The Floundering Expatriate

Case Study

Aaron Glassman

Introduction

The Floundering Expatriate case study is an all-to-familiar example of problems

associated with the global marketplace and when businesses and their leaders transcend

physical and cultural boundaries yet fail to adapt to cultural specifics (Javidan, Dorfman, De

Luque, & House, 2006). This analysis will begin with an introduction, a “set the stage”, of the

Floundering Expatriate case study. Once key players have been identified and the

organizational environment discussed, an analysis will be presented. This analysis will contain

discussion on culture and communication issues along with globalization. This paper will

conclude with recommendations for future research.

The Floundering Expatriate case takes place in 1995 and surrounds the events of a

globalization effort by Argos International, a holdings company based in the United States. The

CEO of this holdings company, Bill Louin, recognized a rising corporate star in Detroit and felt

this new executive, Bert Donaldson, would be the perfect person to help facilitate

communication between recently acquired divisions in Europe. Bert Donaldson’s resume was

impressive. He was a professor of American Studies in Cairo, Egypt for 5 years and while in the

United States, Bert made major improvements to the organizational structure by implementing

cross-functional teams, achieved considerable cost reductions, and much more. In addition,

Bert was charismatic, a hard worker, and very sharp, a proven leader within the U.S.

organization. Louin recognized the need for just such a can-do company man in Zurich. (Adler

et al., 1995)

At the same time, Frank Waterhouse, the CEO of Argos Diesel Europe was awaiting

Donaldson’s arrival in Europe in hopes that together, they could both climb the corporate

ladder and grow to corporate “hero” status (pp. 24). As the case study will later show, this did

not happen. In fact, just the opposite occurred. With Bert Donaldson’s arrival, the corporate

environment became tense and dysfunctional, and there was obvious friction between Bert,

the expatriate, and the local, European divisional leadership. Bert recognized the problem, but

didn’t have an immediate solution. (Adler et al., 1995)

The case-study mentions several European staff members that attempted to inform

Waterhouse about Donaldson’s cross-cultural unawareness. Ursula Lindt is Waterhouse’s

executive assistant and she attempts to inform Waterhouse of the large number of complaints

she’s received regarding Donaldson’s inability to adapt or recognize the need to adapt to local

culture. Lindt’s attempts to inform Waterhouse were met with a “frown” (pp. 25) so Lindt

changed the subject. Although direct attempts to converse with Waterhouse failed,

Waterhouse did finally recognize Donaldson’s failure to culturally adapt. Waterhouse sent a

letter back to CEO Bill Louin in the United States questioning Donaldson’s ability to successfully

adapt and manage, but Louin simply replied with “That’s rubbish Frank” (pp. 28). (Adler et al.,

1995)

Another key player is Bettina Schweri. Schweri is Ursula Lindt’s childhood friend, and is

responsible for organizing Donaldson’s programs. Schweri speaks five different languages and

is extremely familiar with local culture. But, her knowledge is not tapped by Donaldson. Even

worse, Donaldson insulted her by calling her “a secretary” (pp. 28). Throughout the entire

case-study, as was the case with Schweri, Donaldson failed to recognize the need for cultural

adaptation, training, and awareness and the importance of utilizing local resources to assist

with cultural issues. (Adler et al., 1995)

Now that the key players have been identified, let’s take a look and some of the

circumstantial interactions that occurred throughout this case-study. At this point, all

discussion will be based solely on the text without analysis. Bill Louin, the CEO of Argos

International, assigned Donaldson to Waterhouse without any formal cross-cultural training on

the assumption that his Cairo experience was “international”. In addition, when Waterhouse

questioned Donaldson’s capabilities, Louin’s reply was not that of concern but of persistence

without much analysis. (Adler et al., 1995)

Waterhouse appears to be a competent executive with a busy schedule. Waterhouse

doesn’t understand why Donaldson is not doing well and keeps referencing Donaldson’s

success in the United States as evidence he too is a competent leader. There seems to be

internal conflict because although Waterhouse recognizes Donaldson’s U.S. successes, he

continuously points out his European mistakes. Waterhouse wonders why Donaldson didn’t

arrive early for the Argos Management Meeting to “schmooze” (pp. 28). After Donaldson’s

failed keynote address, Waterhouse mumbles “I don’t have time to walk Donaldson through

remedial cultural adjustment.” (pp. 28). This statement implies there was an initial cultural

adjustment process but the text doesn’t discuss this. Waterhouse continuously laments

throughout the case-study that firing Donaldson would destroy his career, how successful

Donaldson was in the United States, but how he doesn’t know how to help him succeed in the

European environment nor does he have the time to facilitate the acclimation process. In

addition, Waterhouse knows that Louin and Argos International focus on U.S. ideals and would

not understand why Donaldson was not successful under Waterhouse, something that would

make them both look bad. (Adler et al., 1995)

Donaldson, a main character in this case-study has an impressive resume. But, from the

moment he stepped on European soil, he did no alter one single trait in an attempt to culturally

adapt to his new environment. Throughout the case-study, Donaldson seems to recognize his

inability to bring a multi-cultural environment together, but cannot seem to identify any

specific problems to resolve. Reports from Ursula Lindt show that Donaldson is contributing to

low morale, and that managers from other divisions have voiced concerns over Donaldson’s

inability to manage a cross-cultural environment. Although not a key player in this case-study,

a human resources officer also made observations similar to Lindt’s. In Donaldson’s own

words, he has tried everything and has reached a point of frustration and flippantly states,

“….they’re just doing to have to join the rest of us in the postindustrial age, learn to do things

the Argos way. I worked wonders in Detroit….” (pp. 30). (Adler et al., 1995) Unfortunately for

Donaldson, the Argos way is American and this concluding statement in the case study is the

most revealing of his interpersonal struggle.

Analysis

This analysis will begin with a general discussion on culture and cultural awareness and

then focus on several interactions within the case study that could have been handled

differently potentially altering the outcome. The analysis will conclude with several

recommendations for further study. Throughout the analysis, there will be a focus on culture

and cultural awareness as it applies to globalization.

It’s clear to this reader that CEO Bill Louin entered the global marketplace with a

domestic mindset and a misunderstanding of what it means to be “international”. This is

proven throughout the case-study by the selection of a manager (Donaldson) with extensive

successes in the United States and only superficial international experience. In this readers

opinion, Donaldson was doomed from the beginning. As soon as Donaldson arrived, he acted

American and couldn’t understand why his international colleagues responded so poorly to his

actions. Donaldson said “No matter what I do…..someone is always pissed off.” (pp. 30). This

general disconnect seems to be from a lack of cultural understanding that caused Donaldson to

be puzzled, irritated, and anxious every time he encountered unfamiliar and seemingly

irrational behaviors (Schein & NetLibrary, 2004).

Further, the case study does not mention any specific cultural training offered to

Donaldson. Waterhouse appears to have a thorough cultural understanding, but doesn’t have

the time to share his knowledge with Donaldson. One reason Donaldson may not have been

respected is because people in different countries have different criteria for assessing their

leaders (Javidan et al., 2006). What made Donaldson a successful leader in the United States is

no guarantee that he will be successful in other cultures. Even worse, what made Donaldson

successful in the United States may even be offensive to some other cultures (Javidan et al.,

2006). One strategic point could have been the formation of a cross-cultural task force. This

task force would involve managers from each culture so cross-cultural issues could be discussed

and cross-cultural friction minimized (Yukl, 2006). But, this approach required individual

culture to be valued, something the following examples discount.

Although numerous cultural missteps occurred, a few interactions will be discussed here

as examples. The first is when Ursula Lindt mentioned to Waterhouse that Donaldson must be

having problems at home because he is working so late. Although a common sign of dedication

in American organizational culture, in Switzerland, working late is a self-sacrificial behavior and

considered atypical thus the concern over Donaldson’s home life. Another cultural incident

arose when Donaldson referred to his program organizer Battina Schrewi as “a secretary”. In a

high power-distance country, power is valued (unequal distribution of), and calling a program

organizer a secretary is an insult to Lindt’s earned power and status. In addition, when Lindt

attempted to discuss other managers dissatisfaction with Waterhouse, Waterhouse frowned

and she dropped the subject. This behavior is expected in low assertiveness cultures, such as

Switzerland, but had this occurred in the United States, a high assertiveness culture, Lindt more

than likely would have continued stating “But sir, you need to hear this” and continued

discussing Donaldson’s faults. (Javidan et al., 2006)

It is clear that Donaldson did not have the respect of other managers necessary to

achieve any form of cohesion or management of this new international venture. Donaldson

failed to consider that although he may have authority, if nobody responds to his position, he

truly lacks power and cannot lead change without the consent of those who will be lead

(Shafritz & Ott, 2005). In this case-study, Donaldson is more of a facilitator vs. a pure change

agent, so some aspects of the change literature are relevant here. Although this reader

recognizes the distinction between facilitator and change agent, the case study eludes to this

internal confusion within Donaldson. A key mistake that Donaldson made was to discount the

importance of participation (Pietersen, 2002). Had Donaldson capitalized on the knowledge of

Lindt or Scherwi, many of the problems highlighted in the case study may not have occurred.

But, the grander problem may have been Louin’s mission expressed through Donaldson,

which is unclear in the case study. The case study discusses the “Argos way” and that the

corporate culture is American, and further discusses how the corporate culture is not

disconnected from the geographic (United States) culture. In addition, there seems be no

unified vision to help transcend the cultural barriers (Yukl, 2006) in an attempt to isolate

geographic culture from corporate culture. In this readers opinion, Donaldson was destined to

fail.

How could an American effectively waltz into existing organizations acquired though

buy-outs and mergers and say “Well folks, ignore your cultural upbringing, ignore your

geographic culture, ignore your previous corporate culture, and let’s begin anew as Argos

America in Europe!”? This is in essence what happened and the results were as predicted by

most of the change and culture literature. The real question is how could this incident have

been prevented?

Let us for a moment create a comprehensive error chain to help decipher what went

wrong. First, Louin choose the wrong person for the job. Instead of consulting with

Waterhouse or expatriate consulting firms, Louin choose a leader that was as “American as

Apple Pie”. It can be assumed that Louin knew this, but rationalized his decision based on

superficial, international experience. Another possible explanation is in-group favoritism,

where added value is placed on an internal candidate vs. a more qualified external candidate

(Bazerman, 2006). Either way, Donaldson was the wrong person for the job without additional,

cross-cultural training.

Once Donaldson arrived, his incompetence was obvious. Waterhouse recognized his

incompetence, but due to his own busy schedule and his own motivation of appearing capable

to Louis at Argos Headquarters, Waterhouse did not effectively address the situation. It wasn’t

until the negative feedback became overwhelming that Waterhouse intervened and sent a

letter to Louin. This letter was indirect and led to a passive response from Louin. How could

Waterhouse and Donaldson stay the course in the face of overwhelming evidence that failure

was near? It is clear that Waterhouse was unable to manage the ambivalence associated with

Donaldson’s U.S. vs. international performance and how to take decisive action (Simon, 2006).

In addition, it was clear that Donaldson took a one-size-fits-all approach and was unable to

enter a learning mode to command resources for his own cultural benefit and future success

(Schein & NetLibrary, 2004). Had any one link in this chain if errors been broken, the case study

would cease to exist.

Further Study

Although it’s unknown how many expatriates run into specific cross-cultural leadership issues

since the scope and nature of problems runs the gamut, it would be interesting to research the

acclimation times of expatriates to new cultures. Understanding acclimation times may serve

to curb “instant success” expectations placed on expatriates. For example, if it’s understood

that it takes an average of 8 months to fully acclimate to the local culture, language, economic

environment, business practices, etc., then managers can have more realistic expectations on

acclimation times and expected performance levels.

Research Question: How long, in months, would it take for an expatriate manager to leave one

geographic culture* category and acclimate** to another with no previous exposure?

*Geographic culture as defined by GLOBE categories (Anglo, Latin America, etc.)

**Acclimate would be given a definition based on levels of comfort in different scenarios.

In this readers opinion, a standardized cross-cultural curriculum should be designed and

administrated by an international accrediting body. This curriculum would be constructed using

subject matter experts from each culture and involve practice exercises, scenario-based

training, and a test instrument of some sort. After the construction of such a training program,

it would be interesting to propose this research question:

Research Question: How long, in months, would it take for an expatriate manager to leave one

geographic culture* category and acclimate** to another having only completed a certified

training curriculum with no previous exposure?

*Geographic culture as defined by GLOBE categories (Anglo, Latin America, etc.)

**Acclimate would be given a definition based on levels of comfort in different scenarios.

The answers to these questions would lead to one final research question on the benefit (if any)

of standardizing cross-cultural training for expatriate managers.

References

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Bazerman, M. H. (2006). Judgment in managerial decision making (6th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: J.

Wiley. Retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy053/2005275472.html

Javidan, , Dorfman, P., De Luque, M., & House, R. (2006). In the eye of the beholder: Cross

cultural lessons in leadership from project GLOBE. Academy of Management Perspectives,

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Pietersen, W. (2002). The mark twain dilemma: The theory and practice of change leadership.

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Schein, E. H., & NetLibrary, I. (2004). Organizational culture and leadership (3rd ed.). San

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Shafritz, J. M., & Ott, J. S. (2005). Classics of organization theory (6th ed.). Belmont, CA:

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Simon, A. (2006). Leadership and managing ambivalence. Consulting Psychology Journal:

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Yukl, G. A. (2006). Leadership in organizations (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ:

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