The Federalistby JEAN YARBROUGH

0n September 17, 1787, afterfour months of deliberationand compromise, the Federal

Convention concluded its businessin Philadelphia and forwarded acopy of the proposed Constitutionto Congress for further action. Ac-cording to the new plan of govern-ment, nine states would have toratify the Constitution before itcould go into effect. Immediatelyafter adjournment, Alexander Ham-ilton, New York delegate to theConvention and one of the Consti-tution's chief supporters, launchedan ambitious newspaper campaignto secure ratification in his homestate.

Both supporters and opponentsof the Constitution recognized thepivotal importance of New York.Not only did New York provide thecrucial link between the New En-gland states and the rest of thecountry, but it was the seat of gov-ernment under the Articles of Con-federation. A negative vote in NewYork would surely affect the out-come in other states. Yet, importantas New York was, it would not bean easy state to carry. Both RobertLansing and Robert Yates, NewYork's other two delegates at Phila-delphia, had walked out of the Con-vention in protest, while GovernorGeorge Clinton organized the oppo-sition at home. Unanimously elect-ed president of the New York Rati-fying Convention, Clinton woulduse his considerable influence in-side the Convention and "out ofdoors" in an effort to defeat theproposed Constitution.

Because time was short, Hamil-ton enlisted the aid of fellow NewYorker, John Jay, in preparing theessays. Jay, though not a delegateto the Federal Convention, was aprominent New York statesmanwho had served as Secretary forForeign Affairs under the Articlesof Confederation. After several oth-

er possibilities had fallen through,Hamilton invited James Madison tojoin them. Madison, a leading forceat the Convention, was now in NewYork as Virginia's representative tothe Confederation Congress. Be-tween October 1787 and May 1788,the three produced eighty-five es-says under the title, The Federalist.It is now generally agreed thatHamilton wrote fifty-one papers,Madison twenty-six and Jay (owingto illness) five. The remaining threepapers, tracing the history of pastconfederacies, are the joint collabo-ration of Madison and Hamilton.

Following a common eighteenth-century practice, the authors didnot reveal their identities butsigned the papers under the pseud-onyms, "Publius." Americans ofthat day recognized that the refer-ence was to Publius Valerius Pub li-cola, who, according to the accountin Plutarch's Lives, had saved theRoman Republic. The choice of"Publius" suggested that, like theirancient namesake, the authors ofThe Federalist papers would saverepublicanism in America by recon-stituting it on sounder principles.

Although The Federalist is themost important writing in Americanpolitical thought, it is, more precise-ly, an exercise in political rhetoricthan political philosophy. Unlikethe great treatises of political phi-losophy by, say, Aristotle or'Hobbes, Publius is not engaged in adisinterested pursuit of the truth.The authors of The Federalist donot explore such questions as"What are the proper ends of politi-cal life?" or "What form of govern-ment best promotes these ends?"Rather, they take as their startingpoint the principles set forth in theDeclaration of Independence(which are themselves derivedfrom Locke, the Scottish moral phi-losophers and others), that the pur-pose of government is to protect

the natural rights of man. Moreover,their work is circumscribed by theknowledge that a republican gov-ernment, organized on federal prin-ciples, is the only form of govern-ment Americans will accept. Thepurpose of The Federalist, then, isto persuade the people, by reasonwhen possible and by appeals topassion and prejudice when neces-sary, that the Constitution estab-lishes a republic, and that this re-public is "sufficiently federal" tosecure their rights.

But if The Federalist has a practi-cal political agenda, it is by nomeans simply a tract for the times.Indeed, it is doubtful that The Fed-eralist had much of an impact uponthe ratification drive in New York.As the political scientist ClintonRossiter has written: "Promises,threats, bargains and face to facedebates, not eloquent words in eventhe most widely circulated newspa-pers, won hard-euned victories forthe Constitution in the crucialstates of Massachusetts, Virginiaand New York." Ultimately TheFederalist's claim to greatness liesin its authoritative exposition of thenew Constitution and of the princi-ples underlying it.

The Federalist's View ofHuman Nature:"If Men Were Angels ..."

At the bottom of The Federalist'sdefense of the proposed Constitu-tion is a view of human naturewhich may best be described asrealistic. The authors of The Feder-alist rejected the popular Enlight-enment view that man was basical-ly good, and corrupted only fromwithout by faulty institutions suchas monarchy or mercantilism. Over-throw these institutions, it waswidely believed, and men can livetogether in harmony with little orno government. Although Publius

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The first Seal of the United States, 1782. Library of Congress.

agreed that these institutions wereflawed, the authors of The Federal-ist* held that the causes of humanquarrelling could not be blamedsimply on external conditions. Theroots of discord and faction are"sown in the nature of man" (No.10). Thus, in answer to the question,"Why has government been institut-ed at all?" Publius replied: "Be-cause the passions of man will notconform to the dictates of reasonand justice without restraint" (No.15). Since no arrangement of thesocial order could ever make mengood, government, with its ultimatethreat of coercion, would always benecessary.

Americans, blessed by Provi-

The Federalist essays will be referredto by their numbers in parentheses afterquotations.

dente with the most favorable ex-ternal conditions (No. 2), mustlearn that man is no better in theNew World than in the Old. Publiusis one of the first to deny "the mythof American exceptionalism."Americans, he warns, have no claimto "an exemption from the imper-fections, weaknesses, and evils inci-dent to society in every shape" (No.6). To believe otherwise is to in-dulge in "the deceitful dream of agolden age."

But if men are not good, neitherdoes Publius regard them as simplyevil. In one of the longest state-ments on human nature in The Fed-eralist, Publius suggests that humannature partakes of both the admira-ble and the base and that repub-lican govenunent would be inde-fensible if men were simply degen-erate.

As there is a degree of depravityin mankind which requires a cer-tain degree of circumspectionand distrust: So there are otherqualities in human nature, whichjustify a portion of esteem andconfidence. Republican govern-ment presupposes the existenceof these qualities in a higher de-gree than any other form. Werethe pictures which have beendrawn by the political jealousy ofsome among us, faithful like-nesses of the human character,the inference would be that thereis not sufficient virtue amongmen for self-government, andthat nothing less than the chainsof despotism can restrain themfrom destroying and devouringone another (No. 55).

Yet although republican govern-ment "presupposes" a certain ca-pacity for virtue, elsewhere in TheFederalist Publius makes it clearthat republican government cannotrely on morality for its preserva-tion. All too often, these "bettermotives" fail just when they be-come most necessary. Moreover,the promotion of virtue by the na-tional government would require adegree of political interference inprivate matters inconsistent withrepublican liberty.

Instead, The Federalist seeks toground republican government onthe most reliable aspect of humannature: self-interest. By self-inter-est, Publius means that most men, ifleft alone, will naturally seek tosatisfy their ovtn interests and de-sires, rather than look to the wellbeing of the whole. In a societysuch as the one Publius hopes tos, ipe, this means that most menwill seek a comfortable materialexistence. Although some men willcontinue to pursue the more aristo-cratic desires for glory and power,Publius understands that the desirefor material well-being is the mod-

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James Madison. Library of Congress.

em democratic passion par excel-lence. Publius does not condemnany of these selfish impulses, oreven try to moderate them. For TheFederalist is confident that im-provements and discoveries in "thenew science of politics" (No. 9) willenable them to channel these de-sires toward the public good.

The Classical RepublicanTradition and "the ExtendedRepublic"

Chief among these discoveries is"the enlargement of the orbit" ofrepublican government. Opponentsof the Constitution, citing the au-thority of the French political phi-losopher Montesquieu, had insistedthat republican government couldnot be expanded beyond the size ofthe states. Smallness was essentialbecause it preserved a sense ofcommunity and made it possible forcitizens to discern the commongood. In an extended republic, thepeople would be too remote fromthe centers of power to participatein public affairs, and governmentwould fall into the hands of privateinterests.

Publius responds in FenralistNo. 9 by arguing that the states arefar too large to meet the require-ments of classical republicanism.Strict adherence to this principlewould require that the states, too,be broken up into city-sized repub-lics. Having demonstrated the inap-plicability of the small republic ar-gument to the Anti-Federalistcause, Publius then proceeds in

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Alexander Hamilton. Library of Congress.

Federalist No. 51 to turn the smallrepublic argument on its head. Inthat paper, he argues that "the larg-er the society, provided it lie withina practicable sphere, the more dulycapable it will be of self-govern-ment." For The Federalist the chiefdanger to republican governmentcomes not from the decline m civicvirtue but, on the contrary, from theall too active involvement of themajority in schemes of oppressionagainst the minority. According toPublius, the great advantage of theextended republic is that it permitsmajority rule while discouragingmajority faction, or the tyranny ofthe many over the few. The minor-ity Publius had in mind was princi-pally the propertied few, but it ap-plies with equal force to religious,racial and ethnic minorities.

The Extended Republicand "The Multiplicity of Sectsand Interests"

This proposition, that a large re-public is better able to protect liber-ty and hence to govern itself, restson two premises. First, by extend-ing the size of the country, thenumber of religious sects, politicalparties and economic interestswould be so multiplied that no onegroup could force an unjust major-ity to oppress others. As Publiusexplains, in a large, pluralistic soci-ety, a coalition of the majority"could seldom take place on anyother principles but justice and thegeneral good." (No. 51). Here again,we note the crucial distinction he-

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John Jay. Library of Congress.

tween majority faction and majorityrule.

But for social pluralism to workto maximum advantage, it is notenough simply to extend the sphereof republican government; the Con-stitution must encourage a largecommercial republic. By com-merce, Publius does not mean unre-stricted laissez faire, for he regards"the regulation of these various andinterfering (economic] interests" as"the principal tool of modern legis-lation." (No. 10). What The Federal-ist has in mind, very loosely, is asystem of free enterprise, in whichgovernment policy and social mo-res encourage the people to ac-quire, possess, and most iii.portant,increase their property and wealth.

In its defense of a commercialrepublic, The Federalist challengesstill another tenet of the republicancreed. For the classical traditioneschewed commerce and insistedthat its citizens remain poor so thatnothing could distract them fromtheir singleminded devotion to thecommon good.

Having substituted self-interestfor virtue as the ground or "spring"of republican government, Publiusis more sanguine about the pros-pect of a commercial republic. Ashe explains in Federalist No. 10, thecure for the evils of majority factionlies in the division of society intodifferent kinds as well as amountsof property. Rich and poor mustview each other not simply as op-posing classes, but as members ofdifferent economic interests andoccupations: creditors, debtors,

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farmers, merchants, manufacturers,etc. Since only commerce can givethis "variety and complexity to theaffairs of a nation" (No. 56), Publiusseeks to encourage a commercialrepublic.

"Inventions of Prudence":Representation and theSeparation of Powers

The second reason that a largerepublic is more capable of selfgovernment is that it attracts morequalified representatives. In smallrepublics, such as the states, repre-sentatives were drawn from small-er, more homogeneous constituen-cies and frequently did nothingmore than mirror the "local andparticular" views of the majority.By contrast, in the extended repub-lic, electoral districts would neces-sarily be larger, increasing the like-lihood that only the most "fitcharacters" would be elected. Andonce in office, these representativeswould "refine and enlarge" ratherthan merely "reflect" their constitu-ents' views. On the political levelthen, the advantage of the largerepublic consists in "the substitu-tion of representatives whose en-lightened views and virtuous senti-ments render them superior to localprejudices and schemes of injus-tice" (No. 10). Nevertheless, Pub-lius does not believe the large re-public guarantees the election of"enlightened statesmen." He recog-nizes full well that such leaders"will not always be at the helm."Thus an additional advantage of thelarge electoral district is that even ifless qualified men are chosen, thesheer diversity of interests andopinions which they represent, aswell as the necessity to compro-mise in order to obtain a legislativemajority, will compel them to en-large their views. So, by virtue ofthe "refined" representation which

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In one of the longest statements on human nature in The Federalist,Publius suggests that human nature partakes of both the admirable andthe base and that republican government would be indefensible if menwere simply degenerate.

the large republic encourages, selfgovernment becomes good govern-ment. It is for this reason that Pub-lius makes representation the sinequa non of republican government.Republican government is nothingmoreand nothing lessthan agovernment in which "a scheme ofrepresentation takes place" (No.10).

If the extended republic makespossible a certain kind of represen-tation, representation in turn makespossible the principle of separationof powers. In a pure democracy,where the people exercise all politi-cal power directly, no such divisionof legislative, executive and judicialpowers is possible. Publius, citingThomas Jefferson, regards the con-centration of political power in thesame hands as the very "definitionof despotic government" (No. 48).

Publius does not claim to havediscovered the separation of pow-ers, but the Constitution does modi-fy the principle significantly. Priorto 1787, the separation of powerswas part of the theory of the mixedregime. According to this olderview, which was given its fullestpractical embodiment in the RomanRepublic and later the British Con-stitution, political power was par-celled out to diff-rent hereditaryclasses in society. For example, inEngland, the monarch exercised ex-ecutive power while the aristocracyand democracy shared legislativepowers. By distributing politicalpowers among these hereditaryclasses, the theorists of the mixedregime hoped to secure the benefitsof monarchy, aristocracy and de-mocracy while avoiding their de-fects.

What makes the American Con-stitution unique is that it severs theseparation of powers from the sep-aration of classes or orders. Insteadthe Constitution establishes a dem-ocratic republic in which every

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branch of governmentand notjust the lower house of the legisla-turerepresents the people. Withinthis wholly democratic framework,Publius hopes to secure the advan-tages of a mixed regime. As heexplains in No. 37, by creating asingle executive, independent ofthe legislature, the Constitution en-courages energy and dispatch inthat branch. Similarly, by reducingthe size of the Senate and extendingits term of office, the Constitutionpromotes certain other aristocrat-ic qualitiesstablity, wisdom, dig-nityso often lacking in populargovernments. In this way, the sepa-ration of powers by itself approxi-mates the virtues of a mixed regimewhile remaining true to its republi-can form.

Still, the main purpose of theseparation of powers is to preventone branch from encroaching uponthe powers of the others. Accordingto Publius, the greatest danger toliberty in a "representative repub-lic" comes not from the executive,but from the legislature. Because itsconstitutional powers are broader,and because it controls the raisingand spending of money, the legisla-ture stands in need of the greatestchecks. "The provision for defensemust ... be made commensurate tothe danger of attack" (No. 51). Ac-cordingly, the Constitution divideslegislative power between the twohouses of Congress, each electedindependently of the other and re-sponsible to different (though dem-ocratic) constituencies. As a furtherprecaution, the Constitution equipsthe executive with one-sixth of thelegislative power through the veto.Finally, the Constitution encour-ages an independent judiciary toinsure the impartial administrationof the laws. By giving to eachbranch "the necessary constitution-al means, and personal motives toresist the encroachments of the

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others" (No. 51), the Constitutio;sputs teeth into the principle of sep-aration of powers. Here again Pub-lius reiterates his view that the Con-stitution cannot rely primarily uponthe "better motives" of moral andpatriotic leaders to maintain theproper separation of powers, butmust appeal instead to each individ-ual's self interest. In perhaps themost famous passage of The Feder-alist, Publius connects the separa-tion of powers with his realisticview of man:

Ambition must be made to coun-teract ambition. The interest ofthe man must be connected withthe constitutional rights of theplace. It may be a reflection onhuman nature that such devicesshould be necessary to controlthe abuses of government. Butwhat is government itself but thegreatest of all reflections on hu-man nature? If men were angels,no government would be neces-sary. If angels were to governmen, neither external nor inter-nal controls on governmentwould be necessary (No. 51).

The Compound Republic:"Partly Federal, PartlyNational"

The Constitution not only dividespower horizontally among the threedifferent branches of government, italso divides power vertically be-tween the federal government andthe states. This vertical distribu-tionor federalismin whichpower is constitutionally distribut-ed between two levels of govern-ment, each of which is supreme inits own sphere, is the most novel ofthe Framers' inventions. Prior to1787, federalism was synonymouswith confederalism. Federalism inthis more traditional sense referredto a league of small republics, unit-ed for limited security purposes.

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FEDERALIS7,A Collekr,tion of Eflays writtcn in fa.

vor of the New Conflitution.'By a Citizen of New-lark.

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PHILO-PUBLIUS)-A N D TR E

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As agreed upon at Philadelphia, &plan.bey 1 qtly 1787.

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P Allerr e 11 m01/71^firAdvertisement for The Federalist in book form, published in The Virginia Independent Chronicle, 13 February1788. Library of Congress.

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The states retained full sovereigntyover their internal affairs and wererepresented equally in the federalalliance. Confederalism was a vitalcomponent of the small republictradition, according to which onlythe state governments could pre-serve republican liberty.

But in 1787, a new generation ofAmericans, having witnessed first-hand the defects of state sovereign-ty under the Articles of Confedera-tion became convinced amodification of the traditional fed-eral principle was necessary if lib-erty was to be secure. Accordingly,the new federal principle inventedat the Constitutional Conventionforms a mean between confedera-tion based on state sovereignty anda consolidated central governmentbased on national sovereignty. TheConstitution, Publius concedes, is"partly federal, partly national"(No. 39).

But is it "sufficiently federal" topreserve the republican liberty? InFederalist No. 39, Publius examinesthe new government from five dif-ferent perspectivesits founda-tion, sources of power, operationand' extent of powers, and theamendment processto convincehis critics that it is "sufficientlyfederal." His discussion makes itclear the extent to which federal-ismin its contemporary mean-ingsuffuses the political order.

Starting with the amendmentprocess, Publius argues that thefoundation of government is a fed-eral act since the Constitution restson the unanimous consent of thepeople in the states. No state can becompelled to join the Union with-out its consent.

Considering next the sourcesfrom which the ordinary branchesof government are derived, Publiusconcludes that they are mixed. TheHouse of Representatives is nation-al because it represents the people

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Though written in haste, under the pressure of editorial deadlines,The Federalist was from the outset regarded as the most authoritativeexplication of the princples underlying the Constitution.

and not the states. On the otherhand, the Senate, especially as orig-inally conceived, is the most "feder-al" branch, since it represents eachstate equally regardless of its sizeor population. Because the presi-dent is chosen by the Electoral Col-lege, rather than by direct popularvote, Publius regards the source ofexecutive powers as essentially fed-eral. Indeed, it is worth noting that,even today, there is no federal of-fice which is elected by a simplemajority of the people as a whole.

Turning next to the operation ofthe new government, Publius con-cedes it is unambiguously national.The federal government will havethe power to legislate directly overindividuals. Publius regards thisprovision as essential, for the gov-ernment would not be a govern-ment if it lacked the power to legis-late and enforce its decisions.

The amending power Publiusconsiders partly federal and partlynational. Although the states havethe power to alter the Constitution,the amendment process does not,as traditional federal theory wouldhave it, require the unanimous con-sent of the states By contrast withthe ratification process, the sover-eignty of the dissenting states ishere breached.

Finally, "perhaps most impor-tantly, federalism provides somecheck" upon the extent of nationalpowers. Since the federal govern-ment is "an incomplete" nationalgovernment, the states are neces-sary to perform those tasks which itis inconvenient or undesirable forthe federal government to perform.The federal principle holds that theabsorption of these powers by thefederal government would danger-ously concentratc political power.

It is true that the Constitutiondoes not explicitly enumeratewhich powers are reserved to thestates. For this reason, the division

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between state and federal jurisdic-tion has been more a political thana constitutional issue. Nevertheless,modern federalism preserves, how-ever loosely, the division of powernecessary for republican liberty. Inthis way, it accords with the centraltheme of The Federalist, that liber-ty is best preserved not by limitingpolitical power, but by properly dis-tributing it.

Conclusion

Although the immediate aim ofThe Federalist was to secure theratification of the Constitution inNew York, it remains unclear howsuccessful the papers were inachieving this goal. On June 21,1788, while the New York RatifyingConvention was just beginning itsdeliberations, New Hampshire be-came the ninth state to ratify theConstitution. Shortly thereafter,Virginia voted to join the Union,and on July 26, 1788, with the newConstitution already a certainty,New York followed suit.

But the enduring claim of TheFederalist does not rest primarilyon its role in securing ratification.Though written in haste, under thepressure of editorial deadlines, TheFederalist was from the outset re-garded as the most authoritativeexplication of the principles under-lying the Constitution. And twohundred years later, there is noreason to revise this view.

Suggested additional reading:David F. Epstein, The Political 77teory of

"The Federalist" (1986).Clinton Rossiter, ed. Federalist Papers

(1986).

Jean Yarbrough is associate professorof political science at Loyola Universityof Chicago and director of the honorsprogram. She is now at work on a manu-script entitled "Moral Foundations ofthe American Republic."

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