The Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia ...develop critical infrastructure in the...

The Global arcTic

Juha Käpylä & harri Mikkola Fiia brieFiNG PaPer 133 • august 2013

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

133

The GrowiNG arcTic iNTeresTs oF russia, chiNa,

The uNiTed sTaTes aNd The euroPeaN uNioN

• With exciting economic opportunities and serious environmental challenges, the Arctic istransformingandre-emergingasageopoliticallyimportantregion.

• MajorglobalplayerswithinandwithouttheArcticarepayinggreaterattentiontotheregion.

• WhileRussiaisatraditionalArcticstatewithsignificanteconomicandsecurityinterestsintheregion,China,theUSandtheEUhavealsoexpressedtheirArcticinterestsmoreexplicitly.Theyarekeentotapintotheeconomicpotentialandhaveasayinthewaytheregionbecomesaccessed,exploitedandgoverned.

• Asaresult,theArcticisnolongeraspatiallyoradministrativelyconfinedregion,butisinsteadtakingitsnewforminthemidstofcontemporaryglobalpolitics.

• TheglobalizationandeconomizationoftheArcticwillmostlikelydownplayenvironmentalismandreducetherelativeinfluenceoftheindigenouspeopleandsmallArcticstatesinArcticaffairs.Arctic governance is also likely to turnmore complex and complicated as the economic andpoliticalstakesareraised.

The Global arcTic

Fiia briefing Paper 133

august 2013

The GrowiNG arcTic iNTeresTs oF russia, chiNa, The uNiTed sTaTes aNd The euroPeaN uNioN

Global security research programme

The Finnish institute of international affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

Juha Käpylä

researcher


harri Mikkola

researcher


The FiNNish iNsTiTuTe oF iNTerNaTioNal aFFairs 3

Introduction1

Kiruna,thenorthernmostcityofSwedenlocatedinSwedishLapland,hostedtheeighthbiannualmin-isterialmeetingoftheArcticCouncil(AC)on15May,2013.Traditionally,theAChasbeenaregionalco-operativeforumwithalimitedmandateonissuesof sustainable development and environmentalprotection.ThisnotonlyconstructedtheArcticasan“internalaffair”oftheACmemberstates2andnon-staterepresentatives,butalsoexcluded“highpolitics”,mostnotablyeconomyandsecurity,fromtheACagenda.

Fromthisperspective,twooutcomesoftheKirunameetingwerenotable.First,themeetingdecidedtograntseveralextra-Arcticplayers–China,India,Italy,Japan,theRepublicofKorea,Singaporeandconditionally the EU – the status of permanentobservers.Thisdecisionwentagainstthetrendofself-imposed exclusionof theAC from the extra-Arcticworld,previouslyreaffirmedonlytwoyearsagointhe2011Nuukministerialmeeting,andlegiti-mizednewstakeholdersinArcticaffairs.

Second,theKirunameetingplacedimportantnewemphasison the economy for theArcticCouncil.TheKirunaDeclarationstatedthattheAC“recognizethecentralroleofbusinessinthedevelopmentoftheArctic,anddecidetoincreasecooperationandinteractionwiththebusinesscommunitytoadvancesustainabledevelopmentintheArctic”.3Comparedtothepreviousenvironmentalemphasis,thisnewfocusintheofficialdiscourseishighlysignificant.

TheKirunadecisionsreflectthenewdynamicsthatthe Arctic region is facing today. As an openinggeopoliticalfrontierwithexcitingeconomicoppor-tunitiesandseriousenvironmentalchallenges,the

1 Thisbriefingpaperwasdraftedasapartofabroaderresearch

projectTowardsGeopoliticsofFlows,fundedbytheFinnish

ScientificAdvisoryBoardforDefenseandNationalEmergen-

cySupplyAgency.

2 Canada,Denmark(Greenland),Finland,Iceland,Norway,

theRussianFederation,SwedenandtheUnitedStatesof

America.

3 ArcticCouncil(2013)TheKirunaDeclaration,http://www.

arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/

category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-

meeting.

Arcticisgaininganincreasingamountofattentionfroma rangeofpolitical actors,bothwithinandwithouttheArctic itself.Asaresult, the“Arctic”cannolongerbeunderstoodasaconfinedregionorasasetofspecific“soft”issuesdealtwithbytheArctic states and local communities themselves.Instead,itisemergingbothasaglobalspaceandasaninstantiationofcontemporaryglobalpolitics.

Thispaper investigates thekeyArctic interestsoffourmajorglobalplayersthatarepayingincreasingattentionto theopeningnorthernregion:Russia,China, theUS and theEU. In sodoing, thepaperilluminates some of the key drivers behind the“globalization”oftheArctic.Thepaperconcludeswithsomeremarksontheglobalnatureofthecon-temporaryArcticanditsconsequences.

Russia: The key player in the Arctic

Russia is themost importantplayer intheArctic,withsignificanteconomic,securityandgovernanceinterestsintheregion.Thisisprimarilybecauseofnaturalresources.Over20%ofundiscoveredglobalhydrocarbonreservesarelocatedintheArcticareaandmostofthemintheRussianArctic.4Thesenatu-ralresourcesarevitaltoRussiannationalsecurityandeconomy;oilandgasaloneaccountforroughly20-25%ofRussianGDP.5Russia’sdomesticsocialprogrammes,infrastructureinvestments,andmili-tarymodernizationareallcriticallydependentonrevenuesfromnaturalresourceexport.

Similarly,hydrocarbonsprovideimportantleverageforRussianforeigninfluence.Thisisespeciallythecasewithenergy-dependentEurope,whereathirdofthenaturalgasconsumedisimportedfromRus-sia.6TheArcticplaysanincreasingroleinthisequa-tionasastrategicallyvitalresourcebaseforRussia.Sofar,theRussianArctichasbeenresponsiblefor

4 Zysk,Katarzyna(2011a)“TheEvolvingArcticSecurityEnvi-

ronment:AnAssessment”,inBlank,StephenJ.(ed.)(2011)

Russia in the Arctic,Carlisle:StrategicStudiesInstitute,pp.

96-97.

5 Simola,Helietal.(2013)Perspectives on Russia’s Energy

Sector,BOFITOnline,3/2013,p.4.

6 Ratner,Michaeletal.(2012)“Europe’sEnergySecurity:Op-

tionsandChallengestoNaturalGasSupplyDiversification”.

CRSReportforCongress,March15,2013.


about10-15%ofRussianGDPand25%ofitsforeignexports7andtherearesystematiceffortstoincreasethesefigures.

Russia’sincreasingnorthwardfocusisalsoduetothefactthatRussia’smaturehydrocarbonsourcesinWestern Siberia are slowly drying up. Recenthydrocarbonactivities intheRussianArctichavetakenplaceprimarilythroughonshoreprojectsinkey locations suchas theYamalPeninsulaand innascentoffshoreprojectsontheArcticseabedintheBarents,PechoraandKaraSeas.TheseoffshoreprojectshaveoftentakentheformofjointventuresbetweenRussianandinternationalenergycorpora-tions.ThissignalsRussia’sneedtoseekinvestmentsandtechnologicalknow-howthroughinternationalcooperation.

However, key offshore projects – such as theShtokhman gas field and Prirazlomnoye oil field–haveturnedouttobeextremelychallengingandhave been suffering from continuous delays andshufflingofforeignpartnersupuntiltoday.Russiahasalsosetitssightsonresourcebasesoutsideitsterritorial borders and submitted a claim for theextensionof itscontinental shelf to theUNCom-missionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf(CLCS)processasearlyas2001.

Inordertoaccess,exploitanddeliverArcticnatu-ralresourcestoglobalmarkets,RussiaalsoaimstodevelopcriticalinfrastructureintheNorthernSeaRoute (NSR), includingports, search-and-rescue(SAR)centres,routeadministration,ice-breakingcapability, and oil spill response capabilities. Inaddition,non-maritimepartsof theArctictrans-portsystem–pipelines,aviationroutes,railways,androads–and theoverall socio-economiccon-ditions of the region require development andmodernization.

Russia also has security interests in the Arctic.Russia seeks toproject its sovereign authority inits wide Arctic region through improved bordercontrol(FSB),toprovidesafetyandsecurityespe-ciallyintheNSR,andtomaintaincredibleforcestosecurecriticalinfrastructures.Russiaalsoseekstomaintain,developandprojectacrediblemilitaryforce – primarily naval, aerial andmissile assets

7 Zysk(2011a),p.97.

–intheregioninordertobeabletoreactinvariouspolitico-militaryscenarios,aswellastodetertheexpansionofunwantedforeignmilitarypresenceintothe(Russian)Arctic.

RussiaalsohasstrategicmilitaryforcesintheArctic,mostnotably theNorthernFleet and itsballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs).Thesemobile forcesareof increasingstrategic importancedue to thechallengesthatRussianland-basedintercontinentalballistic-missilecapabilityfacestoday.8However,developmentsinRussianhardpowerintheArctichavebeenrelativelymodest,especiallyifcomparedtotheColdWarera,andthereiswidespreadagree-mentthatinsteadofre-militarizationorthepoten-tial forahotconflict,Russia isseekingtogovernitsincreasinglybusynorthernfrontandsecureitsintereststherein.9

WhileRussiaseekstomodernizeandprojecthardpower in theArctic, it is apragmaticplayer thathasreliedoninternationalcooperationtomaintainstability conducive to economic activity in theregion. It has resolved long-standingborder dis-putesthroughbilateralnegotiationsandendorsedmultilateral governance in theArctic. Ithas alsoendorsedtheArcticCouncilasthelegitimateinsti-tutionalgovernanceframework,includingitsrecentKirunadevelopments.EvenifRussiaislikelytohar-bourconcernsaboutthegrowingroleofChinaintheregionanditsgovernance,onthewhole,RussiaseemstohavelittletoloseintheACco-operationastheforumcannotproduceindependentandbindingresolutionswithoutRussia’sconsent.

Russia has also supported the United NationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)asthelegitimatemultilaterallegalframeworkforgovern-ing theArcticOcean, including the resolutionofmaritime boundary issues, resource disputes onthecontinentalshelves,andmaritimenavigationdisagreements. The key question that remains,

8 Golts,Alexandr’(2011)“TheArctic:AClashofInterestsor

ClashofAmbitions”,inBlank(2011);Zysk,Katarzyna(2011b)

“MilitaryAspectsofRussia’sArcticPolicy:HardPowerand

NaturalResources”,inKraska,James(ed.)(2011)Arctic Se-

curity in an Age of Climate Change.Cambridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress.

9 Lasserre,Fredericetal.(2012)“Isthereanarmsraceinthe

Arctic?”,Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,14(3/4).


however,ishowcommittedpragmaticRussiaistosupportingmultilateralgovernanceintheArctic,forexampleintheeventofapotentiallyunfavourableCLCSdecisionregardingRussia’sclaimtoextendhercontinentalshelf.

Inaddition,RussiaalsohasaprimarilyeconomicallyrelatedinterestinArcticresearch,forexampleinstudyingitscontinentalshelf.RussiahasbeenlessconcernedthanWesternnationswiththethemeof“sustainability”initsArcticpolicy,anditsenviron-mentalismhasmanifestedmostlyinaninteresttocleanupnuclearandotherwasteintheArcticarea.Russia’sexpressedinterestintheindigenouspeoplealsoseemspeculiargiventherecentdevelopmentsinitstightenedNGO legislationingeneralanditsattention to the leadership issues of the RussianindigenousNGOs(e.g.RAIPON)inparticular.

China: Preparing for the Arctic opening

ChinaapproachestheArcticasaglobalpowerandan“Arcticstakeholder”affectedbyArcticdevelop-ments.China’s interests towards theArctichavebeengrowingsteadilyandithasbecomeapartofChinesestrategicdiscourse.Overall,however,theArcticremainsarelativelyminoraspectofChina’sofficial foreign policy.10 China’s growing Arcticinterest must thus be understood primarily asfuture-oriented,reflectingitsaspirationtobepre-paredfortheArcticopeninganditsconsequences.

TheprimarymotiveforChina’sgraduallyincreas-ingArctic interest is the economy.As a growingeconomy and a non-littoral Arctic stakeholder,ChinaaimstosecureaccesstoopeningArcticship-pingroutes,whichcouldoffersubstantialsavingsinmaritimetransportanddiversifyChinesesecurityofsupply.ChinaalsoseekstostrengthenitsabilitytoaccessArcticresourcebases,includingrichfishingwatersintheArcticOcean,raremineraldepositsinGreenland,andhydrocarbonsinRussia.11

To promote these interests, China has upgradeditsdiplomaticrepresentationintheNordicregion;

10 Jakobson,LindaandPeng,Jingchao(2012)“China’sArctic

Aspirations”,SIPRIPolicyPaperNo.34,November2012.

11 Jakobson,Linda(2012)“NortheastAsiaTurnsitsAttentionto

theArctic”,NBRAnalysisBrief,December17,2012.

signednumerousbilateralagreements,suchasthe2013FreeTradeAgreementwithIceland;supportedChineseprivateinvestments,suchasintheminingindustryinGreenland;acquiredoffshorestakesandashare intheYamalLNGproject inRussia for itsnationalenergycompany;andevenleasedaportinNorthKoreaforapotentialhubforArctictransportinthefuture.

GlobalandArcticwarmingoffersnotonlyeconomicopportunities,butalsobringsaboutcomplexchal-lenges for China. For example, due to changingweatherpatternsChinawillexperiencerisingsealevels and food securityproblems.Consequently,Chinahasaninterest indeepeningitsknowledgeonclimatechangeintheArcticinordertobeabletomitigateandadapttotheeffectsitwillhaveonChinesesociety.ThishasledChinatobothinvestinnationalresearchcapabilityandpromoteinter-national co-operation in scientific research onenvironmentalandArcticissues.

ParticipationinArcticgovernanceisalsoagrowinginterest forChina.TheUNCLOS servesas thekeylegalframeworkthatChinarecognizesintheArctic.AsChinalacksdirectaccesstotheArcticOcean,italsorecognizesthesovereignrightsofArcticlittoralstates. However, China emphasizes that interna-tionalmaritimelawguaranteesitcertainrightsintheArcticmaritimeenvironment,suchastherightof scientific research, the freedomof navigation,and also potentially the right to exploit naturalresources–suchashydrocarbonsandfishery–intheinternationalwatersoftheArcticOcean.12

Thatsaid,Chinacontinuestohaveavitalnationalinterest in foregrounding the importance of sov-ereignty and territorial integrity for two specificreasons:first,topreventexternalinterferenceinitsowndomesticaffairs;andsecond,todefenditsownsovereigntyclaimsintheSouthandEastChinaSeasthatdonotrelyontheUNCLOSprocedure.

WhileendorsingtheUNCLOS intheArctic,Chinahas nevertheless expressed two particular con-cerns.First,Chinaisconcernedthattheextensionof sovereign territory, and especially nationalExclusiveEconomicZones(EEZs),risksshrinkinginternationalwaters in the Arctic, thus possibly

12 JakobsonandPeng(2012),pp.16-18.


weakening its right to benefit fromhydrocarbonand fish resources in those “common” waters.Second,ChinahasalsobeenconcernedabouttheRussian management of the NSR and especiallyaboutthehighice-breakerservicefeesthatRussiademandswithreferencetoUNCLOSArticle234.Astheworld’slargestshippingnationwithover40%ofitsGDPderivedfromtheshippingindustry,ChinafearsthatthepotentialcommercialadvantageoftheNSRcouldshrinkconsiderablyifRussiacontinuestoimposehighservicefeesonthevoyage.13

Chinahas also actively sought, andwas recentlygranted,permanentobserverstatus in theArcticCouncil.ThisreflectsChina’sviewthatArcticstatesdonothaveamonopolyonArcticissuesduetotheirglobalnature,andthattheACwithoutChinawouldbe an inadequate institutional body to dealwithArcticissues.ThepermanentobserverstatusconfersonlylimitedrightsonChinaintheAC,anditwillhavenovotingrights,forexample.However,Chinamostlikelyconsidersthatobserverstatusnotonlytransforms it into a legitimateArctic player, butalsothatpermanentobserversthemselvesmaywellgainmoreinfluenceintheACinthelongrun,thusenhancingChineseArcticinfluenceovertime.

The United States: From a reluctant

to an emerging Arctic player

TheUS has traditionally been a “reluctantArcticpower”14thathaspaidalimitedamountofpolicyattention to the region,andonlyprimarily to itsownArcticbackyard,Alaska.Lackofpublicaware-ness,longdistances,thelow-threatenvironment,budgetaryconcerns,andmorepressingglobalissueshaveallensuredthattheArctichasremainedinthebackgroundofpolicy-making.

WhiletheArcticcontinuestobearelativelyminortopic on the overall US foreign policy agendatoday, theUS has started topay closer attentiontotheregionwiththepublicationofkeystrategicdocumentsandhigh-profileparticipationinArctic

13 Conley,Heather(2012)“NewSecurityArchitecturefor

theArctic:AnAmericanPerspective”,AReportoftheCSIS

EuropeProgram,p.40;JakobsonandPeng(2012),p.18.

14 Huebert,Rob(2009)“TheUnitedStatesArcticPolicy:The

ReluctantArcticPower”,SPPBriefingPapers2(2),May2009.

affairs.Inshort,theArctichasgraduallyemergedasa“new”foreignpolicyfrontierintheUS.15

Theexploitationofnaturalresources–gas,oil,andminerals–istheprimarydriverofcontemporaryUSpolicyintheArctic.ToenhanceUSenergysecurityand the economy, theObama administration hasencouragedtheresponsibledevelopmentofdomes-ticoilandgasproduction.Inrecentyears,duetoadecliningtrendinproductioninexistingoilfieldsontheAlaskanNorthSlopecoupledwithalackofnewonshoresites,therehasbeendomesticpressuretoexploreoffshoreoilintheBeaufortandChukchiSeas.16MajorenergycorporationsfromtheUSandabroadhaveacquiredlicencesforoffshoreproduc-tionblocks.Theseefforts,however,havebeenchal-lengingandbesetwithdelaysduetoUSadministra-tionpressureafterrecentenvironmentalaccidents.Inaddition,advancesinunconventionalgasandoilproductionhavereducedtheurgencytogoArctic.

Secondly,theUSalsohasarangeofsecurityinter-estsintheArctic.Importantly,partsofUSstrategicdeterrence,globalmissiledefenceandearlywarn-ingarchitecturearesituatedoroperationalintheArcticregion.TheissueoffreedomofnavigationintheArcticisanotherimportantsecurityinterestfortheUS.This isbecauseaccessibleandopen inter-nationalmaritimeroutesarearteriesoftheglobalandUSeconomyandkeyenablersofflexiblepowerprojectionbytheUSmilitary.

Consequently,theUSisadamantaboutdefendingfreedomofnavigationandopensealanesglobally,includingonmaritimeroutesintheRussian(NSR)andCanadian(NWP)Arctic.ThisputstheUSatoddswithvarious littoralnationsthatemphasize theirrespectivesovereigntyintheiradjacentmaritimearea.ThestatusofArcticmaritimeroutesisamat-terofglobalstrategicsignificanceduetothewiderimplicationsthatanunfavourableprecedentintheregionwouldhavefortheprincipleoffreedomofnavigationingeneral.17

15 Conley,Heather(2013)“TheNewForeignPolicyFrontier:

U.S.InterestsandActorsintheArctic”,AReportoftheCSIS

EuropeProgram.

16 Conley(2012),p.3;Huebert(2009),pp.4-7.

17 Conley(2012),pp.20-23;Kraska,James(2011)“TheNew

ArcticGeographyandU.S.Strategy”,inKraska(2011),pp.

258-262.


The US also has an interest, though currentlyinadequatecapability,inprovidingsafetyandlawenforcement inthe increasinglybusyandnaviga-ble Arcticmaritime environment.That said, theUSArcticborderdoesnotrankashighinstrategicimportanceasitssouthernbordersdo,andAmeri-canpolicy-makershavebeenrelativelycontenttohaveCanadaupgradeitsArcticcapabilitytogoverntheNorth-AmericanArctic.

Thirdly, the US remains unshielded from theeffects of global climate change. To understandandrespondtocomplexenvironmentalchallenges,theUShasinvestedinscientificresearchonArcticenvironmentaldynamics.Infact,theUShasbeenaforerunnerininternationalclimateresearch,withnotableclimatescholarsandestablishedandpres-tigiousresearchinstitutes.18

TheUS approach to Arctic governance has beenambivalent.WhiledefactoadheringtotheUNCLOS,thecontinuingfailuretoratifythetreatyhampersUS leadership in Arctic multilateral governance.Non-ratificationalsodeniestheStatesalegitimatelegal framework toensure freedomofnavigationandsettledisputes in themaritimeenvironment,mostnotablyintheNWPandNSR.Non-ratificationalsoworksagainstUSeconomicinterestsbydenyingthecountryalegitimatelegalframeworktoseekanextensiontoitsArcticEEZ.Todate,theUShasfol-lowedPresidentTruman’sunilateralistproclama-tionthatresourcesinorbelowtheUScontinentalshelfarethesolepropertyoftheUnitedStates.19

TheUSpolicyontheArcticinstitutionalgovernancehasalsobeenambivalent.Initially,duringthe1990s,theUSsawtheArcticCouncilashavingonlylimitedpoliticalimportance,status,androle.Lateron,duetoagrowingawarenessoftheeconomicprospectsandgeopoliticalstakesofthewarmingArctic,theUSwaswillingtoconsiderthegroupoffiveArcticlittoralstates(the“ArcticFive”)asaformattodis-cusstopicalissues,includingthoserelatedtosover-eigntyandsecurityintheArctic.ThisemphasisdefactomarginalizedtheprospectsoftheACfurther.However,inrecentyears,theUShasreversedits

18 Conley(2012),pp.27-28.

19 Cohen,Ariel(2011)“RussiaintheArctic:ChallengestoU.S.

EnergyandGeopoliticsintheHighNorth”,inBlank(2011),

p.11.

policy on the Council and now regards it as the“pre-eminentforumforinternationalcooperationintheArctic”.20Afteralongsilence,theUShasalsoendorsedtheinclusionofnewobservers–includingChina–intheAC.ThisnotonlyreaffirmsUScom-mitmenttomultilateralismintheArctic,butalsoexpressesincreasingUSwillingnesstostrikenewbargainswithrisingpowers,suchasChina,withintheparametersofthepost-hegemonicliberalmul-tilateralorder.

The European Union: The Arctic gets closer to Brussels

TheEuropeanUnionhas started to show increas-ing interest inArcticaffairs.TheEU is intimatelyconnectedtotheArcticregionthroughitsArcticMemberStatesaswellasvariousEUcompetences,policies and regulationswith adirectbearingontheArcticinareassuchastheenvironment,climatechange, trade, energy, research, transport, andfishery.Thatsaid,theEUhasneverbeenaforerun-nerinArcticgovernance,norhasitbeenacceptedasalegitimate“stakeholder”byallArcticstates.ThiswasmostlybecauseoftheEU’spoliticallyinsensi-tivestancetowardssealingandwhalingandbecauseoftheEuropeanParliament’spoliticallyunfeasibleinitialposition,whichsuggestedacomprehensiveinternationaltreatytogoverntheArcticregiononthebasisoftheAntarcticTreaty.21

Over time,however, theEUhascometoadoptamore politically aware and conciliatory tone inits Arctic policy.22 Today, the EU’s Arctic policymaintains thatArcticgovernanceshouldbebuiltonexistingmultilateralframeworks–theUNCLOS,theArcticCouncil,andtheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)–insteadofanewArctictreaty,whilesimultaneouslybearinginmindandrespect-ingthesovereigntyandnationalinterestsofArcticstatesthemselves.Duetotheinfluenceofvariousmember states with divergent interests, the EUcontinues to lack a coherentArctic strategy and

20 SeePedersen,Torbjørn(2012)“DebatesovertheRoleofthe

ArcticCouncil”,Ocean Development and International Law

43,p.149.

21 Wegge,Njord(2012)“TheEUandtheArctic:EuropeanFor-

eignPolicyintheMaking”,Arctic Review on Law and Poli-

tics3(1),pp.15-17.

22 Ibid.,pp.17-18.


moves forward at the level of policy statements.WhiletheEUhassoughtagreaterroleintheArctic,ithascometorecognizethattheArcticstatesaretheprimaryactors in the regionand that theEUshouldfocusitsgrowingengagementonsupport-ingexistingsuccessfulco-operationandprovidingassistanceinmeetingnewchallengesintheregion.

ThefirstEUArcticinterestrelatestoglobalclimatechange,whichhasvariousenvironmental,social,economicandgeopoliticalimplicationsfortheArc-ticregionaswellasforEurope.WhiletheEUhastackledclimatechangeatthegloballevel,itsemerg-ingArcticclimatepolicyhasstartedtoemphasizeup-to-dateknowledgeofregionalclimatedynam-icsandtheneedtoinvestinArcticenvironmentalresearch.Theseeffortsare identifiedas requiringcoordination between the EU, Arctic states andArcticstakeholders.

Secondly, the EU also has significant economicinterestsintheArctic.EuropeisamajordestinationforArcticresources.Around25%ofArcticoilandgasoutputisdestinedforEurope,and80%ofthefishcaughtinIcelandand60%inNorwayaresoldintheEU.23Consequently,theEUseekstosecureaccess toArctic resource bases in the context ofintensifyingglobalcompetition,and to influencepolicy development in the Arctic states towardsfavourableresourceexploitationandmanagement.

Almost90%oftheEU’stradeiscarriedoutatsea.Asaresult,theEUhasastrategicinterestinthefuturedevelopment,securityandstabilityofArcticmari-timeroutes thatmaybecomeglobally important.Mostnotably,theEUsupportsthedevelopmentofthe“PolarCode”intheIMO,agreementsonsearchandrescueandoilspillresponsecapabilityintheAC,aswellastheprincipleoffreedomofnavigationonArcticmaritimeroutes.WithregardtotheNSR,inparticular,theEUhasexpresseditswillingnesstoassistinthedevelopmentofsustainableshippingontheroute.

23 Cavalieri,Sandraetal.(2010)EU Arctic Footprint and Pol-

icy Assessment: Final Report,December21,2010,p.41;

Neumann,AntjeandRudloff,Bettina(2010)Impact of EU

Policies on the High North: The Cases of Climate Policy and

Fisheries,Directorate-GeneralforExternalPoliciesofthe

Union,PolicyDepartment,EuropeanParliament,p.8.

Thirdly, theEU also seeks to influence the socio-economicdevelopmentofArcticstatesandstake-holdersthroughinvestmentinresearchandfundingforcross-borderco-operationintheArcticregion.Tofosterfurtherregionalco-operation,theEUhasalso engaged in activity in theArctic areavia itsNorthernDimension(ND)jointpolicywithRussia,NorwayandIceland.

TheEUalsoendeavourstohaveastrongerpresenceinArcticgovernance.TheEUisalreadyamemberofseveralrelevantregionalinstitutionalframeworks,such as theBarentsEuro-ArcticCouncil and theNordicCouncilofMinisters.TheEU’smost likelyforthcomingstatusasapermanentobserverintheAC will increase its possibilities to influence theArcticdevelopment,tostayinformedontheArcticdevelopment andotherArctic stakeholders’ con-cerns,andtosucceedinintensifyingandglobalizingpolicycompetitionwithnewArcticstakeholders.24

Conclusion: The global Arctic and its consequences

TheArctic is transforming and re-emerging as ageopolitically important region. New economicprospects inenergy,mineralandmaritimetrans-portsectorsoffersignificantopportunitiesforthetraditionalArcticstates,someofwhicharealreadyactive players in the region, such as Russia andNorway,andsomeofwhichareslowlyturningtheirattentiontotheArctic,suchastheUS.

Newprospectsarealsoattractingtheattentionofnewplayersthatarekeentotapintotheeconomicpotential andhavea say in theway the region isaccessed,exploitedandgoverned,includingChinaand theEU.Thenet effect of these– and other–developments is that theArctic today is a globalArctic:itcannolongerbeperceivedasaspatiallyoradministrativelyconfinedregion,butisinsteadtakingonanewformanddynamicsinthemidstofcontemporaryglobalpolitics.

Whilethereareunresolvedandcontentiousissuesin the global Arctic (e.g. the status of maritime

24 Heininen,LassiandBailes,AlysonJK(2011)Strategy Papers

on the Arctic or High North: A Comparative Study and Anal-

ysis.InstituteofInternationalAffairs,CentreforSmallState

Studies,p.93.


passagesandextensionofcontinentalshelves)thatmay spark diplomatic disputes or even conflicts,theregionischaracterizedbymultilateralcoopera-tionandgovernance.Thatsaid,therearedivergentpoliticalintereststoendorseArcticmultilateralism.Russia, for example, utilizes multilateralism tocreateastable investmentenvironment,whereasChinareliesonittolegitimatelyaccessArcticaffairsasanon-aggressiverisingpowerandextra-Arcticstate.WhileatraditionallyreluctantArcticplayer,the US currently sees Arctic multilateralism asthemostprominenttooltoestablish itspresenceandpromoteitsinterestsintheregionwithintheframeworkofitsgeneralsmartpowerstrategy.TheEUendorsesmultilateralisminitsexternalpolicy–ingeneralandintheArctic–topresentitselfasarelevantglobalactorandanormativepowerinasituationwhereitsglobalrelevanceisdecreasing.

Theglobalizationof theArcticandthenewfocuson the economywill have various consequencesin the region. Firstly, the focus on sustainabledevelopmentinArcticgovernanceislikelytosufferfromasharperfocusontheeconomythatfavoursenvironmentallychallengingbutgloballyinterest-inghydrocarbonextractionandmaritimetransportindustries.Secondly,theindigenouspeopleintheArcticwillmostlikelyloseinfluencewiththeintro-ductionofnewmajorplayersintotheArcticgov-ernance.Attheveryleast,itisunlikelythatChina,forexample,wouldcontributetotheenhancementof indigenous influence inArctic affairs given itseconomicemphasis,interestindomesticstability,aswellasitshistorywithChineseminorities.

Thirdly, new actors, interests and dynamics arebound to affect the traditional Arctic states. Ingeneral,theemergenceofnewmajorplayerswillreduce,albeitwithexceptions,theinfluenceoftra-ditionalandespeciallysmallArcticstates.Yet,forsome,theappearanceofnewmajorplayersmayinfactbeaboon.Iceland,forexample,maystandtogainfromincreasingChineseinterestintheregionby receiving direct foreign investments after itseconomiccrisis.And lastly,Arcticgovernance islikelytoturnmorecomplexandcomplicatedastheeconomicandpoliticalstakesareraisedwiththeintroductionofnewglobalplayersintheregion.


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and internationally. The institute undertakes quality control

in editing publications but the responsibility for the views

expressed ultimately rests with the authors.

The Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia ...develop critical infrastructure in the...

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