THE GLOBAL CONTEXT me slra~ns becauseshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/1312/8/08_chapter...
Transcript of THE GLOBAL CONTEXT me slra~ns becauseshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/1312/8/08_chapter...
CHAPTER - II THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Relatronr between super powers and colontat Thrrd World
slates ate usually rub~ected to stresses me slra~ns because
of wrde dlvergences In Iherr percept~on pollc1e8 A super powel
conducts rts fore~gn polrcy wlth~n the global conrerl 11s polrey
alms at the conla~nmcnt of 11s rival power and the expansron
of 11s own orb^^ of rnfluence Third World rtales, on the other
hand are nal1onal19t In orlentat~on hlghly rensltlve of the~r
ldenlrty and soverlgnty and deeply concerned about lhelr
tcrr~torlal In lntegr~ry and development There slates conduct thert
foretgn pol~cles mostly In the regronal context though the~r
leaders often lecture others cspeclally the super powers on
rnternat~onal peace justcce, morrlrty and h~gher human values
There dlvergences lrmrl the scope of co-operrt10n between the
super power and Thrrd World states The cooperallon becomes
ail the more d~ff~cult , I! a Thrrd world state Irke lndra enlerlacns
greater power amb~trons on the basrs of 11s 1116. resources, locatron
ancrcnt trad~tlons m~l~tary power and democratrc pol~l~cal bystem
The global envtronment thus plays a crucral role In the
shaping of foreign poltcy of a global power ltke the US towards
a rsg~onal power Itke India As d~scurred In chapter-l two
aspects of American global ~mperallver have influenced 11s
pollcy towards lnd~a Firstly, whrle Amerrca's emergence as a
global power after Ihe end o l Second World War oblrged 11 lo
contatn all ~ndependmt cenlet i of power8 lor protecllng 118
global tnfluences, lndra'r rsptrat1on8 to play an actfve and
~ n d e p n d m t role symbol~wd by polley of non.alrgnmen1
n
created lens~ons In US-tndta tw8 Amncr'r oncour8gemont
and ars~rtance to Pak~stan can theretore tt b. soen tn mrms 01 US
attemp! to cfeale an unflroufaD1e DlianCO In South Arc. to
clrcum8cr1be Indm s role; II IS tn l h ~ s mnsa that Indo.bowel
fr~endrhlp can be v l e w d as an outcome Indo.Amer1c8n
d~fferencer Once however lndla developed frlendshrp wtth the
SovM Un~on lhra compln*lsd Indo-US dlvergencer The lrnpl~cal~onr
of Cold War for Indo-US relal~onr cannol therefore be tgnofed As
Sov~el Un~on war most tmporlant source 01 Ihreal to Arner~can
hegemony the US fore~gn pollcy durlng Ihe Cold War was
very much preoccupied w~lh ~ t r flvalry with the Sovtet Untonl
Not rurprls~ngly when US.Sovlel confronlat~on helghlcned
on accounl of Russlan Intervention In Afghanislan In 1979 l h ~ s
set ously rnfluenced US.lndia relalrons On the one hand l h ~ r
clevaltd Pakistan zlgn~ltcance In Amerlca s slraleg~c pcrcepl~on as
a bulwark againsl Sov~ct expanston In South West Asla headmy lo
Amef~ca 8 supply of arms to Pak~slan Ihls understandably angered
Indo On the other hand however lnd~a loo d~sliked Sovlel
~ntervent~on In Alghanislan that acted as a buffer slale between lnd~a
and former USSR ~hough Indh did not openly join the Wsrlern camp
tn denouncing Moscow Thta had 11s own log~c ~n movlng India
towards the U S We therelofe propose lo examme the ~mpl~catton*
of Afghanrstan crtsls known am the second Cold War lor Indo-US
rc~ar~ons In add~l~on we also propose lo d~scuss In th18 chaplet the
larues of lnd~an Ocean apartheld In South Alrrca and Narnblan
tndependunu. Polurltntm problem Non-altgnment Movement and
Nuw Econom~c lnler~t1on8l Order (NIEO) tn rnflwnctng US poltcles
towubt lndu dunng tho Reqm ara.
THE SECOWD COLO WAR
The mend of rwm Cold War whch m a n with th. Sovht antry
Into Afghantatan. led to the adoptton of r tmng antb-communlrt.
a t & - r o m t rtmnUr by RonJd Reagan The U S Govornmnt vc.wrd
th. dK.d r o m t mtlftary mterwntion cn Afghanistan as a gram thraat
to the regtonal stability ~nternatconal peace and Amerccan tnlerests
tn the Gulf region American poltcy makers were of the v i m that the
Sovcet mtlltary presence tn Afghanisthan had placed them In a better
porttion to make further moves In the Southern dtrectton. I e
Paktstan Iran and the Gulf This would not only undermine the
slab~lity of the Gulf regton but 11 would #IS0 threaten Weatern
(erpectally American) ~nteresls In the reg~on' The major Amertcan
interests tncluded the supply of Gulf 011 to the Western world at
reasonable prccea and in the requtred qurntlty. trade Investment& m d
bustnesr tnlereats of the mult~nal~onals the recycltng of petrodollars
contacnnent of Sovcet tnfluence and the preservalcon of the pro.
Amercca conrervattvc Arab regcmes If the Soviet Uncon consoltdatsd
and bgtt~mrzsd therr mtlltary control of Afghanratan. I! could be r
porenttal rrsk for these U S tnteresls 'The Arnertcrn Government
therefore undertook a number of step8 to pressure the Sovrsl& to
w~thdraw by tncreascng the coat of thew mtlttary prenenco tn
The US commctment to the Gulf regton was pledged by the
PrssrdentJ declaratcon, popularly known as the Carter doctrlne
An rnrmpt by m Mnrlde form to gain control of the Perrlan GuH
regcan wiu k fogordd w an m u u n on 1he v ~ l r l intererls of the
UntW Strtn of Armcr. a d wch m attempt d l be mpolkd by
m y w a n 8 ~ u r y Wudmng mtlrlrry fort@ Thn p m w m n l
*as aCComp8nd by uueral punlttvr measures agalnrt the Sovat
Unlon. which mcludrd. 1nl.r *Ira the boyeon of Moscov Olymptcr
the 8tOppaQe of graln supply, ~mposrtton of reslr~ct~onr on trade
e8pecr8lty On sab of htgh technology curta~lment of ftshtng prwtlcger
for Sovtet hshermen in Amertcan wafers and porlponemenl of the
consderat~on of the SALT-II treaty by the Amer~can Senate The
American Government also declared 11s support for Paktrfan a securtty
and terrttorral tntegr~ly and reaff~rmod the 1959 Paktsfan,US Treaty
If also expressed wtll~ngness lo supply arms to Paktstan to beef.up
d$ defences Inlf~ally the Amerlcan Government offered an rss~stance
package worth $400 mtllton whtch the Govonment of Paktgtan turned
down as bang inadequate Later as a result of htgh level Ialks
between Pakistan and the US the Arner~can Govarnmenf agreed In
1901 to provlde a $3 2 bllllon package of economlc asa~stancc and
mtlctary saks spread over r l x years 1901.87'
In pursuance of l h ~ s pollcy, Pakistan obtained ass~stance lor
economlc development and purchased soph~~f tca led mtlifary
sgu~pmsnl ~nciud~ng F-16 rrrcrafts and mirstles,etc Paktstan would
continue lo obtatn arms from the US unttl the exptry of the preoenl
arrangement rn 1887, when this would be renewed or a ntJr
arrangement would replace the current one prov~dsd !here 15 no
sgnif1c8nt change In the repconal secur~ly env~ronrnent In addtllon
lo thts, (ha US undertook convert operattong rtncs 1878-80 lo supply
a krn~tsd quanlrty of arm8 to the rnwrgmt groups in Afghan~~tan
Thew *.@pons fontr~butod to tha upability of these groups to pul
up a 1-h reurt.nw to the Sow! and K8rmal troops In ~ v e 1 8 l part
of Afghancstan f h e prrs~atencr and the low lntenllty of !he
a#
muqmq ~.pl mo b i e ~ troop^ undor aonUnuour P).IMI. From
mo ~ m r n p.n#c(m, mm kept HH s ~ v i o t b o w down then
and fl mmamd M. cost of mtorvm\hon in nutorbs1 and h u m n krm8
for tho Sovets Tho US also moblltud 1t8 al ter lor lrunchlng r
drptomalr offenswe agamrt the S o v ~ l mrlnary adventure and 1otnl.d
rnth other slator, erp.Wlly Th~rd World Stater. In lho~r dornmd for
the *Ithdrmal of Sovtot troopr'
In add~lion lo US-Sovlel tensions on account of Sovlet
~ntervention In Afghanistan, bolh Ihe super powerr differed on olher
burntng trruer of the day Presldenl Reagan had volced the Inlenlton
of h ~ r adminlstrat~on to promote democratic lnrtrtuttons and proctlcer
whtch pcrmtlted the 'people to choose their own way to develop their
own culture lo reconctle Ihelr own differences through peaceful
means" In pUrSU8nCe of thlr object~ve. the U S came In confl~cl
wlth the Sovtet Union The US emphasized lhal In all the counlrter
that the Sov~els had establtrhed Cornmun~st regimes through the use
of force lhey had been kept in power by the conlcnued ure of force
These 'oppretstve' governments never recetved the conranl of Ihe
people Thus. the US help lo lnrurgencier againrt them could not
be described as ' ~ n j ~ l t ~ f i ~ d and illegal ~nterference tn the ~nternal
a f fa~r l of other natlonr' They were fully In accordance w~ lh the
Amertun Declarrtton of Independence and Article 2(4) of the UN
Char te~ '~ The US dented that 1t8 rupport to the ~nrurgencrr war a
way of galntng 'world dommmce'" Aa Mrr Klrkpalrtck rtated ' Ihe
US ha8 no tmperirl vocatron and no lmperlal ambillon8 Most
A m c r ~ ~ r n do not even hvva the dartre to cas lhamretver 88 lsadrrr
0lthftnror)r l '
They onb w8nc.d to M p oth.r c w n t r n l In matnlainiq I h i r
11-nv a d int.gtltyl* ~ h . l u s ~ m ) me US suppon to insurg.nem
r g a m l 9OvOrfImQnb n Nmt*gur and EL Salvador on the b . m thN
they were not Ieg~l~mate demoeralie governmenta 'And a
government whose power depends on external support' has no
Cgitunalr grounds for complatn~ng that earernally rupporlsd lorce IS
u u d aganst d'' Thua, the superpower relattonr w r e stratnod over
the cssue of 'Ieg~limacy' of governments tn Afghanirtan. EL Salvador
and Ntcrragua
The declaration of martial law In Poland In December 1981 added
lo the tens~ons In US USSR relattons The US was 'reriourly
concerned' over the developments In Poland and demanded an end
of Sovtet ~nlervenlton which had allegedly resulted In the tmporction
of marlla1 law However the charge was denled by the Soviel Unlon
a h ~ c h ratd that the ~rnposillon of marlial law was -an inlernal matter'
of Poland Bestdes Poland was a member of the Warrrw Pacl and
a member of the social~st commun~ty of slales thus the U S was not
entitled t~ interfere in its matters In rcsponse lo the evenlr Ihe US
~mposed certain sancttons on Poland to express 11% opporil~on to thir
-brutal repression" Stnce the Soviel Union war regarded as
rerponsrbk for the 'repression ol Poland'. on 29- December 1981
aancl~ons were lmposed on 11 also The US suspended new export
lsencrar for hgh techno1oQy Items and postponed the negol~allonr
on a marnlme pact and a gram agreement The US also 'teslr~cted
the Sov~et acceaa' 10 11s ports and 'withdrew Sovlel alr rarvlce
prnflkqps' A Sovwt off-, that arranged for the purchara of US
non-rgncu)lural products, was &red down Though tho rnarlral law
war suspended on 31' hcember 1982. the government 'retamed
rrrlrutnc, powers', which cwId be used to r e ~ m p o ~ marlul law On
I
ns oarr. the US a d not remow 811 the unehdns. though they were
reeuced dunng 1983 and tW4'' Thus. the U.S sttapidan that the
S:.rtts were rttemptrng lo expand thetr tnflwnce and auppterr the
P ~ C ' O U of Poland led to a deler~oralton of super power relations
Anorher malor inc~dent whrch upset the relaltons between the
s ~ c t r powers was the shooting down ol the Korean A~rl~ner. KAL C07,
by a Sovtet jet fqhter MIG-23 on l Y Seplember 1983 The Crew
and all 269 passengers lncludfng srxty.one Amer~cans were krlled
In the ~nc~deot * The US accused the Sovrels of 'knowrngly '
do*ntng the fi~ght whlch had devrated 300 m~let from 11s assrgned
course dur~ng the last pan of 11s flrght from New York lo Seoul
Prrsldenl Reagan charged lhal the barbaric acl"' was uncalled for
aqa had no 'jlrst~f~catton ellher legal or moral' He reasoned that
commcrclal allcfalt from Sovlet Unlon and Cuba had flown over
srrTs~tive US m~l~tary fac~l~t~es"* but on no instance had they been
harmed becarisc Arnerrca bel~eved tn helping the martnes and
~ " o l s who were lost or in d~stress 'We bel~eve rn followrng
prccca~ires to prevcnl a Iragedy not lo provoke one"
A s a conseguerlce of the ~ncldent the US announced on 5'"
Sep!ernber 1983 !he suspension of certaln cullural S C I O ~ ~ I ~ ~ C and
dt~'cma!tc exchanger w~th the Sov~els However, the Prettdent d ~ d
nct adopt any sltonger measures Ithe the suspensron of srmt lalks
W I I ~ the Soviet In Geneva the cancellal~on of J 1 10 btllron. f~ve.year
US Sovtet gram deal or the bannlng of lechnolog~cal transfers to
USSR On 8" Seplember the US and ntne other nalrons tntroduced
a resolulmn m the SbCurrty Council I0 'deeply deplore the destruc(~on'
of K A L 007 and on 12' September the US Congress un8nimourly
adopted a resolut~on dercr~btng the bnctdent as a 'cold-blooded
b.c~nanrn~~ ( u r d j ~ w d t h e ~ m f ~ u r d f e ~ l l l
acts In h t s ~ o y ~ tbwwm. 1- Sew& wtood Ih. S.cunty C-1
rtrorutlon They chWW mat me w k w r had boon on r 'rpy mlrrcon'
over the 'senrcttva areas of Kamchrlrr Pentnrulr md Srkhrlln
Island:' tho US war only m r n ~ p u W ~ q the w i l d oplnan by
prewnl~ng f r l re slalemenls whtle cn rclurltty the plane had
attempted lo elude the tnlercept~ng Sov~el planer and Ignore the
wrrnlng scgnrls::
lndtrn Perspective
These developments In the early years of Ihc Reagan Prer~denc~
enhanced the super power IClnSlOnS While the US condemned lheso
Sov~el acfrons the Congress government In lndca war hes~lanl to
adopt a strong stand aga~nsl Ihe Sov~ct Union I t d ~ d not give up the
basic pr~nc~ples of 11s poltcy, yet ~t dld not openly crlllc~ze USSR s~lher
Though lnd~a contcnued lo oppose lore~gn occupahons and advocsled
the furtherance of human rcghts 11 was no1 w~lltng lo support Ihe US
I F ~ts condemnallon of the Sovtet ~ntervent~ono Mrs Gandh~ upheld
the vfes that her Gove~nmenl could not 's~ngle oul any one counlry
tor condemnal~on;' lndla saw a s~m~lartty In Ihe Sov~et ~nlervenlconu
ana Amerccan ~nlerferences' The US rearonlng that 11 had asstsled
Itle rebels In N~caragua and El Salvador agalnst '~llrgtl~mate' regcmes
was not rccepled by 4
Indm had ma~ntrmed economcc ielat~ons wcth Poland before the
elghter wh~ch conltnued to be enhanced even after mantal law war
lmpored cn December 1881 lndcr dtd no1 sever lhese I ~ e s nor
f o l l o d Ihs Amerran example, by cmpostng sanctrona on the Sovcel
Uncon and Poland The Polcrh stlurlton had been v10WOd wlth
comrmoylndu U n ~ t u ~ ~ m r t n m e ~ r .
o w t the *rue dur~ng tho Commonnatrh lherda of Government
Summtt 130" Segrembar - 7' 0ctob.r 1 B 8 f ) The Communtque
wued a1 dr and exprerud the conatn of the memb.n owr the
'reftour tmpl~carfonr' 11 could have on the communtly of nattonr
'They conrdered that the poopbe of Poland rhould be left to
deterrntnt thetr Own derllny free from foretgn 1nterferencah After
the declaratton of martla1 law Indta continued to enhance tts trade
relat~ons wtlh Poland On 23'* October 1982 the Energy M~n~rter
Mc Shtv Shankor slgned an agreemen wtth h ~ r Pol~rh counterpart
to eoubie the trade between the two counlrtes~ In December 1982
rne r ~ o countr~es s~gned a New Prolocol for tncreastng trade In
1983,' These acttons tndlcaled that the developmenlr In Poland had
not affected the lnd~an poltcy towards 11 as well as the Sovtat Un~on
W~rh respect lo the Korean Atrllner Ifagedy also Indl8 616 not
openly support the Sovtet stand, but tt adopted a mtld approach I1
had asked the Councll of the Internattonal CIVII Avtatton Orgrntrrl~on
(ICAO, tr ~nvesltgate the ~nctdent However. the Sovlelr opposed the
proposal on the ground that they w c e already ~nverttgattng the trsue
In spfte of Sovtet object~on. a resolution asking for the ~nvestgattons
was passed on 16% September 1983 and the ICAO rlarted
invest~galtons on 17- !japternber Indta, along w~th Rulrta and Chtnr
abslrtoed from votlng on the rerolutton The lndtan representaltve
clarlf~ed that the government agreed to 'the operahve part' of the
fesolutton It had abstained because 'the rerolutton as a whole was
not balanced 7' Thur the Indtan government3 stand war pfo-Sovml
T h e increalcrd IMm tn tho wper power relatwnr, duo lo these
d.rrkpmentr. d d nol mdro any c h a w in lndo SOwl lm Thts
M ttw U S to mw tnda as I, mcrmb.r of tho 'Sovml camp' a d h
was re~uctrnl lo mprwr ch mI#t*ns wlh lndu Tkur ev(Hy m t .
*mlch ouflad the US and USSR aprn reduced the p o t r ~ ~ l r l t e s of
wner US.lnd~r relatwns
The Under C u m n t r of AecommodrUonr
Though the gromng c I 0 8 e o ~ ~ of Indtr and USSR tn genrrrl m
ln61r s reful8l to Openly Cfrttcrse f?usrran lnterventton in Afghantslan
In part~culrr generated tenstons In Indo.Amertcan relat~ons ye( 8
slated above the Afghsncslan cf l r tr pushed lndla towrfds
Wa~htnglon As erplrtned by r keen of observef of lndo Amertcan
teialtons Sovtel mtlttrry tntervent~on In Afghanrslan allered the brrtc
parameters of New Delh~ 5 prospecttve stralegtc prol~le and brougtit
a grudglng realisatron on 11s part that 11 had lo cullrvate the goodwtll
of Ihe US Chtna and even Paktrtan :' (reca!l Ihs then Fo~etgn
Minirrer Natarrmha Rao 5 htntr al Karacht In 1980 for a coordtnated
ap~foach lo the Afghan trsue) to counteract the adverse tm~ltcat~ana
ct the S~sret move on lndtan secuftly That Ihe Sovtol Unron dtd so
w~thout watntng the lndrans eracerbaled New Delht s dtrenchantmenl
and provtded unwelcome proof that derpile professtons of frlendshrp
Moscow would not hes~tate tn doing whal 11 cons~dered lo be In 91%
Dcsl ~nterests regardless of India s e n r ~ t ~ v t t ~ e s ~
New Delht, on the other hand could not fall to notrce the outcome
of d~rcurstonr gorng on belwten Wrshtnglon and lalamabad on the
Afghan *sue Theti talks made I! clear thr l netther of them war
wrll~ng to go that far Pak18t.n s then Fotetgn Mtn~ster. Agha Shrht
neatly epttomrred the new fetrt~onrhrp 8s 'a handuhrbe not r o
embracen Once thbM ltm18 were understood. the worst fears of
New h l h t mga lo~ng the US-Pakruen 8Ikmce worn $ w e w n r l
N r r Q Mum. tb h e n M m w l t a t m ' s gnrl.r prudmcr n
O*aW mth Chln8 me mprovoment m Indu s own rdahons with
C - k M CoMnbutetY to ndwhon m New 0alh1'a trnmediale . though
not bn9-tern Whmly feat*. a b thereby r n r b W to dtstrnce ttrelf
from b e o r end m o w c b ~ r torrards the Amertcanr*
New Deihl's move to reduce 11s dependence on Moscow also go1
an ~mpetua from tts concerns regardlog 11s non-al~gned credentirts
which were clouded ever stnce the Slgnrng of the Indo-59v1et Tremty
tr 7971 Since lnd~a was to ~nhertt the Non.Altgned Movement (NAM)
c?a~nansh~p In 1983 the val~dat~on Of 11s non altgnmcnt ctedent~als
In Ire eyes of tts members In general and South AsIan members In
part~cular who desired the condemnat~on of the Sovlrt act had
become a mustv S~mtlarly Indla with a large Musl~m mlnor~ty and
c ~ q ? ~ ~ c a l e d fles wtth the countr~es of the Islamic crescent must have
felt the need to show greater sympathy to lhetr concerns about the
Scv~et.attempled s ~ b j ~ g a l t ~ n of thclr Musl~m brelhfsn lndta
therefore rejected the Cuban concept of the USSR as a natural ally
cr 1t.e U i as a natural adversary of the NAM
The above menl~oned roots of tens~ons In 1ndo.Sovlet relrt~ons
I e j lndta to reduce her dependance on Moscow Thts became
apparent when it refused l o review the Treaty of Peace and
Fr~endshtp (1971) wtth Sovtet Un~on T~IS provtded Reagan
admlntslrallon r untque atmosphere of co operatton between the
rif.:ary forces of US and India For the f~rst ltme a jotnl Indo-US army
expcdtttan, under the Ierdershtp of Major H S Chauhrn. cltmbed the
7 273 metre Mana peak The three batches of twenty-rrx cl~mbers
retched the peak m r~ r teen days, through the soulhern route which
had never h e n used W o r e aa n
The US-lnbta CO-Operatlon was also wttnesshd In the courses
by the National Defence College (New Delht) and the
corlege of Combat (MhOw) for US ofllcers The vlstt of US wanhrps
13 inatan ports also showed an lncrease1; by late 1988 Until then.
the US ships found It dtfflcult to sad Into lndtan ports because lndla
ha6 rns~sted that the Ships should declare thal they had no unclear
weapons on board The US had persalently refused to ellher conflrm
or deny their presence On board However, l nd~a made a compromise
and altered tts stand Now 11 just requlres thal the fore~gn naval
vessels should slgn a statement that 'they have noted the host
country s wtsh thal vtsltlng shtps must not carry nuclear weapons""
Thus the late e~ghttes wctnessed a llmlled progress In the US.lnd~an
!e!at~ons tn the sphere of arms-sales and technology transfer
INDIAN OCEAN - THE THIRD STRATEGIC AREA
In Ihe Reagan strategy of deal~ng w ~ l h the Russ~ans from a
:.:sition of strength. the lnd~an Ocean assumed an enhanced
sb~n~ficance as the l h ~ r d straleg~c area from wh~ch Amer~can power
c3uld be brought to bear upon the Sov~el Un~on Sfnce the beglnnlng
ci !he farst Cold War Ihe US and 11s European allles have targeted
tLetr bombers and mlss~les on Russ~a from the Atlantic and Pacrflc
rr;lons To thts tradtl~onal West East and Arctlc lrajector~es ol attack
cn the S ~ n o - S o v ~ e t Cornmun~st land mass the lndlan Ocean
hlsrorlcally seemed to be an allract~ve add~l~ona l staglng area for the
US arsenal The northen reach of the Indtan Qcean strelch close
enough to the S~no-Sov~et land mass lo brlng any and all po~nts there
wlthln the range of the Amencan bombers and m~sstles of even an
ear l~er vintage In fact 11 was t h ~ s strategtc dlmenston that by
md.19601 OM US b.ck to t h . Indun Wan stnu the .nd of
her oncl murlvr p- In tho a m dunng tho S.eond World War
The Unctcd States began evcnclng serious stratqlc interest In the
lnd~an Ocean regton when the Britcsh announced In 1968 thew pollcy
of w~thdrlwal from the 'East of Suer' by the end of 1971 The
Amerlcan mll~tary planners were apprehensive that the resultant
'power vacuum' may be filled by the Russians, the Ch~nere and other
elements hosttle to the American and Western interests The Bnt~sh
were anxtous that the Amerccans should step In on the scene and
the laner were not at all reluctant to do sos W~th a vlew to facrl~tate
such a process the Brlttsh government carved out the so called
Brctlsh lnd~an Ocean Terr~tory (0101) tn 1965 In the Western reglon
of the lnd~an Ocean The BlOT compr~sed the islands of Aldabra
Farquhar and Desrocher from Seychelles group of Islands and the
Chagos Arch~pelago a dependency of Maur~tlus Through thn devrce
the Brltlsh detached the Chagos Arch~pelago (In whlch the now
famous Dlego Garcia base 1s located) from Maur~tlus In December
1966 Br~laln and the US s~gned an agreement whlch allowed the
latter to use BlOT for 50 years as a jo~nt Anglo-Arner~can bare A
satelltte tracklng statcon was ret up In the laland of Mahe In
accordance w~th another agreement s~gned between them In 1967
Early tn 1970. the US Congress appropriated $5 4 mtllton lor bulldlng
a 'communccatcon base' In Dcego Garcca and the constructton work
on the base began In March 1971
S~nce then the United States d ~ d not look back Her ~nvolvemenl
and mll~lary presence in the lnd~an Ocean reglon grew by
leaps and bounds and w ~ t h it grew the size and scope of the
operat~ons in Otego Garc~a, whlch now stands as a full fledged
ultra-modarn nuclear naval a e m t s r ~ k bare 1 ranked wry htgh
as a c r ~ c t a l constituent In the natton's global r t r a teg~c~ r r cun ty
frame work conffontlng the Sovtet Unton Several dramal~c
developments In the lndtan Ocean llnoral slnce the 1970'8 (break
up of Pak~stan Arab.lrrael~ war of 1973 011 embargo by the OPEC
fall of the Shah of Iran furmoll In E t h ~ o p ~ a and elsewhere along
the eastern sea board of Afrlca Sov~e l lnvaslon of Afghanistan
and the Iran-Iraq war, etc ) enhanced the pollt~co-mtl~tary and
econornlc s~gnlflcance of the lndlan Ocean reglon for the West
Furthermore the technological break4hrough In man's abll~ty
to mlne the Sea bed greatly Increased the American and
Western ~nduslrlal and commerc~al stake In the Indian Ocean Crucial
developments In the arms race (ABMs SLBMs. SLCMs elc )
greatly Increased the strateglc Importance of the already vital ocean
The Sov~et Unlon had In the process become more vulnerable
to attack launched from the lnd~an Ocean reglon Such a strateglc
prospect of havlng the rnalnland of the adversary w ~ t h ~ n thelr range
of attack from a low p r ~ o r ~ t y reglon l ~ k e South Asta, was l ~ k e a
dream come true for Amerlcan and Western rnll~tary planners
Consequently, there would be a very welcome reducl~on In
the rlsk of Russian refahatory blow to continental Un~ted Staler
and Western Europe wh~ch after all are most v~ta l (In that order)
for the Americans That IS why successive Amerlcan
admlnlstrat~ons have strengthened the Olego Garcla base
despatched naval task forces into the reg~on in ever
~ncreasing numbers and made concerted effort6 to acqulre
more bases, other off-shore and on-shore fac~ l~ t les in the
J m d s and the littoral states of the Indtan Ocean
T)w Sovkt Union m thorefom deterantnod to do emrythlng In
r t r ~ ) O m r t n l i r r t h . W s r W m . e r s r s a d p ~ w ~ n M , q a n
horn w)mh it a mort vulnsrabb to Amenun oflenslve crp8bd1ty Was
d m y wonder then Mat Mere has been an ever gromng super power
military presence. poktccal involvement and also h~ghtened rivalry
between the Big Two in the lndlan Ocean? There was a crucial
dffference though between the objecttves and nature of the power
projected by the two super powers In the reglon The US sought the
Indlan Ocean as an area for poss~ble offensive use The Soviet goals
were essent~ally defenscve and her presence had been hlslorccally and
essent~ally react~ve However. ln the context of this chapter 11 15
necessary to h~ghllght the broad contours of the expanding US mlltlary
presence In the Indian Ocean regton
Between Oclober 1973 and December 1978, the US has sent 18
task forces of ~ t s navy into the lndtan Ocean In January 1979
Dr Zblgnlew Brzezlnskl. US Nallonal Securtty Advlser, declared that
an 'arc of crisis' stretched along the lnd~an Ocean I~ttoral. whlch IS
dotted wlth frag~le social and polttical structures He argued that
unless the 11s malntalned a v~able presence and was able to come
up wllh a qucck, strong and adequate response, the local confl~cts In
the regton and the concomitant dlsorder and lnstabtl~ty would be
exploited by 'elements hostile to our values and rympalhetlc to our
adversaries' In llne with t h ~ s perception, more ships from the
Med~terranean and the Paclhc fleets were dlverted to the lndlan
Ocean S~nce then, the US naval presence lncrsased from 14
warrhlps in Aprli. 1978 to a record hlgh of 40 warshlps In May 1981
It 18 estimated that by 1082, this number had been slabtl~~ed at about
30 wanhips permanently stationed in the lnd~an OceanY
~ftot assuming ofhca In January 1981. Pres~denl Reagan took
wgorour r w r to augment the Indian Ocean fleet on a 'permanent
barn' *nMout ~ U C I I Q the Pacific 'leer or transfer~ng naval unlts from
the Madltemnaan sea In April. 1981 the Pentagon announced plans
to create an Independent Rapld Deployment Command (RDC) AS a
first step Defence Secretary. Welnberger dlrecled that the 56 000 man
army of the laC Air-borne corps be ass~gnd to the operat~onal control
of the Marine LI General Paul Kelly who headed the planned RDF
at the Macdtll Air Force Base Tampa Flor~da The U S has now
launched a vigorous search for tac~l~tles for the forces located tn
Dtego Garcca and the RDF personnel In the reglon whlch would make
the task of per~odcc rotallon of forces easler The Reagan
admlnlstrat~on was requesting many states In the regcon for "Rest and
Recreat~on' and other on.shore and oft.shore facll~t~es In return 11
was offering sizeable cndustr~al investments and other ~nducernents
I! was rurnoured that one such offer was made recently lo the SII
Lankan govoernrnent that latter was favourably ~ncllned and was
cons~der~ng the macn naval port of Trtncomalee In th~s regard'
It was als? reported that the US was conslderlng the creatlon of
a F~f th flee1 haw~ng at least two nuclear powered alrcraft carrles. one
crutser and SIX destroyers Furthermore the US had deployed ~ t s
long-range 8-52 bombers and the h~gnly sophlstlcated combat control
acrcraft called AWACS In Olego Garcia. Saudc Arabta. Israel and
Egypt Bestde. D~ego Garc~a was batng developed cnto a super base
with a 12.000 feet runaway capable of handllng all-types of a~r-craft.
a deep water anchorage capable of recelvlng even Nlmttz class
nuclear-powered errcraft carrcers. and e~ghl fuel storage tanks wlth a
total capaclty of 640.000 barrels suff lc~nt to support a carrler task
force for 30 days and a h~ghly soph~amted eleclron~c communtcal~on
star~on:' The olego Garc:a base has undoubtedly assumed
consduabk gao-Stfatwe Sgntf inca tn lhe polit~m-mtlmry str8t.g~
of the Reagan Admmlstrat~on
lmplicationr of lndian Ocean Politics for US-India Relations
S~nce both Indta and the US are 'stgnlficanl players' tn the mgion.
they have several shared interests In the region, lncludtng those of
prevent~ng confllct and promottng economtc development. social
coheston, polltlcal stablllty, democrat~c governments. human rtghts
and the upllftment of people In splte of these common perspectives.
the two have d~vergent gCOp0llll~al perspect~ves~ Thus, the Indian
Ocean contcnued to be a major factor In the US-lnd~a relal~ons in the
e~ghr~es
The lnd~an government was disturbed over the developmenl of
US bases on the terrttorles bordertng the lndtan Ocean and the
establtshment of the Rap~d Oeploymenl Force These US acl~ons
were ~ncons~slenl wlth the 1970 Lusaka Declarat~on, whtch had
procla~med the lnd~an Ocean a Zone of Peaceao. On the contrary.
the US regsrded the establ~shment of bases In the lndian Ocean as
an essent~al component of tts forelgn policy, espec~ally after the Sovtet
entry into Afghanistan4'. Secondly, the growth of the US and Sov~et
naval factllties in the lndian Ocean was viewed w~th grave concern
by Ind~a, slnce it was teared that the b ~ g power rivalry would inevitably
become linked with the regional confl~cts Thls would accelerate the
arms race between the countr~es of the region and divert their
resources and energies away from developmental act~vit~es At the
same t~me, the influence of the superpowers would bring about
'distortions of their natural evolution' and increase the poss~bil~ties
$1 .convulttVe Or v lot tnt PoI~ttcaI change- Further. the
:uzrrp0$1~0nln0 of S u W V o W n Could L a d to thelr confrontrt~on and
.war utn~ch would endagner the enllrc region': Thus Mrs l nd~ ra
3andh1 denled the posslblllty 01 the US or any other forces acting as
a 'Stab~lu~ng factor' In the regton '1
Paklstan s antlcl~ated support to the Central Command operalung
from Kenya to Paklstan StnOuSly threatened lnd~an secur~ty Interests
The US-Paklslanl co.operatl0n In the held of tntell~gence gathering
crovlded Paklstan with essential ~nformatlon about Ind~a" and the US
a ~ d provtded Pahlstan wcth an opportun~ty of slrengthen~ng ~tsetf For
'PIS ass~stancc Pakistan would be wllllng to reply the US wlth ~ t s
support to RDF and 'varlous forms of strategic co-operation" In the
Ferslan Gulf '' These fears had been substantlaled by a former
-ember o f the US Slate Department s Policy Plannlng Counc~l
'.Ir Fukuyama s statement that Pak~stan could serve as an ~mportant
ei!repot for the RDF movlng from Dlego Garcia or Phlllpp~nes Inlo
'"e Perslan Gulf Mr Fukuyama s report and Mr Jack Anderson s
"sclosures lndlcated that Pak~stan had agreed lo prov~de use of 11s
a fttelds to the US planes In case of a Soviet threal lo the Gulf from
Afghanistan The President of the Movement for Restoration o f
Democracy also alleged on 4" March 1983 that Pres~denl Z~a.ul.Haq
bad 'offered uncondltlonal support to plans for upgrad~ng naval
facil~lies for RDF in Baluchtstanl ports and the construct~on of alr
bases In southern Baluch~stan as a part of US 'forward strategy' In
the regton Pakistan had acqu~red the status of a 'front-llns state'
due to the exlstlng ctrcumstances In Afghanistan and Iran Thus
lnd~a feared that the US and Pakstan would promote the11 relations
for mutual benehtr. wh~ le endanger~ng lnd~an ~nterests*
The Indims Wn 8SpaCully pef lurkd by the enhancement of
naval hull108 on the bland of Owgo G a w . They viewed it as 'an
arrow potnted at the heart of world peace Under the c~rcumrtances
one a n only conclude that D q o Garaa IS alrned at the developtng
countrtem as 11 1s agatnrt the Sovut Unton' The lnd~an anx~ousness
was further ~ncreafed when the US den~als about the butld-up bases
proved to be false A US lnformatlon Service offlctal obrerved In
February 1883 at Allahabad
'The evolut~on of the Amertcan plans for Dtego Garctr have changed rad~cally over time and 11 ts futlle to try convtnce lndtanr that we d ~ d not secretly Intend all along to turn the atoll Inlo a major stagtng area complete wtth runways for 8-52s and anchorage for balltsttc rnlss~le submar~nes'
In splte of this acknowledgement the Reagan Adm~mstrat~on
cont~nued to deny the lnd~an allegattons of the developmenl bang
aimed aga~nst the Thtrd World and declared that the lnd~an
statements had exaggerated the relevance of D~ego Garc~a These
den~als of the US even whtle the developments conl~nued on the
island, created doubts aboul the 'cted~bthty and ~ntenttons' of
Amer~ca. whtch resulted In a deler~oral~on of the US.lnd~a relal~ons"
The lnd~an government also expressed 11s d~mapproval of the US
lark force It was seen as a potentla1 threat rlnce non of the ltttoral
states had the ab~ l~ ty to counteract 11s force. All the atr-craft carrters
of the force operate about twenty-four flghterr like F-14, thtrty r l x
atlack alrcrafl like A-6 and A.7. four E.2 Hawkeye early warnlngl
control aircraft, four EA-60 electron~c warfare a~rcraft. and three
RA-SC long-range reconnaissance aircraft In ~ t s martltme
rtconnairrance and anti -cubmar~ne optrat~onr 11 IS supported by ten
S-E V~king ASW aircratl and eight SH-3 Seeklng ASW heltcopterr
Indta feared that, 'These large float~ng aifieldr. protected by ruffact
f l
md rubm8nnn. u n bring to k r r 8 concentt8ted fire-pomr
at l g w n W e e at any g m n tlmeu Though the US presence In the
Indian Oman ma h a than that n the Paclf~c and the Atlrntlc or the
med~terrmem. I( endangered Indlan securlty
These lndlan concerns were accentuated by the tact that the U S
had developed close 'polltlco~m~lttary Ilnkages' w~th some powers of
the regron and reglonal groups Its relatrons wrth the members of
the ASEAN rn South East Asla. Bangladesh Sf1 Lanka and Pakrstan
In South Asla some members of the GCC In the Gulf Somal~a and
Kenya In East Africa. Egypt and Israel in the Red Sea and the
Medrterranean reglon had helped 11 to 'consol~date and leg~trmixe" 11s
presence Thus the US threat lo any country wh~ch was not a part
of 11s fold. was ~ncreased'* The lnd~an allegat~ons become stronger
when In early 1988. the US based International Development Aid
IIDA) announced a reductton In the a ~ d to lnd~a by more than hall
due to 'budgetary constraints' (from f 5 5 million to S Z 5 million)
However, at the same t~me the a ~ d to Sf1 Lanka was enhanced and
the a ~ d packet of $480 million lo Pak~slan *as no1 reduced Pakrsriln
had recelved th~s favoured treatment since it provlded bases and
strong polnts for stalronlng addillonal contrngents of the RDF and the
use of ~ t s bases and facll~t~es In Karach~ Gwadar and Peshawar"
This proferentral treatment of Pakistan 11s assrslance by the US was
seen as a direct threat by lndra due to the tradtllonal rlvalry between
lndra and Pak~stan
Role of the Soviet Union
The U S on 11s part, accused lndla drscr~m~nating between the
two super powers and condoning Sov~et actlvrt~es, whlch threatened
w ragma ngloculrca and wcunty After tho oil crisis of 1973. VH rovwt
Union had 8ROmpt.d to over the Iittofrl m d hinterland states by
means of 'friendship' trestles The Sovletr had concluded such
treaties with Afghanistan. Ethiopia. Ind~a. Iraq. Maur~tius.
Mozambqw. Tanzmu. and five countries in the Middle East Within
one year of such a treaty being signed w~th Afghanistan. the Soviet
troops had entered the country The U S feared that the other
treaties could be used in a similar manner to establish Soviet control
over the Indian Ocean regions'
The US viewed the establishment of Soviet military positions
along the northern Gulf margin or on the Arabian Sea I~ttoral
overlooking the Hormuz Strait, as a threat to the free flow of oil It
bel~eved that through these establishments. the Soviets would
pressurize the countries dependent on ~rnported 011 for their ~ndustrial
energy upp ply'^ The Soviet military bu~ld.up would also be a threat
to 'the stability of the region and to the national Independence of the
nations in the area"
The U S cr~tcised Indla's 'soft' att~tude towards the Soviet Union
and its expansion in the lnd~an Ocean The US stated that both lndia
and Sri Lanka had contributed towards the declaration of the Indian
Ocean as a zone of peace, but since then lndia had changed its
stand While Sri Lanka viewed the Soviet and American actions with
'apprehension*, Mrs lnd~ra Gandhl's Government tended to 'tilt'
towards the Soviets lndca dismcssed the Sri Lankan appfehens~ons
as an 'e~aggeratton'~ and was h~ghly critical of the US actions
The Indian government clarified that it advocated the removal of
all foreign forces and baser from the region Though ~t expressed
as dissat~sfrction w~th the Soviet activities, i t severely opposed the
US pramco W u S e the US was greater threat to rrg~on" lndta
argued that the Indian Ocean has a greater strateg~c relevance for
the US than for the USSR because the Tndent.1 submar~ne.taunched
m ~ s s ~ l e s from the lndlan Ocean can strtke the ~ndustr~al areas of
southern Russla. While the US can u t ~ l ~ z e t h ~ s threat lo deter the
Sovtets. the USSR Cannot stm~larly operate agalnst the US9* The
S o v ~ t s would not be anxlous to deploy thelr SLMBs In the area since
the~r range was such that they would not reach the US from the Ind~an
Ocean Secondly the Sovlet submarines have lo crulse long
d~slances through choke polnts conftolled by the West to reach the
l nd~an Ocean The USSR could pose ~ t s counter threat more
eflect~vely 11 11 SLBMs In the Paclflc the North Sea and the Atlantlc
Thus the Sov~ets would not be ~nteresled tn uscng the lndlan Ocean
for any rn~l~tary programmes
l n d ~ a also alleged that the conllnuous US deployments slnce
1971 had not been prlmar~ly the result of the cold war of the Sov~et
threat I t had evolved the RDFICENTCOM strategy not to prevent
Sonlet expanslonlsm In the Gul f but to secure the 011 f~elds for ~lsel f
The Sov~et mllltary occupal~on of Afghanistan had only been used as
a pretext for a strategy whtch had been worked out In advance and
perhaps would have been executed even 11 the Sov~ets and not
entered Afghan~stan"
The lndtan government dtd not etrongly oppose the Sov~et moves
In the regton because the Sov~et Unlon appeared lo be more
'sympalhettc' of the Indlan v~ews on the lnd~an Ocean, and even
expressed tts support for the ~ d e a of a zone of peace The Sov~et
Un~on endorsed the proposal for an rntsrnat~onal conference In Srl
Lanka, to cons~der the ~mpkmenta t~on of the 1971 General Asrembly
r m M m Hl<l pmpO@d by W r g a l c r r for a confarenu of world
wdom on tnr, lndun Ocem On the contrary, tho US had adoptd
a d~ffefent DoSdmn to that of lndta It had m s t w t l y refused to accep~
the proposal for a peace zone as a 'real~sttc' and 'kas~ble' one.
Amenca had reasoned that even tf the superpomn agreed to a
compbte d ~ ~ t I l t ~ r t t 8 t t O ~ of the reglon. 11 would rematn 'an area of
~nternal. tntrareglonal. tnterreg~onal nvrlrces', stnce several countrces
of the regton had devloped thetr own navtes At the same Itme. the
US was not supportive of a conference tor d~scuss~ng the
~mplemenlatron of the December 1971 resolullon stnce 11 felt that
'such a conference would be long on denunc~at~ons of the US and
shon on aclual achtevernenlW
Both lnd~a and the US contrnucd to uphold the same vlews wh~ch
had been presented In the late stxlles Thus the lnd~an Ocean
poltt~cs and r~valry created obstacle tn Irnprovernenl In Indo.US
relat~ons However as d~scussed In the next chapter, once the second
Reagan adrnrntstratton moved towards accornmodat~ng Ind~a's
reg~onal tnleresl In south asla (except Pak~stan). Indra loo moderated
~ t s cr~tc~sms of US act~v~t~es tn the lnd~an Ocean
SOUf H AFRICA - APARTHEID AND NAMIBIAN
INDEPENDENCE
Apartheid a@ a Factor
Afrrca, ltke Asla and Laltn Amenca, IS a part of the world where
the two super power* are attemplcng to enhance thetr tnfluence The
Sovtst Uncon had gamed tnfluence over various l~beratton movements
ltke the Popular Movement for the Lcberalcon of Angola (MPLA). the
Front for th. Liberation Of Mozambique (FRELIMO). the African
National C o n p W in South A t r ~ u and S W A W in Nam~ba
by assnttng their =wars of l~berat~on ' *~ Tho US was not wtlltng to k t
the enttre 19gW SltP Out of tts control and thus planned ~t Afr tun
pol~cy accordingly In Africa. South Afrca was awarded a rpectal
stgndcance for Amertcan Plans of creatag 'a Qlobal Pax Amertcm
systemw It not only prevents Sovlet expanstontsm. but also provides
economtc beneflts The US has substantla1 ~nvsstments In the form
of bank loans, d~rect investment a13 securlty In south Atr~ca"', and
~mports all 11s ~ndust r~a l dtamonds 80% 11s manganese and large
quanttttes of copper, ztnc tin, asbestos chromtum and vanadium from
the country ': It also provtdes the sea route for otl and other raw
maternls Thus. the US d ~ d not want to loose lhrs s~gn~f~cant lrade
partnePJ It was also grateful for South Afrlcan support to be US
naval presence In the l nd~an Ocean. and oppostt~on to the
establlshmenl of a zone of peace In the regton *'
The advenl of Mr Reagan to Pfes~dency further enhanced the
srgnlflcance awarded to Soulh Afr~ca Durlng the electton compalgn
hls refererace lo "states' rtghts' had provrded the lndlcat~on lhal Soulh
A!rlca would recelve h ~ s support This lndlcal~on was strengthened
by h ~ s descr~ptton of South Afrlca as a 'protector of Weslern ~nlererls'
and 'a bastton of Weslern ~nfluence and control"" whtch had offered
Its assistance to the US In all tts wars Even before he had become
President, he had asserted
many Americans have lnlerpreted our tnlerest In Afr~ca as an extenston of our desire to achteve rec~al equaltty and ellm~natton of inlurttce bared on race I 'm afratd that thts IS a nattve over s~mpl~flcatton of what really 1s at ISSU~ '
Consoquantly. he m n o U n W In h18 h n t Intenww that the US
would not 'abmdon' South A f r l u *' Later n Match 1981, In r n
~nlervrew wth Mr Walter Cronk~ta he repeated that the US would be
.helpful' lo South Afrlcr To achleve th~a object~ve. the Rergrn
Adm~n~stnt~on adopted a fresh approach with reapect to the prevvhng
concerns of enforcing reforms n South Afrtcr, end~ng aprrthed and
secunng Nrmlblan lndependenceH These atma had been addrea~ed
by the Carter Admlnlstratlon as problems of the reglon W~thout the
emphasls on the Sovlet role I t had therefore, l a ~ d exphas~s on the
North-South d~alogue rather than the East-West President Reagan
however regarded lhls as an 'unrealist~c' approach. slnce Mr Carter
had not comprehended the Sovlet ~nfluencc': Mr Reagan vlewed the
sltuatlon In Afrlca as a "Russian weapon acmed at us"" and South
Alrtca as 'one of the most Important arenas for East-West rivalry*
He thus Intended to adopt a polrcy whlch would fulfil US natlonal
Interests rather than one based on 'African concerns"? Another
aspect of the Carter policy whlch was rejected by Mr Reagan was 11s
'public scolding' of South Afrlcan government for 11s pollcy of raclal
d~scrlrn~natlon '' In splle of certain changes the Reagan
Admlnlstrat~on clarified that it was as much an advocate of human
rtghts as 11s predecessor It would only alter the method for promoting
!hem7' The admlnlstration practised by South Afrlca was expressed
by Mrs Kirkpatrlck she sald that the US had ended ~ t s raclal
dtscrlmlnat~on and would not give acquiescence lo 11 In other partB
of the world"
In thla goal, the Reagan admlnlstrat~on expressed a scm~tartly wllh
the lndran condemnallon of apartheld lndla had been a conatant
C~I~ IC of the pract~ce whlch v~olates the human rtghts and the UN
Charter 11 condemned the practice of aparthetd at vrrloua forums
Jnd mrk.4 mth olhef Afro-Asun countrmr In the Common malth,
the UN and tho Non-Alqned Movement to m d the n u r t poItc108'~.
Even after the Botha nptm set tavorad for ward the new conrblut~on
~n 1983. lndra remrlned dlssrtrsflbd It referred to the trtcrmerrl
Parl~amenl as a 'constltut~onal shame* whcch provtded democrrt~c
rrghts to the 'whrtes the Indrans and the Coloureds' but dented them
to the 'Blacks' Indta. consequently. banned the entry anto Indta of
those South Afrtcan lndlans who had prrttccprted In the elect~ons held
lo ~mplement the constrtutron In 1984 '.
Besrdes lndra also assrsted the llberat~on struggle by 'moral and
mrl~tary* a ~ d to the mrl~tary wlng of the Afrrcan Nat~onal Congress and
by economrc atd to the AsIan Offcce of the ANC In New Delh~ The
lndlan governmenl asstsled the ANC and SWAP0 rn eslablcshlng lhe~r
rnlsslons rn New Delhr" Econorn~c mater~al and humanltarcan a ~ d
was provrded lo South Afrlcan and Namlblan Independence
movements Some economtc atd was also provcded to the
lnternatconal Defence and Atd Fund for Soulhern Afrlca, UN Trusl
Fund lor South Afrcca. UN Educal~on and Tralnlng Programme for
South Afrcca. UN Fund for Namcbca the UN lnstltute for Narnrbra and
the Spec~al Nonalrgned fund for Nam~bra" It welcomed the
estebl~shment of the Southern Afr~ca Development Coordtnalron
Conference (SADCC) for endrng the domlnatron and explortat~on of
South Alrtca on the other Afr~can states Ind~a attended some of the
SADCC meetlngs r s an 'observer' and offered ~ t s 'expert~se and
techn~cal co-operal~on' In the fleld of food and agrcculture small scale
tndustrles, transport. telecornmun~catrons, conventronal sources of
energy, rural eledrtfeat~on, solar energy and w~ndpower'~
Dt i iemmS a m balween Indta m d tho US wnh respect to the
method of endlng apartherd and securlnp Namibian ~ndependence
The Reagan odmlntstratton had given up the 'frosty aloofness' of the
Carter years, to Present a new approach of 'conrtructive
engagement" It referred to the imposition of 'pressure for an end
to apartheid wlth restraint and decorum. and always behind the
scenes'Q Thts pol~cy was atmed at securlng a government bared
on the constnl of the people and end of racial dtscrimlnation, along
w~th malntalntng the US access to minerals and the -8trrteglc- Cape
Sea route It. further, almed at the preserval~on of 'reg~onal secur~ty
In Southern Afrlca agalnst the Soviet-Cuban threat'*x In order to
achieve these ob~ect~ves. the pollcy offered *matcrtal and polltlcal
support' to the "forces 'wtthin and outstde' the South Afrlcan
government whlch strive lor 'peaceful change' in South A l r ~ c a ' ~
It belleved that ~mposilton of economlc ranctlons war not
sufflc~ent The mll~tary strength and economlc self-sufl~ciency ol
Saulh Afr~ca would prevent it from be~ng pun~rhed and presrur~zed
by olher countr~es The l~mited economic loss caused by the
sanct~ons would only make South Africa more obstructive to reforms
Thus the US laid slress on entering Inlo a d~alogue, rather than
confrontation wlth South Alrrca" Instead of the 'counter productlve'
confrontation. w~th South Africa Instead of the 'Counter productlve'
confrontation. it bel~eved that 'qulet persuasion- would be more
conducrve to reforms in the ractal pollclesH The 'overt pressure' war
to be replaced by a 'kid-glove, all-carrot-and.no-st~ck approach' of
constructive engagement Platt stated ''
'Although we no less than others condemn 8pmk.1d. wa do no1 bat~eve t h r l sweeptng, punttlve unenforeerblm remoluttonm contribute to the eas~ng of South Att tcr ' r problsms o l a effect on the contrary IS to compl~crte the negottattons "ow undeway 'or settlement tn ~ a m t b t a ~
Thus 'coex~stence represents the best hope of foater~ng
constructtve ~ h a n g e ' ~ .
The US asserted thal sanct~ons were not needed because South
Afrlca would ~tself Itberal~ze 11s poltcy when 11 came In contact wtth
'a democracy Ilke the US*' The US further argued !hat tf the
'reallsttc' approach was adopted 11 would be reallzed that 'Blacks
dtd not have the resources needed to end aparthetd The
government on Ihe other hand was capable of dealtng wtth economtc
sanct~ons and arms embarge" The admlntstratton lhus. belteved
that 11 was a 'myth lo presume thal South Afrtca could be reformed
by "armed struggle' Accordtngly 11 welcomed Ihe stgntng of the
Nkomat~ Accord between South Afrtca and Mozambique and the
Lusaka Compromtse wtth Angola The two agreements prevented
Angola and Mozamb~que from leltmg thetr terrttor~es be used as bases
agatnst South Afrlca It advocated supporl to the Wh~tes stnce they
alone could brtng about the required changes Another reason
provtded was that when some 'Black' states of Atrlca were tradlng
wtth South Afrtca America had no reason to end tts trade Further
the US was not In favour of sacr~flclng 11s tntereets for the beneftl of
the 'Blacks' I! regarded as 'unfair‘ any atlempt 'to ask Ihe US to
be uprtght. moral and lust at the cost of 11s economlc ~nleresls In
South Afrtcaw It was reasoned that if the US ended ~ t s economtc
actlvltles tn South Africa. the loss would be enta~led entirely by the
Ameitcans The European nal~ons, led by Japan, would be agreeable
to substituts the US in Afi~ca"
Thus. Whenever m y nso lu tsn at the UN attempted to 1mpo8e
p . r twkr u m n r like the W E W 7 7 . SIRES1454 and SIRESJ475.
the US abst81ned from Voting It reasoned that such resolut~ons only
' pob r~ze re la t~ons and undermtne the poss~bllt l les of peaceful
change* ! hce the US acknowledged the economic and military
slgnlhcance of South Afrlca In the domestlc and reg~onal context tt
was supportive Of closer relatlons between the two in economtc and
mrlitary fteld The restr~ctlons placed on the purchase of mttttary
hardware by South Af r~ca were Ilftcd and the posts of naval and
airforce attaches at the Amerlcan Embassy In Prelor~a were restored
Amer~can equ~pment was supplied to the Afr~can pollce to suppress
disturbances The US vetoed a U N resolut~on condemning Pre~oria s
aggression agalnst Angola*' It. sim~larly Ignored the South African
attacks on Mozambique Sawazlland and Lesolhow To establish 11s
military control over Soulh Afrlca America supplied adv~sefs
consultants, and spec~allsts, delivered mllilary hardware, modernized
the naval bases and ports of S~monstown R~chards Bay. Durban, Port
Elizabeth, Capetown, Sal~sbufy Island and Walvrs Bay and lncluded
the Soulh Afrlcan military fac~l~t ,es in the NATO system of
communlcatlons In July 1982. the Reagan Adrn~n~stration even l~fted
the ban on the dellvery of equtpment for the nuclear power industry
and allowed the sale of plutonium-3 In March 1983 an agrcemenl
was reached on the use of South Afr~can terr~tory for the deploymenl
of Amerlcan Tomahawk cruise rn~sslles w~th nuclear warheads capable
of h~ttlng any target In Africa, south of the equator*' In the economlc
held. the US supplied a loan of $1.100 rntll~on, through the IMF. lo
South Afrlca It was meant to establish 'construct~ve relatlons and
budding br~dges of communication with South Afr~ca as a way of
e l~m~natrng apartheidu. Thus, the US developed 11s mllltary and
MX)MK ties uwth South Afrtca scnce ~t was seen 8s a 'tone of US
vltat tntersrts*
Indian Support t o Sanctions
In contrast to the US pol~cy. Indl8 matntatned no ohccr l
trade relations wtth South Afr~ca slnce 1954 and prrs~stent ly
advocated the tmplementatton of a 'global trade boycon'" l nd~a
d ~ d not accept the US reasontng that the economtc sancttons
would be more harmful to the 'non wh~le mtnortly* than to the raclsl
reglme It bel~eved that the South Atrtcan government
depended upon the tlnanclal support from other countrtes II
~t was dented Ihc loans ~nveslment funds and trade retattons
wtlh the other countr~es tt would flnd 11 dtfftcull 10 matnta~n ~lsel f
Secondly 11 agreed wtlh the optnlon of the ANC Pfsstdent
Mr Ollver Tambo that 'such measures could not hurl the
Afrlcans more than does the pol~cy of aparthetd In response to
the US excuse that sancltons would harm lhe netghbour~ng
stales l n d ~ a stated lhal the .ffontl~ne slates had thernselvea
asked for sancttons They were ready to face the loss that could be
caused by 'Prelor~a s retal~al~on' The I h ~ e a l of these retal~atory
steps should not prevent the lrnposttton of sanctions whlch could
successfully pressurtze South Afr~can -weak and stagnant'
economy'02 Indta reasoned that even tf problems came In
the way of peaceful change due to the sanct~ons they would -be
well worth the addtt~onal sacrtf~ce. ~t tt would accelerate the
ending of aparthe~d' It was also suggested that the countr~es
anxious about the 111-effects of the sanct~ons on the
netghbouring states could offer asststance to them l o
reduce the impad On 5' July 1986. Mr R a p Gandhr, dur~ng hts
vutt to Maur l tw, O ~ O w s d a Common m r t t h reonomlc packago
to cover up the l o r r e r of other netghbouring counttier when
tney ended that relation8 w t h Prrtoria':a
America had lustlfred its cont~nued support to Pretorir on the
basts that the Botha Government was movlng towards 'moderate'
apartheld and finally ending the system Thu clatm d ~ d not find any
means of substanttat~ng I( The US hope that the system would
gradually 'abolish ttselr was a 'myth meant for the un~nformed"~
The US beltef thal contact with the US democracy would facrl~tate
the reforms was an approach which had not been appled by Amerlca
whtle advocat~ng sanctions against Iran Cuba and Moscow on
previous occas~ons '~~ This dtscrepancy aroused lndtan doubts about
the US purpose It was suspected that the US was adopting a
sympathetrc attitude towards South Afrlca because it had rnvesled
large sums of money and had constantly expand~ng trade relattons
w~th it '% whtch the US d ~ d not want to loose
lnd~an did not accept the US claim that lhere was no reason for
the US to break ~ t s economrc ttes w~ th the rac~st reglme, when the
olher Black' states continued to trade wrth 11, because these states
carr~ed out transacttons under 'compulston' and were constantly
maklng attempts to free themselves Thus the11 postt~on could not
be compared to that of Amer~ca. which was free to end 11s
~nvolvement'~' Indta belteved that South Africa's suppression of its
people and aggression aga~nst ~ t s ne~ghbours caused cnsecurlty and
instablllty in the regton The practice of apartheid was 'repugnant 10
Ihe Consctence of mankind' and went aga~nst the UnlverSal
Declaratton of Human Rights as well as the UN Charter'" It.
therefore, rdvocated 'jmmcd~ate and total demolition' of apartheid.
y h ~ c h WOUM b a d to the be~olonisat~on of N l m l t a and the
cttrbltrhmmt Of UOrW m reglon Stnce I I mr h R MM wrbr l
criticism was not sufflclenl lndla stood for 'comprehenr~ve
mandatory' r a n c t ~ ~ n s ' ~ Indla bel ievd that 'quck and hard act~on'
war needed to end this 'inhuman' pracattce Any other method
besldes econornlc sanctions would no1 be able to end the system"@
Warntng agalnst the delaying tacllcs of certain interested partlea
Mr Gandhi stated
'the action cannot be delayed now It must be now perhaps even now would (mean) delay Otherwise 11 would result ln more bloodshed grealer bloodshed and perhaps unprecedented bloodshed*"'
He thus, suggested at the Inauguration of the Internattonal Youth
Conference Agatnst Apartheld that the ~nlernattonal comrnun~ty
should plan a 't~rne-bound programme' lo end apaltheid": He
ernphaslred that lnd~a would not be sallsf~ed wtlh 11s ~ndependence
as long as reciallsrn and colonlallsm continued to be perpetusled in
the world It would like to ensure that countries d ~ d not rllernpl lo
make econornlc galns by sacr~l~c~ng the -human dign~ty and human
rights' of others"'
In the vartous internat~onal forums I\ advocated Ihe lrnpos~t~on of
economic sanctions on South Afrlca The Harare Summ~l of non-
aligned natlons demanded the impos~t~on of economic sanct~ons It
called for a proh~b~tion of exports transfer to technology. transport
of otl, term~nation of air links and promotion of tourlsm to South
Africa"' The NAM also sponsored a resolution In the UN Securlty
Council which proposed n~netean mandatory economic Sanctions It
asked for the term~nat~on of ~mpolts of South African krugerrand gold
m. wuhbry goods. sugar, urantum coal Iron, rt-1 and agneulturat
products and exPorl b South Afrtca o l computers, crude 011 and
petroleum products 11 also proposed the severlng of alr ltnks nuclear
trade tax treaties. South Afrtun de~oslt accounts and promotion of
tounsm "'.
Even In the mtnl-summlt of Commonwealth In August 1986 lndla
called for effect~ve sanctlons agalnst South Africa The Communque
Issued on 4" August 1986 Imposed three addlttonal sanct~ons
bes~des those of the Nassau Accord They asked for a ban on new
bank loans to the pr~vate and public sectors In South Africa on the
tmporl of urancum coal. Iron and st111 from South Afr~ca and the
w~lhdrawl of all consular fac~lct~es In South Afrlca. "except to our own
nat~onals and nal~onals of thud countrles to whom we render consular
services"'
The lnd~an advocacy of economlc sanctlons was not supporled
by the US In spcte of the11 shared concern for the prevalence of
rec~allsm the two democracies were drawn apart due to thelr dcvergent
approaches and melhods of oend~ng the malpractice
Namibian Independence
Llke the prevlous US admlnlstrat~ons Mr Reagan also supported
the cause of Nam~b~an tndependence and upheld that 11 was an
Independent territory which was under the '~llegal occupaf~on' of South
Africa" It acknowledge that the den~al of ~ndependence to Nam~bla
would be the cause of ~nstabllQ In the regcon and dlsrupt the relations
of South Afrtca wtth the US as well as the other countrles"' Since
the US wanted to establlrh 'an tndependent stable, democtallc'
country, d m s ready to accept UN Resolution 435 It, however.
e m e d that be'cre tndepcndencc was granted, provnion should be
made for a 'ctvrlued government' whtch would provide Mcunty to tho
mlnorrtres as wC as secure the liberty of the natton"'
The Reogan admlnatrat~on however. llnked the 1s8w of Nam~blrn
rndepondrnca W h the wtthdrawt of Cuban troops from Angola It
argued that the Cuban troops were Sovtet representattver tn Angola.
atmed at provtdrng the Soviets w~th a -lorward postt~on' In A f r ~ c a ' ~ .
and lherr removal Should preceed Nam~btan Independence Prestdenl
Caner had uphela that the Cuban wrlhdrawl would aulomat~cally follow
~f Namlblan Independence could be secured However. Presrdent
Reagan d ~ d no1 ran1 to make any 'assumpttons' and held that
s~multaneous w~lhdrawl was the 'real~st~c' approach to the problem':'
Indian View Point
lndta agreed wtth the Namlbtan vrevv thal the Reagan
admln~stratlon s policy was a way of 'encouraging- the South Afrlcan
government In retalnlng 11s hold over Namlbla and econom~cally
pol~ltcally and milltarlly suppressing the frontl~ne stater'" lndta
supported the cause of the Namtbran people to gacn Ihe rrghl of
self-deterrn~natron and !he ~mplementatton of UN resolut~on 435 It
upheld the UN stand that the South Afrlcan rule of Nam~b~a waa an
'rllegal occupatron' The true representative of the Namlblan people
was the South West Afrtca Peoples' Organlsat~on (SWAPO)'" and 11
alone should have the r~ght to rule lndla accused the US of
preventtng the transfer of power to the SWAP0 It clarmed thal
Arnercca a~med at the establ~shment of a 'pro-Western puppet' reglme
In Namtbia after 11 gatned ~ndependence'~ Slnce SWAP0 was a
Marxtst organtsat~on, the US feared the ertablrshmenl of Sovtel
domnanC8, it SWAP0 O I l m d control over Nam~bu Tha US was
accused of vtew~np the nnn In tenns of Ihs East.West power brlmce
and of obltructtng NImtbl ln ~ndependence'~~ lndla blamed the
Western Contact Croup. comprlrlng of the US. Canada West
Germmy. Britatn and France. for delaying the Itberatton of Namtbu'n
)t obrcted to the Ilnkage of the a s u o of Namlblan tndepmdence
and mlhdrml of Cuban troops from Angola because these two lrsuss
were not related The Cuban forces had gone to Angola on inv~trtton.
and being an Independent counlry. Angola had a r~ghl to dec~dr when
to tnv~le them and at what llme lo end the~r occupallon In the case
of Nam~bca South Africa's mandale over 11 had been ended by the
UN In 1966 Thus, Prelor~a had no legal rcght to rule over Nam~bca
Secondly, South Afrlca was engaged In an aggression agacnst Angola
whlle the Cubans d ~ d not part~c~pate In any such act~v~ly '~ ' Mrr lnd~ra
Gandht belleved Ihal such measures reflected the lnslncertly of the
Western nat~ons lo solve the problem A1 a UN.sponsored
Conference on Nam~bla In Parls, in April 1983, she staled
'Of lale attempts have been made lo l~nk Nam~b~a's tndependence w ~ t h varlous exlraneous and unrelated Issues The Conference should reafflrm that the r~ghl of the Narn~b~an people to Independence ltke that of any other country In the world IS absolute and unfettered by lrrelevanl cons~derat~ons The Conference should urge Ihe UN Secur~ly Counctl to act ~mmed~ately to implement the plan for the Independence of Nam~b~a conta~ned In ~ t s Resolut~on 435, and lo Impose comprehensive mandatory sanct~ons agatnst South Afr~ca II 11 lns~sts on defylng the Securtly Councll Resolut~on'
l nd~a was the f~rs t country that awarded the SWAP0
d~plomal~c recpgnit~on since it had always regarded SWAP0
as the 'sole and authentic' rcprerenlattve of Ihe people
This deciscon of Mr Rajiv Gandhi was a "profound source
of ~nsp:rrlion' for ths Bkck movement for sel f -determ~nat~on'~
Thla Constant Support to the cause of Namcbcan
lndependence by lndla dcd not meet wcth the favour of the
Reagan Adm~n~st ra t lon I ls antc.Sovtet object~ves prevented
11 from contrlbulcng towards the cause of Namlbla s llberatlon
even though I! favoured the Independence of Namlbca
An tmporlant outcome of the VISI~ was the approval a
cotlaboratcve Ind~a-World Bank-USAID nat~onal soccrl lorertry
project to help the conservatcon and erpanslon of l n d ~ a s
forest resources':' It also led to a favourable turn In US. lnd~a
relat~ons because the shared percepl~ons of (he two leaders
led to a 'meeting of m~nds' conducive to the solullon of bllaleral
and golbal problems"' Senator Orf in Hatch summed ~t as
-a new beglnnlng" lor the US-lnd~a relations wklch had 'crealed
a better and more open relattonsh~p between the two"' While
MrGandhc, after the th~rty mlnule talks In Ihe Oval Offlce
appeared Impressed by the "frank for lhr~ght ' and 'humane
nature of 1.1r Reagan the Pres~dent h~mself stated "We h11 11 off":
Besldes the Impresscon whlch Mr Gandh~ made on the
US publlc and admcnlstrat~on the v~srt was a s u c c e s ~ due
to the recognctcon of I n d ~ a s gfowcng economcc mctctary and
commercial strength Secondly the US appreccated the
polcttcal stablllty In India and 11s commctrnent to democracy
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Mr Robert Peck. Btaled
'The Bmooth ruccesslon following Mfs Gandhl s deeply-embedded dernocrat~c ~nst l tut~ons' Further. the US rdmtniatratton wanted l o expand 11s ~nfluq;,ce In South A s ~ a and not be dependent on only Pakistan
tbwowr. Mr.Gandhl was openly cnt twl of the Reagan
administrrtion'r Strrtegrc Defence ~nlhatwe (Sol) or
Star Wars programme. its arms-supply to Pakistan, watver
to the Symington Amendment, and the Afghan policy Though
issue of conflict were reduced to a mcntmum posit~on"~. there
was no hope of a major breakthrough since Mr Gandhi had
reurned the servlces of the advcsera as well as the foretgn
pollcy of Mrs Indtrr Gandhl'" At the same t~me. the Reagan
adm~n~strat~on had also refused to change ~ t s fore~gn pol~cy
During Mr Gandhl's vtsit. the US had clartl~ed that 11 could not alter
11s 'special relat~onsh~p wlth paklstan', and that the rn~lltary
assistance would contlnue after the present agreement ended In
1987'% It meant that lndlan interests would conlinue to be
subord~naled to those of Pak~stan Another mlnor ~rr~tant
descr~bed as 'a gross discourtesy' by the lnd~an Embassy al
Washington was the lnv~tatlon of Mr Ganga S~ngh Dhlllon
a Khallstan propagandist by the Nat~onal Press Club on the day
Mr Gandhi arrived"'
THE UNDER CURRENTS OF ACCOMMODATlONS
The above mentioned an account of differences In the US-lnd~a
relat~ons should not however lead to a conclus~on that global Issues
created unbridgebale gulf tn thelr relations We have already stated
the factors that generated tenslons In US-Soviet relallons and
mollvated Mrs Indira Gandht to look towards the US leadlng to her
Washington visit In June 1982 As explatnod by a keen observer of
US-India relations. Indta's substantive motms for improving relations
wtth the US were not only recognised and appreciated by the
Washngton, but it, too, real ind the imperatives to retreat from the
#
r tgd -ha inctulb 8 d W by II 'u I n Other words. Wash~ngton
realisad thal derpcte NUW Dclhi's early dithering about the Sovlet
tnrasmn. lnU18 shared Amerrca's Interest tn a Sovtet w~thdrawal and
was opposed to further Sovwt expanabon southwards Th~s teal~sat~on
on the pafl of Washlngton IeU ~t to recognlse the slgn~f~cance of New
Delhr's to-operat~on In Pak~stan's defence It therefore, began to
encourage New Delhl's subtle attempts lo dlstance rtself strrteg~cally
from Moscow Not surprts~ngly, the Carter Admlnlstrat~on cleared In
June 1980 nuclear fuel rupplted lor the Tarapui plant after two years
of i r r~tat~ng and acrlmonlous exchanges between the two countries
As a corollary to ~ t s strategy of weanlng lndla away from Moscow
Washrngton encouraged and rejorned at lnd~a s gradually lmprovtng
relat~ons w~ th Pakistan and Ch~na In order to relieve the Amerlcan
&lemma of deallng w~ th reg~onal adversclr~es In a zero.sum game and
thereby reduce Sovtet influence In the region"" In order to address
lhts concern Washlngton had to establish a dialogue w~ th lnd~a
The prospect of securtng lnd~a s f r~ rndsh~p w~rhout abandoning
Pak~stan enthused those pro- lnd~a conservattves wtthln the
US - though very few In number but occupying key pos~t~ons In the
executtve and Ieglslat~ve branches-who were rcfuslng to see
Arner~can pollcy In South Asla as resulrlng a cho~ce between Delh~
and They were encouraged by a large number of Ind~an
e~pat r~ates tn the US Whlle the Amerlcan m~l~ tary bureaucracies had
no real contacts w ~ t h Indta, most of the corporat~ons interested In
selt~ng advanced technology and m~lttary equ~pment to lndta had on
theti stafi a large number of lndran expatriates Almost every member
of every lndcan delegation that came to the US had close relatlver
Or friends romewhere in the US, and often in the corporations they
were vls111nfi There Indo-Amencans counterbelanead to eomo
exrent the lack of potltfco-bunaucarat~c contact b.-n tho hrro
~ountrtos"'
tndts's growing CJpabll~ty also conlnbuted to tho rhl l t In US
perceptton regarding lndta Jur l prtor to Mrr Gandhl's rrt lval In
Washtngton In 1982, the Whlte House stated that 'wa wll recognve
whrch country IS Ihe moat powerful country In South ASIJ No one
has to expla~n that to you"" Whtle stmtlar vlews were expressed
earl~er ~t was the first clear cut relteratlon by the Reagan
Admtntstrat~on It revealed the Admlntstratton's realtsrt~on that
Pak~stan could no longer be balanced wtlh lnd~a and that tt, therefore
made sense for the US to Improve relatcons wllh a power wtth whtch
11 would have to deal w~ th tn the years ahead
Last but no least the economlc l~beralisat~on programme in Indta
inlt~ated by lndtra Gandh~ and acceleraled by her successors.
obvrously attracted Amertcan altentron"' Indro'r lncreasrng smphautr
on free market machan~sms and deregulation pollc~es. that were
advocaled by the Reagan and Bush Admtntstral~ons at home and
abroad enhanced lhelr Interest In amclrorat~ng ties with l nd~a This
country's mtdle class, constttuttng a vast market for US goods and
services. attracted the attention of Amerlcan businessmen at a Itme
when The US economy was suflertng from hlgh unemployment and
trade deflot"' Many large US compantes. lncludlng Pep11 Cola and
several h ~ g h technology flrrns, lobbred !he Reagan Adrn~n~atrat~on to
ruppofl expanded economlc llnks w11h India"' Moreover. Amer~ca"
econornlc problems obliged 11s pol~cy-makers to reallre that lt would
have lo wlnd down ~ t s masslue global p r e s e n c e " ~ h ~ s shrinkage
had lo be met by a new strategy and thus was born the tdea of
coopsrrtlve shcurlty' It rmplw US wtll~ngness to accept Indlr's
rcgconal strtus, d % to accept tho Amerrwn global role9*"
We rnrll therefore now turned to America s approach to Indra's
rcgbonal asp~rattonr dur~ng the Reagan era In the next chapter
F o r E ~ d ~ ~ ~ ~ R q N u . A m n c M m 1- (New MI 197Ci) MI Knt Jhr. PJtlrtm
l n d ~ o n d t h e c m e h e n o ( B U l g . b d a * h ' ~ ~ ~ ( N e w D.lh~) ~ 0 1 26 no 1 Jan-March 1989 pp 45-67 And hts 'Underslandlng Conflict and Corpotal~on between two t b m m c m o f t h e Wwld" T ) H l d C ~ ( N s w ~ i ) , vd2 no 14. ApnllQ88
S Sfown. fheFscssdPOWIH(N6WYark. 1968). p 36. Ahowe. John Lewis Gobda. 'Contrtnment Its Past and Future', in Rich8rd.A Mebm,ed.NertherCddWlrnorDdlsnte - S o d - Amencan Rekhons m Ihe 79Wh ( ChrrkttervlHs. 1902). p 6
See Prcsdent Cafter and hn National Sdcunty Advcricr. Zbgnlsw Brzezmsxi, st8ternent In New Yorlr T w s December 31. 1979 January 5 and February 22. 1980
Far a resume of the background of Mefa ~nterests Rats A Khan. 'Amera ca, Role and Interest m South and SouthWest Asla'. Asran Affarrs MI 9.n0 4.March-April 1982, pp 208 217
For the full text of the statement w e US News and World Reporl February 4 1980 pp 73-76
See 'Jornl US-Pakrstan Statemenf data June 15. 1981
lndran Expmss (New Delht) January 1 1980
Paul H Borsuk 'lnwstbk Enern- Confld and Trrnrl~on In Swd--US Relatmns". tn James C Hstung ed . US-Asran Relatmn
The Natmal SBcunty Paradox, ( New York. 1983) p 152
Jeane J Klrkpatrlck -At Nalonal Press Club Washington 0 C ' . 30 May 1985 In Legrhmacy arrd Force Polrlrcel end Moral Omnuons. vol 1. (New BrunsW. Nsw &my). 1988. pp 4 3 4 435
J Ktrkpatrk, 'To Instnuts of Publrc Affa~rs Conference.' Sydney. Australu. 19 March 1888. mbd, p 371
J K~rkpatrd, bd. 30 M a y 198% p 437
'The US Foretgn Pdtcy The Reagan Imprint'. Congressronal Ouartedy Inc ( Woshmgtoon. 1888). p 25
Sowel Unian H s n l C W s for Moscow and Wasbinglon Gmal oeumon,bQl#, p 5
^The US Fomgn Paky The Reagan Impnnt'.n 13. 30.31
I d q d B.dhmr. ' K m An L n a r Fbght of Fancy'. I N ~ J Today 30 June 1984, p 69
'The US Foreign Poky n 13. p 29
lndlra Gandhc 'Indu s Gandhi Tells Why She n Sour on US ' (Intern) US News 6 WorM Rapon 15 February 1982 p 27
Asran Recorder, (New Delhl) 26 November-2 December1981 p 16341
led. 12-18 November 1982 p 16885
lbdr. 3-9 December 1982 p 1692 1
S K Kapoor A Text Book of International Law (Allahabad Cenlrsl law Agency Allahabad 1985) pp32-33
Nalini Kant Jha. - lnd~a and Ihe Un~tCd Slates Pursu~t and Llrnlts of Accornrnodat~on- Slrareg~c A~lalysis (New Delh~) vo1 27 no 1
April 1994 P 89
S D Mun~ 'South AsIan Relatons Ellateral and Rreg~onal. In Leo E Rose and others eds Towards a New World O d r Ad)us!rng Ind~a-US Relations(Berkeley 1992) p 53 Also Salu P Ltmaye US.lndra Relatans Pursurf of Accnn~modet~on (London 1993) p 3f
Agha Shahi s statement at a seminar In Lahore on 30 June. 1981 as c~led in. W H Wr~ggins -Pak~slan's Fore~gn Pollcy after Afghantstan'. In S P Cohen. ed . The Secunly of &ufh Asla Amencan and Asran Peryxtctwes (Urbana Champagn. University of IUuuns. 1987). p 72
Former Indian Ambassadof to France Narendra Smgh'e asneflcon In lhe arl~ck, entttled. 'Mixed slgns for an ~mprwemenl of US- l n d m Trs'. Internatma! Herald Tnbum, 10 June 1985, and 'Point Paper on Atr Chlet Marshall La Fonlatne-Percepl~ons and Comments'. 5 November 1987. US Government. Deparrmant of Deform. Bndfing Paper, undassfied, p 1
IDR Research Team, The Afghan Problem and South AsIan PefcapWns'. In&an Ddtence Revtew, vol 11.1. January 1982. Pp 112-15
US Omenr far tndm Wmy Cwrrsr. rbd .17 Odobsr lB88
Wyl Rqan Mtthn. 'US Strategy In tha Indian Ocsmn'. A w Pa& Cammunq 18. Fa# 1982.64-9. Srtymvatt Jhrven. 'Super Power Rmlry m Mo Indian Ocean'. Forscgn Anam Reporft (NOW Delh~). vo1 31 no 2 February 1982, pp 32.36 and Mtchael Rrbrdron. 'Mndo Mamures' Far Eastern Econwn: Revtow 30 Apnl 1982. pp 32-33
Mtshra n 44 pp 68-9
Nonnan D Palmer. The UnRed States and lndta The Dtmns~ons of Influence (Connecllcul 1984) p 218
Governments SIalement In Lok Sabha 26 Februav 1981 lo& Sebha Debates no 26 February 1981 p 162
S N~hal Stngh 'Can the US and lnd~an be Real Friends?' Asran Survey vol 23 no 9 September 1983 p 1023
Rodney W Jones 'US Inleresh In the lndlan Ocean Reg~on - papar presented at the Intematcona~ Senrcnar on Indrurr Ocean 12-14 February 1983 Allahabad Untverstty Allahabed
lndtra Gandh~ 'Indta's Gandht Tells W# She IS Sour on US (Intervaw) US News 6 World Ropori. 15 February 1989. p 28
The US saldldas. htgh-level atr reconnatssance (SR.71) AWACS and eMron~c monttortna Oncludtng operalton w4h RC-135 could provtde strategtc and t a c k tnforiaton coocerntng 'force levels operatonal readiness statu$. deployment and mob~ltzat~onal status, ekdrontc lntelllgence for ebdrontc warfare, marlt~me survetllance,tncludtng locatton, deployment and movemenl of amroured formatmns and major polttlcal and economtc trends related lo dsfema pnparedness' In Rqv~r Slngh op crt . pp 187" 188
Rajvir Slngh, US P8krslan 8nd lndra Slralegtc Reletrons (AUohotud. 1885). p 187
PC Kapur. 'US Dtirlgns on Asv-Pac~fic ' Drrmocmrc w w vd 17. no 8.21St February 1988 p 10
B Wvekanandan. -The Inelan Ocean as a Zone of Peace . PIoMbmrandPmpects'Aww,Sutvsy mU1 no 12 Ow 1981 p 1240
Je&m J Klrkpatrlk. 'To lndls Internatconel Centre ' N m b l h ~ 24 August 1981. USlS 013~1al Tell 15 August 1981 p 30
Pahner n 48 p 200
Palmer n 48 pp 200-201
Oennts L Park ed . To Promole P e a c c U S Forcrgrl Pol~cy Irr the Mrd. 1980s (Cal~lornca Hoover Press 1984) p 185
Y Tarabrln *US Expans~onlst Pollcy In Atr~ca " Irr:crnat~alAfla~errs (Moscow) no 10. Ocf 1983 p 4 1
South Afr~ca 'Can US Pol~ctes Influence Change?' Grenf Deersans 81 p 35
Tarabrin n 60 p 42
Turkkaya Ataov "Pres~dent Reagarr s Pohcy 11 Respect to South Afrca I '. Df?mocrafic World vol 14, no 11 17 ' March 1985. p 8
Georgt W Shephered Jr . -Dem~l~tar~zat~on Proposals tor the Indtan Ocean - In Larry W Bowmarl 8 Ian Clark Eds The Indlarr Ocean m Gbbal Pobtlcs (Cokxado 'v'destvaw Press 198 1 p 240
Ataov n 72 p 7
'Afrta South of the Sahara Poverty Hunger and Refugees - Gred Deusnms '83. p 44
W Scott Thompson. 'US Policy Towards Afr~ca Al Amertca'r Semeer CWts. (Ph&&&h~a) d 25. na 4. Winter 1982. p 102 1
Peter J m n a n . ' Atnca The Struggle Behveen East and West. n l k n v s L Pa&&,n68.p193
C- Cdtw. Tmgm and Africa,' The W m T&y. vor aa.no4. AQlY 1982. P 123
S C. Seama. US 'CorntnKlwe Engagement' Pf i Sense and N o m s n r r r . ' ~ L h k k l . v d 14no42.20 Od 1985, p 10
Alan Pdw . 'fha h n s l o n s d US Polrcy Toward8 South Afrca.' Orba. vol25. no 4. Wlnter 1982 p 866
Han Saran Chhabra. 'India A New A f r a Consc~ousncss ' WorM Focus, vd 7, nod. Apnll986. p 29
Hartsaran Chhabra, "India s Support rn Struggle Aga~nst Aparthed.' The Aoneer. (New Delht) 15 October 1990
Chhabra, n 76. p 30
Han Saran Chhabra. "Co-operaton A Shared perspecltvs " WorM Focus. vol5. no 10. October 1984 p 19
Chhabra. n 76 p 31
Ptfer n 82 p 864
Fred Barnes . 'Whde House Watch Broken Engagement ' The New Repubic vol 193 no 9 26 August 1985 p 9
Tarabtn, n 60. pp 41 -42
South Afrca Can US Polisms Influence Change? Great Decrvons vd 84. p 43
Thome8 G Paterm. J Gany Cldford 6 Kenneth J . Reagan. heman F m q n ~drcy A H~stary Stnm leOO (MassachuseIts. Tormo. 1988), p ti69
PbUdt 7 0 d tho Houw Forscpn Alhrr Commmse 22 Apd 1982,' Amencan Forergn Poky Cumtnl Documents
L I-be@~. 'Fmlgn Pdcy Ch- for Amer~cans A Non. PYtorn Guda far Voters.' Fomgn Pokcy Associatron (New Yofk 1984). p 141
m.. p 10
92 S.C. Saxena, 'US 'Constructive Engagement' Pgcy : Sense and Nonsense, Democratic World, vo1.14. no.42, 20 October 1985, pp.11-12.
93 ibid.,p.lO.
94 William R. Feeney, ' Multilateral Political Aspects." in Gene T. Hsiao 8 Michael Witunski, eds.. Sino : American Nonnalisation and its Policy Implications, (New York, 1983) , p.210.
95 George Bush, In November 1982. in Y.Tarabrin. "US Expansionist Policy in Africa," lntemational Affairs (Moscow), no.10, October 1983. p.43.
96 Anirudh Gupta, "Africa:Unhelpful Policy." Wodd Focus, vo1.6, no.1, January 1985, p.35.
97 Tarabrin, n.69,p.48
98 lbid., p.43.
99 /bid., p.42.
100 Shekhar Gupta. " Indo-African Trade : Success on the Sly," lndia Today, 15 December 1985. p.70.
101 V Midstev , "USA-South Africa : A Slnlster Alllance." International Affairs (Moscow) no. 1, January 1986. p 76.
102 "lnd~a for Early Sanctions Against Pretor~a." The P~oneer, 19 February 1987.
103 Chhabra. n 89.p.32.
104 Midstev, n.110, p.74.
105 Ataov. n.72,p.S.
106 Midstev. n.110, p.76.
107 Saxena. n.101, p.11.
108 Chhabra, n.89, p.28.
109 lbid .,p.29.
11 0 ' Rajiv Calls for Tough Action Against Pretoria," Hindustan Times. (New Delh~), 9 January 1987.
Ill 'Anti-Apartheid Meet Begins : P.M Calls for F~nal Assault On Racism.' Telegraph. (Calcutta). 10 January 1987.
112 "Tm8Ound Plan to End Apartherd Urged,' The Statesman. (New Delhi), 9 January 1987.
11 3 'Rajiv Calls for Tough Action Against Pretoria." H~ndustan Times 9 January 1987.
114 'NAM Adopts Firm Steps Against SA.' The Pioneec 8 September 1986.
11 5 'US Denounced for Sanctions Veto. Patriotm23 February 1987. The resolution was vetoed by US and UK, while France and Japan abstained.
116 Rakshat Puri,"Common wealth see Wealth to Impose Harsher Sanctions Against S.Africa:". Hindusfan Times. 6 August 1986.
117 South Africa : ' Can US Policies Influence Change? " Great Decisions vol. 84, p.36.
118 Kirkpatrick, 17.9, p.20.
119 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, To the Overseas Press Club. Waldorf Astoria. New City. 29 April 1981, in The Reagan Phenomenon : and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Research, Washington 8 London 1983, p.161
120 Ibid., p.159
121 Donald Rothchild & John Ravenhill. ' From Carter to Reagan : The Global Perspective of Africa Becomes Ascendent." in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber & Donald Rothchild, eds . Eagle Defient- United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, (Boston and Toronto. 1983), p.361.
122 Ataov , n.72, p.10.
123 K.M. Panikkar, " Namibia : South Africa's Vietnam." World Focus. vo1.7, no.4, April 1986, p.15.
124 Saxena, n.101, p.11
125 Panikkar, n 133, p.16.
126 'ANC and Apartheid," Patriot. 10 January 1987
127 Panikkar, n. 133 p.17.
128 Chhabra, n.89. p.30.
129 Text of Indo-US Joint Statement , 16 June 1985.
130 Dewan Berindranath, 'Reagan-Rajiv Meeting : Issues-Real and Unreal," Democratic Wodd, vo1.14 11.23, June 85, p.5
131 lnde rjii Badhwar and Madhu Trehan. 'Indo : US Relations:A Fresh Look,"lndia Today. 15 July 1985, p.78.
132 Ibi., p.80.
133 Ibid., pp.82-83.
134 Francine R. Frankel, ' Play the India Card", Foreign Policy. Spring 1986. p.149.
135 Ibid., p.150.
136 Chadda. 'India and United States :Why Wtente Won't Happen," Asian Survey. vo1.26 no.10. October 1986, p.1128.
137 Madhu Trehan. 'The Gandhis : Stealing the Show." lndia Today. 15 July 1985. p.87.
138 Fred Greene. 'The United States and Asia in 1987 :Progress Brings Problems," Asian Survey, vo1.28.no.l. January 1988, p.20.
139 /bid., p.19.
140 Kessings Contemporary Archives, vo1.33, no.2, Feb. 1987. p.34947.
141 "Minutes of Sixth Indo-US Joint Commiss~on on Econom~cs. Commercial. Scientific, Technological and Cultural Co-operation," Department of State Bulletin, April 1986. pp.81-82.
142 Syed Ziaullah. "The UD "Goodwill" Spurt." Democratic World, ~01.15, no.4. 1 2 ~ ~ October 1986, pp.5
143 Caspar W. Weinberger, "Press Briefing after Meeting with Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi, 11 October 1986" (Repr~nts). American Centre, New Delhi. pp.1-2.
144 Ibid.. p.4
145 Ibid., p.6.
146 Dilip Bobb. "Indo-US Ties-The Hard Sell." lndia Today, 15 November 1986, p.101
147 Syed Ziallah. "Message Rhind the Weinberger Visit." Democratic World, vol. 15. no.43, 26 October 1986. p. 10
148 Ibid., p.9.
149 'US Help Sought For Alrcraft Carrier." Times of India. 26 August 1988.
150 Dilip Mukerjee, " Carlucci Visit: A Long-term Angle," Times of India. 4 April 1988.
151 K.Shankar Bajpai, 'New Delhi and Washington:The Reagan Effect," ibid.. January 1989.
152 Jha, n.27.pp.89-107.
153 see seminar Onin G. Hatch, 'Reagan and Our Strategy for India", Washington Times, 6 November, 1984. Also Ibid., p.3
154 Stephen P. Cohen, 'Right for the Right Reason : The Reagan Administration and India", lndia Quarferly (New Delhi), ~01.15, no.2, Spring. 1988. p.34
155 Ibid.. p.33, For an overview of Indians in America, see Arthur W.Hehueg and Usha M. Hehvag. An lmmgrant Success Story. East Indians in America (Philadelphia.1990).
156 White House 'Background Briefing Paper on the visit of lndrra Gandhi ",26 July 1982.
157 Satu P.Lirnaye, US-India Relations : Punuit of Accommodatron (London, 1993). p.36 Also Nayan Chanda. "A New Indian Surnmef, FarEastem Economic Review, 25 February, 1988, p.34. For an analysis of Indian Naval Expansion, see Ashley L. Tellis, 'India's Naval Expansion: Reflections on History and Strategy", Comparative Strategy, vol.16, no.2. 1987, pp.185-219.
158 Ibid., n.167.
159 For details. see ibid..
160 There is a widely shared view in the US that running Russia to ruin in an arms race sapped American industrial and technology vitality. For details, see Joseph S Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1990); Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Changes and Military Conflicts from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987); and C. Raja Mohan. "Towards a New World Order", in Rose et al, eds.. n.28, p.21.
161 For details see Nalini K. Jha, "Siz~ng Bill Clinton's Pol~cy on India", lndiaAbmad(NewYork), 26 March. 1993: and his. "US and India, Coming Closer?" India Currents (San Jose, Calif) February 1993, p.17.