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"RB 31·100, Vol I

REFERENCE BOOK

INSURGENT WAR

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE·

.u.s. ARMY COMMAND AND .GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE.Fort Leavenworth, Kansas'

,1 July 1989

;;,0/,'

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAfF COLLEGE

Fort Le8veDworth,Kansas

ALLDJ 1 July 1969

SUBJECT: RB 31.100, Voll, Insurgent W(l/l':Q1t:qJ~~nge and Response

See Distribution '/: ;

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1. This text is the first of thre~ vo14:W ':.h0@''Prepared at the U,S. Army Command and Gene.r8lk~~liI 1I,t instruction in internal defense. Other volumesar.~;:,~li War: Seleoted Case Studies, and Volume Ill, InB'UiI'

'.2. The material presented in th!i;l'> ored by faculty members of the Oollege to satisfy. ,ced textbook on insurgency and internal def~nse 'been considered in the preparation of these ch entextends con· siderably beyond that of 'ito this extent, reflects opinions and i"t,."ni.AM \in were gained through a review of a

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

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I

CHAPTER 1

THE THREAT

Section I. BASIC INSURGENCY

INTRODUCTION

'Peace or war-which is the "norm" for mankind? Is the world of man that worldportrayed by television commercials, which shows happy people living in beautifulhomes, working in pleasant surroundings, doing exciting things in their spare time;or, is it a world of conflict and disorder? One unidentified source claims that in morethan 5,500 years of recorded history there have been no less than 14,500 wars. TheNew York Times during the period 1946 to 1959 reported more than 1,200 civil wars,guerrilla wars, coups d'etat, and other forms of conflict. The Center for Research inSocial Systems (CRESS) of the ,American University. when asked to study and document cases of insurgency during the 20th century, found that one of its first majortasks was to reduce a list of 150 significant cases of insurgency in this century to amanageable number for study. In light of statistics such as these it appears morerealistic to ,view conflict as a "norm" for man and to consider life comparable toopen warfare - a series of engagements, large and small, interspersed by periods ofrelative calm during which the forces regroup and rest.

This, continuing occurrence of conflict in the world of man is apparently one manifestation of his restlessness and selfishness. Man is seldom satisfied with the statusquo; rather, he is most often seeking a better way and a better life. When, from hisown point of view, progress is being made toward satisfaction of his current goals. ahuman will tend to be content as of that instant. But, Should progress be blocked orshould his status be threatened, his reaction can run the gamut from mild unhappinessto savage reprisal. Restlessness is a consequence of human aspirations, a subjectthat deserves more detailed study as a basis for understanding both dissidence andthe response thereto.

HUMAN ASPIRATIONS AND EXPECTATIONSAspirations as used here refer to ultimate desires, goals, or objectives of an individual. Aspirations vary from individual to individual in kind and in level. They area relative thing. a function of the conditions of life the person endures and has endured, his knowledge of the life of others, and the basic requirements for sustainingUfe. A lower middle-class factory worker in the United States may aspire to be amiddle-manager; an unemployed miner may only wish he were a factory worker. Alist of such specific aspirations would be endless. However, it appears that all aSRirations. can be cat~g9riz.ed in one of five ways._

PHYSICAL S\iCUBITYThe protection of one's self and one's family frQm physical harm is instinctive, andthe desire for such"protection is'nsted"~hefirst basic aspiration. Like all aspirations, physical security is a relative thing. Quakers and other religious sects live ina world virtually void of violence; any form of violence or crime would be a seriousdisruption of their life. But, for most people. a certain level of crime, and, violenceis acoepted as relatively normal in the community in which they live. They naturallyaspire for this level to be reduced but do not become particularly ~armed so longas it does not increase.

STABLE/PREDICTABLE ENVIRONMENT1'1'

This aspiration, in a way, is a desire for social security. It is normal for peopleto adopt patterns of living and to want ,to belJile to control these patterns th,ough

~ life. Disruptions or changes to tMse patterns that are not controllable by the

OPL9·3JOO 1-1

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KlQAL/ECOIlQIlIC JUSTICEPor _ada ~rldio.aI u.. I•••piN 01 tJot1Io_ wtliolJo _do 1M __I..sp 01othe......_ 1M q Uoo1 11 Po•• ..-. lrttioetIm 11>....... m&J' 1Dc:I._"'" mud> mo \han lot. 'O'Uloce•• r.. o*lch"'r!nC rtll lila .r.... In _hid.h. rarm. _ hlolD'-. In the mo'" mod..." _.du.• citizen b..,.,,,,I. I

whether he be a father or a .government. It is natural for dependents of a host to become accustomed to a level of support and to freely demand more support with time.If that host is displaced, the replacement host can get by with less support until anew host-dependent relationship is fully; established. Thus it is in the United Statesthat a newly elected government administration is always welcomed and treated withhopeful respect at the beginning of its term. Its members are not expected to provideinstant solutions to problems unsolved by the previous administration and are excusedfor initial unresponsiveness. However, this tolerance is short-lived, and the newadministration is soon evaluated against the same standards as the old.

Figure 1-1 is a simplified representation of the aspiration and expectation levels.Here these factors are shown to generally increase with time. It should be notedthat the lower expectation level (the one related to a replacement host) is of relativelyshort duration as explained above. This graph permits identification of certainzones of significance. The first is the zone between the line of aspirations and thatof expectations. Any population enjoying a provision level in this zone is getting atleast what it expects even if it does not receive all to which it aspires. Here the population is basically content and this zone is called the CONTENT ZONE. Conversely,a population whose level of provision is below what it considers a minimum levelof satisfaction (expectation level) will be discontented and vulnerable to influenceby a replacement host who offers it at least a minimum level of satisfaction. Thiszone is called the VULNERABLE ZONE. The third zone is between the two expectation lines and is called the ZONE OF INITIAL AnVANTAGE. This, for an incumbenthost, is part of the vulnerable zone; but, for a replacement host, is part of the content zone and thus a zone of advantage for him.

PROVISIONLEVEL

VULNERABLE ZONE

TIME

.•ZONEOFINITIALADVANTAGE

Figure 1.. 1. Curvssof aspirations .and e"peotations ..

In theory, a graph of the type in figure 1-1 could be developed for each basic aspira_tion and a person's contentment or vulnerability adjudged for each. If such were done,a given individual could be judged content in certain areas and vulnerable in others.But, overall, he would have a general feeling, considering all of his aspirations together, of either contentment or •vulnerability. Itts this cotnposite feeling that isultimately of most importance since it will be the basts for overall attitudlls anc!l .actipnS.. .

1-~

The term "vulnerable" has been used to describe persons whose provision level is below the level of expectations. This term connotes a condition of weakness among these people but in no way describes their expressed attitudes and overt actions. Being vulnerable cannot be assumed to be synonymous with being revolutionary, hostile, or demanding. The attitude of lI- ,X.Y!n.tt.9Pl!LP£~.9J) ..9.!!..1l.v:ary from one of complete resignation to one of violent reaction. From the opposite point of view, a person w~di>es-iiorproTeiir1B'''n(;tnecessarnycontent. Further, vulnerability has no direct relationship with economic status. Vigilante groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan, have been formed by relatively well-to-do individuals who have become vulnerable ,because they imagine or feel some threat to their way of life by some other group arid thus aline themselves with the Vigilante group as a substitute for reliance on the incumbent government for protection. Wh"t the overt actions of a vulnerable person are will be a ~!gn. oLm.~!!Ly!!,r!!bl~I§rWhicftthefollowing are included:

1. The general education, experience, and ability of the individual.

2. The nature of the government and the degree to which it is able to suppress' dissent.

3. Traditional values and standards of the individual.

4. Family and other responsibilities of the individual.

5. Previous experience of the individual as a dissident.

6. What other "vulnerables" are doing.

Yet, ~YU~:!:~):>~~,.E~!!!,,?,~.i£!,,!i...~Ii.£!.conten~d eer!sm. His condition is such that he has a high potential for socIal protesT'tliat can fie unleashed with a certain stimulus. It is among these vulnerable people that a revolutionary leader finds his followers because it is he that can provide the organization which converts their potential energy of protest into kinetic forces of insurgency.

THE INGREDIENTS OF INSURGENCY The t~.:~~t~~",~ng",~~,iJ:U!J,\l:g~J1.cy"are used in this text in connection with any movement that em~ extralega! measures in rising up against an lDCllro:Rllnt ~uthorl!y for the purpose";;r;;bt'aining"s'ome change in th~ social ordez:. A "sub~:!"!~ive insurgency" is an insurgency that includes in Its objectiUI!l the d~liliruction 21' \l!l9,ermining of_ the ,"\~.mbent \\~.th.~i..ty. An "insurgent war" is a viqlem tat!JLQf.i!lubv.=rsive insurgency and is a deliberate effort, using local adherents, with or without exfernal support, and utilizing psychological and military efforts to weaken the entire military, economic, and political structure of an area or country so that it will fall under the control of insurgent leaders.

An !9!!.YJ:~ l/,~~!i! .Qot be viole!1t. An insurgent group may employ legal and illegal, yet entirely peaceful, means to force the government to institute reforms without disturbing the basic political structure of the nation. In this sense, the actions of some political parties constitute a low-order form of insurgency. A subversive in" surgency can also be non-violent. The crusade of Mahatma Gandhi from 1919 to 1946 for Indian independence is one well-kriown example. Another example, to be discussed later, is the Communist "United Front from Below" technique.

The question of whether an insurgency is good or bad is a matter' of point of view. Americans point with pride to their insurgent war-the American Revolution. So might other insurgent groups feel justified in attacking governments thFlt are exploitive, ineffective, arbitrary, irresponsible, or totalitarian. But, such justified

1-4

http:..9.!!..1l

insurgencies are not the concern of this text. Rather, it is concerned with thosesubversive insurgencies launched against the "right" government by groups, eithertotally native or sponsored by an outside power, which seek destruction of the incumbent government for their own selfish purposes. The "right" government, as usedhere, is not easily defined; however, it must be the one most capable of responsiblemanagement of the social conflicts of the nation. It must work for the nation as awhole; and it must recognize the inevitability of change and provide the mechanismfor orderly and peaceful change.

Insurgency is an advanced form of dissent. Dissent, of course, is normal to everysociety. In fact, a certain amount of dissent is desirable because it serves as astimulant for progress. Figure 1-2 is a chart in which various degrees of dissidenceare correlated with several factors, including their effect on activities of government.As this chart shows, the danger point is reached when the nation-building programsof the nation begin to give way to maintenance of internal security.

I COLO HOT IOISSIDENT FEVER

I-,,-'""'~",Z"-

>oL&JNATION BUILDING~§!i:

:5lXl'" INTERNAL SECURITY",,,,I"'1;;'"- '"0>

'"'"~i; .....z ..... ",

DANGEROUS- DISASTROUS"'-> NORMAL· ACCEPTABLE ,",lXl",~,~...J

1->- REVOLT REVOLUTIONZI-'" - . TERRORISM0> ACQUIESCENCE CRITICISM PROTESTi3(3 INSURRECTION0< INSURGENCY

INSURGENT WAR

I-E5~ EVOLUTIONARY SPECIFIC MAJOR NEW NATIONALeC§ ADJUSTMENT ACTION REFORMS ORDERl:l'"i5

9~"·O

Figure 1..2. Degrees,o! dissidence.;

For insurgency to begin there must be a vulnerable group of people-people whosebasic expectations are not being met. But the' existenceofa vulnerable population isnot enough to begin the insurgent movement. There also must be an element of direction and leadership that can mobilize and organize the forces of discontent. Finally,.the dist:ontented group must have Mnfidence in the cause and leaders of the insurgent

1-5

movement as compared to those of the incumbent government and associate itself with the insurgent movement. These, then, are the basic ingredients of insurgency:

-:;;"'---"'~~-"'"'''"''-''-'

1. l\...~l~~!a~l!J;> ..op~~tJ0n. 2. Dir!~~~~~.~~..~~~~rship.

3. Association of people with the insurgent movement. ~_,."",,,,,,,...._ .......,_,,,,,,,,~..c",,,,,. ··,,,..,,,,,,,,.,·,~,,-,,,,, ......~,,,,,,,,,,,,,

,

and intimidiation may be applied against these appointing and approving authorities to gain legitimacy. illegal as these means might be. The Communist "United Front from Below" technique might be tried. This technique calls for the creation of coalitions of minority parties for the purpose of gaining an overall majority capable of winning governmental control in traditional manner. Then. once the coalition is in power. the Communist element selectively eliminates other coalition elements and works itself into the key positions until they reach a position of power that enables them to take full control.

All of the means discussed thus far envision the use of the traditional structure of the nation to gain legitimacy. A second general approach calls for creation of a competitive structure that is wholly outside the established structure. This new organizational structure would initially seek legitimacy through a psychological campaign aimed at weakening support for the incumbent government while bUilding support for its own cause. Terror and sabotage may be a part of this effort.

The thitQ task is to secure the supRort of forces QLaU~\'!,ority (law and order). In the United States the governmental lorces of authority always support the legally elected administration. This cannot be assumed in all other nations. Yet. support by forces of authority is necessary for any governing group it it hopes to exercise authority. If the existing forces of authority do not automatically support a new group. that group may attempt to subvert these forces and possibly obtain eventual control. Failing this. the new group must weaken. destroy. and replace the traditional forces of authority. This requires development of competitive forces which will initially harass. but eventually engage and defeat. the incumbent forces.

The fourth task of the group is to establish a final governil}g str9cture for the nation. The oid structure may be retained. a revolutionary council may be established. or anyone of many possible forms of government may be created.

Successful completion of the above tasks would bring about a new order to a nation but would not necessarily constitute a solution to the nation's problems. The new government. like the one replaced. would now have. to answer to the people.

CONCLUSION The discussion of insurgency in previous paragraphs has been general and intended to show that insurgency has many patterns. can exist in varying degrees. and is available as a form of action to any group or. ideology. In the next portion of this chapter specific attention will be given to subversive insurgency as practiced by one group ot individuals - the Communists. Since it is true that the Communists have in no way restricted themselves to a single. pattern of action, the insurgency to be described will be that of a classic or model Commuriist insurgency.

/Stction II. TH;,;;,E;:'ZCO;o;M..M:;;;U;;,;N;,;;IS..T.,;;;M;;O;;;DE;;;.:L GENERAL

Communism is a major threat to nations of the free world. The most significant insurgencies of modern times have been led or influenced by the Communists. and leading Communists continue to declare their support of wars of national liberation throughout the world. Knowing of this constant Communist threat. it is essential that freewQrld governments and forces understand the mechanics of Communist insurgency.Further, in understanding and developing a response to the complex Com·munist insurgent organization, a nation can be in the best position to understand the response to any type of insurgency.

1-7

A classic Communist insurgency progresses in a very logical manner. To describe the progression, the many writers on insurgency have. utilized phases to categorize the activity. Unfortunately, there is little agreement among the authors on where to draw the line between phases or how to name them, although all generally agree on the general sequence of activity. This text will use the outline developed by CRESS in their study of insurgencies.

In talking about insurgency phasing there are three points that should be made initially. First, there is no direct relationship of time to phasing. Time is one of the key weapons of the insurgent. A given action may take a little time or a long time - the insurgent must not allow impatience to defeat his cause. Second, there is no clear line between phases. Phases overlap a great deal. Activity can vary from section to section of a nation. It is usually impossible to say that a nation is wholly within one phase or another. Third, any description of the phasing must be considered as that of a "type" insurgency. It is a logical progression, but insurgent leaders may well choose to short cut on certain of the steps and may, if advantageous to them, revert from one stage of intensity .to one of lesser intensity.

Communist insurgen~~!.!.?e.~,;,~.:t;ib~~~!...n..f!.y,~,~t~g~.

STAGE I-CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION Stage I is called clandestine organization. This is 'the period when the insurgent, starting from a relatively weak condition, maps and organizes his campaign for victory. For the Communists duriq~.!ais'ikag!'l' 0~.ationfl.J1M~JJl.Q.iEl•.',vU,ld.~p.~,I!

2. AI ..cb political l.v.l llIn. I. I conlU" ov """vonUon ",Id. up of v.p••_.enIIUv" of all .c""u~ ID I JiVoMI .v... Tbl. I'"""P mill. only occulonally, ""'IL.I.clutlco.lly 1M 1ot.....1 utbonly lor Ihol polllical 1.....1. Day-lD-dlJ' al'faln of u..pll"\I are -...ued bJ" a com... ltI.. M .latf , ......p. ThL. f"O"p I........U, colled tbaCu......1 Atllira CommlllH al ._"Ilona! I_I•.

3. Ai-", ~......... ..-alGI ID be u.. ..L I 1 1 01 aulloorilJ' II.adO '-1-. .odl la .ubjotct ID 1M .W o.l of u......n Iot v 1 1. n!. r...",......• ,.U. lA llIlt",lI. conU"Ol. 01 u.. enUre or h.'Iao.., a r IlI

Communists seek wi~"~,1ll.Il,,!1nlRpqrL,!i!Ll~g~_~~I!Ii!,to 2tp~9ple through "mass organizations." A mass organization is any organized grouping of people. There can bEl-soc1a'f groups. vocational groups. professional groups. and numerous other types. For organizational purposes these groups fall into two categories: (1) organizations whose purpose for being is not conn~!!!Ql!!~,tl;1,~"Q()mmJ.l!}ili!tIn(nrement;"anmrg-f:, g;al)-iz!ti,2!!,!!, that are,~hollY~Pmm\1nili!toriented even though fronts and cover stories' are used to make outsiders. ana even members. think otherwise. To the first category of organization. the Communists apply an infiltration technique designed to give them influence to the extent that they can either cause the organization to support certain Communist goals or to use them in neutralization of opposition elements. All of this is done without altering the original basic structure or purpose of the organization. The second category of organization is carefully developed and oriented for direct support of the Communist movement as a whole.

A labor union is a typical example of the first category of mass organization the Communists would seek to influence. Such a union might be one established originally to be a democratic spokesman for the workers in a factory. ..

The Communists will organize a cell or group of cells from within the union membership or have Communists join the factory and the union if an insufficient number are not already present. This group need involve only a small percentage of the total membership. They carefully collect information concerning the leadership, objectives, accomplishments. failures, and other features of the union as a basis for their strategy. Prior to meetings. the Communists will determine how they can inject their influence. They may prepare resolutions. print them up in advance, and give them wide premeeting publicity so as to best Insure their passage'. Such resolutions would not be overtly pro-Communist. but would be such as to support the Communist objectives in some form. A resolution may be against some governmental policy, against management. etc. When elections come due they will make every effort to seed some of their group onto the ballot in influential spots and thereafter push the campaign for their election. There would be continuous efforts to orient present. new. and potential members of the union toward the Communist objectives if not toward communism itself. During meetings the Communists would be active participants. The Communist voice would be ever present and the Communist objectives would be continually pushed. T~~.."Qt"j4e,~el.!...mjlmllftril m~..D.lI,y,el:/~J.4,!l!ntified o{'enl~ith cOijHllulli§I!!. but that is not important so long as the over~!L!U!ll~ges and aC}'lons .oj tF':,j;!:2P.E".c::..

During the clandestine organization stage. the Communists will also seek sources of

logistic support and personnel for their expanding operations. Those recruited mayor

may not be Communist; individuals may not even realize they are supporting a Com

munist effort. However, once they do, these individuals are hooked and would be hard

pressed to back out.

Bases, escape and evasion nets, and training areas would be planned and their

development begun in this stage. Overall, the work of the, Communists would be one of

laying the groundwork for the future offensive.

STAGE II-PSYCHOI,.OGICAL OFFENSIVE,..............."",,. ~''''"',_, .... ".

members. Initially, and until the Communists gain full military control of an area, this committee will operate covertly and be a shadow government for the members. When the Communists finally take over military control of the area, the executive committee would be the nucleus of the new government and operate overtly. At this time they are properly referred to as the Liberation Front Committee.

An organization such as the Liberated Farmer Association has appeal to the bulk of the adult members of a community in agricultural sections of a nation. There. this single type of mass organization would be sufficient to control most of the population. In other areas of a country under Communist attack there will be a broader range of occupational pursuits and several mass organizations may be needed to control a large part of the population. Where multiple mass organizations exist, a higher level committee comparable in functions to the individual executive committees of the mass organizations would be formed. This higher committee would be selected by the several mass organizations through carefully controlled elections and it would thereafter be in overall control of all mass organizations (and the people) in its area.

Higher level liberation committees-district, relZ!olli\l, Of P.31Wn§J.-will be elected 15y congresses ordelegat'es from tIieiower'levei'groups. Their JQ,ternal,,~Jr,!c!ct:l!.r,~,YJll rou~hl~ corr'i:.!!P,l?.!\L~tall leY:,tl,.!! although they naturally become farger and more del Ie in functions' al'1iIgTler levers. At all levels there ""ill be certain elemen 1>. notabl;>; the ,curren,t.. ' affairs and ~~m~'lat, whiCiiWTule'95im_~~.~',',' J ~.Y ~t {F,at ley~t 'Mius ~on committee hferarchy is truly a large-scale front organization, outwardly represented as a government of the people, but inwardly manipulated by the Communist Party.

Figure 1-4 is a schematic representation of the liberation front structure. AppendiX C is a copy of the regulations of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam, a typical liberation front organization.

All of the Communist tec:hniques for obtaining the support of the masses have been evolved as means for obtaining such support without making all supporters avowed Communists. Party membership is a privilege given to only a fraction of the population. In the Soviet Union only about 5 percent of the popUlation are Communists. In a particular village in South Vietnam, where it was possible to make such determinations. it was found that in a population of 3,000 there were only 56 party members and that 543 members of the community were active members of massorganizations. These 543 members were able to directly influence a total of about 2,000 people.

Takeover of local governments may be possible with little or no violence, but downfall of the national government normally will require defeat or neutralization of the armed forces. This brings about the activities of stage IV.

S!,~~.I~V:M..;:;;,;IL::.IT_A~R_IZ;;,;A..TI-.:ON The militarization stage is filubdivided into three steps for convience of discussions,:rategi,c defensive, o;:ganized guerril!.t 'r.~E.f,~e, and the counteroffensi~e.

/

~, stratec defensive is desi ed to extend and weaken the overnment mili~ary""1orces • e n"'jg_ n. ere w n~be s raids and ambushes for purposes of destroying government nlateriel and capturing equipment and supplies for use and stockpiling by the guerrilla forces. The government and military will be harassed, but the t§l

EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE

MASS iORGANIZATION

(FARMERS)

LIBERATION FRONT COMMITIEE

NOMINAL LEAOERS

BOARO OF CHAIRMEN

SECRETARIAT

SELECTS SLATE(MAY SUBMIT TO POPULAR VOTE)

~-"T CURRENT AFFAIRSCOMMITTEE

,~.~rAWA..IIA.~~.rA

Figure 1·4. The Liberation Front Committee system.

against industry and communications, assassinations. and other acts will be ac~'coinplished by a means of drawing the government forces into isolated static security •roles and proving to the people that the government is incapable of providing themsecurity. The successes of the guerrilla bands will be pictured by the Communistpropagandists as heroic victories of the Peoples' RevolUtionary Army against a corrupt government. This will tend to show the people that the revolutionary cause iswinning some and will win more popular support to the Communist side. At the sametime the government forces will be continually discredited, blamed for atrocities andprutality, and generally painted as iron-fisted puppets of the elite ruling class orforeign imperialists.

The continuous need for money will bring' about acts of extortion and taxation. Ap,pendix D to this chapter is a translated copy of an extortion note from the National,Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam to the Shell, Caltex, and Esso oil companies. It is an excellent example of the extent to which such efforts may go.

fi!§iiAti~j:~i~~,~~~r~~~t~:::~i~taU:~r~~~i~~i~:~~~~~~!~h:e~ec:M~;tI;;~fl~:~o opera ons involving only a few men. PlatopIl,s",1ffis!.&m».£§!I~esare now within the

guerrilla force structure. Their weapons and training have also seen improvementwith ,time. This new capability allows them to consider larger targets. Limitedmobile warfare is now a possibility as are larger scale ambushes and raids. However, the guerrillas still do not seek to capture and hold real estate ,from the govern-

,ment. and a given guerrilla unit will still operate within an established area. TheobjeQtive remains that of whittling away at the government forces and proving theinability of the government to maintain law and order in the nation.

~tep ~ zj~1L~~~,n~i,ve."" ,,0,f, the m,ilitariZatiOn, stage, ,,is, re"a,che,d when,tll,ll..,r'!'i\!,,1,§',:t!,za_ on 0 " , or .~ F-r.iI~n.~f~~8'l~.rm~.'!2.!"£'!'-S.~.!l.!!,~$9,MlJ;!lm~d. :a~!.ta,!!C;>J,l~.~!!dl.a.,!:ger

~fiii1'tSQapable 0 empIoymen'tanywliere in the country are now formed and, for the.', rst. time, capture and control of areas by military action is considered. In this

stage. the final collapse of the government.s military forces is sought and, with theirfall. 'will come the collapse of the national government. The revolutionary army then,absorbs the remaining guerrilla units or disbands them and becomes the Peoples'Red Army.

The Qontrol of the military forces by the Communists is quite unusual and deservesspec~akcomment.The first point is that direct c9p.tro.lJ?ijI,Um.Ul.tar~JJlmeJl,t8,e~ceptthe image !j!efelWl.J.o~~liLQ,pm,!,s~!x,;om tj'le ,P.lU:$;¥. not from the liberation front. Withinthe party organization at each level above the village a staff section or committeeknowh variously as a revolutionary committee or military affairs committee will beestablished. 'Ehis committee is th~.•oe!:.~tor .~L~!l':.,E.1ilit~~r.ef!()!t~I}J)~~Mlfofthetart%.' Defense and gu~rrllla forces are establishedat eacn level which then respondo e party's military committee at that level. District guerrilla forces respond to

the district military affairs committee. province guerrilla forces respond to theprovlJ:lce military affairs committee, etc. With few exceptions, the district forcesconfine their activity to the district, the provincial forces to the provinces, and so on.Therll is n'yertical command line ich dire ,l1n1f.fi",!h'!',Jorces of OM gEl0g'!aphical~rea 0 e orces e on n h Wll,~QQJ\\s;ledgiqiii"IIEt£!~~'if. lnotlie'rwor III. ',!l prlilv no ary a a rs committee, would not normally controrlhe forcesof a ',distriot military affairs committee. Ther,!, are exceptions, of course. One exceptionwou1i:\ co;m,eapc;>ut W~,en. !ll

The village militia is controlled by the local liberation front committee through the current affairs section so it is, in effect, another mass organization. In fact, it is considered an elite mass organization. Of course the party also has a control mechanism to the village militia through the party cellular structure.

When regular forces are organized. they would be structured along conventional lines; that is, a successive layering of organizations and control headquarters that culminate in an army headquarters that responds to the national equivalent of a military affairs committee.

A second means of control over the nlUitary forces comes through a political channel. Witl'iiri ~lt~ "tiiil,niiii i'i"iiil 'ffi:ereTs~aporrffCarof{i.cer as well as the commanaer. "This otlicer is responsible for the ideologica1 aevelopnient and control of ifie ml1itary. He takes his orders from a security committee within the party organization. This channel extends through the military organization to the interparty groups. cells. and individual party members within the unit. Under ideal conditions, each squad will have a small cell. Its members will maintain surveillance and conduct the indoctrination and criticism meetings required daily under Communist doctrine.

The militarization stage can also involve assistance forces from an outside powerindividual agents, terrorists, guerrillas, or organized units. Vo Nguyen Giap feels that such outside assistance is necessary for ultimate victory. Yet, significant outside aid was not essential for either Mao Tse-tung in China or Fidel Castro in Cuba.

STAGE V-CONSOLIDATION ~""",~ ...,it••

With the defeat of the military and the collapse of the government, the Communists now move into stage V, consolidation. There may be isolated pockets of resistance to . be wiped out to complete the military victory. At this time, t,'l.~.,.p..r.~J s &Q:vernm~nt loyali~t~..,1:YilL!?,~,,!!.I?H.~.Q.\I1 anS! eliminated. An extensive int~lIl.gence secret oliceM1wo:r!i w.!ll. b~ e~i9J~bed that ties together the nets wIilch aIrea y ex s n controlled areas. This network will have as its primary mission the detection of any counterrevolution activity in the population.

Mass organizations will be developed additionally to control the people. ~trict cQ!ltiols will be esta1;>lished o~all acti:vities that can influence the p0{1ulatiOn, suCh as thenews media, schools; churches-ancftheentertalnment indus ry. A'Elll-iuntipn e;:opa;,anda e~t will be applied to build up the image of the new "heroiCtI leadersliip.l'ie ng'iorious" fllture of the new "Democratic Peoples I Republic," and the need for watchfulness, sacrifice, and work on the part of each citizen "revolutionist."

The, liberation front government. which had been a combination Communist-nonCommunist grouping, would evolve into a fully Communist governing body by eliminatiOl! ,Ql:~,g!lm&tiQn.llf the noo-Commugist personalities. Thereafter, the paraUei, but intertwined, party-governmental organization so typical of the Communists would maintain control.

If a~maunitshave not been re~a;.!.~~d.. !?~'i'••disbanded, this action must be Qom~Th1Scan'oe"ii"rOuc1iYproTirem ecause many'a? i'1ie 'guerrUias may never have been ideologically associated with the Communist movement and are now susceptible for recruitment into counterrevolutionary bands. There is also that understandable tendency for guerrillas to develop a spirit of independence that makes them unwilling to come under the control of any ruling group.

THE TOTAL ORGANIZATION Figure 1-5 is a schematic representation of the complete Communist organization as described in previous paragraphs.

1-15

In Ill. center and aclln... u.. o•• rall oDtrol m.cbanl.m lor Ill. enUre lnaur~cyI. Ill. Comm....l.1 Party. Gol"l 'rom the l...,h1dual membera, IIl...,..P party .......pe.to the peril' """,ml"_ .1 u.. hlper 1...1•. Ill••lnI"'u" l. Ioflped at Ill. nationalI_I by u.. Central Committee. u.. Polltb 1.....1.......~ _ a mUltary _.oJ... IMClloa lIlal actuelly~.. 11I11 Mcllon for It.. A -..-lIlDIt at _tro! _r Ill. mllll...,. ....... lIl...,.,p polllleal _I. tha, &Iso orte\M1ewith 110. po.l"tJ'. Tb1a do_I '" r .._IIlI. for .... ~"'nallonat lto,lh1""al. InpaJV tdoolOQ _ playl 1 ..aldoq role lor lb. pany.

YILLACfMILITIA

mEMO

OPERATIONAL COMTROLIDEOLOGICAL CONTROLPUTT U~11S

LOtAl

~AlIOUL

MILITARY

: '" .................

.-"

The village militia is organizationally located with other mass org;mizations. It is technically considered as another mass organization, not a formal military element.

The term "infrastructure" is frequently used in reference to an insurgent organiza" tion. As used by the US Army, the term "insur ent infrastructure" includes ll!l parw members; all member art comm ees, weer party members or not; al officerS and ell re af the front from national to hamlet level; security a~ents; ;ijl.x collectgbs; pfopagandistfj; organIzers; tttrorists,: saboteurs; saRper~; an ag't~ .. It does not include guerrillas. organized military units, or ordinary members 0 e front organization unless they are concurrently one of the included types. Thus it includes both clandestine and overt operating groups.

Seclion III. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN AND RURAL AREAS WITH WITH RESPECT TO INSURGENCY

The protracted wars advocated by Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and ehe Guevara are often categorized as "r»rU-based insurgencies" in that the insurgent strength is developed initially in the rural areas of the nation. More recently, the opposite term- "urban-bg.sed insurgepcy"-has been introduced to describe a type insurgency that is confined largely to population centers. The Venezuelan insurgency from 1958 to 1964 is an example of the latter type.

While it is \Inlikely that any insurgency would be completely rural or completely urban, the two settings do offer contrasting characteristics that might cause an insurgent to concentrate his effort in one area as opposed to the other. This section identifies some of these characteristics.

C POPULAIJ.l!lI Despite the crowded living conditions normal to cities, the fast pace of urban living tends to isolate people socially from each other. A family may never know the names of their neighbors and there is a constant movement of individuals from place to place. Strangers are commonplace and seldom noticed. This condition makes it ~ or an insur ent to melt into t nd to operate among the people wit1iOiit

oaus ng a en on. n a sma rural community this is less possible because community life is more stable, and eaoh person usually knows every other resident in the area. Here, an outsider is obvious and any insider ~ho joins the insurgent movement must operate covertly if he needs to conceal his affiliation.

The urban population will oontain more educated and skilled personnel than that of the rural area. It also will oontain more persons in key positions of government, business, and industry; therefore, it is in urba eas that n nsur ent will look for laRders and te9hn&sjliig~ for his organ za on. On e other an, 0 rura and UII'Panareasare souroes of guerrillas, saboteurs, runners, and other working-level ty,pes.

Crit!iijilS and other unsa¥9r;y &ndhj,duals will be present in relatively larger numbers in e olty. Insurgent groups often recruit these individuals for exeoution of oriminal and terrorist acts in behalf of the insurgent movement.

- PHYSICAL FEATURES . . 1I'h4;1; iQl:lnlplex of bUildings and streets in an urban area comprises a~e ~.'.uSiR' b$lis'ei'Rloited ~ an. insur~~nt. The insurgent oan operate i~f Wit ~i,in . eoomlort 0 the same ype of structures that are used for homes and businesses. He and his vehioles o.an move with relative ea.se as part of the normal cit~ traffio. If he ohooses to initiate guerrilla warfare within the oity, his strong £l()int!1I will be intermingled among the homes and businesses of honest oitizens, th$rel;ly frustrating the oounterguerrilla efforts of the seourity forces.

1-17

Rural r

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSEINTRODUCTION

Every man is a ,dissidenL!'~J!,J?9ten:~1 insurwnt. It is highly improbable that' anyhuman will ever live his life wmlou't tieing Issatisfied with some feature of hisexistence. In being dissatisfied. he is a dissident. He may choose to keep his dissatisfaction to himself, he may complain. or he may peacefully protest or demonstrate to make his dissatisfaction known. As discussed previously, dissatisfactionthat receives no relief may smolder for long periods only to be eventually fannedinto flames of more extreme forms of dissent - forms that no longer respect the law.It is here that the dissenter becomes an insurgent. •."~__,,,r.._·~UOl . en.. 'C"

reventi and res onse to ur enc is labeled internal defense.1 However,in erna efense is no, as 1 s name imp ies, entire y e ens ve. n act, itm~"':!,i.B.~basically offensive to succeed at all. Internal defense is not a new and mysteriousdoctrine or science -It Is simply' a specially oriented study of those actions ofgovernment that contribute to national development and internal security. It iss.pecial, in that it looks at these functions as preventive or responsive measuresagainst insurgency.

lnternal defen8,;~ Aetl1211S. ..Q¥o il2Ye~llment »':.in 1:I~th deter' e d be a re lt of thel$!vel oZ;grS'sfdence within a uation. (See chap l.fi - " he leve 0 unres w 11tend to 4i low wilen a government 'lias tile organiza on and initiative to foresee andact upon the needs of the nation but can reach dangerous proportions when government fails to foresee and satisfy national needs •. If unrest becomes exce.ssive, boththe insurgent and the government may become extreme in their actions. thus promoting either. internal chaos or suppressive police state actions by government.Accordingly, the efense~tiVitti in thf norwa1 range fig 1-2, were a healthy amount of social unre'stana d ssent eeps the government on a constructive path without cal,lsing unduediversion of resources to internal security functions.

(i',;}'k ;"., ,] ". i,j

l\rh:.,tert1fl'HnwtnQJ:defense'~,(I$used,\jnthis t.Kt';S .. synonymous with, the term 11 interna/,defens. dod interno),' ~ ld.v./opm.nt" whi¢h isfrequ.ntly"u.o.rf,tn,oth.r puhUcation.... 'Fh••ihgl.rt.'m,has hoon eho.oil to

guidelines have been derived to provide a fundamental basis for the understanding, planning, or evaluation of internal defense activities by a nation. All are discussed from a nation-immaterial perspective. The terms "host nation" and "host govern- ~ ment" are used to describe the affected nation. These guidelines are applicable to any nation, developing or developed, because all nations are subject to insurgent influence. With modification and interpretation, the guidelines could be made applicable to other institutions such as a .community, factory, or school.

There are two assumptions implicit in the presentation of these guidelines: (1~ governm~n~ ,,In,,,.•'l~~stio~ is the leI;@El~~9f",~h,,:nationa9l:L,c;I~i1,~y;~.,the·support or''ffie peo.e1e; ancrT2~Jii.surgent groups to.~si}..!Bl§r!l!!-.LgJ4~l,l£l~~£Y"pns are airec~.~~!,:.§_.•otjg.§.~!l~-"lIbQIjlJi! ...PEAgPllJnRi.c:!OJlot rePt.§.§,~n~. tJi!i'.}5~ ~of the naHon. It follows that, if these assumptions are not valid fria.glven insurgency, thai Insurgency could very well be justified.

INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINES

- INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO I-THE BEST WAY TO FIGHT AN INSURGENT WAR IS T.O PREVENT IT

Ho~~ri~C!;Jc~~~~::i~~At~~h,g:~; ~~~~~:t\\¥~~9J&l~rf*i~9r~«:;:~d

must determine courses of action to control it. An anarchist would propOIHil/~ti1nan is capable of communal cooperative action and could in this way resolve all connict to the satisfaction of everyone. A realist would be hard pressed to find examples in history where man has displayed this capability. Rather, he nates that society"always features some form of organization which contains a structure of authori·tt· to keep it functioning. For the family, the father is head of the household; forQ,llatfolil, the government is in charge. However, the mere presence of a structure of 'authority in an organization is no guaralltee of the viability of that group. A succeS'S~itl)1I',ganization or nation will exist only when that structure of authority provides''I.''lilSponsable

:::gem~~~l o~e~ts :~~~e~: andact1v1tie~;ai:Js~:~~:fl1!*~i mana ement as a e w en a nat nds itselfln~~~ar. uc ~e may have een a og c conseq ce··'o a governmenf(;ompfeteIy ~blivious t~l1eeds of the nation- a. gQveim"t whoWS .d,9wntall."JY.~§li!Qtb ..tlghL~llg~e,,~ also may have resui~7ec'a~ea'government, although consHt\l~,.~r, lacked the ma '" ,,',; . . to' U~ ~~;~. The objective must bea responsible, constitutional govern Ywith an a Fy 0 recognize existinllandpotential problems and to respond tot!temi,wii1Jhin its own resources or with outsidea$a'1$tance when its own resources pro'VIednadequate.

Responsible government, in prevehtihg insurgent war, will find itself SUpp1"Ellllsing subversive groups, creating refai'm,: in reillponseto legitimate appe'als, andd'fv:eloping programs of progress on its own t'nitie.tive. Dissenting groups with objectives in complete conflict with constitutional ideals must be neutralized through legal meliRS. Those movements with legitimate p~ot.$ts:'tnUst be heard by government and their protests given due consideration in gov~rnmellt programs. But, most importantly, t..h!; iovernmen\, the t aonflliC't 'ana: e'r,. mustS!\!?!ltinuously pUrsue programs07 actIon itiatmin m ze t e poss . .' 0 "' entJdevelo in • Of course, it would be over y ea s c 0 assume aa govntiHI~ltt't)cj)i,\ .ave. eforesight and initiative to keep all people satisfied at all tl:itl:e'$:;"l;)Uifi;gGv~rnmentcanfollow an approaCh which keeps its eyes, and ears open to the prol>tel1l. of the nation so that it .leaves the image of being the initiator of progress, not a reactor to assaults by dissident elements. As stated in chapter I, government mus,tl'recognIze the ineVitability of change and provide the mechanism for orderly and pei!cefu'l 'change,

2-2

Responsible government must continuously consider the total needs of the nation. A~natiR!1 is m!!9h like ao> c!!!1!l POI

~:O~~ti;~~,~i~~S:tl~~~h:a~:,,~~or Ie c~~k~~~:~~~~~~:tu~~ seC1lritv;-C '"it. riculture industr overnment, and hous n • e we1gll~ Decoroes progress ve y eavier as t e popu a on ecomes arger n number and as modernization increases individual demands. Thus the chain must concurrently gain strength to carry the load. Since a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, it follows that each link must be continually reinforced to prevent it from becoming the one that snaps, causing the population to fall. Each year there are examples of governments taking emergency action to strengthen or restore a link of their national system to prevent national chaos. Widespread labor strikes, transportation stoppages, natural disasters, student demonstrations, and public utility failures are typical of the cracks that can occur in links of the national system and threaten the stability of the entire nation. Any, government that hopes to maintain its legitimacy must continually seek to prevent the occurrence of these conditions or develop plans to minimize their effect.

All previous discussion emphasizes the importance of preventive measures on the part of government. With respect to insurgent war, prevention is synonymous with erogren because a nation can best progress if all resources and energy are applied to the nation-building process rather than wasted in combating insurgent war and in rebuilding a destroyed nation.

_ INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO 2-THE GOVERNMENT MUST SHOW THE PEOPLE THAT IT IS THE BETTER CHOICE -

If a government keeps social unrest at a low key through the planning and ex.ecution of positive nation-building programs, it will minimize development of serious competitioJ:1 from dissident groups. However, if a government is slack in these efforts, it exposes itself to insllrgent attack. When actuall challen ed b insur ent elements, the goyernmllQ1 must then act to defen its e mac~ an s ow t a s s hebetterchoice.--"',iiiJ' ' " III ill ; ~\f~, t~lfJ.ll ""lifiJi 44f'119' -='"'tt¥.I5'P'~'"

The initial overt activity of insurgents is usually some form of condemnation of government failure. In effect, the insurgent is asking, "What are you going to do about it?" If the overnment has a t a ed in e t it should, at this time. make"'Scime move owN:_ 5iQtE~.Jl;l,~,.m:QRJ,;m, If no effort Is made Py govilf'll'ment. the insurgent can lie expected to increase his activities to the point of violence. Obviously. the government task of response will become more difficult the longer the demands go unanswered, but it still must ultimately prove to the people that it has the better programs, that it properly represents the people, and that it is the ,m:o~t capable manager of the nation.

The discussion for guideline number 1 emphasized that a government does not prove its capability through impulsive reactioJ:l to dissident demands since many of these demands are contrary to the best interests of the nation. Therefore. !!u>roving it is the better choice, the government must be selective and methodical iilIfs response.It l:nustconvey the impression of consistency and stability in all actions forthese are,'characteristics associated with leadership and legitimacy. Every action and eve'l'~program mllst refiect constitutional principles and national ideals. ,

TheeeoRle are the final barometer of Fernment.s legitimacy. Seldom can a governni~n.t , expect '. ~g="~a'Vmg'llCiiVe sptlorf'bt most 01lM' population but it can feel c

INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO 3-INTERNAL DEFENSE SHOULD. BE CHARACTERIZED BY THE- INTEGRATION OF ALL FUNCTIOFl"S-SECURITY, SOCIOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-AT ALL LEVELS

Insurgent war has been described as a deliberate effort, using local adherents (with or without external support), and utilizing psychological and military efforts to weaken the entire military, economic, and political structure of an area or country so that it will fall under insurgent control. This totalnesUU!!;,~.J:l!;Eil"tnecessarily dictates that internal defense, the response to insurgent attack l also be .total and involve the full'range of nation-bui'iding and security functions. --,,~--

In chapter 1, five basic human aspirations were discussed-physical security, stlll!le/ predictable envIronment, group membership, social/economic justice, and individual achievement. Man seeks satisfaction of all of these aspirations; not one at a time, but concurrently. Physical security by itself will Ilot make a contented populationit is no guarantee of adequate food, shelter,. or opportunity. Similarly, provieipIl of economic and social needs without provision of adequate s6'curity wiUgive only temporary satisfaction at best. Thus, a~ in1!!,3Jl~~~~~".tobe complete m..!!s,t conside~ all 1l!lm.\fll.MP!!:~!Sl!1~flIlc1' nee(1s all a.I?lf£t~_JE2§X~m.

At the national' level, there must be the e uival nt of a nati nal inter defense program. s program no necessarily be detailed in single written.;! " .,. lit; tn {act, it seldom would be. Program, as used here, refers more .to a natiol1llJI:~coordinated effort, the coordination being effected by a cabinet, executive't\ouncil, or other national planning group which includes representatives of all Il,s:t}.pnal agencies with internal defense missions. ...·.~.,CiesEach of these member natiP1!!.~'Wwould have a plan or plans to support its own programs; the total of all pi!iilii of all agencies would, in effect, be the national internal defense plan. "" '(,}'In',

in~r ~:?~:f~n~feth~~O~~.it.~a:: n~io~..:lcoordi~~t:.nglt~ro:~t:a\ll ::r::lli~dtill. , ..•• '~~~.However, it is imporall a . con a n ecision-making reprelllll1'i~~I~'t'!~lI national agencies with an internal defense mission-defense, home ~i\l~!j't~;It+;!igp. affairs, treasury, labor, intelligence, etc... and that it be convenedj\l!;l 'f':9f,tlle national executive. DeC is a deci n-makin recommend . " , " , 'and coordinating irguP, Someec sons can e mae wi n m t.,t : $' ," 'r(" ,e natIonal executive. In, those instanc::~.~. where problems cannot beM ,e",,'{f,it~OC~e group, appropriate recomm.,,en.d.l\t,i9.. ax:e made to the national exe.c.,.~.t.i;.:ll;I!;,ij,fgi,"fcCf.••ns ', I'tl~. sm. During the implementatioq. jIJlI'S~, of ,programs, the NIDCC monitRJ}f1'F!~~~!jl. to minimi:i:1il duplication of programs to prevent conflict of effortancttp ~~f'lJ#nely attainment of objectiV:lils. :"';",,d ',< 'Of

'. . . I '.'~.';;. (i'f'~d,~( ,H:~ At all administrative levels below the national level; coordinating grollp~,' ~~!iM:Y e uivalent to t , mustbee,e,taqlished. These a.re referred~cL,; r ,. 0 dinat on cen ers ee The,iro!"li\l:\li:i:ati0ri and functioning arlil gAA~r,. , ll~~RLf1r 0

a 0 e NlD witll &pecific tailoring to !peet tile peculiar, J,l~~~",';\l J!'l9r,~lila it represents.

T e in and co' 1 dlilfense ro ram portance. Lacki 'come ra i1ye. When s s~tuation. deve ops, , gov rnmen oses

.. i)', consistency and is well.on ,the road :to lQlils of legitimacy.

~~:. It!TERN~ D~FENSEGUIDELI~NO 4-PLAHmf#t ,(lRGA~IZ.TION, AND CONTROL OF'It'!,TEBWAL~~~ro1E ~uNcfIONS SH(5Ul FOLLOW TH~~$TAaLlSIiED POLITICAtORGANlzAtro~pFrffE

Insurgency/internal defense is a strug~~elor.anation':the'peoPle, tile economy, the •

2-4

government. For both sides the people are thou h as a 1'0 to be vel' not a group to!:ie efeated. s s qu e un lke conventional war where the objectives are military forces which must be defeated in battle. The people of a nation are administered on a day-to-day basis through a governmental administrative system which proceeds from the national governments through the various intermediate governments to the community level. These governments correspond to the territorial subdivisions that have evolved during the history of the area. Boundaries may follow significant geographical barriers such as mountains or rivers, they may outline the settlements of certain ethnic groups, they may bound areas of high population density, or they may follow arbitrarily set lines. Whatever the reason for the divisions, they are the ones to which the people have become accustomed and the ones for which administrative machinery has been established. Of further significance, ~t is this structure that must be strengthened as part_of the nation-building program of the host patiQn. .

In the internal defens e of a nation, the government, the military, and the police are all involved. Once an insurgency progresses into more violent stages, the requirements for police and developmental leaders Will exceed the numbers available. The military is the only remaining organized group to plug the gap and they, of necessity, may nnd themselves in the role of 01 ce . er • Very often,

.these 1'0 es ecome a ona uties while they also engage in the more conventional military tasks associated with counterguerrilla warfare. The end result is that m~tx.,}l,~l.~~~k!..,1;.,';.~.2.~~~;"~~,;:;l?-edwi,th those of ,the arEi,

problems and coordinate action. It follows that .the staffs of the YariQ\l-~~ieswould be formed into working committees as appropriate or qombined i1"!t.2.,jl?lnL~.@fEr ~to coordinate work in»specialized areas such as intelligence, security, and populace ~control.

The unification of effort through mutual cooperation and coordination would extendofficially to the lowest level where functioning agency staffs exist. However, thespirit of cooperation and coordination should be carried even further. The lowliestvillage chief, religious leader, or other key communicator will be more likely toassist in internal defense if he is consulted.

Discussion to this point assumes that there are a number of concurrent programsunderway in an area. There may be situations where a single agency will be involved in an action. For example, a large-scale tactical operation in a remote areamay be planned and executed wholly by the military. An area for such operationswould be defined and the various chiefs of political/adIl).inistrative subdivisions, whichthis operational area encompasses would be advised by higher political authority thatthe area would be under military control for a certain period. There would be anexchange of intelligence or other information between the area chiefs and the military as a means of assisting planners. The military would then conduct their cam-paign and. with respect to any inhabitants in the operational area, would apply martial ~law. Return of the area to the normal administrative control would be accomplished ,as soon as possible after the operation.

INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE !:!Q ~-A NATION.WIDE, POPULATION·ORIENTED INTELLIGENCENETWORK IS A PREREQUISITE FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE SUCCESS

Intelligence collection is an essential function of forces involved in any type of conflict. In insur enc internal defen e, the need for intelli~enc!jl.)L9J'.iticalto theextent that, withou su er 0 n • g9,yernment internal defense actIOns are ~doomed to fal ure. ere are several feafiiresor--S'ubverslve Insurgency tha'tare ,partIcuLarly charlE;nging from a host nation intelligence viewpoint.

1. During early stages of subyenh:e ~Plilurgepcx, activity by the insurgent islargely clandesHne. if tlie affected nation is indifferent or apathetic. the insurgentcan expand his work without fear of deteCtion. Yet. this is the time when an insurgenc can r.To do so requir.esan-rnMll-·~rnc~e~o;.;r;.Q;a;;:n;;:i:.:z:::a;.:t~io;;:no:.....;;t:::h;;;a.;.t...;r.;;e;:a::c;;:h:.:e;;:s~i;;:n:;;to;...;;e.;.v,;;e;;,ry~..;a;;r..;e;;;a;,:,....:c;,;;o;m~m~u;;,;n;i~ty~....a:n:.:d:..:a:;c:.:t;:.iv~i;,;t;;:,y..'''O:;;t:..;;t~~ria on.

e

2•.The enemy is ever:l:JYhe.~e-hispolitical apparatus, his mass organizations, andhis mll1tary arm. He shares the sa e a d ec nom with the overnment forsn., The enemy, espec a y the members of the infras ruc ure, oa no eraentihed by a uniform, by the equipment they carry. or by their overt day-to-dayactivities.

3. The austere way of life, the sim~le logistics system, and the clandestineform of communications utilized by insur' ent errtHa forces make n

d detection b conventional intelli enoe means articularl i cult. Patrol actionsha mlg oca e a conven on or can comp e e y m ss a guerrilla force. The

guerrilla habit of hiding out in remote, inaccessible terrain compounds the problemof detection.

4. The influence f terror on individuals effectively Ileutralizes maqr, Iwrces ofv luable n ceo eop e who are known to have information of tntengence valuemay no g ve out for fear of reprisal.

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5. The range of intelligence requirements in an internal defense situation ismuch greater. Information on the guerrilla is only one important thing. There isalso need for information which can lead to detection and destruction of the infrastructure. There is a need for information about the people in general so that theirreasons for discontent and their desires can be known to the government and becomethe basis for reforms, policies, and programs. Particularly detailed informationis needed by the psychological operations (PSYOP) agencies so they can develop themost effective themes and messages. There is always a need for counterintelligenceto minimize the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence work.

To obtain the several categories of information, a host nation must have an effectivenationwide intelligence system. This is an intelligence system that is paralle1'1O'andintegratea within the internal" defense coordinating structure described earlier. The~~q}eu~" for this }~ystem is_t:t;o,st !OiC:,l,l;Y the national police because they are represenrecrara:rr-polllTcarTeveIs an Have operating elements throughout the nation.

Police also have the advantage of having been recruited to work in the area wherethey have lived. They generally confine their work to relatively small "beats" andbecome intimately familiar with individuals, families, and the day-to-day life inthe community. Hopefully, they gain the confidence of the people and the people respect them as an enforcer of the laws and as their protector. This confidence andrespect will generate the flow of information because people naturally give information to those they trust and whom they know are in a position to act upon it. Withinthe police organization sh'2,111d b~ an inte~~mce n.e:wor~_that can receive, evaluate,and dIsseminate alI Tntelligence""gaI'iie"a." 1 intlils same or anization should be aI' jjli.tQiE' of in ormation on all citizens, or an za ons a nesses. ese eswou e developed init a y throug a nation census and ident ca on s~s em.

The police 13 stem ma not extend to some of the sparsely populated s,ections of thenation an a su 13 u e organizat on 13 nee e or es areas. e mary can bean effective substitute. For example, they can dispatch patrols on a frequent bASiswhIch Intentlonally visit isolated ranchers and settlements. These patrols wouldmake positive contact with the citizens during each visit to see if there has beenunusual activity or to offer assistance. By utilizing some of the same personnelon repeated patrols a close rapport can be established and the greatest amount ofintelligence can be gainE!d. ThE! same census procedures applied in police-controlledareas would be extended to the remote areas. It fOlloWS that any military units onthis type duty should integrate their intelligence work into the nearest police con-trol headquarters. '

There may be other nonmilitary intelligence networks within a nation that servevery specialized purposes. It must be assumed that such organizations would becreated only if the police system cannot satisfy all needs. However, the presenceof additional intelligence, organiza.tions adds to the coordination problem. Agentsof different systems may not be known to each other or one agent may be servingtwo or more systems. This may lead to interagency jealousies and detract fromthe efficiency of both. If there are two or more seRarate nonmilitary intelligences stems in be d toward ihe sharing of common Interestn e gence at each political administrative leve •

The

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political! administrative area will enter that area's control! coordination structure.Intelligence elements of the ACC would brief the incoming unit on the situation andthereafter the military unit would share in the intelligence collection and dissemination effort.

- INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE .IiQ ~-PSYCHDLOGICAL OPERATIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED ANDEMPLOYED AS A PRIMARY INTERNAL DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEM

Emphasis has already been given to the ,need for positive and progressive government programs either as an insurgency preventive technique or in response to insurgent attack. The full effect of these programs can be achieved only-it the peopleare fully informed of them. In knowing of the programs or in realizIilg oenefits fromthem, the people will be more likely to identify the government as an agent of progress and 'their rightful manager-key objectives in the maintenance of legitimacy.The advertisement of these r rams i...~.J~§IJs. ..IILf§x:Q.~. PSYOP will seek toprove that e government s the est choice while simultaneously showing that theprograms of any insurgent groups are not in the best interest of the nation. Accordingly. PSYOP is a major weapon for enhancing the government.s image anddestroying that of subversive insurgents.

PSYOP will not be directed entirely at the population. ~rogram also must bedirected to the insurgent organization. This program will a tempt to convince theinsurgents that their campaign is doomed to failure and that the host nation government will be the ultimate victor and will best serve the people. It will also encourageinsurgent defection.

Other PSYOP efforts should be directed toward the host nation forces - military.paramilitary, police, and civil. Members of these forces will be working or fightingamong the people on a day-to-day basis. Their methods of operation and their attitudes can influence the success of many programs. Thus. it is e§sential j:j),M these

,."- -'ll!erators be continuously oriented and motivated insure that their contributions~re pos ve.

PSYOP planning will be an inclusive Thereshould be a national PSYOP Ian.im lementation'Or e nex 1t e guidance 0 t ese pans.

d .:e,SYOP plan of the area in which theY operate; that is,PSYOP gu ance and directionwlii not necessarl!y come through agency or force channels. For example, an infantry brigade may be subject to employment anywhere in the nation. If one battaliontask force of this brigade is detached and sent to a certain district on an internaldefense mission, it will enter the district control! coordination structure. The battalion will ,P."1 advised of tiJe district internal defense plans to include the PSYOPplan. Theseptans are then th~, guidance for that battalion. The brigade. not beingin, a position to know the area and its people. is not in the best position to developmeaningful objectives and themes so it should not attempt to direct the battalion'sP$'tOP efforts; it should only give Personnel and material support necessary forthe battalion's portion of the district pzoogram.

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- INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO 7-A PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT MUST INCLUDE THE CREATION OR STRENGTHENINGOF A SPIRIT OF NATIONHOOD AMONG THE PEOPLE

In early 1968, a captured Viet Cong terrorist, Nguyen Van Sam, was interviewed by an American journalist. Van Sam was asked to comment on the appeal of the Viet Minh which he had joined as a youth. He stated, .

"They taught patriotism, for instance, to follow the example of King Quang Trung and King LeLoi, who defeated the Chinese invaders many centuries ago; and it was' beautiful, because it was the first time that someone told be about my native land. Before, I did not know what it was to have a native land because I did not know what native land means. Now, I know. Your native land is like your mother, who must be defended and respected, even if in doing SJ) you die. Your native land is like your hut. And, if someone breaks into it to take it, you must drive him out, . . . whoever he may be: Russian or Chinese or French or American."

This quotation emphasizes the strength of a feeling of national belonging- a spirit of nationhood. In chapter 1, group membership was identified as gne g.t: tQe J)a~!.9 as irations. A nation is one such group. It is an exce tional rou in that 10 alty to tee n where the are w :IIIiig todie or t lie §hQul nc u e measures

esi ned to stren ood.

A spirit of nationhood cannot be developed in a matter of days; nor, can it be forced upon a person. To have this spirit, a person must know his nation, he must share the national ideals, he must associate himself with the nation, and he must feel committed to it. Such feelings take time to grow•

A first ste in the development of a s irit of nationhood is one of basic education. The people must be in ro uce .0 eir nation-its geograp C struc ure, SOCIOlogical composition,' history, basis and operation of the government, and culture. Persons and thin s which are of national s mbolic value must be iven em has is 'in

s s uy assoc a n em w e rowan u n of e nat on. The ag an na ona an em are wo 0 e mos mpor an sym 0 s. ers could be a monarch, national heroes, historic shrines, postage stamps, money, mode of dress, art forms, customs, and architecture. If th13 study of these symbols is properly integrated into the story -of the nation, the viewing of them will thereafter tend to stimulate a feeling of national pride in the observer.

The general philosophy of PSYOP is applicable to the education process in that the exact approach to education of a given group must be tailored to· fit that group. Few nations are homogeneous. More likely there are several ethnic groups, religions, and social classes involved. The differences cannot be overlooked or avoided but the approach taken must seek to emphasize common threads of strength among all groups and to deemphasize sources of friction between them. Racial, rel\tious, or re ional ride has its place but it must be subordinate to national. ride. owever, w en a mem er 0 . as contr ute s fcan 0 e na on's histor t s Elserv . parcu ar em as s s nee en ances 0 n ra rou and 'national ~.

Education will have lastin effects only if the daily lives of the citizenry include ea at cont nuall em n em 0 e r se 0 e ag,

display of pictures of the nationa· execu v or ng, para es, na onal holidays and festivals, field trips to the capital city or to historic sites, .visits by important persons, and dramatic and musical productions are examples of such features. Of

2-9

course, the actions of representatives of government-officials. tax collectors,and police - can either enhance or detract from the national image.

Kel communicators in an" area-rt;ligious )eaders, viJl~g!L£!l~,f~".,J!!l;l9hers,.,e.~c.deserve particular attention. visits"1O the 'narron's capital, observation of governmental bodies at work and personal meeting of important national figures promotestheir association with the national government. Similarly, individuals of nationalprominence should visit communities and make particular efforts to meet and visitwith the key communicators. Liberal use should be made of a camera to recordthese meetings and visits and copies of pictures should be widely disseminated. Thiswill appeal to the ego of the individuals on the picture while also strengtheningtheir commitment to the government. But, the ultimate benefit of this attention willcome when these key communicators help shape the attitudes of the rest of thepopulation.

- INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO~-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS MUST SEEK TO CREATE WITHINTHE PEOPLE BOTH A DESIRE AND AN ABILITY FOR SELF·IMPROVEMENT

"Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day; teach him how to fish and he willeat as long as he lives."

Ancient Proverb

The philosophy contained in this simple proverb is the same as that intended by theeighth guideline. Man's aspiration for social/economic justice establishes for himcertain goals in the social and economic area. These goal~Lqyolveboth,maieri~objllStli .ilnd sta,tus. Material objects can be given and status can be decreeQ'hutman's other aspiration, individual achievement. will be satisfied only when he feelsthat the objects and the status have come through his own efforts. He finds no pridein being a recipient of welfare; in fact, it is degrading. However, there is greatpride to be gained in learning to help one's self. It is this learning process thatmust be incorporated in development programs -learning to communicate, learningmore efficient methods, learning to grow new crops or to raise new animals, learningnew crafts, etc.

a 0 ulation's ex ectations be satisfied with all haste. What peopleook for most is evidence, Of progress e ng ma e toward achievement of their

goals. If they see that the government is interested in their plight and is helping themto help themselves, they are more likely to respect the government as their legitimate administrator.

Obviously, there are times when a government must engage in emergency welfareoperations to meet the basic needs of a group that is suffering. but such programsmust be approached as interim solutions while the people are taught to be'selfsufficient. A nation c ill-arf I'd to indul e in Ion -term veaw .P!:!?&~~,!i!"to

otentially roductive elements n ecause eac non roductive ersoni is' in fact, extensive we are programs can eas y, scourage the productive elemen s of society who carry the burden. When welfareprograms are overdone, the productive elements become discouraged and may turnagainst the government. Further, overall national develo ment cannot occur untilthe total population roduces no on e e u va en 0 e r asic nee s. u ex ra¥t' 'c can e so ra e , or re nves e or such eve opmen "

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-INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO 9-THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF COUNTERINSURGENT ACTIONS MUST BE THE BREAKING DOWNOF-AN ORGANIZATION, NOT THE INFLICTION OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INSURGENT CASUALTIES

Although an insurgent organization can be of many forms and follow many paths it will always consist of a control elsIr\'1nt pl!!LYJI.E~y,§",aCUQllo !ll'ilments. The control element would be the first to appear, action elements being developed as possible and necessary to perform detailed functions such as newspaper publication. fundraising, PSYOP, and terror. T!J,~"t!,)1nk~_WI,,~~,J?lr~S~~!:,~,.l!.~nm£h,J,i.~~.~"~~.and, r90~ .IlY.lit,U,Ul;;PtUMIilQlld tQ.·tll e ",goi~1?l R:l11lU?; the branches correspond to action ~U.li!s:and the leaves corres ond to inCllvfCl a.iIiIiIii...

back toa distant homeland and thereafter forgotten. hu a overnment mustapI?:rpach~" ~£oblem,_with.th& .Jill;li.l~!l.gp,!l~ th.::;.t~he m~imum~~r cw!,:~(and del'e~;r\:oulf'E..;~I;lYil,,!'!~l1.!at~~!il~od)!Ct'fVe. m;~erS'011he nation i~,,!~~.,~orrest poss ee. .

~c:fecttp,!-, rather than capture. is .~th,:_ ¥r~ferred ,rnethg,,;:}f~~yha'Ve o be ex en e 0 e ami es 0 e ec ors 0 reven repr sa s against them. ,..'>'0'."

Extending the ·hand of friendship does not imply forgiveness of criminal acts committed in connection with activities of the insurgent movement. The ha . hip is intended to rovide an eas . ,many m s s in the insurgent movement who were forcsdintg the·me ment or were oyerw;h!l&med by insuUIlUi pr2Rii!Wda. Those captives andde£ectors who are identifieCl as having ,committe criminaT acts must be punishedaccoJ'ding to the law and physically separated from those in the routine rehabilitatien pr.ogriun.

Reward!! Can play an important contributing role~Jn a qefectioq pr~~. D~fectors can be offered rewards for coming in, for bringing evidence of· ling insurgent leaders, for bringing in weapons. or for furnishing cer.tatn informllttien. These rewards should be well advertised and promptly paid to be effective.

iThegaining of productive citize?s. the conservation ef combat terees, the shrinking of the insurgent ranks, the gaming of intelligence, and· the '9ir.eaiiilllnof neWPSYOP ~themes are all adyantages ,to. be gained frQm a pgsUiye defest'poLarpneaty program. But, such a program. cann~t""6e expected to neutralize an e~t1>J'einsu,rgentorganization. A ainst those at refuse this rou e . ;I the mus eat ose cap ure compriSe another group who need convers on ut they cannot e accorded the warm welcome given defe.ctors or processed with them. However, ca tives should ee it . t el t to .artici ate in rehabilitat on ro rams durin eir As in any pI' sonpopua on. eJ'e are many pr soner w o,W' e receptive to complete rehabilitation.

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_INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO U~INTERNAL [)EFENSE HAS CONSTRUc;TIVE GOALS; SPECIFIC INTERNAL [)EFENSE ACTIONS MUST BE TAILORED TO PROMOTE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESEGOALS

Internal defense is like conventional warfare in that all actions should support thefinal objective. However. the objectives of the two differ significantly- in conventional war the objective is subjugation of another nation through destruction of itsarmed forces; in internal defense the objective is the construction or strengtheningof a nation-nation building. All internal defense actions should contribute to thisconstructive goal. •

The bulk ofJS:mliC activities in the nation-building program of internal defense€fe conStrue '. iir Very patUJ:e. Others. such as police control measures andcounterguerrilla campaigns. are' basicall~ destructive or inconveniencing. Yet,even these actions can be planned to provra a pos1t1ve contrtbuhon to l'lail8h buildingif the l.eth2d 0t Jmplew~ntat!9n is designed. to Strengtfien gooawill between thesecurity orces. as represen atives of government. and the people.

Security operatigns are designed either to rotect the ulati n e

«k~~"C',:: '-",," , " .."" ''',: , " . , '

,,I.ll~"IJPl'lnWl(i!~$. ·0r· restrictions shQuld be removed when nQ lOnger· essential.etQ.~:,f:b'~l J:J?j.(,;l i:,1 j :U, ," ' "', _ ,'_.' , -,I', , " . ",:~:'i-,-It ',')u'1actil;ons should be coordinated through appropriate area coordini!~(!)ncent':j!!

"Wi"tI\1lUil';.unanimftY of action.~

- INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO 12-POLICIES REGARDING .SUPPRESSION OF INSURGENT

VIOLENCE SHOULD BE FORMULATED BEFORE VIOLENCE OCCURS, BE I3ASED ON LAW, BE

PUBLICIZED, AND BE ENFORCEABLE

A ma 'or lateau in an i ur e c is reached when ~aC;~f~Ji£.~.iBW~:cts o v 0 ence. en s occurs, the governmen must react to suppress the olence ano prevent its spread. Res onse to iolent insur ent acts will nor.W.,;\llZ be /JlQre difficult than to common ac s 0 cr me or severa reasons. rsr, in most cases,

e ac s 0 v 0 ence wave een planned by the insurgent control group and will be so well executed that the possibility of apprehension of the executors is minimal. ' Second, many acts of violence will be committed as part of mob action so that identi fication of individuals for prosecution is virtually impossible. Third, government will find itself under pressure to apply a lower standard of justice to the insurgents than to ordinary citizens when there is public sympathy with insurgent claims that violence is a logical form of protest. Finally, those militants apprehended and jlililed by authorities automatically become heroes and martyrs, rather than apprehended criminals, and their detention becomes cause for further violence.

qO{erreAt~, m st ositi e ce, as with any insurgent 'act of ex rem sm, is to la • To do this, government must first a mit to the t f violence occurrin an te plans a r combat it, e as s r suc lans will o e land so these must e' r;sear~Eed to determine their a equacy. Ifelaws are ac ng in some way, appropriate legislation must be enacted to creiilW adilquate government authority to deal with violence and the resultant code of law must be publicized. Next, t,!},'il l{9vergw lilpt roue t prllRlir~ itlilll~{"'Q yghold the law. Various control measures and police/military actions that might be necessliry should be thoroughly planned so that actions can be taken in a prompt, decisive manner with all necessary forces and equipment. What must be av ded is an lu ess in :.;esponse •since this tends to give legitimacy to the violent acts an n icates government weakness. On the other ha al vernment re 0 e wi sustain or enhance the overnmen s ma e of stren h an a y.

For government reaction against insurgent violence to be effilcttve, 'it follOWlil that th!"~l?J.~ and. t\!,e military ffildst be ize a d trained t '. s. Tra n ng 1ii'Survemance, search, and riot contro s normal or.tb,~ p,9,ce; but, for the military, special training will be appropriate. Such spesial,tX'~iflin,g.should become normal for the military so that they will be prepared to proviae immediate

\>fll'tl'-support when needed.

",",' INTERNAL DEFENSE GUIDELINE NO 13-THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOFFfHE INlJlERNAL DE. FENSE Of A NATION RESTS WITH THAT NATION. OUTSIDE NATION ASSISrANCE IN THIS EFFORT MAY BE JiELPFUL OR NECESSARY, BUT CAN BE COUNTERJ!'R~U¢lI'-WEIF,MISAPPLIED

Internal defense, being primarily a nation-building process; iis'rt!olftlnuous and necessarily extends through all stages of development of a natton·frollb. the time that it is completely dependent, through its developing anaBEirr~geiil.\l:l:!l!,t'ing stages, to the point where it is self-sustaining. Until a nation do'es'beeome elf-sus in i~ obvious1 mu nd on outside ass s ance to meet its everyday needs plus any requirements for eve opmen. ur ng per 0 sof interll«:I 'pEtito's, a developing nation would need significant Iilssistance only in the economte' and sociopolitical areas. But, during periods when its internal security is threatened, extensive military assistance may be appropriate. In the most extreme 'criSEI'. commitment of foreign operational forces may be essential to maintain the stability of the host nation's government.

2-14

The need for outside as.!!istauce. Jo .develO~ing 0X:~.~hreate~!l,Ul3:.tio!!:s is. manifest. It is the o15jectives and specific kinds of ass stance that '6ecome suti]ect to question. In chapter 5, foreign assistance is discussed in detail-both economic and military. This chapter emphasizes that all forms of assistance to a host nation must be compatible with host nation capabilities, support the nation-building and security programs of the nation, and be in furtherance of the foreign policy of the assisting nation. Interwoven within all assistance programs must be a philosophy of making the recipient nation self-sustaining in all spheres of activity in the shortest period Oft time• ..~.!:t~ the ..?ep' itself,e~eh,!!sis .rp.~~.~,~~~.~~1.f?1~~,.!?~~~2no on proVlSlon - s.

• -. S' Sfl)

It is in the military' assistance area where the form of assistance becomes parti cularly sensitive, especially when outside nation operational forces are introduced. On this subject, LTC Luis A. Villa-Real, Philippine Army, in his book Huk Hunting, made the statement,

"Foreign troops are certain to be less welcome among the people than are the regular armed forces of their own government . . • It would be rare, indeed, if the use of foreign troops would not in itself doom to failure an antiguerrilla campaign."

Although many would disagree with the statement made in the last sentence of this quote, all should agree that there can be many dangerous sidll-'ii~8fl'i1tr~ of forei troo s which can r ve to be counter roductive for tne'Overa 1 int.ernal

efense program 0 e nation. ong e po ent a pro ems are these:

1. The economy of an area, if not the entire country, can be upset by the intre:>d);\,9,UQg.~,..J!!mif.i,llilltnJ,jmt1Ill:§ ~,,p,lli~RI?,e!.. This is especially true if these forces come from a developed nation. These forces will be competing with the population for various necessities and this will drive prices up. If the forces have leisure time and money to spend in the civilian community, the problem will be compounded. The net effect is one which counters the objective of strengthening the nation's economy as part of the nation-bUilding program. It can also create resentment among the population.

2. If allied

be a tendenc

~~~~n~go~n~~~~~~~~ in th~e~~~~:.:r:

3. The presence of allied forces in an affected nation ~ves the insur~ent an entirely new theme. These forces become "imperialists," capttatists," PagenisOf a colonial power," etc., in the words of the insurgent. He fully exploits this idea in his propaganda effort directed at the population.

4. The addition of allied forces can stimulate unfavorable world o£inion against the host nation and its allies. '!'he operation can be portrayed as outsre force being used to suppress a purely internal problem.

5. The introduction of outside forces in behalf of the government may caJ:!se some other o\jtside power to come to the aid of the insurgent. .

·w'

2-15

forces control structure of the host nation. Howev

~~~7~.~T~h~e¥Jin~d~i~vi~dU~al~m~e~m~b~e~r~S~O~f~th~e~a~ll~i~e~d~f~0~r~c~e~s~m~a~~b~e~~oo~~~1~i~d2£ttinate,cljE.the ea S 0 e ass s e na on s n erna e ense prograw. Cao;.~less application of a purely mary so u on o· ac pro e ea or set back the work of nonmilitary programs.

8. Overzealous artici ation in civic action b allied forces; that is. civic action which is not in consonance w e os na on eve opmen program, can stimulate population expectations beyond a level ~u£Eortable by the ~~~U2~~ndeparture

.. x.of the 'a:I11ed unit. '.11 (,':..

2-16

CHAPTER 3

NATION BUILOING

INTROOUCTION

Ask five individuals for a definition of nation building and expect five different responses. It is a relatively new term, not yet officially defined, and is not enjoying common understanding. Most often it is used synonymously with economic development or internal development. This text treats nation building as the building of a society that is able to act as the prime defender of its goals and meanings, able to engage in the maintenance of its boundaries with reepect to other societiee, and capable of generating its own objectives which, in the political sector, will define the national policy of that society. This definition gives nation building a meaning be;(ond, ~~.velo£';.lent! development being generally understood to involve processes and programswtffi specified objectives - security, economic improvement, social improvement- that mayor may not contribute to nation bUilding. Hopefully, development programs would complement and promote the nation-building process and vice versa. Thus, t.he objective of nati2a..llui]'s,!~Wl'..,.M.'i,lIlecreaUfllJ gt a stable societ;>" ().'tp;able of self-ggycornment anC! stable relaUQ!¥lbum,Jti!b gthe;r societies. The routes to this objective are many, and"'the guIdance for choosing a route is nebulous. This chapter seeks to give 'flome organization to the process by discussing the philosophy, principles, and key col\.siderations involved.

VALUE THEORY

A socie.t;>; ..~.-L..i.~~l...msuYJ.sl~l"l, liVing in a re1':ltL'?nship that permits them to perpetuate themselves over generations, to maintain meanIngful boundaries that define geographical and ecological space in which they live interdependently, and to meet the long-term needs of reproduction and the short-term needs of survival. In developing this status, a societ will take on a culture or a set of inte d eanings, valp!".s, ,,'tfld ommuni a lon, w th a en ant artifacts that are characteristic of its way of life and tha govern the lives of individual members. A society can be a nation, a part of a nation, or an entity independent of a nation. An example of a society not part of a nation would be the displaced Jews of Europe prior to the establishment of Israel.

A societr becomes a nation when it has matured t oi t that a e in ~-governmen• ecom sana n- e it e art ci ail . in varIous Porms of po lca e av or w t res 0 other states. In ian tribes of early American history are typical 0 nations that did not become nation-etates. Thus, the g~tion-building pr,9cess takes individuals; c~~es from them a society, with attendant culture; and ~v;ntuah;x moIgs Ibat sgcNt;,; into ~ nation-stat;' .

on s These values provee cohes on at mo ds groups 0 individuals into a society. Values are the developed commitments individuals feel which cause them to actin certain ways in a given situation. A lengthy list of values that may be held by individuals could be developed. Duty-Honor- Country, the motto of the United States Military Academy, summarizE>s threE> basic values that the professional soldier shoulll hold. SelfishnE>ss, selflessnE>ss, permissiveness, discrimination, patronage, fatalism, idolism, and resignation are typical of other terms that can bE> used to describe an individual's values. With respect to value orientations directed toward a sociE>ty or nation,