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The IAEA and the Control of Radioactive Sources Brian Dodd President-Elect Health Physics Society.
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Transcript of The IAEA and the Control of Radioactive Sources Brian Dodd President-Elect Health Physics Society.
The IAEA and the Control of The IAEA and the Control of Radioactive SourcesRadioactive Sources
The IAEA and the Control of The IAEA and the Control of Radioactive SourcesRadioactive Sources
Brian Dodd
President-ElectHealth Physics Society
2
International Atomic Energy AgencyInternational Atomic Energy Agency
“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.
138 Member States
2247 Staff from more than 90 countries
6 Departments
3
Authorized functions (Statute):Authorized functions (Statute):
To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses...
To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses...
To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts...
4
Authorized functions (Statute):Authorized functions (Statute):
To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable materials...are not used to further any military purpose...
To establish...standards of safety for protection of health...and to provide for the application of these standards...
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Six Departments of the IAEASix Departments of the IAEA
Management Policy, Legal Advice, and Administrative Support
Nuclear Sciences and Applications Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Technology Safeguards
Verification of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Material
Technical Co-Operation Technology Transfer
Nuclear Energy Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle, and Waste Management
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Six Departments of the IAEASix Departments of the IAEA
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Office of Nuclear Security Division of Nuclear Installation Safety Emergency Preparedness and Response Division Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety
Policy and Programme Support Section Waste Safety Section Radiation and Transport Safety Section
• National and Global Infrastructure Enhancement for Radiation, Transport and Radioactive Waste Safety
• Radiological Protection of Patients• Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials• Control of Radiation Sources
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HIERARCHY HIERARCHY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDSOF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Guides
Fundamentals
Requirements
underlying principles - aimed at politicians and regulators
specify obligations and responsibilities
recommendations to support
requirements
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Other Lower-Level DocumentsOther Lower-Level Documents Safety Reports
Technical Documents (TECDOCs)
Conferences and Symposium Papers Series
Accident Reports
Others
10 10
‘‘ORPHAN’ORPHAN’ SOURCES are radioactive SOURCES are radioactive sources which:sources which:
Were never subject to regulatory control; or
Were initially regulated, but then: Abandoned, Lost or misplaced, Stolen, or Removed without authorization.
11 11
‘‘VULNERABLE’VULNERABLE’ SOURCES are SOURCES are radioactive sources which:radioactive sources which:
Are currently under regulatory control; but
For which the control is insufficient to provide assurance of long term safety and security.
Note: Vulnerable sources could relatively easily become orphaned.
12 12
‘‘DISUSED’DISUSED’ SOURCES are radioactive SOURCES are radioactive sources which:sources which:
Are no longer in use or intended to be used.
Note: a disused source may still represent a significant radiological hazard.
It differs from a spent source in that it may still be capable of performing its function; it may be disused because it is no longer needed.
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Concern was raised in Dijon in 1998 Concern was raised in Dijon in 1998 because of accidents with orphan sourcesbecause of accidents with orphan sources
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GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil
1985: Private radiotherapy clinic closed down Unit dismantled,
Cs-137 source capsule ruptured causing major contamination
1987: teletherapy head stolen
50.9 TBq (1375 Ci) caesium-137 teletherapy machine left in abandoned clinic
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GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil
Exposure of large number of public:112 000 people monitored 249 people contaminated 49 people 0.1 - 6.2 Gy 4 people died
6 y old girl 18 y old man 22 y old man 38 y old mother
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GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil
85 houses significantly contaminated 200 people evacuated 7 houses demolished
Major contamination of property:
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GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil
Total volume of waste = 3500 cubic m 3800 metal drums 1400 metal boxes 10 shipping containers
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Gilan, IranGilan, Iran 1996: Ir-192 source
used for industrial radiography falls out of shielded container
Manual worker picks up source and puts it in chest pocket
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Gilan, IranGilan, Iran
Resulting in severe
radiation burns to the chest
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Istanbul, TurkeyIstanbul, Turkey December 1998: Two containers sold as scrap and broken open 3.3 TBq (88 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshielded Containers dumped 10 persons with acute radiation syndrome 404 persons medically examined 23.5 TBq (636 Ci) cobalt-60 source unaccounted
21
Istanbul, TurkeyIstanbul, Turkey1993: 3 disused teletherapy
sources packaged and stored by a private company awaiting return to supplier in USA
Inappropriate storage facilities
February 1998: 2 packages transferred to
inappropriate storage facilities
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Samut Prakarn,Thailand,Thailand October 1999: 3
disused teletherapy sources stored by a private company at unsecured parking lot
Jan/Feb 2000 unauthorized removal of one unit - dismantled for scrap
15.7 TBq (425 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshielded 10 people highly exposed 3 of whom died no contamination
23
Lilo, GeorgiaLilo, Georgia
Lilo military training center 1997: 11 Georgian soldiers
developed radiation induced skin lesions and acute radiation syndrome
Abandoned sources (Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226) found at various locations:
in coat pocketon building sitein buildingsburied in groundsin refuse moundon soccer pitch…
1997, LILO
POTIMATKOJI
ZUGDIDISANTREDIA
KAHISHI
Dec.2001, LJA
Radiological accidents in Georgia.Radiological accidents in Georgia.
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December 2001, Lja, Georgia
A group of woodcutters find 2
hot ‘objects’ in the forest. (unshielded
strontium-90 sources,
each approx. 30,000 Ci !)
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The back of patient 2 on 6 January 2002
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… sources later discovered beside a path, under a rock, on the edge of a 50m-
deep 30°-slope.Source
Source
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Source Recovery in Georgia
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Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)
RTG’s were used in various civilian and military applications (e.g. to power navigational beacons and communications equipment in remote areas…)
Several 100’s Sr-90 powered navigational beacons operated
in the Artic from Novaya Semlaya to the Bering Strait.
These generators also appeared in Belarus …
… and elsewhere in Asia…
… completely unsecured!…
… and easily removable by the public! ...
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Radiological Accident Statistics Radiological Accident Statistics (1944-2000)(1944-2000)
~ 400 reported accidents ~ 3000 exposed persons > 100 deaths, more than half involving
patients In addition, orphan sources can be mixed
up with scrap causing contamination problems
Illicit trafficking involves orphan sources but very few orphan source incidents are due to illicit trafficking events
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At Dijon it was recognized that inadequate control (safety and security) has caused many serious accidents
Orphan sources were, and are, a major concern
So, IAEA was asked to develop and implement an action plan as well as to develop guidance to begin to address the issues
Summary so far...Summary so far...
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Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance
IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10
IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10
Major Findings of the Conference:Investigate formulation of an international undertaking on the safety & security of sources
Dijon September
1998
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Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance
IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10
IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10
• Approved by BoG & endorsed by GC Sept 1999• Some issues not resolved
SCOPE
39
Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance
REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12
REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12
Draft REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
GOV/2002/35/Add.1-GC(46)/11/Add.1
Draft REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
GOV/2002/35/Add.1-GC(46)/11/Add.1
Draft REVISEDCategorization of Radioactive Sources
Draft REVISEDCategorization of Radioactive Sources
September 11
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International Conference on International Conference on Security of Radioactive SourcesSecurity of Radioactive Sources
High-level conference Held 10-13 March 2003 Over 720 participants From over 120
countries Two major findings
with other topical findings
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Endorsed by GC
GC(47)/RES/7
Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance
REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9
REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9
Scope
IAEA/CODEOC/2004
G8 Evian SummitJune 2003
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Endorsed by GC
GC(47)/RES/7
Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance
IAEA/CODEOC/IMP-EXP/2005
Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources
GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13
Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources
GOV/2004/62-GC(48)/13
G8 Sea Island SummitJune 2004
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Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance
REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12
REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 10, 2001GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12
Discussed making the Code legally binding – but no consensus
Many countries trying to implement the Code
IAEA to revise Action Plan (again)
Next conference in ~3 years
44
Categorization of Radioactive Categorization of Radioactive SourcesSources
Category PracticeActivity Ratio
A/D
1RTG’s; Irradiators;
Teletherapy; Gamma KnifeA/D ≥ 1000
2Industrial gamma radiographyBrachytherapy (HDR/MDR)
1000>A/D≥10
3Fixed industrial gauges with high activity sources (level, dredge, conveyor gauges etc.)
Well logging gauges10>A/D≥ 1
4
Brachytherapy (LDR except eye plaques & permanent implants)
Industrial gauges with lower activity sources (e.g. portable moisture/density gauges)
Bone densitometers; Static eliminators
1>A/D≥ 0.01
5Brachytherapy (eye pl. & perm implants);
XRF devices; Electron capture devices; Mossbauer sources: PET check sources
0.01>A/D
and
A>Exempt
Inc r
eas i
ng
Ris
k
45
Some D values of interestSome D values of interest
Radionuclide D (TBq)D
(Ci)
Am-241 0.06 2
Co-60 0.03 0.8
Cs-137 0.1 3
Ir-192 0.08 2
Sr-90/Y-90 1 30Now published as Safety Guide RS-G-1.9
46
Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Nuclear Security Plan of ActivitiesNuclear Security Plan of Activities
It has eight topic areas and is mainly focused on nuclear material (SNM); however,
It had two main thrusts for sources… Remediation of past problems Prevention of future problems
47
1: Remediation of Past Problems1: Remediation of Past Problems
Collect, dispose of known disused sources
Secure vulnerable sources, especially high-risk sources (Tripartite initiative)
Search for, recover and dispose of orphan or vulnerable sources
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Collecting known disused Collecting known disused sourcessources
IAEA has for many years had campaigns to collect, properly dispose of, and secure the large number of disused sources around the world
Collection and conditioning of radium sources in Africa is a good example
Return of a 700 TBq (19,000 Ci) 137Cs source from Cote d’Ivoire to France is another
49
Securing vulnerable sourcesSecuring vulnerable sources
Tripartite Initiative secured HIGH activity sources in some former Soviet Union countries: Azerbaijan Belarus Estonia Kazakhstan Moldova Tajikistan
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Tripartite PartnershipTripartite Partnership
USA brought $ and security team Russia brought information on sources
and technology and possible recycling of some sources
IAEA brought contacts, local knowledge, project management and co-ordination
100 kCi dismantled and transported to safe and secure storage.
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Many high activity radioactive sources are vulnerable...
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53~2,000 Ci Cs-137 ~10,000 Ci Co-60~40,000 Ci Sr-90
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~3,500 Ci Cs-37 each
55
Several disused teletherapy heads
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Other ProjectsOther Projects
EU funding for work similar to Tripartite: Balkans Armenia
Six disused medical irradiators secured in: Tanzania Philippines
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Active Searches for
orphan sources
Surveyor Rappellinginto Ravine
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Passive searches for sourcesPassive searches for sources
IAEA published guidance on prevention, detection and response to illicit trafficking and inadvertent movement of radioactive materials (TECDOCs 1311, 1312, 1313)
ISO, IEC are each developing standards based on this earlier work
IAEA has a research project aimed at capability improvements: 28 labs and 18 countries are involved
IAEA, USA and EU have all provided equipment and training for border monitoring, with concentration in Eastern Europe and NIS countries
61
IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking DatabaseIAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database
As of Dec. 2003: 335 incidents involving
non-nuclear, radioactive materials have been confirmed
However, more than 75% of these involve Category 4 & 5 sources
At least 50% of 335 appear to entail deliberate criminal activities, including about 20 incidents with Category 1-3 sources
Most of these seem to be amateurish groups motivated by financial gain
62
Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Nuclear Security Plan of ActivitiesNuclear Security Plan of Activities
It had two main thrusts for sources… Remediation of past problems.
By end of 2005:Dismantlement and relocation of the highest risk
sources (~35) in 6 countries to be completedEleven high activity sources (~29,000 Ci) and 58
neutron sources recovered from Africa and Latin America
Prevention of future problems
63
2: Prevention of Future Problems2: Prevention of Future Problems
Improve legal and regulatory infrastructure
Implement the Code of Conduct, including:
import/export controls on high risk sources strengthen or regain control with a National
strategy increase security of sources as needed
Involve manufacturers and distributors with issues such as source redesign, return of sources…
64
Legal and regulatory controlsLegal and regulatory controls
IAEA has published a large number of standards, regulations and guidance
Model Project for StrengtheningRadiation Protection Infrastructurehelps developing countries put these into practice
Radiation Safety Infrastructure Appraisals (RaSIA), now modified to include security of radioactive sources (RaSSIA)
>100 missions completed by end of 2005
65
Code of ConductCode of Conduct
High level document to governments and regulatory authorities to serve as “guidance for the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations on the safety and security of radioactive sources”
66States committed States not yet committed
As of Oct 2005, 77 countries, G8 As of Oct 2005, 77 countries, G8 and EU have endorsed the Codeand EU have endorsed the Code
68
Scope of CodeScope of Code
Focus on sealed, high-risk radioactive sources (essentially Cat. 1-3, withsome provisions only forCat. 1 and 2)
Excludes nuclear materials, as defined in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
Excludes radioactive sources within the military or defense programs
69
Examples…
Provide guidance on: Legislation Regulations Regulatory body Import/export controls
ContentsContents
Built on existingInternationalStandards
70
SourceRegister
National register of radioactive sources for “at least Cat. 1 & 2” (~58 Countries trained in IAEA’s RAIS)
National strategies for gaining or regaining control over orphan sources
Strengthening Control over Strengthening Control over SourcesSources
States should develop:
71
Security measures needed to deter, detect and delay unauthorised access, removal of source, etc
Security MeasuresSecurity Measures
Maintain confidentiality of sensitive information
Countries should define domestic threat, and assess vulnerability
72
Disused sources can be Disused sources can be particularly vulnerableparticularly vulnerable
Disused sources should be managed safely & securely (including financial provisions where appropriate)
73
Import and Export of Radioactive Import and Export of Radioactive SourcesSources
Export Authorization from exporting state’s
regulatory body Notification of importing state’s
regulatory body Consent of importing state’s
regulatory body (Cat. 1 sources)
Import Authorization from importing state’s
regulatory body
But, so far only a few (11) countries have recommitted
78
Co-operation with Manufacturers Co-operation with Manufacturers and Suppliers of Sourcesand Suppliers of Sources
ISSPA is drafting a Code of Good Practice for the industry (http://www.isspa-org.com/)
Manufacturers are participating in IAEA meetings to ‘minimize the consequences of malicious use’ through improved design and construction.
The IAEA has encouraged the development of
79
Conclusions - USAConclusions - USA
The USA has been actively engaged in the international effort, and has been leading on many fronts
Several NRC orders, rulemakings and parts of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 are the direct result of the USA’s commitment to the Code of Conduct
The USA is funding many multi- and bi-lateral efforts to help ensure the safety and security of radioactive sources
80
Conclusions - IAEAConclusions - IAEA
The IAEA’s work on the safety and security of radioactive sources has been quite extensive
However, it has no authority except over its own programs
So ultimate control of sources depends on each country and ultimately on the person with the authorization…So…
81
Conclusions - HPSConclusions - HPS It’s time for a renewed vision for the
Radiation Safety Without Borders program Chapter to Country – Long term - years Person to person – Relationship based Professional support – Multiple mode
Resources, advice, experts on IAEA missions, funds to attend meeting
Help seed a foreign chapter, that develops into an independent national society that becomes an IRPA Associate Society
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Supplementary Ionizing Supplementary Ionizing Radiation Warning SymbolRadiation Warning Symbol