THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT - Live Law · chandra choudhury path bhetapara guwahati- 28 kamrupm ......

Page No.# 1/96

GAHC010139172019

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : WP(C) 4198/2019

1:GEETALI DOLEY R/O VILL. TARIANI BHEKELI,P.O. DHINPORA BALIJAN, P.S. BOGIMADI, DIST.-LAKHIMPUR, PIN-786003

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, DISPUR, GUWAHATI-781006

2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR

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GUWAHATI-78100

Advocate for the Petitioner : MS K GOGOI

Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM

Linked Case : WP(C) 2684/2019

1:NIPAN KUMAR PATHAK S/O- SRI SUSENDRA KUMAR PATHAK PERMANENT R/O- VILL- MAIRAMARA P.O. AND P.S. HOWLY

DIST- BARPETA ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM

DISPUR GHY-6

2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. 1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GHY-6

3:THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. 1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GHY-6

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4:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. 2ND FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GHY-6

5:THE COMM. OF TAXES GOVT. OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN G.S.ROAD DISPUR GHY-6

6:THE DY. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES KOKRAJHAR

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A K BHUYAN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:JYOTIRMOY ADHIKARY AND ANR. S/O- SRI MRINAL ADHIKARY R/O- WARD NO. 1 KANAKLATA ROAD P.O AND P.S- BONGAIGAON DIST- BONGAIGAON ASSAM

2: RAJU SAHA S/O- LATE RAMKRISHNA SAHA R/O- VILL- KALAHBHANGA (MISSION ROAD) P.O AND P.S- BARPETA ROAD DIST- BARPETA ASSAM VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06

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2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT DISPUR GHY-06

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT DISPUR GHY- 06

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:KAMAL DEBNATH S/O KHITISH DEBNATH R/O WARD NO. 3 KALAHBHANGA BARPETA ROAD DIST.-BARPETA PIN-781315 ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR. REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

2:THE JOINT SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:BHASKAR CHANDRA DEVA SARMA

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S/O- HARISH CHANDRA DEVA SARMA R/O- H NO.5 CHANDRA CHOUDHURY PATH BHETAPARA GUWAHATI- 28 KAMRUPM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM and 5 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY- 6

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL A DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-6

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DISPUR GHY- 6

4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNELA DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 6

5:THE ASSAM PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REP. BY THE CHAIRMAN JAWAHAR NAGAR KHANAPARA GHY- 22

6:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR OF ASSAM RAJBHAWAN GHY-1

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. M DAS Advocate for the Respondent : SC PERSONNEL DEPT.

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1:VIKASH KUMAR PINCHA S/O- SHIKHAR CHAND PINCHA R/O- SHREE ARIHANT GARMENTS B.G. MARKET 2ND FLOOR

SRCB ROAD FANCY BAZAR DIST- KAMRUP (M) GHY-1 ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR. REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

2:THE JOINT SECRETARY FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : SC FINANCE AND TAXATION


1:KAVITA DAS R/O- SRIMANTAPUR BHANGAGARH GHY

ASSAM PIN- 781032

VERSUS

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1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6

2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME AND POLITICAL DEPTT. DISPUR

GHY-6

3:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

4:THE JOINT DIRECTOR TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:RAJU SAHA S/O- LT RAMKRISHNA SAHA R/O- KALAHBHANGA (MISSION ROAD) P.O. AND P.S. BARPETA ROAD DIST- BARPETA ASSAM PIN- 781315

VERSUS


2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-06

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3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-06



1:SABBIRA IMRAN D/O. NURUL IMRAN R/O. MANIRAM DEWAN ROAD NEAR NAGAON SADAR THANA KHAN BAHADUR COMPLEX P.S. AND DIST. NAGAON ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

3:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY.-06.


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1:BHARGAV PHUKAN S/O. SRI D. K. PHUKAN R/O. H/NO.9 KRISHNAPUR BELTOLA D.TAROO PATH 2ND LEFT BYLANE P.O. LAKHIMANDIR GUWAHATI-781028 DIST. KAM.RUP ASSAM.

VERSUS


2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:HARSHAJYOTI BORA AND 7 ORS. S/O- SRI ANIL CHANDRA BORA R/O- BISHNURAVA ROAD P.S. TEZPUR

DIST- SONITPUR

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ASSAM

2: JAYANTA KUMAR NATH S/O- NAGEN CHANDRA NATH R/O- VILL- KABAICHUBA BORDOLGURI P.S. SIPAJHAR DIST- DARRANG ASSAM

3: HEMANTA SAIKIA S/O- BHOGESWAR SAIKIA VILL- LAKHTAKIA P.S. DHEMAJI DIST- DHEMAJI ASSAM

4: MS. SABBIRA IMRAN D/O- SRI NURUL IMRAN R/O- MANIRAM DEWAN ROAD NEAR NAGAON SADAR THANA P.O. NAGAON PIN- 782001

5: DILIP KR. KALITA S/O- LT BHABA KANTA KALITA R/O- SENCHOWA TINIALI P.O. SENCHOWA DIST- NAGAON ASSAM PIN- 782002

6: JATINDRA PRASAD BARUA S/O- DR. HOMESWAR BARUAH R/O- AMOLAPATTY B.M.ROAD NAGAON ASSAM

7: KAUSHIK KALITA S/O- SRI SANATAN CH. KALITA R/O- H.NO. 28 LAKHIMI NAGAR HATIGAON GHY- 38

8: KAVITA DAS R/O- SRIMANTAPUR BHANGAGARH GHY

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ASSAM PIN- 781032 VERSUS


2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME AND POLITICAL DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

3:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME AND POLITICAL DEPTT. DISPUR

GHY-06



1:BARNALI DAS D/O MR. JAGADISH DAS RESIDENT OF VILLAGE PIJUPARA PO NAGARBERA PS NAGARBERA DIST KAMRUP 781127 ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM

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PERSONNEL(A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006



1:MUSTAFA AHMED BARBHUIYA S/O ISHAQUE BARBHUIYA R/O HOUSE NO. 5 LNB ROAD HATIGAON P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON DIST.-KAMRUP(M) PIN-781038 ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA

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ASSAM


1:LEENA KRISHNA KAKATI D/O MR. TIKENDRA NATH KAKATI R/O HOUSE NO. 20 BAGHARBARI SATGAON ROAD PANJABARI GUWAHATI-37P.O-PANJABARI P.S- DISPUR DIST.-KAMRUP(M) ASSAM

VERSUS


2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006



1:MOON MAZOOMDER W/O PRANJAL CHAKRABORTY D/O MRS. MEERA MAZOOMDER R/O NETAJI ROAD

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MADHAYA SRIPURIA P.O.- SRIPURIA P.S.- TINSUKIA DIST.- TINSUKIA PIN- 786125 ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006



1:JOYDEV MAHANTA S/O. LT. NILOMONI MAHANTA R/O. BAPUJI NAGAR P.O. BALADMARI P.S. GOALPARA DIST.- GOALPARA ASSAM PIN- 783121.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR

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GUWAHATI-06.

2:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

3:COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARTY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.



1:RUMI SAIKIA R/O VILL- NAGAON ROAD- PAINGAON JYOTINAGAR HOUSE NO. 69A P.. ITACHALI DIST. NAGAON ASSAM PIN - 782003.

VERSUS


2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.

Page No.# 16/96

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.



1:ANIRUDHYA ROY S/O. MANOMOHAN ROY R/O. OXIGURI P.O. SRINAGAR P.S. TAMRAHAT DIST. DHUBRI ASSAM-783332.

VERSUS


2:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

3:COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

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1:BHASKAR DUTTA DAS S/O SRI BHADRESWAR DUTTA DAS R/O HOUSE NO. 9 A.G. OFFICE ROAD KRISHNAPUR BELTOLA GUWAHATI 781028 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006



1:SRABANTI SENGUPTA R/O- BHOLANATH ROAD VILL- KADAMONI

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P.O- DIBRUGARH P.S- DIBRUGARH DIST- DIBRUGARH WARD NO.3 PIN- 786001

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A JAIN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


Page No.# 19/96

1:NISHA MONI DEKA WIFE OF VIKASH KUMAR PINCHA RESIDENT OF SRCB ROAD FANCY BAZAR DIST.- KAMRUP (M) GUWAHATI- 781001 ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR. REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

2:THE JOINT SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:PALLABI SARMA CHAUDHURY W/O. SURAJIT CHAUDHURY R/O. HOUSE NO. 26 KRISHNANAGAR CHATRIBARI P.S. PALTAN BAZAR GUWAHATI KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY CHIEF SECRETARY ASSAM DISPUR

Page No.# 20/96

GUWAHATI-06 ASSAM.

2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06 ASSAM.

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL-A DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR B KAUSHIK Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:SURANJITA HAZARIKA W/O- SAURAV KUMAR DEKA H NO. 34 KALYANI NAGAR KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI- 781019 P.O- KAHILIPARA P.S- DISPUR WARD NO. 26

VERSUS


2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY DEPTT OF TRANSPORT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

3:THE SECRETARY

Page No.# 21/96

DEPTT OF TRANSPORT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

4:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY DEPTT OF TRANSPORT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006



1:SMTI. BARNALI DEVI W/O- DIPJYOTI UZIR R/O- HOUSE NO. 6 HATIGAON P.S. HATIGAON DIST.- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM PIN- 781038.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPARTMENT 1ST FLOOR F-BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

3:THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXES GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN

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G.S. ROAD DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

4:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXES NALBARI UNIT ZONE-B NALBARI ASSAM PIN- 781335.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A CHAMUAH Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:PRASENJIT KR. GHOSH S/O- LATE SURESH KUMAR GHOSH R/O- H NO. 40 APRO COLONY LANE ULUBARI GUWAHATI P.S PALTAN BAZAR DIST- KAMRUP(M) ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM

2:THE SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM

3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY

Page No.# 23/96

TRANSPORT DEPTT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR S S DEY Advocate for the Respondent : SC TRANSPORT


1:GULSHAN DAOLAGUPU S/O LT. GOVIND DAOLAGUPUR/O F/NO. 408 MANIK NAGAR R.G.BARUAH ROAD GUWAHATI-781005 DIST.-KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

VERSUS


2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME(A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006



Page No.# 24/96

1:SRI HIMANGSHU CHOWDHURY AND 3 ORS. S/O- SRI BIBHU BHUSAN CHOUDHURY R/O- VILL- BELTOLA PO BALADMARI DIST- GOALPARA ASSAM

2: SRI DEBOJIT BORA S/O- LT JITENDRA MOHAN BORA R/O- VILL- GANDHINAGAR L.K.ROAD PS NAGAON DIST- NAGAON ASSAM

3: SRI BADRUL ISLAM CHOUDHURY S/O- LT ABDUS SHAKUR CHOUDHURY VILL AND PO MOHAKAL PS BADARPUR DIST- KARIMGANJ ASSAM

4: SRI RAJARSHI SEN DEKA S/O- NILAMANI SEN DEKA R/O- LACHITNAGAR KANAKLATA PATH GHY-7 ASSAM VERSUS


2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

3:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY

Page No.# 25/96

Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:DILIP KUMAR KALITA S/O SHRI BHABA KANTA KALITA R/O VILL- SENCHOWA P.O. SENCHOWA TINIALI P.S. NAGAON DIST. NAGAON ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI -06 IDS.T KAMRUP (METRO) ASSAM.

2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-6 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.

3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -6 DIST.KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR F KHAN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM

Page No.# 26/96


1:PRASENJIT KR. GHOSH S/O. LATE SURESH KUMAR GHOSH R/O. HOUSE NO. 40 APRO COLONY LANE ULUBARI GUWAHATI P.S. PALTANBAZAR DIST. KAMRUP(M) ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT. GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM.

2:THE SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT. GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM.

3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. P N GOSWAMI Advocate for the Respondent : SC TRANSPORT


1:HRITURAJ GOGOI

Page No.# 27/96

S/O- SHRI TANKESWAR GOGOI R/O- H.NO. 19 CHANDAN NAGAR PATH LANE 3 BASISTHA GHY DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM PIN- 781028

VERSUS


2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONAL (A) DEPTT. ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6

3:THE SECRETARY IN THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6

4:THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6

5:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE DEPTT. ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6

6:THE DY. COMMISSIONER LAKHIMPUR DISTRICT NORTH LAKHIMPUR ASSAM

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R SARMA Advocate for the Respondent : GA

Page No.# 28/96

ASSAM


1:HARSHAJYOTI BORA AND 2 ORS. S/O SRI ANIL CHANDRA BORAH R/O BISHNURAVA ROAD P.S. TEZPUR DIST. SONITPUR ASSAM- 784001

2: SRI JAYANTA KUMAR NATH S/O NAGEN CHANDRA NATH R/O VILL- KABAICHUBA BORDOLGURI P.S. SIPAJHAR DIST. DARRANG ASSAM PIN - 784145.

3: SRI HEMANTA SAIKIA S/O BHOGESWAR SAIKIA VILL- LAKHTAKIA P.S. DHEMAJI DIST. DHEMAJI ASSAM- 787057. VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.

2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.


Page No.# 29/96



1:UTPAL BHUYAN SON OF SRI JOGEN BHUYAN R/O. VILL. MODHUPUR P.O. KURUKANI P.S. KAKOTIBARI PIN- 785691 DIST. CHARAIDEO ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY.- 781006.

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY.- 781006.

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY.- 781006.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A D CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:GANESH CHANDRA DAS AND 2 ORS. S/O- SRI RAGHAB CHANDRA DAS R/O- BELTOLA COLLEGE ROAD BELTOLA GHY- 28

Page No.# 30/96

P.O- BELTOLA P.S- BASISTHA DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

2: DEEPSIKHA PHUKAN D/O- MR. DIPAK KUMAR PHUKAN R/O- H NO. 9 AG OFFICE ROAD D TAROO PATH KRISHNAPUR GUWAHATI- 781028 P.O- BELTOLA P.S- BASISTHA DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

3: MONIKA TERONGPI W/O- SRI HABE TIMUNG R/O- RONGHINGCHONG (NEAR PANCHAYAT OFFICE) KARBI ANGLONG- 782460 P.O- DIPHU P.S- DIPHU DIST- KARBI ANGLONG ASSAM VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY- 06 ASSAM

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 ASSAM

4:THE PRINCIPAL / JOINT SECRETARY

Page No.# 31/96

TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DM DEPTT DISPUR GHY-06 ASSAM

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR N DUTTA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:SAIBUR RAHMAN BARBHUIYA S/O. MR. TAYEEBUR RAHMAN BARBHUIYA R/O. TML ROAD KADAMTAL P.O.- RONGPUR P.S. SILCHAR SADAR SILCHAR DIST.- CACHAR PIN- 788009 ASSAM.

VERSUS


2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECREARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.


Page No.# 32/96


1:MANZOOR ELAHI LASKAR S/O- MAHI UDDIN LASKAR R/O- MEHERPUR P.O- SILCHAR DIST- CACHAR ASSAM

VERSUS


2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06



1:JATINDRA PRASAD BARUAH S/O- DR. HOMESWAR BARUAH R/O- AMOLAPATTY B.M.ROAD P.O. NAGAON P.S. SADAR DIST- NAGAON ASSAM PIN- 782001

Page No.# 33/96

VERSUS


2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

3:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R P KAKOTI SR. ADV. Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:JYOTIRMOY ADHIKARY S/O SRI MRINAL ADHIKARY R/O WARD NO. 1 KANAKLATA ROAD P.O. AND P.S. BONGAIGAON DIST. BONGAIGAON ASSAM

VERSUS


2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPARTMENT

Page No.# 34/96

DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI - 06.



1:DHRUBOJYOTI CHAKRABORTY S/O- LATE SUDHANGSHU SEKHAR CHAKRABORTY SETTLEMENT ROAD KARIMGANJ TOWN P.O- KARIMGANJ- 788710 DIST- KARIMGANJ ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS REP. BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR DISPUR GHY- 06

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR DISPUR GHY- 06

Page No.# 35/96

4:THE APSC REP. BY THE CHAIRMAN APSC KHANAPARA GUWAHATI- 22 ASSAM

5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HAILAKANDI DISTRICT P.O- HAILAKANDI- 788151 DIST- HAILAKANDI ASSAM

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N DHAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:RHITURAJ NEOG S/O. SH. RAJENDRA PRASAD NEOG R/O. HOUSE NO.1 BYE LANE NO.2 CHANDAN NAGAR SURVEY BELTOLA GUWAHATI-781006 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.

VERSUS


2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

3:THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM

Page No.# 36/96

FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

4:THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR B CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:DIPAK KHANIKAR R/O- VILL- NATUN BAZAR P.O- RATANPUR P.S- JENGRAIMUKH DIST- MAJULI WARD NO. 10 PIN- 785105

VERSUS


2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR

Page No.# 37/96

JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK- A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006



1:DWITHUN BORGAYARY S/O ASWINI KR. BORGAYARI RESIDENT OF HATIMATHA PO- KOKRAJHAR DISTRICT- KOKRAJHAR ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GHY-6.


Page No.# 38/96



1:MANAS PRATIM HALOI AEC ROAD ANGAD NAGAR PATH HOUSE NO. 41 P.O. GAUHATI UNIVERSITY P.S. JALUKBARI DIST. KAMRUP(M) WARD NO. 02 PIN- 781014.

VERSUS


2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/ JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. 1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. 2ND FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

4:THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXES GOVT. OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN G.S. ROAD DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

Page No.# 39/96

5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXES NAGAON ZONE GOVT. OF ASSAM COURT CAMPUS NAGAON- 782001.



1:SUSOVAN DAS S/O. SRI SALIL KUMAR DAS LONGAI ROAD SREEPALLI KARIMGANJ TOWN P.O. SETTLEMENT ROAD- 788712 DIST. KARIMGANJ ASSAM.

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS. REP. BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.

4:THE ASSAM PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REP. BY THE CHAIRMAN ASSAM PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION KHANAPARA

Page No.# 40/96

GUWAHATI- 781022 ASSAM.

5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER KARIMGANJ DISTRICT P.O.- KARIMGANJ- 788710 DIST.- KARIMGANJ ASSAM.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N DHAR Advocate for the Respondent : SC PERSONNEL DEPT.


1:PALLAVI SHARMA D/O- SHRI RAM PRASAD SARMAH R/O- H.NO. 6 DR. B.K.KAKOTI ROAD KACHARI BASTI ULUBARI GHY-7 DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

VERSUS


2:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6

3:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6


Page No.# 41/96


1:KUNAL DAS S.O- TAPAN DAS PERMANENT R/O- VILL- ULUBARI P.O- ULUBARI P.S- PALTAN BAZAR DIST- KAMRUP(M) ASSAM PIN- 781007

VERSUS


2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06

4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A K BHUYAN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


Page No.# 42/96

1:SUNAYANA AIDEW RESIDING AT B N MAHANTA ROAD HOUSE NO. 54 AMULAPATTY NAGAON P.O. NAGAON P.S. NAGAON SADAR DIST. NAGAON WARD NO. 10 PIN-782001.

VERSUS


2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. 1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT. 2ND FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

4:THE COMMISSIONER OF TEXES GOVT. OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN G.S. ROAD DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.

5:THE DY. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES NAGAON ZONE GOVT. OF ASSAM COURT CAMPUS

Page No.# 43/96

NAGAON-782001.



1:HIMANGSHU CHOWDHURY S/O. SRI BIBHU BHUSAN CHOUDHURY RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BELTOLA P.O. BALADMARI DIST. GOALPARA ASSAM.

2: SRI RAJARSHI SEN DEKA S/O. NILAMANI SEN DEKA RESIDENT OF LACHIT NAGAR KANAKLATA PATH GUWAHATI-7 DISTRICT KAMRUP (M).

3: SRI BADRUL ISLAM CHOUDHURY S/O. LATE ABDUS SHAKUR CHOUDHURY VILL. AND P.O. MOHAKAL P.S. BADARPUR DIST. KARIMGANJ ASSAM. VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

2:ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

Page No.# 44/96

4:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

5:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM


1:AMRIT JYOTI SHARMA S/O LATE PRAFULLA CHANDRA SHARMA R/O NEW AMOLAPATTY P.O./P.S. GOLAGHAT DIST. GOLAGHAT ASSAM PIN 785621

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006

2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006

3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. D K MISRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM

Page No.# 45/96


1:KAUSHIK KALITA S/O SANATAN CHANDRA KALITA R/O HATIGAON LAKHMINAGAR P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

VERSUS

1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI - 06.

2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.

3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R SINGHA Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM

Dates of Hearing : 02.12.2019, 03.12.2019,

04.12.2019, 05.12.2019,

06.12.2019, 09.12.2019,

11.12.2019, 12.12.2019,

13.12.2019, 16.12.2019,

17.12.2019, 18.12.2019,

02.01.2020, 03.01.2020,

06.01.2020, 07.01.2020,

Page No.# 46/96

08.01.2020 and

22.01.2020.

Date of Judgment : 18.03.2020.

BEFOREHONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT BHUYAN

JUDGMENT & ORDER

The 52 (fifty-two) writ petitioners in the present 49 (forty-nine) writ petitions cries foul

with their discharge from service during the period of probation and pleads in one voice that

the Court should lift the veil to reach and ascertain the intention and reason behind the

issuance of the impugned orders. The petitioners submit that their discharge from service is

based on alleged misconduct and it is the report of the investigation carried out by the

Dibrugarh Police Station that propelled and became the foundation of the impugned action.

2. The imputations against each of the writ petitioners finds recorded in the respective

supplementary charge-sheets, which came about following investigations in Dibrugarh P.S.

Case No. 936/2016, on the basis of an FIR dated 27.10.2016 lodged by one Dr. Angshumita

Gogoi of Namrup, district Dibrugarh, alleging to the effect that one Naba Kanta Patir

contacted and told her to pay Rs.10 lakhs in consideration of her recruitment to a post of

Dental Surgeon in the exercise carried out by the Assam Public Service Commission (APSC).

Said Sri Patir demanded that the amount of Rs.10 lakhs be brought to his residence at

Dibrugarh on 27.10.2016. She had informed the matter to the Dibrugarh Police and on the

said date i.e. 27.10.2016 Sri Patir was apprehended from his residential premise located at

the Circuit House Road while in the process of receiving the amount from the complainant.

Following further investigations, each of the petitioners were arrested and implicated as

accused with imputations being more or less the same. Investigations revealed that one

accused Sri Rakesh Kumar Paul (A-3), who was the Chairman of APSC, along with his brother

Page No.# 47/96

Sri Rajib Paul (A-9), who is a businessman and the owner of the printing house ‘Subhadeep

Printers’ and one Sri Sudip Das (A-10), another businessman, colluded with each other and

used to print duplicate and fake APSC answer scripts, which were given to the writ petitioners

for re-writing the answers again after the examination. The re-written answer scripts were

thereafter replaced with the original answer scripts in connivance with one Sri Pabitra

Kaibarta (A-5), the then Assistant Controller of Examinations, APSC, for the purpose of

getting the writ petitioners selected in the Combined Competitive Examination of 2013 and

2014 respectively, conducted by the APSC. The duplicate and fake answer scripts of the writ

petitioners were recovered and seized from the Confidential Examination Branch of APSC. The

forensic examination of the seized answer scripts revealed that the same were not printed in

the Government Press and the handwriting of marks is of Rakesh Kumar Paul (A-3). In the

said answer scripts, either there was no signature of the Invigilator or in case of any

signature appearing, the same were found to be fake and mis-matched with the signature of

the concerned Invigilator.

3. The entry of the writ petitioners into service may now be noticed. One set of petitioners

are from the 2015 batch of candidates, who had cleared the Combined Competitive

Examination-2013 under the aegis of the Assam Public Service Commission, pursuant to

Advertisement dated 11.08.2013. As many as 42,553 candidates had appeared in the

Combined Competitive (Preliminary) Examination, out of which 2287 nos. of candidates

appeared in the Main Examination on being so qualified. Candidates qualifying and called for

interview stood at 497 nos. and finally 241 candidates were selected and recommended for

appointment to various services under the Government of Assam, having regard to options

expressed by the candidates. Another set of petitioners are from the 2016 batch of

candidates who had qualified in the Combined Competitive Examination-2014 pursuant to

Advertisement dated 03.04.2014. As many as 24,722 candidates appeared in the Combined

Competitive (Preliminary) Examination and from amongst those qualifying, a total of 1550

nos. of candidates appeared in the Main Examination. For the purpose of interview 371

candidates were called, out of which 180 candidates were selected and recommended for

appointment to various services under the Government of Assam, considering their

Page No.# 48/96

preferences/options expressed by them. Thus, a total 421 nos. of candidates from both

batches were offered appointments on probation, including the 52 nos. of writ petitioners in

the present bunch of cases. These 52 nos. of writ petitioners are from the total 60 persons

whose services were discharged during the period of probation, which discharge orders are

primarily the subject-matter of challenge herein. The particulars of the writ petitioners,

implicated as accused in respective charge-sheets, and the service to which they belonged,

are shown hereunder:

Assam Civil Service (Jr. Grade)

Sl.No.

W.P.(C) No. NAME OF PETITIONER ACCUSEDNo.

SUPPLE-MENTARY

CHARGE/SHEET1. 5817 of 2017 Bhaskar Chandra Dev

SharmaA-12 I

2. 2621 of 2018 Bhaskar Dutta Das A-11 I3. 2625 of 2018 Amrit Jyoti Sharma A-13 I4. 5809 of 2018 Himangshu Chowdhury A-25 II5. 5809 of 2018 Debojit Bora A-20 II6. 5809 of 2018 Badrul Islam Choudhury A-32 II7. 5809 of 2018 Rajarshi Sen Deka A-35 II8. 7098 of 2018 Dwithun Borgayary A-17 II9. 8554 of 2018 Kunal Das A-27 II10. 131 of 2019 Rumi Saikia A-36 II11. 779 of 2019 Susovan Das A-59 VI12. 863 of 2019 Dhrubojyoti Chakraborty A-55 VI13. 1008 of 2019 Ganesh Chandra Das A-58 VI14. 1008 of 2019 Deepsikha Phukan A-52 VI15 1008 of 2019 Monika Teronpi A-48 VI16. 1346 of 2019 Anirudhya Roy A-24 II17. 1371 of 2019 Joydev Mahanta A-45 IV18. 1442 of 2019 Manzoor Elahi Laskar A-56 VI19. 1727 of 2019 Barnali Das A-51 VI20. 1749 of 2019 Saibur Rahman

BarbhuiyaA-57 VI

21. 1759 of 2019 Moon Mazoomder A-47 VI22. 1762 of 2019 Mustafa Ahmed

BarbhuiyaA-65 VI

23. 1766 of 2019 Leena Krishna Kakati A-50 VI24. 2228 of 2019 Srabanti Sengupta A-49 VI25. 2244 of 2019 Dipak Khanikar A-14 II26. 2454 of 2019 Pallabi Sarma Choudhury A-22 II

Page No.# 49/96

27. 2513 of 2019 Utpal Bhuyan A-60 VI28. 3121 of 2019 Hrituraj Gogoi A-43 IV29. 3123 of 2019 Nisha Moni Deka A-37 II30. 3066 of 2019 Kamal Debnath A-30 II31 4198 of 2019 Geetali Doley A-34 II

Assam Police Service (JR. GRADE)

Sl.No.

W.P.(C) No. NAME OF THEPETITIONER

ACCUSEDNo.

SUPPLE-MENTARY

CHARGE/SHEET32 7768 of 2018 Harshajyoti Bora A-21 II33 7768 of 2018 Jayanta Kr. Nath A-16 II34 7768 of 2018 Hemanta Saikia A-15 II35 7891 of 2018 Sabbira Imran A-18 II36 8523 of 2018 Jatindra Pd. Baruah A-26 II37 820 of 2019 Kaushik Kalita A-42 IV38 954 of 2019 Kavita Das A-66 VI39 998 of 2019 Dilip Kumar Kalita A-29 II40 2163 of 2019 Pallavi Sharma A-53 VI41 2374 of 2019 Bhargav Phukan A-62 VI42 2376 of 2019 Gulshan Daolagapu A-61 VI

ASSAM TAXATION SERVICE

Sl.No.


ACCUSEDNo.

SUPPLE-MENTARY

CHARGE/SHEET43 1721 of 2019 Sunayana Aidew A-33 II44 1730 of 2019 Manas Protim Haloi A-39 III45 2131 of 2019 Barnali Devi A-44 III46 2458 of 2019 Rhituraj Neog A-63 VI47 2684 of 2019 Nipan Kr. Pathak A-64 VI48 4905 of 2019 Vikas Kr. Pincha A-38 III

ASSAM TRANSPORT SERVICE

Sl.No.


ACCUSEDNo.

SUPPLE-MENTARY

CHARGE/SHEET49 8539 of 2018 Prasenjit Kr. Ghosh A-46 V50 206 of 2019 Suranjita Hazarika A-54 VI

Page No.# 50/96

ASSAM LABOUR SERVICE

Sl.No.


ACCUSEDNo.

SUPPLE-MENTARY

CHARGE/SHEET51 8117 of 2018 Jyotirmoy Adhikari A-31 II52 2783 of 2019 Raju Saha A-19 II

4. From the above it is seen that the writ petitioners herein belonged to different

service under the Government of Assam.

(I) As regards those belonging to the Assam Civil Service, their discharge from service

was in terms of the provisions under Rule 20, clause (c) of the Assam Civil Service Rules,

1998 (in short the 1998 Rules), the relevant part of which reads as under :

“20. Discharge of Probationer- A member shall be liable to be discharged from service-

(c) if any information received relating to his integrity, age, health, character and antecedents the

Governor is satisfied that the probationer is ineligible or otherwise unfit for being a member of

the service; or “

(II) Those belonging to the Assam Police Service, they were discharged from service in

exercise of powers under Rule 16, clause (b) of the Assam Police Service Rules, 1966 (in

short the 1966 Rules) the relevant part of which reads as under :

“16. Discharge of a probationer- A probationer shall be liable to be discharged from the service or in

the case of persons appointed to the service under clause (b) of rule 5(1) be reverted to the post of

Inspector of Police if he -

(b) is considered otherwise unsuitable, for reasons to be recorded, for continuing in the service by

the Governor.”

Page No.# 51/96

(III) In so far as the petitioners belonging to the Assam Taxation Service are concerned,

their discharge from service came about in terms of Rule 19, clause (ii) of the Assam Taxation

Service Rules, 1995 (in short the 1995 Rules), the relevant portion of which reads as under :

“19. A temporary or officiating member under these Rules shall be liable to be discharged or reverted to

the lower cadre of the service or to his original service as the case may be, if :-

(ii) it is found on a subsequent verification that he was initially not qualified for the appointment or

that he had furnished any incorrect information with regard to his appointment.”

(IV) In so far as the petitioners belonging to the Assam Transport Service are

concerned, they were discharged from service in exercise of powers under Rule 19, sub-rule

(2) of the Assam Transport Service Rules, 2003 (in short the 2003 Rules), the relevant part of

which reads as under:

“19. A temporary or officiating member shall be liable to be discharged or reverted to the lower cadre

of the service or to his original service, if :-

(2) it is found on a subsequent verification that he was not initially qualified for appointment or that

he had furnished any incorrect information with regard to his appointment.”

(V) Lastly, as regards the petitioners belonging to the Assam Labour Service, they were

discharged from service in exercise of powers under Rule 13, clause (c) of the Assam Labour

Service Rules, 2007 (in short the 2007 Rules), as amended, the relevant part of which reads

as under :

Page No.# 52/96

“13. Discharge of a Probationer – A probationer shall be liable to be discharged from the service -

(c) if on information received relating to his nationality, age, health, character and antecedents the

Government is satisfied that the probationer is ineligible or otherwise unfit for being a member of

the service; or “

5. Before proceeding to record the primary grounds of challenge, the three different

model forms of discharge orders that had been issued, may be noticed. The same are

reproduced hereunder and taken at random from (i) WP(C)/2621/2018, (ii) WP(C)/2163/2019

and (iii) WP(C)/206/2019 :

(i) “ AAP.148/2017/28

Government of AssamDepartment of personnel (personnel :: A)

Assam Secretariat (Civil) DispurGuwahati-781006

Dated Dispur the 8th September, 2017

Orders by the Governor notification

Whereas, Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS was appointed on probation to ACS (Jr.Grade) vide Notification No. AAP. 319/2011/248 dated 12-08-2015 and subsequently hisservice was placed at disposal of Revenue & D.M. Department vide Notification No.AAA.20/2015/46 Dated 28-02-2017 for posting him as Circle Officer/Assistant SettlementOfficer; and

Whereas, Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS, Circle Officer, Borbhag Revenue Circle wasarrested by the Dibrugarh Police on 03-05-2017 in connection with the Dibrugarh PoliceStation Case No. 936/2016 U/S 7/13(1)(A)(B)(D)/(2) P.C. Act R/W Sec. 120(B)/420 IPC andadded Sec. 463/468/471/477(A)/201 IPC and placed under suspension vide Notification No.RLR.97/2016/13 Dtd. 18-05-2017; and Whereas, the service of Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS (Under Suspension) was withdrawnfrom Revenue & DM Department vide Notification No. AAA 15/2015/78 Dtd. 01-07-2017; and Whereas, sufficient information relating to the integrity of Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS(under Suspension) has been received which warrants drawal of conclusion that the officer isunfit for being a member of the Service; and Whereas, the Governor of Assam is satisfied that the officer is, thus, ineligible or otherwiseunfit for being a member of the Service and it is necessary & expedient to discharge him fromservice; and Whereas, the Governor of Assam is also satisfied that any further departmental enquirymay hamper the Police investigation in the above mentioned criminal cases having largerinterest of the State; Now, therefore, the Governor of Assam in exercise of the powers conferred by rule 20(c)of the Assam Civil Service Rules, 1998 r/w rule 10(ii) of the Assam Services (Discipline andAppeal) Rules, 1964 is pleased to discharge Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS (Under Suspension)from service with immediate effect.

By order and in the name of the

Page No.# 53/96

Governor of Assam

Sd/- Dr. K. K. Dwivedi

Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Assam

Personnel (A) Department. ”

(ii) “ Government of Assam

home (a) Department :: dispurGuwahati ::6

E-mail : [email protected]

Orders by the Governor

notification

Dated Dispur the 30th November, 2018

No. HMA.924/2017/59 : The Governor of Assam, in exercise of power conferred by Rule 16(b) ofthe Assam Police Service Rules, 1966, is pleased to discharge Smti Pallabi Sharma, APS(Probationer), Deputy Superintendent of Police, 25th AP (ONGC) Bn., Ligiripukhuri, Sivasagar (UnderSuspension) from service with immediate effect.

By order and in the name of the

Governor of Assam

Sd/- Dr. Deepak Majumdar

Secretary to the Govt. of Assam

Home (A) Department. ”

(iii) “ Government of AssamTRANSPORT Department :: Dispur

OFFICE ORDERDated Dispur the 21st January, 2019

No. TMV.298/2016/144 : Whereas, Smti Suranjita Hazarika W/o Shri Saurav Kr. Deka residentof Kahilipara, Guwahati had appeared for the Combined Competitive Examination 2014 – 2015conducted by APSC and,

Whereas, on recommendation by APSC vide letter No.51PSC/CON/Exam-141/CC(M)/2014-2015 dated 30-06-2016, Smti Suranjita Hazarika was appointed temporarily as DTO, as perNotification No. TMV.295/2015/287 dated 15-10-2016, who had undergone two-week Joint

mailto:[email protected]

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Induction Training Course alongwith the Probationers of ACS & Allied Services conducted byAASC, Khanapara w.e.f. 18th to 28th October, 2016 and;

Whereas, after completion and release from the Joint Induction Training Course vide No.AASC(T/C)118/2016 dated 28th October, 2016, Smti. Hazarika, DTO (Probationer) had joined inthe Commissionerate of Transport on 31st October, 2016 and subsequently was posted in theregular place of posting and;

Whereas, a report has been received from Commissioner of Transport, Assam vide letterNo.CT-E/377/2016/3218 dated 20-07-2018 that Smti Suranjita Hazarika, DTO, Transport Officer(Pool) and DTO (Licensing) Kamrup (M) was arrested on 18-07-2018 (during her Probationperiod) in connection with Dibrugarh PS Case No.936/16 U/S 7/13 (1) (A) (B) (D)/(2), theprevention of corruption of Act, and SEC 120 B/420/463/468/471/477(A)/201 IPC and detainedunder custody beyond 48 hours and;

Whereas, during investigation the examination conducted by the APSC, the answer bookletswere seized U/S 27 of Indian Evidence Act from the confidential room of APSC building whichwas of the CCE (M) 2014-2015 for the ACS and allied services and was sent to the FSL,Guwahati for forensic examination by observing all the formalities and;

Whereas, during the course of investigation, Smti Hazarika, District Transport Officer,Sonitpur was arrested on 18-07-2018 for evidence opined by SP, Dibrugarh for seizure offake/duplicate answer scripts and;

Whereas, as per report of Shri Surajeet Panesar, APS, Additional Superintendent of Police(H.Q) Dibrugarh, Smti Suranjita Hazarika was placed under suspension vide Notification No.TMV.298/2016/67, dated 24-07-2018 w.e.f. the date of arrest i.e. 18-07-2018 and;

Whereas, another report along with the certified copies of relevant documents have beenreceived from the Superintendent of Police, Dibrugarh, Assam vide letter No.RB/2018/4067,dated 24-07-2018, with a request for sanction order to prosecute the arrested public servantSmti Suranjita Hazarika and;

Whereas, as per request of S.P Dibrugarh prosecution sanction order has been accordedagainst Smti Hazarika vide Notification No. TMV.298/2016/138-A, dated 30-10-2018 and;

In view of the above, it is found from the copies of records that the case of Smti Suranjita Hazarika (Probationer) is similar to the cases of ACS/APS (Probationers), since she appeared in the same CCE (M) 2014-2015 conducted by APSC and was selected.

Now, the Governor of Assam in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 19(1 & 2) of the Assam Transport Service Rules, 2003, is pleased to discharge Smti Suranjita Hazarika, DTO (Probationer), Transport Officer (Pool) and DTO (Licensing) Kamrup (M) (Under Suspension) from service with immediate effect.

Sd/- N.G. Sonowal, IAS

Secretary to the Govt. of Assam

Transport Department. ”

6. Arguments and submissions were advanced on behalf of all the respondents. To be

precise, Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, represented the petitioners in WP(C)

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5809/2019, WP(C) 7098/2018, WP(C) 7768/2018, WP(C) 131/2019, WP(C) 954/2019 and

WP(C) 2458/2019; Mr. A.K. Bhuyan, learned counsel in WP(C) 5817/2017, WP(C) 8554/2018

and WP(C) 2684/2019; Mr. A. Chamuah, learned counsel in WP(C) 2131/2019; Mr. D.K.

Mishra, learned senior counsel in WP(C) 2621/2018, WP(C) 2625/2018, WP(C) 1749/2019,

WP(C) 1762/2019, WP(C) 2163/2019, WP(C) 2374/2019 and WP(C) 2376/2019; Mr. N. Dutta,

learned senior counsel in WP(C) 1008/2019; Mr. N. Dhar, learned counsel in WP(C) 779/2019

and WP(C) 863/2019; Mr. U.K. Nair, learned senior counsel in WP(C) 156/2018, WP(C)

820/2019, WP(C) 2458/2019, WP(C) 3066/2019, WP(C) 3123/2019 and WP(C) 4905/2019;

Mr. S.K. Talukdar, learned counsel in WP(C) 1618/2018, WP(C) 7891/2018, WP(C) 8117/2018,

WP(C) 1346/2019, WP(C) 1371/2019, WP(C) 1442/2019 and WP(C) 2783/2019; Mr. S.S. Dey,

learned senior counsel in WP(C) 8539/2018 and WP(C) 608/2019; Mr. R. Sarma, learned

counsel in WP(C) 3121/2019; Mr. S. Das, learned counsel in WP(C) 4198/2019, WP(C)

206/2019, WP(C) 1721/2019, WP(C) 1730/2019, WP(C) 2228/2019 and WP(C) 2244/2019;

Mr. P. Dutta, learned counsel in WP(C) 2513/2019, Mr. B. Kaushik, learned counsel in WP(C)

2454/2019; Mr. A.B. Dey, learned counsel in WP(C) 8523/2018 and Mr. F. Khan, learned

counsel in WP(C) 998/2019, WP(C) 1727/2019, WP(C) 1759/2019 and WP(C) 1766/2019.

7. The thrust of Mr. K.N. Choudhury’s submission is that if on the attending facts and

circumstances the impugned order of discharge is seen to be based on alleged misconduct or

if a live connection or nexus is seen to exist between the allegations of misconduct and

discharge, then the same, even if couched in a language which may not appear to be

stigmatic, would amount to punishment for which a departmental enquiry would be

imperative. Referring to the paragraphs 7 to 17 of the affidavit-in-opposition dated

09.05.2019 filed by the State respondents in WP(C) 5809/2018, submission made is that it is

clear therefrom as to what propelled the respondents to discharge the petitioners, which

came in the guise of the order under Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules. Similarly, reference is also

made to the stand of the State respondents that also in respect of discharge of petitioner

employed in the Assam Police Service, the same was based on allegations of misconduct

although shrouded in an innocuous-looking order under Rule 16(b) of the 1966 Rules. Thus,

the pin-pointed argument is that the very foundation for taking recourse to either Rule 20(c)

or Rule 16(b) is clearly the investigation carried out by the Dibrugarh Police. It is contended

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that condemning the petitioners on the basis of the police investigation is a travesty of

justice. Further, it is only on presumption that the petitioners are sought to be victimized,

inasmuch as, the allegations are yet to find established before the competent authority in

accordance with law. Referring to the relevant rules envisaging discharge of a probationer

from service, it is stated that the conditions precedent for invoking the same is the

satisfaction of the Governor, which must be on an objective criteria based on relevant

materials and concrete evidence. It is submitted that recourse to such rule cannot be in an

ipsi-dixit manner, that is, on the mere saying of the respondents. By referring to paragraph 7

of the affidavit-in-opposition dated 09.05.2019 of the State respondents, it is stated that it is

apparent therefrom that the conscious decision taken to discharge the petitioners was only on

the basis of the report of the Dibrugarh Police in June, 2018.

8. Mr. K.N. Choudhury have also touched upon another aspect, in that, in so far as the

petitioners who were members of the Assam Civil Service are concerned, they had completed

the initial 2 (two) year period well before order was passed extending their period of

probation. It is submitted that they were appointed on 12.08.2015 on probation and the

subsequent order of extension was issued on 27.11.2017. By referring to Rule 22 of the 1998

Rules, particularly to sub-rule (2) thereof, it is submitted that the conditions required for

being confirmed in service were complied with by completing necessary training etc. It is thus

the contention that having regard to the same, their service stood confirmed and on such

confirmation if any discharge order was to be issued, the same could only have been done

after affording opportunity of hearing and granting protection under Article 311 of the

Constitution, by following the procedure as engrafted under Rule 9 of the Assam Services

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1964 (hereinafter the 1964 Rules). As regards the petitioners

who were members of the Assam Police Service, it is submitted that they had already been

confirmed in service and to this end reference is made to page 50 of WP(C) 7768/2018 to

show that mention therein is made of their completion of the probationary period of 2 (two)

years. Thus, similar argument is also made in respect of their deemed confirmation of service.

Reference is made to the Notification dated 08.03.2018, which is a Final Gradation List

available in the records of WP(C) 7122/2019, to say that the very fact that the names of the

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petitioners appeared in the said Final Gradation List, reinforces the stand of having been

confirmed in service as, by normal practice, names of probationers do not generally figure in

Gradation Lists unless confirmed. Reference is also made to several other documents

enclosed to the writ petitions where the word ‘probation’ is not mentioned against their

names, meaning thereby that it must be inferred that the period of probation stood

completed. Mr. Choudhury also submits that the petitioners were never served with the

orders extending their service and the same came to light only from the affidavit filed by the

respondents in the present proceedings.

9. While denying the allegations of payment of bribe money, Mr. Choudhury submits that

statements made by the petitioners, if any, before the police authorities with regard to

payment of money for securing jobs, cannot or could not have been acted upon to their

detriment in view of the clear bar under section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872. In this

respect, reliance is placed in the case of Khatri vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1981) 2 SCC

493 to say that although statements made before the police officer can be used as evidence

in proceedings under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution, however, the same is hedged

with a rider, so much so, that such statements can only be used provided it is otherwise

relevant under the Evidence Act. Submission made is that in view of the law laid down in

Khatri (supra), the statements alleged to have been made by the petitioners before the police

cannot or could not have formed the basis for the impugned action.

10. In support of the arguments and submissions above, Mr. Choudhury have placed

reliance in as many as 10 (ten) decisions of the Supreme Court, including the case in Khatri

(supra). The reported cases relied upon are mentioned hereinbelow. However, only those

reported cases which, in the opinion of this Court, are relevant to the cases at hand, would

be referred to in the later part of this judgment.

(i) 1958 SC 828 (Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India)

(ii) (1974) 2 SCC 831 (Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and anr.)

(iii) (1980) 2 SCC 593 (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and Ors. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Ors.)

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(iv) (1984) 2 SCC 369 (Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India and anr.)

(v) (1999) 3 SCC 60 (Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences,

Calcutta and Ors.)

(vi) (2014) 6 SCC 644 (Joginder Pal and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors.)

(vii) (2006) 11 SCC 356 (Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors.)

(viii) (2010) 8 SCC 220 (Union of India and Ors. vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi)

(ix) (2013) 3 SCC 607 (State Bank of India and Ors. vs. Palak Modi and anr.)

11. Mr. A.K. Bhuyan adopts the arguments of Mr. K.N. Choudhury and on facts adds that

the petitioners must be deemed to have been confirmed in service as even in the orders of

suspension there is no whisper of their service being on probation. It is submitted that the

discharge orders being ex facie punitive, therefore, opportunity of hearing was mandatory.

Relying upon the case reported in (2015) 15 SCC 151 (Ratnesh Kumar Choudhury vs. Indira

Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences, Patna, Bihar and Ors.), submission made is that it will

amount to stigma if the order is in a language which imputes something over and above mere

unsuitability for the job. According to Mr. Bhuyan, stigma is writ large in the impugned

orders. Reliance is also placed in (1994) 3 SCC 569 (Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab) to

say that a confession made to a police officer while the accused is in the custody or made

before he became an accused, is not provable against him in any proceeding in which he is

charged to the commission of the said offence.

12. Mr. A. Chamuah, too, adopts the arguments of Mr. K.N. Choudhury and goes on to say

that the petitioner is a meritorious student with First Class distinctions in her academic career

throughout. Mr. Chamuah submits that the order of discharge dated 12.02.2019 under Rule

19(ii) of the 1995 Rules have already received consideration of this Court and the prima facie

findings finds recorded in the order dated 11.04.2019 to the effect that a process by which

the impugned action although may appear to be based on a tentative premise but if the same

have devastating and irreversible effect, the same would attract the principles of natural

justice and Rule 19(ii) involves the said process. Mr. Chamuah further submits that there can

be no dispute that if it is a case of deciding the suitability of a probationer and for that limited

purpose an inquiry is conducted, the same cannot be faulted as such. However, if during the

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course of such an inquiry any allegations are made against the person concerned which result

into a stigma, he must be afforded the minimum protection contemplated under Article

311(2) of the Constitution of India even though he may be a probationer. It is further

submitted that in case this Court holds the petitioner to be a tainted person, the same will

vitiate the trial. Also, the Office Order dated 05.01.2018 extending the period of probation,

was never made known to the petitioner. In support of his arguments, reliance is placed in -

(i) (1974) 2 SCC 831 (Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and anr.)

(ii) (1999) 3 SCC 60 (Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences,

Calcutta and Ors.)

(iii) (2013) 16 SCC 59 (Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat and anr. Vs. Jayshree Chamanlal

Buddhbhatti)

13. Mr. D.K. Mishra relies on categorical statements made in the writ petitions to say that

the discharge orders are stigmatic, casts aspersions on integrity, it is by way of punishment

and founded on the police report. To illustrate that the impugned action is founded on police

report, reference is made to the Additional Affidavit dated 24.04.2019 of the State

respondents in WP(C) 2621/2018 to say that the basis is implicit at paragraphs 5, 7 and 18

thereof. Moreover, at paragraph 28, the respondents themselves have admitted that the order

was passed as per the report of the Dibrugarh Police. Thus, it is submitted that allegations of

misconduct were the springboard from where the impugned orders were catapulted, which is

not permitted in law sans an enquiry. It is also submitted that the very fact of dispensing with

the enquiry for reasons that criminal trial will be affected, itself demonstrates existence of

allegations of misconduct. By making reference to the 1964 Rules it is stated that nature of

penalties are specified in Rule 7; the procedure for imposing a penalty is provided in Rule 9

and Rule 10(ii) provides for dispensing with the enquiry, for reasons to be recorded, which is

same as the Proviso(b) of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Submission made is that resort

to Rule 10(ii) could not have been made by by-passing the provisions of Rule 9 of the 1964

Rules. In support of the above reliance is placed in -

(i) (1985) 3 SCC 398 (Union of India and anr. vs. Tulsiram Patel)

(ii) (2006) 13 SCC 581 (Tarsem Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors.)

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(iii) (2016) 9 SCC 491 (State Bank of India vs. Neelam Nag and anr.)

14. Whether the discharge orders are stigmatic or not, submission made is that the stand

of the respondents are contrary, in that, whereas at paragraph 62 of their Additional Affidavit

dated 25.07.2019 it is stated that the order is not punitive, however, at paragraph 6 it speaks

of ‘colossal fraud’ and that the petitioners are the ‘beneficiaries’. Mr. Mishra contends that the

statement at paragraph 6 itself demonstrates that the view of the respondents that the

discharge orders are not punitive and Article 311(2) is not attracted, does not hold water.

Anticipating that the State respondents would take the stand that rules of natural justice are

not required to be followed in cases of cancellation of selection which is vitiated due to fraud,

manipulation, corruption and illegalities involving the petitioners and those responsible for

conducting the selection and that the selection and appointment of the petitioners are null

and void and, further, that the said stand would have the support of decided cases of the

Supreme Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in

(2006) 11 SCC 356 and in Joginder Pal and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported (2014)

6 SCC 644, Mr. Mishra submits that the facts in the said cases, as may be obtained from the

decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Amarbir Singh and Others vs. State of

Punjab and Others, reported in 2004 (1) SCT 88 (P&H), are altogether different. It is stated

that the irregularities noticed in Amarbir Singh involved leaking of questions papers to the

candidates; instructions given to the examiners to award higher marks; manipulation and

upgrading of marks awarded to candidates, with very high marks to those who paid money;

award of poor marks in the interview to those who were not to be selected and had not paid

money despite securing high marks in the written examination; control exercised by the

Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission in appointing examiners with instructions

for awarding specific marks to the chosen candidates, and the irregularities found in the

answer books of some of the candidates. As against the decision of the High Court in Amarbir

Singh cancelling the entire selection process, the matter had travelled to the Supreme Court

in the case of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon. Mr. Mishra reiterates that the present case is entirely

distinct and, to this end, makes reference to paragraph 40 of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon to say

that it was in the context of submissions made by the senior counsel representing the State

of Punjab and senior counsel appearing on behalf of the High Court that the services of the

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appellants before the Supreme Court were terminated not in terms of the rules but in view of

the commission of illegality in the selection process involved, the Supreme Court did not feel

necessary to consider the applicability of the relevant provisions of the statute and the effect

of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. It was on this premise that the

Supreme Court returned a finding that an appointment made in violation of Articles 14 and 16

of the Constitution of India would be void and a nullity. This, according to Mr. Mishra, is not

the case at hand. Drawing attention to paragraph 46 of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon it is

submitted that there always exists a distinction between a proven case of mass cheating for a

Board examination and an unproven imputed charge of corruption where an appointment of

civil servant is involved. Further, at paragraph 93 thereof the Supreme Court observed that a

different standard should be adopted for terminating the services of the officers who had

completed about 3 (three) years of service, inasmuch as, they may have passed departmental

tests, given higher responsibilities, were nearing completion of period of probation and had

been working to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. Referring to the decision in

Joginder Pal, which is the case decided by the Supreme Court against the decision in the

second Amarbir Singh’s case after remand from the Supreme Court in Inderpreet Singh

Kahlon, Mr. Mishra submits that the Supreme Court have recorded the fact that in respect of

the appellants the High Court found that FIRs were registered against them and they

definitely carry a trace, stain or blemish that they were tainted. Submission made is that

lodging of FIRs with imputations against the petitioners are altogether missing in the cases at

hand.

15. Referring to the provisions of discharge of probationers in Rule 20(c) of the 1998

Rules, permitting discharge from service in case of doubtful integrity, Mr. Mishra submits that

having regard to the meaning of ‘integrity’, as propounded in paragraph 18 of Vijay Singh vs.

State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 242, any allegations against the petitioners

of lacking integrity and unfit to be retained in service, are clearly stigmatic in nature and this

view can be had from paragraph 16 of Swaran Singh Chand vs. Punjab State Electricity Board

and Ors., reported in (2009) 13 SCC 758.

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16. Drawing notice to the important principles on the concept of “motive” and “foundation”

concerning a probationer, as enunciated in various landmark decisions of the Supreme Court,

Mr. Mishra submits that it is well settled that a probationer has no right to hold the post and

his services can be terminated during or at the end of the period of probation and the same

will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment. But, if there are allegations of misconduct

and the termination of service is sought to be founded on such misconduct or negligence or

inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article 311 of the

Constitution of India. Mr. Mishra further submits that “misconduct” is not just a phenomenon

relatable to post recruitment period but can also relate to the period when evaluation test is

held for entry into service. In support of the contentions above, reliance is placed in :

(i) (1974) 2 SCC 831 (Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and anr.)

(ii) (2000) 5 SCC 152 (Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P. and Ors)

(iii) 2016 (3) GLR. 381 (Prasanta Kalita vs. Gauhati High Court and anr.)

(iv) (2013) 3 SCC 607 (State Bank of India vs. Palak Modi and anr.)

(v) (2001) 3 GLT 528 (Biplab Mazumdar vs. Union of India)

(vi) (1970) 2 SCC 871 (The State of Bihar vs. Shiva Bhishuk Mishra)

17. Objection is raised as regards the manner of the verification of the statements in the

Additional Affidavit of the respondent no.2 filed on 25.07.2019 bringing a different stand,

which affidavit was filed after 11 (eleven) months from the date when the affidavit-in-

opposition was filed. It is submitted that in view of the slip-shod verification, which is

apparently contrary to Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Rule 27 of the Gauhati

High Court Rules, together with the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme

Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Purushottam Jog Naik, reported in AIR 1952 SC 317

and in the case of Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury vs. State of Assam and Ors, reported in

1995 (3) GLT 467, no credence can be given to the said Additional affidavit dated 25.07.2019.

18. Lastly, Mr. Mishra submits that the FIR dated 27.10.2016, which set in motion the

investigation by the Dibrugarh police implicates one Naba Kanta Patir and this FIR does not,

in any manner, implicate the petitioners. No separate FIRs have been lodged against any of

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the petitioners. Further, the allegations of payment of bribe are as vague as can be, in that,

neither in the Accused Forwarding Report nor in the Production Report and Bail Objection

there is any mention of any confession having been made by the petitioners with regard to

payment of bribe, unlike the cases in respect of one Samedur Rahman (A-4) and Pabitra

Kaibarta (A-5) where, in their Production Report and Bail Objection, it records the fact of their

making confession. Submission made is that the allegation that the petitioners had confessed

as regards payment of bribe is absolutely false. From the Supplementary Charge-sheet

implicating the petitioners it is stated that there is a fundamental flaw, in that, it cannot be a

case that answer scripts are never given for printing by outsourcing from empanelled printing

houses. Reference is made to the statements at paragraph 20 of the Affidavit-in-Reply dated

23.10.2019 in WP(C) 2621/2018, read with Annexure-2/page 43 thereof, which gives the list

of Firms registered under the Directorate of Printing and Stationary, Assam from the year

2013 to 2016. In the course of hearing Mr. Mishra submitted that the name of ‘Subhadeep

Printers’ also finds place at Sl. 73 in the list produced over to the Court.

19. Mr. N. Dutta’s core submission is that under whatever circumstances, the protection

under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India enuring to the petitioners cannot be taken

away. This is in the context that there cannot be a general proposition that in respect of a

probationer the protection under Article 311 can never be applicable. It would depend on

individual facts. Referring to Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules it is submitted that the expression

“any information” would take within its fold reasonable and probable information which must

verily be believed to be true and such information relating to integrity, character or

antecedents of the probationer must appear from the file records. Apprehension expressed is

that no exercise was carried out to find out or satisfy itself as to the existence of reasonable

and probable information, which is one of the condition precedent for invoking Rule 20(c). In

short, that there is utter lack of due application of mind in the impugned action. On the

principles of natural justice it is contended that opportunity of hearing is imperative if an

impugned administrative action is attended to by civil consequences. Further, that natural

justice being the quintessence of the process of justice, fairness in action demands that an

opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the person affected. In this, as contended, there

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can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function,

inasmuch as, an unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may result in far more serious

consequences than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry and, therefore, the rules of natural

justice must apply equally in an administrative inquiry which involves civil consequences. In

support of the above, heavy reliance is placed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, reported

in (1978) 1 SCC 248. Further, that audi alteram partem rule of natural justice, being a highly

effective tool devised by the Courts to act as a healthy check on abuse or misuse of power by

a statutory authority, its applicability should not be narrowed or circumscribed. It is submitted

that in the facts and circumstances of the cases at hand even the well-recognised exceptions

and exclusions to audi alteram partem rule are not attracted, so much so, grant of

opportunity of hearing would not have the effect of paralysing the administrative process

and/or that the need for promptitude or urgency of the situation demanded exclusion of the

requirement of fair-play in the administrative action. Submission is also made that in a given

case audi alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit a brief and minimal hearing,

either prior to a decision or as a post-decisional remedial hearing. As in Maneka Gandhi,

where the Supreme Court observed that a fair opportunity of being heard following the order

impounding the Passport would satisfy the mandate of natural justice and that the

requirement of giving opportunity to the person concerned can and should be read by

implication in the Passports Act, 1967, Mr. Dutta contends that a similar exercise would be in

sync with the concept of circumstantial flexibility of the audi alteram partem rule of natural

justice.

20. On the aspect that rules of natural justice must be complied with when an

administrative action may result in civil consequences, Mr. Dutta places reliance in Mohinder

Singh Gill and ors. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & ors., reported in AIR

1978 SC 851 for the proposition that ‘civil consequence’ cover infraction of not merely

property or personal rights but also of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary

damages. Emphasis is laid on deprivation of salary etc., which is visited upon the petitioners

due to the impugned administrative action, adversely affecting their civil rights. Submission

made is that even taking an extreme view that protection under Article 311 is not available,

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this cannot be the end of the road, inasmuch as, following Maneka Gandhi and Mohinder

Singh Gill, a reasonable opportunity of hearing is always present. On another score, by

terming the state action as arbitrary which strikes at the equality clause, so guaranteed to a

person by Article 14 of the Constitution, Mr. Dutta submits that since the state action also

touches upon the matter with relation to public employment, it is violative of Article 16 too.

21. On the concepts of “motive” and “foundation” to discover the true effect of an order of

termination, although reference is made to the cases in Gujarat Steel Tubes (supra); Chandra

Prakash Shahi (supra) and in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical

Sciences and anr., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520, Mr. Dutta submits that the 7 Judges’ case in

Samsher Singh (supra) holds the field to distinguish between the motive and the foundation

of an order. Referring to paragraph 62 of Samsher Singh, where reference is made to the two

important observations in Parshotam Lal Dhingra, it is submitted that law is clear that where

a right exists under a Service Rules to terminate the service, the motive operating on the

mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant. Reason being, motive inheres in the state of

mind which is not discernible. On the other, if termination of service is founded on

misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and

violates Article 311 of the Constitution. Thus, the imperativeness and duty of the Court to find

out from the relevant file-notings as well as from other proceedings or documents connected

with the formal order of discharge what the true ground for the discharge is. It is contended

that if on scrutiny the Court finds that the order has a punitive flavour in cause or

consequence, it is dismissal, even if non-injurious terminology is used in the impugned order.

Reliance is also placed in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, reported in (1984) 2 SCC

369 for the proposition that where the form of the impugned order is merely a cloak for an

order of dismissal for misconduct, it is always open to the Court before which the order is

challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. In other

words, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving

effect to the rights conferred by law upon the aggrieved person.

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22. Lastly, Mr. Dutta submits that unproved allegations cannot be the basis for discharge

from service even if there is proved violation of Article 14 and 16 in the conduct of the

selection process in so far as the petitioners are concerned without an inquiry. The mere fact

that the petitioners are charge-sheeted in the Dibrugarh Police case, the same cannot

constitute cogent ground for discharge from service. In this, reliance is placed in the

Constitution Bench judgment in Manoj Narula v. Union of India, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 1,

particularly to paragraph 122 thereof, to say that mere allegation, be it in the form of an off-

the-cuff allegation or an allegation in the form of a first information report or a complaint or

an accusation in a final report under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code or even on

charges being framed by a competent court, the law does not hold a person guilty or deem or

brand a person as a criminal. That person may stand condemned in the public eye, but even

that would not entitle anyone to brand the said person as a criminal. The fundamental reason

being, a person is innocent until proven guilty. On a final note, Mr. Dutta reiterates and

emphasises that adjudication of the present cases would necessarily require ascertainment

from the office records if the order is founded on misconduct or otherwise. If the answer is in

the affirmative, applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution will come into play proprio

vigore and even in an extreme situation where the protection of Article 311 is not found to

be attracted, the petitioners are entitled to a reasonable opportunity of hearing, be it as a

post-decisional remedial hearing, in terms of the law laid down in Maneka Gandhi.

23. Mr. N. Dhar begins by saying that Rule 20(c) of 1998 Rules is itself stigmatic and,

therefore, the petitioners could not have been discharged without opportunity of hearing.

Relying on Chandra Prakash Shahi, it is submitted that the Court must lift the veil and on

doing so would find that the impugned orders are not discharge simpliciter. For the fact that

the petitioners were not probationers on the date of discharge, compliance of natural justice

became more imperative. It is also submitted that there are no allegations against the

petitioners in the FIR filed by Dr. Angshumita Gogoi. Mr. U.K. Nair adopts the arguments of

the preceding counsels and also submits that misconduct being the foundation of the

impugned orders of discharge, as would be apparent from paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-

opposition dated 09.05.2019 of the respondents, the legal necessity for affording opportunity

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of hearing to the petitioners could not have been dispensed with. Mr. S.S. Dey submits

on behalf of his client, who was appointed to the Assam Transport Service, that the Discharge

Order dated 21.01.2019 itself demonstrates that the action is based on the report of the

Dibrugarh Police. Referring to Rule 19 of the 2003 Rules, which provides for discharge of a

probationer, it is submitted that none of the conditions in Rule 19 are attracted to cause

discharge of the petitioner from service. Also, having regard to the date of appointment and

the provisions of Rule 21 of the 2003 Rules, the petitioner must be deemed to have been

confirmed in service, more so, when no extension order had been issued in respect of the

petitioner. Mr. R. Sarma have referred to the various date(s) on which the petitioner was

appointed, passed departmental examination and completed training, extension of the period

of probation, suspension from service and the final discharge on 07.09.2018. Primary

contention made is that the impugned order of discharge could not have come about in

violation of the principles of natural justice. By referring to the case in Kumaon Mandal Vikas

Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar Pant and Others, reported in (2001)1 SCC 182, Mr. Sarma

submits that it is a fundamental requirement of law that the doctrine of natural justice be

complied with and such compliance is an integral part of administrative jurisprudence,

although it would be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Mr.

P. Dutta as well as Mr. B. Kaushik adopts the arguments of the senior counsels and also

submits that the expression “satisfaction” appearing in Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules itself

connotes the requirement of an enquiry. Further, that the discharge orders having touched

upon and having questioned the integrity of the petitioners is itself stigmatic, thus, requiring

compliance of natural justice. Mr. A.B. Dey submits that there is no proved violation on the

part of the petitioner and the discharge order is not on established facts. It is submitted that

the petitioner, as a member of the Assam Police Service, have rendered distinguished service

and have also received commendation certificate from the Director General of Police, Assam.

Referring to Rule 16(b) of the 1966 Rules, it is submitted that the expression “is considered

otherwise unsuitable”, by necessary intendment and implication, takes within its fold the

requirement of opportunity of hearing. Placing reliance in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal

Corporation, reported in (1985)3 SCC 545, it is submitted that even if the rules are silent, the

audi alteram partem rule of natural justice must be read into. Mr. F. Khan submits that the

petitioners having completed the probationary period in service, therefore, in terms of the

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decision in Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana vs. Dwarka Das, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 789,

the power to discharge could not have been exercised. Further, since the impugned order of

discharge is actually in the realm of dismissal from service, the protection granted by Article

311(2) of the Constitution would apply, be it a temporary servant or a probationer. On the

said proposition, reliance is placed in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1964

SC 449; Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 593 and V.P.

Ahuja v. State of Punjab and Ors, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239.

24. Mr. S.K. Talukdar echoes the arguments already placed and adds that the order of

discharge is stigmatic in nature and essentially an order of dismissal/removal from service,

although it prima facie appears to be innocuous. It is clearly relatable and connected to

alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner arising out of Dibrugarh Police Case

No.939/2016. It is, therefore, submitted that the alleged misconduct having formed the

foundation, as such, the impugned action could not have been resorted to without an inquiry

as contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Further, the guilt of the

petitioners not having been established by the prosecution in any criminal court of law, the

presumption of innocence is attached to them. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by

the respondent no.3 on 02.04.2019 and the subsequent additional affidavit filed by the same

respondent on 25.07.2019, it is contended that both affidavits demonstrates different stand of

the respondent. Although much has been stated by the respondents that the order of

discharge is in conformity with law and the same is in the domain of ‘discharge simpliciter’

without any stigma attached to it and that the materials appearing from the preliminary

inquiry, including the investigation carried out by the Dibrugarh Police, forms the motive of

discharge and not the foundation thereof, it is submitted that the discretion so exercised in

invoking the relevant provisions under the rules is, however, subject to the rule of law.

Submission made is that the duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of power to decide

and determine, if the act of the State operates to the prejudice of a person. Entitlement to a

hearing need not be shown or super-added if adjudication of a matter involves civil

consequences. Further, that the concept of rule of law would lose its meaning if the State

instrumentalities are not made accountable with the duty of discharging their functions in a

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fair and just manner. After all, the requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a

requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. For the above

propositions, reliance is placed in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, reported in AIR

1967 SC 1269 and in A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1970

SC 150. On Rule 13(c) of the 2007 Rules and, particularly, to the words employed therein i.e.

“character” and “antecedents”, reference is made to the meanings thereof in Black’s Law

Dictionary (Tenth Edition). Meanings of ancillary words “antecedent character” and “bad

character” are also referred to and submission made is that the expressions itself are

insinuations of dishonesty, unreliability and unlawful or immoral behaviour. This being the

position, it is submitted that the provision in the rules is itself stigmatic, thus, calling for the

requirement of an enquiry. In other words, compliance with natural justice is implicit in Rule

13(c) and nothing more has to be super-added. Further, the satisfaction of the Government is

a condition precedent in invoking Rule 13(c) and although it may be a subjective satisfaction,

the same must be grounded on materials which are of rationally probative value. The

discretion so exercised cannot be an unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability.

On the above, reliance is placed in the Constitution Bench judgment in Barium Chemicals Ltd.

and Anr. v. Company Law Board and Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 295 and in Khudiram Das

v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1975) 2 SCC 81.

25. On the aspect of natural justice, Mr. Talukdar further submits that the requirement of

opportunity of hearing cannot be dispensed with merely in the absence of any provision in

the statute providing for such hearing. In a situation where the statute is silent, the

requirement of natural justice has to be read into it, particularly when the order assailed

involves adverse civil consequences to the party concerned. In this, reference is made to the

case in Olga Tellis as well as in Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax,

Central-I and Anr., reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151 and in Kesar Enterprises Limited v. State of

Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in (2011) 13 SCC 733.

26. It is contended by Mr. Talukdar that the stand of the respondents with regard to

allegation of colossal fraud and of the petitioners being beneficiaries of a corrupt selection

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process, the same are without any foundational facts and are mere conjectures. Allegation of

illegal gratification is vehemently denied unless adverse finding is rendered in a trial before

the competent court of law. For the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances preceding or

attendant thereto resulting in the impugned action, it is submitted that the same would

require ascertainment by the court and, if need be, to lift the veil and examine the office

records relating to the decision-making process. The case in Chandra Prakash Shahi is placed

for consideration for the above proposition. Lastly, Mr. Talukdar submits that the decision to

dispense with departmental proceedings cannot rest solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned

authority. Further, no final opinion can be formed with regard to any direct involvement of the

petitioners merely on the basis of the report of handwriting expert. On both the propositions

above, reliance is placed in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in AIR 1991

SC 185 and in Dayal Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 263.

27. Mr. Somnath Das opens his arguments stating that a mere perusal of the discharge

order would go to show that it is stigmatic and the element of stigma is so apparent that it

would not even be necessary to look at the contemporaneous records/file notings. Without

doubt, it is submitted, that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, the same would operate

as a hindrance/hurdle for future employment. In respect of Rule 19 of the 2003 Rules, it is

contended that neither of the two sub-Rules apply in the instant case and, therefore, the

same could not have been resorted to for discharging the petitioners from service. It is stated

that the petitioners had successfully undergone necessary training and there has been no

occasion where they failed to render satisfactory service during their tenure. As such, sub-

Rule (1) of Rule 19 has no application. As regards sub-Rule (2) of Rule 19, it is contended

that the expression “subsequent verification” would mean verification made after

appointment and the other expression “initially qualified” would only mean qualifications

necessary for direct recruitment, as prescribed under Rule 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said 2003

Rules, which are criterions on age, academic qualifications, health and character respectively.

Further, in the absence of any allegations against the petitioners of having furnished incorrect

information with regard to their appointment, the sub-Rule (2) also has no application.

Submission made is that in the absence of the essential ingredients and/or conditions

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precedent for invoking the power under Rule 19, the impugned orders had been passed

illegally and without due application of mind.

28. Mr. Das submits that as explained in Parshotam Lal Dhingra, one of the tests for

ascertaining the punitive element in an order of termination is as to whether the person

concerned has been visited with evil consequences. It is contended that “evil consequences”

has to be assessed in relation to the blemish on the employee’s reputation so as to render

him unfit for service elsewhere. It is submitted that the order of discharge clearly connotes

blemish, disrepute, aspersions on character and integrity and moral reproach on the part of

the petitioners. The order is clearly in a language which imputes something over and above

mere unsuitability for the job. Thus, stigma and punitive element in the impugned order

being all-pervasive, a full-fledged enquiry into the allegations, in strict compliance of natural

justice, could not have been dispensed with and, in this situation, even a post-decisional

opportunity of hearing would not subserve the rules of natural justice. On the above

propositions, reliance is placed in Chandra Prakash Shahi as well as in Kamal Kishore

Lakshman v. Management of M/s Pan American World Airways Inc. and Ors., reported in

(1987) 1 SCC 146 ; Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra) and H.L. Trehan and Ors. v. Union of

India and Ors., reported in (1989) 1 SCC 764. Further, relying in the case of D.K. Yadav v.

J.M.A. Industries Ltd., reported in (1993) 3 SCC 259, Mr. Das submits that an order involving

civil consequences must be made consistently with rules of natural justice and ‘civil

consequences’ would also cover material deprivations. Therefore, a person concerned must

be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and a fair opportunity must

be given to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. It is contended that principles

of natural justice and duty to act in just, fair and reasonable manner must be read into the

relevant rules governing the service of the person concerned.

29. Mr. Das submits that in respect of the petitioners whom he represents and are from

the Assam Civil Service, they are to be deemed as to have been confirmed in service. Reason

assigned is that Rule 25 of the 1998 Rules prescribes that after the first increment being

made admissible to a member of the service in the Junior Grade time scale on expiry of one

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year from date of joining, the further increments due would be allowed only on confirmation

in the service. The said petitioners having

received the first and second increments and going by the prescription in Rule 25 of the 1998

Rules, contention made is that they must be deemed to have been confirmed in service.

Touching upon another aspect it is submitted that having regard to the sequence of events,

commencing with the date(s) of arrest, suspension from service, payment of subsistence

allowance and finally the discharge from service, it cannot be a case that the respondents

have taken a prompt decision and that the same was a reflex action following the

investigation and report of the Dibrugarh Police.

30. The State respondents are represented by Mr. Maninder Singh, learned senior counsel,

assisted by Mr. N. Kohli, Advocate. Mr. Singh opens his arguments by saying that

notwithstanding any provision in the relevant Service Rules, the General Clauses Act, 1897

abundantly provides that if there is power to appoint, such power shall also include the power

to suspend or dismiss. Having struck this opening note, it is also argued that where a

selection process is actuated by fraud, appointments made would be void ab-initio on

satisfaction that may be derived by the authority based on cogent materials. In the case in

hand, as submitted, the appointments of the petitioners were not validly made. Their

appointments are tainted with element of fraud and, in fact, as against each of the

petitioners, criminal prosecution is on. The vital determination to be made by the Court in the

backdrop of the foundational facts involving the petitioners, according to Mr. Singh, is

whether the State action was bona fide on having discharged the petitioners from service.

Question raised is, was it not obligatory on the part of the State to take the impugned action

for maintaining sanctity and for reposing faith in the system and public offices in relation to

affairs of the State Government and whether in the attending foundational facts was there

any other option available to the State. Further, if the relief prayed for in the writ petitions

affects public interest, whether prayers so made can be entertained. On the arguments

advanced by the petitioners on the Police Report being the foundation and not the motive, it

is submitted that the same are without relevance and do not come into play in the present

cases as fraud in the process of selection of the petitioners finds demonstrated at the

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threshold itself. It is argued that the decision taken by the State respondents is entirely in

conformity with law and the action so impugned is in the realm of discharge simpliciter where

no adverse civil consequences are involved. It is not a case of discharge on alleged

misconduct after appointment and during the probationary period but on discovery of

predominant fraud at the point of entry into service. Therefore, according to Mr. Singh, no

determination of the question as to whether the impugned action involves motive or

foundation vis-à-vis the Police Report is warranted. On the arguments advanced on behalf of

the petitioners that a mere perusal of the discharge orders would show that stigma is all-

pervasive, thus bringing in the punitive element, Mr. Singh contends that such argument

would be available only in case where there has been valid appointments, which is not so in

the cases at hand. Further contention is that discharge on the basis of Police report is valid

and the same have found approval in decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. Also,

because of the foundational facts, the petitioners are clearly an identifiable and segregated

class of persons whose appointments are tainted. It is not a case of individual enmity nor any

element of bias exists that may be attributable to the action of the State respondents.

31. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition of respondent nos. 2 to 4 dated 25.07.2019,

much reliance is placed in the statements and averments made therein. Mr. Singh has taken

this Court to the categorical statements made to the effect that the cases in hand do not

pertain to allegations of misconduct against the petitioners during discharge of their duties

after having been appointed to public offices. It pertains to their indulging in colossal fraud

for securing appointments to public offices by payment of illegal gratifications. Such

appointments having been secured through a tainted/fraudulent process, the same are to be

tested by application of different parameters and yardstick. It is not a case where initial

appointments are not clouded with allegations of fraud and/or that it is only on misconduct

attributable to a period subsequent to a valid initial appointment. It is further stated that it

being a case where at the very induction to public offices it is tainted with fraud and illegality,

it would not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to contend violation of any right, much less

violation of any fundamental rights. Further, that it is too well settled in law that if fraudulent

and illegal means are predominant in any selection process and it is impossible to identify the

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participants and/or the beneficiaries to a spoils system, then in every such case the entire

selection process would require interference. However, if identification of

participants/beneficiaries is possible, then it would be a case where no laxity is to be shown

and the matter to be suitably dealt with as being undeserving to remain in the public offices.

Mr. Singh makes a brief reiteration of the facts to say that investigation revealed that a large

number of candidates who had participated in the competitive examination held in the year

2013 and 2014 had secured appointments by payment of illegal gratification to the then

Chairman and officials of APSC, in addition to various touts and middlemen. It is only those

candidates in whose cases duplicate answer sheets, substituting the original answer sheets,

had been recovered from the Confidential Examination Branch of APSC as well as from the

house of the then Chairman, they alone have been discharged from service and added as

accused in the charge-sheet(s) filed before the competent court of law.

32. As to the role and responsibility attached to the discharge of functions by a member of

the civil service, Mr. Singh places reliance in the observations made by the Supreme Court in

Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398. It is submitted that the task

of efficiently and effectively implementing the State policies and enactments rests with the

civil services. Thus, the public is vitally interested to be ensured of the efficiency and integrity

of such services. The discharge of duties with a sense of responsibility does not depend only

upon the top echelons of the civil services but also percolates to such other members of the

civil services, including those in the most subordinate posts. The call of the hour is that it is

much in public interest and public good that government servants who are inefficient,

dishonest, corrupt or have become a security risk should not continue in service. In this, the

concerned government servant cannot be heard to complain that he is deprived of his

livelihood. Neither public interest nor public good would require that salary or subsistence

allowance be continued to be paid out of the public exchequer to the concerned government

servant.

33. Referring to the case in Krishan Yadav & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in

(1994) 4 SCC 165 and in Union of India vs. O. Chakradhar, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 146,

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where report of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had formed the basis for

cancellation of selection and such report having commended itself to acceptance by the

Supreme Court, it is the contention of Mr. Singh that the orders of discharge in the present

cases, based on the foundational facts as revealed from the Police Report, would not suffer

from any legal infirmity and, likewise, would commend itself to acceptance by this Court.

34. Much reliance is placed in the case of Joginder Pal, where observations and

conclusions made in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon’s case also received due consideration. It is

submitted that the said cases had gone into the aspect of two categories of candidates who

had been selected to executive posts by the Punjab Public Service Commission – one

category labelled as tainted candidates and the other as non-tainted candidates. In so far as

tainted candidates are concerned and who are facing criminal trial, Mr. Singh takes the cue

from Joginder Pal to say that the fate of such candidates hardly pose any challenge,

inasmuch as, as it has been specifically found that the petitioners herein have indulged in

unfair means and have been selected by paying bribe and definitely not on their merit, the

writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. Relying on Joginder Pal and Inderpreet Singh Kahlon

it is further submitted that if an appointment is made in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the

Constitution of India, the same would be void and a nullity and in view of the foundational

facts substantiating commission of illegality in the selection process, in so far as the

petitioners are concerned, the effect of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution would

not warrant consideration. On the argument that the impugned orders of discharge had been

made in terms of the rules, unlike in the case of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon, and that it was on

this account that the Supreme Court did not consider the applicability of the relevant

provisions of rules as also the effect of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, Mr.

Singh places reliance in Tulsiram Patel, particularly to paragraph 126 thereof, where it has

been laid down that if a source of power exists by reading together two provisions, whether

statutory or constitutional, and the order refers to only one of them, the validity of the order

should be upheld by construing it as an order passed under both those provisions. Thus,

omission to mention provision will not invalidate an order where the source of power exists. It

is the contention of Mr. Singh that the power to discharge the petitioners is also referable to

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the source of power emanating from Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Mr. Singh also

submits that law would not permit tainted candidates to plead reinstatement in service on

ground that they are facing criminal proceedings and may also be acquitted after

investigation or trial. This aspect of the matter, according to Mr. Singh, has been duly

answered at paragraphs 20 and 21 in Joginder Pal. Reliance is also placed in a Division Bench

judgment of this Court in Sekhar Roy v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1984) 1 GLR

500 to say that it is open to the appointing authority to terminate the service of a temporary

employee during the pendency of criminal proceedings if the appointing authority is satisfied

that such temporary employee is not suitable to hold the post. Further, there is no rule that

on initiation of a departmental or criminal proceeding the services of a temporary employee

cannot be terminated by an order of termination simpliciter.

35. Referring to Parshotam Lal Dhingra Mr. Singh contends that appointment of a

Government servant to a permanent post may be substantive or on probation or on an

officiating basis. It is submitted that only in the cases where a person has been appointed

substantively to a permanent post in Government service or to a temporary post for a fixed

term or appointed temporarily to a post which has ripened into a quasi-permanent service,

their termination without appropriate proceedings as per the relevant service rules read with

Article 311(2) of the Constitution or termination before the expiry of the fixed term of service

or deprivation of the right to the post after it has so ripened, would prima facie be a

punishment and be regarded as a dismissal or removal from service so as to attract the

application of Article 311 of the Constitution. It is thus submitted that except in the three

cases above, a Government servant has no right to his post and termination of his service

would not amount to dismissal or removal by way of punishment. Illustratively, where a

person is appointed to a permanent post in a Government service on probation, if his service

is terminated either during or at the end of the period of probation, it will not ordinarily and

by itself be a punishment. Reason being, the Government servant so appointed on probation

is without any right to continue to hold such a post anymore than a person who has been

employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to. Further, such termination would

not operate as a forfeiture of any right of the Government servant so appointed on probation

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to hold the post and it obviously cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way

of punishment so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Mr. Singh

submits that even if an extreme view is taken that the petitioners herein fall into any of the

three categories above, the protection under Article 311 will still not be available as their

discharge from service is not on grounds of misconduct or inefficiency during post-

recruitment period but predominantly due to their illegal and fraudulent induction to

Government service at the entry point. In this connection reference is also made to Samsher

Singh where the two important observations made in Parshotam Lal Dhingra with regard to

termination of service of a person appointed to a permanent post in Government service on

probation was noticed. It is submitted that whereas the motive operating on the mind of the

authority to terminate the service is wholly irrelevant as motive only inheres in the state of

mind which is not discernible but if the termination is sought to be founded on manifest

misconduct, then it would be a punishment and will go to violate Article 311 of the

Constitution. Mr. Singh reiterates that discharge of the petitioners from service is far from

being founded on misconduct and, therefore, arguments on ‘motive’ and ‘foundation’ are

wholly misplaced.

36. Touching upon the power of the State authority to discharge a probationer, Mr. Singh

submits that Samsher Singh has laid down that before a probationer is confirmed in service,

obligation is cast upon the authority to make consideration whether the work of the

probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post and even in the absence of

any rules thereof, the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy

for the job or for any other object the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must

be discharged. In this connection reference is made to the relevant provisions in the

applicable Rules relating to discharge of probationer and it is contended that power is vested

on the authority concerned to make consideration as to whether the probationer is “otherwise

unfit” for being a member of the service and, wherever the Rules is silent, the ratio laid down

in Samsher Singh, as above, would operate proprio vigore. Thus, whether the Rules provide

or not, it is obligatory on the part of the authority concerned to undertake an exercise to

satisfy itself on the suitability of the probationer to continue to hold the post.

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37. It is submitted by Mr. Singh that until the date of discharge all the petitioners were on

probation. It is stated that confirmation in the service has to be preceded by expression of

satisfaction of the appointing authority and such stipulation finds expressed in the service

rules relevant to the cases at hand. Relying on various Supreme Court decisions, it is

contended that one cannot become a permanent servant merely because of efflux of time,

unless the service rules which govern the servant specifically lays down that the probationer

will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over, which is not so in

the present cases. Further, the service rules do not contemplate automatic confirmation and

there is a condition of the probationer having completed the period of probation to the

satisfaction of the appointing authority. It is, thus, contended that satisfaction being a pre-

condition for confirmation, even if the probationer is allowed to continue beyond the initial

period of two years as mentioned in the rules, there is no question of deemed confirmation.

Further, this contention of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before making confirmation and

the authority so competent to confirm must pass an order to that effect. For the proposition

above, reliance is placed in G.S. Ramaswamy v. the Inspector General of Police, Mysore State,

Bangalore, reported in AIR 1966 SC 175; Pratap Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh,

reported in (1979) 4 SCC 263; K.A. Barot v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC

287; Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of M.P., reported in (1996) 1 SCC 560; Wasim Beg v.

State of U.P. and Ors., reported in (1998) 3 SCC 321; Registrar, High Court of Gujarat v. C.G.

Sharma, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 132 and Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School

and Anr. v. J.A.J. Vasu Sena and Anr., reported in 2019 SCC Online SC 1075.

38. In conclusion, Mr. Singh submits that reliance placed by Mr. D.K. Mishra in paragraph

37 of Palak Modi that the use of unfair means in the evaluation test/confirmation test

constitutes a misconduct and such observation would support a contention that misconduct

can also be a pre-recruitment phenomena at the stage of evaluation test, the same has been

placed out of context, inasmuch as, the said observation in Palak Modi was rendered in a very

different factual context. Reliance is also placed in Debendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal

and Ors., reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 to say that it is a settled proposition of law that

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where appointment to an office is secured by playing fraud upon the competent authority,

such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Fraud unravels everything and if by

committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be

countenanced by a Court of law as the appointment secured by fraud renders it voidable at

the option of the employer. Lastly, that exercise of power by the Court should be for the sake

of justice. It should refuse to interfere in exercise of its equity jurisdiction if the quashing of

the order results in greater harm to the society. It is the responsibility of the Court, as

custodian of the Constitution, to maintain the social balance by interfering wherever

necessary for sake of justice and also refusing to interfere where it is against the social

interest and public good. In this, reliance is placed in State of Maharashtra and Ors. v.

Prabhu, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 481.

39. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, replying to the primary submissions of Mr. Singh, submits that it is

premature on the part of the State Respondents to conclude that since initial appointment is

tainted, thus, it is void ab initio and nothing further is required. Bona fide action of the State

respondents, as emphasized by Mr. Singh, is misplaced as the same has to be tested, having

regard to the civil consequences that may visit the petitioners. Further, the stand of the State

Respondents that the impugned action was also taken for restoring public faith in high public

office, the same are merely high words. Also, the role of public servants as observed in

Tulsiram Patel cannot be applied proprio vigore in the cases at hand detrimental to the

interest of the petitioners as facts are altogether different. Mr. Choudhury also contends that

although there cannot be any dispute to the proposition that fraud vitiates everything,

however, the said proposition is wholly inapplicable as no element of fraud on the part of the

petitioners have been established. On the two cases relied upon by Mr. Singh, Mr. Choudhury

contends that both Krishna Yadav and O. Chakradhar were only based on preliminary Police

report which was of administrative nature. On Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it

is submitted that indeed the power to appoint also includes power to suspend or dismiss but

the power to dismiss cannot, ipso facto, be exercised without following procedure as

established by law. Placing reliance in the case of Manoj Narula, it is submitted that mere

Police report cannot operate as a disqualification warranting invoking of Rule 20(c) of the

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1998 Rules and/or the provisions relating to discharge of probationer under the service rules.

Mr. N. Dutta, in his reply, submits that reliance placed on Krishna Yadav and O. Chakradhar by

the State Respondents, are distinguishable as the facts in both the cases are entirely different

from the cases at hand. In the said cited cases the Supreme Court exercised powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution and irregularity was found vitiating the whole selection, unlike

the present cases where individuals have been targeted. It is submitted that although law is

clear that individual show-cause notices to selectees are not required to be served when

irregularity committed in the process of selection is all-pervasive vitiating the whole selection,

however, the said principle would not be applicable as the petitioners have been individually

targeted, thus, making it incumbent upon the State Respondents to serve individual notices

on them. Mr. Dutta reiterates his submissions on the exceptional circumstances, as observed

in Maneka Gandhi and Tulsiram Patel, where principles of natural justice can be excluded. It

is contended that the impugned action was not under any circumstance where a right to a

prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before the discharge order had been passed

would have obstructed taking of prompt action and/or the nature of the action to be taken,

together with its object, purpose and scheme of the relevant statutory provisions, warranted

its exclusion and/or invoking the principles of natural justice would have had the effect of

paralysing the administrative process or circumstance demanded the need for promptitude

and for taking of urgent action. Mr. D.K. Mishra, in his reply, submits that by dispensing with

enquiry with reference to Article 311(2), Proviso (b) or Rule 10(2) of the 1964 Rules, it

cannot be said that the discharge is termination simpliciter. It is submitted that the State

action to discharge the petitioners are more guided by unnecessary media publicity than by

reason. Placing reliance in State of Maharastra v. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, reported in

(1997) 8 SCC 386, it is submitted that a trial by press, electronic media or public agitation is

the very antithesis of law and it can well lead to miscarriage of justice. On Krishna Yadav and

O. Chakradhar, Mr. Mishra echoes the arguments of Mr. Dutta and submits that both the cases

are distinguishable and cannot be applied to the cases at hand. So is the case in Registrar,

High Court of Gujarat, cited by the State Respondents, which is factually different altogether.

It is submitted that in the said case the Supreme Court itself expressed satisfaction after

perusing the confidential reports and other relevant vigilance files etc. to conclude that the

High Court and the Full Court in the administrative side was right in taking the decision to

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terminate the services and that the respondent therein was not entitled to continue as a

Judicial Officer. In such circumstance, the Supreme Court observed that the order of

termination was termination simpliciter and not punitive in nature and, therefore, no

opportunity was required to be given to the respondent therein. In contrast, it is submitted

that discharge of the petitioners from service in the present cases are only based on doubts

on their integrity and no further. No conclusion had been reached after an exercise as done in

the cited case. It is further submitted that there is neither any admission on the part of the

petitioners nor any indisputable factual position with regard to their involvement in “colossal

fraud” for securing appointment, which two factors may abundantly suggest that only one

conclusion would be possible and the Court would not be required to issue a writ merely

because there is violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended that in the

absence of the two primary factors, the decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, reported in

(1999) 6 SCC 237, referred in Part-III Compilation of Judgments placed by the State, is

misplaced. On the necessity for compliance of the principles of natural justice, reliance is

placed in the case of Mahipal Singh Tomar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in

(2013) 16 SCC 771, wherein the law laid down in Maneka Gandhi, Mohinder Singh Gill,

Tulsiram Patel and Inderpreet Singh Kahlon had been reproduced. Referring to the stand of

the State Respondents, where reliance was placed in Parshotam Lal Dhingra to the extent

that except in the three cases illustrated in paragraph 11 thereof that a government servant

on probation is without any right to continue to hold a post anymore than a person who has

been employed on probation by a private employer, Mr. Mishra submits that the same has

been placed out of context, inasmuch as, paragraph 11 has to be read with paragraph 14

which lays down that persons who officiate in a permanent post or in a temporary post, the

constitutional protections would as much be applicable to them and any contrary view cannot

find support. It is further submitted that none of the petitioners were discharged on grounds

of unsuitability. Integrity having been questioned by invoking Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules,

the said action itself is stigmatic. Also, the impugned action is ill-conceived, inasmuch as,

foundational facts can never stand established ex parte. By passing, mention is made that

there are at least three candidates who are continuing in service despite being similarly

placed but treated differently for having turned approvers. Mr. Somnath Das, in his reply,

reiterates his submissions and rebuts the stand of the respondents that the entry of the

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petitioners was illegal and therefore natural justice is not applicable. It is submitted that, at

first, it must be established that the entry was illegal, which fact can only be ascertained after

any enquiry. It is submitted that expressions like integrity, antecedents etc. itself makes Rule

20(c) stigmatic. Further, Section 16 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable as the

relevant service rules itself provides the power to discharge probationers. Mr. Das also

contends that discharge of the petitioners is visited with evil consequences, in that, there is

not only loss of pay and allowances but also affects future career. This being apparent on the

face of it, it must be held that the petitioners have been punished and the termination of

their service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service and such termination

without opportunity of hearing must be regarded as wrongful and in violation of their

constitutional rights. For the above proposition, Mr. Das makes reference to paragraph 28 of

Parshotam Lal Dhingra.

40. All parties were heard extensively covering 18 (eighteen) dates. Hearing stood

concluded on 22.01.2020 and on the same date judgement was reserved. With leave of the

Court and on 04.02.2020 Mr. K.N. Choudhury placed for consideration a recent judgment of

the Supreme Court delivered on 28.01.2020 in Civil Appeal No. 777 of 2020 (Dr.

Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala & Ors.), which is a case pertaining to

termination of service of an Associate Professor in the Department of Hindi on grounds of

committing sexual misconduct with the girl students during the period of probation. The said

Associate Professor was terminated from service by orders of the Vice Chancellor of the

Central University of Kerala, based on the report of the Internal Complaints Committee and

the decision of the Executive Council of the University. Placing reliance in the said case Mr.

Choudhury submits that where an order of termination is ex-facie stigmatic or even if material

amounting to stigma is not contained in the order of termination of the probationer but might

be contained in any document referred to in the termination order and such reference may

inevitably affect the future prospects of the incumbent, in that case the impugned order must

be construed as ex-facie stigmatic and which cannot be issued without subjecting the

incumbent to a regular enquiry as per the service rules.

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41. In a nutshell, the contentions on behalf of the petitioners are basically that the orders

of discharge are founded on alleged misconduct which can be traced to the investigation and

report of the Dibrugarh Police. In other words, a live connection exists between the

allegations of misconduct and discharge. Besides, stigma is writ large in the orders, so much

so, that it casts aspersions on integrity and clearly demonstrates that the same had been

issued by way of punishment. The very fact that there are allegations of lacking integrity and

unfit to be retained in service in the impugned orders, this itself makes the orders stigmatic in

nature. Taking it one step further, it is also contended that the element of stigma is so

manifest in the discharge orders that it would not even be necessary to look at any

contemporaneous records or file-notings. That the orders of discharge clearly connote

blemish, disrepute, aspersions on character and integrity on the petitioners. The orders are

clearly in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job.

Thus, stigma and punitive element being all-pervasive, the audi alteram partem rule of

natural justice could not have been dispensed with. Illegality abounds that whereas discharge

is founded on the allegations in the police report, such allegations are yet to find established

in accordance with law. Contention is that the discharge orders are not on established facts.

There are neither any separate FIRs lodged against the petitioners nor there are irrefutable

proof with regard to payment of bribe, not to speak of the fact that even if any admission of

involvement had been made by the petitioners before the police, the same could not have

been acted upon, being hit by section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Further, no

exercise had been carried out by the respondents to satisfy itself as to the existence of

reasonable and probable information, which is a condition precedent to invoke the rule

relating to discharge of probationer. Contention is also made that as in a quasi-judicial

enquiry, the rules of natural justice equally apply in an administrative enquiry which involves

civil consequences and civil consequences would also cover material deprivations. As regards

natural justice, it is contended that even if an extreme view is taken, in the facts of the case,

that protection under Article 311 is not available, a reasonable opportunity of hearing would

always subsist following Maneka Gandhi and Mohinder Singh Gill. Even if rules are silent, the

requirement of audi alteram partem rule of natural justice must be read into it. The

entitlement of hearing need not be shown or supper-added if the adjudication of the matter

involves civil consequences. The thrust of the attack being that the impugned action is

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founded on misconduct, which the respondents deny, it would therefore be imperative for the

Court to lift the veil and look into the relevant file-notings and other proceedings or

documents connected with the formal orders of discharge to discover the true ground leading

to the discharge orders and whether there is punitive flavour in cause or consequence.

Further contention is that law does not hold a person guilty or brand him as a criminal on

mere allegations or even on charges framed by a competent Court of law. Guilt has to be

established and until then the presumption of innocence is attached to the person. The

position would not change even if the person stands condemned in the public eye. This is in

the context that unproved allegations cannot form the basis for discharge without holding an

inquiry even if there is proved violation of Article 14 and 16 in the conduct of the selection

process. Further, the discretion to draw satisfaction in the act of discharging a probationer,

the same cannot be an unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability. There is utter

lack of application of mind, in that, provisions of the service rules pressed into action are

wholly inapplicable and could never have been resorted to for the mere fact that there has

been no occasion where the petitioners failed to render satisfactory service during their

tenure of service. Lastly, the decision to discharge the petitioners from service was not a

prompt decision or a reflex action immediately following the investigation and report of the

Dibrugarh Police.

42. Indeed, a rain of rulings merely adds to the volume, not to the weight of the

proposition and so this Court would desist from citing all of them except a few. The

expression “misconduct” echoes predominantly throughout in the submissions on behalf of

the petitioners. Therefore, it is most necessary to understand the concept and the legal

requirement when applied to an act involving discharge of a temporary servant or a

probationer from service. The answer is not far to seek, having regard to the law laid down in

a series of judgments, starting with the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Parshotam Lal

Dhingra, followed by the seven-Judge Bench in Samsher Singh to Gujarat Steel Tubes, Anoop

Jaiswal, Dipti Prakash Banerjee, Chandra Prakash Shahi, to cite the least, which are amply

discussed in Palak Modi. Clearly, if the termination of service results from or is founded on the

right of the employer flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the

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termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences. Article 311 of the

Constitution of India is not attracted. However, if such termination from service is sought to

be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a

punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. The circumstances

preceding or attendant on the order of termination/discharge are to be examined, the motive

behind it being immaterial and irrelevant for the reason that motive inheres in the mind which

is not discernible. Simplicity of the form of the order of discharge or of the order itself, even if

innocuously worded, will not give any sanctity if the circumstances of the case establishes

that the order is founded on misconduct involving stigma and that it had been effected in

infraction of the principles of natural justice or that of the provision of Article 311. Thus,

where the form of the order is just a facade for an order of dismissal for misconduct, justice

would require the Court, before which the order is put to challenge, to go behind the form to

ascertain the true character of the order.

43. Applying the above principles to the present cases to ascertain the circumstances and

the foundational facts leading to the discharge of the petitioners from service during the

probation period, the original office files containing the notes on arrest and suspension of the

petitioners as well as the notes on the decision-making process involving consultations with

and approval accorded by high governmental authorities, are perused. The office files called

for by this Court covers each of the 52 (fifty-two) writ petitioners and, to be precise, the

following Office File No. (i) AAP 148/2017 pertains to Bhaskar Dutta Das(A-11), Bhaskar Deva

Sarma(A-12) and Amrit Jyoti Sharma(A-13); (ii) AAP 380/2017 in respect of Dipak

Khanikar(A-14), Dwithun Borgayary(A-17), Debojit Bora(A-20), Pallabi Sarma Choudhury(A-

22), Anirudhya Roy(A-24), Himangshu Choudhury(A-25), Kunal Das(A-27), Kamal Debnath(A-

30), Badrul Islam Choudhury(A-32), Geetali Doley(A-34), Rajarshi Sen Deka(A-35), Rumi

Saikia(A-36) and Nisha Moni Deka(A-37); (iii) AAP 150/2018 in respect of Moon

Mazoomder(A-47), Monika Teronpi(A-48), Srabanti Sengupta(A-49), Leena Krishna Kakati(A-

50), Barnali Das(A-51), Deepshikha Phukan(A-52), Dhrubajyoti Chakraborty(A-55), Manzuoor

Elahi Laskar(A-56), Saibur Rahman Barbhuiyan(A-57), Ganesh Chandra Das(A-58), Susovan

Das(A-59), Utpal Bhuyan(A-60) and Mustafa Ahmed Barbhuiyan(A-65); (iv) AAP 91/2018 in

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respect of Hrituraj Gogoi(A-43) and Joydev Mahanta(A-45); (v) HMA 924/2017 in respect of

Hemanta Saikia(A-15), Jayanta Kr. Nath(A-16), Sabbira Imran(A-18), Harshajyoti Bora(A-21),

Jotindra Pd. Baruah(A-26), Dilip Kumar Kalita(A-29), Kaushik Kalita(A-42), Gulshan

Daolagupu(A-61), Pallavi Sharma(A-53), Bhargav Phukan(A-62) and Kavita Das(A-66); (vi)

FTX 115/2017 in respect of Sunayana Aidew(A-33), Vikas Kr. Pincha(A-38), Manas Protim

Haloi(A-39), Barnali Devi(A-44), Rhituraj Neog(A-63) and Nipan Kr. Pathak(A-64); (vii) TMV

299/2016 in respect of Prasanjit Kr. Ghosh(A-46); (viii) TMV 298/2016 in respect of

Suranjita Hazarika(A-54), and (ix)/(x) GLR 169/2017 and GLR 169/2017/Pt-I in respect of

Raju Saha(A-19) and Jyotirmoy Adhikary(A-31). The grounds of arrest and the materials

collected against the petitioners are contained in the aforesaid office files. Broadly,

investigations revealed that the petitioners were involved in securing job by adopting unlawful

means in collusion with the arrested accused person, Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul, the then Chairman

of APSC, and other arrested members of the Assam Public Service Commission and officials

and agents connected therewith. During the course of investigations, written answer-scripts

of the APSC Combined Competitive Examination were seized from the Confidential

Examination Branch of APSC as well as from the house of Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul. The

handwriting samples of the arrested accused persons as well as that of the petitioners were

obtained and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. It revealed that the

answer-scripts were not printed in the Government Press. Also, the signatures of Invigilators

in the answer-scripts were found to be fake and mismatched with the Invigilators who were

on duty on the respective day of examination in the particular Examination Hall. These fake

answer-scripts were written again by the petitioners after completion of the examination and

the same were replaced with the original answer-sheets in connivance with Sri Rakesh Kr.

Paul and his other arrested associates.

44. Without entering into any legal argument as to its admissibility, which is for the

appropriate fora to decide, the office files also contains statements made by a section of the

petitioners before the police admitting to their complicity in the illegal activity to which they

were beneficiaries. The statements of such petitioners found in the office files are that of

Hrituraj Gogoi(A-43), Joydev Mahanta(A-45), Barnali Devi(A-44), Moon Mazoomder(A-47),

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Monika Teronpi(A-48), Srabanti Sengupta(A-49), Leena Krishna Kakati(A-50), Barnali Das(A-

51), Deepshikha Phukan(A-52), Dhrubajyoti Chakraborty(A-55), Manzuoor Elahi Laskar(A-56),

Saibur Rahman Barbhuiyan(A-57), Ganesh Chandra Das(A-58), Susovan Das(A-59), Utpal

Bhuyan(A-60), Mustafa Ahmed Barbhuiyan(A-65), Vikas Kr. Pincha(A-38), Manas Protim

Haloi(A-39), Rhituraj Neog(A-63), Nipan Kr. Pathak(A-64), Suranjita Hazarika(A-54), Raju

Saha(A-19) and Jyotirmoy Adhikary(A-31). The statements are basically with regard to their

appearance in the APSC Mains Examination and making payment of money ranging between

25 to 40 lakhs to Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul, through his agents, for getting selection by the APSC

and for securing job.

45. The office files, as indicated above, chronologically records the events taking place,

following information received from the Dibrugarh Police as regards arrest of the petitioners

in connection with Dibrugarh P.S. Case No.936/2016. From the decision calling for detailed

reports from the Dibrugarh Police for taking further action, to receiving such reports in

connection with the arrest of the petitioners, to the decisions to withdraw the services of the

petitioners pending action to be taken by the Personnel (A) Department, Government of

Assam, to obtaining the views of the Judicial Department before taking final decision and to

obtaining the approval accorded by the Chief Minister of Assam, together with the views of

the Advocate General, Assam, before the petitioners were discharged from service by orders

of the Governor of Assam, the same finds recorded in the respective office files.

46. Clearly, the allegations of irregularities on the part of the petitioners are not allegations

of any irregularities, negligence, inefficiency and misconduct taking place during discharge of

their duties post-recruitment or after having been appointed to public offices. The allegations

against the petitioners in indulging in gross irregularities and fraud, involving payment of

illegal gratifications, for securing appointments to public offices are apparently of pre-

recruitment period, that is, before they were appointed to public offices. In the understanding

of this Court the element of misconduct, which reverberates in the submissions made on

behalf of the petitioners, is attributable only in respect of a period subsequent to a valid initial

appointment. Not a single citation could be placed on behalf of the petitioners for the

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proposition that irregularities committed during the recruitment process and/or before

appointments had been made and/or before a person is born into a cadre/service, would

constitute misconduct. A vain attempt was made when reliance was placed in paragraph 37 of

Palak Modi to say that the use of unfair means in the evaluation test/confirmation test would

certainly constitute misconduct. Reliance so placed vis-à-vis the facts and circumstances in

the present cases, is altogether out of context. In Palak Modi the private respondents therein

had already been appointed as Probationary Officers way back on 05.05.2006. In due course,

the State Bank of India informed that they were due for confirmation in service and,

therefore, they are to appear in the test proposed to be conducted on 27.02.2011.The private

respondents appeared in the test held on 27.02.2011 but their names did not figure in the

result declared on 10.05.2011, primarily on the ground that the Institute of Banking

Personnel Selection, which body was entrusted with the task of preparing the examination

papers and evaluating the answer-sheets, submitted a Report to the Bank that some

candidates including the private respondents were suspected to have used unfair means.

Thus, paragraph 37 of Palak Modi, which makes mention that use of unfair means during

“evaluation test/confirmation test” would constitute misconduct, was only in respect of test

conducted for the purpose of confirmation in service. No law was laid down in Palak Modi that

misconduct can also be stretched back to a period prior to entering into service and for

illegalities and irregularities committed during the selection process. As misconduct cannot be

a pre-recruitment phenomena, the very bedrock of the submissions made on behalf of the

petitioners that the impugned action being founded on misconduct, therefore, the principles

of natural justice and/or the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution could not have been

dispensed with, in the considered opinion of this Court, does not hold any water.

47. Indeed, there can be no hiding from the fact that the arrest and the materials collected

against the petitioners following the FIR dated 27.10.2016, registered as Dibrugarh P.S. Case

No.936/2016, had set the ball rolling. The investigation reports of Dibrugarh Police were the

foundational facts, the gravity of which was considered by the Government of Assam in the

Personnel (A) Department, which eventually resulted in the impugned orders being passed,

preceded by consultations with the concerned Departments, obtaining the views of the

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Judicial Department and with approval of the highest governmental authority. The impugned

actions are only in respect of an identifiable group/section of the candidates who had

appeared in the Mains Examination. The identifiable group are only those candidates where

their duplicate answer-sheets, after substituting with their original answer-sheets, were

recovered from the Confidential Examination Branch of APSC as well as from the house of the

then Chairman Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul. This identifiable group alone were discharged from service

and against whom charge-sheets have been filed. They are the 52 (fifty two) writ petitioners

herein and another 8 (eight) candidates who are not before this Court. Allegations are with

regard to criminal conspiracies resulting in tampering with the examination process for the

benefit of the petitioners herein. Investigations have revealed that the petitioners had

indulged in unfair means for getting selected by paying bribe or on extraneous

considerations, but certainly not on account of merit. There are cogent materials on which

the respondent authority derived satisfaction that the selection process through which the

petitioners came to be selected and eventually appointed was tainted by fraud. Irregularities

in the selection and appointment of the petitioners being found at the threshold itself, can it

be said that the State action was not bona fide in discharging the petitioners from service and

was it not the solemn duty of the State to take the impugned action for maintaining sanctity

and in reposing faith in the system and public offices in relation to the affairs of the State

Government. Can it be said that it was not open to the State Government to act on the

disturbing revelations emanating from the police investigations with regard to grave

illegalities being discovered involving the petitioners during the selection process, which

illegalities occurred well before they had entered into service. To reiterate, the discharge of

the petitioners from service was not on account of any alleged misconduct after appointment

but on discovery of fraud at the point of their very entry into service. There is a clear dividing

line between a challenge made to an order of discharge on grounds of misconduct during

post-recruitment period and a challenge made to an order of discharge on grounds of

irregularities and illegalities finding place relatable to a pre-recruitment period. Whereas the

former would invariably invite compliance of audi alteram partem rule of natural justice

and/or compliance of the protection guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution, the

latter can fall within the category of exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem,

particularly, if there are reliable materials to reach a satisfaction that, in so far as the

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petitioners are concerned, the examination process and their selection was vitiated. Going

back to Parshotam Lal Dhingra and Samsher Singh, it is only when termination is seen to be

founded on manifest misconduct, it would be a punishment and will go to violate Article 311

of the Constitution in the absence of any enquiry. However, as observed above, the

arguments on misconduct being the foundation, are wholly misplaced and misconceived,

inasmuch as, discharge of the petitioners from service are not founded on the phenomena of

misconduct, as is understood in service jurisprudence.

48. The Dibrugarh Police Reports, following investigations, are part of the records and a

compilation of the same has also been furnished before this Court by Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned

Senior Counsel, during the course of hearing. It is seen that the illegalities and irregularities

discovered in the selection had been scrutinised and investigated upon in respect of each of

the writ petitioners. The detailed police investigations enabled to pick out the candidates who

had unlawfully benefited. A mere perusal of the police reports leaves no room for doubt as to

the thoroughness with which the investigation was carried out. Irregularities attributed

against each of the petitioners are minuted, reinforced by statements made before the

Investigating Officer by such petitioners, as available in the records, admitting to their

complicity. Having gone through the police reports, the prima facie view of this Court is that

the same commends itself to acceptance. The question is, could such selection in respect of

the petitioners be acted upon in the matter of public employment. Also, whether the State

respondent could have acted upon the police reports to eventually discharge the petitioners

from service. No law is cited on behalf of the petitioners to support a view that there is legal

embargo in acting upon police reports, as seen to be done in the present cases. On the

contrary, the decisions in Krishan Yadav and O. Chakradhar goes to support a contention that

police reports can be acted upon. This Court, therefore, would hold that the orders of

discharge, which are the subject-matter of challenge in the present cases, do not suffer from

any legal infirmity only on a contention that the impugned orders are based on foundational

facts emanating from the reports of the Dibrugarh Police. Orders of discharge from service

founded on police reports are one thing and orders founded on misconduct are altogether a

different aspect or proposition. What is relevant in the present cases is to ascertain whether

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the orders of discharge were founded on misconduct, as understood in service jurisprudence.

This has already been answered in the negative in the preceding paragraphs of this

judgment.

49. In Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Joginder Pal, the Supreme Court had dealt with

two categories of candidates who had been selected to executive posts through examinations

conducted by the Punjab Public Service Commission. They were categorised as tainted and

non-tainted candidates. Taking a cue from Inderpreet Singh Kahlon, this Court would hold

that if services of appointees are to be terminated after having put in few years of service,

what would be imperative are that sufficient materials have been collected on the basis of a

thorough investigation in fair and transparent manner; that the illegalities committed have

gone to the root of the matter, vitiating the selection of the appointees, and that the

appointees must be found to be part of the fraudulent purpose and/or the system itself must

be found to be corrupt. Applying the above principles, there is no denying the fact that

against each of the writ petitioner sufficient materials had been collected through a process

of thorough investigation and the materials so collected disclosed grave illegalities with

involvement of the petitioners. The gravity of the illegalities found to have been committed

was such that it had gone to the root of the matter, thereby, vitiating their selection. In

Joginder Pal, in respect of the petitioners therein who were found to be tainted candidates

and were facing criminal trial, the Supreme Court held that the fate of such candidates do not

pose much of a challenge as it was found that they had indulged in unfair means and were

selected either by paying bribe or because of other extraneous reasons, certainly not on their

merit. This is precisely the case of the writ petitioners herein, as revealed from the police

reports. Although the petitioners were discharged from service by taking recourse to the

provisions of the governing service rules relating to discharge of petitioners, what stands out

predominantly is that such discharge from service was in view of the commission of illegalities

in the selection process involving an identifiable group, which included the petitioners as well.

Therefore, the arguments made on behalf of the petitioners questioning the applicability of

the relevant provisions of the Service Rules as also the effect of the provisions of Article 311

of the Constitution, is not required to be gone into, more so, when the foundational facts as

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revealed from the police reports were duly taken into consideration. The appointments of the

petitioners having been made in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the

same would be void and rendered a nullity.

50. On the foundational facts the consequences of law impacting on the petitioners would

brook no exception. Manifestly, the petitioners cannot be regarded as innocent or too

immature to understand the consequences of their action. The materials collected through

the process of a thorough investigation revealed that the petitioners were clearly amongst the

identified, segregated beneficiaries of an illegal process. The petitioners who have been

identified as having indulged in illegal and unfair means for selection, either for making illegal

gratifications or because of extraneous reasons and not on account of merit, this Court would

take a position that the decision to discharge them from service is perfectly justified. This

Court would also not accept any contention that as there may be a possibility of acquittal in

the criminal case, therefore, the decision to discharge them from service at this stage was not

warranted. Relying on the observation made in Joginder Pal, the petitioners cannot be heard

to say that they should be reinstated in service and allowed to continue until decision is

rendered by the competent criminal court.

51. The increasing importance of natural justice in the field of administrative law was

noticed in Maneka Gandhi. Fair play in action was held to be the soul of natural justice. Truly,

if there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is

implicit in the exercise of such power. It is also held in Maneka Gandhi that the duty to act

judicially need not be super-added. It may be spelt out from the nature of power conferred,

the manner of exercising it and its impact on the person affected. Where it is found to exist,

the rules of natural justice would be attracted. Opportunity of hearing also becomes

imperative if an administrative action is seen to be attended to by civil consequences. In

Mohinder Singh Gill a civil consequence has been defined to cover infraction of not merely

property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary

damages. While relating to the exceptions to audi alteram partem rule, as noticed in Maneka

Gandhi, it was held that every legal proposition must, in the ultimate analysis, be tested on

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the touchstone of pragmatic realism. Audi alteram partem rule would stand excluded if (i)

importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process, or (ii)

there is need for promptitude, or (iii) the urgency of the situation demands. The exclusions,

as held in Maneka Gandhi, must be applied only in exceptional circumstances where

compulsive necessity so demands. In a given case, the audi alteram partem rule may also

suffer situational modifications. Essentially, the person concerned should have a reasonable

opportunity of presenting his case and such reasonable opportunity may be a full-fledged

hearing or it may be a hearing which is very brief and minimal, either prior to the decision or

even as a post-decisional remedial hearing. Importantly, the hearing must be a genuine

hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.

52. On the above, first and foremost, the circumstances resulting in the discharge of the

petitioners from service are undoubtedly exceptional. Sham examinations involving the

petitioners in the Mains examination and their selection and appointment through an illegal

process is the basis of their removal. The foundational facts, as observed in the preceding

paragraphs, in the opinion of this Court, were sufficiently compulsive to take the petitioners

out of their jobs. There was need for promptitude in taking stringent action. Urgency of the

situation also demanded weeding out those identifiable persons who had entered into service

through an irregular and illegal process. The audi alteram partem rule, tested on the

exceptional facts and circumstances of the present cases, is not applicable and the petitioners

cannot be heard to demand an opportunity of hearing or to claim a right for a post-decisional

hearing. The disturbing disclosures in the investigation reports with regard to prevalence of

unfair procedure and tampering of the examination process for the benefit of the petitioners,

brings the present cases within the category of exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem.

To reiterate, there are sufficient reliable material and foundational facts to reach a finding

that the examination process involving the petitioners in the Mains examination was vitiated.

The petitioners also cannot be heard to say that merely because they would be deprived of

salary and allowances, the impugned action have visited them with civil consequences. A

discharge from service founded on misconduct and without opportunity of hearing may inflict

a person with civil consequences. However, when it involves discharge from service, not

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founded on misconduct but on grounds of grave illegalities and irregularities, as indulged by

the petitioners at the point of their selection and prior to entry into service, there cannot be a

contention of infliction of civil consequences.

53. On the argument that even if protection under Article 311 is not applicable the audi

alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit a brief and minimal hearing following

Maneka Gandhi, this Court would observe that even if an extreme view is taken that the

petitioners could make out a case that they have suffered prejudice on being denied

opportunity of hearing, the same would have no bearing. This Court would record and the

petitioners would admit that opportunity of hearing was granted in ample measure by this

Court. During the course of hearing on day-to-day basis, covering 18 days, both sides were

heard on their contentions and arguments extensively and elaborately, both on facts as well

as on law. Having considered their contentions, this Court is of the opinion that the concerned

State respondent was justified in ordering discharge of the petitioners from service. In so far

as the case in Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala & Ors. is concerned,

which was placed for consideration by Mr. K.N. Choudhury after judgment in the present

cases was reserved, it is seen that the facts therein vis-à-vis the facts in the instant cases are

altogether different. Further, this Court has neither found any element of stigma in the

impugned orders nor has found that the impugned orders are founded on misconduct. The

said case in Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. is not applicable and/or relevant in the adjudication of

the present cases.

54. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that power to appoint also

includes the power to suspend or dismiss. The relevant provision under the respective Service

Rules also provides power to discharge a temporary or officiating member or a probationer

from service. In the impugned orders reference had been made only to that provision in the

Service Rules relating to such discharge. In this context, notice is had to paragraph 126 in

Tulsiram Patel which clearly lays down that if a source of power exists by reading together

two provisions, whether statutory or constitutional, and the order refers to only one of them,

the validity of the order should be upheld by construing it as an order passed under both

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those provisions.

55. The arguments placed on deemed confirmation in service, either on account of having

completed the initial probationary period of 2 years in some cases or due to names of some

of the petitioners appearing in the Final Gradation List or the word ‘probation’ not being

mentioned against their names in some official documents or the second increment having

been paid to some petitioners, which increment is allowed only on confirmation in service in

terms of Rule 25 of the 1998 Rules , the fact remains that there are no orders passed by the

competent authority in respect of any of the petitioners towards confirmation of their service.

It is seen that in the Service Rules relevant to the cases at hand the expression of satisfaction

of the appointing authority has to precede confirmation in service, which is singularly absent

in case of the petitioners. Law does not permit automatic confirmation in service due to efflux

of time unless the Service Rules governing the servant specifically lays down that condition.

There cannot be any question of deemed confirmation merely on the ground of continuance

of service beyond the initial 2 (two) year probationary period. The case laws cited by Mr.

Singh on behalf of the State respondents on the legal principles above commends for

acceptance by this Court. Reference is made to paragraph 11 in Chandra Prakash Shahi

wherein a legal proposition was reiterated that permanent status can be acquired only by a

specific order confirming the employee on the post held by him on probation. This Court also

finds great force in the submissions of Mr. Singh justifying the bona fide action of the State in

discharging/removing the petitioners from service.

56. For all the reasons and the findings above, the writ petitioners have failed to make out

any case warranting interference to their impugned orders of discharge from service. The

petitioners are not entitled to any equity and the foundational facts alone speaks volumes of

the irregular and unfair procedure that had been set in motion and processed to reach its

illegal goal, which process have found the petitioners to be the direct beneficiaries. Before

parting with the case, this Court would also record that judicial conscience must only support

the righteous cause. Grant of any relief to the petitioners, in the opinion of this Court, would

only act as an anathema to a righteous cause. All the 49 (forty-nine) writ petitions

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accordingly stands dismissed. Interim orders passed in the writ petitions stands recalled.

Parties are left to bear their own cost.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT - Live Law · chandra choudhury path bhetapara guwahati- 28 kamrupm ......

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