The formation of the state in Greece, 1830–1914

2 The formation of the state in Greece,18301914

Kostas P. Kostis

Introduction

Anyone interested in modern Greek history is aware of the plethora of studies onthe formation of the Greek state. However, it would be difficult to argue that thesestudies allow a clear understanding of the mechanisms and the processes of theformation of Greek state. In large part the relevant research suffers from problemsinherent to Greek historiography. Two of these are the most important. The firstis the extremely abstract nature of the discourse, which makes no effort to get intouch with the data. The second is a procrustean use of theoretical models to fitthe Greek and generally the non-Western European realities. The final result is,I think, obvious. Despite the large number of studies in political history, we actu-ally know very little about the formation of the Greek state and the phenomenonof patronage which constitutes the passe partout concept of every theoreticalundertaking, despite the criticisms it has been subjected to because of its limitedheuristic ability.1

The problems begin with the very foundation of this state. This is not so muchbecause it is difficult for us to understand the nature of the Greek revolution.Rather it is because we are unable to connect the pre-revolutionary reality withthe result of the apostasia (defection) of 1821, to use the wording of a chronog-rapher of the revolution, Ambrosios Frantzis.2 Scholars concerned with this issueare well aware of the problem. In a relatively recent study, Christos Lyrintzisposes the question in the following way:

Perhaps the most important problem in the study of the Greek political sceneas it was shaped after Independence, can be summed up in the analysis andinterpretation of the process of transition from one system in which the pres-ence of a strong Ottoman power dominated, to a system in which power wassubjected at least to some degree, to the control of different agents and inwhich representative/participatory processes were put into place that werenew to Greek society.3

Indeed, a primary question, the answer to which would solve many difficultiesfaced by students of nineteenth-century political history, concerns the process of

transition from the systems of power and political domination prevailing duringthe Ottoman period to their respective institutions in post-revolutionary Greece.Up to here, there is no point of disagreement. Nevertheless, all those who havestudied the political life of modern Greece tend essentially to overlook theOttoman reality. This attitude can be observed as early as the formative years ofthe creation of the Greek state. Explicitly or not, it aims to disconnect theOriental past of the Ottoman domination from what is considered the Westernbackground of the post-revolutionary state. In other words, Ottoman reality istotally overlooked, reduced to the mere relationship between subjects (more par-ticularly between notables and captains on the one hand and the people on theother). This is probably because these relationships may be considered directlycomparable to those of the post-revolutionary period, insofar as they concern thesame individuals.

In this way, however, the entire functioning of the relationships of power, as theywere structured within a broader political system, the Ottoman Empire, disappearfrom the analysis. In other words, the transition from one system of political dom-ination to another is not studied within the framework of the structures of powerbefore, during and after the revolution. Consequently, the phenomenon of transi-tion or continuity cannot be assessed. Instead, it is considered self-evident that thetransition takes place through the adoption of a new institutional framework by therevolution, while at a local level the structures of power remain unaltered, riddledwith patronage exchanges and the attempt to appropriate the state apparatus.

Thus the modern Western-like institutions, which are summed up in thenational state, work closely with the notables and the people whose actions arebased on the logic of patronage relationships and who represent the traditionalstructures of Greek society. This is in the sense that the latter constitute the onlyelement, which may offer coherence to the political and social structure of themodern Greek state, insofar as the powers of the market and the civil society areabsent. All of this results in an extremely common interpretative schema: that ofa traditional society eroding the institutions, which are intrusive and foreign to it,as a final product of the spurious construction called the Greek state.4

Inversely, the opposite schema, prevalent in mainly conservative politicalcircles, expresses the same point of view. The introduction of foreign institutionsinto Greece led to the disorganization of traditional society and to the distortionof Greekness, which was the only guarantee of a successful historical course forthe Greek state. Consequently, both these perspectives share a belief in the impos-sibility of the coexistence of a traditional society with the modernity of Westerninstitutions. It is here that lies, in my opinion, the second weak point to be foundin the problematic concerning the articulation of post-revolutionary political life,and which can be expressed by the lack of conceptual coherence and continuity.

The problem

This conceptual weakness is connected with the identification of the state, whichemerged from the Revolution, with the nation-state of Western Europe. The

The formation of the state in Greece, 18301914 19

reasoning hidden behind this identification is, at first glance, obvious. A nationalrevolution, as the Greek one is considered to be, regardless of its other character-istics, cannot but lead to the creation of a nation-state. This argument is supportedby the fact that the modern state acquires, and cannot do otherwise, in order to belegitimized within the Western state-system, European institutions, which areprogressively strengthened throughout the entire nineteenth century.

However, in this way one identifies the state, which was an outcome ofthe Greek revolution, with the modern, that is, the nation-state. At the basis of thisargument, which in almost all cases is implicit, is the idea that this stateis the product of a national revolution or, in accordance with the viewpoint thatthe institutions which frame it or give it substance, are of the Western variety.5

The latter poses many more substantial problems than it can solve. It also leadsto the favourite sport of political scientists and historians, particularly those ofMarxist orientation. All the interpretative efforts regarding the formation of theGreek state are reduced to measuring the deviations of state accomplishmentsfrom the ideal types that should have emerged and that naturally are representedby the Western European model. In other words, the problem of the formation ofthe Greek state is not far from being transformed into a moral issue, since somecorrupt politicians or a corrupt social mass, depending on the political views ofthe author, prevented Greece from achieving the position which it deserved ordeserves.6 In the more extreme versions of this viewpoint, such as that of IonDragoumis, the nation and the state find themselves in a continuous struggle, inwhich the former has its own glorious destiny, free and independent of the hard-ships which the Greek state and, in an indirectly clear way, the Greek politicianscontinually heap on it.7

I previously characterized this problem as conceptual. The haste with whicheveryone rushes to characterize the Greek state as national creates some questionsand contradictions. The international literature sees the modern state as thenation-state, the state that, at least symbolically, is born in the French Revolutionand the great Reform Act of 1832 in England. Its being was not determined bythe predicate national which is attributed to it, but by certain mechanisms for themanagement of power which lead to its uniqueness and, therefore, differentiate itfrom alternative state mechanisms. For M. Mann, for example, infrastructuralpower, that is the ability of the state to infiltrate civil society and to activate polit-ical decisions throughout the entire state, constitutes state power itself, primarilyin present-day capitalist democracies.8

A. Giddens defines the nation-state as a bordered power-container and consid-ers the processes of civil transformation and internal peace making as, amongother things, the preconditions for its existence.9 The same holds for the views putforward by G. Poggi, according to which the modern state expresses the institu-tionalization of political power, shifting the problem in this way from the study ofinstitutions to the processes through which political power is institutionalized.10

Thus, attention strays from the institutional level,11 and leads to the scale of thestructure of power and how it is exercised. This, in my opinion, constitutes a veryrealistic approach to the study of the state, which is not simply an institution or

20 Citizenship and the nation-state in Greece and Turkey

even a set of institutions, but a way of organizing and exercising power. In reality,this final view is treated from a realistic perspective, as an entity in existence, asan organization that controls or attempts to control territory and populations. Thisrealistic position offers a much greater heuristic freedom from the abstract mod-els usually proposed and it creates the preconditions for a more productive analysisof the institutions.

I contest the possibility of speaking of a nation-state, that is a modern stateafter the revolution. The fact that the latter constitutes a kind of rupture with theOttoman reality does not allow us to assume a complete break with the powerstructures of Ottoman Greece. All the characteristics of power exercised, at leastin King Ottos Greece, point to the logic of the traditional or pre-modern state. Weshould not forget that, in this type of state, the government focuses mainly uponthe management of conflicts within the framework of the ruling class. This wasusually carried out in the most important urban centres and not so much througha systematic management of the whole territory which the state claims as its own,as in the case of modern states.12

A pre-modern state

Therefore, I think that, at least until late in the nineteenth century, it would beincorrect to speak of a nation-state. Power constitutes a personal right and is exer-cised not by individuals, but by groups, the control of which constitutes a basicpriority at the expense of territorial control. The way in which King Otto exer-cised power gives credence to such a view. This is also so in the case in whichpower, and more specifically state power, was handled by the local elite in therevolution of 1843. King Otto not only believed that every source of power andlegitimacy emanated from himself as the divinely ordained sovereign: he imple-mented this belief, in managing power through the regulation and the control ofthe contradictory interests of the political parties and the factions, asJ. A. Petropulos has demonstrated so well.13 There is nothing to indicate that theregime of King Otto pursued the development of mechanisms, using infrastruc-tural power means that would extend the sphere in which the state exercisedpower to ever widening groups of the population, or that it would mobilizea growing volume of economic resources.

Is there a clearer demonstration, regarding the way in which power was exercisedby King Ottos regime, than that of its utter indifference toward constructing a rudi-mentary communication network? This alone would have allowed the state directpenetration into the area it wished to control and would have multiplied theresources available for economic utilization.14 If eighteenth-century France createda road network allowing the sovereigns direct control of citizens, in the Greece of1864 one could see that there are areas which state-power never touched.15 It isthus at this point that we can observe not the non-existence, but the lack of interestin the fulfilment of one of the most fundamental goals of a modern state.

The Greek state, like the Ottoman state, took a coherent position on the issue ofborders. As I. Koliopoulos notes so penetratingly, the border zone of Greece and


of the Ottoman Empire had the character of a military frontier, a quasi-undefinedand uncontrolled area where military/bandit troupes moved, came into conflict andtook shape.16 This was a practice diametrically opposite to that of the modern statefor the control of populations, which requires strict control of the border anda zealous monitoring of the movement of populations to and from its territory.

At the same time, the institutional framework constituted the only alternativeway, related to the Ottoman model, of legitimizing the states existence at theinternational level and also of transforming the political discourse into a nationalone. Of course this holds, if we accept the identification of the institutional withthe legal framework and do not seek the genuine functioning of every institutionas formed through the action of the political agents. This is because, for instance,it is feasible to see the functioning of the Parliament, which was created with therevolution of 1843, as an aberration from the ideal prototype of parliamentarism.It is, however, difficult to understand the real significance of the Parliament inGreek political life, if we do not take into consideration the result of the struggleof the local elite for participation in state power, and that it functioned as an oli-garchic structure of their political domination.17 At any rate, the entire system ofliberal institutions imported after the Greek War of Independence acquire acompletely different content, if we take into account the fact that they play noarbitrating or intermediary role whatsoever as officially they should have,18

and that, to a great degree, they do not differ from the assemblies of the nota-bles of the Ottoman period, except by name. Insofar as individuals, anony-mous and equal before the law, are non-existent and the representation of localinterests occurs through family and peripheral clientelism, it would be absurd todiscuss parliamentarism and liberal institutions.

Moreover, the logic of corruption, which coexists with the possession of statepower, also constitutes an element of the traditional state and represents the rightto office according to Weberian terminology. The words of Makriyannis in theNational Assembly of 1844: They (that is the eterochthones19) stayed so long andate bread and turned our fatherland upside down. Let them go away now and wewould eat the bread,20 represent nothing more than a claim to the right to man-age the public funds, a right acquired through participation in the administrationof power. This, however, is a point of view that can only, to a very small degree,be considered as expressing the modern management of state power. In fact, it isthe same redistributive logic that ruled the Ottoman administration. In this regardI believe that the use of the specific term (redistributive) by K. Tsoukalas21 inorder to define the nature of the Greek state during the nineteenth century is verysuccessful. This is something which underlines the continuities between theOttoman and the post-revolutionary period.22

The same phenomenon moreover, is revealed, perhaps in a less impressivemanner, but with greater significance for the nature of the state and of publicadministration, in another field. Despite the prohibition of tax farming and theperforming of auctions on the part of civil servants and local authorities overa 50-year period (from 1833), their participation in these activities constitutedtheir ex officio privilege, which was never contested in practice.23 Its acceptance,


explicit or otherwise, by the majority of the personnel of the Greek state, politicaland not, implies a political consciousness far removed from the conception of thecitizen of Western Europe and a practice which has nothing to do with the modernstate.

Having clarified these basic principles of the approach, I think that it is feasibleto go on to a more specific analysis of the problem of the formation of the Greekstate. I believe that a basic axis of this study should not be the model of the mod-ern state. This should be used only to achieve a record of periodization.24 In otherwords, we should not apply ourselves to investigating the deviations of theachievements of the modern state from the ideal types suggested by the nation-state. This, as I have already mentioned, would lead us to completely misleadinginterpretations and fruitless analyses. On the contrary, our primary target will bethe quest for and the recording of the goals of the Greek state. From this pointonwards, we can assess its effectiveness in achieving these goals. In this way,I think that, to some degree, we are being fair to the Greek state. This is becausewe will not insist that the regimes of King Otto or of Kapodistrias adjust to ourdemands and desires. Instead, we will search for their goals and judge themaccording to their ability to achieve those goals. I must add here that obviouslythis approach to the state may proceed providing only that states are seen asorganisms, which exert control over people and territory.25 That is to say, this isonly so in a realistic perspective and that the risk of moving on to a hypostasiza-tion of the state is always present. Regardless of this danger, however, an investi-gation of the aims of the state, in addition to its effectiveness, may disengage usfrom the addiction to Western reality, which is indirectly accepted to exist in theGreek state.

I refer to an example, which is typical of this kind of approach. The choice ofthe regency to make King Otto leader of the Church26 has been considered bysome intellectuals as a distorting influence of Protestant origin upon theOrthodox and consequently upon the traditions befitting a Greek, and by othersas an achievement of modernist forces. Actually, this problem has two dimen-sions: on the one hand, the creation of an independent church; on the other, thesuffocating control of the state over the church, at least until 1850.

With regard to the first point, it would be difficult to imagine a newly born stateabandoning one of the most fundamental mechanisms of control of its population,that is the patriarchate, to its opponent, the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, it isnot accidental that, even from the time of the revolution, the autocephalouschurch was seen as a given and that only later would it be used as a point of con-flict with King Ottos regime and as a rallying point for the followers of theRussian party.

The issue of the relations between the state and the church is not nearly sostraightforward. As I have already mentioned, the complete subordination of thechurch to state power was considered a victory of modernism by some, and byothers as a sort of alienation which Westernism brought forth. In both cases, theunderlying perception is that of conflict between good and evil, which does nothelp much in understanding either the problem or the solution, and carries the


analysis back to a normative framework from which it gains nothing. Furthermore,it oversimplifies a problem to which, even if we limit ourselves to the Europeanexperience of the first half of the nineteenth century, a variety of solutions weregiven, depending upon the national reality which it had to confront.

In the Greek case, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the range of choicefor state power was extremely limited. This is because the formation of a central-ized state with the church, an all-powerful pole for the accumulation of political,economic and ideological power, remaining independent and indeed on friendlyterms toward one of the three political parties of the period, was inconceivable.Therefore, attempts to interpret the position of the state toward the church basedupon the schemas upheld by the agents of modernism or Westernization on the onehand, and tradition on the other, can offer nothing beyond legitimizing an apolo-getic political discourse. And this discourse refuses the state its right to act as anorganism interested in its strength and its reproduction.

The solution, provided for the issue of the relations of the church and the statewas one which allowed the Greek state to incorporate the networks of powerwhich passed through the church into its own mechanisms. The policy regardingmonasteries and their holdings, as well as the tight control exercised upon theorgans of decision-making of the Greek Church, are absolutely interpretable andunderstandable, if we take into account that all these factors worked to the advan-tage of some party mechanisms which were antagonistic to Bavarian domination.They also strengthened local powers which were not on friendly terms with itsregime, and which developed parallel to the state systems of communication.27

Kapodistriass indifference to the imposition of similar controls on the churchsubstantiates this point of view, exactly because he was in a position to control thechurch, because of his close ties with the Russian party.28 It is further supportedmainly by the increasing indifference of the state in the following years towardimposing analogous regulations on the churches of the regions which it graduallyannexed. The most characteristic examples are the churches of Crete and theDodekanisos which today remain independent of the Greek Church. Finally, thegradual loosening of the control of the state over the church also substantiates thisview. A classic example of this is provided by the laws and A of 1852 whenthe church took the form of a public corporation and administered its affairs tosome degree relatively independently of the state.29

The question of national lands and the overall trends in agricultural reforms isa similar issue. Many historians claim that the premature distribution of land sup-ported agricultural reforms of a bourgeois nature. However, they overlook thephysiognomy of the agricultural population itself and assume choices on its part,which could be supported within the logic of the market. Yet a point that is moreimportant for our discussion was the intention of the Greek state to surrender,with uncertain consequences, the most important weapon of the peasant popula-tions incorporation into its logic and practices. What is also overlooked is that thevillagers and the notables were squatters or had trespassed upon a very large partof the national lands, while the plans for distribution instituted from time to timewere resounding failures.30


The policy followed by the Greek state, one of non-recognition of land ownershipunless titles could be verified, remained a very powerful weapon for the controlof the legality of each claim and finally of the whole population. On the otherhand, it did not prevent squatting or trespassing. Of course, the cost was theunderdevelopment of the land market, although this did not appear to concern thestate. With its policy in the area of national lands, the Greek state finally suc-ceeded in being formed in such way as to inhibit separatist movements and tointegrate peasant populations without much reaction.

These examples demonstrate just how rational the policies of the Greek statecan be, if we consider them from a different angle.31 The impressive cohesion andrapid formation of the modern Greek state may have had as a cost fiscal weak-ness and a stunted economy. However, they had the benefit, incomparably moreimportant in the eyes of the state administrators and in the logic of the formationof the state, of the creation of a state apparatus which with very limited meanssucceeded in absorbing local political elites and peasant populations,eterochthones and aftochthones (foreigners and natives) and in promoting itselfas the only factor of legitimacy of political life. That is, they succeeded in theinstitutionalization of state power, to borrow the phrase of G. Poggi.

The winds of change

Intuitively I would maintain that, until 187080, we have the phase of thestrengthening of central power, a period which in many ways can be seen as tran-sitional from the Ottoman reality to the formation of a national state. From thenonwards, a series of indicators may convince us, although admittedly based on aquick reading of the empirical material, that we are passing to another phase inthe history of the Greek state. I briefly mention the elements that underscore thesechanges.

With the overthrow of King Otto a wave of introspection appears among theGreek politicians. The failures of the Crimean War and later of the Cretan upris-ing demonstrate the striking weaknesses of the Greek state within a changingenvironment and lead the new generation of politicians, who made their firstappearance in those years, to seek new solutions to the economic problems of thestate. The entire decade of the 1870s is replete with parliamentary discussions onthe economic and administrative reforms required. From such a perspective onecan also see the distribution of national lands of 1871, which on the other handunderlines the weakening of the significance of state ownership of land. The stateappears to feel more self-confident, at least domestically, because externally thesituation is reversed with regard to the preceding period, as I demonstrate below.

Furthermore, during the 1870s, the Greek state begins its agonizing attempts toattain a compromise with its creditors. The achievement of this compromise willallow Greece to appeal once again to foreign capital markets to obtain loans.These will serve in its first attempt to construct a rudimentary road and railnetwork. Along with its economic dimensions, this undertaking signals the firstreal declaration of the Greek states intention to penetrate its territory. Until then,


control mechanisms had been indirect, the interests assimilated or neutralizedthrough negotiation. In direct relation to these changes, the military organizationof the Greek state begins to undergo significant changes. Already by 1876, thegovernment of A. Koumoundouros has attempted a new organization of the army,in order to respond to military enterprises of a major scale.32 The changes madeby Trikoupis in the army, beginning in the 1880s,33 are directed toward the cre-ation of the framework for long-term change in the military organization of thecountry aimed at fighting an external enemy and not of confronting domesticopponents. However, it was only the law P, put forward by the Theotokisgovernment (190608) that led to the complete separation of public security fromthe duties of the army. The latter is clearly forbidden to become involved in servicesoutside its mandate.34 From the same perspective, the suppression of banditry inessence the Dilesis massacre in the 1870s which constitutes the final major incidentof banditry underscores a new attitude of the state not to give in to violence.

During the same decade, the first constituents of the countrys democraticgovernment are articulated and materialize through the implementation of theparliamentary majority and with the reduction of the influence of the local elitesaround 1885. In the period 187585, these changes are expressed, on the onehand, according to K. Gardika-Alexandropoulou,35 through the shaping of a self-regulating political system, relatively free of institutionalized inequalities ofpower. On the other hand, for C. Lyrintzis they are expressed in the reduction,throughout the 1860s, of governmentaladministrative interventions in the elec-toral process and in the coming to the fore of electoral competition as the fieldpar excellence where the division of political power is judged.36 In direct relationwith the limitation of the influence of local elites is the taxation of yoked animalsthrough which the competition between the local elite and the central powerreaches its formal end. On the one hand, taxation ceases to constitute a privilegedmechanism of surplus distribution to the advantage of the social group of taxfarmers. On the other hand, the political significance of the latter is reduced tonothing.37

Last but not least, in 1852 we observe the final and probably the most impressivepeasant uprising. With the suppression of Papulakoss movement, the countryenters a phase of absolute peace with regard to peasant uprisings.38 Thus, thepeasant population appears to have been integrated into the state mechanisms andthe slogans which up to that point could incite them for example, that the sov-ereign was of a different creed apparently cease to stir them.39 We will have towait until the final years of the nineteenth century and the uprisings connectedwith the raisin issue in order to find new social movements against the statepower. However, they now take a different form and are of a different nature. Itmay not be at all coincidental that the year of the Papulakos movement is the yearduring which the law concerning the emancipation of the church is implemented.

What could these changes mean? They were cumulative. There is no doubtabout it. They are concentrated into a time period of 30 years or perhaps even less.These are years in which the examples could of course have been multiplied.40

The success of a bourgeois class, which attempts to modernize the state, would


constitute an easy and rough solution to this problem, in the same way in whichthe pale industrial movement which appears in the years 187080 has led some tospeak about the appearance of capitalism in Greece. I think that nothing of thekind holds, except of course if, beginning from the period of bourgeois transfor-mation and looking backwards, we see things from the perspective of how theyturned out. The entire period, which is being examined here, should be seen fromits own perspective. A state apparatus asserts itself over populations, an apparatuswhich attempts to strengthen and reproduce itself broadly. The gradual achieve-ment of some of its goals gives it the possibility of passing on to new targets.

Therefore, if at least for the period of King Otto (186090), it is clearly impos-sible to speak of a modern state; for the period following his fall, a categoricalrejection of the attempt which was made for some kind of modernization of theGreek state would be superficial. Perhaps the most important questions thatshould be answered here are: What kind of modernization? Where does it find itsmotives? From where does it get its incentive?

External dependence and modernization

Up to this point, the formation of the modern Greek state has been confronted asa process with an exclusively internal dynamic. Restricting ourselves to observ-ing the societies of the Greek peninsula alone would, however, pose severe limitsto an understanding of the phenomenon. We must not forget that the Greek stateis a product of international conditions, that its sovereignty for a long historicalperiod had been curtailed, and finally that, on the geo-political scale, the protec-tive powers constitute a far from negligible factor, in the sense that they deter-mined positions and choices, internal dynamics and political conflicts. Finally, itshould not be overlooked that, throughout the entire period under investigationhere, the Greek state is in continuous competition with other states, a relationshipwhich cannot but influence its own make-up.

The overlooking of the consequences of the Greek states entrance into theinterstate system upon its formation results from the response of historical andpolitical scientists in the 1970s and 1980s to simplistic Marxist theories whichattribute every problem of the Greek state to its dependence on foreign powersand their domestic agents. On the other hand, the internally oriented approach tothe shaping of the Greek state which led to that response, leaves a series of unan-swered questions behind it which in turn lead to the discovery of bourgeoisclasses about whom it is not worth speaking.

The Greek state was created within the framework of the European Concert: itsexistence, in addition to its position in the geo-political system of the period, can-not be viewed outside of it. It was one of the states which was founded to play amediating role in the functioning of the nineteenth-century international interstatesystem. Another example was Switzerland. From this point of view41 these fac-tors also made up one of its new characteristics.42 Its behaviour in some sectors,primarily in foreign policy and on the issue of military organization, which in myopinion are fundamental factors in an understanding of the course of state


formation, can be interpreted much more easily, if one takes into account thisdimension of its existence.

Between the Paris conference of 1815 and the Crimean War, the system workedto some degree effectively, based upon a stable balance of power, which the greatpowers could and did develop in the context of the European Concert.43 The smallstates like Greece made up a field of confrontation of the contradictions of thegreat powers, and this phenomenon is expressed both in the internal life of thekingdom with the existence of three foreign political parties and in the foreignpolicy of the kingdom. The latter is continually oriented neither toward directintervention in the diplomatic field, nor toward direct military confrontationwith the opponent. It simply expects to obtain benefits only on the diplomatic frontthrough inciting/warning of a problem,44 in the same way in which the creationof the kingdom was the result of the policy of the balance of power between thegreat European nations.

The fact that the foreign policy of the Ottonian period displays so manyfluctuations in its preferences for foreign powers cannot be attributed to anyindependent policy which King Otto attempted to follow. Rather it can be foundin the articulation of international relations which compel the Greek sovereign tosearch for rifts in the relations between the great powers in order to reap benefits.This appears even more clearly from the position that the state took in the area ofmilitary organization. War in the period of King Otto is nothing more than a mis-sion of bandit groups in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The goal is not togain territory, something which was impossible given the military strength of theOttoman empire, but to exert pressure and to declare its presence at the confer-ences of the great powers. Perhaps it is characteristic of this fact that, during theOttonian period, there was not a single attempt to organize an army which wouldbe in a position to fight Turkey, nor any complaint that no such attempt was tak-ing place. This was at a time when the Ottomans were totally reorganizing theirmilitary system. However, the diplomatic representation of the Greek state is slack,in fact often non-existent, since the presence of Greek diplomats in foreign courtswould have little to offer in a period of the smooth functioning of the EuropeanConcert. The presence of foreign embassies in the Greek court was sufficient.

With the Crimean War a significant change took place in the international balanceof power. In contrast to the widespread belief which was common until that timethat the future of the small nations was in the hands of the great powers, a feelingdeveloped that they now held their fate in their own hands. Thus, the techniquesinvolved in the change of the balance of power after 1854 result from an extremelywell developed and refined system of alliances.45 These changes will also start tobe reflected from a certain point onward in the foreign policy of the Greek state andin its very formation. The failures which Greek foreign policy registered during theCrimean War in 1850 and the Cretan revolution of the 1860s demonstrate its limits,but also those of the military organization of the state itself. From then on, a slowbut gradual turn toward creating ties with the British sphere of influence begins andcan also be seen in the search for Balkan allies, while at the same time the state itselfgradually becomes conscious of its need for a new organizational goal.46


The Balkan issue will play a catalytic role in state organization. A simple studyof the budgets of the Greek state suffices to demonstrate the importance of warexpenditures in the decade of the 1870s and after, and consequently that of theexpansion of the state apparatus, and to underline the contrast with the Ottonianperiod.47 If O. Hintze, possibly influenced by his origins, considered militaryorganization as the basic variable in state formation, C. Trikoupis vindicated himto some degree when, in 1890, he announced in Parliament that the sound partsof the budget depend to a large degree upon the army and the navy expenditures.48

The fact that until 1860 the budgets are put forward as measured and balanced,while after this period they employ the logic of large deficits and of rapid expan-sion is probably not a chance occurrence.49 Furthermore, the good housekeepingattributed to the Ottonian period was not simply an idiosyncrasy of the king, buta product of a different perception of the state concerning geo-political relationsand state administration. The size of the budgets of the Greek state displays suchintense variations from period to period that there is no significant scope fordoubt on this point.

Thus the Greek state orients itself more and more toward the formation of thosemechanisms (military and diplomatic) which would allow it to participate on anequal basis in the Balkan competition. During the 1870s the decisiveness withwhich a solution is found for the debts of the War of Independence which hadremained unsettled for five decades, underlines the immediate need for the read-justment of the state apparatus to the changing elements in the environment of thestate. It was only through external borrowing that the Balkan states hoped that theycould find themselves in the position to demand their share of the empires legacy.

If, however, the direct changes brought about by the new international condi-tions were nothing but increased foreign and domestic borrowing, indirectly theconsequences were more serious. Initially the need for participation in the inter-state system meant reorganizing the army and the diplomatic corps. With regardto the former, one could stop at the consequences which something of this sortcould have for the society itself. For example, the introduction of conscriptionwas an initiative that would not leave the Greek countryside indifferent, sinceit would deprive it of labour. However, the more general reorganization of thearmy, which would allow it to participate in military confrontation, also meantreorganization of the state apparatus in order to respond to the needs of conscrip-tion, organization and support of a significant number of men and the handlingof the new war technologies. However, as C. Trikoupis often stressed, the intro-duction of conscription surpassed the capabilities of the Greek state, and that wasthe reason why its implementation was curtailed and ineffective.50

The adaptability of the state apparatus to new demands appeared limited andthis observation holds for all the Balkan states. The absolute incapacity of thestate to raise capital in a way that would serve its interests, but even more to uti-lize it rationally, was a product of this weak organizational adaptability.Modernization, of course, constitutes a framework, but also a reality which doesnot suit the Balkan case. In fact, we can observe the transmission of incentivesfrom the international environment to which the states attempted to adapt. Thus,


with the exception of Romania, all the rest of the Balkan countries sooner or laterproved themselves incapable of reorganizing in accordance with the demands ofthe international economy and politics. In the end they had to submit to interna-tional economic control. Only through such control could the institutional frame-work for raising and yielding return on borrowed capital be organized and arudimentary framework for the rational management of public funds be puttogether. To put it briefly, the dynamic of change in the state apparatus does notseem to constitute an element inherent in the states nature. It emerges from exter-nal incentives and adapts to them. Thus the dynamics of the transformationobserved after 1870 are a product of changes in the interstate system after theCrimean War that push the political elites toward the reorganization of the mili-tary and diplomatic apparatus of the state, in order not to lose contact with thedynamics of Balkan antagonism. The formation of the nation-state in Greece is aphenomenon which cannot be understood only through the process of internalaccumulation, but is primarily the outcome of the countrys participation in theinterstate system, as it is shaped after the Crimean War.

Notes

1 Lyrintzis, C., d a e Ef 19 b[The Political and Patronage System in Nineteenth-century Greece], EdKc [Hellenike Koinonia], 1 (1987), 15782.

2 Frantzis, A., Ed kc c Ef [Synopsis of theHistory of Renaissance Greece], 3 vols (Athens: 1839), vol. 1, p. : Frantzis adoptsthe distinction between revolution and defection which is also used in Thucydides.Thus, defection of those who suffer violence is juxtaposed with the revolution ofthose who do not suffer violence. Trikoupis, S., Ikc EdEf [The History of the Greek Revolution], 2nd edn, 3 vols (London:1860), vol. 1, p. 311, also adopting in his turn the Thucycidian distinction, maintainsthat the Greek war had the characteristics of revolution in the overturning of theregime and the characteristics of defection since Greece defected from the Ottomanempire which controlled it, and, for this reason, he uses both these terms without dif-ferentiation.

3 Lyrintzis, C., T C b. Kc d Ah 19b [The Last of the Great Families: Society and Politics in Achaia in theNineteenth Century] (Athens: Themelio, 1991), p. 13.

4 Diamandouros, N., H ck e Ef kc f 19 b [The Establishment of Parliamentarism inGreece and its Functioning during the Nineteenth Century], in D. Tsaousis (ed.),O Ed c 19 b [Aspects of Nineteenth-centuryGreek Society] (Athens: Estia, 1984), p. 57ff.

5 A term which is usually replaced by what is thought to be cosily identical to that ofbourgeois.

6 For a typical articulation of this view, see Mouzelis, N., The Concept ofModernisation: Its Relevance for Greece, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 14, 2,October (1996), where the fact that the state is controlled by patronage and populistparties, in addition to its grotesque size, are the elements which made it resemble amonster. This is considered the main reason for its impotent reactions to the rapidchanges in the international environment. As a result, the state is reduced to politicalparties and the political personnel.


7 Dragoumis, I., Ea a [Greek Civilization] (Athens: Philomythos,1914, last edn 1931); Veremis, T., Aa a kf C c kf.T ck kf Ka [From the Nation-state to theNation without a State: The Experiment of the Konstantinopolis Organisation], inT. Veremis (ed.), Ed a a Ef [NationalIdentity and Nationalism in Modern Greece] (Athens: Cultural Foundation of theNational Bank of Greece, 1997), pp. 2752.

8 Mann, M., The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms andResults, in M. Mann, States, War and Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

9 Giddens, A., The Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 121.10 Poggi, G., The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Cambridge: Polity Press,

1990), p. 18ff.11 However, even if we remain at the institutional level, before we discuss modern or civil

institutions in the modern Greek state, we should demonstrate that these institutionsunder discussion have a specific civil or modern physiognomy, something which I donot think is self-evident. Institutional regulations of the Antivassilia, for example, donot consist of anything more than elementary regulations for the functioning of a cen-tralized state. In fact, it is perhaps not coincidental that, among all the areas with whichthe Ottoman regime was involved, only that of civil law did not attract its interest. It isalways worthwhile to read Maourer, G. L., O Ea a [The Greek People](Athens: first German edn 1835, 1976), p. 397ff, in order to see the reasoning whichhides the measures of the Bavarian regency and which I do not think justify the char-acterization of modern or bourgeois type for those institutions which were importedinto Greece by the Bavarians.

12 Giddens, The Nation State, p. 57.13 Petropulos, J. A., Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 18331843

(Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1968).14 Synarellis, M., ka f Ef 18301880 [Roads and Ports in

Greece, 18301880] (Athens: Cultural Foundation of the Greek Bank for IndustrialDevelopment, 1989).

15 Halikiopoulos, P. I., C kc Ef [Thoughts on Greece], 2 vols (Patras:1864), vol. II, p. 44.

16 Koliopoulos, J. S., c ka Ef 19 b[Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 18211912], in T. Veremis (ed.),Ed a a Nak Ef [National Identity andNationalism in Modern Greece] (Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank ofGreece, 1997).

17 Petmezas, S., a ka d c Ef[Political Liberation Struggles and National Integration in Greece], Ik [Histor], 2,September (1990).

18 Ibid., 99.19 People who arrived in Greece after the War of Independence and took control of the

army and civil offices.20 Dimakis, I., H d d 1843 d a

ka [The 1843 Change of Regime and the Issue of Natives and Foreigners](Athens: Themelio, 1991), p. 33.

21 Tsoukalas, K., Kd f kf. H ka abk Ef [Social Development and the State: The Formation of PublicSpace in Greece] (Athens: Themelio, 1981), p. 80.

22 This continuity appears even more clearly with regard to the issue of taxation. Despitethe constitutional principles regarding taxation, which were determined by the revolu-tion and are considered the foundation of the taxation policy of the Greek state, it isdifficult to consider the very taxation logic which was adhered to as different from thatof the Ottomans. The goal of collecting revenue which would support state power and


policy is expressed through improvements in the collection of taxes and not in anincrease in the taxation capacity of the population through an increase in incomes.Related to this see Mitrophanis, G., H kc ke kd

Ef (18281862) [The Taxation of Primary Production in Greece(18281862)], unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Athens, Department ofPolitical Science and Public Administration, Athens (1992). The point of view whichHalikiopoulos puts forward (C kc Ef, p. 77) that Taxation is Turkishdoes not constitute a simple figure of speech but represents reality.

23 Sideris, A. K., H kd C kd kc [TheHistorical Evolution of our Agricultural Taxation], Akc O

b Kb Eb [Archives of Economic and Social Sciences], 11 (1931),p. 370.

24 As I hope will become clear as we go on, there is a clear break in the behaviour of thestate during the nineteenth century and, contrary to the viewpoint of Tsoukalas,Kd f kf, p. 43, the articulation of a rudimentaryperiodization is possible.

25 Skocpol, T., Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,in P. Evans, K. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 9.

26 Pantazopoulos, N. I., Georg Ludwig von Maurer. H k khf ka

kd kd d

c [Georg Ludwig vonMaurer: The Full Turn of Modern Greek Legislation toward the European Model], off-print, Ed Ekc d N

b O

b EbAkc c c [Scientific Annual of the School ofLaw and Economic Sciences], vol. I (Thessaloniki: Aristotelian University, 1968),p. 217; Konidaris, I. M., H C e c Ec Ef [The Genesis of the Autocephalos Regime of the GreekChurch], in E. Chrysos (ed.), E C a C. H a e e kd d 19 b [A New Worldis Born: The Image of Greek Civilisation in Nineteenth-century German Science](Athens: Goethe Institute, 1996), pp. 20722; Metallinos, G., kf kc. T

C d kc bk e f d kc [Tradition and Alienation: Breaks in the SpiritualProgress of Modern Hellenism during the Post-Byzantine Period] (Athens: Domos, 1stedn 1986, 1994), pp. 22748; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft.

27 Frazee, C. A., Oka Ec Ed Akc 18211852 [TheOrthodox Church and Greek Independence, 18211852] (Athens: Domos, 1987),p. 162; Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, p. 194 ff.

28 During the Kapodistrian period, an ecclesiastical committee functioned which made sug-gestions to the governor, the latter holding decision-making power. As Petrou, I. S.,Ec d Ef 17501909 [Church and Politics inGreece, 17501909] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1992), pp. 1467 mentions, the policyof Kapodistrias was the model for the fundamental reshaping of the church in later years.

29 Konidaris, G. I., Ed kc Ef [The Ecclesiastical Historyof Greece], 2 vols, 2nd edn (Athens, 1970), p. 223ff.

30 Dertilis, G. B., Terre, paysans et pouvoir politique. Grce, XVIIIXXe sicle,Annales E.S.C., JanvierFevrier, 1 (1996), 878.

31 Consequently, I disagree radically with the viewpoint of Tsoukalas, Kd f- kf, p. 45, regarding the irrational functioning of the state. In the finalanalysis, rationality is determined by the aims pursued, and of course the aims of theGreek state were not to live up to the Weberian prototype of bureaucracy.

32 Aspreas, G. K., d kc Ck Ef 18211921 [A PoliticalHistory of Modern Greece, 18211921], 3 vols (Athens 192230), vol. II, p. 77.


33 Veremis, T., O a ka Ef 19 b [The RegularArmy of Nineteenth-century Greece], in D. Tsaousis (ed.), O dc 19 b [Aspects of Greek Society in the Nineteenth Century](Athens: Estia, 1984), p. 170.

34 Aspreas, d kc, vol. III, p. 84.35 Gardika-Alexandropoulou, K., Parties and Politics in Greece, 18751885: Toward

a Two Party System, doctoral dissertation, Kings College, University of London(1988), pp. 308, 382.

36 Lyrintzis, T C b, p. 139.37 Petmezas, a ka d c Ef,

37.38 Aroni-Tsichli, K., AkC Ck f Ef, 18331881

[Agricultural Uprisings in Old Greece, 18331881] (Athens: Papazissis, 1989).39 All of the peasant uprisings of the King Otto era and that of Papulakos, particularly,

relegate us ideologically to a traditional system of political relationships in whichan uprising constituted an attempt to restore order. Kotaridis, G., kdf C [Traditional Revolution and 1821] (Athens: Plethron,1993), in particular pp. 137 and 162.

40. It will suffice to stress the changes which are seen in the area of municipal adminis-tration and of public administration with the introduction of the law regarding the qual-ifications of public employees, an indication perhaps of the attempt to set up aWeberian-type bureaucracy and judiciary.

41 Schroeder, P. W., The Nineteenth-century International System: Changes in theStructure, World Politics, 1 (1986), 126.

42 The three new elements of international politics as they are shaped after 1815 are: theEuropean Concert; the cutting off of the European interstate system from the non-European world; and finally the creation of a system of intermediary states, one ofwhich was Greece.

43 Clark, I., The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 145.

44 It is in this way that we can explain the continuous shifts of King Ottos foreign policyfrom one power to another, depending on the conjuncture which defines the Europeanbalance of power.

45 Clark, The Hierarchy of States, pp. 1617, 134.46 The fragmented perception of how the Greek issue could be solved also constitutes a

source of friction between the supporters and the opponents of Trikoupis, even at theclose of the century. At least for some members of Parliament of the Deliyiannis blocGreece must capitalize on the chance conditions occurring in one area or other andsolve the upcoming issues one at time, while for Trikoupis the issue has to be con-fronted in some unified way following the systematic military preparation which willallow Greece to confront Turkey: see Trikoupis, C., Aak Bd (Athens,1891), pp. 3233.

47 Kostis, K., Politiques financires, finances publiques et contrle financier interna-tional en Grce (18811898), in G. Chastagneret (sous la direction) Crise espagnolet nouveau sicle en Mditerrane. Politiques publiques et mutations structurelles desconomies dans lEurope mditerranenne ( fin XIXedebut XXe sicle) (Casa deVelasquez: Publications de lUniversite de Provence, 2000).

48 Trikoupis, Aak Bd, p. 9.49 We must not forget that the internationalization of the European economies starts to

obtain its own dynamics only from the 1860s and onward: see Berendt, I. T. andRanki G., The European Periphery and Industrialisation, 17891914 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 101.

50 Trikoupis, Aak Bd, p. 57.


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The formation of the state in Greece, 1830–1914

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