Peter D. Asquith

The identification and evaluationof arguments - A task too important

to leave to the logicians

Abstract: A commonly stated purpose forlogic is evaluation of arguments. This paperdescribes the classical view, raises questionsregarding its adequacy, and on the basis of thedeficiencies found discusses ways to amend andrefine the classical conception to make it moreapplicable to ordinary discourse.

Resumen: Un propósito comúnmente asig-nado a la lógica es la evaluación de argumentos.Este artículo describe la visión clásica, cues-tiona su adecuación, y con base en las deficien-cias encontradas discute maneras de corregir yrefinar la concepción clásica para hacerla másaplicable al discurso ordinario.

1. Introduction - What is anaccount of argument?

There is general agreement that logicinvolves having a theory of argument. To havesuch a theory one rninimally needs to: (i) makeclear what we mean by an argument; and (ii)specify criteria for correctness and incorrectness.Unless we simply desire to develop an abstracttheory we also need to be concerned about howwe can identify arguments in ordinary discourseand what the process is for applying our stan-dards to these entities. In other words not onlyprovide the theory, but also demonstrate how thetheory can be used to analyze and evaluate ordi-nary discourse. For this purpose direction in ana-

lyzing passages of ordinary prose needs to beprovided and the theory needs to be completeenough so that not every passage of ordinary dis-course to be analyzed contains situations whichthe theory does not address.

1 want to consider the standard answer tothese questions and develop a catalog of issuesraised regarding the adequacy of this position.' 1want to claim that these issues suggest the clas-sical position needs to be extended in numerousrespects and that this extension takes the tasks ofargument identification and evaluation beyondwhat is norrnally considered the purview of thelogician. This catalog of issues is being con-structed as a preliminary study in hopes of ulti-mately being able: (i) to construct a theory ofargument which combines the insights of bothproponents of the classical position and its criticsand (ii) to design a course which effectivelyteaches logic which students can successfullyapply to everyday discourse. What 1 do in thispaper is review the classical position, point outsome deficiencies, and indicate the programmesof activities that need to be carried out in order toestablish a more complete theory as well as todesign the desired course.

2. The classical position

One of the places we frequently layout thetheory of arguments and show how it is to beapplied is in introductory logic classes.

Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XXXIX (98), 53-63, Julio-Diciembre 2001

54 PETER D. ASQUITH

Consequently, 1 will base my description of theclassical position in what is found in texts used insuch courses.?

2.1. Argument definition

An argument is a set of statements all butone of which are used to bring forward evidencefor the remaining one. The statements beingused to bring forward the evidence are calledpremises while the statement for which the evi-dence is being brought forward is called the con-clusion. Two types of arguments should benoted. There are non-ampliative/demonstrativearguments in which the intent is to present evi-dence for a conclusion which contains no infor-mation not already contained in the premises.There are ampliative/non-demostrative argu-ments in which the intention is to present evi-dence for a conclusion which contains moreinformation than is contained in the premises.

2.2. Evaluation standards

Two different sorts of questions are usuallyasked in the course of argument evaluation: (i)are the premises appropriately related to the con-clusion, i.e., do the premises provide the requiredsupport for the conclusion? and (ii) are the prem-ises, in fact, true? The first of these is the ques-tion of logical correctness. An argument is logi-cally correct if the truth of its premises providesgood grounds for accepting the conclusion astrue. First, notice that this version of the correct-ness characterization imposes a specificallysemantic condition. Second, we need to unpackwhat counts as "pro vides good grounds for".Customarily that is done in two ways. The clas-sical criterion of logical correctness is thatemployed for non-ampliative/demonstrativearguments - it is impossible that the premisesshould be true and the conclusion falseo This cri-terion is usually referred to as the criterion fordeductive validity. A second way of specifyingwhat constitutes good grounds - it is highlyimprobably that the premises should be true andthe conclusion false - is the ampliative/ non-demonstrative criterion of logical correctness

which is often referred to as the criterion ofinductive strength. The second question - theone regarding the actual truth of the premises -is traditionally labeled the soundness question.

2.3. Evaluation techniques

What is customarily done in determininglogical correctness and soundness? What are theimportant differences in determining the twotypes of logical correctness?

2.3.1. Logical correctness

2.3.1.1. Non-ampliativelDemonstrativeinferences

The evaluative question in deductive logicfor any argument is whether it is va1id. The keynotion here is that of an exceptionless guarantee.One can never have all true premises and a fa1seconclusion. Showing that it possib1e to have alltrue premises and a false conclusion demon-strates that the criterion of demonstrative logicalcorrectness is not satisfied. On the other handshowing the impossibility of a counterexamp1edemonstrates deductive validity, To accomplishthis we first determine its formo Once we haveascertained the form of the argument we applysome formal method to determine whether thepremises of any argument having that form couldbe all true and the conclusion false.' There arenumerous techniques for determining deductivevalidity, e.g: truth tables, truth trees, Venn dia-grams, logical derivations.

2.3.1.2. Ampliative/Non-demonstrativeinferences

There is no exceptionless guarantee inampliative logic and because of this looking fora counterexample is not part of the strategy. Themost common treatment is to discuss severalexamples of this type of argument - argumentsby analogy, inductive generalization, correlationarguments, causal arguments, etc. Usually thisdiscussion includes some brief pointers on howto identify the particular kind of argument andseveral pertinent evaluation considerations.

IDENTIFICATION ANO EVALUATION 55

2.3.1.3 Differences in determining logicalcorrectness

The difference with respect to a guaranteesets up different tasks in the effort to ascertainlogical correctness. In deductive/non-ampliativelogic the effort is directed towards either estab-lishing a counterexample or proving that onedoes not exist for the argument form under con-sideration. This is an invariable property of theform and does not vary from one use of the formto another or depend on the context in which theform is used. In contrast in inductive/ ampliativelogic one is guaranteed that the case of all truepremises and a false conclusion is possible forany argument form being considered. As a resultwhat needs to be examined are the circumstancesin which the form is being used to determine theimpact these particular circumstances have onthe probability of going from all true premises toa false conclusion. Logical correctness in deduc-tive/non-ampliative logic is a property of theform and not context dependent whereas logicalcorrectness in inductive logic is a property of aparticular occasion of use of the formo

Moreover, in deductive logic there is a"right" answer which can be determined solelyvia semantic methods. Either it is possible toproduce a counterexample or it is not. There isno context dependency here. In non-demonstra-tive logic different contexts (i.e., different knowl-edge states) can produce different evaluations oflogical correctness. As new knowledge isacquired the assessment of logical correctness ofthe argument may change. The assessment oflogical correctness for ampliative logic is contextdependent.

Another major difference is that the logicalform (precise syntactical formulation) of individ-ual statements does not playas significant a rolein ampliative logic as it does in deductive logic.While texts continue to talk about the form of anargument when doing ampJiative/non-demon-strative logic it takes on another meaning.Deterrnining the form here requires looking atthe functionaJ roJe pJayed by various cJaims. ForexampJe, in an argument by analogy the premis-es - no matter what the logical form of the indi-

vidual statements - make a comparison betweentwo items or types of items showing that theyshare some properties in cornmon and that one ofthe them has some additional property. The con-clusion makes the declaration that the other itemtoo is Jikely to have the additional property.Instead of the type of form you have in deductiveJogic what you have here is really an argumentschema. A number of specific forms may meetthe requirements of the schema.

These differences make inductive Jogic amore compJicated subject to treat at an eJemen-tary level than deductive logic. These differ-ences also point out that the only aspect of eval-uating for logical correctness which is not con-text dependent is the evaluation of a given formfor deductive validity.

2.3.2 Soundness

Of these two evaluation questions - Jogicalcorrectness and soundness - only the questionof deductive logical correctness is regarded astruly and solely in the province of the logician.Both the assessment of inductive logical correct-ness and the assessment of the truth of individualstatements frequently require empirical knowl-edge. However, it is often pointed out that thereare certain kinds of statements whose truth orfalsity the logician can ascertain - logical truthsand logical faJsehoods. It is also possibJe for thelogician to discuss the possibility of definitelydeterrnining the truth or falsity of a particulartype of assertion, e.g., that universal affirmativeclaims can be definitively falsified, but not defi-nitely confirmed in an infinite universe.However, generally it is not the case that deter-mining the truth of a claim is a matter of logic.

2.4. Application

In discussion of the application of the classi-cal theory it is usefuJ to start with the notion ofstandard logical formo An argument in standardlogical form has a number of characteristics: i)each different premise is started on a new line;"ii) all the premises precede the conclusion; iii)some type of notation is used to distinguish the

56 PETER D. ASQUITH

conclusion from the premises; iv) the logicalform of the individual statements is clearly dis-played by paraphrasing if necessary; v) state-ments are paraphrased to improve clarity if nec-essary; vi) redundancy is eliminated; and vii) allpremises including tacit or suppressed premisesare made explicit.

There is not uniform agreement on whatcounts as application of this theory of argument.If arguments are already in standard logical form,then the utilization of the techniques for determin-ing logical correctness often is interpreted as theapplication question. If the arguments are not instandard logical form, then getting them into stan-dard logical form becomes part of the applicationquestion. The most ubiquitous exercise found is tosort an argument in which the premises do not pre-cede the conclusion into a ordering which does.In addition to premise/conclusion order the tradi-tional concems in this area have involved (i) dis-cussing the fact that grarnmatical sentences are notthe basic element of assertoric logic - in particu-lar what we need to focus on are the individualtruth-valued units separate from the sentenceswhich contain them; (ii) getting clear on exactlywhat statements are being made by the naturallanguage sentences being used, e.g., dealing withproblerns raised by vagueness and ambiguity; (iii)dealing with issues regarding unstated claims -what are the criteria determining what may beappropriately added; and (iv) if possible identify-ing the form or schema of the argument as anamed form or schema.

All of this assumes that an argument hasalready been identified. However, when readingordinary text argument identification can be oneof the most difficult tasks. Standard advice givenwith regard to identifying arguments and theirconstituent parts is to look for certain categoriesof words. One needs to look for:

(i) argument structure words/phrases - because,therefore - which indicate an implicationand help to separate the premises from theconclusion;

(ii) logical structure words - not, and, or, if-then, all, some - which are used in deter-mining the logical form of the statements;

(iii)· argument type indicators - it is probablethat, it definitely follows that - which helpmake the determination whether one is deal-ing with a demonstrative or non-demonstra-tive argument;

(iv) key words/phrases - is similar to - to helpdetermine non-demonstrative argumentschema.

Frequently, fairly extensive lists of thesetypes of words/phrases are given with the cautionthat the lists are not exhaustive and that the wordson the lists can function in a variety of ways.

3. Questions aboutthe classical position

There are a variety of questions which havebeen raised regarding this classical conception ofarguments and their evaluation. Among themare: (i) are there additional argument evaluationstandards? (ii) are the classical standardsdeployed in argument evaluation the correct stan-dards to use? (iii) are the standards for claimevaluation the appropriate ones? (iv) does thisclassical characterization of an argument clearlycapture the ordinary conception of argument?(vi) is it the case that claims only playa singlerole in arguments? (vii) does this account for allthe ways arguments are used? (viii) are thereuseful ways of characterizing argument pattemsother than describing argument forms?

3.1. Evaluation standards and techniques

Are there additional criteria for argumentevaluation in addition to logical correctness andsoundness? Is truth the appropriate evaluationstandard for the individual claims of which anargument is composed?

3.1.1. The need for an additional argumentevaluation standard

Are the evaluation criteria adequate forensuring that we have a "good" argument?Consider the following argument.é

IDENTIFlCATION AND EVALUATION 57

All males who take birth control pills willnot become pregnant.John Jones is a male who takes birth controlpills.John Jones will not become pregnant.

This argument satisfies the deductive criteri-on of logical correctness - the truth of the prern-ises is sufficient to guarantee the truth of the con-clusion. The argument also has true prernises: thefirst prernise is an empirical truth and since JohnJones is my creation I can give him whatever oddchemical dependencies I choose. Thus the argu-ment is sound. Consequently, the argument sat-isfies both of the standards given so far for beinga good argument. However, the customary intu-itive reaction is that this not a good argument.This suggests that there is another evaluationstandard which this argument does not satisfy.

In this particular case the way in which theargument goes awry is fairly clear. We believethat being placed in the category of being male issufficient to guarantee that the individual will notbecome pregnant. Consequently, we believe thata stronger argument would be:

All males will not become pregnant.John Jones is a maleoJohn Jones will not become pregnant.

In this case our background informationinforms us that the original argument was not uti-lizing the best reference class - the class"males" is better than the class "males who takebirth control pills," Ultimately we are not onlylooking for an argument which is logically cor-rect and has true premises, but one which weregard as the strongest argument available for theconclusion.

In making this deterrnination we needed toconsider how the specific argument instance isrelated to other information available to uso Herewe have another way in which arguments areevaluated - by their connection with otherinformation. There are various ways in whichthe connection is assessed. Altemate positionsand objections are part of the connection to otherinformation. Types of questions to raise when

doing this type of evaluation include: How wellare known objections to the position dealt with?How well is the position taken distinguishedfrom other positions on the issue? What argu-ments can be given against these other positions?How well are questions about the consequenceshandled?"

3. J .2.The need for refinement 01 existingstandards for claim "goodness"

3.1.2.1. Variety of claims in arguments

On the standard conception we are dealingwith assertions - claims which can be true orfalse and usually these are empirical claims.However, a quick check of arguments found inordinary discourse suggests that there are othertypes of claims functioning as prernises or con-clusions in the arguments - value judgments bothethical and aesthetic, definitions, as well as morecomplicated assertions, e.g., modal claims. Notall of these claims are regarded as either simply"true"or "false". This suggests that the standarddefinition of soundness needs to be generalized.The intuitive idea behind soundness is that all ofthe prernises have appropriate episternic stand-ing. In generalizing the questions which need tobe asked include: What types of claims occur inarguments? What is the appropriate status andhow is it assessed for each of the types of claimswhich appear in the argument?

3.1.2.2. The standard for assertions

Whether truth is the appropriate standard forassertions is a question which has also beenraised. One issue is whether requiring that astatement be true is too restrictive. It has beensuggested that well confirrned would be moreappropriate. A second question has been raisedwhether truth or any of its weaker relatives is theappropriate status for assertions. Several alterna-tives have been proposed. One by JamesFreeman suggests substituting the more legalisticnotions of presumption and burden of proof cri-teria.? Another suggests accepted by the audi-ence for whom the argument is íntended.f

58 PETER D. ASQUITH

3.1.3. Techniques lar evaluating ampliativearguments

The c1assical position has been that all thatcan be done is to illustrate with examples. Arethere useful general techniques which can beemployed to evaluate ampliative inferences forlogical correctness? Clearly there will not be thesame kind of techniques as there are for non-ampliative inferences, but it may be possible toprovide a more systematic account than has beencustomary.

3.2. The conception of an argument

Does the c1assical characterization of anargument as "a set of statements all but one ofwhich are used to bring forward evidence for theremaining one" satisfactorily capture customaryusage? Are the concepts of "argument" and"logical consequence" used interchangeably inordinary discourse? Are there more complicatedargumentative structures than are recognized bythe standard characterization? Do all argumentshave the same function?

3.2.1. Argument, logical consequence,implication, and explanation.

There are deductively valid argument formswhich individuals who have not been corruptedby training in formal logic have difficulty accept-ing as arguments.? Prime examples are disjunc-tion and simplification:

DisjunctionAAvC

SimplificationA&BA

Disjunction usually seems problematic in anumber of ways inc1uding doubts that it is a validdeductive argument form until a truth table isworked out. In contrast simplification is readilyseen to be valid, but the intuitive reaction is thatthese forms don't really represent arguments.

This seems to suggest that not aIl implica-tions have the same standing as arguments.

Moreover, there appear to be implicationswhich are things other than argurnents. In partic-ular explanations frequently involve implications.

Silver, mercury, and all the other metal s except ironand zinc, are soluble in diluted sulfuric acid, becausethey have not sufficient affinity with oxygen to draw itoff from its combination either with sulfer, the sul-furous acid, or hydrogen.l?

What is it that distinguishes the sets of state-ments in which one of their members is a logicalconsequence of the rest as an argument fromthose which are not? It has been suggested thatwhat is characteristic of a argument generally isthe existence of a proposition that is unsettled orcontentious. This can occur in a variety of ways- the information may be new, the informationmay be in dispute, etc. This unsettIed proposi-tion occurs in a discourse which could potential-ly settle it. 11 If this is accepted, then while onecan determine whether there is a logical implica-tion without an examination of the context, onecan only determine if the implication is an argu-ment by an examination of the context.

3.2.2 Extended Arguments

It does not require much looking in ordinarydiscourse to find argumentative passages inwhich the same c1aim is functioning both as apremise and as a conc1usion. For example:

Since all of the beans from the container that we haveexamined have been pinto beans, it is reasonable toconcIude that only pinto beans are in the container.Any beans that are pinto beans are edible beans.Therefore, the beans in the container are edible.

Here we have "only pinto beans are in thecontainer" serving as both the conc1usion of aninductive generalization and as a premise in animmediately foIlowing deductive argument.This suggests that the conception of argumentneeds to be generalized beyond the original c1as-sical characterization of an argument.

An initial set of distinctions which might helpus sort through a more complex conception ofargument is the following. If no reasons are given

IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION 59

in the argument to support a particular premisethat premise is called a basic premise or basic rea-son. If a conclusion is not used to provide supportfor other conclusions it is called a final conclu-sion. Conclusions used to provide support forother conclusions are called intermedia te conclu-sions. In a single argument, all the premises willbe basic reasons and the conclusion a final con-clusion. In ordinary discourse arguments rarelycome singly. Often a number of arguments arebeing made virtually simultaneously. These areusually referred lo as complex arguments (some-times as extended arguments). One ofthe ways inwhich complex arguments occur is an argumentchain. Argument chains use intermediate conclu-sions. In argument chains the conclusion of thefirst argument serves as a premise of the secondargument and the conclusion of the second servesas a premise of the third, etc. This type of struc-ture is relatively simple. The way in which argu-ments are presented is often even more complex.These are called "argument nests". A divergentargument is one type of argument nest. In thistype of argument the same premise is used to sup-port several different conclusions. In a convergentargument several different single arguments arebeing given each of which supports the same con-clusion. To sort out the relationships among thecomponents of complex arguments various kindsof diagrammatic techniques are frequentlyemployed to display the structure of the complexargument. These structures are different fromeither argument forms or argument schema. Themost frequently used form of diagram is the arrowdiagram.'? An alterative approach is that of dia-graph representations.P

3.2.3 Functions of arguments

"Does the idea of "support" simplicitermake sense? Aren't we really dealing with "sup-port for a purpose"? The standard definitions for"logical correctness" appear to have the purposeof obtaining "the truth". Are there other purpos-es for which an argument might be used to pro-vide support for a claim? The answer clearlyseems to be "yes". We utilize hypothetical argu-ments. We use arguments to falsify claims.

Consequently, any conception of argument needsto be able to account for these cases.

3.3. Difficulties witb applicability

What issues arise when attempting to applythe classical theory? How do you ascertain thatthere is an argument? Do statements have morespecific roles in an argument other than servingas a premise or a conclusion? What are the con-ceros about interpreting text?

3.3.1 Existence of an argument

The analysis provided so far suggests thatseeing lots of arguments in standard logical formor near standard logical form will do little to pre-pare you for dealing with ordinary discourse.The first question is whether there actually is anargument in the passage. Anyone who hasassigned a class to select some ordinary text andidentify and analyze the arguments found knowsthat more skill is needed to accomplish this thanmight have been anticipated. When looking at apassage of ordinary discourse this is frequently adifficult question to answer. Are there implica-tions in the passage? Are the implications intend-ed as an argument? What is the argument? Thecustomary injunction is to look for implicationindicators, then try to identify the conclusion fol-lowed by a search for the premises for that con-clusion. As we have already seen in the discus-sion of the concept of an argument, there arepotential difficulties with that approach. The so-called argument indicators may only be conse-quence indicators and as we have seen earlierthese need not be an argument. A more deeplycontextual analysis is required. How can we dealwith these complexities? The earlier suggestionof "unsettledness" made earlier applies here. Arethere other possible signposts which might help?

3.3.2. Roles for premises

The paradigmatic case is the single argu-ment with each statement playing a single role inthe argument. However, passages in ordinarydiscourse are more complex. Statements may be

60 PETER D. ASQUITH

playing multiple roles or different roles thanthose in the paradigmatic single argument.Observation is theory-laden. What you mightlook for depends on your expectations. Are theresome general kinds of argument structures, orroles for premises which you might expect to belooking for? The idea of argument schema raisedin conjunction with ampliative inference alreadysuggested that the roles of statements could be animportant factor in argument analysis. There areseveral views which suggest various roles for dif-ferent cIaims in an argument.

3.3.2.1. Toulmin

For Toulmin the statements occurring in anargument have various roles.!" There is a claim,data serving as evidence for it, and a warrant thatlicenses an inference from the data to the cIaim.

On Toulmin's account modalities and rebut-tals also playa roleo Modalities are an indicationof how strongly an arguer believes the premisessupport the concIusion. Rebuttals are undermin-ing conditions.

3.3.2.2. Dialogical interpretation

Another conception of arguments is thatthey occur in the context of dialogues.PMoreover, there are a variety of standard purpos-es for dialogues. These standard purposes putsconstraints on the structure of the dialogue whichin term helps determine the structure of theresulting complex argument. Among the dia-logue types which have been identified by pro-ponents of this view are: persuasion dialogue,information seeking dialogue, negotiation dia-logue, inquiry dialogue, eristic dialogue, anddeliberation dialogue.

3.3.2.3. Recurring complex argument structures

Are there complex argument structureswhich are recurring? In the example of a com-pound argument considered previously first wefound an inductive generalization. Then the con-cIusion from this inductive generalization wasused as a premise in a deductive argument.

Some authors have suggested that this is a com-pound argument structure commonly found inscience. Are there some complex argument pat-tems which occur with some frequency? gener-ally? with respect to a specific discipline?

3.3.3 Textual interpretation

Besides the relatively narrowly focusedinterpretation questions of ambiguity, vaguenessand missing cIaim, there are broader textualinterpretation concems in accurately reconstruct-ing an argument from a passage of ordinaryprose.!" This is a topic well known to historiansof philosophy and too complex to discuss here.

4. Implications and tasks

What are the implications of the precedingdiscussion for the role of the logician? On thebasis of the preceding discussion what needs tobe done? in terms of tasks which have alreadybeen identified? in terms of questions whichthat need to be addressed? Is there a useful ter-minology to adopt that captures some of whathas been discussed and will facilitate furtherdiscussion?

4.1. The unique province of the logician

In the process of this analysis we have dis-covered that argument identification and mostparts of evaluation are context dependent activi-tieso Only the determination that a given argu-ment form is val id or invalid can regularIy bemade without knowledge of the argument's con-text. Only this activity is uniquely the provinceof the logician. For many aspects of argumentidentification and evaluation in ordinary dis-course standard course work in logic does notprovide the background and skills required.

4.2. Alternate terminology

This analysis suggests that it would be use-fuI to adopt a more generalized vocabulary fordiscussing arguments and their evaluation which

lDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION

contains the tenninology of the classical positionas subcases. The following is an initial effort atthis task.

A. Argument identification

Argument typeAmpliative argument - the intention is to

present evidence for a conclusion whichcontains more information than is con-tained in the premises.

Non-ampliative argument - the intent is topresent evidence for a conclusion whichcontains no information not alreadycontained in the premises

Argument complexitySimple argument - has a single conclusion

and none of the premises are themselvesargued for

Compound argument - has premises that arethemselves argued for or multiple con-clusions

Argument arrangement - pattern of arrange-ment of information in the argument

Argument form - determined by precisesyntactic description of the statementswhich make up the argument

Argument schema - description of argumentbased on functional roles of the prernis-es and conclusion

Argument structure - property of a com-pound argument which is shown dia-grammatically.

B. Argument evaluation criteriaCorrectness - premises appropriately relat-

ed to the conclusiondeductively validnon-dernonstrative logical correctness

Competence - statements have appropriateepistemic statussatisfactory definitionaccepted value judgmentappropriately supported assertions -classical position is true assertions -soundness

Connectedness - appropriately related toother available information

61

proper reference classobjections consideredimplications consideredaltematives considered

Cogency - satisfies all of the other criteria

4.3. Issues for further development

What needs to be done to further develop theanalysis? A summary of topics needing furtherexploration.

Argument definition

Construct an argument definition satisfyingthe following constraints.'?

(i) accommodate indirect proofs;(ii) accommodate hypothetical arguments;(iii) allow an argument to support a claim;(iv) allow an argument to refute or question a

claim;(v) enable distinctions to be made between

arguments, descriptions, explanations, etc.(vi) enable distinctions to be made among

arguments, implications, and reasoning;(vii) count both "bad" and "good" arguments

as arguments;(viii) provide the basis for criteria which can be

utilized to help pick out arguments ineveryday discourse;

(ix) allow for both simple and compoundarguments.

Argument identification

(i) Comprehensive theory of argument indi-cators

(ii) Common complex argument structures(iii) Guidelines for argument identification

Argument representation

(i) Adequate notation for the representationof complex argumentsPossibility of overall graphical representa-tion of arguments

62 PETER D. ASQUITH

(ii) Criteria for argument reconstruction(iii) Discipline specific argument pattems

Argument evaluation

(i) Theory of connectedness(ii) Techniques for the evaluation of amplia-

tive inferences(iii) Appropriate episternic statuses for state-

ments and how to evaluate(iv) Catalog of the types of claims occurring in

arguments and their appropriate epistemicstatuses

4.4. Pedagogical questions

What are the implications of this analysis forhow one ought to teach an introductory logiccourse if the goal is to provide the student withskills which are immediately and obviouslyapplicable? What is the skill set required for thestudent to be able to be able to do this? What arethe effective ways of imparting these skills?What is the sequencing of acquiring these skills?How much can realistically be done in a sernes-ter? Two strategies have frequently been used.One is to encourage to find arguments being usedin everyday contexts and analyze them. Theother is concentrate on learning the techniquesfor ascertaining the logical correctness of argu-ments and restrict the examples to constructedexamples which avoid some of the thomier prob-lems encountered when dealing with argumentsin their native habitat. Each of these has diffi-culties and neither approach is complete. Is therea way to effectively combine these differentapproaches? Which of the skills can be taughtor reenforced interactively via computer? Doesthis analysis provide any suggestions about howto teach better writing and thinking?

Notes

l. Most of the difficulties pointed out with respectto the classical position are not original to thispaper. They are drawn from a variety of sources.Not all of them have arisen as critiques of the

classical position. Drawing them together andtrying to sketch out their collective implicationsis the contribution of this paper.

2. The earlier editions of Copi's Introduction toLogic (which is still in use today in its 10th edi-tion) serve as an example of what I am taking asthe classical position.

3. Freeman (1994), p. 374. This is not a requirement which affects logical

correctness, but does facilitate discussions ofsoundness. It is also not a very precise require-ment as a single premise which is a conjunctioncould also be split into two separate premises.

5. This is based on an argument given by Salmon(1971),p.34

6. Johnson (1996), p. 265Govier (1999), Chapters 12 and 13

7. Freeman (1994), p. 41. A somewhat related idealies behind defeasible logics.

8. Govier. (1999), Chapter Seven9. Johnson (1996), pp. 77-7810. Hurley (1994), p. 2711. Walton (1996), p. 18 discusses 6 different forms

of unsettledness12. Thomas, Stephen N. (1973)13. Walton (1996), Chapter 614. Toulmin et al. (1979)15. Walton (1992), p. 134. More extensive accounts

are found in Walton (1989), and Walton (1989a)16. Walton (1996) p. 21317. Walton(1996) pp. 3-4

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IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION

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Peter D. AsquithDepartment of PhilosophyMichigan State University

East Lansing, Michigan 48824-1032U.S.A.