwithajudgeoranarbitratorto talk about apendingmatterwithoutthe agreement or participation of theother parties. See Ill. R. PRof’l ConduCt, 3.5(b).Mediation, however, presents a

Pre-Mediation Telephone Conference with a Mediator—an Important

Tool for Counsel

Russell M. Ware is a share-holder with SmithAmund-sen, LLC in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He has been a trial lawyer for 40 years, concentrating on the de-fense of lawyers’ profes-sional liability claims and personal injury matters. He

now devotes the major portion of his practice to service as a mediator and arbitrator in civil cases. Mr. Ware’s articles on mediation and ne-gotiation strategy have appeared in national and statewide publications. He has authored more than thirty articles on dispute resolution, profes-sional liability, and trial practice. He is a former President of Wisconsin Defense Counsel (Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin) and is a member of the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA).

Brian S. Ebener is an at-torney practicing out of the SmithAmundsen LLC Chi-cago office. He has been a trial lawyer for over 25 years and has tried dozens of cas-es to verdict. He handles a wide variety of civil litigation matters and concentrates

his practice in the suburban Chicago collar counties. Mr. Ebener is a certified mediator and an approved member of the court appointed mediators in the Circuit Court of Lake County.

different situation.There isnoprohibi-tionontalkingtothemediatoronanex partebasis.Indeed,duringthemediationsession,mostofamediator’stimeisspenttalking separately to each side. In fact,some experienced mediators will initiate pre-mediationcallsaspartoftheirownpreparation.

Such ex parte communicationsshould be conductedwith the under-standing that themediatorwill keepinformationlearnedduringthetelephonecall confidential from the other side.Counselcan,therefore,discussthecasewiththemediatorwithoutfearofreveal-ingweaknesses in the client’s case orproposednegotiation tactics.However,“confidentiality”isimportantinadiffer-entway.Counselmaywant to discusscase-related matters with the mediator outsidethepresenceofhisorherclient.Forinstance,theremaybeaspectsoftheclient’s personality, emotionalmakeup,attitudes,orlevelofsophisticationwhich,ifdisclosedtothemediatorintheclient’spresence,mightbeembarrassingorhurt-fultotheclient.Thesetypesofdiscussionswith amediator do not constitute anydisloyaltyonthepartofcounsel.Onthecontrary, because suchdiscussions aremeanttocarryouttherepresentationofand advance the client’s interests, they are impliedlyauthorizedbytheclient.SeeIll. R. PRof’l ConduCt1.6(a).

Because experiencedmediators domorethanjustcarrydemandsandoffers

betweentheparties,theygenerallywel-comea“headsup”fromcounselastoanycircumstancesthatmayadverselyimpactthe chances of a successful outcome.Althoughevery case is different, therearesomerecurringspecialbarriers.Thesebarriers,which counselmay recognizein advanceof amediation session, areappropriate subjectsof apre-mediationex parte conferencewiththemediator.

• Anon-partywillattendthemedia-tion. Sometimesaclientwillbringanon-partyfriendorrelativeformoralsupport.Insomecases,itiscleartocounselthatthisfriendisade facto advisor and the client will not act at


themediationwithout theapprovalofthisperson.Ifthemediatorknowsthisinadvance,thisadvisorcanbetreated courteously and appropri-atelythroughoutthemediation,thuseliminatingtheriskthatanoffendedadvisor derails the mediation.

• Theplaintiffmayneedhisorher“day in court” at mediation. By the timeofthemediation,someplaintiffswillnothavehadtheopportunitytoexplainwhattheyhavegonethroughbecauseof their injuries.Theywillneed,andwant,toventandverbalizetheirstorybeforetheycanconsideranysettlement.Counselwhoseclientwillneedsuchanopportunityshoulddiscuss thiswith themediator inadvanceofthemediation.Insomecases,theplaintiffmayneedachanceto address the defendant directly.Inothercases, theplaintiffmaybesatisfied if heor she is allowed tofully discuss thematter during aconfidentialcaucuswithcounselandthe mediator present. In any case, alerting themediator to this issuewillallowthemediatorandcounseltostructurethemediationsothattheplaintiff’sneedismet.

• The clientwill be coming to themediation in an emotional state. Eithertheplaintifforthedefendantmaycarryheavyemotionalbaggageto the mediation that may prevent resolutionofacasethroughmedia-tion.Apreparedmediatorcanensuretheseemotionalfactorsarehandledeffectively,soprospectsforultimatesettlement are not diminished.

• Theclienthasunreasonableopin-ions on settlement value. Counselmay know that his or her client

willhaveunreasonableopinionsonsettlement value. Even intelligentand well-meaning clients may have unreasonable expectations.An ex-periencedmediatorcanbepreparedtodealwith those expectationsbyconductingthemediationinahelpfuland non-coerciveway tomodifythose expectations so that a settle-mentispossible.

• Theclienthaspersonal concernsthat make a settlement imperative. Generally,allparties toasuithavemany thingsother than the lawsuitto deal with each day. The party may have health problems, a personalcrisis,or seriousfinancial concernsthatmakeaquickendtothependinglitigation imperative. Counsel, inthese cases, may wish to alert the mediatorof thesecircumstances solong as the mediator does not disclose such urgency to the other side. Inthese situations, amediator armedwiththisinformationwillnotallowthemediation to end if somehopethat continued effortsmay lead toresolution.Infact,themediatormayoffer to followupwith thepartiesin comingdays tokeep settlementdiscussionsgoing.

• The plaintiff needs an apology.Justasinsomecasesaplaintiffmayneed to tell his or her story, in other cases counselmayperceivethattheplaintiffneedstohearthedefendantexpresssincereregret.Thedefendantmaybalkat this,butsometimesanapology may go a long way toward setting the stage for resolution bylesseningtheplaintiff’sanimositytothedefendantandresistancetosettle-ment.Ifthatisthecase,amediatorcanbereadytogivethedefensean

opportunitytooffersuchastatement.Typically, these statements are given at the beginning of themediationtosetthepropertonefortheactualnegotiations.

Therearemanyothertypesofchal-lenging scenarios that might exist. The criticalpointisthatoftentimesbyalertingthemediatortotheseissuesinadvance,themediatorcanbepreparedtoeffectivelyaddresstheseissues.

Certainly,atelephoneconferenceisnotasubstituteforawellwrittenmedia-tion statement.Awritten submission isthe primary way to give the mediator importantandrelevantinformationaboutthe dispute beingmediated and yourclient’sposition.Whenaspecialbarrierexists,atelephonediscussionhascertainadvantages over awritten submission.First,itismoreflexiblethanawrittensub-missionandallowsforadynamicsharingof information.Duringa telephonecallthemediatorcanaskimmediatequestionsthusallowing themediatorandcounselto share insights into the problemandshareproposalsforhandlingit.Second,atelephonecallallowscounseltoadvancetheclient’sintereststhroughadiscussionofpersonalandsensitivemattersthatarenotappropriateinawrittensubmission.

Conclusion

A pre-mediation telephone call with the mediator is not necessary in every case. There are some cases where a tele-phonecalltothemediatorishelpful.Themediatorwantstofacilitateasuccessfulresolutionandalertinghimorhertothesespecialcircumstancesallowsthemediatortohelp everyone achieve their goal—asuccessfulsettlement.


Joseph G. Feehan and Brad W. KellerHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Evidence and Practice Tips

About the AuthorsJoseph G. Feehan is a partner in the Peoria office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., where he concentrates his practice in commercial litigation, products liability, and per-sonal injury defense. He

received his B.S. from Illinois State University and his J.D. cum laude from the Northern Il-linois University College of Law. Mr. Feehan is a member of the ISBA Tort Law Section Council and is also a member of the Peoria County, Illinois State, and American Bar Associations.

Brad W. Keller is an as-sociate in the Peoria office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C. He practices primarily in the areas of business and commercial litigation and tort litiga-tion. He received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Illinois

in 2007 and his J.D. magna cum laude from University of Illinois College of Law in 2010.

In Fraser v. Jackson,2014ILApp(2d)130283,theIllinoisAppellateCourt,SecondDistrict,upheldthetrialcourt’sdecisiontobarthedefendant’smedicalexpertasadiscoverysanction.Italsoaf-firmedthetrialcourt’sorderawardingtheplaintiffhisfeesandexpensesincurredinprovingthereasonablenessofchargesfrom onemedical provider after thedefendantdeniedIllinoisSupremeCourtRule216requeststoadmitregardingthereasonablenessofthosebills.

The Fraser case emphasizes theimportanceofcomplyingwithIllinoisSupreme Court Rule 213 and theconsequencesforfailingtodoso.Addi-tionally, it demonstrates the importance ofhavingasolid,good-faithbasisfordenyingrequeststoadmitregardingthereasonableness ofmedical bills priorto trial.

Background Facts

Fraser stemmed from a motorvehicleaccident thatoccurred inZion,Illinois,inSeptember2009.Fraser,2014ILApp(2d)130283,¶1.Thedefendantranastopsignandcausedtheplaintifftosufferinjuriestohislowerback,neck,head, and knee. In 2011, the plaintifffiledsuitagainst thedefendant.As thecase approached trial, several disputes

aroseandcreatedtheissuesconsideredon appeal.

First,adiscoverydisputearosere-gardingDr.Skaletsky,anexpertretainedbythedefendanttoexaminetheplaintiffpursuanttoIllinoisSupremeCourtRule215.Id.¶¶6-9.OnJuly31,2012,follow-ingDr.Skaletsky’sretention,theplaintiffissued production requests asking forcorrespondence, reports, and invoices from the case, aswell as depositiontranscripts from anymatters inwhichDr. Skaletsky had previously servedasanexpertfordefensecounselorfordefendant’sinsurer. Id.¶6.Onthesameday,theplaintiffissuedasubpoenaduces tecum toDr. Skaletsky that requestedreports and income records from hiswork as amedical expert since 2007,transcripts of any depositions he hadgiven,anymaterialsreliedoninforminghisopinionsinthecase,andrecordsfromaspecificpriorcaseinwhichheservedas an expert. Id.¶¶6-7.

OnAugust 3, 2012,Dr. Skaletskyinformedtheplaintiff’scounselthathewould not complywith the subpoenaissued to himon the grounds of phy-sician-patient privilege.He proceededtoexaminetheplaintiffandreviewtheplaintiff’smedicalrecordsonAugust13,2012.Id.¶8.Hedraftedareportofthesame date regarding his examination and

review.DefensecounselthendisclosedDr. Skaletsky as a controlled expertwitness pursuant to Illinois SupremeCourtRule 213(f)(3) and noticed hisevidencedeposition forNovember. Id. OnSeptember12,2012,defensecounselrespondedtotheplaintiff’ssubpoenatoDr. Skaletsky by providing IRS 1099forms from2008 through 2011, and alistofpaymentsmadetoSkaletskyfrom2008through2011.Id. ¶¶8-9.

Based on Skaletsky’s failure toprovide allmaterials requested in theplaintiff’ssubpoena,theplaintiffpursuedan order from the court compellingcompliance.The trial court agreedandorderedthedefendanttocomplywiththesubpoenarequestsonOctober17,24and31,2012.Thefinalordersetadeadlineforcomplianceat5p.m.onNovember1,2012. Id.¶11.Thetrialcourtorderedproduction of reports, correspondence,

Fraser v. Jackson:SecondDistrictAffirmsOrders

Barring Expert as Discovery Sanction and Awarding Fees Associated with Proving

Reasonableness of Medical Bills



and billing since 2007 and stated thatif thematerialswerenotproducedinatimelymanner,Skaletskyshouldproducehistaxreturnsfrom2008to2011.Id. ¶11.

On themorning ofNovember 1,2012, thedefendantfiled amotion fora protective order related to the income informationDr.Skaletskywasaskedtoprovide. The motion was granted and it wasorderedthattheinformationshouldbelimitedinitsusetothiscase. Id.¶11.Defensecounselthenfaxedtheincometaxreturnstotheplaintiff’scounselonNovember4,2012.Id. ¶¶11-12.

OnNovember 6, 2012, becausetheplaintiffhadnotreceivedanyofthecorrespondence or reports requestedin the subpoena, the plaintiff filed anemergency motion requesting thatthe trial court barDr. Skaletsky fromtestifyingattrial. Id. ¶12.Thetrialcourtgranted the plaintiff’smotion, barringDr. Skaletsky as a discovery sanctionpursuanttoIllinoisSupremeCourtRule219(c).Id. ¶12.

Defense counsel filed a motionto reconsider the order barring Dr.Skaletsky’s testimony arguing that theplainmeaning of the court’s previousorderwasthatSkaletskycouldcomplywiththesubpoenabysubmittinghistaxreturnsifhedidnotwishtoproducetheotherrecordsrequestedinthesubpoena. Id. ¶13.Thetrialcourtdeniedthemo-tion,explainingthatiftherequestshadbeenlimitedtoincomeinformation,thedisclosureoftaxreturnswouldhavebeensufficient.However,thecourtfoundthatSkaletskyalsorefusedtoproducereportsfromhispreviousworkasanexpertwit-ness,whichwererequestedbysubpoena. Id.Thecourtfoundthatasaresult,theplaintiffwouldhavebeenprejudicedincross-examiningDr.Skaletsky at trial.Id. ¶13.

Theseconddisputeatissueonappeal

was the admissibility of the plaintiff’smedicalbills from theAuroraMedicalGroup(Aurora)andwhethertheplaintiffcouldrecoverthecostsassociatedwithproving that thecharges incurredwerereasonable.A fewmonthsbefore trial,the plaintiff servedRule 216 requeststo admit that certain chargeswere forreasonableandnecessarytreatmentandthat the chargeswere fair, reasonable,andcustomary. Id. ¶10.IncludedinthebillsattachedtotheRule216requeststoadmitwerethosefromAuroraMedicalGroup.Thedefendantdeniedalloftherequeststoadmit.Id. ¶10.

Attrial,theplaintiffofferedevidencefromthreephysiciansthatsupportedthatthe plaintiff’s injurieswere caused bythe accident and that the treatment and charges incurredwere reasonable andnecessary. Id. ¶¶15-17.TheplaintiffalsocalledabillingrepresentativefromAu-roratotestifythatthebills($34,246.51of the total$44,369.11)contained fair,reasonable, and customary charges forthe treatment rendered. Id. ¶18.Todoso, the plaintiffwas forced to open acaseinWisconsinpursuanttoWisconsinlawandhad toenlist the servicesofaWisconsin lawfirm to serve the sum-mons. Id. ¶18.

At trial, the plaintiff received averdictintheamountof$61,372.43. Id. ¶19.Severalpost-trialmotionsfollowed,including one filed by the plaintiff torecover the fees and costs expended tosecure the trial testimonyof theAurora

billingrepresentative.Thecourtgrantedthe plaintiff’smotion and denied thedefendant’smotion for a new trial.Thedefendantthenappealed.Id. ¶19.

Second District Decision

TheIllinoisAppellateCourtSecondDistrictemphasizedtwoareasinwhichthe defendant failed to complywithrulesgoverning appeals.The appellatecourtfirstexplainedthat thedefendanthadnotcompliedwithIllinoisSupremeCourtRule 323 by failing to provideeither a transcript of the trial courtproceedings, a bystander’s report, oran agreed statement of facts. Id. ¶ 22.Second, the court explained that thedefendant had not included a concisestatementoftheapplicablestandardofreviewforeachargumentpresentedonappeal. Id.¶23.Despitethedefendant’sfailuretocomplywiththerules,whichthecourtpointedoutare rulesandnotmerelysuggestions,thecourtwentontoconsiderthesubstanceofthedefendant’sappeal. Id. ¶¶22-24.

order Barring Dr. skaletsky

ThefirstissueaddressedonappealwaswhetherthetrialcourthadabuseditsdiscretioninbarringDr.Skaletskyfromtestifying at trial.The plaintiff arguedthat itwasproper tobarDr.Skaletskybecausethedefendanthad“continuously

Despite the defendant’s failure to comply with the

rules, which the court pointed out are rules and not

merely suggestions, the court went on to consider

the substance of the defendant’s appeal.


Evidence and Practice Tips | continued

and systematically disregarded” the trialcourt’sorderstoproducediscoveryregardingDr. Skaletsky, an argumentwhich the court did not believewasan overstatement. Id. ¶ 30.The courtexplained that the defendant subjectedhimself to the requirements of Rule213(f) by retaining and disclosingDr.Skaletskyasanexpert. Id. It explained thatthedefendanthadbeenorderedtocomplywiththeplaintiff’srequestsonthreeoccasions,andthatthedefendantcouldhaveavoidedthesanctionimposedat any timebefore the grantingof theplaintiff’smotion to bar Skaletsky bymerely complying with all requestsmade. Id.

On appeal, the defendant reiter-ated his argument from themotion toreconsider that Skaletsky’s incometax informationwassufficient todem-onstratewhether therewas bias, andwas therefore sufficient to fulfill theplaintiff’sdiscoveryrequests. Id.¶31.However, the SecondDistrict pointedout that the defendant ignored thetrialcourt’sexplanationthattheplaintiffrequested reports frompast cases. Id. ¶31.Thecourtfeltthisnon-productionwasmoreconcerningbecauseitlimitedtheplaintiff’sabilitytoeffectivelycross-examineSkaletsky.Id.¶32.

The appellate court further distin-guishedthetwocasescitedbythedefen-dantthatitfeltwereclearlyinappositetothecaseatissue.Thecourtaffirmedthe trialcourt’s ruling,finding that theinitial orderwas clear on its face andwasfurtherexplainedonthetrialcourt’srulingon themotion to reconsider. Id. ¶¶33-34.

Medical Bills

The Second District next consid-eredwhether the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting the bills fromtheplaintiff’s treatment atAurora intoevidence.Thetreatingdoctorstestifiedattrialthatthechargesincurredwereadirectresultoftheinjuriestheplaintiffsuffered in theaccident. Id. ¶39.Oneofthedoctorshaddirectlytestifiedthattheinjurieswerecausedbytheaccident.Further, a billing representative fromAurora had testified that the chargeswerecustomaryandreasonablefortheservices rendered. Id. Thecourtpointedout that the treating physicians andbilling representative could obviouslynot testify regarding the cause of theaccident, but noted that the defendantadmittedhisnegligence incausing theaccident. Id.Thecourtfeltthatbasedontheevidence,andreasonableinferencesdrawn therefrom, a jury could havereasonablyconcludedthattheaccidentcaused the plaintiff’s injuries and thatthe treatment provided was necessary andreasonable.Id.

Further, the court distinguishedthe defendant’s citation to aworker’scompensation case, Land and Lakes Co. v. Industrial Comm’n,359Ill.App.3d582(2dDist.2005),inwhichanawardformedical expenses was reversed.In that case, the only foundationaltestimony for themedical bills camefromtheclaimanthimself.Initsruling,the Land and Lakescourtexplainedthatfoundationcouldhavebeenestablishedthroughdepositiontestimonyofphysi-cians or through the testimony of abillingrepresentativefamiliarwiththetreater’s billing practices.Land and Lakes, 359 Ill.App. 3d at 591.Thus,theSecondDistrictruledthattheLand and Lakescasecitedbythedefendantactuallysupporteditsdecisionbecauseit suggested that testimony similar towhat the plaintiff had presentedwassufficienttoestablishtheadmissibility

ofmedicalbills.Fraser, 2014ILApp(2d)130283, ¶40.

costs and Attorney Fees

The defendant’s last argument onappeal was that the trial court erredin awarding the plaintiff the costs andattorney fees associatedwith securingthetrialtestimonyoftheAurorabillingrepresentative.Thecourtfoundthattheplaintiff’srequeststoadmitregardingthereasonablenessofthechargescontainedwithin theAurora bills were properandthatthedefendanthadagood-faithobligationtomakeareasonableefforttosecureanswers.Id. ¶45.

The appellate court explained thatthe trial court had indicated that thedefendantlackedgoodfaithindenyingthe requests to admit.The defendantdisagreed, stating that his expert had already related to him an opinion that the treatmentatAurorawasnotrelated. Id. ¶48.Thedefendantalsoemphasizedthathehadchosennottotakethediscoverydepositionsoftheplaintiff’sdoctorsandthereforedidnotknowtheywouldoffertestimony regarding the necessity and reasonablenessofmedicalexpenses.Id. ¶¶47-48.

The court rejected the defendant’sarguments,firstexplainingthatitfailedto understand exactlywhat the defen-dant thought thenatureof thedoctors’testimonywouldbeotherthanthecauseof theplaintiff’s injuries, thenatureofthediagnoses,and thenecessityof theprescribedtreatment. Id. Thedefendant’sargumentalsoignoredthefact that theawardwasfor theamount theplaintiffexpendedtosecurethebillingrepresenta-tive’s testimony that the charges were reasonable and customary. Id. ¶ 48.Moreover,theSecondDistrictfoundthatthe defendant ignored the trial court’s


rationaleforimposingtheaward,whichwasthatthedefendant’srefusaltoadmitwasnotingoodfaith.Id.

sanctions

Finally,theSecondDistrictconsid-eredtheplaintiff’srequestforattorneyfeesandcostsassociatedwithdefendingtheappeal.ThecourtexplainedthatIl-linoisSupremeCourtRule375(b)allowsfor the imposition of sanctions if it isdeterminedthatanappealisfrivolousornottakeningoodfaith.Id.¶51.Further,it explained that the purpose ofRule375(b)istocondemnandpunishabusiveconductof litigantsandtheirattorneyswhoappearbefore theappellatecourt.Id. ¶¶50-51.

Thedefendant responded thatbar-ring Skaletskywas a severe sanctionthatcamewithgreatprejudice,butdidnot respond to the assertion that the defendant’ssecondandthirdargumentshadnosupportincaselaw. Id. ¶50.Thecourtfoundthatthedefendant’sfailuretodosounderscoredthefrivolousnatureofthe entire appeal and awarded sanctions pursuanttoRule375(b).Id. ¶¶50-53.

Conclusion

The Fraser case emphasizes theimportance of complyingwith IllinoisSupremeCourtRule213andtheconse-quencesforfailingtodoso.Additionally,itdemonstratestheimportanceofhavinga solid, good-faith basis for denyingrequeststoadmitregardingthereason-ablenessofmedicalbillspriortotrial.


About the Authors

Civil Rights UpdateDavid A. Perkins and Brad A. ElwardHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

David A. Perkins is a partner at Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C. Mr. Perkins concentrates his practice in the areas of civil rights, municipal liability, first party property claims, and general tort litigation. He has spoken on a wide variety of subjects, includ-

ing: civil rights liability, municipal liability, the in-vestigation of fire losses, and first-party property claims. He is a member of the Peoria County, Illinois State, and American Bar Associations, as well as the Abraham Lincoln American Inns of Court, and the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel.

Brad A. Elward is a part-ner in the Peoria office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C. He practices in the area of appellate law, with a sub-concentration in workers’ compensation ap-peals and asbestos-related appeals. He received his

undergraduate degree from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, in 1986 and his law degree from Southern Illinois University School of Law in 1989. Mr. Elward is a member of the Illinois Appellate Lawyers Association, the Illinois State, Peoria County, and American Bar Associations, and a member of the ISBA Work-ers’ Compensation Section Counsel.

Lastyear,theSeventhCircuitCourtofAppeals handed down a significantdecision applying the FourthAmend-ment’sobjectivelyunreasonablestandardtomedicalcareprovidedbycontractedphysiciansandnursestoanarresteewhohad not yet had his Gerstein probablecausehearing.InCurrie v. Chhabra, 728F.3d626(7thCir.2013), thecourtnotonly expanded its prior rulings,whichheldthattheFourthAmendment’sstan-dardappliedtojailersandprisonguardsundersuchfacts,butitfurtherhintedthatitmight,infuturecases,refusetoapplythequalifiedimmunitydefensetoprivatemedical providers. This article examines the Currie decision’s implications to medicalcareprovidersasaresultofthisextensionoftheFourthAmendmentandfurther explores the court’s commentsrespecting the availability of qualifiedimmunity to contractorswho providemedical services to the state.

Factual Background

This case involved a section1983claimfiledbytheestateofPhilipOkoro,decedent, againstWilliamsonCounty,HealthProfessionals,Ltd.,Dr.JogendraChhabra,andanurseMarilynReynolds.Currie, 728F.3d at 628.The originalcomplaint alleged thedefendantsweredeliberately indifferent to Okoro’sallegedly seriousmedicalneeds. Itdidnotpleadastatelawclaimformedical

Fourth Amendment ProtectionsApplied to Medical Care Provided to

Pre-Gerstein Arrestees

malpractice. Id. at 627-628. Underestablishedlaw,theEighthAmendmentapplies to prisoners, but not pretrialdetainees,whiletheFourteenthAmend-mentapplies topretrialdetaineesfromthe time of theirGerstein hearing (a


Civil Rights Update | continued

judicialdeterminationofprobablecause)until trial; neither amendment appliesto pre-Gerstein arrestees. Id. at 628.Both amendments utilize a deliberateindifferencestandard.Inmatesawaitinga Gerstein hearing are protected bythe FourthAmendment’s objectivelyunreasonablestandard.Id.

Okorowasarrestedwithoutawar-rant at his residence inOctober 2008on suspicion of having committed amisdemeanor crime. Id.at627.HewasdetainedattheWilliamsonCountyjail,a facility that contractedwithHealthProfessionals to providemedical carefor arrestees and inmates held at thecountyjail.Id.Dr.ChhabraandNurseReynoldswere employed byHealthProfessionals.

Almost immediately afterOkoro’sarrest, his family notified the jail of-ficials thatOkoro had type I diabetesandwas schizophrenic. Id. According to the complaint, this latter disease compromisedOkoro’sabilitytomonitorandcare forhisdiabetes.Whileat thejail,Okorowas under the care ofDr.ChhabraandNurseReynolds.Id.at628.OnDecember23,2008,Okorocollapsedin his cell and later died of diabeticketoacidosis,abuildupofacidicketonesinthebloodstreamthatoccurswhenthebodyrunsoutofinsulin.Id.

Thecaseproceededthroughdiscov-eryonthedeliberateindifferenceclaimuntil the plaintiff, in response toWil-liamsonCounty’smotionforsummaryjudgment,arguedforthefirsttimethat

theFourthAmendment’sobjectivelyun-reasonablestandardapplied.Id. At that time, the plaintiff revealed thatOkorohad not received his Gerstein hearing. The plaintiff settledwithWilliamsonCounty and thenmoved to amendhercomplaintagainsttheremainingdefen-dants based on a violation ofOkoro’sFourthAmendmentrights.Id.

Chhabra,Reynolds,andHealthPro-fessionalsmovedforsummaryjudgment,arguingthattheFourthAmendmentdidnot apply to the provision ofmedicalservices, and that even if it did, therightwasnotclearlyestablishedatthetimeofOkoro’sdeath,makingqualifiedimmunityproper.Id.Thedistrictcourtdenied themotion, andChhabra andReynoldsfiledanappealonthedenialofqualifiedimmunity.Id.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The SeventhCircuit affirmed thedenial of summary judgment, findingthat theFourthAmendment applied tocontracted medical services provided to a prison inmate who had yet to receive his Gerstein hearing. Id.at633.Accordingtothecourt,priorcaselawhasappliedtheFourthAmendmenttotheprovisionofmedical services in a pre-Gerstein setting. Id.at629-630.Specifically,thecourt pointed to its 1992 decision inVillanova v. Abrams, 972F.2d792,797(7thCir.1992),whereitheldthat“theFourthAmendmentgovernstheperiodofconfinementbetweenarrestwithouta

warrantandthe[probablecausedetermi-nation].”Thecourtalsoincludedalitanyof cases inwhich it had since appliedthe FourthAmendment’s “objectivelyunreasonable”standardtoboth“condi-tions of confinement” and “medicalcare” claimsbroughtby arresteeswhohad not yet had a Gerstein hearing. Id. at629(citingOrtiz v. City of Chicago, 656F.3d523 (7thCir. 2011) (medicalcare);Williams v.Rodriguez, 509F.3d392(7thCir.2007)(medicalcare);Sides v. City of Champaign, 496F.3d820(7thCir.2007)(medicalcare);Lopez v. City of Chicago,464F.3d711,719(7thCir.2006)(conditionsofconfinement)).

Thecourt refused toadopt thede-fendants’cogentdistinctionthatnoneofthesecaseshadspecificallydealtwiththeprovisionofmedicalcarebyphysiciansor nurses, but rather involvedmedicalcare provided by jailers or guards.Currie,728F.3dat630.Thecourtalsostated that from the perspective of thearrestee, “it matters not a whit whether it isthejailerorthedoctorwhoseconductdeprives him of life-savingmedicalcare.” Id.Thecourtconcluded,“[t]hisiswhyourFourthAmendmentcasesspeakbroadlyofclaimsinvolvingthe‘provi-sionofmedicalcare,’...notsimplythe‘denialofmedicalcarebyajailer.’”Id. (quoting Ortiz,656F.3dat538).

Thecourtfurtherfailedtoappreci-ate thefact thatphysiciansandnurses,unlike jailersandguards,alreadyhavean obligation under state negligencelawtoprovidereasonablecare.Indeed,physiciansandnursesarealwayssubjecttosuchstatelawclaims,evenwhentheyface allegations of deliberate indiffer-ence. See, e.g., Moss v. Miller,254Ill.App.3d174(4thDist.1993).

Inresponsetotheconcernsvoicedbythedefendantsatoralargument,thecourtstated, “[i]f jail officials fear that this

The original complaint alleged the defendants

were deliberately indifferent to Okoro’s

allegedly serious medical needs.



frameworkmight impose too onerousaburdenonthemortheiragents,thereisanobvioussolution: the responsibleofficialscanensurethatarresteesreceivea prompt determination of probablecause,astheFourthAmendmentalreadyrequires.”Id.at631.

Whilethissolutionmightbefeasibleforthejailitself,howcouldacontractedmedical service provider ever do so? In fact, looking closely at theCurrie decision, itappears thecourtconfusedtheFourthAmendmentclaimagainstthejail,forfailingtoprovideOkorowithaGerstein hearing, and the claims against themedicalproviders.WhetherthejailisliableforFourthAmendmentviolationsisaseparatequestionfromwhetherthephysicianandnurseareliable.Neverthe-less,thecourtofappealsfoundthattheFourthAmendmentapplied tomedicaltreatment provided by a physician ornursetoarresteeswhohadyettoreceivetheir Gerstein hearing. Id.at633.

Next,thecourtaddressedthedefen-dants’argumentthateveniftheirconductviolatedOkoro’s FourthAmendmentrights, qualified immunitywas properbecausenopreviousdecisionhad“appliedtheFourthAmendment to analyze thereasonablenessofhealth careprovidedby contractedmedical professionals toarresteesbeingheldbythepoliceinjail.”Id. (internal quotationmarks omitted). According to thecourt, “[t]hecontoursofOkoro’s FourthAmendment rightswere‘sufficientlyclearthatareasonableofficialwouldunderstandthatwhatheisdoingviolates that right’ throughout theperiodofOkoro’sdetention.”Id.at632 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483U.S.635,640(1987)).Thecourtrejectedthedefendants’argumentthatpreviousFourthAmendmentmedical care cases “spokeonlyof‘officers’(andnot‘medicalcareproviders’),”stating,“[t]hatistooslender

a reedforus,particularlysinceofficialscanbeonnoticethattheirconductviolatesestablished laweven in the absenceofearlier cases involving fundamentallysimilar[or]materiallysimilarfacts.”Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536U.S.730,741(2002))(internalquotationmarksomitted).

Thecourtemphasizedthat“nothingin our opinions hints at some specialFourthAmendment exemption forhealthcareprofessionals;wediscussedwrongdoing by ‘officers’ and ‘lockupkeepers’becausethosewerethepositionsthedefendantsheld.”Id. Moreover, the courtassertedithadrejected“anargu-mentmuchlikeChhabraandReynolds’in Ortiz, where the defendants urgedthat in 2004 (the time of the allegedwrongdoing in that case) no decisionhad applied theFourthAmendment toanalyzethereasonablenessoftheprovi-sion ofmedical care to arrestees.” Id. (citing Ortiz, 656F.3dat538)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

Evenso,theprincipleunderscoringqualifiedimmunityisthattheconstitu-tionalrightinquestionmustbeclearlyapparent. Given that a state law medical malpracticeclaimisalwaysavailableasaremedyfortheprovisionofnegligentmedical services, regardless of theinmate’sstatus,thephysicianandnursewere reasonable in assuming that theprevious cases involving jailers andguardsdidnotapplytothem.

AvailabilityofQualifiedImmunity to Private Medical Providers

In addressing the availability ofqualified immunity, specifically theapplicationoftheFourthAmendmenttomedical care provided to pre-Gerstein arresteesbyphysicians andnurses, theCurrie courtmadeaninterestingancillaryfindingbeyondtheissuesofthecase.Id.

at631-632.Thecourtstated,“[i]fthereisanylackofclarityinourpreviouscases,. . . it is only with respect to the threshold issuewhetherthedefenseofqualifiedim-munityiseveravailabletoprivatemedicalcareproviders like thedefendants.” Id. at631.According toCurrie, while the SupremeCourt’s decision inFilarsky v. Delia, 132S.Ct. 1657 (2012), heldthatsection1983immunity“shouldnotvarydependingonwhetheranindividualworking for thegovernmentdoessoasa full-timeemployee,oronsomeotherbasis,” theSupremeCourt nonethelessreaffirmeditspriorholdinginRichardson v. McKnight, 521U.S.399(1997),which“categorically reject[ed] immunity forprivate prison employees,” relying instead onthemarketplacetoprotectemployees.Id.at631-32.Currie noted that the Sixth CircuitCourt ofAppeals had recentlyinterpreted Filarsky’s rulingandheldthata doctor providing psychiatric services to inmates at a state prison was not entitled toassertqualifiedimmunityasadefense.Id.at632(citing McCullum v. Tepe, 693F.3d696(6thCir.2012)).

Although the court foundMcCul-lum‘s reasoning persuasive, it did notdefinitivelydecidetheissuebecauseevenif thedefendantswere entitled to seekqualifiedimmunityasageneralmatter,“wewouldconcludethatthedefenseisnotapplicablehere.”Id.Whilecertainlydicta, the court’s seeming agreementwith McCullum ontheunavailabilityofqualifiedimmunitytoprivatecontractorsworkingwiththestateshouldbenotedbydefensecounselpracticingwithintheSeventhCircuit.

Conclusion

While thepreciserulingofCurrie will have limited impact on physicians,


Civil Rights Update | continued

given that most jails provide arrestees with Gerstein hearings in a timely manner, private medical contractors nevertheless have reason for concern.A medical negligence claim with con-stitutionalparametersisnowapotentialconsideration when providing medical care to prisoners.As noted above,prison physicians and nurses often donot know the status of the individualstheyaretreating.Previously,allphysi-cianswerewell-awareof thepotentialforamedicalmalpracticeclaimiftheirtreatment was negligent. Yet, there was never the potential for attorneys’ fees,costs,orpunitivedamages.See,e.g.,735ILCS5/2-1115.Moreover,anyplaintiffalleging a state law claim formedicalmalpracticeisrequiredtofileacertificateofmerit in accordancewith735 ILCS5/2-622. Moving forward, medicalproviders treating pre-Gerstein arrestees mayfacethepotentialforattorneys’feesandcostsformedicalmalpracticeclaims,andwhether theplaintiffmust complywiththecertificateofmeritrequirementhasnotbeendetermined.

But, perhaps themost concerningaspectofCurrie isthatthecourtfoundthe reasoning in McCullumpersuasive.Whiledicta in Currie,ifthisreasoning isadoptedbyfuturecourts,allcontractedmedical service providers will have to re-examinetheircontractsandpossiblyadjust theirfeeschedules toreflect theadded risk associatedwith no longerbeingabletoassertqualifiedimmunity.Currie isclearlyashotacrossthebowforcounselrepresentingphysiciansandother medical service providers that contract with state entities, especially prisons.

About the Authors

Medical Malpractice UpdateDina L. Torrisi and Jennifer A. HeydemannHeplerBroom LLC, Chicago

Jennifer A. Heydemann is an associate attorney of HeplerBroom LLC. Ms. Heydemann graduated from Duke University in 2006 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology and Spanish. She received

her J.D. from Washington University School of Law in St. Louis in 2009. She is admitted to practice in Illinois and the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois. She focuses her practice in the areas of medical malpractice and insurance defense. Ms. Heydemann is a member of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel.

Dina L. Torrisi is a partner at HeplerBroom LLC. Ms. Torrisi focuses her practice in the area of professional liability defense and general negligence. She has exten-sive litigation experience in defending hospitals, physi-

cians, and nurses. Ms. Torrisi received her B.S. from University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, and her J.D. from The John Marshall Law School. She is admitted to the bars of Illinois, the Northern District of Illinois, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Ms. Torrisi is a member of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel and Illinois Association of Healthcare Attorneys. She is also an Arbitrator for the Cook County Mandatory Arbitration Program.

Medical malpractice attorneys do not commonly experience the practical applicationofFryeinthetypesofcasestheyhandle—partlyduetoattorneysandtrialjudges’lackoffamiliaritywithitsuseinthemedicalmalpracticecontext.This article serves as a “Frye 101”refreshercourse,coveringthebasicsofthe Frye standard,whentoinvokeaFrye challenge, and recent developments in case law.

Generally, expert testimony is ad-missiblewhen the expert testifies tomatters that are beyond the commonknowledgeofordinarycitizensandwhenthe testimonywill aid the fact-finderin reaching its conclusion.People v. Gilliam,172Ill.2d484(1996);Ill. R. EvId. 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).When itcomestothescientificevidence,however“specialcaremustbetakenbythetrialcourtinrulingupontheadmissibility.”Torres v. Midwest Dev. Co.,383Ill.App.3d20,26(1stDist.2008).“Juriestendto equate sciencewith truth andmayplacesubstantialweightonanyevidencelabeledscientific.” Torres,383Ill.App.3dat26.Therefore,itiscrucialtochal-lenge the validity of your opponent’sscientificevidencebeforetrialtopreventthejuryfromhearingunreliablescientificevidence.

A Frye hearing is a pretrial hearing totesttheadmissibilityofnovelscientificevidence.Under Illinois law, scientificevidence is only admissible at trial ifthemethodology,orscientificprinciple

Frye Challenges in the MedicalMalpractice Setting: A Refresher Course

uponwhich the opinion is based, is“sufficientlyestablishedtohavegainedgeneralacceptanceintheparticularfieldtowhichitbelongs.”In re Commitment of Simons,213Ill.2d523,529–30(2004)(quotingFrye v. United States, 293F.1013,1014(D.C.Cir.1923)).Frye is the exclusivetestinIllinoisfordetermining



theadmissibilityofscientificevidence.Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.,199Ill.2d63,77 (2002).ThetestiscodifiedunderIllinoisRuleofEvidence702.Ill. R. EvId.702.

Counsel shouldfileaFrye motion whentheopposingsideseeksto intro-duceanexpertopinionbasedonanewornovelscientifictheoryormethodology,which is not generally accepted in the relevantscientificcommunity.Donald-son,199Ill.2dat79,abrogated on other grounds, In re Simons,213Ill.2dat532. A theory isnovelifitis“originalorstrik-ing” or does “not resemble somethingformerlyknownorused.”Id.

A Fryemotion should be broughtas a motion in limine to exclude theevidence. Once a Fryemotionisfiled,thejudgewillconductaFryehearingduringwhich the proponent of the evidencebears the burden of showing generalacceptance. People v. McKown,236Ill.2d278,294(2010).Theproponentcanpresent evidence including scientificpublications, prior judicial decisions,practical applications, as well as the testimonyofscientistsastotheattitudesoftheirfellowscientists.People v. Kirk, 289 Ill.App. 3d326, 332 (1997).Themovantwill then have an opportunityto respond.

Fryemotions are oftenbrought incombinationwith other foundationalchallengestotheadmissibilityofexperttestimony. It should be noted, though,

that the standard of review is not thesame forFrye rulings as for otherfoundational and relevancydetermina-tions.Asof2004, Illinoishas adopteda de novo standardof review forFrye hearings. In re Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at530-31.Under the de novo standard, the reviewingcourtcanconsidernotonlythetrialcourtrecord,butalsosourcesoutsidetherecord,includinglegalandscientificarticles,aswellascourtopinionsfromother jurisdictions. Id. at 531.Otherfoundational and relevancy challengesto expert testimony remain subject toreviewonlyforanabuseofdiscretion.Id.

SomeillustrativeexamplesofhowFrye hearings have served physician defendantsinmedicalmalpracticecasesarelistedbelow.

Agnew v. Shahillustratesthebenefitof seeking aFrye hearingbefore trial,particularlywhen theother side’s caserestsheavilyonthetestimonyofasingleexpert. Agnew v. Shah,355Ill.App.3d981(1stDist.2005).Agnew was a medi-calmalpracticeoccultbreastcancercaseinwhichtheplaintiff’stheoryofliabilityrested on the testimony of an expertwitnesswhoopinedastothetimingofthe plaintiff’s lymph nodemetastasis,and based his opinion on a backwardextrapolation methodology. Agnew, 355Ill.App.3dat989.Thedefendantmoved in limine tobartheopinionsofthe plaintiff’s expert, arguing that thebackward extrapolationmethodology

was not generally accepted in occultbreastcancerpatients.Id.Thetrialcourtconducted a piecemealFrye hearing duringthecourseofthetrial.Id.at983.

After the plaintiff’s expert testi-fied,thetrialcourtdeterminedthat thebackwardextrapolationmethodologyasappliedtooccultbreastcancerpatientswas not generally accepted and struckthe testimony that relied on this meth-odology. Id. at 987.The jury returnedaverdictinfavorofthedefendant.Theappellate court conducted a de novo reviewandaffirmedthetrialcourt’sFrye ruling.Id.at989.Thecourtrejectedtheplaintiff’sargumentthattherulingwasinconsistent with the Donaldson case, wherebackwardextrapolationwasfoundtobegenerallyacceptedasappliedtoaneuroblastoma.See Donaldson,199Ill.2dat82-85.TheoncologiccommunitythatstudiedneuroblastomaswasdistinctfromtheoccultbreastcancercommunityforpurposesoftheFrye analysis. Agnew, 355Ill.App.3dat990.

Thecourtalsoheldthatitwasappro-priateforthedefendanttoraisetheFrye objectionduringmotionsin limine, and that the piecemeal Frye hearing did not denytheplaintiffafairtrial.Id.at991.

Wilhelmex rel.Wilhelm v.Ferolo, illustrates howFrye and foundationalobjectionscanbeassertedsimultaneouslyforstrategicleverage.SeeWilhelm,2012ILApp(2d)110271-U(non-precedentialunpublishedwrittenorderunderIllinoisSupremeCourtRule23(e)).InWilhelm, theminorplaintiff alleged that herpe-diatriciansfailedtorecognizeearlysignsofretinoblastoma,atypeofeyecancer.The plaintiff alleged that the delay indiagnosis led to optic nerve involvement, resultingintheneedfordrastictreatment

Agnew v. Shah illustrates the benefit of seeking

a Frye hearing before trial, particularly when the

other side’s case rests heavily on the

testimony of a single expert.


Medical Malpractice Update | continued

measures including the removal of theplaintiff’s eye and extensive chemo-therapy and radiation. Wilhelm,2012ILApp(2d)110271-U,¶3.

Theplaintiff’sexpert,apathologist,opined that the retinoblastoma waspresent before the defendants saw theplaintiffandthattheopticnerveinvolve-mentoccurredeighttotenweekspriorto diagnosis. Id.¶5.Theexpert reliedonaphotographoftheminorplaintiff,which revealed an obstruction of theplaintiff’sredreflexandthepresenceofawhitereflex.Id.

The defendants filed amotion in limine to bar the expert’s opinion astotherateandtimingoftheplaintiff’stumorprogression.Thedefendantscitedthe testimony of the other testifyingphysicians,whodeniedthattherateofgrowthoftheplaintiff’stumorcouldbedeterminedwithanydegreeofmedicalcertainty. Id. ¶¶ 8-17.The defendantsargued that the methodology usedby the plaintiff’s expert to reach herconclusions, including the use of thephotograph, were not generally accepted in the scientific community and didnot meet the Frye test. Id.¶¶5-6.ThetrialcourtconductedanextensiveFrye hearing, and determined that the expert’s opinionswereappropriatelybarredpur-suanttofoundationalandFrye standards. Thecourtbarredthetestimonypursuanttolackoffoundation,butacknowledgedthattheresultwouldbethesameunderFrye. Id.¶22.

Following the trial court’s eviden-tiary ruling, the defendantsmoved forsummary judgment, arguing that theplaintiff had no reliable scientific evi-dencetoestablishthatearlierdetectionwouldhaveledtoadifferentoutcome.Id. ¶ 47.The trial court granted the

motionforsummaryjudgment,andtheappellatecourtaffirmed.Id. ¶¶54-65.

In Ruffin ex rel. Sanders v.Boler, theplaintiffsallegedthatthedefendantobstetrician applied excessive lateraltractionduringtheminorplaintiff’sde-livery, resulting in a brachial plexusinjury.Ruffin ex rel. Sanders v.Boler, 384 Ill.App. 3d7, 9 (1stDist. 2008).Thedefendant’sproximatecauseexpertwasabiomedicalengineerwhoanalyzedtheforcesinplayduringthedelivery.Heopinedthatthegentletractionappliedbythedefendantcouldnothavecausedthechild’sinjury.Ruffin,384Ill.App.3dat16.ThecourtconductedaFrye hearing prior to trial, and determined that the engineer’s methodology met the Frye standard and was generally accepted in the relevant engineering and obstetriccommunities.Id.at14-16.Theappellatecourtaffirmed.Id.at25.

These three cases show how Frye hearings,whenproperlyexecuted, canhaveprofound effects on the outcomeof a case.The cases discussed in thisarticle represent only a fractionof theinstances where Frye challenges have

ledtodispositiverulingsonmajorissues.Keep inmind, whether you are

seekingtointroduceordefendscientificevidence, a methodology generally ac-ceptedinonefieldmaynotbegenerallyaccepted in the scientificfield in yourcase. As Agnew illustrates, onemustcarefully discern the specific field inwhichtheevidenceisproffered.

PractitionersshouldbefamiliarwithFrye’s application in medical malprac-ticecasesasitcanbeaneffectivetooltobarmedicalopinionsbasedonflawedor unaccepted science.Conversely, ifmet with a Frye challenge, practitioners should be prepared to defend the sci-entificevidencethatformsthebasisoftheirexperts’opinions.Thetrialcourt’sgatekeeping functionwith regard tonovelscientificevidenceisacrucialpartof the trial process.Through properlyconductedFryehearings,opinionsbaseduponunreliablescientifictheoriesshouldnotreachthejuryfortheirconsideration.

As Agnew illustrates, one must carefully discern the

specific field in which the evidence is proffered.

Practitioners should be familiar with Frye’s application

in medical malpractice cases as it can be an effective

tool to bar medical opinions based on flawed or

unaccepted science. Conversely, if met with

a Frye challenge, practitioners should be prepared

to defend the scientific evidence that forms

the basis of their experts’ opinions.



Stacy Dolan FulcoCremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, LLC, Chicago

Recent Decisions

About the Author

Stacy Dolan Fulco is a part-ner at the Chicago law firm of Cremer, Spina, Shaugh-nessy, Jansen & Siegert, LLC. She practices primarily in the areas of premises liability, products liability, and wrongful death defense.

She received her undergraduate degree at Illinois State University and her J.D./M.B.A. de-gree from DePaul University. She is a member of the IDC.

In Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 2014ILApp.(1st)122677,theplaintiffsuedaretailer,lawfirm,andindividuallawyers for purportedly releasing herpersonalandprivateinformationinthecourse of a federal lawsuit. Johnson, 2014ILApp.(1st)122677,¶1.Thetrialcourtgrantedthedefendant’smotiontodismiss on several ground, includingtheabsolutelitigationprivilege.Id. The appellatecourtaffirmed,holdingthattheabsolute litigation privilege applied inthis matter. Id.

Previously,theplaintiffhadfiledapersonalinjurylawsuitagainstaretailer,allegingaslipandfallincident.Id.¶3.The defendant removed the personalinjurycasetotheU.S.FederalDistrictCourt,NorthernDistrict of Illinois Id. Prior to trial, the parties prepared, signed, and filedwith the court a joint finalpretrial order. Id.¶4.Theappendix tothefinalpretrialordercontainedalltheexhibits and deposition transcripts theparties planned to use at trial. Id. The juryruledinfavorofthedefendant,andtheplaintiffappealed.Id.

On appeal in the personal injurysuit, the plaintiff claimed to havefirstdiscoveredthatcertaindocumentswereattachedtothefinalpretrialorder,whichincludedhersocialsecuritynumber,dateofbirth,financialinformation,medicalinformation,andreferencestoaminor.Id.¶5.Theplaintifffiledamotioninthedistrictcourt,requestingthatthedocu-

mentsbesealedandredacted,andmovedfor sanctionsagainst thedefendant forfailingtocomplywiththecourt’sredac-tionrules. Id.Theplaintiffargued thatthe defense counsel’s failure to redacttheinformationwasinextremebadfaithandthatthedefendantwasnegligent.Id. Thedistrictcourtdeniedthemotionforsanctionsbutgrantedthemotiontosealandredactthedocuments.Id.¶6.

Even though the documentswereplaced under seal and redacted bythe U.S. Court ofAppeals, SeventhCircuit, the plaintiff filed suit in statecourt against the retailer, the lawfirmrepresenting the retailer in the initial suit, and the two individual attorneyswhohandledthedefenseofthecase. Id. ¶9.Thesuitstemmedfromtheir“failureto redact certain personal informationfromdocumentsthatwereattachedtothefinalpretrialorder.”Id.¶9.Theplaintiffarguedthateventhoughthedocumentswereultimatelyredactedandsealed,theywereinthecourt’spublicrecordsystemfor over fourmonths, and during thattime, they could have been copied byanyone. Id.

In the plaintiff’s amended com-plaint,shealleged invasionofprivacy,negligence, and negligent infliction ofemotionaldistressagainstalldefendants,andbreachofawrittenandoralcontractagainsttheretailerandlawfirm.Id.¶11.Thedefendantsfiledamotiontodismissunder735ILCS5/2-619,andthecircuit

courtdismissedtheplaintiff’scomplaintwith prejudice. Id. ¶ 12.The circuitcourtfound,“thattheabsolutelitigationprivilege, res judicata and collateral estoppelappliedtobartheclaims.”Id. Theplaintifffiledanappeal.Id.

The IllinoisAppellateCourt FirstDistrictinitiallydiscussedthestatutoryrequirementsforthedismissal.Section2-619(a)(9) of theCode ofCivil Pro-cedure provides for the dismissal of acomplaintiftheclaim“isbarredbyotheraffirmativematter avoiding the legaleffect of or defeating the claim.” 735ILCS5/2-619(a)(9) (West2010).Suchamotion“‘shouldbegrantedonlywhenit raises an affirmativematterwhichnegates the plaintiff’s cause of actioncompletely or refutes critical conclu-sionsoflaworconclusionsofmaterial,butunsupported,fact.’”Johnson,2014ILApp. (1st) 122677, ¶ 14 (quotingEmployers Mut. Cos. v. Skilling,256Ill.App.3d567,569(2dDist.1994)).

Theplaintifffirstarguedthattheab-solutelitigationprivilegedidnotbarherclaim.Thecourtnotedthattheabsoluteprivilegeistreatedasanaffirmativede-fense,andthereforeproperlyaddressedin a section 2-619motion. Johnson, 2014ILApp.(1st)122677,¶15(quoting

The Absolute Litigation PrivilegeBars Plaintiff’s Suit Following Filing

of Personal Information


Recent Decisions | continued

Thompson v. Frank,313Ill.App.3d661,663 (3dDist. 2000)).TheRestatement(Second)ofTorts§586(1977)providesthat“anattorneyisabsolutelyprivilegedtopublishdefamatorymattersconcerninganotherincommunicationspreliminarytoaproposedjudicialproceeding,orinthe institutionof, or during the courseandaspartof,a judicialproceedinginwhichheparticipates as counsel, if hehas some relation to the proceeding.” In addition,the“absoluteprivilegeprovidesacompletebartoaclaimfordefamation,regardlessofthedefendant’smotiveorthe unreasonableness of his conduct.”Johnson, 2014 ILApp. (1st) 122677, ¶15(citing Thompson,313Ill.App.3dat664).

ThecourtnotedthatinIllinois,“therules on absolute privilege to publishdefamatorymatterstatedinsections583and592Aapplytothepublicationofanymatter that is an invasion of privacy. Johnson, 2014 ILApp. (1st) 122677,¶ 16 (quoting Restatement (Second)of Torts (1977)) (citing McGrew v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 147 Ill.App.3d104,114(1stDist.1986)).Forthisreason,theappellatecourtruledthattheabsolutelitigationprivilegeapplies to the plaintiff’s invasion of privacyclaimagainst all defendants.Johnson, 2014ILApp.(1st)122677,¶16.

As to the remaining claims, the appellate court determined that itwas

properforthetrialcourttoapplytheab-solutelitigationprivilegetothoseclaimsas well. Id.¶17.While“Illinoiscourtshavenotspecificallydiscussedwhetherabsoluteimmunityextendstoclaimsfornegligentinflictionofemotionaldistressor breachof contract . . . a numberofothercourtshaveheldthattheabsolutelitigation privilege can apply in suchcases because ‘[t]he absolute privilegewouldbemeaninglessifasimplerecast-ingofthecauseofaction. . . couldvoiditseffect.’”Johnson,2014ILApp.(1st)122677,¶17(quoting Barker v. Huang, 610A.2d1341,1349(Del.1992).

Theplaintiffreliedonthreecasestosupporthercontentionthatthelitigationprivilege did not extend to all of herother claims. Id.¶18.“InZdeb v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,297Ill.App.3d622,628-29(1stDist. 1998), this court found thatIllinoiscourtshavenotextendedtheab-soluteprivilegetoclaimsforintentionalinterferencewithprospectiveeconomicadvantage.” Id. In Thompson v. Frank,

313Ill.App.3d661,665(3dDist.2000),the court did not extend the privilege“toalibelactionbasedonanallegedlydefamatorycommunicationbetweenoneparty’s attorney and the spouse of theopposing party to pending litigation.” Id.Finally,inKurczaba v. Pollock,318Ill.App.3d686,703(1stDist.2000),thecourtdidnotapplytheprivilege“toadefendant’soutofcourtdisseminationofa complaint to third parties not involved in theaction.”Theappellatecourtdidnotfindanyofthesecasespersuasiveinthis matter. Johnson,2014ILApp.(1st)122677,¶18.

Thecourtwentontonotethat“thereisnocivilcauseofactionformisconductwhichoccurredinprior litigation.”Id. ¶19(citing Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Phillips,154Ill.App.3d574,585(1stDist.1987).“Instead,petitionstoredressinjuriesresultingfromallegedmiscon-duct in judicialproceedings shouldbebrought in the same litigation.” Id. In thiscase,theplaintifffiledamotiontocomplainabouttheallegedmisconductinthedistrictcourt,andthedistrictcourtand the appellate court ordered thatthedocumentsbesealedandredacted.Johnson, 2014 ILApp. (1st) 122677,¶ 19.The fact that both courts deniedtheplaintiff’smotionforsanctionsdoesnotprovideanadequatebasisforacivilactioninstatecourtbasedonthesameconduct.Id.Forthesereasons,thecircuitcourt’srulingwasaffirmed.Id.¶20.

Summary Judgment for Hotel Upheld Based on the De Minimus Rule

The plaintiff argued that even though the documents

were ultimately redacted and sealed, they were in the

court’s public record system for over four months,

and during that time, they could have been

copied by anyone.

In St. Martin v. First Hospitality Group, Inc.,2014ILApp.(2d)130505,theplaintiffwasinjuredwhenhetrippedandfellonanunevenportionofsidewalk

outsidetheentranceofahotel.St. Martin, 2014ILApp.(2d)130505,¶3.Thehotel“movedforsummaryjudgmentarguingthatitdidnotoweplaintiffadutyofcare,



becausethedefectinthesidewalkwasde minimus.” Id.¶6.Thetrialcourtgrantedsummaryjudgmentforthehotelandtheplaintiffappealed.Id.

Theplaintifftestifiedthathetrippedoverunevenslabsofconcreteacoupleof feet away from themain entrancedoors to the hotel as he was entering the hotel. Id.¶4.Photographsshowedthatthe defectwas just outside the doorsandunder a roof that extendedover adrive-upareainfrontofthehotel.Id. The plaintiff’sbrothermeasuredtheheightofthedefecttobe1½to1¾inches.Id. A hotelmanagertookphotographsofthedefectthedayafterthefallthatshowedthedefectatapproximatelyahalfinch.Id.¶5.Approximately21monthsaftertheincident,adefenseexpertmeasuredthedefecttobeunderaninch.Id.¶5.

On appeal, the plaintiff arguedthat the de minimus ruledidnotapplybecause the defectwas near the frontdoors, and also contended that there were issuesof fact as to theheightofthedefect.Id.¶8.Theappellatecourtnoted the elements needed to prevail in anegligenceaction:“theplaintiffmustprovethedefendantowedaduty,thatthedefendantbreachedtheduty,andthattheplaintiff’sinjurywasproximatelycausedbythebreach.”Id.¶10(quotingTzakis v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc.,356Ill.App.3d740,745-46(1stDist.2005)).

“Thedutyofanowneroroccupierofanypremisestowardinviteesisthatofreasonablecareunderthecircumstancesregardingthestateofthepremisesoractsdoneoromittedbythem,andtheowner/occupiermustmaintainthepremisesinareasonablysafecondition.”St. Martin, 2014ILApp.(2d)130505,¶11(quot-ing Wardv.KMartCorp., 136 Ill. 2d132,141 (1990)).Theprimary factorsconsideredwhendeterminingifadutyexistsare:“(1)thereasonableforesee-

abilityoftheinjury;(2)thelikelihoodofinjury;(3)themagnitudeoftheburdenofguardingagainsttheinjury;and(4)theconsequencesofplacingthatburdenonthedefendant.”St. Martin,2014ILApp.(2d) 130505, ¶ 12 (quotingMarshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422,436-37(2006)).

The de minimus rule originated incases involvingmunicipalities andwaslater extended to apply to private owners andpossessorofland.St. Martin,2014ILApp.(2d)130505,¶13(citingHartung v. Maple Investment & Dev. Corp.,243Ill.App.3d811,814-15(2dDist.1993)).Theruleisbasedinlargepartontheideathatmunicipalitiesandpropertyownerswouldsufferanunreasonableeconomicburdeniftheywererequiredtokeeptheirsidewalks inperfectcondition,as“it iscommonknowledge that sidewalks areconstructedinslabsfortheveryreasonthattheymustbeallowedtoexpandandcontractwithchangesintemperature.” Id. (quotingHartung,243Ill.App.3dat816and Putman v. Village of Bensenville,337Ill.App.3d197,202(2dDist.2003)).

To determine if the de minimus rule applies, the courts look at theheight variances in addition to all other relevantfacts.St. Martin,2014ILApp.(2d) 130505, ¶ 14 (citingArvidson v. City of Elmhurst, 11 Ill. 2d 601, 604(1957)).Absentanyaggravatingfactors,aheightvarianceoflessthantwoinchesis considered de minimus. St. Martin, 2014ILApp.(2d)130505,¶14(citingWarnerv.CityofChicago,72Ill.2d100,104-05(1978)).

Anaggravatingfactorthathasbeenfound tovoid thede minimus ruleandprevent summary judgment is a busybusiness or commercial districtwherepedestriansmaybedistractedandtherebyoverlook a defect.St. Martin, 2014 ILApp.(2d)130505,¶15(quotingPutman,

337 Ill.App. 3d at 205).When thereis an aggravating factor,whether thedefendantowesadutyofcarebecomesa question of fact, exceptwhere theplaintiff fails to provide evidence thatsuchacircumstanceactuallyexists.St. Martin,2014ILApp.(2d)130505,¶15(citingRepinski v. Jubilee Oil Co.,85Ill.App.3d15,20-21(1stDist.1980)andHartung,243Ill.App.3dat817).

Inthiscase,theplaintiffarguedthatthedefectbeinglocatedjustoutsidetheentrance doors to the hotel amountedto an aggravating circumstance thatwouldprecludesummaryjudgment.St. Martin, 2014 ILApp. (2d) 130505, ¶15.Aspartofitsanalysis,theappellatecourtreviewedtwocaseswherethede minimusrulewasnotappliedduetoag-gravatingcircumstances.InHarris v. Old Kent Bank,315Ill.App.3d894,902(2dDist.2000),theplaintiffallegedthatthedefendantbankfailedtoprovideasafemeansofingressandegresstotheonlyentrance of its establishment Harris, 315 Ill.App.3dat902.Thecourtdidnot apply the de minimusrulebecauseitwasreasonabletoassumetheplaintiffcouldbedistractedwhilewalkingout,and there was not an excessive economic burdentomaketherepair.Id. In Bledsoe v. Dredge,288Ill.App.3d1021,1024(3dDist.1997),theplaintifffelloutsidea partially enclosed entryway to a com-mercialbuilding.Thede minimus rulewas not applied because the areawaspartially enclosed and not exposed to the weather. Bledsoe, 288 Ill.App.3dat1024;St. Martin,2014ILApp.(2d)130505,¶17-18.

There was no question in thiscase that thedefectwas less than twoinches, and therefore, generally notactionable under thede minimus rule.St. Martin,2014ILApp.(2d)130505,¶


Recent Decisions | continued

19.Theissuewaswhetheranaggravat-ingcircumstanceexisted.Theappellatecourtdeterminedthattheplaintifffailedto specifically allege or provide anyevidenceofanaggravatingcircumstance,such as heavy foot traffic, distractionor congestion. Id.Therefore, the courtwasonlyaddressingwhetherthedefectbeing in close proximity to a coveredentrywayofacommercialbuildingwasanaggravatingfactor.Id.

Theappellatecourtapplieditsdeci-sion in Hartung and determined that the de minimusruleappliedtothiscase.Id. ¶20.“AsweheldinHartung,giventheextremeandvariousweatherconditionsinIllinois,slightvariationsinsidewalkelevationsaretobeexpected,andside-walkscannotbeperfectlymaintainedatall times.” Id.Eventhoughtheareawaspartially covered, the sides were open, therebyexposingittotheelements.Thecourt found that “requiring the ownerto constantlymonitor and perfectlymaintainoutdoorwalkways. . .wouldcreateanundueburden.” Id.

Lastly, the appellate court notedthatthedefectwasonethatisroutinelyencounteredonanormalsidewalkandcaneasilybeavoided.Id.¶21(quotingHartung,243Ill.App.3dat816-817).As support for this concept, the courtreferredtoanexpertaffidavitsubmittedby thedefendant,which indicated thatthesidewalkwasnot inneedof repairand that itdidnotpresentahazardouscondition. Id. ¶ 21. Even though theexpert’sobservationwasmadewellaftertheplaintiff’s incident, thecourtnotedthat the plaintiff did not present anyexpert testimony in response. Id.

SincethecourtappliedHartung and didnotfindtheplaintiff’sargumentofanaggravatingfactorpersuasive,theappel-late court affirmed summary judgmentforthedefendant.Id.¶¶22-24.

Bradford J. PetersonHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Urbana

Workers’ Compensation Report

About the AuthorBradford J. Peterson is a partner in the Urbana office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C. Brad concentrates his practice in the defense of work-ers’ compensation, con-struction litigation, auto liability, premises liability,

and insurance coverage issues. In recent years, Brad has become a leader in the field on issues of Medicare Set Aside trusts and workers’ compensation claims. He has writ-ten and spoken frequently on the issue. He was one of the first attorneys in the State of Illinois to publish an article regarding the ap-plication of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act to workers’ compensation claims, “Medicare, Workers’ Compensation and Set Aside Trusts,” Southern Illinois Law Journal (2002).

Frequently, IDC Quarterly has reportedonthestatusofCongressionalefforts to reformconditionalpaymentsin the context ofMedicare set-asides(MSA), and again present a report ofrecent developments in two areas: (1)the implementation of theStrengthen-ing Medicare and Repaying Taxpayers (SMART)Act requirements; and (2)theproposedextensionoftheworkers’compensation MSA re-review process.

CMS Implementation ofSMART Act Requirements

cMs issues sMArt Actinterim Final rule

OnSeptember19,2013,CenterforMedicareandMedicaidServices(CMS)enactedaninterimfinalrulesettingforththeregulatoryframeworkforimplemen-tationoftheSMARTAct(Pub.L.No.112-242).TheinterimfinalrulehasbeenwidelycriticizedasCMSdidnotfollowtheformalregulatoryprocessinenactingregulationsrequiredundertheSMARTAct. In addition, the interimfinal rulesetsforthaconditionalpaymentsprocessand timeline that fails to complywiththeSMARTAct’srequirementthat thefinal conditional payments amount beobtainablewithin120daysofnoticetoCMS. AmeRICAn InsuRAnCe AssoCIAtIon, Comment to CMS Interim Final Rule for

CMS Begins to Reform ConditionalPayments Process and Proposes

Rules for the Re-Review of Rejected Medicare Set-Aside Proposals

Comment on SMARTActWebPortal, Am. Ins. Ass’n (Nov.19,2013),http://www.aiadc.org/aiadotnet/docframe.aspx?docid=362698.

Pursuant to the rule, theMedi-care beneficiary or their attorneywillbe required to notify the appropriateMedicare contractor that a liabilityinsurance,nofaultinsurance,orwork-ers’compensationclaimhasbeenfiled.42C.F.R.§411.39(2013).This initialnotificationwillbeprovidedoutsideoftheconditionalpaymentswebportalthatwillbeusedtoaccessconditionalpay-ments information.§411.39.Once theMedicare contractor receives notifica-tion,Medicarewillhave65daystopost

http://www.aiadc.org


itsinitialclaimscompilationonitswebportal.§411.39.Ifnecessary,CMScanextend the65-daydeadlinebyanother30days.§411.39.

Once Medicare posts its initial claimscompilationonthewebportal,thebeneficiary,thebeneficiary’srepre-sentative,and the insurerwillbeableto access the conditional payments amount. § 411.39.The beneficiary isthen required to notifyCMS throughthewebportalwhentheyarewithin120days of settlement. § 411.39.Duringthat time, the beneficiary can refreshthe conditional payment claims search asoftenasheorshewishes.§411.39.CMSwillupdate theconditionalpay-mentsinformationwithinfivebusinessdays of the beneficiary’s request. §411.39.Beneficiarieswillthenbeabletodownloadatimeanddatestampedfinalconditionalpaymentamount.§411.39.For the conditional payment amountto be valid, the litigantsmust reachsettlementwithin three business daysof the timeanddate stamp.§411.39.Thereafter,thebeneficiarywillhave30daystoprovidesettlementinformationtoCMS.§411.39.

Wheredisputesexistastothecon-ditional payments amount, partieswillbeable to submitdisputes through thewebportal.CMSmustresolvedisputeswithin11daysofreceipt.Thepartieswillhaveonlyoneopportunitytodisputetheconditionalpaymentsamount.§411.39.

The interim rule indicates that theweb portal will be fully secure andoperational by January 2016.This iswellafterthedeadlinethattheSMARTAct imposed.Until January 2016, thebeneficiaries, their representatives, orinsurerwill be able to view only thetotal conditional payments amountthroughthewebportal.Theywillnotbeable to view specific information such

asdiagnosiscodes,billamounts,datesof service, and provider names.Thus,litigantshavealmostnoabilitytodisputetheconditionalpaymentsamountastheywillnotknowwhatchargesareincludedin the total.

Proposed Expansion of the Workers’ Compensation

Medicare Set-AsideRe-Review Process

OnFebruary11, 2014,CMSpub-lished its “ProposedExpansion of theWorkers’ Compensation MedicareSet-Aside Re-Review Process.” See generally Settlement Solutions,CMS Seeking to Expand its WCMSA Re-Review Process, medICAReInsIghts.Com (Feb. 12, 2014, 5:10PM), http://medicareinsights.com/2014/02/12/cms-seeking-to-expand-its-wcmsa-re-review-process/.Formanyyears,CMShasbeencriticized for their failure to provide aformalprocessandpolicyforworkers’compensation litigants to seek reviewor appeal ofCMS determinations onMedicareSet-Asides.Often,CMSwillreject MSA proposals and demand that theMSAbefundedinahigheramount.InitsFebruary11,2014,proposal,CMSoutlineda framework for anexpandedre-review process.

The proposal provides that all requests for re-review of anMSAdeterminationwillbesenttotheWork-ers’ Compensation Review Contractor (WCRC)forresolutionwithin30busi-nessdays.Thespecialistswhoconductthere-reviewwillbedifferentfromtheindividualwhomadetheoriginalMSAdetermination. Id.

CMS proposes two categories ofre-review.ThefirstcategoryprovidesforareviewbytheWCRCanytimeforthefollowingreasons:

• Identification of amathematicalerror in the approved set-aside amount;or

• Original submission included caserecordsforanotherbeneficiary.

The second category allows for are-reviewwhenthefollowingconditionsaremet:

1. TheoriginalWCMSAwasapprovedwithinthelast180days;

2. Thecasehasnotsettled;3. Nopriorre-reviewrequesthasbeen

submitted;and4. There-reviewrequestsachangeof

theapprovedamountoftenpercentor$10,000.00(whicheverismore)foranyofthefollowingreasons:

a)Submitterdisagreeswithhowthemedical records were interpreted

b)Medicalrecordsdatedpriortothesubmissiondateweremistakenlyomitted

c)Items or services prices in theapproved Medicare Set-Aside amountarenolongerneededorthere is a change in the benefi-ciary’s treatment plan

d)Arecommendeddrugshouldnotbeusedbecauseitmaybeharmfulbeneficiary

e)Dispute of items priced for anunrelatedbodypart

f)Disputeoftheratedageusedtocalculatelifeexpectancy.

Severalorganizations,includingtheDefenseResearchInstitutehavesubmit-tedrecommendedchangesthatmaybeincluded in thefinalCMSRe-ReviewPolicy. It is hoped that the re-review processwill be expanded beyond thecurrentCMSproposal.

http://medicareinsights.com


Roger R. Clayton, Mark D. Hansen, and J. Matthew ThompsonHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Health Law Update

J. Matthew Thompson is an associate in the Peoria office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C. He practices primarily in the area of general tort de-fense. He received his B.S. in Accounting from

Culver-Stockton College in 2005 and his J.D. cum laude from Southern Illinois University School of Law in 2008.

About the AuthorsRoger R. Clayton is a partner in the Peoria office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., where he chairs the firm’s health-care practice group. He also regularly defends physicians and hospitals in medical malpractice litigation. Mr. Clayton is a

frequent national speaker on healthcare issues, medical malpractice, and risk prevention. He received his undergraduate degree from Bradley University and law degree from Southern Illinois University in 1978. He is a member of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel (IDC), the Illinois State Bar Association, past president of the Abraham Lincoln Inn of Court, president and board member of the Illinois Association of Healthcare Attorneys, and past president and board member of the Illinois Society of Healthcare Risk Management. He co-authored the Chapter on Trials in the IICLE Medical Mal-practice Handbook.

Mark D. Hansen is a part-ner in the Peoria office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C. He has been involved in the defense of cases involving cata-strophic injury, including the defense of complex cases in the areas of medi-

cal malpractice, products liability, and profes-sional liability. Mark has defended doctors, nurses, hospitals, clinics, dentists, and nurs-ing homes in healthcare malpractice cases. He received his undergraduate degree from Northern Illinois University and law degree from University of Illinois College of Law. Mark is a member of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel and is a former co-chair of the Young Lawyers Committee, former ex officio member of the Board of Directors, and has served as chair for various seminars hosted by the IDC. He is also a member of the Illinois Society of Healthcare Risk Management, the Abraham Lincoln American Inn of Court, and the Defense Research Institute.

IDC Quarterly previouslyreportedon Home Star Bank and Financial Services v. Emergency Care and Health Organization, Ltd., 2012 ILApp (1st)112321,which created a split amongthedistrictsofIllinois’AppellateCourtregardingtheinterpretationoftheGoodSamaritanAct(theActandtheimmunityit affords to physicians).This columnpredictedthatthesplitwouldultimatelybe resolved by the Illinois SupremeCourt,which proved to be truewhenthecourtreleaseditsdecisioninHome Star Bank and Financial Services v. Emergency Care and Health Organiza-tion, Ltd., 2014 IL 115526 (2014). Initsdecision,theIllinoisSupremeCourtsignificantlynarrowedthescopeofim-munityaffordedtophysiciansundertheAct.Additionally, the court’s decisionislikelytoimpactemergencymedicinephysician contracts and hospital policies, and lead to future litigation regardingthoseentitledtoimmunityundertheAct.

Factual Background

Thedefendantwasanemergencyroom physician employed by anotherdefendant,EmergencyCareandHealthOrganization,Ltd.(ECHO),whichhadanexclusiveemergency roomservicesagreement with the hospital. Home Star Bank 2014IL115526,¶1,5.ECHOpaid

thephysicianhourlyforhisworkintheER. Id. ¶ 7.The physician’s employ-mentcontractrequiredthatheabidebyhospitalpolicies,oneofwhichrequiredanERphysiciantorespondtocodebluealerts in the hospital and direct the code blueteam.Id.¶¶6-8.

During his shift, the physicianrespondedtoacodebluefortheplaintiff,an inpatient on another floor that thephysician had never met or treated. The physicianattemptedtointubatetheplain-tiff,buttheplaintiffultimatelysufferedpermanentbraindamage,resultinginanegligenceactionbeingfiledagainstthephysicianandECHO. Id.¶3.

The patientwas not billed for thephysician’s services for responding tothe code blue.Neither the physician,ECHO, nor the hospital billed for thephysician’s services. Id.¶4.Therefore,baseduponprior interpretationsof theGoodSamaritanAct,thedefendantphy-sicianandECHOmovedfor summaryjudgmentbecausenobillwasgeneratedfor thephysicianservices. Id.¶4.Thecircuitcourtgrantedsummaryjudgment,finding no evidence the plaintiffwasbilledforthephysicianservices. Id.¶18.

The Good Samaritan Act

ImmunityundertheActwasorigi-nally limited to physicians providing

Illinois Supreme Court Rules Against Emergency Room Physicians inResolving Split Among AppellateDistricts Regarding Interpretation

of Good Samaritan Act



emergencycarewithoutfee“atthesceneofamotorvehicleaccidentorincaseofnuclearattack.”Ill.Rev.Stat.ch.91,§2a(West1965).The legislature,however,amendedtheoriginalActmultipletimes,anditcurrentlyreads:

Physicians;exemptionfromciv-il liabilityforemergencycare.AnypersonlicensedundertheMedicalPracticeActof1987orany person licensed to practice thetreatmentofhumanailmentsinanyotherstateorterritoryofthe United States who, in good faith,providesemergencycarewithout fee to a person, shallnot,asaresultofhisorheractsoromissions,exceptwillfulorwantonmisconductonthepartoftheperson,inprovidingthecare,beliableforcivildamages.

745 ILCS49/25. InHome Star Bank, thecourtsetouttoresolvewhethertheterm“withoutfee”isambiguous,andifso,howthattermshouldbeinterpreted.

A Split Among the AppellateDistricts Interpreting “Without Fee”

Before 2012, the IllinoisAppel-lateCourt consistently ruled that carewas rendered “without fee”when thephysician did not bill for the servicesatissue.Estate of Heanue v. Edgcomb, 355 Ill.App. 3d 645 (2dDist. 2005); Neal v. Yang,352Ill.App.3d820(2dDist.2004); Blanchard v. Murray,331Ill.App.3d961(1stDist.2002); Rivera v. Arana,322Ill.App.3d641(1stDist.2001); Villamil v. Benages,257Ill.App.3d 81, 92 (1stDist. 1993);Roberts v. Myers, 210 Ill.App. 3d408 (1stDist.1991);Johnson v. Matviuw,176Ill.App.3d907 (1stDist. 1988).The appellate

court gave the term “without fee” itsordinarymeaning,andsimplylookedtowhetherabillwassent.Villamil,257Ill.App.3dat92.Further,theappellatecourtheld that whether the physician received an economic benefit as a result of theservices was irrelevant, and the physi-cianwasentitledtoimmunityunlessthephysiciancharged“afeespecificallyfortheservicesatissue.”Estate of Heanue, 355Ill.App.3dat649-50.

Then in 2012, the IllinoisAppel-late Court, FirstDistrict, brokewithprecedent in Home Star Bank,2012ILApp(1st)112321.Ratherthanfollowingpriorappellatecourtdecisions,theFirstDistrictfollowedafederaldistrictcourtopinionfindingthephrase“withoutfee”ambiguous.Henslee v. Provena Hosps., 373F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ill. 2005).TheFirstDistrictheldthatafeeexistedif either the patientwas billed or thephysician was paid, i.e., the physician waspaidhourlyor salary for the timetreating the patient. Home Star Bank, 2012ILApp(1st)112321,at¶39.Thisdecision created a division concerning thephrasetorendercare“withoutfee.”Home Star Bank,2014IL115526,¶25.

“Without Fee”Determined to be Ambiguous Thesupremecourtnotedthat,prior

to2012,theappellatecourtbelievedtheterm “without fee”was unambiguous,and therefore, interpreted it narrowly.

Home Star Bank,2014IL115526,¶39.However, thesupremecourt found theterm“withoutfee”is“clearlycapableofbeingunderstoodbyreasonablepersonsin more than one way.” Id.Thesupremecourt relied upon various dictionarydefinitions of “fee,” pointing out thatsomeof those definitions includednotonlyacharge,butalsocompensationorpaymentbeingreceived.Id.Therefore,the court found the term “fee” broadenoughtoincludeapatientbeingbilledoraphysicianbeingcompensated.Id.

IllinoisSupremeCourtDefines“Without Fee” More Broadly,

AttemptingtoAligntheDefinitionwith the Legislature’s Intent

BecausetheIllinoisSupremeCourtdetermined that “without fee” wasambiguous,itsetouttodefinethetermin a manner consistent with legislative intent. Id. ¶ 40. In doing so, the courtrelied upon several aids to statutoryconstruction.First,thecourtpointedtodictionariesdefining“GoodSamaritan”and “good-samaritan law” to includethosewho voluntarily or gratuitouslyprovide help or aid. Id. (citingTheRandomHouseDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage 609 (1983)&Black’sLawDictionary715(8thed.2004)).Second,the court cited theAct’s statement oflegislativepurpose,which twice referstothosewho“volunteer”theirtime.Id.

The supreme court relied upon various dictionary

definitions of “fee,” pointing out that some of those

definitions included not only a charge, but also

compensation or payment being received.


Health Law Update | continued

¶41(citing745ILCS49/2(West2010)).Third, the court referred to legislativehistory,which purported to show thatthosevotingfortheActintendedimmu-nitytoextendtophysiciansvoluntarilyrendering care outside of an office orhospital setting, and not those receiving compensation. Id.¶¶42-44(citing78thIll. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May22,1973,at49-50(statementsofSenator Schaffer); 89thGen.Assem.,HouseProceedings,Mar. 25, 1996, at100-01 (statements ofRepresentativesLang andWinters)). Fourth, the courtwas persuaded by a decision from theCalifornia Court ofAppeals, whichfoundthepurposeofaGoodSamaritanlaw is to encourage physicians to actwhentheyhavenodutytodoso,andtoprotectthoseprovidingservicesoutsidetheirtypicalareaofexpertiseorworkingenvironment. Id.¶¶45-46(citing Colby v. Schwartz,78Cal.App.3d885,892,144Cal. Rptr. 624 (2dDist. 1978)).Finally,thecourtfoundthat“thenarrowdefinitionpreviouslyadoptedbytheap-pellatecourtthwartslegislativeintent,”andoneofthepresumptionsofstatutoryconstructionisthatthelegislaturedoesnotintendabsurd,unjustorinconvenientresults. Id. ¶47.Thecourtdeterminedthatthenarrowdefinitioncouldunjustlyoppressthepoor,because“[i]f the . . .doctor provided negligent emergency care to an indigent uninsured patientandthehospitaldidnotbillthepatientbecauseitwouldnotbeabletocollect

payment,thedoctorwouldbeimmuneunder theAct.” Id. ¶ 48 (citingBenBridges, Comments, Curb Your Immu-nity: The Improper Expansion of Good Samaritan Protection in Illinois,34S.Ill.U.L.J.373,391(2010)).However,thisconcern ignores the reality that in almost allsituations,abillwillbegenerated,iffornootherreasonthantosupportataxwriteoff.

For these reasons, the court heldthat a “fee” existswhen the patient isbilled for services or the physician iscompensated. Id.¶50.Specifically,thecourtfoundthat“giving[theterm‘fee’]a construction that includes a doctor’scompensation will ensure that thelegislature’sintentiseffectuatedratherthan thwarted.” Id.

In addition to the fact that thephysicianwascompensatedforthetimespent rendering the treatment at issue,thecourtnotedthathewasrequiredbycontract and hospital policy to respond tocodebluealertsaspartofhisordinaryduties.Id.¶50.Thecourt’sfocusontherequirementofemploymenttorespondtocodebluealertsmaybeessential topreservingthedefenseforatraditionalGood Samaritan,who happens to beunluckyenoughtobereceivingcompen-sationatthetimeofrenderingcare.Forinstance, a physician associated with a metropolitanmedicalgrouporhospitalmay have an agreement to travel to a rural locationonedayperweektoseepatients, and receivecompensation for

traveltime.Ifthatphysiciancomesuponacaraccidentwhiletravelingtoorfromthe rural location, surely thephysicianisentitledtoimmunityforanycareheprovides.Similarly,ifasalariedphysi-cian employed by a hospital providesemergency carewhilewalking acrossthestreet topickuplunchorwhileonthe sidewalk smoking, that physiciantoo should be entitled to immunityunder theAct. Innumerable situationssimilar to thesewill likelyarise in thefuture, and the courtswill be requiredtoclarifyHome Star Bank’s somewhat looselanguage.

Conclusion

TheIllinoisSupremeCourt’sopin-ion in Home Star Bank significantlylimits the scope of immunity affordedunder theGood SamaritanAct. Thedecision is likely to impactemergencyroom physician contracts and hospital code blue policies. Emergency roomphysicians,theiremployers,andinsurers,willundoubtedlyhaveseriousconcernsabout responding to code blue alerts,mostoftenforpatientsthephysicianhasneverseen.Hospitals,ontheotherhand,may need experienced emergency medi-cinephysiciansrespondingtocodebluealertsincertainsituations,buthospitalsmaybeforcedtoabandonthatpracticeinlightoftheIllinoisSupremeCourt’sdecision.Furthermore, future clarifica-tionofthedecisionislikelyinevitable,becausephysicianswillbecalledupontoactastrueGoodSamaritansinsituationswhere they are coincidentally beingcompensated.Thisdecisionshouldnotpreclude immunity in those situations,butastrictreadingoftheopinionmayleadsomecourtstoruleinsuchamanner.

For these reasons, the court held that a “fee” exists

when the patient is billed for services

or the physician is compensated.



About the Author

Feature ArticleStacy E. CrabtreeHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Peoria

Modern day slavery and humantrafficking continues to be a predomi-nant concern in the United States and othercountries.Forexample,theOscaraward-winningfilm,12 Years a Slave, sex trafficking at SuperBowlXLVIIIin 2014, and the fate of hundreds ofNigeriangirlskidnappedbyBokoHaramhave been at the forefront of currentevents.In2000,Congressfoundthatthethen-current legislation failed to keeppacewiththegravityofthecrimescom-mittedintraffickingcases,andasaresultCongresspassedtheTraffickingVictimsProtectionActof2000(TVPA).VictimsofTrafficking andViolenceProtectionActof2000,Pub.L.No.106-386,114Stat.1464,DivisionA(2000)(codifiedas amended in scattered sections of 8U.S.C.,18U.S.C.,&22U.S.C.).Giventhedepravityofthetypicalhumantraf-fickingcase,law-abidingemployersmaydismiss theTVPA and its subsequentamendments as having little impact on theirbusinessoperations.However,theamendinglanguageandrecentcaselawinterpretingthoseamendmentsillustratehoweasily law-abiding employers canfind themselves defending a lawsuitundertheTVPA.

The Legislation

WhenCongress passed theTVPAin 2000, its principal concernwas the

When Employers Become HumanTraffickers:AnOverviewofthe

TraffickingVictimsProtectionAct

sex trade industry; even so, it furtheracknowledged, “[t]rafficking in per-sons isnot limited to thesex industry.This growing transnational crime also includes forced labor and involvessignificant violations of labor, publichealth, and human rights standardsworldwide.” 22U.S.C. § 7101(b)(3).Withrespect toforced labor,Congressauthorizedfinesorimprisonmentupto20years(orlifeincertaincircumstances)forknowinglyobtaining services fromsomeonethroughphysicalforce,threats,oraschemeintendedtocausesomeoneto believe that theywould suffer seri-ous harm or physical restraint if theindividualdidnotperformsuchservices.18U.S.C. § 1589.TheTVPA furtherprohibitedknowinglyobtainingservicesfrom someoneby abuseof the laworlegalprocess.18U.S.C.§1589.

The Amendments Expand Coverage

In 2003, Congress amended theTVPAtopermitvictimsofsuchcrimesto bring civil causes of action againsttheir perpetrators. See18U.S.C.§1595(2003).AspartoftheWilliamWilber-forceTraffickingVictims ProtectionReauthorizationActof2008,Congressadded a ten-year statute of limitationsperiodforcivilclaims,Id.at§1595(c),andbroadenedthescopeofforcedlaborpunishableundertheTVPAbydefining

“seriousharm”and“abuseofthelaworlegal process.” Id.at§1589.Asaresult,§1589readsinpertinentpart:

(a) Whoeverknowinglyprovidesorob-tainsthelabororservicesofapersonbyanyoneof,orbyanycombinationof,thefollowingmeans—

(1) bymeans of force, threats offorce, physical restraint, orthreatsofphysical restraint tothatpersonoranotherperson;

(2) bymeans of serious harm orthreatsofseriousharmtothatpersonoranotherperson;

(3) by means of the abuse orthreatenedabuseoflaworlegalprocess;or

(4) bymeansofanyscheme,plan,orpatternintendedtocausetheperson to believe that, if thatperson did not perform suchlabor or services, that personor another personwould suf-fer serious harm or physicalrestraint, shall be punished asprovidedundersubsection(d).

. . .

Stacy E. Crabtree is an associate in the Peoria office of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C. She represents businesses, not-for-profits, and gov-ernmental entities in com-mercial and tort litigation in state and federal court.

She also assists clients with commercial trans-actions, corporate governance, and compliance issues. Ms. Crabtree received her J.D., summa cum laude, from Florida Coastal School of Law and B.A., summa cum laude, from Bradley University.


Feature Article | continued

(c) Inthissection: (1) Theterm“abuseorthreatened

abuseoflaworlegalprocess”means the use or threateneduse of a lawor legal process,whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or foranypurpose forwhich thelaw was not designed, in order to exert pressure on anotherperson tocause thatperson totakesomeactionorrefrainfromtakingsomeaction.

(2) Theterm“seriousharm”meansany harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psy-chological,financial,orreputa-tionalharm,thatissufficientlyserious,underallthesurround-ingcircumstances,tocompelareasonablepersonof thesamebackground and in the samecircumstancestoperformortocontinue performing labor orservicesinordertoavoidincur-ring that harm.

Id.at§1589.Inotherwords,TVPAprohibitsone

from knowingly obtaining another’slaborbytheuseoforthreateneduseofforce, physical restraint, serious harm,or an improper scheme. See Headley v. Church of Scientology, 687F.3d 1173(9th Cir. 2012) (granting summaryjudgmentforthedefendantwasproperwheretheplaintiffsfailedtoshowtheyprovidedlaborbecauseoftheimproperconductproscribedundertheTVPA).

Some cases under the TVPAundoubtedly involve force, physicalrestraint, and other serious harm tosupport a claim of forced labor. Forexample, in United States v. Afolabi,508

F.App’x.111,113(3rdCir.2013),thedefendant broughtmore than 20WestAfricangirlstotheUnitedStatesunderthefalsepretensesthatthegirlswouldgo to school or learn a trade. Instead, thegirlsworkedinhairbraidingsalons16hours per day,were forced to giveallmoneytheyearnedtothedefendant,andenduredviolentbeatingsandthreats.Afolabi, 508F.App’x. at 113. InDoe v. Howard, 1:11-CV-1105, 2012WL3834930, *2 (E.D.VirginiaAugust 7,2012), the plaintiffwas held virtuallyprisoner,raped,andforcedtoworkforless than $1.00 per hour.Aside fromtheseextremescenarios, though, itbe-comeslessclearwhenforcedlaborexistsbecauseofabuseoflawornonphysicalseriousharm.AlthoughanyonecanbringaclaimundertheTVPA,thesignificantmajority of the case law arises in thecontext of immigrants, guestworkers,andotherswhohave a legitimate fearofbeingdeportedorotherwisearrestedandprosecutedduetotheirimmigrationstatus.

Immigrants and Guest Workers

Tounderstand the risk to employ-ers of immigrants and guestworkers,backgroundastothesetypesofworkersishelpful.Guestworkers,asusedinthisarticle, means those persons admitted

toworkintheUnitedStatesunderoneof the non-immigrant classes set forthin the Immigration and Nationality Act includingH-1B(specialtyoccupation),H-2A(agriculturallabor)orH-2B(non-agriculturallabor)workers.See 8U.S.C.§1184(b)(1994).Theseindividualsarepermitted towork in theUnitedStatessolely for the employerwho appliedforthevisaontheworker’sbehalf.Id. Amongmanyotherobligations,employ-erswhouseguestworkersmustnotifytheU.S.DepartmentofLaborandU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecuritywhentheemployer terminatesaworkeror aworker otherwise leaves employment.20C.F.R.655.122(n)(2014);20C.F.R655.20(y)(2014).WithrespecttoH-2AandH-2Bvisas, if theworker has notyetcompletedatleast50%oftheworkperiod,thentheemployerisnotliablefortheworker’stransportationexpenses.Id.

Guestworkers differ from immi-grants in that immigrants are, in theory, allowed to remain in the United States on apermanentbasisasindicatedbyreceiptofagreencardandarenotnecessarilytiedtoonespecificemployer.AustinT.Fragomen,Jr.et. al., ImmIgRAtIon PRoCe-duRes hAndbook,§16.1(May2014).Inmany cases, aspiring immigrants rely on theiremployerforsponsorshipthroughthe green card process. Id.

In other words, TVPA prohibits one from knowingly

obtaining another’s labor by the use of or threatened

use of force, physical restraint, serious harm,

or an improper scheme.



Recent Judicial Interpretations

Howhave courts handled an em-ployer’swarningsofeitherdeportation,lossof transportation,and/or reportingto governmental officials under theTVPA?What if an employer informsitsH-2Aworkerwhoiscontemplatingleaving that the employer will have to notify the government (as it is legallyrequiredtodo)andtheworkerwillhaveto pay his/her own transportation home? Whatifanemployerisunhappywiththeaspiringimmigrant’squalityofworkandwarns the employee that it may have to withdraw sponsorship?

Pre-TVPA, theUnited States Su-premeCourtrecognizedthat“threaten-ing ... an immigrant with deportation could constitute the threat of legalcoercionthatinducesinvoluntaryservi-tude,eventhoughsuchathreatmadetoan adult citizenof normal intelligencewould be too implausible to produceinvoluntaryservitude.”United States v. Kozminski, 487U.S. 931, 948 (1988).Consistent with this decision, a New Yorkdistrictcourtin Shukla v. Sharma, No.07-CV-2972,2012WL481796,at*4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012), uphelda jury’s verdict finding the defendantsliableforforcedlaborunderTVPAandstated even if the plaintiff suspectedthedefendant’swarningofdeportationwas puffery, “a reasonable person ofplaintiff’sbackgroundandcircumstancescouldstillfearthat[thedefendant]mightcontact the authorities if plaintiffwasuncooperative.”The district court inGarcia v. Cutright,No.6:11-06407-HO,2012WL1831865,*4(D.Or.May17,2012),recognizedthatalthough“notallbad employer-employee relationshipsconstituteforcedlabor,”thedefendant’s

alleged threat of the plaintiff beingdeportedwas sufficiently serious tocompeltheplaintiff’slaborandprecludedismissal.Warningsofdeportationmayalso be considered an abuse of legalprocess,andthereforeaviolationof18U.S.C.§1589(3),wheretheemployeeisnotlawfullyintheUnitedStates.United States v. Calimlim, 538F.3d 706, 713(7thCir.2008).

In Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 790 F.Supp.2d1134,1138(C.D.Cal.2011),the Filipino plaintiffs alleged that thedefendant recruiters promised themteaching jobs at schools in theUnitedStates upon each of the plaintiffs’payment of a $5,000 recruitment fee.After they paid the recruitment feeand sent their passports and visas to the defendants, per the defendants’instructions, the defendants refused to

theaverageannualhouseholdincome”in the Philippines. Id. at 1139, 1144.Thecomplaintfurtherallegedincidentswhere the president of the defendantrecruitingagencythreatened“shecouldhave teachers deported,” threatened to suetheplaintiffsiftheystartedspeakingout,andthreatenedtolettheplaintiffs’visas expire. Id. at1144.ThecourtfoundthesefactsstatedaclaimundertheTVPAfor abuse of legal process and seriousharm. Id.at1146.

But, some courts recognize thatpermissiblewarnings of adverse, butlegitimate, consequences are not asufficientbasisforaclaim.See Headley v. Church of Scientology, 687 F.3d1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2012) (holdingthe defendant church’swarning to theplaintiff church members that theywouldbe suppressed from the church,including family and friends, if they

Pre-TVPA, the United States Supreme Court recognized

that “threatening ... an immigrant with deportation could

constitute the threat of legal coercion that induces

involuntary servitude, even though such a threat made

to an adult citizen of normal intelligence would be too

implausible to produce involuntary servitude.”

provide plaintiffswith their visas orallowthemtoleavefortheUnitedStatesuntileachoftheplaintiffspaidasecond,largerrecruitmentfeeof$10,000.Id. at 1138-39.TheplaintiffsallegedtheywereforcedtopaythesecondfeeandforcedtoworkintheUnitedStatesbecauseofthe first recruitment fee,which alonewas “more than one-and-a-half times

leftdidnotconstituteathreatofseriousharminviolationofTVPA).In DeSilva v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc.,No.10-CV-1341,2012WL748760*7(E.D.N.Y.March7,2012),thedefendant employer represented to theplaintiffswhowereH-1Bvisa holdersthat their “employment would be in



jeopardy”iftheyfailedtocompleteallof their assignedwork.Consequently,theplaintiffsclaimedtheyworkedduringmealbreaksandoutsideoftheirsched-uledhoursduetofearoflosingtheirjobs.DeSilva, 2012WL748760 at *7.Thecourtadmonishedtheplaintiffs,however,fornotcitingasinglecaseinsupportoftheirtheorythat“threateningtofireanat-willemployee...constitutesforcedlabor’” and dismissed the plaintiffs’claim. Id. In United States v. Bradley,390F.3d145,151(1stCir.2004),vacated on other grounds,545U.S.1101(2005),thecourtofappealsheldthatanemployer’sthreatnottopayforanemployee’striphomeiftheemployeeleftbeforetheendof the employmentperiod “couldbe alegitimatestance for theemployerandnotcriminalconduct.”Thecourtfurtherstated that the jury instructions shouldhave “included qualifying languageexplaining that somewarnings fromtheemployercouldbelegitimateandtodifferentiate suchwarnings from illicitthreats.” Bradley,390F.3dat151.

Warningsgivenbeforeorafter theemployment period that the employee could be deported or subject to legalaction are also likely insufficient for aclaim. Pasamba v. HCCA Intern. Inc., No.CV-08-0247-PHX-NVW,2008WL2562928,*5 (D.Ariz. June24,2008). TheplaintiffinPasambawasaFilipinorecruitedbythedefendanttobecomealicensedRegisteredNurseintheUnitedStatesandworkinahospital.Pasamba,

2008WL2562928,at*1.Theplaintiffwaswarnedaboutpotentialdeportationand/or legal action before she beganworkingandwassubjectedtothreatsoflegalactionforrepaymentofrecruitingexpenses after she no longerworkedfor thedefendant. Id. at *6.The courtdismissed the plaintiff’s allegations offorcedlaborbecauseshecouldnotshowshewas forced towork if the threatscameonlybeforeandaftertheemploy-ment period. Id.

AlthoughcaselawisstilldevelopingundertheTVPA,itappearsthedifferencebetweenan impermissible threatandalegitimatewarningultimatelyreliesontheintentofthespeaker.InCamayo v. John Peroulis and Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 10-CV-0072,2012WL4359086,*5(D.Colo.Sept.24,2012),theplaintiffssuc-cessfullystatedaclaimundertheTVPAby alleging the defendants threatenedtohavetheplaintiffsdeported“toinstillfearandpromotecompliance.”Similarly,in Ramos-Madrigal v. Mediola Forestry Service, LLC, 799F.Supp.2d958,960(W.D.Ark.2011),theplaintiffssurvivedamotiontodismissbecausetheyallegedthe defendant threatened the plaintiffswithseriousimmigrationconsequencestopreventthemfromleavingemployment.See also U.S. v. Cassel,408F.3d622,633(9thCir.2005)(holdinginaFirstAmend-ment case that a “true threat” requiresproofthatthespeakerintendedthespeechasathreat).Obviously,theplaintiff’staskof proving a threatening intent by the

preponderanceoftheevidenceinacivilcaseiseasierthanthegovernment’staskof establishing it beyond a reasonabledoubtinacriminalcase.

Conclusions and Recommendations for Employers

Employersofimmigrantsandguestworkers can take certain actions tominimizetheirexposureundertheTVPA.First,priortotheemployee’straveltotheUnitedStates, if possible, orotherwiseprior to the start of the employmentperiod, the employer should have theemployee sign awork agreement inthe employee’spreferred language thatexplains the consequences of earlytermination and verbally explain it tothe prospective employee in the same language.AsdemonstratedinPasamba, theseconversations aremore likelynottobe considered threats inviolationoftheTVPAbecausetheemployeehasnotstartedworkandthereforeisnotprovidingtheworkbecauseofanyperceivedthreat.

Second, employers should instructtheir management-level employees whenitisappropriateornottodiscussconsequencesofearlyterminationwithimmigrantsorguestworkers.Generally,thereislittleneedtodiscussthisaftertheworkerhassignedtheworkagreementdisclosingtheconsequences.

Third, if the employer regularlyuses guestworkers from a particularcountry or region, consider investingin cultural awareness or other trainingforemployeesthatwouldhelppromoterespectful communication and lessenperceivedtension.Moreover,evidenceofsuchtrainingmayhelpnegateallegationsthat an employer acted intentionally with respect to a TVPA violation.

Although case law is still developing under the TVPA,

it appears the difference between an impermissible

threat and a legitimate warning ultimately relies on

the intent of the speaker.



About the Authors

Lindsay Drecoll Brown and Matthew S. SimsCassiday Schade LLP, Chicago

Construction Law

Lindsay Drecoll Brown is a senior associate in the Chicago office of Cas-siday Schade LLP. She concentrates her practice in civil litigation defense, with an emphasis on construction law, profes-sional liability and product

liability. Ms. Brown received her J.D., cum laude, from Loyola University Chicago School of Law, and her undergraduate degree from Michigan State University, with high honors. She is a member of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel’s Construction Law Committee.

Matthew S. Sims is a senior associate attorney in Cassiday Schade’s Chicago Office. He has a broad practice in civil litigation, including areas such as the defense of construction contractors in injury cases, medical

liability defense, product liability defense, and commercial litigation. He has extensive experience in risk transfer and indemnification.

Defendingagainstconstructionneg-ligenceclaimsrequiresanunderstandingofthemostrecentcourtrulingspertain-ing toSection 414of theRestatement(Second)ofTorts.Restatement(Second)ofTorts§414(1965).AdoptedinIllinoisin 1965 inLarson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,33Ill.2d316,323(1965),that section provides an exception to thegeneral rule thatonewhoemploysan independent contractormaynot beheld vicariously liable for the acts oromissionsofthatentity.Madden v. P.M. Paschen/S.N. Nielsen, Inc.,395Ill.App.3d 362, 381 (1st 2009). Specifically,Section414states:

Onewho entrustswork to anindependentcontractor,butwhoretainsthecontrolofanypartofthework,issubjecttoliabilityforphysicalharmtoothersforwhosesafetytheemployerowesa duty to exercise reasonablecare,which is caused by hisfailure to exercise his controlwithreasonablecare.

The concept of “retained control”isexplainedbycomment(c)toSection414,asfollows:

Inorderfortherulestatedinthissection to apply, the employer must have retained at leastsomedegreeofcontroloverthemanner inwhich thework isdone.Itisnotenoughthathehas

Retaining Control: Recent 2014Interpretations of Restatement Section 414

merely a general right to order theworkstoppedorresumed,toinspect its progress or to receive reports,tomakesuggestionsorrecommendations which need not necessarily be followed,or to prescribe alterations anddeviations.Suchageneralrightisusually reserved toemploy-ers, but it does notmean thatthe contractor is controlled as to hismethods ofwork, or astooperativedetail.Theremustbesucharetentionofarightofsupervisionthatthecontractorisnotentirelyfreetodotheworkin his own way.

Evenwith the clarifying languagecontained within comment (c), theamountofcontrolrequiredtotriggeradutyunderSection414remainsacon-stantlymovingtarget,requiringintensivefactualanalysisandintuition.Thelevelofcontrol thatmaybeexertedwithoutriskingafindingofdutyisoftenupfordebate,particularlyinlightofconflictingappellatecourtdecisionsaddressingtheissue.CompareBokodiv.FosterWheelerRobbins,312Ill.App.3d1051(1stDist.2000)with Martens v. MCL Const. Co., 347 Ill.App. 3d 303 (1stDist. 2004).This dispute is further complicatedbyconflicting interpretations of Section414’sapplicationthathavebeenrenderedbytheSeventhCircuitCourtofAppeals.DecisionsbytheSeventhCircuitinthisarena aim to predict how the Illinois

SupremeCourtwoulddecidethesameissue.Taco Bell Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 388F.3d1069,1077(7thCir.2004).ContrarytotheIllinoisAppellateCourt,theSeventhCircuithasfoundthattherecannotbeafindingofvicarious liabil-ityunderSection414.Lee v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., 2014 ILApp. (1st)130771, ¶ 84, fn. 7;Aguirre v. Turner Const. Co., 501F.3d825,828(7thCir.2007)(rejectingthetheoryofvicariousliabilityunderSection414fromCochran v. George Sollitt Const. Co., 358Ill.App.3d865(1stDist.2005)).

AnumberofdecisionsrenderedbyIllinoisAppellateCourtin2014clarifythismurkyissue,specificallyaddressinghowmuchcontrolmayresultinafindingof retained control underSection 414.

Construction Law | continued


Thosedecisionsarebrieflyhighlightedbelowas eachmay assist practitionersin assessing a client’s risk level andproviding advice regarding the potential impactofspecificcontractuallanguage.

cain v. contarino

According to the Illinois Appellate Court,SecondDistrict,inCain v. Con-tarino,acourtcanfindretainedcontroldespite clear contract language to thecontrary if the conduct of the partiesdemonstrates actual control. 2014 ILApp (2d) 130482, ¶ 86. However, ageneral contractor does not necessarily retain control over the manner in which workisdonebyrefusingthesubcontrac-tor’srequesttousespecificconstructionequipmenttocompleteaparticulartask.Id. ¶116-117.

In Cain, the plaintiffwas injuredwhile performing carpentrywork forhisemployerattheconstructionsiteofa single-family home.The plaintiff’semployer,HawkinsConstruction,wasdirecting hiswork at the site pursuantto an agreement with the project’s gen-eral contractor. Id. ¶40.Theagreementunambiguously gave the subcontractorcomplete control over the means and methodsofitswork.Id. ¶77.Italsomadethesubcontractorresponsibleforjobsitesafety.Id. Nonetheless,theplaintiffal-legedthatthegeneralcontractorshouldbe held liable for the subcontractor’snegligencepursuanttoSection414.Id. ¶48.Thegeneralcontractormovedforsummaryjudgmentonthegroundsthatitdidnot retainorexerciseanamountofcontroloverthesubcontractor’sworksufficientforadutytoariseunderSection414.Id. ¶10.Thecircuitcourtgrantedthemotion,enteringsummaryjudgmentin favor of the general contractor andagainsttheplaintiff.Id. ¶42.

Onappeal, theplaintiffargued thegeneral contractor retained control in the areasofworksafety,workmeans,andmethods. Id. ¶86.Astoworksafety,theplaintiff failed to identify any specificsafetymeasureimposedonthesubcon-tractor. Id ¶ 88.The court specificallyrejectedtheplaintiff’sreferencestothegeneral contractor’s apparent right to haltunsafeworkpractices,aswellasthegeneralcontractor’srequirementthatthesubcontractorutilizeallnecessarysafetyequipment, reasoning that “a generalrighttoenforcesafetydoesnotamountto retained control.” Id. ¶106.

Turning to the control over themeans andmethods of thework, thecourtaddressedtheplaintiff’scontentionthat the general contractor exhibitedcontrolovertheequipmentutilizedbyhiscompany. Id. ¶86.Theplaintifftestifiedthat hewas injuredwhile setting rooftrusses on a garagebyhand. Id. ¶33.Heclaimedthatcertainrisksassociatedwithtrussworkarealleviatedwhenthework is performedwith the assistanceofacrane.Id. Theplaintiff’semployerpurportedly requested a crane for useduring the trusswork, but the generalcontractordeniedthatrequest.Id. ¶33,113.Theplaintiffallegedthathewasnotfreetoperformhisworkinthemannerhewanteddue to thatdenial. Id. ¶49.Thecourtrejectedthisargument,findingthegeneralcontractorowednodutyofcareundertheretainedcontrolexceptionofSection414.Id. ¶118.Notably, thecourt rejected this argument as itwasunsupportedbyanyexperttestimony,oreventestimonybasedonindustrycustomand practice. Id. ¶¶116-117.

AfewpracticepointsmaybedrawnfromCain. First,theopinioncontainsex-tensivequotationstowhatcouldbecon-sidered“typical”Section414depositionquestioning,muchof it contextualized

withthefactualrecord.Contemporane-ously,thecourtprovidesaroadmapfora few arguments that could be usedto neutralize those standard lines ofquestioning.Next,thedecisionincludesabriefdiscussionofhowacontractualrequirementtocomplywithOSHAmaynot indicate sufficient retained controltoimposeaduty.Id. ¶85(“[E]venifthecontractimposednewregulatoryliabilityupon [the subcontractor], any controlwouldstemfrom OSHA,notfrom[thegeneralcontractor].”);see also Calderon v. Residential Homes of Am., Inc., 381Ill.App. 3d 333, 343 (1stDist. 2008)(findingOSHAregulationsdonotcreatea duty of care). Finally, practitionersmaytakenoteofthecourt’sfindingthatthe general contractor’s single instance of control overwindow levelingwasinsufficient to impose a duty of carewith regard to the setting of buildingtrusses. Id. ¶¶ 107-108.The practicepointtobedrawnisthatevidenceofasingleinstanceofcontrolunrelated to the activity in which the plaintiff was injured isinsufficienttoimposeadutyofcare.

Fonseca v. clark

Aprimecontractor,otherwiseknownasageneralcontractor,willnotbefoundliable for the acts of a subcontractorwhere the subcontractor contractuallyagreestoberesponsibleforjobsitesafetyand the prime contractor neither engages inanactiveroleofensuringsafety,norretains control over the incidental aspects of the independent contractor’swork.Fonseca v. Clark Const. Group. LLC, 2014ILApp(1st)130308.

In Fonseca, the plaintiffwas em-ployedasadrywallcontractorworkingatabuildingindowntownChicago.Id. ¶3.Thebuildingownerhiredageneralcontractor to oversee the construction



of the new building, and in turn, thegeneral contractor hired the plaintiff’semployertoworkasadrywallcontractor.Id. The general contractor had also hired an electrical contractor to perform theelectricalworkforthebuilding.Id. ¶7.Whileintheprocessofmovingaheavypieceofdrywall,theplaintifftrippedonelectrical debris thatwas on thefloorofthehallway,whichcausedtheheavypieceofdrywalltofallonhim,causingmultipleinjuries.Id. ¶¶11-12.

Theplaintifffiledanegligencesuitagainst the general contractor and the electrical contractor, alleging the electri-cal contractor failed to remove debrisfromtheareawherehewasworking,andthegeneralcontractorfailedtoproperlysupervisetheworkontheconstructionsite. Id. ¶ 13.The general contractormovedforsummaryjudgment,arguingthatithadnotretainedsufficientcontroltotriggeradutyunderSection414.Id. ¶18.The trial court granted summaryjudgmentinfavorofthegeneralcontrac-torandtheplaintiffappealed.Id.

In affirming summary judgmentin favor of the general contractor, theFonseca court recognized the issue ofwhether the general contractor owed a duty under Section 414 turned onwhether it had sufficient control overtheworkoftheelectricalsubcontractor.Specifically, theFonseca Court reliedheavilyonthegeneralcontractor’ssub-contractwiththeelectricalsubcontractor,which included statements that theelectricalcontractorassumedtheentireresponsibility for thework, including the responsibilities which the general contractor had assumed to the owner, and theelectricalcontractorwasresponsibleforcleaningandremovingdebrisfromitsworkarea.Id. ¶29.

The Fonseca court discounted theportionsofthegeneralcontractwiththe

ownerthatobligatedthegeneralcontrac-tortocontroltheworkofsubcontractors,finding that these responsibilitieswerepassed down to the electrical contractor. Id. Moreover, the general contractor had notactuallyexercised anycontractuallyretained right to control.As such, theFonseca court found that the generalcontractor “did not retain control over [the subcontractor].” Id. (emphasis inoriginal). TheFonseca court furtherfound that even though the generalcontractor had a safetymanager, heldweeklysafetymeetings,andimposedasafetymanualonthesubcontractor,thosefactorswereinsufficienttotriggeradutyunderSection414.Id. ¶¶30-31.Inshort,pursuanttotheFonseca decision, a prime contractormayrelyonasubcontractto“pass-down”responsibilityforsafety—and ultimately, any legal duties underRestatement(Second)ofTorts,Section414—tosubcontractors.

lee v. six Flags theme Parks, inc.

Toadequatelyassesswhetheradutyarises underSection 414, practitionersmustconsidercontractualcontrol,super-visory control, and operational control. Lee v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc.,2014ILApp (1st) 130771. InLee, a heavy equipmentmechanic fell to his deathwhileworkingtodismantlethe“SplashWaterFalls”ridebydisconnectingandremovingstructuralsteel.Id. ¶¶3-4.Hisestatefiledanumberofclaimsagainstthepropertyowner,SixFlags,includingaclaimforconstructionnegligence.Id. ¶5. In that claim, theplaintiff allegedSixFlagsretainedsufficientcontroloverthework of its general contractor, themechanic’semployer, tobeheld liableforthatcontractor’snegligencepursuantto Section 414. Id. The circuit courtgrantedsummaryjudgmentagainstthe

plaintiffon thatclaimand theplaintiffappealed. Id. ¶¶63,73.

Upon review, the appellate courtnoted, “[t]hebest indicatorofwhetheran employer has retained control over theindependentcontractor’sworkistheparties’contract,ifoneexists.”Id. ¶74.PursuanttotheagreementexecutedbySixFlagsandthecontractor,SixFlagsdid not retain contractual control overthegeneralcontractor’swork.Id. ¶76.Thecontractorwasexplicitlyidentifiedas the sole entity responsible for andwithcontrolover“constructionmeans,methods, techniques, sequences andprocedures,”aswellasforcoordinatingtheworkperformed.Id. ¶8.Theagree-mentalsoincorporatedsafetyguidelinespromulgatedbySixFlags,whichstatedthecontractorwasresponsibleforsafetyandsafetytraining,aswellasforensur-ingcompliancewithallapplicablelawsand OSHA requirements, includingthose in effect for proper barricadingandwarning of holes. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.Theguidelines further required contractorsworking above six feet to provide fallprotectionequipmenttotheiremployeesandenforcetheuseofthatfallprotectionequipment.Id. ¶10.

ThecourtheldtheSixFlagssafetyguidelines insufficient to be indicia ofretained control. Id. ¶ 78.The courtreasonedthatrequiringcompliancewithOSHAregulationsdoesnot create anyduty of care, nor is the existenceof asafetymanual,planordirectoranalogoustoretainingcontrolabsentevidencethatthose things affected the contractor’smeans andmethods of completing itswork. Id. ¶ 77. In contrast to such afinding,theSixFlagssafetyguidelinesdidnotcontainanythingdifferentfromthecontractor’sownsafetyguidelines.Id. ¶¶81-82.


Construction Law | continued

Thecourt’sinquirydidnotendwiththe contract, as retained control may also beexhibitedthroughsupervisoryand/oroperational control. Id. ¶74.Supervisorycontrol is exhibited through pervasivemonitoringofthemannerinwhichtheworkisbeingdone.Id.¶89.Inthiscase,SixFlagspersonnelvisitedtheworksitetwotothreetimesperweek,butlimitedits interactionsduringvisits to assess-ingtheamountofworkcompleted.Id. ¶¶92-94.Frequentjobsitevisitsarenotenough to rise to the level of retainedcontrolwherethepurposeofthedrop-inismerelytocheckontheprogressofagiven project. Id.¶89.Assuch,thecourtfound the plaintiff failed to establishretainedsupervisorycontrol.Id.

Similarly, the plaintiff failed todemonstrate thecontractorwasunableto perform thework in its ownway,suchthatafindingofoperationalcontrolcouldbesupported.Id. ¶97.Afindingofoperationalcontrolmaybeappropriatewhere supplies and directions weregiven to the contractor. Id. ¶ 96.Thecourt found no such evidence in therecord, noting the decedent only received instructionsfromhisemployerandthecontractorsuppliedsafetyharnessestoits employees. Id. ¶¶96-97.Ofinterest,thecourtwasnotswayedbytestimonyfromthesafetymanager forSixFlagsindicating that fall protection equip-ment,includingharnesses,lanyardsandretractable equipment,was providedtomaintenancepersonnelbySixFlagsGreat America. Id. ¶19.

NoteworthyfromLee isitsoutrightrejectionoftheSeventhCircuit’sinter-pretationofSection414.Id.¶84,n.7.The Lee Courtmadeitapointtostatethat the Seventh Circuit decision inAguirre v. Turner Const. Co., 501F.3d

825,828(7thCir.2007) and the district courtdecisionofO’Neill v. Ford Motor Co., 2009U.S.Dist. LEXIS 115107(N.D.Ill.Dec.9,2009)wereatoddswiththeIllinoisAppellateCourt’srecognitionofvicariousversusdirectliabilityunderSection414.Id. ¶84,n.7.Practitionersmay also note that the Lee courtrecastBokodiv.FosterWheelerRobbins,Inc.,312Ill.App.3d1051(1stDist.2000) and Wilkersonv.PaulH.Schwendener,Inc., 379 Ill.App. 3d 491 (1stDist.2008) as “Direct Liability” cases,althoughneitherofthosecasesexplicitlyrecognizedaspecificdistinctionbetweendirect and vicarious liability. Further,the Lee courtechoedthesentimentsofCochran in rejecting the older Section 414 cases ofPasko v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 14Ill.App.3d481(1stDist.1973)andWeberv.NorthernIllinoisGasCo., 10Ill.App.3d625(1stDist.1973).ThesupercesionofBokodi,Wilkerson,Pasko, and Webermaybetemperedbythewell-establishedprinciple that “[a]panel,division,ordistrictoftheappel-late court hasno authority tooverruleanother panel, division, or district.” In re Marriage of Gutman, 232Ill.2d145,149(2008).

ramirez v. Fcl Builders, inc.

Ramirez v. FCL Builders, Inc., 2014ILApp(1st)123663isparticularlyim-portanttopractitionersnotonlybecauseitaddstothenumerousinterpretationsofthelevelofcontrolanalysis,butalsobecause of its impact on related juryinstructions. InRamirez, the plaintiffwasinjuredwhileemployedasarooferfor a subcontractor, SullivanRoofing.Id. at ¶ 1.He subsequently asserted aclaim against the general contractor,

FCLBuilders,fornegligencepursuanttoSection414oftheRestatement(Second)ofTorts. Id. at ¶ 4. In support of thatclaim,theplaintiffarguedFCLBuildersretainedcontrolovertheworkbySul-livanRoofing.Id. at¶5.Attrial,IllinoisPatternJuryInstructionNo.55.01wassubmitted to the jury at the plaintiff’srequestandoverFCLBuilders’objec-tion. Id. at¶165.Theinstruction,entitled“ConstructionNegligence—WorkEn-trustedToAnother”states:

A[n] [owner] [contractor] [other]who entrustswork toa [subcontractor] [contractor][other]canbeliableforinjuriesresulting from thework if the[owner] [contractor] [other] retained some control over the safetyoftheworkandtheinju-rieswere proximately causedbythe[owner’s][contractor’s][other’s]failuretoexercisethatcontrol with ordinary care.

IPICivil(2011)No.55.01.The Ramirez CourtheldthatIllinois

PatternJuryInstructionNo.55.01doesnotaccuratelystatethelawofconstruc-tionnegligencebecauseitfailstoexplainthatameregeneralrighttocontrolsafetyisnotsufficientforafindingof“retainedcontrol” according to comment (c) toSection 414 and recent interpretingcase law. Id.¶165.Instead,toimposeliabilityunderSection414thedefendantmust havemore than “some control”over the subcontractor’s work. Id. ¶168.Ultimately,theCourtfoundFCLBuilderswasnotentitledtoanewtrialdespitethesubmissionoftheimproperjuryinstruction,reasoningtheinstructiondidnotseverelyprejudiceFCLBuilders’



righttoafairtrial.Id. ¶196.Nonetheless,thedecisionmaybeusedbypractitionersinthefuturetoguardagainstthisfaultyjuryinstruction.

Additional Unpublished Decisions

In addition to the foregoing pub-lished opinions, three unpublisheddecisionsinterpretingSection414wererenderedbytheFirstDistrictAppellateCourtthisyear:Escareno v. Terra Cotta Commons Condos. Ass’n, 2014ILApp(1st) 120682-U,Torres v. Gutmann Leather LLC,2014ILApp.(1st)122460-U, and Lynne v. Duke Realty Ltd. P’ship, 2014ILApp(1st)123659-U.Althoughpractitionersmaybenefitfromareviewoftheholdingssetforthwithineachofthese decisions, they are not bindingauthority.

Conclusion

Cain, Ramirez, Fonseca, and Lee are useful decisions for contractorsdefendingconstructionnegligencecases.These recent decisions demonstrate the evolving state ofSection 414 liabilityinIllinoisthatrecognizesdirectversusvicarious liability,which continues tomove further away from the SeventhCircuit’s interpretationofSection414.Nevertheless,adutyanalysisunderSec-tion414stillrequiresintensivefactualanalysis,andanybright-lineruleas totheamountofcontrolrequiredtotriggeradutyappearstoremainelusive.

M. Elizabeth Dyer KellettHeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville

Supreme Court Watch

About the AuthorM. Elizabeth Dyer Kellett is an associate at Hepler-Broom LLC. Ms. Kellett is a litigation attorney with a primary emphasis in the defense of complex, multi-party civil cases and class actions, involving all aspects of consumer fraud,

personal injury, product liability, and construc-tion. Ms. Kellett also regularly handles appeals and consults with others in the firm on appel-late issues. Prior to joining HeplerBroom, Ms. Kellett practiced law in Washington, D.C. and represented institutions of higher learning in ad-ministrative hearings and proceedings before the U.S. Department of Education. She also repre-sented insurance and financial corporations and individuals in proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission, civil and criminal litigation, and in matters of corporate governance and compliance. Ms. Kellett earned her B.A. from Georgetown University in Washington D.C. in 2002 and her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center in 2006.

Theplaintiffsarethreeformerem-ployeesofthedefendant,anagriculturalcorporation.Theplaintiffsallegethattheywerewrongfullyterminatedbythedefen-dantbecausetheyprovidedinformationaboutunderweightseedbagstoaformercoworker,whoreportedthebagstotheIllinoisBureauofWeightsandMeasures.The defendant claims that one of theplaintiffswasterminatedforalegitimate,non-retaliatory reason—horseplaywithaforkliftinviolationofwell-establishedcompany policy—and the other twoplaintiffs were terminated due to acompany-widereductioninforce.

Thecircuitcourtgrantedthedefen-dant’smotion for summary judgment,finding that,while theplaintiffs estab-lishedarebuttablepresumptionthatthedefendants had unlawfully dischargedthem,thedefendantarticulatedlegitimatereasonsfordischargingtheplaintiffs.

TheplaintiffsappealedtotheIllinoisAppellateCourt,FifthDistrict.TheFifthDistrict reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in enteringjudgment for defendant after applyingincorrectelementsapplicabletotheclaimofretaliatorydischarge.Michael, et al. v. Precision Alliance Group, LLC,2014ILApp(5d)120517-U.

When an Employer Is Sued forRetaliatory Discharge and Advancesa Legitimate Reason for Termination,

Must the Employer also Prove itsDefense to Avoid Summary Judgment?

Michael et al., v. Precision Alliance Group, llc,No. 117376, 4th Dist. No. 4-12-0691

Reviewing the case under thede novo standard, theFifthDistrict foundthatthecircuitcourtcorrectlyarticulatedtheelementstosustainacauseofactionfor retaliatory discharge.Namely, theplaintiffs must prove that: (1) theyengaged in a protected activity; (2)the defendant committed adverse acts


Supreme Court Watch | continued

against the plaintiffs; and (3) a causalnexus existed between the plaintiffs’protected activities and the adverse actiontakenbythedefendant.Id.¶13.However,oncethedefendantarticulatedlegitimate nondiscriminatory reasons fordischargingtheplaintiffs,thecircuitcourterroneouslyincreasedtheplaintiffs’burden by requiring the plaintiffs toprovethatthereasonsthedefendantgavefor discharging the plaintiffswere, infact,pretextsfordischarge.Id.Therefore,thecircuitcourtdidnotapply thecor-rect legal test to the evidence.Finally,becausethecircuitcourtfoundacausalnexusbetweentheplaintiffs’dischargesand their protected activities, theFifthDistrictfoundthattheplaintiffsprovedtheir retaliatory discharge claims and remanded only the issue of plaintiffs’damages. Id.

The defendant seeks review inthe Illinois SupremeCourt. First, the

defendantarguesthat theFifthDistrictignored the Illinois SupremeCourt’srulinginClemons v. Mechanical Devices Co.,184Ill.2d328(1998).Accordingtothedefendant,Clemons establishedthatthe tort of retaliatorydischarge shouldbereviewedusingtraditionaltortanaly-sis,which places the burden to provecausationentirelyontheplaintiff,evenwhere the defendant offers a defenseto negate the causation element. Id. at 338-39.Therefore, the plaintiffswererequiredtodemonstratethatthedefen-dantdischargedthemfortheirprotectedactivityandnotforthelegitimatereasonsadvancedbythedefendant.Byrequiringthedefendanttoproveitsnon-retaliatoryreasons for discharging the plaintiffs,theFifthDistrictimproperlytransferredtheburdenofproofoncausationtothedefendant.

Thedefendantalsoargues that theFifthDistrict erred in failing to defer

Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272, Does the 30-Day Clock Start to Run When a Court Issues an Oral Ruling or

When that Oral Ruling is “Entered of Record”?Williams v. BNsF railway company, et. al, No. 117444, 1st Dist. No. 12-1901

to the circuit court’s findings of factandfailingtoconsider thedefendant’sevidenceofalegitimate,non-retaliatoryreasonfortheterminations.Thedefen-dantexplainsthat,contrarytotheFifthDistrict’s conclusion, the circuit courtonly made a preliminary determination that the plaintiffs had set forth some evidence that couldsupportafindingofretaliatorydischarge.Thecircuit courtdid not find causation as amatter oflaworfact.Moreover,thecircuitcourtultimately found that the defendanthad valid, non-pretextual reasons fordischarging two of the plaintiffs, andthat the other plaintiff failed tomeethisburden.TheFifthDistrict,however,improperly rejected this finding andfailed to give any consideration, letalone, deference to the circuit court’sfindingoffact.

The plaintiff filed suit against thedefendant railroad company pursuanttotheFederalEmployers’LiabilityActfor an employment-related injury.Thedefendantfileda third-partycomplaintforcontributionandcontractualindemni-ficationagainstthethird-partydefendantterminal services company.The juryreturnedaverdictinfavoroftheplaintiffand assessed the negligence of eachparty. Williamsv. BNSF Railway Co., et. al,2013IllApp(1st)121901¶1.Thejuryalsoreturnedaverdictinfavorofthe

third-partydefendantonthedefendant’scontractualindemnityclaim.Id.

OnApril18,2012,thecircuitcourtissuedanoral,notwritten,rulingdenyingall post-trial motions. Id.¶6.Theonlyremainingissuewasthedefendant’sre-questforasetoffagainstthejudgmentintheamountoftaxesitwouldhavetopayinthefutureonlostwagesawardedbythejury.OnMay31,2012,thedefendantfiledanemergencymotionforleavetocitesupplementalauthorityconcerningoneoftheissuesthatwasdeniedonApril18

—whether the defendantwas entitledto a remittitur. Id. ¶ 10.The circuitcourtnotedthattheremittiturissuehadalready been denied but allowed thedefendant’s supplemental citation andheardadditionalargumentsonthesetoffand remittitur issues on June 1, 2012.The trial court did not enter awrittenorderrelatedtotheJune1,2012hearing.

OnJune6,2012, thecircuit courtheardadditionalargumentsonthesetoffandremitterissues.Attheconclusionofthehearing, thecircuitcourtentereda


written order in the Law Record, which deniedthedefendant’spost-trialmotionfor setoff and remittitur.Thewrittenorderstatedthatitwas“finalandappeal-able.”Id.¶16.

The defendant filed its noticeof appealwith the IllinoisAppellateCourt, First District, on June 29,2012.TheFirstDistrictdismissedtheappeal, holding that because the de-fendantdidnotfileanoticeofappealwithin30daysofthetrialcourt’sApril18denialofallpost-trialmotions,thecourt lacked jurisdiction to hear theappeal. Id.¶28.

The First District held that thedefendant’srequestforasetoffdidnottollthetimeforfilinganoticeofappealofthecircuitcourt’sApril18rulingde-nyingthedefendant’spost-trialmotions.Williams,2013IllApp(1st)121901¶20.Because “a request for setoff seeks tosatisfy,notmodify,thejudgmententeredby the trial court” andbecause sucharequestcouldbepursuedmorethan30daysafterthedenialofthedefendant’spost-trialmotion seeking to vacate ormodifythejudgment,“thependencyof[thedefendant’s]setoffrequestcouldnotpostpone[thedefendant’s]obligationtotimelyappealfromthedenialofitspost-trial motion.” Id.¶21-22.Therefore,theFirstDistrict held that the defendant’sJune29appealwasuntimely.

TheFirstDistrictalsoheldthatthetrial court erredwhen it reconsidereditsApril 18 ruling on remittitur. Id. ¶24.Thedefendant’semergencymotionregarding remittiturwasfiled onMay31,2012—over30daysafterthedenialofthedefendant’spost-trialmotion.Id. “Becausethe30dayshadalreadyrun,the trial court could not revest itselfwithjurisdictionbystatingattheJune1, 2012 hearing on [the defendant’s]motionthat itwasappropriatefor[the

defendant]tobringnewcaselawtothecourt’sattention.”Id.

Finally, theFirstDistrictheld that“thefactthatthetrialcourtdidnotissuea written order denying the post-trial motions[did]notmaketheoralrulingofApril18anylessfinal.”Id.¶25.TheFirstDistrictnotedthatIllinoisSupremeCourtRule272,whichprovidesthatajudgment is not final until the signedjudgmentisfiled,“furtherprovidesthatifnosuchsignedjudgmentistobefiled,thejudgmentisenteredatthetimeitisenteredof record.” Id. While the June6orderwas thefirst signed judgment,itwaslimitedto theremittitur issue—which, according to theFirstDistrict,wasnolongerproperlybeforethecircuitcourt—and the setoff issue.This fact,andthefactthatthecircuitcourtneverrequiredthepartiestosubmitanorderregardingthedenialofthedefendant’spost-trialmotion, led theFirstDistricttoholdthattheoralrulingdenyingthedefendant’spost-trialmotionswas“finalonApril18,2012,thedateitwasenteredinto the record.” Id.¶27.

According to thedefendant’speti-tionforleavetoappeal,itarguesthattheFirstDistrictmisreadIllinoisSupremeCourtRule 272 and Illinois case lawgoverningthefinalityofjudgmentsandorders.Rule 272 requires that an oralruling be “entered of record” in ordertobefinalandenforceable.PursuanttoSwisher v. Duffy,117Ill.2d376(1987),

ajudgmentis“enteredofrecord”whenanotationofthecourt’spronouncementismade by the clerk.The defendantcontends thatbecause thecircuitcourtclerkfailedtomakeanynotationofthecourt’sApril18oralruling,thatrulingwasnotfinalorappealable.Inholdingthat theApril18oral rulingwasfinal,thedefendantargues, theFirstDistrictrenderedtheeffectivedateofjudgments,and the standards under Rule 272,uncertain.

The defendant further avers thatthe circuit court’sApril 18oral rulingdisposingofpost-trialmotionswasnot“entered of record” until June 6—thedate onwhich the clerk entered theruling in theLawRecord.While theFirstDistrictdidnotallowthedefendantto includeacertifiedcopyof theLawRecord to be included in the recordon appeal, neither the plaintiffs northe third-party defendant disputed theaccuracy of the document.Moreover,according to the defendant, the FirstDistrictcannotignoretheofficialrecordof circuit court proceedings and theJune6LawRecordentrydisposingofthepost-trialmotions.Therefore,underRule272,thecircuitcourt’sApril18oralrulingwasnoteffectiveuntilJune6andthedefendant’sJune29noticeofappealwas timely.

According to the defendant’s petition for leave to

appeal, it argues that the First District misread

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272 and Illinois case law

governing the finality of judgments and orders.


Scott L. HowiePretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago

Appellate Practice Corner

About the Author

Scott L. Howie is a part-ner at Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, in Chicago, specializing in posttrial and appellate practice in the state and federal courts. He received his undergraduate degree from Northwestern Uni-

versity in 1989 and his law degree from Chicago-Kent College of Law in 1994. Mr. Howie is a member and past director of the Illinois Appellate Lawyers Association, where he co-chairs the Moot Court Committee.

HowmanydistrictsdoestheAppel-lateCourtofIllinoishave?Trickques-tion;differentsourcessuggestdifferentanswers, and the answer may depend onwhythequestionisbeingasked.Thepotentialconfusionreflectsanambiguityabout the appellate court’s organiza-tionalstructure,andsuggestsaconflictbetween the IllinoisConstitution andtheSupremeCourtRulesindescribingthat structure. Practicing attorneys arelikely tofind thesenuances somewhatless gripping than legal scholars and political scientists.But practicing lawinthestateofIllinoissometimesraisesotherquestionswithmoreobviousrel-evance.Whatistheeffect,forinstance,ofaFirstDistrictdecisiononacircuitcourtthatsitswithintheSecond?WhatiftheThirdDistricthasissuedadecisionthat conflictswith theFirst’s?Does itmatteriftheSecondDistricthasissuedadecisionofitsown?

Any attorney conducting legalresearch in Illinois needs to know theanswers to questions like these, espe-ciallywhenputtingthatresearchtousein arguments before the circuit courts.Answering such questions requires anunderstandingoftherelationshipamongthefivedistrictsandthevariousjusticeswhositineachofthem.

The Illinois Constitution

Under the Illinois Constitutionof 1970, Illinois has a single, unitary

Divided Against Itself:Conflictswithinthe

Illinois Appellate Court

appellatecourt; thestate itself,not thecourt,isdividedintofivedistricts.ArticleVI,section1,providesforthefamiliarthree-tieredstructureofthestatejudicialsystem: “The judicial power is vestedinaSupremeCourt,anAppellateCourtandCircuitCourts.”Ill.Const.Art.VI,§1.Thepurposeofthefive-waypoliticalsubdivisionisunrelatedtotheappellatecourt’s jurisdictionor authority, and isintended for the purpose of selectingjudges to sit on the reviewing courts:“TheState isdividedintofiveJudicialDistricts for the selection of SupremeandAppellateCourtJudges.”Ill.Const.Art.VI,§2.

ItisnotbyaccidentthattheCon-stitution identifies the appellate courtinthesingular.The1870Constitutionoriginally provided formultiple “in-ferior appellate courts,” one for eachdistrict.Ill.Const.1870,Art.VI,§11.Decisionsofeachappellatecourtwerebindingonlyonthetrialcourtswithinthe districtwhere that court sat. SeePeople v. Layhew,139Ill.2d476,489-90(1990)(citingTaylorMattis&Ken-nethG.Yalowitz,Stare Decisis Among [sic] the Appellate Court of Illinois,28DePaulL.Rev.571(1979)).The1870Constitutionwas amended in 1964 tocreate a single appellate court, and todividethestateintofivejudicialdistrictsforthepurposeofselectingjudgesforthereviewingcourts.Ill.Const.1870,Art.VI,§§1,2(amended1964). That structurewasadoptedwithout change

whenthe1970Constitutionwasenacted,andremains ineffect today. Ill.Const.Art.VI,§§1,2.

Why Does the State’s OneAppellate Court Look Like Five?

Inpractice,theideaoftheappellatecourt as a single unified entity seemsmore often honored in the breach.Though it hasbeen50years since theformerConstitutionwas amended tocreateasingleappellatecourt,itmustbesaidthattheappellatecourtdoesnotlook like a unitary body.The justices havelittleofficialinteractionwiththosefromotherdistricts;asignificantexceptionistheWorkers’CompensationCommissiondivision,which is composed of fivejustices, one from each district. Theunderstanding of the court as a singlebody is also in apparent conflictwithits seeming resemblance to the federalsystem, inwhich each circuit’sCourtofAppeals is an autonomous bodywithnojurisdictionoverthetrial-levelcourts in other circuits.See Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 95 (1997) (Harrison, J.,speciallyconcurring).



Indeed, the language commonlyusedtoidentifytheappellatecourtmir-rorswhatisusedtoidentifythefederalappeals courts. Inmuch the samewaythat“SeventhCircuit”isacommonplacereferencetotheU.S.CourtofAppealsforthecircuitthatincludesIllinois,Indiana,andWisconsin,“FirstDistrict”isequallyubiquitousascollectiveshorthandfortheappellatecourtjusticeswhoareselectedfromandsitinthatpartofthestate.Su-premeCourtRule22,whichprovidesfortheorganizationof theappellatecourt,employsthesameshorthand,usingthenumerical designations of the districtstoidentifythejudicialdivisionsthataretositineachoftheappellatecourt’sfivephysical locations: “TheFirstDistrictshallsitinthecityofChicago,”andsoon. Ill. S. Ct.R. 22(a)(1). Likewise,in referring to “[e]ach districtof the Appellate Court,” the rule’s languageclasheswiththeConstitutionalprovisionthat it is the state—not the appellatecourt—thatisdividedintodistricts.Id. (emphasis added). “TheConstitutiondoesnotprovideforanappellatecourtofthejudicialdistrict.”Yellow Cab Co. v. Jones,108Ill.2d330,335(1985).

Itishardlyfairtoblamethesupremecourtforthismisunderstanding.Clearly,itisusefultohavethissortofshorthandavailable. But the ubiquity of suchshorthand,especiallygivenitsusefulnessin discussing the respective divisionsof the appellate court,makes it all themore important to bemindful of theConstitutionalidealthatthosedivisionsarepartofaunifiedwhole.

While Some Cases Treat theDistricts Strictly as Equals …

Consistentwiththisunderstanding,thesupremecourtgenerally resists thenotion that the decisions of a circuit

court’s “home district” should carryanyspecialweightorbemorebindingonacircuitcourtthanthosefromotherdistricts.Inonesuchcase,itaddressedwhether a circuit court in one districtmight be bound by an appellate courtdecision from another district, andheld that it could—even though theappellatecourtsittinginthatdistricthaddecidedthecontrollingissuedifferently.People v. Granados,172Ill.2d358,371(1996).Granados concerned a criminal defendant’s challenge to his sentence,which had been extended pursuant tostatutesthatenhancedhisoffensesfrommisdemeanors to felonies due to hisprior convictions. Granados,175Ill.2dat363–64(citing625ILCS5/11-501(d)(1)(1992),625ILCS5/6-303(d)(1992),and730ILCS5/5-5-3.2(b)(1)(1992)).Atthetimeofhisoffenses,whichtookplacewithin the Third District, the appellate courtsittinginthatdistricthadheldthatthe extended-term sentencing provision didnotapplytosuchcircumstances.Id. at366(citingPeople v. Spearman,108Ill.App.3d237(3dDist.1982)).Intwoother districts, however, the appellate courthadrejectedthatviewandheldthattheprovisionwasapplicable.Id.at369(citingPeople v. Crosby,204Ill.App.3d548(1stDist.1990),andPeople v. Roby, 172Ill.App.3d1060(4thDist.1988)).The supreme court had since resolvedthatconflict,holdingthatthesentencingprovisionappliedtosuchcircumstances.

Id. at 364–65 (citingPeople v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d218 (1995)).ButGranados concernedwhetheritwasconstitutionalto apply the extended-sentencing provi-siontothedefendant,whoclaimedthatatthetimeofhisoffenses,itwasreasonableto believe that hewould be sentencedaccording to the Third District’s view that the provision did not apply. Id.at366–67.

Thesupremecourtrejectedhisargu-ment,holdingthatitwasnotreasonablefor him to rely on theThirdDistrict’sview. Id. at 371. It didnotmatter thatthe case law was settled and consistent within theThirdDistrict; “[t]here isonly one IllinoisAppellate Court,”the supreme court observed, “and thatcourt’spronouncementson thepresentissuewereunsettledat the timeof thedefendant’scrimes.”Id.(citingLayhew, 139Ill.2dat489).Therewasnogreatersignificance to thedecisions thatcamefromtheThirdDistrict,eventhoughthatwaswherethedefendant’soffensesoc-curredandinwhichsatthecircuitcourtwherehewastried.Implicitlyrecogniz-ingthatthedecisionsfromotherdistrictswereequallybindingeventhoughtheywereinconflict,thesupremecourtheldthat the other districts’ holdings gave the defendant “fairwarning” that thesentencingprovisioncouldapplytohim,and that therewas “no constitutionalprohibition”againstsuchanapplication.Id.at370.

There was no greater significance to the decisions

that came from the Third District, even though that

was where the defendant’s offenses occurred and in

which sat the circuit court where he was tried.


Appellate Practice Corner | continued

Echoingtheideathatdecisionsfromaparticulardistricthavenoheightenedsignificancetothecircuitcourtsinthatdistrict,thesupremecourtcriticizedtheFifthDistrict forattempting toassumesuch a role. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d at489–90.Layhew concerned a criminal defendant’sargumentthatthetrialcourthaderredinnotformallyinstructingthejury as to theburdenof proof and thepresumption of innocence, though thedefendanthadnotrequestedsuchinstruc-tions. Id.at485.Initsdecisionreversingthedefendant’sconviction,theappellatecourthadissuedawide-ranging“direc-tive” to the circuit courts in the FifthDistrict, requiring them to give juriesthoseinstructions“inallcriminalcases,formally,inwriting,andatthecloseofthecase,whethertenderedorrequested.”Id. at 489;People v. Layhew, 191 Ill.App.3d592,595(5thDist.1989).

In reinstating the defendant’s con-viction, the supreme court sharplycriticized the appellate court for thatdirective and rejected the notion that theappellatecourtfortheFifthDistricthadanyspecialauthorityoverthetrialcourtsinthatdistrict:“Wemustremindthatcourtthatthereisbutoneappellatecourtwithin the State of Illinois, andthatapaneloftheappellatecourtdoesnothaveconstitutionalauthoritytoissue‘directives’ to lower courtswithin itsdistrict.” Layhew,139Ill.2dat489.

… Others Treat the Home Districtas First Among Equals

Despite promoting the under-standing that the appellate court is asingle unitary court, rather than fiveautonomous courts, the supreme courthas nonetheless acknowledged that inthe face of a direct conflict betweenthe decisions from different districts,

the circuit court’s home district isfirst among equals. Recognizing thatdisparate decisions sometimes emanate fromthedifferentjudicialdistricts,thesupremecourthassetforthrulesforthecircuitcourtsinmanaginglegalconflicts. “[W]hen conflicts arise amongst thedistricts,thecircuitcourtisboundbythedecisionsoftheappellatecourtofthedis-trict in which it sits.” Aleckson,176Ill.2dat91(citingState Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Yapejian,152Ill.2d533,539–40(1992)).Whenthedistrictsareinconflictandthereisnocontrollingauthorityfromthedistrictinwhichitsits,acircuitcourtis“freetochoosebetweenthedecisionsof theotherappellatedistricts”—but itis still required to followoneof them.Yapejian,152Ill.2dat540.

In Yapejian, the supreme courtcriticizedthecircuitcourtforfailingtofollowtheprecedentsetforthbyseveraldecisionsoftheappellatecourt.Despiteappellate court decisions holding thatsection143a(1)oftheIllinoisInsuranceCode did not require arbitration ofdisputes relating touninsuredmotoristcoverage,boththecircuitcourtandtheappellate court had declined to followthese authorities—presumablybecausenone of them came from the SecondDistrict, which had not addressed the issue.Thecircuitcourtconcludedthatthestatuteunambiguouslyrequiredarbitra-tion, and the appellate court affirmed.Id.at539.

Thesupremecourtreversed.Whileitacknowledgedthattheappellatecourtwasnotboundbyappellatecourtdeci-sionsfromanydistrict,itcriticizedthecircuit court for failing to follow suchdecisions. Id.at539–40.Notingthatthelawhadnotbeeninconflict,thesupremecourtdrewadistinctiontoahypotheticalinstance“inwhichthecircuitcourtwasfacedwith conflicting decisions from

the various appellate districts” but nocontrolling authority from its “homedistrict”—acircumstance inwhich thecircuit court “wouldhavebeen free tochoose between the decisions of theother appellate districts.” Id.at540.Butthatwasnotthecircumstanceinthecasebeforeit,wheretheauthorityfromotherdistrictswasconsistent.Eventhoughthecircuitcourt’shomedistricthadnotad-dressedthesubject,thecircuitcourtwasnonethelessboundbythedecisionsfromthe other districts and was not permitted todisregardbindingauthority.Id.

The supreme court reiterated thisprinciple in Aleckson, holding that a circuit court isboundby thedecisionsofitshomedistrictwhenthedecisionsofvariousdistrictsareinconflict.Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2dat92.At issue inAleckson waswhether itwas proper for the ap-pellate court to apply a prior decisionprospectively and not retroactively, an inquirythatrequiredthecourttoconsiderwhetherthedecision“establishedanewprincipleoflaw…byoverrulingclearpast precedent on which litigants have relied[.]” Id.(citingChevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404U.S.97,106 (1971)).TheAlecksoncourtfoundit“beyonddispute”thattheplaintiffshadrelieduponclearpast precedent, since the decision in questionhadbeencontrollingauthorityin the Second District, where the case wasbrought,formorethan20years.Id. Thedefendantshadarguedthattheplain-tiffswereunjustifiedinrelyingonthatdecision,becauseitreflectedaminorityviewthathadbeenexpresslyrejectedbythreeotherdistrictsoftheappellatecourt.Id.Butthesupremecourtrejectedthatargument,recognizingthateventhoughit was a minority view, it was the view heldbytheappellatecourtsittinginthedistrictwherethecasewasfiled.“[F]acedwithconflictingappellateauthority,”the


courtheld, itwasnotunreasonablefortheplaintiffs“torelyupontheauthorityfromtheirhomeappellatedistrict.”Id.

In a special concurrence, JusticeHarrisontookissuewiththenotionthatauthority from the plaintiffs’ “homejudicialdistrict”wasanymoreimportantthanauthorityfromelsewhereinthestate,orthatcircuitcourtshadanyreasontofollowdecisionsfromtheirowndistrictsinstead of those fromothers. “[W]hatcircuitcourtsshouldbedoing,”hewrote,“isfollowingthemostrecentappellatecourtdecisiononpoint.”Id.at95(Har-rison,J.,speciallyconcurring).Whilehisapproachdifferedfromthemajority’s,ittoowasbasedontheprinciplethattheauthorityof thestate’ssingleappellatecourt is unrelated to the five judicialdistrictsintowhichthestateisdivided:“Because there is only one appellatecourt,adecisionbyanydivisionofthatcourtisbindingprecedentonallcircuitcourts throughout the state, regardlessof locale.” Id. at 94-95 (citingPeople v. Harris,123Ill.2d113,128(1988)).Giventheseprinciples,JusticeHarrisonsawnoreasontoallowthecircuitcourt’slocation to dictate which decision the courtshould follow.Whilesucha rulemakessenseinthefederalsystem,withitsseveralautonomouscourtsofappeal,hefeltitunsuitedto“theunitarynatureoftheIllinoisappellatecourtandthereachofitsdecisions[.]”Id.at95.Indeed,hewrote that circuit courts should followthemost recent decision “even if thedecisionconflictswithapriordecisionofanappellatecourtdivisionlocatedwithinthecircuitcourt’sparticulardistrict.Thegeography is simply irrelevant.” Id.

The appellate court itself hasstruggledwith thequestionofwhetherdecisions fromacircuit court’s “homeappellate district” carry any greater weight. Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois,

329 Ill.App. 3d1020, 1029 (1stDist.2002).AtissueinSchmidt was whether the circuit court had been correct torecognizeacauseofactionforintrusionupon seclusion.While decisions fromtheSecond,Third, andFifthDistrictsrecognizedthetort,therewasonefromtheFourthDistrictthatdidnot.Schmidt, 329 Ill.App. 3d at 1028. Since thesupremecourthadnotyetresolvedthisconflictamongthedistricts,thedefendantmaintainedthatthecircuitcourtshouldhavefollowedthedecisionsoftheFirstDistrict—itshomedistrict—which, thedefendantclaimed,hadnot recognizedthe tort either. Id.at1027.

Acknowledgingthatsomesupremecourt decisions—such asAleckson—required the circuit court to followdecisions from itshomedistrict,whileothers—suchasGranados—gaveequalweighttodecisionsfromallfivedistricts,theappellatecourtfoundit“uncertain”whichprincipleshouldapply.Id.at1029.Itultimatelyfounditunnecessarytode-cide,concludingthatthedecisionsfromtheFirstDistricthadalreadyrecognizedthecauseofaction,“albeitobliquely,”atthetimeofthedefendant’sconduct.Id. at 1030.(Itwentontoreversethejudgmentagainstthedefendant,however,holdingthattheplaintiffshadfailedtoestablishtheelementsofthetort.Id.at1041.)

Conclusion

Schmidt identified an uncertaintythat is likely to arise again.While itshould be clear that circuit courts are

boundbyappellatecourtdecisionsfromanywhere in the state, that principle alone doesnothelpwhenthedecisionsfromdifferentdistrictsareinconflict,makingit impossible to follow onewithoutviolating another. In such a case, thecircuitcourtmustfollowthedecisionoftheappellatecourtfromitshomedistrict,ifthereissuchadecision,andifthereisnot,itmayfollowanyoftheconflictingdecisions.

JusticeHarrison’s recommendedalternative—follow themost recentdecision, regardless of district—is notthe law,but itmaybemost faithful toConstitutionalprinciples.Ifhisrecom-mendation is at oddswith the popularunderstandingoftheappellatecourtasbeing divided into different districts,it is consistent with the principle that the court is a unitary judicial bodywhose geographic connections do not matter to its jurisdiction or authority.Hisapproachwouldhavetheadvantageof providing certainty in those circuitcourtswhosedistrictshaveyettoweighinonarecognizedconflictbetweenotherdistricts.Thatcertaintywouldcomeatacost;hisapproachwouldalsodiminishthe certainty enjoyedby circuit courtsindistrictswheretheappellatecourthastakenaside.Butthatmaybeaminimalcost.Theveryexistenceoftheconflictraises the possibility that the supremecourtwillresolveit,presumablyreject-ingone sideof theconflict—anduntilthen, giving neither side’s proponents much certainty as towhich sidewillcarry the day.

“[W]hat circuit courts should be doing,” he wrote,

“is following the most recent appellate court decision

on point.” (Harrison, J., specially concurring).


In Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.severalemployeesof theUnitedStates SteelCorporation (U.S. Steel)brought an action seeking back payfromtheiremployerfortimetheyspentdonning and doffing certain items ofprotective gear. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,134S.Ct.870,874(2014).Theemployees alleged the protective gear, including protective gloves, boots,leggingsandarespirator,wasrequiredbyU.S.Steelduetohazardsassociatedwithworking at the steel plant. Id. at 874.TheUnited StatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofIndianaheldthat donning and doffing these itemsconstituted“changingclothes”andwastherefore non-compensable under theFairLaborStandardsActof1938(FLSAortheAct).Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2009U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96715, *35.TheSeventhCircuitCourt ofAppealsaffirmedthatruling. Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 678F.3d 590, 599(7thCir.2012).Uponreview,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtheldunanimouslythat the phrase “changing clothes,” as used in the FLSA,means the act ofputtingon“itemsthatarebothdesignedand used to cover the body, and arecommonlyregardedasarticlesofdress.”Id.at876-877.Thus,theU.S.SupremeCourt found that time spent donninganddoffingthegearatissueinSandifer wasnon-compensableundertheFLSA.Thiscolumnexaminesthebasisforthe

James L. Craney is a part-ner in the Madison County office of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, where his practice focuses upon general liability liti-gation. During his career, Mr. Craney has defended numerous employment dis-

crimination, wrongful termination, and civil rights violation suits, both in federal and state court. He earned his B.S. from the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana, and his M.S. from Southern Illinois University in Carbondale. He earned his J.D. from St. Louis University, where he also obtained the program’s Health Law Certificate. Mr. Craney is a member of the IDC Employment Law Committee, and is a regular speaker before bar association and industry groups.

James L. CraneyLewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Edwardsville

Employment Law

About the Author

U.S.SupremeCourtFurtherClarifiesthe “Changing Clothes” Standards

in the Fair Labor Standards Act

SupremeCourt’sdecisionandquestionswhateffectthisdecisionwillhaveonthedevelopmentofwageandhourlaw.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Portal-to-Portal Act

Enactedin1938,theFLSAgovernsminimumwages andmaximumhoursfor certain employees “engaged incommerceorintheproductionofgoodsfor commerce, or are employed in anenterprise engaged in commerce or in theproductionofgoodsforcommerce”inanyworkweek.Sandifer,134S.Ct.at 875 (quoting29U.S.C. § § 206(a),207(a)and213).WhiletheActdefines“employee”(“anyindividualemployedby an employer”) and “employ” (“tosufferorpermitwork”),theActdoesnotdefine“work”or“workweek.”Id. The absenceof these definitions ultimatelyled to a series of opinionswhere theSupremeCourtgavethesetermsbroadeffect, culminating inAnderson v. Mt. Clemons Pottery Co., 328U.S. 680(1946).

In Anderson, the SupremeCourtheld “the statutoryworkweek includesall time during which an employeeis necessarily required to be on theemployer’spremises,ondutyorat theprescribedworkplace.”Anderson, 328U.S. at 690-691.That period includestimespentpursuing“certainpreliminaryactivitiesafterarriving…suchasputting

on aprons and overalls [and] removing shirts.” Id., at 692-693.Following theAnderson opinion,organizedlaborseizedontheCourt’sexpansiveconstructionofcompensability byfilingwhat becameknown as “portal” actions,which is areference to the “portals” or entrancestomines,whereworkers put on theirgear.Congress responded by passingthePortal-to-PortalActof1947,statingthattheFLSAhadbeen“interpretedju-diciallyindisregardoflong-establishedcustoms,practicesandcontractsbetweenemployers and employees.” Sandifer, 134S.Ct.at875.

OneoftheeffectsofThePortal-to-PortalAct(PTPA)wastoexcludefrommandatorily compensable time any“activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to [the] principal activity oractivities,whichoccureitherpriortothe timeon anyparticularworkday atwhich such employee commences, orsubsequenttothetimeonanyparticularworkdayatwhichheceases,suchprin-cipal activity or activities.” Id. (citing29U.S.C.§254(a)(2)).Subsequently,aLaborDepartment interpretivebulletin



advisedthat,althoughchangingclotheswould be considered preliminary orpostliminaryactivitieswhenperformedoutside theworkday, that those sameactivitiesmay“incertaincircumstancesbe so directly related to the specificwork [of] the employee [that they]would be regarded as an integral partof theemployee’s ‘principalactivity.’”Sandifer, 134S.Ct. at 875 (citing 29C.F.R.§790.7(g),n.49).

Inresponsetothetensionbetweenthe PTPA and the LaborDepartmentbulletin,CongressamendedtheFLSAin1949.Theamendmentaddedtheprovi-sionatissueinSandifer,whichprovides:

HoursWorked. In determin-ing for the purpose of [theminimum-wageandmaximum-hourssections]ofthistitlethehours forwhich an employeeis employed, there shall beexcluded any time spent inchanging clothes or washing atthebeginningorendofeachworkdaywhichwas excludedfrommeasuredworking timeduringtheweekinvolvedbytheexpresstermsoforbycustomor practice under a bona fidecollective-bargainingagreementtotheparticularemployee.

29U.S.C.§203(o).Thus, under section 203(o), com-

pensationforthetimespentwashingorchangingclothes isasubjectappropri-atelydeterminedthroughcollectivebar-gaining. Sandifer,29S.Ct.at876.But,ifpreliminaryorpostliminarytaskssuchasputtingonsafetygearisnot“changingclothes”forpurposesof§203(o),thenitismandatorilycompensableundertheFLSA.

The Facts of sandifer

As noted, the plaintiff-employeessoughtbackpayfortimespentputtingon and taking off various pieces ofprotective gear.The plaintiffs allegedthatU.S.Steel required theemployeestowearalloftheitemsduetohazardsregularly encountered in steel plants. Sandifer,134S.Ct.at874.Theplaintiffsnoted12itemsinthelawsuitasthemostcommon kinds of required protectivegear: “aflame-retardant jacket, pair ofpants,andhood;ahardhat;a‘snood’”;(ahoodthatalsocoverstheneckanduppershoulderarea),“‘wristlets’”(essentiallydetached shirtsleeves); “work gloves;leggings; ‘metatarsal’ boots; safetyglasses;earplugs;andarespirator.”Id. at874.

Thequestion of compensability inthe Sandifer caseturneduponaprovisionin the relevant collective-bargainingagreement. The agreement with the plaintiffs’unionprovided that timefordonninganddoffingprotectivegearwasnot compensable.The validity of thatprovisionturnedupontheapplicabilityof§203(o),whichallowspartiestodecide,aspartofacollective-bargainingagree-ment,thattimespentchangingclothes…atthebeginningorendofeachworkday”isnoncompensable.Id.at874.

U.S.SteeldidnotdisputetheSev-enthCircuit’sconclusionthat“[h]adtheclothes-changing time in this case not been rendered noncompensable pursu-ant to § 203(o), itwould have been aprincipalactivity,”andthusmandatorilycompensable.Id.at876.Theplaintiffsarguedthattheputtingonandremovingoftheprotectivegeardidnotconstitute“changing clothes,” and, therefore,should bemandatorily compensableundertheAct.

The U.S. Supreme Court beganits analysis bynoting the fundamentalcannon of statutory construction that,unless otherwise defined,wordswillbe interpretedas taking theirordinary,contemporary, common meaning. Id. at 876(citingPerrin v. United States, 444U.S. 37, 42 (1979).TheCourt notedthatdictionariescontemporaneousto§203(o)’senactmentdefined“clothes”as“itemsthatarebothdesignedandusedto cover the body, and are commonlyregardedasarticlesofdress.”Asaresult,theCourtassignedthatmeaningtothewordasusedin§203(o).Sandifer,134S.Ct.at877.

In reaching this conclusion, theCourtrejectedseveralargumentsraisedby the employees. First, the plaintiffsargued that theword “clothes” is tooindeterminate and should be read toexcludeitemsthataredesignedtoprotectagainstworkplacehazards. Sandifer,134S.Ctat877.TheCourtnotedthatunderone definition, “clothes” is “a generalterm forwhatever covering isworn,or ismade tobeworn, fordecencyorcomfort.”Id.UndertheCourt’sanalysis,“comfort” does include safety. Forexample, because a parasol orworkglovescanprotectagainstthesun’srays,orscrapesandcuts,bothcanenhancethewearer’s“comfort.” Id.

TheCourt alsonoted that theem-ployees’ interpretation of the statutewould effectively render § 203(o) anullity. Section 203(o) provides anexception to a statutory compensationrequirementwhen that conduct con-stitutes “an integral and indispensablepartoftheprincipalactivitiesforwhichcoveredworkmenareemployed.”Id. at 877(citing Steiner v. Mitchell,350U.S.247, 256 (1956)).Because protectivegear is the only clothing that is integral


Employment Law | continued

andindispensabletotheworkofmanypositions, the Court concluded thatthe employees’ definition of the termwouldlimit§203(o)to“whatmightbecalledworkers’costumes,wornbysuchemployees as waiters, doormen and train conductors.”Id.at877.

TheCourt discussed the historicalcontextsurrounding§203(o)’spassage,andspecificallyhighlightedanillustra-tionincludedintheLaborDepartment’s1947 regulations, demonstrating how“changingclothes”couldbeintimatelyrelated to a principal activity. That illustration indicatedanemployee inachemicalplantcannotperformhisdutieswithoutputtingoncertain“clothes”asisrequiredbylaw.Id.

Second,theemployeesarguedthattheCourt’s definition of “clothes” forpurposes of the statutewas so broadthat absurd itemswould be embracedbyit,including“bandolierstobarrettesto bandages.” Id. TheCourt rejectedthisargument,notingthatthestatutorysection in question dealtwith clothesintegraltojobperformance,andthatthedonninganddoffingofotheritemswouldcreatenoclaimtocompensationunderthe Act. Id.,at878.

Importantly, the Court also rec-ognized the boundaries of its owndefinition, in that “our definition doesnotembracetheview,adoptedbysomeCourtsofAppeals,that‘clothes’meansessentially anythingwornon thebody—including accessories, tools, and soforth.”Id.at878(citingSalazar v. But-terball, LLC,644F.3d1130,1139-1140(10thCir.2011)(“clothes”areitemsorgarmentswornby a person, includingknifeholders).TheCourtobservedthat:

Theconstructionweadopttodayisconsiderablymorecontained.Many accessories—necklaces

and knapsacks, for instance—are not ‘both designed andusedtocoverthebody.’Noraretools ‘commonly regarded asarticlesofdress.’Ourdefinitionleavesroomfordistinguishingbetween clothes andwearableitemsthatarenotclothes,suchassomeequipmentanddevices.

Sandifer,134S.Ct.at878.TheCourtalsoclarifiedthemeaning

oftheword“changing.”Theemployeeshad argued that “changing” connotessubstitution,andthat—forexample—anindividualisnotdescribedas“changingclothes”whenheputsonanovercoat. Id.TheCourtacceptedthatthenormalmeaningof“changingclothes”connotessubstitution, but again turned to therelevantdictionaryforadefinitionthatincluded an alternative definition of“altering.” Id.

TheCourtconcludedthatwhiletheusualmeaning of “changing clothes”may connote substitution of clothing,the“broaderstatutorycontextmakesitplainthat‘timespentchangingclothes’includes time spent in altering dress.”Id.Also,fromapolicyperspective,“theobjectof§203(o)istopermitcollectivebargainingover the compensability ofclothes-changing time and to promote the predictability achieved throughmutually-beneficial negotiation.” Id. Ifthedefinitionof “changing” turnedonwhetherornotclothingwassubstituted,therewouldbenopredictability,becausewhether one actually exchanges streetclothesforworkclothesorsimplylayersthem over the top is a personal choice, influencedbyavarietyoffactors.Id. at 740-741.

TheCourtultimatelyheld that theemployees’ donning and doffing oftheprotectivegearatissuequalifiedas

“changing clothes” within the meaning of § 203(o). Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at741.As to the12 itemsat issue in thelitigation,theCourtdeterminedthatthefirst nine fitwithin the interpretationof “clothes” as “items that are bothdesigned and used to cover the body,and are commonly regarded as articles of dress.”These include jacket, pants,hood, gloves, hard-hat, snood, wristlets, leggings,andboots.Id.at741.

Three items, however, did not satisfy the standard.TheCourt notedthatwhileglassesandearplugshaveacovering function, they are not com-monlyregardedasarticlesofdress.Astotherespirator,theCourtnotedthatitfellshortonbothgrounds.Id.TheCourtthen addressed whether the time spent donninganddoffingthesenon-clothingitemswouldbedeductedfromthenon-compensabletime.TheCourtdeclinedtoapply a de minimis rule.Id.at741-742.Nonetheless, theCourt did not deductthe time spent with the non-clothes items fromthenon-compensabletime:

Ifanemployeedevotesthevastmajorityofthetimeinquestionto putting on and off equip-ment or other non-clothes items (perhapsadiver’ssuitandtank)the entire period would notqualifyas‘timespentinchang-ing clothes’ under § 203(o),evenifsomeclothesitemsweredonnedanddoffedaswell.Butifthevastmajorityofthetimeisspentindonninganddoffing‘clothes’aswehavedefinedthatterm,theentireperiodqualifies,and the time spent putting onandoffotheritemsneednotbesubtracted.

Id.at743.

THE IDC MONOGRAPH:

The Attorney-Client Privilege in Malpractice Claims

IDC QUARTERLY | Volume 24 Number 3

Donald P. EcklerPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago

Matthew F. TibblePretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago

M-2 | IDC QUARTERLY | Monograph | Third Quarter 2014

About the Authors

The Attorney-Client Privilegein Malpractice Claims

Introduction

I closed part of a deal selling my client’s membership interest in a limited liability company and the buyer just told my client that I committed malpractice concerning that aspect of the sale as I allegedly helped my client breach his fiduciary duty. How do I respond to my client’s questions about whether he can tell the buyer our legal position so that buyer can understand that my client and I did nothing wrong?

I just missed a deadline for filing an appeal concerning an issue in a lawsuit that I am defending, and my client sent me an email threatening a malpractice claim. Can I talk to my partner about the issues raised in my client’s email? These situations and many more like

them are the type of scenarios an attorney never wants to encounter in her practice and hopes she never has to explain to her partners. Despite our profession’s quest for infallibility, we are all human and make mistakes. The questions of: (1) when we or our clients can disclose attorney-client communications to respond to a third-party’s assertion of a potential malpractice claim, and (2) whether we can talk to our partners about potential malpractice claims are of paramount concern for the practitioner who wants to satisfy her pro-fessional ethical obligations. By looking at the current status of Illinois’ attorney-client privilege as well as the attorney-client privilege in other states, this article will

Donald Patrick Eckler is an associate at Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered. He practices in both Illinois and Indiana in the areas of commercial litigation, professional malpractice defense, tort defense, and insurance coverage. He earned his undergraduate

degree from the University of Chicago and his law degree from the University of Florida. He is a member of the Illinois Association Defense Trial Counsel, the Risk Management Association, and the Chicago Bar Association. He is the co-chair of the CBA YLS Tort Litigation Committee.

provide the answers to these questions.Since at least Monier v. Chamberlin1

and certainly continuing through Con-solidation Coal Company v. Bucyrus-Erie Company,2 Illinois courts have disfavored attorneys’ privilege assertions seeking to protect documents and statements from disclosure. While this remains a general principle of Illinois law, recent changes in the common law indicate possible develop-ments ahead in Illinois’ attorney-client privilege.

This article will first set forth the general principles of Illinois’ attorney-client privilege, and then discuss the recent common law changes. Finally, this article will apply these changes in case law to practical questions and demonstrate some developments in Illinois practice concern-ing the attorney-client privilege.

The Attorney-Client Privilegein Illinois

The general rule concerning discovery is stated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1)’s heading: “Full disclosure required.”3 This means that parties must produce every document, statement, or other piece of potential evidence requested during litigation unless a party can establish that the requested material falls within a narrowly-defined exception such as the attorney-client privilege. Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2) governs a party’s assertion of privilege, and states, in relevant part, as follows:

All matters that are privileged against disclosure on the trial, including privileged communica-tions between a party or his agent

and the attorney for the party, are privileged against disclo-sure through any discovery procedure. Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for trial is subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party’s attorney.4

An assertion of a privilege is the excep-tion, not the rule,5 as Illinois law adheres “to a strong policy of encouraging dis-closure, with an eye toward ascertaining

Matthew F. Tibble is a par tner a t Pretze l & Stouffer, Chartered where he concentrates his prac-tice in general civil litigation and professional liabil-ity defense. Concerning his professional liability defense work, Mr. Tibble

routinely represents accountants, attorneys, mortgage professionals and insurance produc-ers in malpractice and breach of contract claims. Likewise, Mr. Tibble also frequently represents corporate directors and officers in breach of fiduciary duty, shareholder derivative and other types of suits. He received his undergraduate degree from DePaul University in 1999 and his juris doctorate from DePaul University College of Law in 2004.

Third Quarter 2014 | Monograph | IDC QUARTERLY | M-3


the truth which is essential to the proper disposition of a lawsuit.”6 Consequently, Illinois law strongly disfavors the applica-tion of any privilege in litigation, including the attorney-client privilege.7Accordingly, courts narrowly construe the attorney-cli-ent privilege.8 Finally, Illinois law provides that the party asserting the privilege bears the burden of establishing the facts that give rise to the privilege, and if that burden is not met, a privilege will not attach.9

Under Illinois law, the attorney-client privilege protects from discovery disclosure the documents or statements that reflect communications made in confidence between a lawyer and a client.10 To be entitled to the attorney-client privilege’s protection, a claimant must establish that: (1) the statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) the client or attorney made the statement while the attorney acted in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or services for the client; and (3) the statement remained confidential, i.e., neither the cli-ent nor attorney disclosed the statement to a non-party to the attorney-client relation-ship.11 Not every disclosure from client to attorney is, however, entitled to protection by the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice that might not have been made absent the privilege.12 Furthermore, the attorney-client privilege does not protect communications primarily regarding business advice.13 Thus, for the privilege to apply, the confidential communications must be primarily legal in nature.

While the attorney-client privilege seems like a simple principle of law, it becomes more complicated in the corporate context as an attorney is not just represent-ing a person but a corporate entity that could employ one or thousands of people. In this context, Illinois uses a version of the attorney-client privilege that is commonly

known as the control-group test,14 which is explained as follows:

As a practical matter, the only communications that are ordinarily held privileged under this test are those made by top management who have the ability to make a fi-nal decision rather than those made by employees whose positions are merely advisory. We believe that an employee whose advisory role to top management in a particular area is such that a decision would not normally be made without his advice or opinion, and whose opinion in fact forms the basis of any final decision by those with actual authority, is properly within the control group. However, the individuals upon whom he may rely for supplying information are not members of the control group.15

Thus, under Illinois’ control-group test, attorney or client communications concern-ing legal advice in the corporate context are only protected by the attorney-client privilege if those communications: (1) meet the attorney-client privilege elements described above and (2) are made with the corporate client’s top management who have the ability to make a final decision regarding the legal issue or their direct advisors, which, as discussed below, is a more complicated analysis than it seems. The control-group test will not protect an attorney’s communications with a corpo-rate representative who does not have final decision-making authority.16

Illinois’ version of the control-group test contrasts sharply with the United States Supreme Court’s formulation of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.17 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court rejected the control-group test, holding

that it “frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging communication of relevant information.”18 Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that the privilege can extend to any employee who communicates with counsel at the direction of her superiors, regarding matters within the scope of her duties.19

The Illinois Supreme Court has refused to adopt Upjohn and continues to adhere to the more limited control-group test. The supreme court has held that Illinois’ control-group test “strike[s] a reasonable balance by protecting consultations with counsel by those who are the decision makers or those who substantially influence corporate decisions and by minimizing the amount of relevant factual material which is immune from discovery.”20 The Illinois Supreme Court’s emphasis on the disclosure of relevant information was paramount to its decision to continue to utilize the control-group test, while the United States Supreme Court’s rejection of the control-group test rested on its desire for open communications seeking legal advice in the corporate context. This difference in approach is instructive for the analysis to follow.

Under Illinois’ control-group test, a court’s threshold determination is whether an individual is a member of the corpora-tion’s control group. Under Consolidation Coal, a person is within the control group if she is top management able to make a final decision.21 Other corporate employees must satisfy these elements to be in the control group: (1) the agent served as an advisor to top management of the corporate client; (2) the agent’s advisory role was such that the corporate principal would not normally have made a decision without the agent’s advice; and (3) the agent’s opinion or advice in fact formed the basis of the final decision made by those with actual authority within the corporate principal.22


However, just because an agent supplies information or facts to a corporation’s top management does not mean that agent is within the corporation’s control group.23 Pursuant to Illinois’ rule, an individual may be a member of the control group for some issues, but concerning other issues, that same agent may not be in the control group.

To determine who is in a corporation’s control group, Illinois courts have looked at the agent’s role in the organization, and not her title. In Knief v. Sotos, the appellate court held that because a bar’s head waitress and manager were not in the bar’s control group concerning litigation decisions, the attorney-client privilege did not protect the head waitress and manager’s communications with counsel representing the bar from disclosure even though those two individuals managed the defendant’s business.24

To establish that an individual is in a corporation’s control group, the proponent of the privilege must supply facts to establish the basis for the assertion. In Midwesco-Paschen Joint Venture for Viking Projects v. Imo Industries,25 the court considered a privilege claim that a field service manager responsible for an allegedly defective product sold by the corporation to plaintiff fell within the corporation’s control group. In making its determination regarding the attorney-client privilege, the appellate court held that the manager was a member of the corporation’s control group. Testimony established that the manager had direct managerial respon-sibility over the subject product and that the corporation obtained the manager’s advice regarding liability for the subject product.26

Even if a communication appears to fit within the attorney-client privilege as it relates to individuals or to corporations, there are some exceptions to the attorney-client privilege that require a practitioner to take caution. Two of these exceptions are critical to understating the current status

of the attorney-client privilege in the legal malpractice context: (1) the subject-matter-waiver doctrine and; (2) the fiduciary-duty exception. Next, this article addresses each exception and provides advice concerning avoiding the pitfalls related to each one.

The Subject-Matter-Waiver Doctrine

In Center Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the subject-matter-waiver doc-trine to the attorney-client privilege outside of the litigation context.27 In doing so, the supreme court reversed a circuit court’s order that had required the defendants to produce documents that fell within the attorney-client privilege.28

The Center Partners litigation arose from a dispute between the purchasers of real property and the general partners of the partnership that owned the property.29 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had received legal advice on how to evade their contractual, fiduciary, and legal duties to the plaintiffs by creating a “synthetic partnership” as well as by stopping the business’ growth and stealing certain corporate opportunities.30

During discovery, the plaintiffs moved to compel the production of defendants’ documents that contained legal advice, which certain defendants shared among the remaining defendants.31 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived any privilege by sharing the documents with parties who were not covered by the attorney-client relationship. Thus, accord-ing to the plaintiffs, they failed to maintain confidentiality of the documents.32 The circuit court agreed that the defendants waived the privilege by sharing the docu-ments and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to compel.33 The defendants produced the documents.34

Following the document production, the parties took the deposition of one of

the defendant’s executives. During that deposition, the executive testified as to the substance of legal advice he received, but refused to testify as to the rationale for the advice or other details concerning the advice.35 The plaintiffs filed a second motion to compel, but the circuit court denied that motion finding the attorney-client privilege protected that testimony from disclosure.36

Later, the plaintiffs opposed the defendants’ privilege claim regarding documents that concerned the negotiations for the purchase agreement at issue.37 As the defendants refused to produce the docu-ments, the plaintiffs filed a third motion to compel, arguing that the defendants waived the privilege as two of the defendants’ witnesses testified about legal advice they had received in the presence of other par-ties.38 The plaintiffs further argued that the defendants waived the privilege as a third witness for the defendants testified to legal advice he received despite an instruction from counsel not to answer such questions and an assertion that the privilege was not being waived.39 Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived the privilege because the defendants disclosed only “tid-bits” of information, which was inappropriate as defendants could not use the privilege as both a sword and shield.40 The defendants responded by arguing that their counsel’s advice regarding the negotiations was not at issue, and they had not waived the privilege because their disclosure of some communications did not constitute a subject-matter waiver of all such communications.41

The circuit court granted the plaintiffs’ motion after an in camera review of the documents, finding that because the defendants shared the documents with individuals who were not a party to the attorney-client relationship, the defendants had waived the privilege.42 The circuit court entered “friendly contempt” against



the defendants when they refused to produce the documents, and the defendants appealed the circuit court’s ruling.43

The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling and held that when defen-dants disclosed the information among one another they waived the privilege.44 In its holding, the appellate court found no basis to distinguish between a subject-matter waiver in the litigation or business context.45

The Illinois Supreme Court addressed a question of first impression: whether the subject-matter-waiver doctrine ap-plies to extrajudicial disclosures?46 After setting forth Illinois’ general principles of privilege law, the court reviewed the concept of waiver generally under Illinois law.47 In doing so, the court observed, “[t]he attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, rather than the attorney, although the attorney asserts the privilege on behalf of the client.”48 The court went on to state that “[o]nly the client may waive the privilege” and “[t]he attorney, although presumed to have the authority to waive the privilege on the client’s behalf, may not do so over the client’s objection.”49 According to the court, “[a]ny disclosure by the client [of information protected by the attorney-client privilege] is inherently inconsistent with the policy behind the privilege of facilitating a confidential attorney-client relationship, and therefore, must result in a waiver of the privilege.”50

The court then turned to the subject-matter-waiver doctrine, which provides that the attorney-client privilege is waived on a specific subject matter otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege when the cli-ent voluntarily breaches the attorney-client relationship by disclosing a confidential communication with his attorney to a third-party.51 According to the court, the subject-matter-waiver doctrine is intended to prevent selective disclosure that could inure to the benefit of the disclosing party.52

Turning then to application of subject-matter waiver to the documents, which included attorney-client communications that occurred in the business transaction that preceded the litigation, the court held that while the content of the attorney-client communications made in the presence of the third party waived the attorney-client privilege as to those specific communica-tions, the subject-matter-waiver doctrine did not apply to the remainder of the protected communications on the same subject matter made outside of the judicial proceeding context.53

In rendering this holding, the Center Partners court reviewed two federal court opinions.54 Specifically, the court looked to In re Von Bulow55 and In re Keeper of Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.)56 In those cases, both courts held that subject-matter waiver did not apply extrajudicially.57 In the In re Bulow case, the federal court held:

[W]here, as here, disclosures of privileged information are made extrajudicially and without prejudice to the opposing party, there exists no reason in logic or equity to broaden the waiver beyond those matters actually re-vealed. Matters actually disclosed in public lose their privileged status because they obviously are no longer confidential. The cat is let out of the bag, so to speak. But related matters not so disclosed remain confidential. Although it is true that disclosures in the public arena may be ‘one-sided’ or ‘misleading’, so long as such disclosures are and remain extrajudicial, there is no legal prejudice that warrants a broad court-imposed subject-matter waiver. The reason is that disclo-sures made in public rather than in

court—even if selective—create no risk of legal prejudice until put at issue in the litigation by the privilege-holder. Therefore, inso-far as the district court broadened petitioner’s waiver to include related conversations on the same subject it was in error.58

In In re Keeper of Records, the federal court observed that “[t]here [was] a qualitative difference between offering testimony at trial or asserting an advice of counsel defense in litigation, on the one hand, and engaging in negotiations with business associates, on the other hand.”59

Following these rulings, the Center Partners court rejected the cases cited by the plaintiff, as it found the subject-matter-waiver doctrine should not be applied extrajudicially.60 The court found that limiting the subject-matter-waiver doctrine’s application better served the doctrine to prevent a party from strategi-cally or selectively disclosing documents and rejected the analysis that application of the doctrine must lead to a tactical advantage in litigation.61

The supreme court then turned to whether the statements made during the depositions of the defendants’ executives placed the disclosures at issue.62 In doing so, the court held that while the witnesses testified as to the advice they received, they did not testify as to the actual content and basis for the legal advice.63 Citing United States v. O’Malley,64 the court stated that a client does not waive the attorney-client privilege merely by disclosing the subject that was discussed; rather, the waiver occurs when the client discloses the actual communication.65 Thereafter, the supreme court found that the testimony did not waive the defendant’s privilege claim.

The Center Partners ruling limits the type of disclosures that can lead to waiver


of the attorney-client privilege. It allows businesses to conduct negotiations among themselves and other counsel without fear that their attorney-client communications later will be required to be disclosed. Despite this limitation, attorneys should apply common sense measures to prevent waiver by keeping communications regard-ing legal advice and strategy between counsel and client as much as possible, and not between counsel for separate parties. Maintaining confidentiality of attorney-client communications is the best practice to avoid costly and risky litigation about those communications. But, if a disclosure occurs, the communication may still be protected according to Center Partners. Likewise, counsel must be aware of the fiduciary-duty exception to the attorney-client privilege and when it may operate to require disclosure of otherwise privileged communications.

Fiduciary-Duty Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege

Recently, several courts have ad-dressed whether the law should extend the attorney-client privilege to protect communications between a law firm’s in-house counsel, seeking advice from other firm lawyers on how to handle a client’s potential malpractice claim against the firm.66 Before this develop-ment, courts sometimes required the production of communications involving a client’s malpractice claim, even though the communications arguably fell within the purview of attorney-client privilege.67 Those communications arguably fall within attorney-client privilege as the lawyer accused of malpractice turned to in-house counsel for legal advice on how to handle the malpractice issue. This exception to the attorney-client privilege is commonly referred to as the fiduciary-duty exception.68 Two recent Illinois cases,

Garvy v. Seyfarth & Shaw69 and MDA City Apartments, LLC v. DLA Piper LLP,70 have examined the application of the fiduciary- duty exception to the attorney-client privi-lege in the legal malpractice context. As explained below, both decisions declined to adopt the exception in Illinois.

Nevertheless, Illinois practitioners should understand the fiduciary-duty exception as several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have acknowledged that it is a viable doctrine. This is especially true in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s emphasis on disclosure when it comes to privilege, which provides that Illinois law adheres “to a strong policy of encouraging disclosure, with an eye toward ascertaining the truth which is essential to the proper disposition of a lawsuit.”71

According to the United States Su-preme Court in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, English courts first de-veloped the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege based on a prin-ciple of trust law in the 19th century.72 As described in Jicarilla Apache Nation, “[t]he rule was that when a trustee obtained legal advice to guide in the administration of the trust, and not for the trustee’s own defense in litigation, the beneficiaries were entitled to the production of documents related to that advice.”73 Courts applying the fiduciary-duty exception reasoned “that the normal attorney-client privilege did not apply in [the situation where the beneficiary was seeking advice for the administration for the trust] because the legal advice was sought for the beneficiaries’ benefit and was obtained at the beneficiaries’ expense by using trust funds to pay the attorneys’ fees.”74

Relying on Jicarilla Apache Nation, courts have imposed the fiduciary-duty exception for two reasons. First, the excep-tion applies because the trustee obtains the legal advice as a mere representative of the beneficiaries, as the trustee has a fiduciary

obligation to act in the beneficiaries’ best interest when administering the trust.75 Consequently, the beneficiaries are the “real clients” of the attorney who advises the trustee on trust-related matters, and therefore, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the beneficiaries rather than the trustee.76

Courts look at several factors in making this “real client” determination, including:

1. Determining when a trustee sought the legal advice to ascer-tain whether there was a reason for the trustees to seek advice in a personal capacity (i.e., protection from claims against the trustee) rather than in a fiduciary capac-ity (i.e., protection of the trust corpus);

2. Determining if the documents or advice at issue was intended for any purpose other than to benefit the trust; and

3. Determining if the trust’s funds had been used to pay for the legal advice received by the trustee or whether the advice was obtained at a trustee’s expense.77

Regarding the third factor, courts distin-guish between “legal advice procured at the trustee’s own expense and for his own pro-tection,” which would remain privileged, and “the situation where the trust itself is assessed for obtaining opinion of counsel where interest of the beneficiaries are at stake.”78 In the latter case, courts would apply the fiduciary exception, and typically a trustee could not withhold those commu-nications from the beneficiaries.79

According to the United States Su-preme Court, the second reason courts impose the fiduciary-duty exception is that the trustee’s fiduciary obligation to furnish trust-related information to the



beneficiaries outweighs the trustee’s interest in the attorney-client privilege.80 The policy of preserving disclosure in the trustee-beneficiary relationship is “ultimately more important than the protection of the trustees’ confidence in the attorney for the trust.”81 Generally, courts applying the fiduciary-duty exception find that the full disclosure of information better assists a beneficiary in policing a trustee in the trust management, and a beneficiary’s ability to police in a more informed fashion outweighs “the policy consideration of attorney-client privilege.”82

The situation described in Jicarilla Apache Nation, regarding a trustee who seeks legal advice concerning his ac-tions as trustee, is analogous to a lawyer who consults with in-house counsel to determine the appropriate course of action within the Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, Jicarilla Apache Nation is instructive to determine whether otherwise privileged information will maintain protection from disclosure in the legal malpractice context.

Regarding the operation of the fiducia-ry-duty exception in the legal malpractice context, some courts have held that be-cause: (1) an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to her client even after her client accuses her of malpractice; and (2) the attorney seeks legal advice on how to deal with a client’s malpractice assertions while still representing that client, the fiduciary-duty exception applies. Thus, the attorney must produce all communications between herself and her in-house counsel in the subsequent malpractice litigation.83 Some courts have even held that the fiduciary-duty exception applies when the attorney contacts her partners about legal and ethical issues concerning the malpractice.84 This situation is similar to the one examined by the Appellate Court, First District, in Garvy v. Seyfarth & Shaw.85

Garvy v. Seyfarth & Shaw

In Garvy, the court held that a de-fendant, alleged to have committed le-gal malpractice, had properly withheld attorney-client communications with its in-house counsel and outside defense counsel made before the defendant withdrew from representing the plaintiff.86 According to the Garvy court, the defendant represented the plaintiff in corporate transactions as well as the subsequent litigation that arose from those transactions.87 During the underlying representation, the defendant advised the plaintiff that a number of conflicts had arisen and recommended that the plaintiff retain independent counsel to represent him concerning those conflicts, which the plaintiff did.88 Thereafter, the plaintiff’s independent counsel raised several issues regarding the defendant’s legal advice, including several claims of potential malpractice. Despite the issues raised, and at the insistence of the plaintiff’s independently-retained counsel, the defendant continued to represent the plaintiff.89 During this period of continued representation, the defendant had multiple communications with its in-house counsel and outside defense counsel regarding the legal and ethical concerns related to the continued representation and the plaintiff’s claims of malpractice. After determining that it could no longer represent the plaintiff, the defendant withdrew from representation.90

In the subsequent legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff sought all communica-tions from the date of the defendant’s letter setting forth the conflicts to the date of the defendant’s withdrawal, including those between the defendant and its in-house counsel regarding the plaintiff’s malprac-tice claim.91 The circuit court ordered production of all communications and documents. When the defendant refused to comply with its order, the court held the

defendant in contempt for failing to pro-duce the communications and documents.92

In vacating the contempt citation and reversing the judgment of the circuit court, the Garvy court held that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications sought by the plaintiff from disclosure.93 In making its ruling, the court examined the fiduciary-duty exception and stated, “[t]he fiduciary-duty exception to the attorney-client privilege arose in the context of trust law, and was based on the principle that the beneficiary of the trust had a right to the production of the legal advice rendered to the trustee related to the administration of the trust.”94 According to the court, the logic “behind the exception was that because the advice was obtained using the authority and funds of the trust and the beneficiary was the ultimate recipient of the benefit of that advice, the beneficiary was entitled to discover the communications between the attorney and the fiduciary.”95 The court further observed, “The fiduciary-duty exception does not, however, apply to legal advice rendered concerning the personal liability of the fiduciary or in anticipation of adversarial legal proceedings against the fiduciary.”96

After explaining the fiduciary-duty exception, the appellate court rejected the application of the two opinions from foreign jurisdictions holding that the fiduciary-duty exception applied in cir-cumstances similar to those presented in Garvy.97 In those foreign cases, two federal courts ordered legal malpractice defendants to produce documents protected by the attorney-client privilege because those courts found that the fiduciary-duty exception applied.98 Those courts’ deci-sions requiring disclosure stem from the defendant law firms’ conflicting interests.99 During representation of the legal malprac-tice claimants, the defendant law firms each had a fiduciary duty to their clients and


duties to protect their firm or other clients from claims.100 Therefore, the defendant law firms had to produce all attorney-client communication during the period they still represented their former clients, including their communications with outside legal counsel and in-house counsel regarding the potential malpractice claims.101 The need for the disclosure was based on the law firm’s fiduciary obligation of full disclosure to their clients.102

In rejecting these foreign decisions, the Garvy court first noted that the fidu-ciary-duty exception to the attorney-client privilege is not recognized under Illinois law.103 The Garvy court did not, however, explicitly reject the fiduciary-duty excep-tion. Following this, the court described the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of the fiduciary-duty exception in Jicarilla Apache Nation. In doing so, the Garvy court reviewed the Supreme Court’s exami-nation of the adversary proceeding factor and stated that the adversarial factor was “important because, if adversarial proceed-ings were pending, it would indicate that the fiduciary was seeking legal advice in a personal rather than fiduciary capacity, and the [fiduciary-duty] exception would not apply.”104 Thereafter, the court held, “even if Illinois did recognize the fiduciary-duty exception, it clearly would not apply here where [the defendant] sought legal advice in connection with [the plaintiff’s] legal malpractice claim against it, and not in its fiduciary capacity as [the plaintiff’s] counsel in the pending litigation.”105 Consequently, the Garvy court concluded that “the documents and communications related to legal advice sought by [the de-fendant] in connection with [the plaintiff’s] legal malpractice claims against it [were] protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.”106

The court next found that Rules 1.4 and 1.7 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct did not provide a basis to allow the

plaintiff to obtain the defendant’s attorney-client communications, even though those rules required full disclosure to the client and required immediate withdrawal in the event of a conflict.107 In reaching this con-clusion, the court observed that Comment 9 to Rule 1.6 and Rule 5.1 contained lan-guage specifically allowing an attorney to communicate with in-house counsel.108 The court stated, “[a] lawyer’s confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer’s personal responsibility to comply with the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and that lawyers are permitted to make confidential reports of ethical issues to designated in-house counsel.109 According to the Garvy court, permitting lawyers to confidentially communicate with counsel to ethically resolve a client dispute serves the interest of all involved.

Next, the Garvy court found that, consistent with its obligations under Rule 1.7, the defendant had sufficiently disclosed its conflicts to the plaintiff.110 The court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion that by allowing a law firm to disclose and identify the conflict that formed the basis of the privilege claim, it would essentially be allowing the law firm to “grade its own paper.”111 Such a holding would render the conflict disclosure requirement meaning-less.112

Finally, the court held that the attorney-client privilege protected the defendant’s communications because the defendant’s in-house counsel did not labor under a con-flict of having two clients with conflicting interests. Rule 1.7 would seem to bar that type of representation by any member of the defendant firm.113 In making this ruling, the court rejected the application of the dual-representation doctrine referenced in Mueller Industries, Inc. v. Berkman, which held “that the attorney-client privilege did not apply where one client knew that the law firm represented another client in

matters related to its representation of him, and could not have reasonably expected that his communications with his attorney would be confidential.”114 In discussing Mueller Industries, Inc., the court stated:

The Mueller court limited its holding to communications re-lated to the business, the interest the two clients had in common. Even if we were to conclude that [the defendant] representing itself is similar to the representing of an external client, the representation did not involve a common interest with [the plaintiff]. Thus, the dual-representation doctrine is not applicable here and the attorney-client privilege applies to commu-nications with [the defendant’s] in-house counsel regarding [the plaintiff’s] malpractice claim.115

Following this reasoning, the Garvy court reversed the circuit court and found that the attorney-client privilege applied.

MDA City Apartments, LLC v.DLA Piper LLP

In an opinion rendered 21 days after Garvy by the same appellate panel review-ing the same trial judge, the MDA court reversed a circuit court’s order requiring a defendant law firm to produce documents concerning its communications with its in-house and outside counsel concerning a motion to disqualify the defendant law firm.116 There, the underlying action arose from a contract dispute between the defendant’s client, the MDA Apart-ments, and Walsh Construction.117 Walsh Construction filed a motion to disqualify the defendant law firm because it had represented Walsh-related entities and individuals in other matters.118 In response to Walsh’s motion, the defendant consulted



with its own in-house counsel and retained an attorney to defend Walsh’s motion. The court granted Walsh Construction’s motion to disqualify, and MDA subsequently filed a complaint for legal malpractice against the defendant.119

Unlike in Garvy where there was a direct assertion of malpractice when the legal malpractice defendant made the privileged communications at issue, MDA did not assert a malpractice claim against the defendant until nine months after the court granted the disqualification motion. In contrast to Garvy, the MDA case had no direct allegation of malpractice when the defendant communicated about the disqualification issue with its in-house or outside counsel (i.e., no clear conflict between the attorney and client existed on a malpractice issue at the time the defendant law firm received the legal advice at issue).

Asserting the attorney-client privilege, the legal malpractice defendant, withheld from disclosure in discovery all commu-nications with its in-house counsel and the attorney retained to represent it on Walsh’s motion concerning the disqualification issue, including communications made regarding filings in MDA’s claim against Walsh.120 Upon MDA’s filing of a motion to compel, the circuit court held that the defendant’s communications did not fall within the attorney-client privilege and that the fiduciary-duty exception applied; thereafter, the circuit court ordered the defendant to produce those communica-tions.121 When the defendant refused to produce them, the circuit court held the defendant in contempt, and the defendant appealed.122

The MDA court reviewed the Garvy analysis, and like in Garvy, acknowledged that the fiduciary-duty exception did not exist in Illinois law.123 The MDA court further held that even if Illinois had adopted the fiduciary-duty exception, the referenced communications did not fall within the

purview of that exception. In making this ruling, the court examined the nature of the advice sought, and found that because the defendant was the “real client” in interest to the disqualification advice, the attorney-client communications did not fall within the fiduciary-duty exception. The court found that the defendant had the real inter-est in the disqualification advice because: (1) the defendant paid for its personal representation on the disqualification issue and (2) MDA was not the beneficiary of the advice concerning disqualification.124 The MDA court stated:

Although MDA can claim an interest in the ultimate ruling on the motion to disqualify, the motion itself was not directed to the merits of MDA’s position but the alleged conflict involving [the defendant]. Thus, even if we were to extend Illinois law by adopting the fiduciary-duty exception, which we decline to do on the facts here, the exception would not apply to the communications in question.125

The court acknowledged that MDA re-ceived the ultimate benefit of the disqualifi-cation advice, but found that the defendant, and not MDA, was the “real client” in interest concerning that advice. Similar to Garvy, the MDA court rejected MDA’s ar-gument based on an application of the duty to disclose under the Illinois Rules of Pro-fessional Conduct and the Mueller court’s dual-representation doctrine. Finally, the MDA court reversed the circuit court’s contempt citation and held that the attor-ney-client privilege protected communica-tions regarding disqualification.126

Other States

Recently, the highest courts of review of several sister jurisdictions have squarely addressed the fiduciary-duty exception’s application to the attorney-client privilege in the legal malpractice context. In 2013, the Supreme Court of Georgia examined this issue in Hunter, Maclean, Exley, & Dunn v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC.127 In that case, the court applied Georgia’s codified attorney-client privilege analysis to determine whether an attorney’s com-munication with his law firm’s in-house counsel regarding a client’s potential malpractice claim would result in the ap-plication of the fiduciary-duty exception.128 The court held that to avoid production in discovery, the party seeking the protection of the attorney-client privilege needed to show: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the communications concerned the purpose for which legal advice was sought; (3) the communications were maintained in confidence; and (4) no exception to the privilege applied. 129

To determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed as required for the first statutory element, the court looked at several facts regarding the nature of the legal relationship, including: (a) whether the firm maintained a designated in-house attorney for purposes of handling the firm’s malpractice claims; (b) whether the firm maintained separate files for the client’s legal work and the firm’s malpractice de-fense work; (c) whether the firm billed the client for the malpractice defense work or billed the defense work to the file; and (d) whether the in-house attorney designated to handle the malpractice claim for the firm had worked for the client.130 Regarding the maintenance of confidentiality element, the court said that intra-firm communications regarding the malpractice must only in-volve “in-house counsel, firm management, firm attorneys, and other personnel with


knowledge about the representation that is the basis for the client’s claim against the firm,” otherwise communications about the malpractice claim may not be subject to protection.131

Concerning the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, the court reasoned that the fiduciary-duty exception did not ap-ply because the client’s malpractice claim established a clear lack of mutuality be-tween the firm and its client, which resulted in adverse positions much like in Garvy. The Georgia Supreme Court, however, did not have occasion to address how the court would rule when reviewing an issue like that offered in MDA, i.e., where there is no direct assertion of malpractice or clear adversarial position when the firm sought legal advice from its in-house counsel or outside defense counsel.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-sachusetts took a different approach to reviewing the attorney-client privilege’s application concerning in-house commu-nications regarding a client’s malpractice claims.132 In RFF Family Partership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, the court found that the attorney-client privilege applied to communications with in-house attorneys regarding malpractice claims made by current clients. The party asserting the privilege must establish: (1) the law firm had designated an attorney or attorneys within the firm to represent the firm as in-house counsel; (2) the in-house counsel had not performed any work on the client matter at issue or any substantially related matter; (3) the time spent by the attorneys in these communications with in-house counsel was not billed to the client; and (4) the communications were made and maintained in confidence.133

Two other state supreme courts, in Or-egon and Minnesota, are currently review-ing the application of the fiduciary-duty exception in the legal malpractice context, and it is expected that several Illinois appel-

late courts will also consider the applicabil-ity of this exception to the attorney-client privilege in the near future.134 Thus, Illinois practitioners may be able to help ensure that communications with other lawyers about malpractice claims from clients by following the standards established under the cases from other states.

Analysis As noted above, the subject-matter

waiver and fiduciary-duty exceptions to the attorney-client privilege are two issues that Illinois practitioners need to be mindful of when addressing legal malpractice claims. A review of these issues reveals some general rules that a practitioner should keep in mind when attempting to answer the type of questions posed in the introduction:

I closed part of a deal selling my client’s membership interest in a limited liability company and the buyer just told my client that I committed malpractice concerning that aspect of the sale as I allegedly helped my client breach his fiduciary duty. How do I respond to my client’s questions about whether he can tell the buyer our legal position so that buyer can understand that my client and I did nothing wrong?

I just missed a deadline for filing an appeal concerning an issue in a lawsuit that I am defending, and my client sent me an email threatening a malpractice claim. Can I talk to my partner about the issues raised in my client’s email?

When a client inquires regarding how much of her discussions with you she can disclose while negotiating with an adver-sary or potential business partner, the best

answer is still probably none. However, based on the Illinois Supreme Court’s rul-ing in Center Partners, Ltd., there is some flexibility regarding the subject-matter-waiver doctrine in the transactional context. Consequently, if your client tells the other party your advice in a transactional setting, the basis for your advice might still be protected by the attorney-client privilege in subsequent litigation.

The question of whether you can talk to your partner about a client’s assertion of a malpractice claim, however, is a bit more difficult. Although Illinois has not adopted the fiduciary-duty exception to the attorney-client privilege, it is a pressing topic on the national stage, which means it is only a matter of time before an Illinois court squarely addresses it. Moreover, in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s emphasis on disclosure in the privilege context, we expect that Illinois will review the fiduciary-duty exception again.

Based on Garvy and MDA as well as some of the other national common law on this issue, Illinois firms should take steps to prepare for the potential advent of the fiduciary-duty exception. First, an Illinois firm should have a set procedure for handling client conflicts and malpractice claims that may arise when performing legal services. Based on the common law referenced above, that procedure should probably include the retention of a separate attorney to provide legal advice on the conflict and malpractice issues as well as potentially withdrawing from the client’s representation. Second, if an Illinois firm is going to designate a specific in-house counsel to advise its lawyers on conflict or malpractice issues relating to clients, the firm should ensure that: (1) it maintains a separate file for the conflict or malpractice work; (2) the firm does not charge the client for the legal advice on the conflict or malpractice issue; (3) the designated in-house attorney has not worked for the



client or on the issue related to the conflict or malpractice claim; and (4) the com-munications with the in-house attorney are kept confidential.

As referenced above, Illinois utilizes the control-group test, which further com-plicates the confidentiality requirement. Under this test, only the in-house attorney’s discussions with the firm’s control group would arguably remain confidential, which means that an Illinois firm and its in-house attorney need to be careful as to whom they communicate with on the conflict or malpractice issue. Both the firm and the in-house attorney need to ensure that their communications are not disclosed outside of the control group.

Finally, an Illinois law firm needs to ensure that during the period of its contin-ued representation in which the conflict or malpractice claim occurs, the firm keeps their clients informed of all aspects of their legal work and meeting its professional disclosure obligations to their clients. A law firm has a full disclosure obligation to its clients, and it must meet those obligations if it continues to represent the client in a conflict or malpractice context. In keeping its client informed, a firm should clearly differentiate between communication related to the client’s legal work and the legal work performed for the firm’s defense. Blurring the lines of communica-tion regarding the client’s legal work and the firm’s defense work could result in the subsequent disclosure of communications protected by the attorney-client privilege.

While Illinois’ common law continues to develop regarding the attorney-client privilege, practitioners should take steps to ensure that in the event of a malpractice claim their subsequent communications regarding that claim are protected from disclosure. Illinois attorneys need to take these steps while still fulfilling the duties they owe to their clients.

(Endnotes)1 35 Ill. 2d 351 (1966).2 89 Ill. 2d 103 (1982).3 Ill. S. Ct. R. 201.4 Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(b)(2).5 Golminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Const. Co., 112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 448-449 (2d Dist. 1969).6 Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Supply Lines Ins. Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 190 (1991).7 In re Marriage of Daniels, 230 Ill. App. 3d 314, 324-25 (1st Dist. 1992). Illinois courts, however, have found that some privileges exist beyond those referenced in Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2). See e.g. People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456 (1964) (finding an insurer-insured privilege exists) and FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Corp., 236 Ill. App. 3d 355 (1st Dist. 1992) (finding that an accountant-client privilege exists based on a state statute).8 Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 138 Ill. App. 3d 276, 278 (1st Dist. 1985).9 Claxton v. Thackston, 201 Ill. App. 3d 232, 234 (1st Dist. 1990).10 Shapo v. Tires N’ Tracks, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d 387, 393 (1st Dist. 2002).11 Rounds v. Jackson Park Hosp., 319 Ill. App. 3d 280, 285-86 (1st Dist. 2001).12 Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228-29 (2d Dist. 2006).13 CNR Invest., Inc. v. Jefferson Trust & Sav. Bk., 115 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1076 (3d Dist. 1983). 14 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 118-19 (1982). 15 Id.16 Id.17 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).18 Id. at 392. 19 Id. at 394.20 Consolidation Coal, 89 Ill. 2d at 118-119.21 Id.22 Archer Daniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. App. 3d at 279-280.23 Id. 24 181 Ill. App. 3d 959, 964 (2d Dist. 1989).25 265 Ill. App. 3d 654 (1st Dist. 1994).

26 Midwesco-Paschen, 265 Ill. App. at 663; see also, Mlynarski v. Rush-Presbytarian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 213 Ill. App. 3d 427, 432 (1st Dist. 1991).27 Illinois Rule of Evidence 502(a) applies to subject matter waiver in the context of litiga-tion, whereas the communications sought to be protected in Center Partners occurred prior to the institution of litigation.28 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 1.29 Id. ¶¶ 3-10.30 Id. ¶ 10.31 Id. ¶ 11-13.32 Id. ¶ 12.33 Id.34 Id. ¶ 13.35 Id.36 Id.37 Id. ¶ 14.38 Id. ¶¶ 15-16.39 Id. ¶¶ 17-18.40 Id. ¶ 19.41 Id. ¶ 20. 42 Id. ¶ 20.43 Id. 44 Id. at 21-22.45 Id.46 Id. ¶¶ 25-27.47 Id. ¶35.48 Id.49 Id.50 Id.51 Id.52 Id. ¶ 39.53 Id. ¶ 76.54 Id. ¶ 43.55 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987).56 348 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2003).57 Id. ¶¶ 45-51.58 Id. ¶ 47.59 Id. ¶ 50.60 Id. ¶ 57.


61 Id. ¶¶ 57-60.62 Id. ¶ 64.63 Id. ¶ 73.64 786 F.2d 786, 794 (7th Cir. 1986).65 Center Partners, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 73.66 Koen Book Distributors. v. Powell, Trachman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 FRD 283, 285-286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding no attorney-client privilege for intra-firm communications regarding potential legal action by current client against law firm); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 220 F.Supp.2d 283, 287 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (same); SonicBlue, Inc. v. Portside Growth and Opportunity Fund., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 181, at *26 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (same); Thelen Reid & Priest, LLP v. Marland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17482 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (recognizing confidentiality of consultations with in-house ethics adviser but requiring disclosure of in-firm communications made after firm learned of client’s adverse claim). TattleTale Alarm Systems v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, 2011 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 10412 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 3, 2011) (applying attorney-client privilege and rejecting client’s access to documents for failure to show “good cause” to compel disclosure).67 Id.68 Id.69 2012 IL App (1st) 110115.70 2012 IL App (1st) 111047.71 Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Supply Lines Ins. Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 190 (1991).72 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S.Ct. 2313 (2011).73 Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S.Ct. at 2326.74 Id.75 Id.76 Id.77 Id. at 2322.78 Id.79 Id.80 Id.81 Id.82 Id.83 Koen Book Distributors. v. Powell, Trachman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 285-286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding

no attorney-client privilege for intra-firm com-munications regarding potential legal action by current client against law firm); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 220 F.Supp.2d 283, 287 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (same); SonicBlue, Inc. v. Portside Growth and Opportunity Fund., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 181, at *26 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (same); Thelen Reid & Priest, LLP v. Marland, 2007 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 17482 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (recognizing confidentiality of consultations with in-house ethics adviser but requiring disclosure of in-firm communications made after firm learned of client’s adverse claim). TattleTale Alarm Systems v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10412 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 3, 2011) (applying attorney-client privilege and rejecting client’s access to documents for failure to show “good cause”).84 Id.85 2012 IL App (1st) 110115, ¶ 47.86 Id. 87 Id. ¶¶ 3-10.88 Id. ¶ 11.89 Id. ¶ 37.90 Id. ¶ 13.91 Id. ¶ 15.92 Id. ¶¶ 16-18.93 Id. ¶ 38.94 Id. ¶ 31.95 Id.96 Id.97 Id. ¶¶ 32-35; Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland Co., No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 578989 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007); and Koen Book Distributors, Inc. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284 (E.D. Penn. 2002).98 Id.99 Id.100 Id.101 Id.102 Id.103 Garvy, 2012 IL App (1st) 110115, ¶¶ 35.104 Id.105 Id.106 Id. ¶ 38.107 Id. ¶ 40.

108 Id.109 Id.110 Id.111 Id. ¶ 36.112 Id. ¶ 39.113 Id. ¶ 42. Rule 1.7 precludes an attorney from representing two clients with adverse interests and Rule 1.4 requires an attorney to advise a client that such a conflict may exist. However, the court found that since in house counsel had no such divided loyalty, no communication with the client on this issue was required.114 Id.115 Id.116 2012 IL App (1st) 111047.117 Id. ¶ 3.118 Id. ¶¶ 6-8.119 Id. ¶¶ 8-9.120 Id. ¶ 10.121 Id. ¶ 11.122 Id.123 Id.124 Id.125 Id. ¶ 19.126 Id.127 317 Ga. App. 1 (2012).128 317 Ga. App. at 2-4(2012).129 Id.130 Id.131 Id.132 RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 465 Mass. 702 (2013).133 RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 465 Mass. 702-06 (2013).134 Coloplast A/S v. Spell Pless Sauro, PC., 2013 Minn. Dist. 45 (4th Dist. 2013); Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Termaine, LLP, 353 Ore. 430 (2013).


sandifer’s Place in Contemporary Wage and Hour Law

TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthas now handed down two recent opin-ionsprovidingguidanceas towhetheremployeesmustbecompensatedwhilechanging into andout of clothing andsafety equipment in thework setting.In2005,theCourtexaminedtheeffectofthePortal-to-PortalActonthecom-pensabilityofwalkingandwaitingtimebetweentheproductionandthechangingareas. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,546U.S.21(2005).There, theCourt held that thetime spentwalking from the changingareaafterdonningprotectivegear,andthetimespentwalkingtothechangingareainordertodofftheprotectivegear,werecompensableundertheFLSA.IBP, Inc.546U.S.at39.TheCourtalsoheldthat the time spentwaiting todoff thesafetyequipmentwasalsomandatorilycompensableundertheFLSA.Id.How-ever,theCourtheldthatthetimespentwaiting todon thefirstpieceofsafetygearthatbeginsthecontinuousworkdayisexcludedfromtheFLSA.Id.at528;(see also,KimberlyRoss,U.S. Supreme Court Finds Time Spent in Safety Gear isCompensable;TimeSpentWaitingtoDon Gear is Not,IllinoisAssociationofDefenseTrialCounsel,IDC Quarterly, Vol.16,No.1(16.1.15).

The safety equipment involved inIBP, Inc.includedoutergarments,hard-hats,hairnets,earplugs,gloves,sleeves,aprons, leggings, and boots. IBP, Inc. 126S.Ct.at521-522.Otheremployeeswerealso required towearavarietyofprotective equipment for their hands,arms,torsos,andlegs.Thisgearincludedchainlinkmetalaprons,vests,plexiglassarmguards,andspecialgloves.Id. IBP had previously concluded that theworkdaybeganwiththefirstpieceofmeatcut,and

endedwiththelastpieceofmeatcut.IBPwouldpay for fourminutesof clothes-changingtime,butdidnotcontendthatthis fully compensated the employeesfor the preproduction andpostproduc-tiontimespentdonninganddoffingthesafetyequipment.Id.at522.TheIBP, Inc. Courtheldthatthedonninganddoffingof such equipmentwas “integral andindispensable” to a “principal activity”oftheemploymentundertheFLSA,and,therefore,compensable. Id.at528.

However,theemployerinIBP, Inc. didnotraiseachallengeunder§203(o).According to Sandifer,mostoftheitemsinvolved in IBP, Inc. would arguablyconstitute “clothing.”Thus, under theSandifer rule, employees’ time spentchangingbeforeandafterproductionattheIBPfacilitywouldnotbemandatorilycompensableundertheFLSA,butratherwouldbeappropriatesubjectmatterforcollectivebargaining.

An interesting question for prac-titioners and employers is what role the Sandifer opinion will play in the tapestryofwageandhourlaw.TheIBP, Inc. opinion focused upon timing, or whattasksconstitutethebeginningandendofaworkday.Sandifer, in contrast, focuseduponthe typeofclothingand/orequipmentworn.Futureopinionsarelikely to focus upon some interactionbetweenthosetwoconcepts,andinfact,some reported opinions already appear to show this interplay. For example,in Mitchell v. JCG Industries, Inc., the Seventh Circuit examined “whetherthe time spent in changing during thelunch break isworktime thatmust becompensated.” 745F.3d837,839 (7thCir.2014).(holdingthetimespentdon-ninganddoffingsanitarygearoverthetopof theirstreetclothesduringlunchbreaksisde minimis,andthereforenotmandatorily compensable). In Jones

v. C&D Technologies, Inc., a federaldistrict court examinedwhether traveltime should be includedwith donninganddoffingtime.2014U.S.Dist.LEXIS39009 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (declining to“expandtheSupremeCourt’sholdinginSandifer tolumpnon-‘hanging’activitiessuchastraveltimeinwithdonninganddoffing, such that time spent on thoseactivitieswill also be included in the5-and10-minuteallowances.”).

Conclusion

In Sandifer theSupremeCourtruledthat under the plainmeaning of thePortal-to-PortalActthecompensabilityoftimespentdonninganddoffingmostprotective equipment is governed bythe terms of any applicable collectivebargaining agreement. The SupremeCourt inSandifer Courtdid recognize,however,thatcertaintypesofprotectiveequipmentsuchasrespiratorswerenotsufficiently similar to traditional formsof attire to fall within the Portal-to-PortalAct’sdefinitionof“clothing,”andsuggested that time spent donning anddoffing such itemsmight therefore becompensableundertheAnderson rule—atleastinsofarasthetimespentdonningor doffing themwas not insignificantwhen compared to other preparatory or wind-down activities.

Employerswouldbewelladvised,therefore,toensurethatanylanguageintheircollectivebargainingagreementsre-latingtotimespentdonningordoffingissufficientlybroadtoencompasswhateverprotective equipment the job requires.Where there are particular itemswornbyemployeeswithregularity,employersshouldexplicitlyidentifythoseitemsintheircollective-bargainingagreementsasitemswhosedonninganddoffingisnotcompensable.


A recent Monograph in IDC Quar-terlyprovidedathoroughexplicationoftheoverallstructureandapplicationoftheIllinoisTortImmunityAct.SeeHow-ardL.Huntington,et al., Tort Immunity Act,IllinoisAssociationofDefenseTrialCounsel,IDC Quarterly,Vol.24,No.1(24.1.M-1). The principles discussedin that Monograph are constantly on display,sincelocalgovernmentliabilitymaybethemostprolifictopicaddressedby courts on any regular basis. In thepastyearorso,severaldozensignificantdecisionsaddressingmunicipalliabilitywerepublishedbytheIllinoisSupremeCourtandappellatecourtsalone,alongwith another half-dozen unpublishedopinions. These cases generally grappled withcraftingtheparametersofgovern-mentaltortdutiesandstatutoryimmuni-ties,andtheinterplaybetweenthetwoconcepts.Althoughmuchofthefieldofgovernmental liability is occupied byfederaldecisionsoncivil rightsclaimsandthejudge-madeimmunitiesappliedin those cases, this article will address recentstatelawdevelopmentsinvariousareasofgovernmentaltortliability.

Application of theTort Immunity Act

Themajor focus of cases ongov-ernment liability discuss the IllinoisGovernmental and Governmental Em-ployeesTort ImmunityAct, 745 ILCS10/1-101,et seq.(West2014). The initial questionofwhethertheTortImmunity

Thomas G. DiCianniAncel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C., Chicago

Municipal Law

Thomas G. DiCianni is a partner in the law firm of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthe-fer, P.C. He concentrates his practice in general liti-gation, defense of govern-ment entities and public officials, municipal law,

and the representation of governmental self-insurance pools.

About the Author

Act even applies to a claim is generally anuncomplicated one, but the IllinoisSupremeCourt added some ambiguitytothequestionadecadeagoinRaintree Homes, Inc., v. Village of Long Grove, 209Ill.2d248(2004),wherethecourtfound that a lawsuit seeking refundofdeveloperimpactfeeswasaclaiminres-titution,anequitableremedymeasuredbythedefendant’sunjustgainratherthantheplaintiff’sloss,andnotindamages,whichisthethresholdrequirementoftheTortImmunityAct.

In Pleasant Hill Cemetery Association v.Moorefield,2013ILApp(4th)120645,plaintiffs,theownerandtenantoffarm-land,suedthetownshiphighwaycommis-sioner for altering a culvert underneatha township road causing the farmlandto flood.The commissioner argued theculvertdecisionwasadiscretionaryone,and therefore immuneunder§2-201oftheTortImmunityAct745ILCS10/2-201(West 2014).The plaintiffs argued thatunderRaintree,theTortImmunityActhadnoapplicationbecausetheywereseekingrestitutionforthediminutioninthevalueoftheirlandcausedbytheflooding,notdamages.Theproblemwiththeplaintiff’sargument,however,wasthatSection833of theRestatement ofTorts specificallydefinesthetortofdrainageinterference,makingtheplaintiff’sclaimclearlyonefordamages,ratherthanrestitution,sothattheRaintreedistinctioncouldnotwork.ItisadifficultargumentthatastatuteknownastheTortImmunityActwouldnotapplyto an action specifically defined in the

Restatement ofTorts.Nevertheless, theplaintiffs tried it, and the court rejectedtheargument.

Police/Prosecution

Prosecutors, tucked away in theircourtrooms, have generally been safefrom the liability issues that govern-ments face from law enforcementactivities.Thepolice,whobringintheprosecutiontargets,areinthefrontlineofliabilitytraps,buttheprosecutorshavebeeninsulatedfromalloftheserisksbytheshieldofabsoluteimmunity.Amongotherpolicyreasonstocloakprosecutorswithabsoluteimmunity,courtsalsomayhave been generous in this protectionbecause,afterall, ifholesgetpunchedin that armor, judicial immunity couldbenext.Theepidemicofclaimsarisingoutofreversedconvictionshastestedthestrengthofthatimmunityandinalmostevery respect, except the most extreme cases,ithasheldup.Onerecentexampleis Frank v. Garnati,2013ILApp(5th)120321,wheretheplaintiff,prosecutedfor kidnapping, sued the prosecutorafter acquittal, arguing that the chargewasmotivatednotbyadesiretobringaguiltypersontojustice,butbypersonalconflictbetweentheprosecutorandtheplaintiff.Thecourt,however,lookedtofederallawforguidancewhereabsolute

Survey of Recent GovernmentalLiability Cases


immunity for prosecutorial decisions,eventhosemotivatedbymalicetowardtheplaintiff,hasheldstrong,andrejectedtheplaintiff’sclaim.Id.¶6.

In Prough v. Madison County,2013ILApp(5th)110146,theappellatecourtreaffirmedthereluctanceofcourtstofindpolice liable for any failure topreventcriminalacts,eveninextremesituations.Sections 4-102 and 4-107 of theTortImmunityAct provide complete im-munityforsuchclaims,whichtogetherimmunize a failure to prevent a crimeormake an arrest or hold a person incustody.InPrough,theCountyreleasedan arrestee, despite a circuit court’sdetention order for his involuntaryadmissionforapsychologicalevaluationundertheMentalHealthandDisabilitiesCode,405ILCS5/1-100,et seq. (West2014).Afterhisreleasethemanpromptlymurderedhisfather.Id.¶11.Thecourtfoundnoliabilitytothefather’sestate,applying the absolute immunities of §4-102and§4-107.Id.¶26.

Ofcourse,beforethequestionofim-munityiseveraddressed,therecouldbenoclaimunlessthereisatortdutyowedtotheinjuredpartybythegovernment.InPrough,followingtheIllinoisSupremeCourt’s lead inDeSmett v. County of Rock Island,219Ill.2d497(2006),thecourtassumedadutysimplytodecidethedefendants’§2-619motion,cuttingrighttotheimmunityissues.See Prough, 110146at¶14. LikeDeSmett, the case demonstrates thestrengthof the4-102

and4-107 immunities.But seeFenton v. City of Chicago, 2013 ILApp (1st)111596,wherefailuretoprotectaplain-tiffundertheIllinoisDomesticViolenceAct(IDVA)overcametheseimmunities,asthecourtheldthattheIDVAimposesaspecialdutyuponpoliceofficerstowardthoseprotectedundertheAct,andthatofficers could be liable for injuries tothoseprotectedindividuals.NothingintheTortImmunityActimposesthistypeofspecialdutyontogovernmentofficials.

Pedestrians

Themost frequent claim reflectedby recent cases involves pedestrianswhofailtostayuprightoroutofthewayofotherdangers.Twoprinciplestestedmoststrenuouslyintheseclaimsaretheintended and permitted user provisionof§3-102(a)oftheTortImmunityAct,andthecommonlawruleofnodutytopreventinjuriesfromnaturalaccumula-tions of ice and snow.A city owesnodutytoapedestrianwalkingonthestreetbecauseastreetisintendedandpermittedforusebyvehicles,notwalkers,unlessin a crosswalk or the area boundinglegallyparkedvehicles.Zameer v. City of Chicago,2013ILApp(1st)120198;DeMambrov.CityofSpringfield,2013ILApp(4th)120957.

What if the pedestrian, however,cannotfindthecrosswalkbecauseit iscovered in snow? In Harden v. City of Chicago, 2013 ILApp (1st) 120846,

theplaintiff trippedwhenher foot gotstuck in ametal platewhile crossingthestreetonlythreefeetoutsideofthecrosswalk.Shemighthavestayedwithinthe crosswalk and avoided the hazardexceptthecrosswalklineswerecoveredbysnow.Sothequestionbecame,wasthreefeetoutsideofthecrosswalkcloseenough to the crosswalk such that thecitycouldanticipatethatcrosswalklinesmightbeobscuredbysnow,andintendedandpermittedusersmightaccidentallystray outside of the crosswalk lines?According to the Harden court, thecitydidnotoweadutytotheplaintiff.Id. ¶ 37.As the court observed, therearemarked crosswalks and unmarkedcrosswalks,delineatedbycertainlaterallinesextendedfromsidewalksperpen-diculartothestreet,definedby§1-113oftheIllinoisVehicleCode.625ILCS5/1-113(West2014).Id.¶28.Hadtheplaintiffbeeninwhatwouldqualifyasanunmarkedcrosswalk,theresultmighthavebeendifferent.Whilethecitymayhavehad a duty tomaintain the streetfor pedestrians even if outside of thecrosswalk lines, the plaintiff’s injuryin Hardenoccurredevenoutsideofanunmarked crosswalk.Hence, the courtfoundtherewasnodutyowed.

Butacitymaynotoweadutyevenfor an unmarked crosswalk if othermarkingsandthenatureofthepropertyindicate that the city intended pedestrians to cross onlywithin a nearbymarkedcrosswalk. InDunet v. Simmons, 2013ILApp(1st)120603,apedestrianwaskilledwhenhitbyacarwhilecrossinga street in an area that qualified as anunmarked crosswalkunder § 1-113oftheVehicle Code, allegedly becauseof negligent lighting of the area.Thepedestrian could have crossed at awell-litmarked crosswalk two blocks


The court, however, looked to federal law for guidance

where absolute immunity for prosecutorial decisions,

even those motivated by malice toward the plaintiff,

has held strong, and rejected the plaintiff’s claim.


Municipal Law | continued

away.The court reiterated that under §3-102(a)oftheTortImmunityAct,themunicipalityonlyhasaduty if itbothintendsandpermits theproperty tobeusedinthewayinwhichitisusedwhentheinjuryoccurred.Id. ¶28.Althoughapedestrianmaybepermittedtocrossin an unmarked crosswalk,where themunicipality intends pedestrians tocrossatanotherlocationdesignatedbycrosswalkmarkings, the pedestrian isnot an intended user of the unmarkedcrosswalk. Id.¶30.Asaresult,therewasnodutyandnoliability.

Road Design and Maintenance

In§§3-102and3-104oftheTortImmunityAct,Illinoisprovidessomeofthebroadestimmunityinthecountrytomunicipalities for highwaydesign andmaintenance claims. Adding in the dis-cretionaryimmunityof§2-201,aswellasthegeneralizedpremisesliabilitydutyrulesof§3-102(a)oftheTortImmunityAct,municipalitieshavequiteafortressforclaimsblamingvehicleaccidentsonroadwayconstruction,designandmain-tenance. In Perfetti v. Marion County, 2013ILApp(5th)110489,theplaintifflost control of his vehicle, allegedlybecauseofa“wavy,spongyandmushy”roadsurface, exacerbatedbyadeclinein the roadway. Id. ¶¶ 7-9.Applying§3-102(a)oftheAct,thecourtruledthatthetrialcourtproperlygrantedadirectedverdictbasedonalackofevidencethatthecountyhadactualknowledgeoftheproblemorthattheconditionexistedforalongenoughtimetoestablishconstruc-tiveknowledge.Id.¶11.

On the other hand, in Martinelli v. City of Chicago, 2013 ILApp (1st)113040,theplaintiffwasabletomaneu-veraroundtheimmunitiestopreserveanalmostsevenmilliondollarverdict,after

being struck by amotorist on a streetconstruction project.The case is lawschoolexamination-likeinitsdiscussionofduty,immunity,andproximatecause.Thegistofit,however,isthatalthough§3-104immunizesapublicentityforitsfailureto“initially”providetrafficregu-latoryandsafetymeasures,onceitdoesso,itispotentiallyliablefornegligentlyaltering thosemeasures. Id. ¶ 18.Theplaintiffthere,autilitycompanylaborerworkingwithcityemployeesinlocatingundergroundcableforconstructionworkon a city street,was seriously injuredwhen struck by amotorist, allegedlybecause the city had removedvariousdevices that it had previously put inplace to separate thework site fromareas where motorists travel. Id. ¶ 11.The city argued itwas immune fromliabilityunder§3-104foritsfailuretokeepsuchdevicesinplace,butthecourtfoundthatalthough§3-104wouldhaveimmunizedthecityforitsinitialdecisionregardingtrafficcontroldevicesorsafetymeasures, once it put them in place, §3-104immunitywaslost.Id.¶21.

Schools

Jane Doe – 3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors,2012IL112479,isbyfarthemostsignificantrecentdecisionaffectingschooldistrictliability, and in reality, the potentialexposure of any employer.As statedbefore in this column, bad factsmakebad law, and real bad factsmake realbadlaw.Inallfairness,allofthefactsintheIllinoisSupremeCourtandappel-latecourtopinionsweretakenfromthecomplaint,sothatthedefendantschooldistricthadnoopportunityonthosebigstagestoofferitssideofthestory.Withthatdisclaimerinmind,thefactsallegedagainstthedefendantschooldistrictwere

somewhat horrendous.The complaintallegedthattheabusingteacherhadbeendischarged from the defendant schooldistrictforsexualmisconduct,butwashiredbyanotherdistrictafteritreceivedareportfromthedefendantdistrictthattheteacher had completed his employment therewithoutanyproblems.Id. ¶5.

The circuit court dismissed thecomplaintforlackofaduty.Id. ¶11.Theappellatecourtreversed,findingthatthedefendantdistrictwillfullyandwantonlymisrepresented the teacher’s record. Id. ¶12.

TheIllinoisSupremeCourtaffirmed,but first addressed the duty question,whichtheappellatecourtbypassed.Id. ¶¶ 18-38.Becausewillful andwantonconductisnotaseparatetort,butaformof negligence, the entire negligenceanalysis, includingwhether the defen-dant owed the plaintiff a duty,mustbemet.The supreme court found thatmereallegationsofwillfulandwantonmisrepresentationwouldnotestablishaduty,butthatusingthefour-partcommonlawdutyanalysis,whichconsiders theforeseeability and likelihoodof injury,thedefendantdistrictowedtheplaintiffsa dutynot to place them in danger by“passing” the bad teacher on to theirschool district. Id.¶35.Findingaduty,the court then addressedwhether thedefendant districtwas immune under § 2-109 of the Tort ImmunityAct,whichimmunizesliabilityarisingoutof“theactsoromissionsofanother.”Thecourtlimitedthatprovisiontoclaimsof“superiors”liability,somethingfamiliarto federal civil rights law,where thereis no respondeat superiorliabilityforasupervisorfortheactionsofanunderling.Id. ¶ 42. The court also found that §2-210immunityfornegligentmisrep-resentationwasnotapplicablebecausethe allegations in the complaint alleged


willful andwanton conduct. Id. ¶ 44.The Doe-3 decision and its implications couldoccupyitsowncolumn,orevenacompletemonograph,andtheramifica-tionsofitbearwatching.Theflurryofconcurringanddissentingopinionsinitaddtothediscourse.

Bullying, in schools, themilitary,eventheNFL,isahottopic.InHaskal v.Williams,2013ILApp(4th)121131,the court found that a school district’sreactiontothebullyingofastudent,indenyingthestudent’srequesttotransferto another classroom, fellwithin thediscretionaryimmunityof§2-201oftheTortImmunityAct.

Fire and Rescue

In Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 2013ILApp(1st)122360,theappellatecourtuphelda juryverdict in favorofthe plaintiff for paramedics’ willfuland wanton response to a 911 call.Abruzzo first gained famewhen theIllinois SupremeCourt decided thattheabsoluteimmunityof§§6-105and6-106oftheTortimmunityAct,foranyfailuretoevaluate,diagnose,orprescribetreatment for an illness or physicalcondition,didnottrumpthewillfulandwantonconductexceptiontoimmunityundertheEmergencyMedicalServices

Act (210 ILCS5013.150(a)).Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324(2008).At trial after remand, the juryfoundthedefendantparamedics’conductwillfulandwanton,whichwasaffirmedon appeal based on the difficult factssurroundingtheparamedicresponse.Id. at329.Oneofthemoretroublingaspectsof the case, however, is that the trialcourtallowedtheplaintiff tointroduceas an evidentiary admission a statement from the defendants’ § 2-619motionto dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint.Id. at 330.Themotion, tracking theallegationsinthecomplaint,arguedthattheTortImmunityActappliedbecausethe defendant paramedics provided notreatment in response to the call. Id. The plaintiff introduced thestatement fromthemotionattrialtorebuttheparamed-ics’ evidence that they complied with all oftheirstandardoperatingproceduresforthe call. Id.at330.Theappellatecourtfound the trialcourtproperlyadmittedthe statement, thoughwarning that therulingwasconfinedtothefactsofthatcase. Id. at347.

Nevertheless, the concern that the decision raises for defendants,particularlygovernmentaldefendants,isobvious.Defendantsmustadmitalltypesofallegationsinacomplainttopresentanappropriatemotiontodismiss.After

all,thebasisforamotiontodismissisthat, even taking theallegations in thecomplaintastrue,noclaimexists,eitherbecauseunder§2-615,thereisnosuchcauseofaction,orunder§2-619,someaffirmativematter defeats the claim.Defenseattorneyswillhavetocarefullytailor their motions to dismiss to avoid the Abruzzoresultifthecaseultimatelygets tried.

ParamedicsdidgetabreakinWilkinsv.Williams,2013IL114310,wheretheplaintiffwasinjuredinacollisionwithan ambulance on a non-emergencytransportofapatientfromahospitaltoa nursing home.The court found thatthe negligence immunity afforded bytheEMSAct applied even though thetransport was not an emergency, and that theambulancewasoperatingwithoutitslights or siren activated. Id.¶4.Thecourtalso held that § 11-205 of the IllinoisVehicleCode,which requires that anyemergencyresponsebeconductedwithduecare,didnotnegatethenegligenceimmunityavailabletoparamedicsunderthe EMS Act. Id. ¶ 36; see, e.g. 625ILCS11-205.

Conclusion

These cases discussed above eachhighlight themultiplemoving partsinvolved in defending governmentalentitiesandhowduties,immunities,andcommon lawdefenses can get blurredinanundueway.Carefullydelineatingthe precise nature of any defense isparamountineffectivelypresentingthedefenseofagovernmententity.

The supreme court found that mere allegations

of willful and wanton misrepresentation would not

establish a duty, but that using the four-part common

law duty analysis, which considers the foreseeability

and likelihood of injury, the defendant district owed

the plaintiffs a duty not to place them in danger by

“passing” the bad teacher on to their school district.


Catherine A. CookeRobbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., Chicago

Property Insurance

About the Author

Catherine A. Cooke is an associate at Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd. and concentrates her practice in the area of commercial litigation and creditors’ rights. She earned her un-dergraduate degree from Indiana University–Bloom-ington in 2003, and law

degree from The John Marshall Law School in 2006, where she served as Administrative Editor of The John Marshall Law Review. She is licensed to practice law in both Illinois and Indiana.

As lawyers representing condomin-iumassociationsandpropertyinsurancecompanies,orperhapsascondominiumowners ourselves, it is important tobe aware of the rights andobligationsassociatedwith condominiumproper-ties, particularly those built in the lastfive-to-ten years.What recourse doesa condominium association have forbuilding defects and how longmightthoserightsbeprotected?Inacasedem-onstratingthesignificanceof thefraudexception to the statute of limitationsandstatuteofreposeofconstruction-re-latedclaims,theIllinoisAppellateCourtFirstDistrictheld that a condominium associationcouldproceedonitsclaimsagainstadevelopernearly15yearsafterconstructionwascompleted.Henderson Square Condo. Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, et al,2014ILApp(1st)130764.The facts of the case are relativelystraightforward, andunfortunately, arenot terriblyuncommon inconstructionlitigationinvolvingcondominiums.

Theplaintiffcondominiumassocia-tionanditsBoardofManagersallegedthat the defendants—the developmentcompanies and its owners—began tomarketandsellindividualcondominiumunits in the project and, in doing so,“represented and impliedly warranted that the property and the unitswouldbe habitable and free from defects.”

Condominium Association CanBring Claims for Breach of Fiduciary

Duty and Misleading Marketing Materials Nearly 15 Years after Construction

Was Completed

Henderson Square Condo. Ass’n,2014ILApp (1st)130764, ¶12.Longafterthe defendants turned over control ofthecondominiumassociationtothefirstowner-elected board in 1996, certainunitsbegantoexperiencewaterseepageno later than thewinterof2007-2008.Id.¶36.

Sometime in 2009, the condo-miniumassociationretainedanexteriorrestoration consultant and engineer toinvestigatethewaterproblems.Id. ¶13.The association then retained a contrac-tor to undertake repairs, duringwhichthe contractor discovered significantdeficienciesintheoriginalconstruction.Id. ¶14.Theplaintiffsallegedthat thedefectscouldnothavebeendiscoveredwithout performing extensive testingor opening up of walls, and “[t]hedefectswere concealed and, as such,theywere not reasonablydiscoverableto the Unit owners who did not possess special knowledge or skill in thefieldofconstruction.”Id. Istherenowargu-ablyanexceptiontocaveat emptorforcondominiumowners?

The Original Complaint

The plaintiffs filed their originalcomplaintonOctober31,2011allegingfivecausesofaction:(1)breachoftheimpliedwarranty of habitability; (2)

fraud; (3) negligence; (4) breach oftheChicagoMunicipalCodeprovisionprohibitingmisrepresentation of factsduring themarketing and sale of realestate (ChicagoMunicipalCode§13-82-030);and(5)breachoffiduciaryduty.Id. ¶ 1.Thecruxofalloftheunderlyingallegationswasthatthedefendantsfailedto construct the units free of defectsand in accordance with the advertised plans and specifications. Id. ¶¶ 17-23. The plaintiffs further alleged that thedeveloper-controlled boardmembersinadequately funded the association’sreserveaccount.Id.¶24.

The defendantsmoved to dismissthefirst three counts on the basis thattheyweretime-barred,havingbeenfiledmorethan14yearsafterthedefendantsturnedovercontroloftheassociationtotheowner-electedboardin1996.Id. 28.Therelevantconstruction-relatedstatuteof limitationsandstatuteofreposearefoundin735ILCS5/13-214.

Section 13-214(a) sets forth thestatuteoflimitations,inpart,asfollows:“Actions based upon tort, contract orotherwise against any person for anact or omission of such person in thedesign,planning,supervision,observa-


(Continued on next page)

tionormanagementofconstruction,orconstructionofanimprovementtorealpropertyshallbecommencedwithin4yearsfromthetimethepersonbringinganactionorhisorherprivitykneworshouldreasonablyhaveknownofsuchactoromission.”735ILCS5/13-214(a).

Section13-214(b) is the statuteofrepose,whichstatesthatactionssetforthin the preceding subsectionmay notbebroughtafter10yearshaveelapsedfromthe timeofsuchactoromission,however any person who discovers an actoromissionprior to10years fromthetimeoftheactoromissionshallinnoeventhavelessthan4yearstobringacauseofaction.735ILCS5/13-214(b). Forboththestatutesoflimitationsandrepose,“[t]helimitationsofthisSectionshallnotapplytocausesofactionarisingoutoffraudulentmisrepresentationsortofraudulentconcealmentofcausesofaction.”735ILCS5/13-214(e).

The trial court granted the defen-dants’section2-619motion todismissthe first three counts,with prejudice,butgrantedtheplaintiffsleavetofileanamendedcomplaintastothefourthandfifthcounts. Henderson Square Condo. Ass’n,2014ILApp(1st)130764,¶30.

The Amended Complaint andNew Factual Allegations

OnJuly2,2012,theplaintiffsfiledan amended complaint, which re-alleged countsIthroughIIIforpurposesofpre-servingtheissuesonappeal.Id. ¶39.Theamendedcomplaintincludedcertainad-ditionalfactsnotcontainedintheoriginalcomplaint. Specifically, the plaintiffsalleged thatwhilemarketing theunits,the defendants provided prospectivepurchaserswithaninformationpacket,which includedbuilding specificationswiththetypeandlocationoftheinsula-

tiontobeused.Id. ¶ 34.Theplaintiffsalso alleged that the project contemplated ongoingconstructionand“add-onunits”andthatfurtherconstructionwastobeundertakenin2012.Id. ¶ 35.

Next, the plaintiffs alleged that itwasnotuntilafteremploying thecon-tractors that the association discovered thefullextentofthelatentdeficienciesintheoriginalconstruction.Amongotherproblems, themasonry lackedmortar,theexteriorwallssurroundingmasonryopeningsandabovethetopfloorceilingslackedadequateinsulationorinsulationentirely,andthewallsabovethetopfloorlackedapropervaporbarrier.Id. ¶ 36.

The Defendants’ Motion toDismiss the Amended Complaint

The defendants filed a 735 ILCS5/-2-619.1motion to dismiss on thebasis that the causes of actionwerebarred, relying on the 10-year statuteof repose in the construction claimstatute.Thedefendantsallegedthattheconstructionwas completed in 1996,and any subsequent constructionwasunrelatedtotheplaintiffs’property.Id. ¶52.Inresponse,theplaintiffsarguedthattheconstructionclaimsstatuteoflimita-tionsdidnotapplybecausetheircausesofactionwerebasedonmarketingand

The trial court found that the plaintiffs’ causes of

action were based in construction and found that the

fraud-based exception to the statute of limitations or

repose did not apply because the plaintiffs failed to

plead fraud with the necessary particularity.

As to count IV for breach of theChicagoMunicipalCode,theplaintiffsalleged certain misrepresentations in themarketingmaterials, such as thatthe units reflected “solid constructionskills,”thatthedevelopmentcompanieswerecommittedto“qualityanddetail,”and regarding the specifications of theinsulationtobeused.Id. ¶ 41.IncountV,theplaintiffsallegedthattheindividualdeveloper-runboardmembersbreachedtheirfiduciarydutiesby failing to suf-ficiently fund the reserves,particularlybecausetheykneworshouldhaveknownthat the project contained extensive defectsand the reserve fundingduringtheirtenureontheboardwasinsufficienttoaddressthosedefects.Id. ¶ 44.

fraud,notconstruction,oralternatively,theexceptionforfraudulentmisrepre-sentation applied and their claims were thus still timely under the statute oflimitations or statute of repose. Id. ¶54.Thedefendants’combinedmotionalsocontainedasection2-615motiontodismissthecauseofactionbasedontheChicagoMunicipalCode becausethey alleged it did not provide a private causeofactionfordamages.Id. ¶57.

The trial court granted the defen-dants’motionanddismissedcountsIVandVof the amended complaintwithprejudice. In doing so, it found thatthe causes of actionwere time-barredand that the plaintiffs failed to plead


Property Insurance | continued

sufficientfactstostateacauseofactioninbothcounts.Id. ¶60.Thetrialcourtfoundthattheplaintiffs’causesofactionwerebasedinconstructionandfoundthatthefraud-basedexceptiontothestatuteof limitations or repose did not applybecause the plaintiffs failed to pleadfraudwith the necessary particularity.Id. ¶63.

Inadditiontofindingthecausesofactionweretime-barred, thetrialcourtdismissed counts IV andVbecause itconcludedbothcountsfailedtostateacauseofaction(thoughthedefendants’2-615 motion was only directed atcountV). The court found that themisrepresentations in count IVwerenot actionable because the ChicagoMunicipalCode provision applied topre-existing facts and not promises toperforminthefuture.Id. ¶¶69-70.Thetrialcourtalsofoundthattheindividualdefendants only controlled the boardforashortperiodin1996,andtheyhadnofiduciarydutytomaintainfundsonbehalfofthecondominiumassociationin2009.Id. ¶72.

Appellate Court Reverseson All Counts

Onappeal,theplaintiffsfirstarguedthat the trial court should not haveappliedtheconstruction-relatedsection13-214statuteoflimitationsandreposetocountsIVandVbecausetheydidnotarisefromconstruction-relatedactivities.Instead, they argued that, the 5-yearstatuteoflimitations,foundwithin735ILCS 5/13-205 for actions to recoverdamages for injury to property or allcivil actions not otherwise provided for,applied.Id. ¶¶81,85.Alternatively,theplaintiffs argued that if the section13-214periodsapplied,allcountswere

timelyfiled, or if untimely, theywereexceptedfromthelimitationsperiodbythe fraud exception containedwithinsection13-214(e).Id. ¶81.

The appellate court found that thefraud exception applied, and reversed.The appellate court concluded that itneednotdeterminewhentheactualactsoromissionsoccurredbecauseitfoundthefraudexceptionhadbeentriggered.Id. ¶94.“Fraudulentconcealmentstopstherunningofthestatuteoflimitationsperioduntilthecauseofactionisdiscov-ered.” Id. ¶95;Eickmeyer v. Blietz Org., Inc.,284Ill.App.3d134,140(1stDist.1996);Gillespie Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.7v.Wight&Co., 2014IL115330,¶41.Thoughthepurposeofthestatuteofreposeistoterminateliabilityafteracertaintime,itwouldbeunjusttoallowthedefendant to benefit fromconceal-mentof theplaintiffs’ causeof action,andthustheappellatecourtdeterminedthatitmustexaminewhetherthedefen-dants’ actions amounted to fraudulentconcealment. Henderson Square Condo. Ass’n,2014ILApp(1st)130764,¶96.

Were the Latent ConstructionDefects “Concealed?”

Theplaintiffsallegedthattheprob-lems with the property were latent

defects,which by themselves, are notsufficient to circumvent the statute ofreposeunderthesection13-214(e)fraudexception. Id.¶99.Toassertfraudulentconcealment,theplaintiffmustshowanaffirmativemisrepresentation,orintheabsenceofone,deceptiveconduct,whichresults in an act of concealment. Id. ¶ 100;Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc.,245Ill.App.3d258,270(2dDist.1993).Thecourtnotedthatwhilesi-lencealoneinnotdisclosingdefectsdoesnot give rise to a misrepresentation claim, ifthesilenceiscoupledwithdeceptiveconductor the suppressionofmaterialfactsresults inactiveconcealment, theseller has a duty to speak.Henderson Square Condo. Ass’n,2014ILApp(1st)130764,¶100.

Marketing Brochure ContainedPotential Misrepresentations

The plaintiffs argued that the in-formationpacketdistributedbythede-fendantstoprospectivebuyersincludedspecificationsregardinginsulationtobeused,whiletheengineer’sreportnotedthat portions of the exteriorwalls andceilingeitherlackedinsulationentirely,orlackedadequateinsulation.Id.¶103.Because the representations regardingthespecificgradesof insulationwould

The court noted that while silence alone in

not disclosing defects does not give rise to a

misrepresentation claim, if the silence is coupled

with deceptive conduct or the suppression of

material facts results in active concealment,

the seller has a duty to speak.


encourage potential purchasersnot to makeadditionalinquiries,theappellatecourt concluded that the plaintiffs hadpleadedadequatefacts toraiseaques-tionoffactastowhetherthedefendantsowedadutytorevealthattheproperty,contrarytowhatwasrepresented,lackedinsulationcompletelyorlackedadequateinsulationintheexteriorwallsandthirdfloorceiling.Id.

Inadequate Funding of Reserves May Amount to Concealment

The board ofmanagers of a con-dominium association is responsibleto adopt a budget,which provides forreasonablereserves,takingintoaccountthe repair and replacement cost, and estimatedusefullifeofthepropertyitisobligatedtomaintain.765ILCS605/9(c)(2). The plaintiffs argued that thedefendantsknewextensiverepairswouldberequiredtofixthelatentconstructiondefects. Thus, when they budgetedreservesasboardmembers,theirconductamountedtoafalsestatementabouttheestimated useful life and condition ofthe property. Henderson Square Condo. Ass’n,2014ILApp(1st)130764,¶106.

A boardmember’s fiduciary dutyrequiresthemtoensurethatreservefundsareadequatetofundforeseeablerepairsatthetimetheyturnedovertheproperty.Id. ¶129.Whetherthedefendantboardmembersprovided reasonable reservesin light of the known latent defectswasaquestionoffactandaccordingly,dismissalonamotionpursuant tosec-tions2-619or2-615wasimproper.Id. ¶¶ 106,129.

Chicago Municipal Code Creates a Private Cause of Action for Damages

Lastly,theappellatecourtconcludedthat regardless of the version of theChicagoMunicipalCodeineffectatthetimethelawsuitwasfiled, itpermitteda private cause of action for damagesinadditiontoattorneys’feeseveniftheword “damages” was not expressly stated in the Code section. Id. ¶112.Thoughthedefendants’ allegedly false statementswere notmisrepresentations of pre-existingfacts,asisrequiredforcommonlaw fraud claims, the appellate courtconcludedthatSection13-72-030oftheChicagoMunicipalCodeconcernedthemarketing and sale of condominiums,whichmayoccurprior to constructionis complete. Id. ¶118.

It thereforeconcludedthatthelawwas intended to provide a remedy sepa-rateandinadditiontocommonlawfraudclaims. Id.Analogizing the ChicagoMunicipalCode section to disclosuresunder the Residential Real PropertyDisclosureAct,735ILCS77/1et seq., the appellate court also found that acauseofactionneednotbepleadedwiththeparticularity required for fraud. Id. ¶¶117-118.Ifthedefendantsconcealedthe falseness of their representationsinmarketing the property, the statuteof reposewas tolled, and accordingly,dismissalonasection2-615motiontodismiss was improper. Id. ¶118.

Lessons from Henderson square condominium Association

Condominium associations willlikely rejoice in this recent, detailedruling,thoughdevelopersandmembersofthefirstdeveloper-runboardwillnot.Thecasedemonstratesthenecessityof

adequate funding of an association’sreserveaccounts,particularlywhenthedeveloper or itsmembers are on theboardandsubjecttoindividualliabilityforbreachoffiduciaryduty.Totheextentdefects in the constructionmay notbecome apparent until well after thedeveloper turnover, in this case, some10-plusyearslater,acondominiumas-sociationmaystillbeabletosuccessfullyallegefraudulentconcealmentofdefectsand toll the statute of limitations andstatuteofrepose—oratleasttheclaimsmaysurviveamotiontodismiss.

Henderson Square also highlights the additional cause of action to beawareofpursuanttoSection13-72-030and13-72-10oftheChicagoMunicipalCode against a developer or seller in the marketingofrealproperty.TheseCodesectionspermitrecoveryofdamagesandattorneys’fees,inadditiontoanyothercommon law fraud claims, anddonotrequiremisrepresentations of existingfacts or the same pleading specificityrequiredforfraud.

Thiscasemaycausecondominiumassociations to consider or reconsider itsinsuranceliabilitycoveragepriortoandaftertakingpossessionandcontrolof the property from the developer.Additionally, it serves as a reminder that associationsand theirattorneys shouldtimely submit any claims relating toconstruction defects to their insurerswhen they first realize such defectsexist—evenifthescopeoftheproblemsisunknownandthedefectsarisemanyyearsafterdeveloperturnover.


Seth D. LamdenNeal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Chicago

Insurance Law Update

About the Author

Seth D. Lamden is a litiga-tion partner at Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP in Chi-cago. He concentrates his practice on representing corporate and individual policyholders in coverage disputes with their insur-ers. In addition to dispute resolution, Mr. Lamden

counsels clients on matters relating to insurance and risk management, including maximizing insurance recovery for lawsuits and property damage, policy audits and procurement, and drafting contractual insurance specifications and indemnity agreements. He obtained his B.A. from Brandeis University and his J.D., magna cum laude, from The John Marshall Law School.

When an insurer agrees to defenditsinsuredagainstapotentiallycoveredclaimwithoutreservingtherighttodenycoverage,theinsurerusuallyhastherighttocontrolthedefenseoftheunderlyinglawsuit.See 3JeffreyE.Thomas,NewAppleman on Insurance LawLibraryEdition § 16.04(1) (LexisNexis).Thisrightpermitstheinsurertodictatehowmuchmoneywillbespentonlitigation,whichtacticalchoiceswillbemade,andwhetherandwhenthecasewillbetriedor settled.The insurer loses the rightto control the defense under Illinoislaw,however,ifitreservesitsrightstodeny coverage pursuant to a coveragedefensethatturnsonfactsthatmaybedeveloped in the underlying litigation.See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 64Ill. 2d 187, 197 (1976). For example,whenaninsureragreestodefendasuitallegingbothnegligenceandintentionalmisconduct, but reserves the right todeny coverage for damages becauseof intentionalmisconduct, it creates aconflictofinterest.Iftheinsuredisfoundliable,theinsurerwouldbenefitfromafindingthattheliabilitywascausedbyuncovered intentionalmisconduct, yettheinsuredwouldbenefitfromafindingthattheliabilitywascausedbycoverednegligence. See Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d at198-99.Inotherwords,thereisariskthatan insurercontrolling thedefensemay“steer” the defense toward uncoveredcountsortheoriesofliability.

When a “Peppers” conflict arises,

What Peppers Counsel Needs toKnow Before Agreeing to Follow

Insurer Litigation Guidelines

the insurer loses its right to selectdefensecounselorcontrol thedefenseof the underlying action. Instead, theinsurerisobligatedtodischargeitscon-tractualduty todefendbyreimbursingthe insured“for the reasonablecostofdefendingtheaction”by“independent”counselwhoisselectedandcontrolledsolelybytheinsured,andwhorepresentsthe sole interests of the insured, andnot the insurer. Id.The insurermustreimbursetheinsuredfordefensecostsastheyareincurred.See Ins. Co. of the State of Penn. v. Protective Ins. Co., 227Ill.App.3d360,368-69(1stDist.1992).Ofcourse,insurersandinsuredsdonotalwaysagreeonhowtomeasurewhat constitutes a reasonable defensecost, and disputes can arise betweenthe insured’sright todirect itsdefenseand the insurer’s right to limitdefenseexpenditurestothosethatarereasonableand necessary.

Moreover, as discussed below,defense counselmust ensure that aninsurer’slitigationguidelinesdonotcom-promisetheattorney’sdutytotheinsuredofloyaltyandindependentprofessionaljudgment.Litigationguidelines that re-strictadefenseattorney’sabilitytodefendacaseeffectivelybecausetheystatethattheinsurerwillnotpayforcertaincostsordefenseactivitiescouldpresentseriousethicalconcernsiftheattorneybelievesthatsuchcostsoractivitiesarenecessaryto the defense of the case.Moreover,reportingobligationssetforthinlitigation

guidelinesdonottrumpdefensecounsel’sdutytoobtaintheconsentoftheinsured,their sole client, prior to disclosing to the insurerconfidentialorprivilegedinforma-tionthatmightimpairtheinsured’srightto coverage.

Insurers Often Attempt toControl Litigation Costs byRequiring Compliance with“Litigation Guidelines” or

“Billing Guidelines”

Insurers often ask their insuredsand their defense counsel to abide byinsurer-drafted litigation guidelinesas aprerequisite to reimbursement fordefense costs.Requirements imposedbysuchguidelinescaninclude:capsonhourlyrates;restrictionsonstaffing(bothbyseniorityandnumberofattorneys);refusal to pay for certain tasks (suchasmeetings among attorneys); refusalto pay certain expenses as “overhead” (suchascopying,onlineresearch,workby paralegals and other non-attorneystaff);andrequiringtheuseoftask-basedbilling codes instead of block billingtolimitfurthertheworkforwhichthe


attorney (and the insured) can seekreimbursement.

Litigation GuidelinesAre Not Mandatory

Although litigation guidelines areoften presented to defense counsel asmandatory, there is usually nothingin the insurance policy that requirescompliancewith litigation guidelines.The touchstone forwhether an insurermustpayforaspecificdefenseactivityorassociatedcostiswhethertheworkorcostisa“reasonablecostofdefendingthe action.” Peppers,64Ill.2dat199.Litigation guidelines cannot supersedethe general rule that an insurer in aconflictsituationmustpayallreasonableand necessary defense expenses, andan insurer’s prospective refusal to payfor specificdefense activities does notconstitute a valid basis for the insurertorefusetopayforsuchactivities.See Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.,No.09C7063,2012WL2115487,at*5(N.D.Ill.June10,2012)(finding “any alleged noncompliancewith the billing guidelines does notrenderthefeeslegallyunreasonableanddoesnototherwiseaffecttheamountthat[theinsurer]owes”).

The Determination of Whether Attorney Fees are Reasonable

Should be Determined on aCase-By-Case Basis

Ingeneral,courtsfollowthefactorssetforthinIllinoisRuleofProfessionalConduct1.5whendeterminingwhetherattorneys’ fees incurred in the defenseofamatterarereasonable.SeeWilliamsv. Am. Country Ins. Co.,359Ill.App.3d128,142(1stDist.2005).Suchfactorsinclude:

thetimeandlaborrequired,thenovelty and difficulty of theissues, the skill required, thepreclusionofotheremploymentnecessary to accept the case, the customary fee charged inthecommunity, theamountofmoney involved in the case, theresultsobtained,andtheat-torney’sreputation,experience,andability.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 288Ill.App.3d743,758(1stDist.1997).Whenaninsurerdisputesitsobligationto reimburse the insured for defenseexpenses,suchexpensesaredeemedtobeprima facie reasonable if theyhavebeenpaidbytheinsured.See American Service Ins. Co. v. China Ocean Shipping Co. (Americas) Inc.,402Ill.App.3d513,530(1stDist.2010)(quotingTaco Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co.,388F.3d1069 (7thCir. 2004)). See also Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford,210F.Supp.2d1017,1025(N.D.Ill.2002)(findingfactthatinsured paid defense expenses soughtfrominsurer“stronglyimpliescommer-cialreasonablenessofthefees,especiallyinlightofthefactthatultimaterecoveryof the feeswasuncertainbecause [theinsurers]repeatedlyrefusedtopay”).

Rule 5.4(c) Precludes DefenseCounsel from Allowing an Insurer’s

Refusal to Pay for NecessaryLitigation Activities or Costs to

Interfere with the Attorney’sIndependent Professional Judgment

When an insurer’s reservation ofrights requires it to discharge its dutytodefendasathird-partypayeroflegalservices, independent defense counselcannotpermittheinsurer’sprospectiverefusaltopayforcertaindefenseactivi-ties or costs to compromise the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the insured.See Ill. Sup.Ct. R. Prof’l Conduct, R 5.4(c)(2014). In that regard, IllinoisRule ofProfessionalConduct5.4(c) states that“[a] lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services foranothertodirectorregulatethelawyer’sprofessionaljudgmentinrenderingsuchlegal services.” Id.Inotherwords,ifanattorneybelieves that certain activitiesarenecessaryfortheinsured’sdefense,theattorneycannotpermittheinsurertointerferewith the defense by refusingto pay for such activities. See ABA StandingComm. on Ethics& Prof’lResponsibility, Formal Op. 01-421(2001).Moreover,aninsurerwillbein


Litigation guidelines cannot supersede the general

rule that an insurer in a conflict situation must pay all

reasonable and necessary defense expenses, and

an insurer’s prospective refusal to pay for specific

defense activities does not constitute a valid basis for

the insurer to refuse to pay for such activities.


Insurance Law | continued

breachofitsdutytoprovideindependentdefensecounselifitattemptstocontrolthe defense by controlling the pursestrings. See Peppers,64Ill.2dat198-99.

At least one court has held thatdefensecounsel“whosubmittothere-quirementofpriorapprovalviolatetheirduties under theRules ofProfessionalConduct to exercise their independentjudgment and to give their undividedloyalty to insureds.” In Re Rules of Prof ’l Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d806 (Mont. 2000). Other courts andbarassociationshavestatedthatlitiga-tion guidelines require a case-by-caseanalysistoensurethattheguidelines,asapplied,donotputalawyerinapositionthat compromises the duty of loyaltyowed to theclientunder state rulesofprofessionalresponsibility.See, e.g.,Ky.BarAss’nEthicsComm.Op.KBAE-416(March2001),available athttp://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e-416.pdf.

Numerous courts and bar asso-ciations have identified restrictions inlitigationguidelines that so clearly in-terferewiththeindependentprofessionaljudgmentofanattorneythatitwouldbeimproperforanattorneytocomplywiththem.Such restrictions include requir-ing an attorney to obtain the insurer’sapprovalprior to: (1)performinglegalresearch(See OhioBd.ofComm’rsonGrievances and Discipline, Advisory Op. 2000-3 (June 1, 2000),available at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2000/Op%2000-003.doc); (2) conductingdiscovery,takingdepositions,orretain-ingexpertwitnesses(See Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723 (November 23, 1998),available at http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1723.htm;);and(3)filingmotionsorplead-

ings(See StateBarofAriz.Op.99-08(September 1999),available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=502).

Other guidelines that have beenfoundtobeimproperinclude:(1)refus-ing to pay for reasonable discussionsbetweenmembersof thedefense team(See Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm.Op.3of1998,available at http://www.inbar.org/Portals/0/downloads/ethics/1998.pdf ); (2) “dictat[ing] theuse of personnelwithin the lawyer’sownoffice”(Id.);and(3)requiringtheattorneytoobtaintheinsurer’sapprovalprior to conducting investigations orvisiting accident sites (See R.I. Supr.Ct.EthicsAdvisoryPanelFinalOp.No.99-18(Oct.27,1999),available athttp://www.courts.ri.gov/AttorneyResources/ethicsadvisorypanel/Opinions/99-18.pdf).

Defense Counsel Cannot Disclose Information that Could Adversely

Affect Coverage without theInsured’s Consent

Litigationguidelinesoften requiredefensecounseltoprovidestatusreportsandcaseevaluations regarding thede-fenseoftheunderlyingaction.Althoughaninsured’sobligationtocooperatewithitsinsurerrequirestheinsuredtoprovideinformation regarding the defense ofthecase,thisdutydoesnotnecessarilyrequiretheinsuredtoprovideinforma-

tion that would support a coveragedenial. SeeWasteMgmt., Inc. v. Int’lSurplus Lines Ins. Co.,144Ill.2d178,204(1991)(“Whiletheinsuredhasnoobligationtoassisttheinsurerinanyef-forttodefeatrecoveryofaproperclaim,thecooperationclausedoesobligatetheinsuredtodiscloseallofthefactswithinhisknowledgeandotherwisetoaidtheinsurerinitsdeterminationofcoverageunderthepolicy.”)

The IllinoisRules ofProfessionalConduct preclude an attorney fromdisclosingaclient’sconfidential infor-mationwithout the client’s consent.Specifically,IllinoisRuleofProfessionalConductRule1.6(a)providesthat“[a]lawyer shall not reveal informationrelatingtotherepresentationofaclientunlesstheclientgivesinformedconsent. . .” and IllinoisRule ofProfessionalConductRule1.8(b)providesthat“[a]lawyershallnotuse informationrelat-ing to representationof a client to thedisadvantage of the client unless theclientgivesinformedconsent...”

The Illinois State Bar Association hasrecognizedthatwithouttheconsentoftheinsured,adefenseattorneycannotdisclosetoaninsurerconfidentialcom-municationsor information thatmightprejudicetheinsured’srighttocoverage.In that regard, the Illinois State Bar Associationprovidedthefollowingcom-mentaryregardingadefenseattorney’sethicalobligationswhenreportingtoaninsurer:

The Illinois State Bar Association has recognized that without the consent of the insured, a defense attorney cannot disclose to an insurer confidential

communications or information that mightprejudice the insured’s right to coverage.

http://kybar.org

http://ohio.gov

http://http://www.vacle.org

http://www.azbar.org

http://www.inbar.org

http://ri.gov


[T]heCommitteedoesnotbe-lievethattheinsuredhasthedutyunderthe“cooperationclause”to reveal adverse informationconcerningpossiblelatenotice,misrepresentation, or other matterswhichmay prejudicethe insured’s coverage underthe policy. To the extent that the reports to the insurermayinvolveanysuchdisclosures,itis the Committee’s opinion that the insured’s general counselhasarighttoinsistthattheybedeleted,sincetheinsured’sdutytocooperatewiththeinsurerintheconductofthelitigationdoesnotextendtoincriminatingitselfwithrespecttopossiblepolicydefensesoftheinsurer.Insuchcircumstances, the retainedattorneymustrefrainfromdis-closinganysuchfacts,sincehehas the sameobligation inhisrepresentation of the insuredas if he had been personallyretainedbytheinsured.

Iftheretainedcounselandgen-eralcounselcannotagreeonthecontentofreportswithregardto the “cooperation clause”question, counsel retained bytheinsurershouldadvisegen-eralcounselthattheparticulardeletions or omissions may expose the insured to a claimofbreachofcooperationbytheinsurer.Iftheconflictbecomesirreconcilable,retainedcounselshouldmoveforleavetowith-drawpursuanttoRule1.16(b)(D)soasnottojeopardizetheattorney-client relationship with either the insurer or theinsured.

Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. on Prof’l ConductNo. 92-2, p. 3 (July17, 1992) (internal citation omitted),available at http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/92-02.pdf.In otherwords, the IllinoisRules ofProfessionalConductrequireadefenseattorneytoobtaintheconsentofhisorherclient,theinsured,beforedisclosingconfidential communications or infor-mationtoaninsurer,especiallyifsuchcommunicationsor informationmightprejudicetheinsured’srighttocoverage.

An Insurer’s Use of anOutside Fee Auditor CouldResult in a Privilege Waiver

Some litigationguidelines requiredefense attorneys to submit their in-voices to outside auditors retained bythe insurer to reviewbilling invoicesandwrite off fees charged forworkdeemedunnecessary.Attorneyinvoicesoften contain detailed informationregarding the defenseof the case thatmaybeprotectedbytheattorney-clientprivilege.Even though the disclosureto an insurer of privileged defenseinformationtypicallydoesnotconstituteawaiver of the privilege in Illinoispursuant toWasteManagement, 144Ill.2dat194,aninsurer’sdisclosureofprivileged information to a party thatis not part of the legal defense team,such as a third-party auditor, mayconstituteawaiveroftheprivilege.See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct & Insurer Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, 2P.3dat820-21(holdingdisclosureofconfidential information contained inbilling invoices to third-party auditormayresultinwaiverofattorney-clientprivilegeorwork-product protection).Because such disclosures could lead

toaprivilegewaiver,anattorneymustobtain the informed consent of theinsuredbeforesendingbillstoathird-partyfeeauditor.See ABAOp.01-421,supra, at 5-6 (stating “[a]majority ofjurisdictionshaveconcludedthatitisnotethicallyproperforalawyertodisclosebilling information to a third-partybilling reviewcompanyat the requestofaninsurancecompanyunlesshehasobtainedtheclient’sconsent.”)

Conclusion

Insureds should review litigationguidelinescarefullywiththeirdefensecounsel and attempt to negotiate anagreementwiththeinsureranddefensecounsel regarding acceptable billingpractices before the attorney beginsworkon thefile.Ultimately,however,it is the defense attorneywhomustensurethatlitigationguidelinesdonotinterferewiththedutiesimposedbytheIllinoisRulesofProfessionalConduct.Negotiatingamutually-agreeablebill-ing agreementwith the insurer earlyin thedefenseof thecasewillhelp toensurethatdefensecounsel’sabilitytorepresenttheinsuredeffectivelyisnotcompromisedmateriallybytheinsurer’slitigation guidelines, that the insurerdoes not breach its duty to provide afulldefense,andthatneithertheinsurednor the defense attorneywill end uphaving to shoulder anyportion of thefeesthatshouldbecoveredbyinsurance.Moreover,insuredsshouldadvisetheirinsurers that they do not consent tohavingtheirattorneys’billinginvoicesreviewed by third-party auditors inlightoftheriskthedisclosureofbillinginvoicestoanauditorcouldresultintheinadvertentwaiveroftheattorney-clientprivilege.

http://http://www.isba.org


Feature ArticleSteven M. PuiszisHinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago

Introduction

OnMay 29, 2014, the IllinoisSupremeCourt formally adopted rulesrelatingtothediscoveryofelectronicallystoredinformation(ESI).Toaccomplishthis,thecourtamendedIllinoisSupremeCourtRules201,214,and218.Illinois’new ediscovery rules (Rules) go intoeffectJuly1,2014.

Asawayofcontrollingediscoverycosts,theRulesincorporatetheconceptofproportionalityfromRule26(b)(2)(C)oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure.SupremeCourtRule201(a),asamended,provides “discovery requests that aredisproportionate in termsof burdenor

Steven M. Puiszis is a Partner with Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP. He serves as Hinshaw’s Deputy Gen-eral Counsel, counseling his firm’s lawyers on eth-ics, professional responsi-bility and risk management issues. He is a member of

Hinshaw’s Lawyers for the Profession Practice Group, which represents lawyers and law firms in liability and professional responsibility matters. Steve received his J.D. from Loyola University Chicago. Mr. Puiszis is a Past President of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. He is the Secretary Treasurer of DRI and serves on DRI’s Board of Directors. He is also a member of the Seventh Circuit’s Electronic Discovery Pilot Program Committee.

About the Author

Understanding Illinois’New Ediscovery Rules

categories of ESI then that intentionshould be addressed at the initial casemanagementconference...orassoonthereafteraspracticable.”Ill.S.Ct.R.201(c),CommitteeComments(adoptedMay29,2014).

TheRulesarealsonotableforwhatis not covered. They do not address severalissuesthathavearisenunderthefederalrulesrelatingtotheformatofESIwhenproducedindiscovery.TheRulesalsodonot touchuponwhen thedutytopreserveESIarises,whatmeasuresapartyshould take topreserveESI,andsanctionsforthelossofESI.

This articlewill briefly highlightthe differences betweenESI and con-

ofrulesrelatingtothediscoveryofESI.Ediscoverypresentsanumberofuniquechallengesunlikeanythingencounteredwhenpracticingintheeraofpaper-baseddiscovery.ESIdiffersfrompaperrecordsinatleastsevensignificantways:

Volume

First, the volume of potentiallyavailableESIindiscoverydiffersfromtraditional paper discovery. Today, computers andmobile devices are thesource of virtually all information,most of which is never printed onpaper outside of a litigation context.Largely, email has replaced telephone conversationsandmail.In2003,itwasestimated that “close to 100 billione-mailsaresentdaily,”andthatnumberhasonlygrownsince.GeorgeL.Paul&JasonR.Baron, Information Inflation:Can the Legal System Adapt?,13Rich.J.L.&Tech.10,(2007),available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article10.pdf. Additionally, the authors highlighted, “[t]he amount of stored information

Ediscovery presents a number of unique challenges

unlike anything encountered when practicing in the

era of paper-based discovery.

expenseshouldbeavoided.”Ill.S.Ct.R.201(a)(eff.July1,2014).Additionally,theCommitteeComments toSupremeCourtRule 201(c) adopted one of theapproachestakenintheSeventhCircuitEdiscovery Pilot Program Principles. ThecommentslistvariouscategoriesofburdensomeESI that can be excludedfrom discovery under a proportional-ity analysis.Rule 201(c)’sCommitteeCommentsfurtherexplain,“ifanypartyintends to request the preservation orproduction of potentially burdensome

ventional paper discovery that prompted theadoptionoftheRules.ItwilloutlineIllinois’newRulesandprovidepracticetipsfortheirapplication.

How Discovery of ESI is Different than Paper Discovery

A commonmisperception aboutelectronic discovery is that it is easy, and shouldbetreatedlikepaperdiscovery.Ifthatmisperceptionweretrue,thentherewouldhavebeennoneedfortheadoption


continues to grow exponentially,” ex-plaining:

Perhaps more easily grasped, the amount of information inbusinesshasincreasedbythou-sands,ifnottensofthousandsof times in the last fewyears.In a small business,whereasformerlytherewasusuallyonefour-drawer file cabinet fullofpaper records,now there istheequivalentoftwothousandfour-drawerfilecabinetsfullofsuchrecords,allcontainedinacubicfootorsointheformofelectronically stored informa-tion. This is a sea change. Id.

Today,for lessthan$100,onecanpurchaseaharddrivewithoneterabyteofstorageforahomecomputer.Onetera-byteofstorageequatesto50,000treesmade into paper and printed. The entire printedcollectionoftheU.S.LibraryofCongresswouldtakeonly10terabytesof storage.How Much Information? available at: http://www2.sims.berkley.edu/research/projects/how-muchinfo/datapowers.html.

Because of the explosion in theamount of electronic information, thecost to collect and review ESI forrelevancyandprivilegeisfargreaterthanthat involving paper discovery.

Metadata

Another way ESI differs frompaper discovery is metadata. ESI creates informationaboutitself,whichiscalledmetadata. Metadata is generally not visibletotheuser,andisautomaticallygeneratedbythesystemorapplicationusedtocreateanelectronicdocumentoranothertypeofESI.Metadatatellswho

createdadocument,whenitwascreated,when it was last accessed, who last viewed thedocument, if thedocumentwasmodified,whenitwasmodified,whomodifiedit,andhowmanyversionsofthedocumentexist.Itcanalsotellyouwho sent an email, when it was sent, who was copied on the email, and to whom it wassent.Dependingonthenatureoftheapplication or program involved, a com-puterorotherdevicecancreatehundredsoffieldsofmetadataaboutanelectronicdocumentorothertypesofESI.

The information provided by thegenerationofmetadatacanbeuseful.Forinstance,itcanbeusedtoauthenticateadocumentoridentifywhosentanemailwhen that isunclearorunknown.But,forthemostpart,manyofthemetadatafieldshavelittleornoevidentiaryvalueorusefulnessinlitigation.

Dynamic Nature

ESIalsodiffersfrompaperrecordsbecauseitisdynamicinnature.Variousmetadata fields automatically changesimply by clicking on a document toprint,ormoveittoafolder,ortransferittoadiscforproductionindiscovery.Simplyturningonorbootingupacom-putercanalterfragmentedinformationorresidualdataonacomputer’sharddrive.CertainformsofESI,suchasinformationinacomputer’srandomaccessmemory,orinuserorserverlogs,incachefiles,andinbrowserhistoriesareephemeralinnature,existingonlyforarelativelyshorttime.Throughforensicexaminationofacomputer’sharddrive,onemaybeable todiscover fragmentedordeleteddata, and ephemeral data is extremely difficult topreservegivenitsshort lifespan duringwhich its recovery couldevenoccur.

Exists in Various Formats

Additionally, unlike paper docu-ments, ESI can be created and storedinvariousformats.Therearethousandsof formatsused tocreateorstoreESI,manyofwhichareproprietaryinnature.Withoutaccess to theapplicationusedto create a particular form of ESI, itmay be unreadable and uselesswhenproduced in itsnativestate.Therefore,itiscriticaltoknowtheformatinwhichrequestedESIiscreatedandstored.ESIproducedinitsnativestatewillcontainmetadata,butcanbeverydifficulttobatestampandimpossibletoredact.ESIcanalsobeproducedinanimagedformat,themost common of which includeportabledocumentformat(.pdf),taggedinformationfile format (.tiff), or jointphotographicexpertsgroup(.jpg).WhileESIproducedinanimagedformatcanbebatestamped,redacted,andviewedbythepartyreceivingit,nometadatawillbeincludedwiththeimageunlessoneaddsaloadfiletotheimage.TheadditionofaloadfiletoESIproducedinanimagedformatwillrequirethepartiestoagreeonwhichmetadatafieldstoinclude,andwilladdtothecostofproduction.ThereareprosandconstoproducingESIinanativeorimagedformat,whichcounselshould carefully evaluate before anyproductionoccurs.

Dispersion of Data

Another salient difference is thedispersionofESI.Withpaper records,finding thewarehousewhere a com-pany’s records were stored was relatively easy.When it comes toESI, however,figuring outwhere the documents arestoredorlocatedcanpresentasignificantchallenge.ESIcanbestoredlocallyon




a company’s desktop computers, onportable laptops or tablets, onmobilephones,oronaflashdriveordisc.ESImay be found on home computers ifemployees are allowed towork from

home,orcouldbestoredonacompany’sservers located in a different state orcountry.Determining all the locationswhereESImaybestoredisnoeasytaskasreflectedbythediagrambelow:

Therouteanemailtakesdependsonthenetworkconfigurationofthesenderandrecipient’semailsystems.Howlonganemailresidesinanyoftheselocationswilldependupontheretentionpracticesofanypersonsorentitiesinvolvedinthetransmission.

DifficultyofDisposal

While ESI is dynamic in natureandcertainformsofESIcanbereadilyalteredthroughthenormaloperationofacomputer(e.g.metadataorfragmenteddata),electronicdocumentscanbemoredifficult to dispose of than their papercounterparts.Once a paper documentis shredded, it is irretrievable.On theotherhand,hitting thedeletekeyonacomputerdoesnotdeleteallinformation.Instead, hitting the delete key simplyaltersthecomputer’sfileallocationtableor disk directory so that the computerreads the space on the hard drive where the document is stored as availablefor reuse.Until the device reuses oroverwrites that space completely, the deletedinformation,oratleastaportion

Additionally,emailsmayexistinavarietyoflocations.Thenextdiagramshowsthevariousroutesasingleemailcanpotentiallytakebetweenthesenderandrecipient:



ofit,ispotentiallyrecoverablethroughaforensicexaminationofthecomputer’shard drive.

Thewide dispersion of ESI alsomakes itmoredifficult to dispose.At-temptingtodeleteinformationonaworkcomputer, even if successful,will notdeletecopiesonportablestoragedevices,homecomputers,orback-uptapes.

Legacy or Obsolete Data

Thinkbacktothecomputersusedmerelyadecadeago.Themobilephonescarried today have more memory and computingpowerthanthosecomputers.Hardware, software, and computersystemsgrowobsolete in justamatterofa fewyearsgiven the rateatwhichtechnologyadvances.Itisnotuncommonto encounter data created by softwareor on systems that a vendor no longer supports. Thus, it is not unusual forcompanies to periodically change their computersystems,softwareapplicationsortechnologyplatforms.Ifachangetoanewsystem,application,orplatformoccurs, and the information createdby the legacy application or system isnotmigrated to the newplatform, theinformation on the legacy system canbe difficult to retrieveor process.Thepotentialrelevancyoflegacydatacanbedifficulttodeterminewithoutrestoration,whichcanbeextremelytimeconsumingand costly to accomplish.

In light of these differences, onemust be prepared to refute the notionthatdiscoveryofESIshouldbetreatedjust likepaperdiscovery.Asonecourtaptlynoted:

[T]heCourt is not persuadedby the plaintiffs’ attempt toequate traditional paper-baseddiscovery with the discovery

of e-mail files. Several com-mentators have noted important differencesbetweenthetwo….Chiefamongthesedifferencesisthesheervolumeofelectronicinformation.E-mails have re-placedotherformsofcommuni-cationbesidesjustpaper-basedcommunication.Manyinformalmessagesthatwerepreviouslyrelayedby telephoneor at thewater cooler are now sent via e-mail.Additionally, comput-ers have the ability to captureseveralcopies(ordrafts)ofthesame e-mail, thusmultiplyingthevolumeofdocuments.Allofthesee-mailsmustbescannedforbothrelevanceandprivilege.Also,unlikemostpaper-baseddiscovery, archived e-mails typicallylackacoherentfilingsystem. Moreover, dated archi-val systems commonly store informationonmagnetictapeswhich have become obsolete.Thus, parties incur additionalcostsintranslatingthedatafromthetapesintouseableform.Onecommentatorhassuggestedthatgiven the extraordinary costs of convertingobsolete backuptapes into useable form, therequesting party should berequiredtoshowthatproductionwilllikelyresultinthediscov-eryofrelevantinformation.

Byers v. Illinois State Police,99C8105,2002WL1264004at*10(N.D.Ill.June3,2002).

Illinois’ Ediscovery Rules

DefinitionofESI

The Supreme Court adopted anamendmenttoRule201(b)thatincludesadefinitionofESIinthescopeofdiscov-ery.Theamendmentaddssubparagraph(4)toRule201(b)andprovidesthatESI:

Shall include any writings,drawings, graphs, charts, pho-tographs, sound records, im-ages, and any other data or data compilations in anymediumfromwhichelectronicallystoredinformation can be obtainedeitherdirectlyor, ifnecessary,aftertranslationbytherespond-ing party into a reasonablyuseableform.

IllS.Ct.R.201(b)(eff.July1,2014).TheCommitteeCommentstosub-

paragraph(4)explainthatthedefinitionofESIwasintendedtocomportwiththeFed.R.Civ.P.34(a)(1)(A).Ill.S.Ct.R.201(b),CommitteeComments(adoptedMay29,2014).Because thedefinitionof ESI inRule 201(b)(4) is virtuallyidenticaltoRule34(a)(1)(A),decisionsinterpretingFed.R.Civ.P.34(a)shouldbeillustrativeofthescopeofpotentiallydiscoverableESIinIllinois.

TheCommitteeCommentstoRule201(b)(4)explainthedefinitionofESI“isintendedtobeflexibleandexpansiveastechnology changes.” Id.WhileIllinois’definitionofESIisintendedtobeflexibleenough to accommodate technologicaladvances,itisself-limiting.Ifelectronicdataisnotcapableofbeingstored,thenitshouldfalloutsidethescopeofdiscoveryundertheIllinoisrule.See, e.g, Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223



The Committee Comments to Rule 201(b)(4) explain

the definition of ESI “is intended to be flexible and

expansive as technology changes.”

F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (ad-dressing the failure to preservewavepatternsonoscilloscopes).

The reference in Rule 201(b)(4)to translationofESI into a reasonablyuseable form recognizes that ESI canbe created in unique or proprietaryformatsoronlegacysoftwarethatwhenproducedinanativeformatmayneedtobeconvertedintoanotherformatsimplyto be reviewed by the party receivingthe ESI.

Proportionality The concept of proportionality

currentlyfoundinFed.R.Civ.P.26(b)(2)(C)(iii)wasaddedtoIllinoisSupremeCourtRule201(c),whichdealswiththepreventionofdiscoveryabuse.Subpara-graph(3)ofRule201(c)nowprovides:

Proportionality.WhenmakinganorderunderthisSection,thecourtmay determinewhetherthelikelyburdenorexpenseoftheproposeddiscoveryinclud-ingelectronicallystored infor-mation, outweighs the likelybenefit, taking into accounttheamountincontroversy,theresources of the parties, theimportance of the issues inlitigation, and the importance of the requested discovery inresolvingthoseissues.

Ill.S.Ct.R.201(c)(3)(eff.July1,2014).

WhiletheadditionofproportionalityintoRule201(c)wasintendedtocontroltheburden and expenseof ediscovery,likeitscounterpartinthefederalrules,itis not necessarily limited to ediscovery. Rather,Rule 201(c)(3) applies to anydiscoverymethodsavailableunderourSupremeCourtRules.Thisconclusionis confirmed by the 2014 amendmenttoSupremeCourtRule 201(a). Previ-ously, Rule 201(a) provided that the“[d]uplicationofdiscoverymethods toobtain thesame informationshouldbeavoided.”Ill.S.Ct.R.201(a)(eff.Jan.1, 2013).After its 2014 amendment,Rule 201(a) states: “Duplication ofdiscoverymethods to obtain the sameinformationanddiscovery requests that are disproportionate in terms of burden or expenseshouldbeavoided.”Ill.S.Ct.R.201(a)(eff.July1,2014)(emphasisadded).NotethatthelanguageaddedtoRule201(a)addressesdiscoveryrequestsgenerally, and is notlimitedtorequestsforelectronicdiscovery.

Additionally, the proportionality provisionaddedtoSupremeCourtRule201(c)insubparagraph(3)employsthephrase “including electronically stored information.”Ill.S.Ct.R.201(c)(3)(eff.July 1, 2014) (emphasis added).Hadthe SupremeCourtRulesCommitteeintended to limitRule201(c)’spropor-tionalityanalysisonlytothediscoveryofESI,itwouldhaveonlyprovidedthatRule201(c)(3)appliestothediscoveryof ESI rather than employing the phrase “includ-ingelectronicallystoredinformation.”

The concept of proportionalityaddressesthemarginalutilityofthere-questeddiscovery.See, e.g., Byers,2002WL 1264004 at *11 (stating, “whenfacedwitharequestthatwouldimposesignificantcostontherespondingpartyacourtshouldfocusonthemarginalutilityoftheproposedsearch”).TheCommitteeComments toRule201(c) explain thatproportionality is intended to apply when thebenefitofthediscoverybeingsoughtisoutweighedbythecostandburdenofproducingtherequestedinformation.Ill.S.Ct.R.201(c),CommitteeComments(adoptedMay29,2014).

Several commentators have cogently explainedwhy the concept of propor-tionalitywasaddedtotheFederalRules:

Oneof the recurrent concernsabout paper discovery wasthatextremelybroaddiscoveryrequests were easy to draft,extremelyburdensometosatisfyandoftenproducelittleornoth-ingof importance to the case.In 1983, the “proportionality”provisions now contained in Rule26(b)(2)(C)wereaddedtoaddress these concerns.

ShiraA.ScheindlinandDanielJ.Capra,Electronic Discovery and Digital Evi-dence, CAses And mAteRIAls4 (2009).Given the added burden and cost ofelectronic discovery, the concept ofproportionality has becomeevenmoreimportant.

When asserting a proportional-ity objection, counsel should considerprovidingthecourtwithasmuchfactualinformation as can be compiled. Forinstance, if aparty’sdiscovery requestwouldrequirethedefendanttosearch50computers,thedefendantshouldprovideanestimateofthetimeandcostsinvolved



tocomplywiththatrequest.Whiletheamountofthedamagessoughtisrelevanttotheproportionalityanalysis,rememberthatoneofthebenchmarksagainstwhichtheediscoverycostwillbemeasuredis“theamountincontroversy.”

Because one factor to considerin any proportionality analysis is the importance of the issue in the litiga-tion,which the requested discovery istargeting,discoveryontangentialissueshavinglittleimportancetotheultimateresolutionoftheactionshouldbeaprimecandidate for a proportionality objec-tion.Because proportionality focusesonthemarginalutilityoftherequesteddiscovery,requestsforinformationfrombackup tapesandothersourcesofESIthat are extremely costly to restore and produce should also trigger a propor-tionalityobjectionwhentheinformationcan be obtained from a less costly orburdensomesource.

Frequently,courtandcounselmaynotrealizehowbroadadiscoveryrequestis thatseeksallcommunicationsaboutaparticularsubjectmatter.Compliancewith such a request in some instancescouldrequirethesearchofhundredsorthousands of computers depending onthesizeofthecompany.Inthisscenario,counsel should remember that anotherfactorinanyproportionalityanalysisistheimportanceoftherequesteddiscov-eryinresolvingtheissuesinlitigation.As a result, counsel should seek tocollaboratively identifywith opposingcounselthosepersons(datacustodians)who aremost likely to have relevantinformation.ESIfromthosecustodiansshouldbeproduced,andaproportionalityobjectionshouldberaisedtoproducingESIfromotherpersonswhoarenotlikelytohaveanyrelevantinformation.Again,however, counsel should be preparedtopresent informationon the cost and

burdenofproducingthatadditionalESItothecourt.

Categories of ESI That OftenMay Not Be Discoverable

TheCommitteeCommentstosub-paragraph (3) ofRule 201(c) explainthat a proportionality analysis “oftenmayindicate”thatcertain“categoriesofESIshouldnotbediscoverable.”IllS.Ct.R.201(c)(3),CommitteeComments(adoptedMay29,2014).

TheCommentthenliststhefollow-ingeight(8)categoriesofburdensomeESIthatoftenmaynotbediscoverableunderaproportionalityanalysis:

• Deleted,slack,fragmentedorunal-locateddataonharddrives;

• Randomaccessmemory(RAM)orotherephemeraldata;

• On-lineaccessdata;• Data inmetadata fields that are

frequentlyupdatedautomatically;• Backup data that is substantially

duplicative of data that is moreaccessibleelsewhere;

• Legacydata;• Informationwhoseretrievalcannot

beaccomplishedwithoutsubstantialadditionalprogrammingorwithouttransforming it into another formbefore search and retrieval can beachieved;and

• Other forms of ESIwhose pres-ervation or production requiresextraordinaryaffirmativemeasures.

Ill.S.Ct.R.201(c)(3),CommitteeCom-ments(adoptedMay29,2014).

The concept that certain categories ofESImaynotbegenerallydiscoverablewasdrawnfromPrinciple2.04(d)oftheSeventhCircuit’sElectronicDiscoveryPilot Program Principles available at:

http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/Principles8_10.pdf.Thesecategoriesprovide anotheropportunityforcounseltoraiseavalidproportional-ityobjection.

TheCommitteeComments furthernote, however, that a proportionality analysis“maysupportthediscoveryofsomeofthetypesofESI”listedabove.TheCommentsfurtherexplainthatoneshouldnotviewthelistofburdensomecategories of ESI as “static, sincetechnologicalchangeseventuallymightreduce the cost of producing someofthese types ofESI.”Additionally, theComments clarify that proportionalityrequiresa“case-by-caseanalysis.”Ill.S.Ct.R.201(c)(3),CommitteeComments(adoptedMay29,2014).

Finally, it is important tonotethattheCommitteeCommentstoRule201(c)provide:

Ifanyparty intends torequestthe preservation or produc-tionofpotentiallyburdensomecategories of ESI, then thatintention should be addressedat the initial case management conferenceinaccordancewithSupreme Court Rule 218(a)(10) or as soon thereafter aspracticable.

Ill. S.Ct.R. 201(c),CommitteeCom-ments(adoptedMay29,2014).IfapartyfailstorequestthepreservationofoneormoreofthesecategoriesofburdensomeESI, theninfairness, thatpartyshouldnotbeabletolatercomplainthatitwasnot preserved or bring amotion forsanctionsforitsloss.

http://http://www.discoverypilot.com



Forms of ESI Production

Supreme Court Rule 214 wasamendedtospecificallyprovidethatre-questsforwrittendiscoverycanincludeESI as defined underRule 201(b)(4).Theamendmentaddssubparagraph(b)toRule214,whichstates:“Ifadiscoveryrequestdoesnotspecifyaformforpro-ducingelectronicallystoredinformation,apartymustproduceitinaformorformsin which it is ordinarily maintained or inareasonablyuseableformorforms.”Ill.S.Ct.R.214(b)(eff.July1,2014).SupremeCourt Rule 214(b) is baseduponFed.R.Civ.P.34(b)(2)(E)(ii),andtherefore federal decisions interpretingthat particular provisionof the federaldiscovery rulesmayprovide guidanceincomplyingwithRule214(b)’srequire-ments.

TheamendmenttoRule214(c)addsa provision,which recognizes that apartymayobjecttoaproductionrequest“onthebasisthattheburdenorexpenseof producing the requestedmaterialswouldbedisproportionatetothelikelybenefitinlightofthefactorssetoutinRule 201(c)(3).” Ill. S.Ct.R. 201(c)(3) (eff. July1,2014). Inotherwords,Rule214(c)asamendedcontemplatesaproportionalityobjection.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure34(b)(2)(D)providesthatarespondingpartymayobjecttothe“requestedformfor producingESI.”That subdivisionofRule 34 further provides that if therespondingpartyobjectstoarequestedform,or if no formwas specified in aproductionrequest,theproducingparty“muststatetheformorformsitintendsto use”when producing the requestedESI.Fed.R.Civ.P.34(b)(2)(D).Similarprovisions are noticeably absent fromtheamendments toRule214. Itwould

seem, however, that a similar approach to ESIproductionformatsiscontemplatedunderourSupremeCourtRules.

TheSupremeCourtRulescontem-platethatthepartieswillattempttoworkout their discovery differences,whichcan include disputes over the formatinwhichESI is produced.See Ill. S. Ct.R. 201(k) (eff.October 24, 2012).The parties should attempt to resolveanydisputeovertheformatoftheESIproductionbeforeanyproductionoccurs.Ifthepartiescannotresolvetheirdispute,they should then seek a resolution bythecourt.Thiswillhelptoavoidargu-mentsthattheESIwasnotproducedinareasonablyuseableformandlimittheriskofhavingtoproduceESIasecondtimeinadifferentformat.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure34(b)(2)(E)(iii)providesthatapartyneednotproducethesameESI“inmorethanoneform.”Thesupremecourtmayhaveconcluded a similar provisionwasun-necessaryinlightofRule201(a),whichalready frowns upon “[d]uplication ofdiscoverymethods to obtain the sameinformation.” Ill.S.Ct.R.201(a) (eff.July1,2014).

The2006AdvisoryCommitteeNotetoFederalRule34explainsthatifaparty“ordinarilymaintains the informationit is producing in away thatmakes itsearchable by electronicmeans, theinformation should not be producedinaformthatremovesorsignificantlydegrades this feature.”Fed.R.Civ. P.34 advisory committee’s note (2006amendment).WeshouldexpectIllinoistoadoptasimilarapproachbecauseRule214(b)nowrequireslitigantstoproduceinformation in a “reasonably useable”form.SeeIll.S.Ct.R.214(b)(eff.July1,2014).

Early Attention to Ediscovery

TheamendmenttoIllinoisSupremeCourt Rule 218 includes a provisionthatencouragespartiestousetheinitialcasemanagementconferencetoresolveissuesconcerningESI.TheamendmenttoRule218(a)addsSubparagraph(10),which provides that at the initial case management conference counsel andthecourt toconsider“issues involvingelectronicallystoredinformationanditspresentation.”Ill.S.Ct.R.218(a)(10)(eff. July 1, 2014).Thus, counsel fora party should learn about the client’savailableESIanditsinformationsystemstobepreparedtoaddressissuesrelatingtothepreservationandproductionoftheclient’s ESI.

Sanctions

TheIllinoisSupremeCourtmadenochangestothesanctionsavailableunderRule219addressingthelossofESI.Acomment,however,explains:

TheCommittee believes thatthe rule is sufficient to coversanctionissuesastheyrelatetoelectronicdiscovery.Therulingsin Shimanovsky v. GMC, 181 Ill.2d112(1998)andAdams v. BathandBodyWorks,358Ill.App. 3d 387 (1stDist. 2005)contain detailed discussion ofsanctions for discovery viola-tionsforthelossordestructionofrelevantevidenceandfortheseparateanddistinctclaimforthetortofnegligentspoliationofevidence.

Ill.S.Ct.R.219,CommitteeComment(adoptedMay29,2014).



While an established body of lawexistsinIllinoisaddressingtheissuanceof sanctions, these decisions involvegenerallythelossordestructionoftan-gibleobjectsduetohumanintervention,negligent or otherwise. ESI on the other hand,canbelostsimplyfromtheroutineoperationof a computer, and as notedabove,someformsofESIaretransitoryor ephemeral in nature.Accordingly,theissueofsanctionsforthelossofESIwillpresentnewscenariosthatcourtandcounselwillhave tocarefullyaddress.TheCommitteeCommentto201(c)(3),which requires a party to specificallyrequest the preservation of potentiallyburdensomecategoriesofESIateithertheinitialcasemanagementconferenceor as soon thereafter as practicable,is another factor that should not beoverlookedwhen sanctions are soughtinvolvingthelossofESI.

Notably, on the sameday that theIllinoisRuleswereadopted,theStandingCommittee onRules of Practice andProcedure in federal court approved apackage of proposed amendments totheFederalRules, one ofwhich dealswiththelossofESI.TheproposedRule37(e) applies to ESI that: (1) shouldhavebeenpreserved;(2)islostbecauseapartyfailedtotakereasonablestepstopreserveit;and,(3)cannotberestoredorreplacedthroughadditionaldiscovery.IfacourtfindsthatanotherpartyhasbeenprejudicedbythelossofthatESI,itispermittedtoorder“measuresnogreaterthan necessary to cure the prejudice.”Moresignificantsanctionsarepermittedonlyuponanadditionalfindingthatthe“party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s usein the litigation.”PreliminaryDraft ofProposedAmendments to the FederalRules ofBankruptcy andCivil Proce-dure, 318 (2013), http://www.uscourts.

gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf.

Practice Tips

Rule 218 requires that counselfamiliarwith the case be prepared todiscussissuesrelatingtoESIanditspres-ervation at the initial case management conference. Consider discussing ESIissueswheneverpossiblewithopposingcounsel prior to the initial conferencewiththecourt.Knowinganopponent’spositiononediscoveryissuespriortotheconferencemaysavetimebyidentifyingareas of agreement or those areas notworthfightingover,andallowscounseltofocusonimportantediscoveryissueson which there is disagreement.

Asexplainedbelow,however, thisstrategyrequirespriorconsultationwiththe client. Endeavor to avoid committing toapositionwithopposingcounselorthecourtonanediscoveryissuethattheclient cannot meet.

Advance Reasonable EdiscoveryPositions

Thecostandexpenseofediscoveryrequiresyoutoworkcollaborativelywithopposing counselmore now than everbefore.Therewill be instanceswhereediscovery issues cannot be resolved.Whenthatoccurs,itiscriticalthatyou

donotappeartobetakingunreasonablepositions on ediscovery.Your lettersto opposing counsel and discoveryobjections should bewrittenwith theunderstandingthattheywillbereviewedbythecourtinconnectionwithamotionto compel or for sanctions. Judges arehumanandgenerally,donotappreciategamesmanship, hardball or scorched-earth tactics when it comes to discovery. The court ismore likely to accept theediscoverypositionsyouadvanceifthepositionsarereasonable.

Strategies for LimitingDiscovery Costs

Variousstrategiesandtoolscanbeused to limit ediscovery costs,whichcounsel should discuss, and hopefullyagree upon.Thefirst is deduplication.Ifanemployeesendsane-mail tofivecoworkers,theclientshouldonlyneedtoproduceonecopyofthatemail,notsixcopies.Deduplication tools permit theidentificationofexactcopiesofemailsordocumentsthatcanlimitthevolumeof ESI for review and production indiscovery.

Discuss and seek agreement ondate ranges, and data custodians, orthosepersonswholikelyhaverelevantinformation.Considerdiscussingtheuseofkeywordsearchesand,wherepossible,

Knowing an opponent’s position on ediscovery issues

prior to the conference may save time by identifying

areas of agreement or those areas not worth fighting

over, and allows counsel to focus on important

ediscovery issues on which there is disagreement.



seek the input of opposing counsel onsearchtermstouse.Thesefilterswillhelplimit the amount ofESI counselmustreview for privilege andworkproductbeforeproducingitindiscovery.

Predictive coding involves a pro-cess of coding relevant and irrelevantdocuments inconjunctionwith theuseof technology,which learns to iden-tifyrelevantmaterialsfromthosecodeddocuments.Discussuseof this toolorothercomputerorassistedreviewtoolsto identify relevantESIwithopposingcounsel.

Seek Rule 502(d)Non-WaiverOrders

GiventhevolumeofESInowavail-able, includeRule 502(d) non-waiverordersasapartofanydiscoverystrategy.ARule502(d)non-waiverorderprotectsthe parties and their counsel against awaiver of attorney-client privilege orworkproductprotectionthatcanoccurindiscovery.Counselshouldaddresstheissuanceofanon-waiverorderpursuantto IllinoisRule ofEvidence 502(d) attheinitialcasemanagementconference,if one has not already filed amotionseekingsuchanorder.

Consider Promptly Issuinga Litigation Hold

Wheninitiallyretainedonamatter,consider sending the client a litigation hold letter.While the content of thelettermayvarydependingonthenatureof the case and the client, the lettershouldexplaintheclient’sobligationtopreserve potentially relevant informa-tion.Consider including in the letter abroad explanation of the issues in thecase,thetypesofESIthatmayhavetobepreserved,andthepotentialramifications

offailingtopreservepotentiallyrelevantESI. Consider also advising the client in thelettertoalertkeypersonnelwhomayhaverelevantESI,preferablyinwriting,aboutthelitigationhold.

Initial Client Meeting

Given the potential complexity ofediscovery issues and the client’s ITnetwork, a best-practices approachsuggests learning asmuch as possibleabouttheclient’sinformationandemailsystemsbeforetheinitialcasemanage-mentconference.Everycaseandclientisdifferentsonoone-size-fitsallapproachexists when it comes to ediscovery. The information needed fromyour clientswill vary from case to case. Someinformationneededfromtheclientmightinclude:

• Adescriptionoftheclient’snetworkarchitecture,andanexplanationofhowtheclient’semailandinforma-tionsystemsoperate;

• How email and ESI are retainedby the client, how long they areretained, and all locations where theyarestored;

• WhatapplicationsareusedtocreateandstoreemailandESI;

• ThevolumeofemailandESIintheclient’spossession,andhowmuchmayberelevanttothecase;

• Howmany computers, tablets andmobile phones, or devices maycontain potentially relevant ESI or email, where they are located, whether they are connected to a cen-

tralnetworkorserver,andwhetherinformation is storedon them thatmaynotbefoundonthenetwork;

• Whether the client has a BYOD(“bring your owndevice”) policy,whether employees are allowed to workusinghomecomputersand/orpersonalmobile devices,whetherthosepersonaldevicesarelinkedtoanetworkserverandhaveESIthatmaybestoredononlythosedevices;

• Whether the client’s email or in-formation system has any auto-matedfeaturesthatroutinelydestroyemails,ordiscardsESIafteraspe-cifictimeoronceaspecificvolumeisreached,andwhetherthatfeaturecanbeorhasbeeninterrupted;

• Whatcontrolsorpoliciesaclienthasaddressingtheuseoforthedown-loadingofinformationonportableflashdrivesorotherportablestoragemedia;

• How frequently the client backsupitssystems,whatinformationiscapturedonbackuptapes,howlongthosebackuptapesareretained,andwhether any potentially relevant ESI maybefoundonlyonthosetapes;

• Whether the client has any legacysystems or legacy data on which potentiallyrelevantESIisstored;

• Whether any potentially relevantESI isstored in thecloud,or is inthepossessionorunderthecustodyorcontrolofathirdparty,andifso,theidentityandlocationofthatthirdpartyorcloudvendor;

• Whether the client has taken anysteps to preserve potentially relevant

Every case and client is different so no one-size-fits

all approach exists when it comes to ediscovery.



Michelle M. Wahl and Brittany L. KasparSwanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, Chicago

Young Lawyer Division

About the Authors

Michelle M. Wahl is an associate with the Chi-cago office of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, where she focuses her practice in asbestos litigation and toxic tort defense litiga-tion, which includes the preparation of pleadings

and discovery requests, voluminous document reviews, deposing of witnesses, keeping abreast of legal developments, and the preparation of discovery responses for matters in multiple jurisdictions. Ms. Wahl also has experience in intellectual property litigation and transactional services, including work with clients in various aspects of the entertainment industry. She also has assisted in the registration and policing of trademarks and copyrights. In addition to her current involvement with the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel, she is also a member of the American Bar Association, Women’s Bar Association of Illinois, Chicago Bar Association, and Indiana State Bar Association.

email and ESI, and what steps have beentaken;

• Whether third parties and/or keypersonnelwholikelyhaverelevantemail or ESI in their possession or undertheircontrolhavebeennoti-fiedaboutthelitigationholdandarepreservinginformation;

• Whethertheclienthastheinternalcapabilitytopreserve,review,pro-cess,andproduceitsemailorESItocounseloranediscoveryvendor;

• Whether there are any uniquefeatures to the client’s email orinformationsystemsthatmayimpactitsabilitytopreserveorproduceitsESIoremail;

• Whethertheclientisawareofanyissues,problemsorconcernswithitssystemsand/oritsabilitytopreserveandproduceitsESIoremail;

• Whethertheclienthasadocumentretention policy, whether that policy applies to ESI or emails, and whether the client has complied with that policy;

• Whether theclienthasadatamapshowing where its data is stored andhow that dataflowsacross itsnetwork;and

• Who is the contact personmostknowledgeable about the client’semailandinformationsystemsandits retention practices.

With this information, counselshouldbeequippedtoplanfornotonlydiscussionswithopposingcounselaboutediscoveryissuesthatmayarise,butalsohaveanunderstandingofobjectionstoraise in response todiscovery requestsasdiscoveryunfolds.

The IllinoisSupremeCourtCom-mission on Professionalism (ISCCP)haspartneredwiththeIDCfortheIDC’sinaugural Lawyer-to-LawyerMentor-ing Program to develop relationships between new and seasoned attorneys.While theprogramcertainlyallowsanexperiencedlawyertoprovideguidancetoanewlawyertransitioningfromlawstudent to practicing attorney, it alsoallows new attorneys to share their knowledgeofvariousissueswithveteranlawyers.

Through the Eyesof a New Lawyer –

Brittany Kaspar

Asarecentlawschoolgraduatenowworkingasafull-timeassociate,Iwasanxious to participate in theLawyer-to-Lawyer Mentoring Program as a way to interactwith attorneys outsidemyfirm.The program is flexible andallows for discussion of a variety oftopicsincludingprofessionalism,ethics,civility,diversity,andwellness.Atourfirstmeeting,mymentorandImetforlunchtodiscusstheimportanceofclientcommunicationandmethodstomaintainappropriate,ongoingcommunicationtokeepclientsinformed.

Initially, we each completed a self-assessment exercise to gaugehowwellwe currently communicatewithclients and determine areas that may need improvement.We discussed theimportanceofkeepingclientsinvolvedin

A Look at the IDC’s New MentoringProgram with the Illinois Supreme Court

Commission on Professionalism

Brittany L. Kaspar is an associate at Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP. She concentrates her practice in the defense of busi-nesses and individuals in civil litigation matters. Ms. Kaspar has experience in the areas of medical

negligence, product liability, and intellectual property. She is a graduate of the University of Illinois (B.A., 2010) and the Chicago-Kent College of Law (J.D., 2013), where she was a Notes and Comments Editor for the Chicago-Kent Law Review.

thedecision-makingprocessandhowtoaskclientsforfeedbackonservicestheyhave received.Mode of communica-tionwas also a lengthy aspect of our


Young Lawyer Division | continued

discussionbecause of the generationaldifferencesinourcommunicationprefer-ences.Today,theoptionsincludemailingaformalletter,makingaphonecall,orsending an email.Wediscussedwheneach option is most appropriate, as well astheprosandconsofeachmethod.

My mentor and I have several more meetingsplannedoverthecourseofthenextyear,inwhichwewilldiscusstopicssuchastimemanagement,negotiation,career paths, long and short-term career goals,andstrategiesforbalancingcareerwithpersonallife.Sharinganddiscuss-ing tips and real-life scenarioswithmy mentor has certainly helped me in makingthetransitionfromlawstudentto practicing attorney.

Through the Eyes of an “Older” Young Lawyer –

Michelle Wahl

AsChair of theYoung LawyersDivision, I am delighted and honored to beapartoftheIDC’sinauguralLawyer-to-Lawyer Mentoring Program with the ISCCP. As a “not-so-recent” law school graduate(albeityoungatheart),IshareinBrittany’s sentiment toward the program. I am administering the program with my friendandcolleague,GregOdom.Weareproudof the levelofparticipationandthepositivefeedbackBrittanyandothershaveprovidedthusfar.OurprogramwiththeISCCPisawonderfulopportunityfornotonlyouryounglawyers,butalsoourveteranlawyers,whobringawealthofknowledge,experience,andexpertisetothe program.

Whatisuniqueabouttheprogramis the element of reversementoring.

Through this portion of the program,young attorneys are encouraged todiscuss theirviewsandconcernswiththe seasoned attorneys, such as bal-anceofprofessionalandpersonallife,concerning aspects of legal culture,whatattractsyounglawyerstoparticularemployers,bestandworstpartsofbeinga young lawyer, andwhat activitiesyoung lawyersenjoy.Theyoung law-yers also provide advice and insight on how social media may help seasoned attorneys better network andmarketthemselves,andhowcertainresourcesincreaseefficiency.

Further, theprogram’scoretopics:professionalism, ethics, civility, diver-sity, and wellness, are imperative to the successofanattorney,regardlessofageorexperience.Itisabenefittousalltorecognizeandappreciatetheoathwetakeasofficersofthecourtandtoadheretothecivilityandprofessionalismrequiredofuswhenserving in thatcapacity. Inaddition, topics relating to diversity and wellness, includingmental health, areoften ignored and left unaddressed forfearofrepercussions.Ourprogramwiththe ISCCP provides a true open-doorpolicybetweenmentorandmenteethatencourages discussion of such issuessothattheymaybeproperlyaddressedand treated.

I am thrilled with the program’s success thus far, and I am certain theIDCandISCCPunionwillgrowthankstotheISCCP’swonderfulstaff(particu-larly,KatherineErwin,SpecialProjectsDirector) programming, and programparticipants.Thankyoutoallthosewhohelpedlaunchthisprogramandwhowillhelpittogrowforyearstocome!

CoRRECTIoNThe Young Lawyer Division column in Volume 24, Number 2 of the IDC Quarterly mentioned a CLE event entitled “Avoiding the Pitfalls of Legal Malpractice & Ethical Business Development for Young Attorneys.” Un-fortunately, we failed to recognize the generous co-sponsorship of this event by ProQuest, a division of Alliant (www.proquestinsurance.com). The IDC thanks ProQuest for their support of the event and the association.

http://www.proquestinsurance.com



Association News

IDCOfficersandDirectorsElectedBradley C. Nahrstadt ofLipe,

Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt & Pontikis, Ltd.,Chicago,waselected2014-2015IDC Secretary/Treasurer and to aposition on theExecutiveCommitteeat theAnnualMeeting, heldMay 30,2014.Mr.NahrstadtwillmoveuptheExecutiveCommitteeladdertobecomepresidentinJune2018.

Other officers on the ExecutiveCommittee include President David H. Levitt ofHinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago; President-Elect Troy A. Bozarth ofHeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville; First Vice President R. Mark Mifflin ofGiffin,Winning,Cohen & Bodewes, P.C., Springfield;and Second Vice President Michael L. ResisofSmithAmundsen LLC, Chicago.

The following members wereelected to new three-year terms on the

IDCBoard of Directors: Joseph G. Feehan, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C.,Peoria;Rossana Fernandez, Fer-nandez and Associates, LLC,Chicago;William K. McVisk, Johnson & Bell, Ltd.,Chicago;Nicole D. Milos, Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, LLC,Chicago;Bradley C. Nahrstadt, Lipe, Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt & Pontikis Ltd., Chicago; andPatrick W. Stufflebeam, HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville. Edward K. Grassé ofBusse, Busse & Grassé, P.C., Chicago wasappointedtofilltheboardpositionleftvacantwhenBradleyC.NahrstadtwaselectedSecretary/Treasurer.

Heather R. Watterson ofCNA, Chicago, and Stephen G. LoverdeoftheLawOfficeofStevenA.Lihosit, Chicago, were appointed to serve as Directors at Large.

Thispastyearhasbeenawhirlwindof activity for theAssociation. TheBoard of Directors and our manyvolunteers undertook initiatives toimproveouradministration,advocacy,professional development offerings,communications,younglawyerdevel-opment,andsomuchmore.Oureffortsincluded comprehensively reviewingour association bylaws; developinglitigation fundamentals programming;implementing a Mentoring Program withareversementoringaspect;offer-ingCLEthroughoutthestateofIllinois;outreach toThe JohnMarshall LawSchoolandSouthernIllinoisUniversitySchoolofLaw;launchingarevisedIDCwebsite;beginningtheformulationandimplementationofajointbartaskforceto advance and improve the discovery process; comprehensively analyzing

and submitting IDC comments onproposedFederalRulesofCivilPractice(2014 Federal Civil Practice RulesCommittee),and;filingamicibriefsinCrittenden v. Cook County Commission on Human Rights; Mackey v. DeFranco, and Bruns v. City of Centralia.

Allof this success couldnothavebeen achievedwithout the countlesshoursanddedicatedworkofourvolun-teers. IDCvolunteerswork diligentlybehindthescenescontributingtimeandtalenttoimprovethedefensebarandthepracticeoflaw.Wesincerelyappreciatealloftheworkthatourvolunteersdoforthe association.

In May, we gathered together to recognizeournextgenerationofleadersandtocelebratethehardworkandac-complishmentsofthepastyear.

IDC Presents Awards

At the Awards Reception, sev-eral members were recognized fortheir service. Jeffrey S. Hebrank ofHeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville, was recognizedwiththeDistinguishedMem-berAward, andMichelle M. Wahl ofSwanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, Chicago, was recognizedwith theRising StarAward. Glen E. Amundsen ofSmith- Amundsen LLC,Chicagowasrecognizedwith the President’s Award, and John W. RobertsonofStatham, Long & Mitchell, LLC,Galesburg,wasrecognizedwiththeVolunteeroftheYearAward.

TheMeritoriousServiceAwardwaspresented to C. William Busse, Jr. ofBusse, Busse & Grassé, P.C., Chicago forhisserviceontheBoardofDirectors;Geoffrey M. Waguespack ofButler Pappas LLP,Chicago,forhisserviceasEditor-in-Chief of the IDC Quarterly;and, Donald J. O’Meara, Jr. ofPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago, forhisservice asEditor-in-Chief of the IDC Survey of Law.

TheMeritoriousServiceAwardwasalso presented to David M. Bennett


Association News | continued

of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago, for his service as Chair ofthe Membership Committee;The-resa Bresnahan-Coleman ofLangh-enry, Gillen, Lundquist & Johnson, LLC, Chicago,forherserviceasChairoftheEmploymentLawCommittee;Dennis J. Cotter of SmithAmundsen LLC, Chicago,forhisserviceasCo-ChairoftheConstructionLawCommittee;Bruce H. Schoumacher,ofQuerrey & Harrow, Ltd.,Chicago, for his service asChairof the Commercial LawCommittee;David J. SullivanofSchuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C.,Chicago,forhisserviceasChair of theTort LawCommittee;Michelle M. WahlofSwanson, Martin & Bell, LLP,ChicagoforherserviceasChair of theYoungLawyersDivision,and; Heather R. Watterson ofCNA, Chicago,forherserviceasChairoftheEvents Committee.

President’s Commendations were presented to Dennis J. Cotter, SmithA-mundsen, LLC, Chicago, Patricia J. Hogan, Cassiday Schade LLP, Chicago and Heather R. Watterson, CNA, Chi-cago,fortheirworkonthe2014SpringSymposium;PatrickW.Stufflebeam, HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville and

Joseph G. Feehan, Heyl, Royster, Voel- ker & Allen, P.C.,PeoriafortheirworkontheJudicialReception;Al J. Pranaitis, Hoagland, Fitzgerald & Pranaitis, Alton,was recognized for his serviceasEditor-in-Chief and aCo-Authorofthe50thAnniversaryBook.C. William Busse, Jr., Busse, Busse & Grassé, P.C., Chicago and Bradley C. Nahrstadt, Lipe, Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt & Pon-tikis, Ltd.,Chicago,werealsorecognizedfortheirworkasco-authorsofthe50th Anniversary Book.Paul R. Lynch, Craig & Craig, LLC, Mt. Vernon, and Anne M. Oldenburg, Hay & Oldenburg LLC,Chicago,wererecognizedfortheir



service as Co-Chairs of the 50th An-niversaryGala,and;Michelle M. Wahl, Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, Chicago and Gregory W. Odom, HeplerBroom LLC,Edwardsville,wererecognizedfortheirdevelopmentandimplementationofthe IDC Mentoring Program.

DRI Recognizes Tiffany

Aleen Tiffany ofAleen R. Tiffany, P.C.,CrystalLake,wasrecognizedattheIDCAwardsReceptionbyDRISecre-tary/TreasurerStevenM.PuisziswiththeDRIExceptionalPerformanceCitation.ThiscitationrecognizesAleenforhavingsupported and improved the standardsofeducationofthedefensebar,andforhavingcontributedtotheimprovementof the administration of justice in thepublicinterest.CongratulationsandoursincerethankstoAleenforthecountlesshoursofworkonbehalfofthedefensebarandtheAssociation!

The 2014 IDC Presi-dent’s Award recipient is Glen E. Amundsen o fSmithAmundsen LLC, Chi-cago.PresidentAleenTiffanyselectedAmundsen for theaward, which honors an indi-vidualwhohasdemonstratedoutstandingserviceandcommitmenttothedefensebar.

Tiffanyremarks,“IamproudtohaveknownGlenfor20years,andamprouderstilltocallhimadearfriend.Glenhasalways been a zealous advocate ofIDC, and it is to him that I owe most significantgratitudeforgettinginvolvedasayounglawyer,andstayinginvolvedas I advanced in my career.”

“ItisduetoGlen’sencouragementthatIchairedmyfirstcommittee—hevolun-teeredme,reportingtomethat‘mynamecameupat aBoardmeeting.’ Initially,I wondered at that, pleased that Board membersknewwhoIwas—onlytorealizelaterthat,infact,itwasGlenwhobroughtmynameup.Following thathumorousyetauspiciousstart,Iremaingrateful,forthoseopportunitiesthatallowedmetoseefirst-handhowgreatIDCanditsmembersare.Asaresult,Iwas‘hooked’andknewIwanted to stay involved.”

“GlenhasbroughtmuchtotheIDC,including his time and talents—buthasalwaysremainedhumble, insistingthatitishewhohasreceivedsomuchmore from IDC.One thing I can sayunequivocally—Iamthankfulforhisen-couragementandadvice,hismentoring,andforbringingmynameupatBoardmeetings.WithoutthemsurelyIwouldnotbeIDCPresident,andwouldhavemissedoutonthefulfillingandlearningexperienceservicehasbroughtme.”



Jeffrey S. HebrankReceives IDCDistinguished Member AwardJeffrey S. Hebrank, a partner with

HeplerBroom LLC in Edwardsville, has beennamedtherecipientofthe2014IDCDistinguishedMemberAward.

Hebrank’sinvolvementintheIDChas spanned twenty-fiveyears andhasincluded service as chair of numerouseventsandcommittees,amemberoftheboard,andIDCPresidentin2007-2008.

Amundsen Honored withPresident’s Award

“IunderstandthatthisawardisaboutinspiringleadershipintheIDC.ImustsaythatitisactuallythemanyexamplesofdedicatedservicetotheprofessionandthebettermentoftheciviljusticesystemthatIhaverepeatedlywitnessedfromthemembershipofIDCthatisinspiringtome.Thereisnonemoreworthyofthatsentiment thanAleenTiffany,whohastirelessly served the organization. Shehasalwayshadmybackthroughtoughtimes and difficult cases overmanyyears. Iamproud tobeher friendandcolleague.”

G l en Amund s en i sthe Chairman and CEO ofSmithAmundsen LLC.He isan experienced trial lawyer, havingtriedover100casestoverdict. Glen concentrates his practice on litigating commer-cial contract and tort related

disputes. In addition to his litigationwork,Glenisanexperiencedmediatorwith formal training accreditedby theUnitedStatesArbitration&MediationAssociation. Glen is also frequentlyinvitedtoteachotherlawyersandspeakon trial practice techniques and bestpracticesinthecourtroom.Apastpresi-dentoftheIDC,hehastestifiedbeforetheIllinoisGeneralAssemblyregardingproposed amendments to theCode ofCivilProcedureandonevidentiary is-suesrelatingtotheadmissionofexperttestimonyincourt.Glenwasnamedtothe Illinois Super Lawyerslistfor2005–2014.Additionally,Glenwasselectedbyhis peers for inclusion inThe Best Lawyers in America®2013and2014inthefieldofcommerciallitigation.HeisAVratedbyMartindale-Hubbellforhislegalabilityandethics.GlenwasnamedaLeadingLawyer in various areas oflitigationpracticeby theLawBulletinPublishingCompany.GlenwasrecentlyselectedasoneofITTChicago-Kent’s125AlumniofDistinction.

Amundsen says “thank you verymuchforthehonorofthisawardandtheresultingrecognitionfrommyfriendsandcolleaguesinthedefensebar.AlthoughIamnotquitesurewhatIhavedonetomeritthishonor,Iamverygratefulandhumbledbytheknowledgethatsomanygreat lawyers have received this award inthepastfortheirservicetotheIDC.”


AdevotedmemberoftheIDC,Jeffnever fails to promote the associationanditsimpactonthedefensebar.“TheIDCisthegoldstandardforcivildefenselitigators in Illinois. IDC’s national reputation for excellence provides anendorsementforyouandyourpractice.Whenaclientischoosingonepracticeoveranother,IDCmembershipisagreatadvantageforyou.”

IDC PresidentAleenTiffany re-marks,“Jeffhastirelesslysupportedandfurthered IDC’s legislative and otherefforts,beforeduringandafterhistermas President, in addition to serving as a leader inhisfirm,andmaintainingavibrantandsuccessfultrialpractice.HeisavaluablevoiceinIDCefforts,long-range planning, and in the legislature.DuringhistermasPresidentofIDC,Jeffrecognized,‘pushingyourselfhigherandfurther than this organizationhas ever

goneisnotaslighttopriorpresidents,butanexpectation.’AndJeffhaslivedthatbelief—notonlyasPresident,butsincethattime—andnotonlyforIDC,butinhis career. Jeff has combined genuinehardworkandcommitment,withafairmindedness that fewpossess,with theintelligenceandcreativityneededtobea‘trailblazer.’”

PresidentTiffany goes on to say,“Jeffisjustoneofthoseattorneysthathisopponentswanttodislike,becausehe’sso good—but can’t, becausehe’s suchagoodand fairguy. IDCmeetingsareneitherboringnorquitethesamewhenJeffisthere!Andthatisquiteafeat,asweboastsomeveryfunnyandgoodnaturedpeople!IhaveknownJeffformorethan15years,andamproudtocallhimafriendandahighlyrespectedcolleague.”

“TheDistinguishedMemberAward,which isgiven to themember thathas


John W. Robertson Named IDC Volunteer of the YearJohn W. Robertson, a partner with

theGalesburglawfirmofStatham, Long & Mitchell, LLC has been named the2014IDCVolunteeroftheYear.Robert-sonwasrecognizedforhisoutstandingcontributions to the IDC, specificallyas they relate to the development and deliveryoftheStatewideCLEprogramsin2013.

“JohndisplayedavastarrayoflegalknowledgeoverhisyearsofserviceontheIDCBoardofDirectors—andhasanimpressivesenseofhumor.IverymuchenjoyedservingwithJohnontheBoard,andwasrepeatedlystruckbyhisexperi-ences, expertise, and willingness to help out. John has been a regular advocateandvolunteeronbehalfoftheIDC—itisjustlikeJohnthataftercompletinghisBoardofDirectorsserviceinJune2013,

demonstrated years of commitment toadvancing themission of the IDC, istailor-made formembers like Jeff.HiscommitmenttotheIDCandthedefensebar is his trademark. He is alwaysavailable to lend a hand—be it in thelegislature,with an event, orwith ourmembership,” saidExecutiveDirectorSandraWulf.

Hebrank is a successful litigatorwhose trial experience covers many areas ofpersonalinjuryandbodilyinjuryliti-gation with special emphasis in the areas ofasbestosandtoxictort.Hehasbeeninvolved in litigation since graduatingfromStLouisUniversitySchoolofLawin1982.Hehaspracticedprincipallyinasbestos litigation since 1988 and hastriedasbestoscasestoverdictforseveralclientsthroughoutthecountry.Heiscur-rentlyonnationaltrialteamsforseveralofHeplerBroom’sclients.

he immediately volunteered toChaira Statewide CLE program designed to raise awareness of IDC and educationin Illinois, and then coordinated it flawlesslyinmultiplecitiesthroughoutIllinois, fromAugust throughOctober,and indicated an interest in participating in future, similar statewideprograms,”remarkedIDCPresidentAleenTiffany.

IDCExecutiveDirectorSandraWulfsaid“John’sdevotionoftimeandenergytotheStatewideCLEprogramswasfan-tastic.Wherehesawaneed,hefilleditbyprovidinganexcellenteducationaleventformembersfromalloverthestate.TheStatewide CLE program was his project fromstarttofinish.HeisverydeservingofrecognitionastheVolunteeroftheYearforallof theworkheput intobringingmoreCLEtoourstatewidemembers.”



Michelle M. Wahl Named2014 IDC Rising Star

Bradley C. NahrstadtElected Secretary/

TreasurerBradley C. Nahrstadt of theChi-

cagofirmLipe, Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt & Pontikis, Ltd. was elected Secretary/TreasurerfortheIDCattheassociation’sAnnualMeeting.Brad is apartner andoneofthefoundingmembersoftheLipeLyonsfirm.

BradhasservedasamemberoftheIDCBoardofDirectors, is a past col-umnist,FeatureArticle,andMonographauthorfor theIDC Quarterly. Brad has alsoservedasafeaturedspeakeratpastIDC events.

Bradfocuseshispracticeondefend-ingproductliability,professionalliability,premisesliability,andcommercialmattersin state and federal courts around thecountry. In addition tohis involvementwith the IDC,Brad isamemberof theAmericanLawInstitute,theAssociationofDefenseTrialAttorneys,theChicago-LincolnInnofCourt,theClaims&Litiga-tionManagementAlliance, theDefenseResearchInstitute,theIllinoisStateBarAssociation, the International Association ofDefenseCounsel, and theLitigationCounsel ofAmerica. In addition, he is“AVPreeminent”peer review ratedbyMartindale-Hubbell,reflectingthehighestpeerrecognitionforethicalstandardsandlegalability.

Chicago attorney Michelle M. Wahl is the recipient of IDC’s 2014RisingStarAward.WahldistinguishedherselfaschairoftheYoungLawyerDivision(YLD).

MichellehasbeenamemberoftheIDCsince2009andwasnamedtoheadtheYLDfor2013-2014.Shesays,“Thispast year Iwasblessed andprivilegedto serve asChair for the IDC’sYoungLawyers Division. In addition to host-inganarrayof successfuleducational,social and philanthropic events, we also strengthened the YLD presence anddynamicbetweenourdivisionandthe organization’smore seasoned at-torneys.Indoingso,manyofouryounglawyers gained valuable insight,werepresentedwith incredible networkingopportunities andmost importantly,providedwith lastingmentors for ourpersonalandprofessionallives.”

WahltakestremendousprideintheworkoftheYLDandwhennotifiedofbeing presentedwith theRising StarAward replied, “I can honestly say that this experience has left me with so

manywonderfulmemories and evenmoreextraordinaryfriends.IthanktheIDC for allowingme to serve in thiscapacityandamsoproudtobeapartofthedefensebarandourorganization.Given the IDC’s leadership, past and present, I can say with certainty that thisorganizationwillcontinuetothriveand generate a positive impact on the defensebar.”

PresidentAleenTiffany remarks,“MichelleabsolutelyexemplifiesIDC’sRising Star award—she is tireless,creative,sharp,andhardworking.Herendlessenergyandexcitementnaturallyrallies others aroundher; her humilityand desire to share glory and accolades maximizestheirdesiretofurtherhelpher.Sheisabornleaderandakindandcaringperson. I was personally impressed and thankfultoMichelleforhermanyeffortsandsuccessesthisyearastheIDCYoungLawyers’Chair, and am looking veryforward to followingMichelleandhermanysuccesses.YouwilldefinitelywanttokeepaneyeoutforMichelle—shewillbeattheheartofmanygreatlegalideasand accomplishments.”

Wahl focuses her practice on as-bestos litigation and toxic tort defenselitigation. She also has experience in intellectual property litigation andtransactional services, includingworkwith clients in various aspects of theentertainment industry. In addition tohermembership in the IDC, she is amember of the Lawyers for theCre-ative Arts, American Bar Association, DefenseResearch Institute,Women’sBarAssociationofIllinois,ChicagoBarAssociation, Indiana State Bar Associa-tion, and Indianapolis Bar Association.


Judicial & Awards ReceptionInearlyMay,theIDChostedaJudicialReceptionwithspecialguestSupreme

CourtJustice Lloyd A. Karmeier.WewouldliketothankJusticeKarmeieraswellasthemanymembersandjudgeswhojoinedusforthereception.WewouldalsoliketothankHeplerBroom LLCforhostingtheevent,andthefirmsatrightfortheirsponsorship.

AlsoinMay,themembersoftheIDCgatheredtogetherforourAwardsReception.Wewerepleasedtopresentmanyawardstoourmembers(seestory,page71)andwouldliketothankHinshaw & Culbertson LLPforhostingtheevent,andthefirmsatrightforsponsoringtheAwardsReception.

Aleen R. Tiffany, P.C.

Hay & Oldenburg LLC

Bleyer & Bleyer

Brown, Hay & Stephens

Busse, Busse & Grassé, P.C.

Cassiday Schade LLP

Craig & Craig, LLC

Cray Huber Horstman Heil &VanAusdal, LLC

Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy,Jansen & Siegert, LLC

Engineering Systems Inc.

Giffin, Winning, Cohen & Bodewes, P.C.

HeplerBroom LLC

Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP

Hoagland, Fitzgerald & Pranaitis

Jump & Associates, P.C.

Lipe, Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt& Pontikis, Ltd.

Litchfield Cavo LLP

McKenna Storer

Quinn, Johnston, Henderson, Pretorius & Cerulo

Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C.

S-E-A, Ltd.

Sikich

SmithAmundsen LLC



50th Anniversary GalaAfter Hours Reception

WewouldliketothankeveryonewhoattendedourAfterHoursReceptionatLloyd’sRestaurantonFriday,June27.WearealsogratefultotheMcKenna Storerfirmfortheirgeneroussponsorshipofthiswonderfulreception.



OnJune28,2014nearly250 IDCmembersandguestspackedtheTrumpInternationalHotel&TowerinChicagoto celebrate the association’s 50th An-niversary. The black-tie Gala was awonderful party, filledwith fantasticfood,music and dancing, fireworks(courtesyoftheCityofChicago!),photoboothfun,andgreatfriends.

Itwaswonderfulbringingeveryonetogethertocelebratethemanyachieve-ments of the past 50 years.Wewerepleased that so many past presidents (27 in all!), andour formerExecutiveDirector Shirley Stevens,wereabletojoinusforthisevent.

We are very thankful to themanymembers andfirms that contributed tothesuccessoftheevent.Specifically,we

wouldliketothankthe50th Anniversary GalaPlanningCommitteefortheirmanyhoursofworkon thisevent.GalaCo-Chairs:Paul R. Lynch, Craig & Craig, LLC and Anne M. Oldenburg, Hay & Oldenburg LLC; and Committee Mem-bers:Chuck Cole, Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C.; Joseph G. Feehan, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C.; Jennifer B. Groszek, Resolute Management, Inc., Midwest Division; R. Howard Jump, Jump & Associates, P.C.; David H. Levitt, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP; Al J. Pranaitis, Hoagland, Fitzgerald & Pranaitis; PatrickW.Stufflebeam, HeplerBroom LLC;Aleen Tiffany, Aleen R. Tiffany, P.C.; andSandra J. Wulf, CAE, IOM, Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel.

IDC’s 50th Anniversary GalaPhoto Above:Seated (L to R): Jennifer Jerit Johnson, Stephen J. Heine, Aleen R. Tiffany, Willis R. Tribler, Anne M. Oldenburg, Charles H. Cole, Gordon R. Broom, Patrick E. Maloney, Paul L. Price

Second Row (L to R): John P. Ewart, Bradley C. Nahrstadt, Douglas J. Pomatto, R. Howard Jump, Daniel Formeller, Lyndon C. Molzahn, R. Michael Henderson, Michael L. Resis, Kenneth F. Werts, Jeffrey S. Hebrank, Robert V. Dewey

Back Row (L to R): Troy A. Bozarth, Steven M. Puiszis, David H. Levitt, Gregory C. Ray, R. Mark Mifflin, Alfred P. LaBarre, Gregory L. Cochran, Stephen L. Corn, Lawrence R. Smith, Glen E. Amundsen, Rudolf G. Schade, Jr.

(Not pictured, but also in attendance was Jack T. Riley, Jr.)

Photos by Ralph Greenslade


50th Anniversary Gala | continued


Advancing the LawAleen R. Tiffany, P.C. with Hay & Oldenburg LLC

Craig & Craig, LLC

HeplerBroom LLC

Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP

Jump & Associates, P.C.

Lipe, Lyons, Murphy, Nahrstadt & Pontikis, Ltd.

Litchfield Cavo LLP

Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company

SmithAmundsen LLC

Ensuring EquityCassiday Schade LLP

Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, LLCDRI

Sikich

Advocating JusticeBleyer & Bleyer

Cray Huber Horstman Heil & VanAusdal, LLC

ESI (Engineering Systems, Inc.)

Exponent

LWG Consulting

MDD Forensic Accountants

Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C.

S-E-A, Ltd.

Gala PartnersHoagland, Fitzgerald & PranaitisISBA Mutual Insurance Company

McKenna Storer

Thank You to Our Sponsors

The IDC is proud to welcome the following members to the Association:

Robert P. Arnold WalkerWilcoxMatousekLLP,Chicago

Ronald Austin Jr.Brothers & Thompson, P.C., Chicago

Matthew R. Bloom Scott Halsted & Babetch, P.C., Chicago

Thomas G. Cronin Gordon & Rees, LLP, Chicago

Christina Cullom Quinn, Johnston, Henderson, Pretorius & Cerulo, Peoria

Grant Farrar City of Evanston Law Department, Evanston

Henry J. Ford Jr.City of Evanston Law Department, Evanston

Bonny Garcha BatesCarey LLP, Chicago

Martha Gely-Kruto Nyhan, Bambrick, Kinzie & Lowry, P.C., Chicago

James C. Goodfellow Jr.Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Chicago

Monica GutowskiJohnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicagon Sponsor:RickHammond

Heather Keil O’Hagan LLC, Chicago

John (Jack) KileyErickson, Davis, Murphy, Johnson&Walsh,LLP,Decaturn Sponsor:EvanJohnson

Kevin McKenzie Nicolaides Fink Thorpe Michaelides Sullivan LLP, Chicago

Ian H. Morrison Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago

Lauren Marie Penn LitchfieldCavoLLP,Chicago

Michael Ryan Radak Langhenry Gillen Lundquist &Johnson LLC, Chicago

Steven Ira Rapaport LawOfficesofRapaport&Herzberg,Northbrook

William H. Schramm IIICassiday Schade LLP, Chicago

Jeffrey James Scolaro Daley Mohan Groble, Chicago

Amanda A. Sonneborn Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago

Sylvia Bokyung St. Clair Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney, Chicago

Susan Elizabeth Sullivan Swanson Martin & Bell LLP, Chicago

Jeremy Unruh Polsinelli PC, Chicago

Jonathan Viner Nicolaides Fink Thorpe Michaelides Sullivan LLP, Chicago

Raven A. Winters Littler Mendelson P.C., Chicago

Patrick Woytek Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago



Schedule12:30 Registration

1:00 Opening Remarks

1:15 – 2:15 Outpacing the Odds: Using Clients’ Metrics to Stay Ahead of the Game | Janet R. Spies, Spies, Powers & Robinson, P.C., Denver, CO

2:15 – 3:15 How to Avoid $1,000/day Penalties – Statutory Compliance with the Requirements of Liens | Moderator: Patricia Kent, Gould & Lamb, Bradenton, FL, Speakers: Amy Collignon Gunn, The Simon Law Firm, P.C., St. Louis, MO Gregory L. Shevlin, Cook, Ysura, Bartholomew, Brauer & Shevlin, Ltd., Belleville, IL

3:45 – 4:30 Missouri v. Illinois – Differences in Discovery and Depositions | Gerard T. Noce, HeplerBroom LLC, St. Louis, MO and Russell K. Scott, Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C., Belleville, IL

4:30 – 5:45 Panel Discussion: Evidence through the Judges Eyes | Moderator: Hon. Booker T. Shaw (Ret.), Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, MO, Panelists: Hon. Michael Burton, St. Louis County Circuit Court, Hon. Andrew J. Gleeson, Illinois Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, Hon. Thomas Mummert, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, and Hon. Nancy Rosenstengel, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Illinois

5:45 – 6:45 Cocktail Reception with “Comments from the Clubhouse” | John Mozeliak, Senior Vice President and General Manager, St. Louis Cardinals, LLC

7:15 St. Louis Cardinals v. Milwaukee Brewers

RegistrationRegistration for this event is $250 for IDC and MODL Members and $350 for non-members. Registration includes CLE, seminar materials, refreshment breaks, cocktail reception, and one ticket to the St. Louis Cardinals v. Milwaukee Brewers baseball game (food & drink provided at the game).

Continuing Legal Education CreditApplication will be made for the following credit hours:IL and IN 3.0 CLE Credit Hours; MO and WI 3.6 CLE Credit Hours

Hotel AccommodationsA small block of guestrooms has been reserved at the Hilton St. Louis Ballpark. Room rates are $159 and may be reserved by phoning 877-845-7354.

Questions? Call 800-232-0169 or email [email protected]

An Illinois and Missouri Comparative Law SeminarPresented by the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel and the

Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers

Thursday,September18,2014•HiltonSt.LouisBallpark•St.Louis,MO

Payment Information

Enclosed is check number for $ .Please charge $ to my credit card (do not fax or email credit card information)Card #: Exp: / Card Security Code:Name as it appears on card:Credit Card Billing Address:

RegistrationName

Firm

Email

Phone

Special Dietary/Accessibility Needs

Seminar & Ball Game IDC / MODL Member – $250 ..........................$ Non-Member – $350 .......................................$

Illinois / Missouri ComparativeLaw SeminarSeptember 18, 2014

Seminar SponsorsThe Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel and the Missouri Organization of Defense Counsel would like to thank the following industry partners for their generous support of this event:

• ESI (Engineering Systems, Inc.)• Exponent• Midwest Litigation Services• Pohlman USA Court Reporting• Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc.• Robson Forensic, Inc.• S-E-A• Semke Forensic

Please return this form with payment to: Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel PO Box 588, Rochester, IL 62563-0588

http://iadtc.org


or their associates enjoy a reduced registra-tion fee.

To guarantee that students receive their Academy materials in plenty of time to pre-pare for the Academy, and due to the limited enrollment of 44 students, early registration is highly recommended.

Continuing Legal Education We will apply for the following CLE credit for this program:

Illinois & Indiana — 14.5 (including 1.0 Professionalism/Ethics Credit)

Missouri & Wisconsin — 17.5 (includ-ing 1.0 Professionalism/Ethics Credit)


North Central Region Trial Academy

Attendee:

Firm:

Address:

City, State, Zip Code:

Firm Line: Direct Line:

Email:

No. of Bench Trials in Past 3 Yrs: No. of Jury Trials in Past 3 Yrs:

Special Dietary/Accessibility Needs:

Payment InformationMy check, number is enclosed for $Current members who wish to pay by credit card may do so by registering online at: www.dtci.org. Non-Members must pay by check.

Please complete this registration form and return it as soon as possible to the Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana, 9505 Copley Dr., Indianapolis, IN 46260

2014 North Central Region Trial AcademySeptember 11 – 13, 2014

THRoUGH Aug. 15 –REGISTRATIoN Aug. 15, 2014 Sept. 11, 2014

DTCI, IDC, WDC Member $800 $900 Non-Member $1,000 $1,100

Total Amount Due

AMoUNTDUE

è

Presented By: the Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana, the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counseland the Wisconsin Defense Counsel

September11–13,2014•RadissonatStarPlaza•Merrillville,Indiana46410

The North Central Region Trial Academy is the only trial technique seminar in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin specifi-cally designed for defense counsel. The Trial Academy is an excellent means of providing “on your feet” experience for lawyers who have limited courtroom and trial experience.

What to ExpectStudents can expect personal attention, a rigorous schedule and an exceptional educa-tion in trial advocacy.

Students are provided written materials well in advance of the Academy and are respon-sible for coming to the Trial Academy pre-pared to conduct the entire defense of the trial, from the opening statement to the clos-ing argument. The materials provided, which include investigative materials, statements from witnesses to be used for impeach-ment, pleadings, deposition testimony, jury instructions and articles on trial advocacy, allow the students to conduct an entire trial. The students are to be prepared as if they were actually engaged in trial. Students are required to submit a Trial Outline in advance of the Academy.

With a ratio of four students to one instruc-tor, every student is guaranteed individual attention during each phase of the trial. Each student is videotaped while conducting part of the trial, and each receives a copy of that videotape upon conclusion of the Academy.

Due to the intensity of the program, we rec-ommend that all participants spend Friday night, September 12, at the hotel. This will provide participants with additional time for preparation so that they can get as much out of the program as possible.

Registration Information Enrollment for the Academy is limited to 44 students with registration being ac-cepted on a first-come, first-served basis. The registration fee includes all Academy materials, videotape, all meals, and network-ing opportunities. IDC, DTCI, WDC Members

Hotel Information The 2014 North Central Trial Academy will be held at the Radisson at Star Plaza, 800 East 81st Avenue, Merrillville, Indiana, 46410. A block of rooms has been reserved for all Academy participants. Sleeping rooms are separate from the Academy registration fee and are priced at $129 Standard/$139 King Upgrade. The room block will expire on August 21, 2014. Rooms reserved after this date will be made on a space and rate available basis only. To reserve a room, call the Radisson directly at 800-395-7046.

The seminar scheduleis available at

www.iadtc.org.


http://www.dtci.org

68- | IDC QUARTERLY | Third Quarter 201354

Prefix First Middle Last Suffix DesignationFirmorGovernmentAgencyAddressCity State ZipCode CountyFirmorAgencyLine DirectLine FaxLineEmail WebsiteAreaofPractice #ofAttorneysinFirmIDCSponsorNameandFirmLawSchool AdmittedtotheBarintheStateof Year ARDC#HomeAddress City,State,ZipCodeHomePhone AlternateEmailAddress

Illinois Association ofDefense Trial Counsel MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

MembershipintheIllinoisAssociationofDefenseTrialCounselisopentoIndividuals,Corporations,Educators,andLawStudents.Foralistofqualifications,visitwww.iadtc.orgorphonetheIDCofficeat800-232-0169.ApplicantsshallbeadmittedtomembershipuponamajorityvoteoftheBoardofDirectors.

Iam(Weare)applyingformembershipasa(an)(SelectOnlyOne):

InadditiontojoiningtheIDC,youcantakeadvantageoftheDRIFreeMembershipPromotion!AsanewmemberoftheIDCandifyou’veneverbeenamemberofDRI,youqualifyfora1yearfreeDRIMembership.Ifyouareinterested,pleasemarktheboxbelowandwewillcopythisapplicationandsendittoDRI.Also,ifyouhavebeenadmittedtothebar5yearsorless,youwillalsoqualifytoreceiveaYoungLawyerCertificatewhichallowsyouonecomplimentaryadmissiontoaDRISeminarofyourchoice.m Yes,IaminterestedintheFreeDRIMembership!

Individual Applicant Information – Attorneys & Governmental Attorneys

Prefix First Middle Last Suffix DesignationLawSchool AnticipatedGraduationDateAddress City,State,ZipCodeEmail Address Phone

Race Gender Birth Date

IDCiscommittedtotheprincipleofdiversityinitsmembershipandleadership.Accordingly,applicantsareinvitedtoindicatewhichoneofthefollowingmaybestdescribethem:

(Application continued on next page)

IndividualAttorney,inpractice: GovernmentalAttorney,inpractice: Corporation,with:m 0-3years($100) m 0-3years($75) m 1-2Affiliates($250)m 4-5years($150) m 4-5years($100) m 3-5Affiliates($500)m 6-9years($225) m 6-9years($160) m 6-10Affiliates($750)m 10+years($250) m 10+years($190) m 11-15Affiliates($1,000) m 16-20Affiliates($1,500)mStudent($20) mEducator($75)

Corporate Applicant Information

Biographical Information

Free DRI Membership

Educator and Law Student Applicant Information

CorporationName BusinessorServiceProvidedAddress City,State,ZipCodePhone Fax WebsiteOnaseparatesheetofpaper,pleaselistallindividualswhoaretobeaffiliatedwiththisCorporateMembership.BesuretoincludeName,Address(ifdifferentthanthecorporateaddress),Phone,Fax,andEmailAddressforallaffiliates.


80 | IDC QUARTERLY | Fourth Quarter 2013 57

AllSubstantiveLawCommitteesareopentoanyIDCmember.EventandAdministrativeCommitteesaregenerallysmallcommitteesandmembersareoftenappointedbytheBoardofDirectors.SubstantiveLawCommitteesareresponsibleforwritingtheMonographfortheIDC QuarterlyandmaysubmitotherFeatureArticles.CommitteeskeepabreastofcurrentlegislationandworkwiththeIDCLegislativeCommittee,aswarranted.Committeesalsoserveasaresourcetoseminarcommitteesforspeakersandsubjectsand,ifandwhencertainissuesarisethatwouldwarrantaspecific“topical”seminar,thecommitteemayproducesuchaseminar.

Pleaseselectbelowthecommitteestowhichyouwouldliketoapplyformembership:

Substantive Law Committees m Commercial Law m Employment Law m Local Government Law m ConstructionLaw m InsuranceLaw m Tort Law

Administrative Committees mEvents mMembership mLegislative mYoungLawyers

Event Committee m Events

Membership CommitmentByprovidingafaxnumberandemailaddressyouareagreeingtoreceivefaxesandemailsfromtheassociationthatmaybeofacommercialnature.Icertifythat:

ThankyouforyourinterestinjoiningtheIllinoisAssociationofDefenseTrialCounsel.YourapplicationwillbepresentedtotheBoardofDirectorsforapprovalattheirnextregularmeeting.Untilthattime,ifyouhaveanyquestions,pleasecontacttheIDCofficeat:

Illinois Association of Defense Trial CounselPOBox588•Rochester,IL62563-0588•800-232-0169•217-498-2649•www.iadtc.org

Membership InvestmentMembershipDues .................................................................................................... $

VoluntaryPoliticalActionCommitteeDonation* .................................................. $Total Amount Due ................................................................................................... $

COMMITTEE INVOLVEMENTIllinois Association ofDefense Trial Counsel

* Recommended Amount: <3yearsinpractice ......... $15 4-5yearsinpractice ........ $25 6-9yearsinpractice ........ $55 10+yearsinpractice ....... $75

Payment Informationm Enclosedischeck#intheamountof$.m Visa m MasterCard m AmEx

m PleasechargeCreditCard# intheamountof$ Exp.Date/

NameasitappearsontheCard CardSecurityCode

BillingAddress City,State,ZipCode

Signed Date

mAs an Individual Attorney,Iamactivelyengagedinthepracticeoflaw,thatatthepresenttimeasubstantialportionofmylitigationpracticeinpersonalinjuryandsimilarmattersisdevotedtothedefense.

mAs a Corporate Member,wewillsupportthepurposeandmissionoftheAssociation.

mIamcurrentlyaProfessor or Associate ProfessoroflawatanABAaccreditedlawschool.

mIamcurrentlyaStudent enrolled in an ABA accredited law school.

PleaseNote:IDCduesarenotdeductibleasacharitablecontributionforU.S.federalincometaxpurposes,butmaybedeductibleasabusinessexpense.TheIDCestimatesthat2.5%ofyourduesarenotdeductiblebecauseoftheIDC’slobbyingactivitiesonbehalfofitsmembers.

— Do Not Fax or Email Credit Card Information —


ILLINOISASSOCIATIONOFDEFENSETRIALCOUNSELLAW• EQUITY • JUSTICE

of eventsCALENDARl August 21 IDC After Hours • Location TBA • Chicago

l August 22 Executive Committee & Board Meeting • Location TBA • Chicago

l September 11–13 North Central Region Trial Academy •StarPlazaHotel• Merrillville, IN

l September 18 IDC / MODL Fall Seminar •BuschStadium•St.Louis,MO

l October 10 Executive Committee & Board Meeting • Location TBA • Chicago

l October 22–26 DRI Annual Meeting •SanFrancisco,CA

l October 30 Concealed Carry in Illinois • Location TBA

l November 6 IDC After Hours • Location TBA • Chicago

l November 7 Executive Committee & Board Meeting • Location TBA • Chicago

l December 4 Executive Committee Meeting • Location TBA • Chicago

l December 4 Holiday Party • Location TBA • Chicago

PresortedStandard

U.S. PostagePAID

PermitNo.650Springfield,IL

ILLINOIS ASSOCIATIONOFDEFENSETRIALCOUNSELP.O.Box588Rochester,IL62563-0588

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