THE EXTREMES AND ABSURDITIES OF IMPEACHMENT AND IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

THE TWELFTH WORKSHOP OF  

PARLIAMENTARY SCHOLARS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS 

WROXTON COLLEGE, WROXTON, OXFORDSHIRE, UK, 25-26 JULY 2015

IBRAHEEM OLADIPO MUHEEB, Ph.D.DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN NIGERIAibraheem_muheeb@yahoo.com

&  

EMMANUEL REMI AIYEDE, Ph.D.DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN NIGERIAeaiyede@yahoo.com

THIS PRESENTATION

Problems/Issues• The oversight function of the legislature has often been exhibited within the precincts of impeachment

threat.

• Impeachment becomes the constitutional weapon to extract compliance of, and commitment from the executive, resulting in accusation and counteraccusation of blackmail in the disguise of oversight.

• Impeachment threats also become bargaining chips amidst allegations of financial inducements for legislative loyalty and understanding.

 • Rules of engagement are observed in breach, and the ends to which impeachments are committed have

often been self-serving, bringing governance to a halt in some cases.

Therefore, this paper:• Interrogates the incidence of impeachment campaigns in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999-2015)

• Examines the substantive and procedural underpinnings of select impeachment campaigns.

• Uncovers the circumstances of political exchanges on which impeachment campaigns thrive.

• Highlights how its prevalence hindered intra and inter-institutional relations, and institution building in accountability terms.

INTRODUCTION 1

The Legislature and Specific Legislative Powers• The legislative powers of the Nigerian Federation are vested in the National Assembly comprising

the Senate and the House of Representatives - Section 4(1-2) of the 1999 Constitution.

• Section 4(6-7) defines the legislative powers of the State House of Assembly similar to those of the National Assembly with separation of powers and checks and balances among the three arms of government.

• Sections 50 & 92 contains provisions for the emergence and removal of Principal officers of the legislature at the national and subnational levels respectively.

• Sections 80-89 grant the National Assembly oversight powers including modalities for auditing public accounts, appointment of auditor-general, investigation as well as power as to matters of evidence.

• Sections 120-129 also grant subnational legislatures oversight powers similar to that of the National Assembly.

• These powers are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling the legislature to: • Make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence,• Correct any defects in existing laws; and • Expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence

and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated.

INTRODUCTION 2

Conceptual Clarifications:• Impeachment is within the ambit of checks and balances to guide against possible abuse of

power by public officials and it is within the context of separation of powers.

• It is a process that is used to charge, try, and remove public officials for misconduct or serious malfeasance while in office.

• It must be for acts and omissions amounting to gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of the office.

• It is a power granted the legislature, acting on behalf of the people, to ensure that public officials act within the ambit of the constitution and in accordance with established and acceptable norms of social and official conduct.

• Impeachment, either as grave violation or breach or a misconduct, implies that the allegation must be weighty and not petty prior to impeachment campaign given the executive’s popular mandate.

• Impeachment is to be carried out by the legislature in collaboration with the judiciary.

• It is to be deployed sparingly.

MODELS

The United States of America (USA) – • Held as model for Nigeria’s federal democracy with shared constitutional and structural configurations.• Here, civil officers including Senators and Judges could also be impeached – literature attests.• The American constitution also highlights specific grounds for impeaching a public officer. • Common articles of impeachment include false testimony, fabrication of false records, and improper disclosure of

confidential law enforcement information.

• Article II, Section 4 states that: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on impeachment for, and Conviction of, treason, bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.”

• The phrase “High Crimes and Misdemeanors” left the exact definition of impeachable offenses open to interpretation by Congress, it is generally interpreted to mean both indictable offenses and other serious misconduct, including corruption, dereliction of constitutional duty, and violation of limitation on the power of an office.

• It is sparingly invoked on strong evidence of breach or substantial abuse of power at both the Federal and State levels.

• From the passage of the federal Constitution to the mid-1990s, only 50 impeachment proceedings were initiated.• Only fifteen officers have been successfully impeached since 1787 when the American Constitution became

operational.

The United Kingdom (UK) with shared history as colonial master• UK has since developed what is known as “passing a vote of no confidence” on any erring public officer for

offence serious enough to warrant such a fundamental parliamentary decision. This has been sparingly used when considered absolutely necessary.

THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

• The 1979, and the 1999 Constitutions were not explicit on grounds for impeachment, thus granting the legislature broad latitude to exercise discretion in the interpretation of ‘gross misconduct’.

• Sections 143(11) and 188 (11) of the 1999 Constitution merely define “gross misconduct,” as a grave violation or breach of the provisions of the constitution or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the opinion of the House of Assembly to gross misconduct.

• Successive Nigerian constitution inadvertently put the executive at the mercy of the legislature.

• Pliable and reckless legislatures had feasted on the constitutional lacuna to impeach on frivolous grounds.

• Former Governor Alhaji Balarabe Musa of the defunct People’s Redemption Party (PRP) of the old Kaduna State was impeached by the State House of Assembly dominated by equally defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second Republic, 1979-1983.

• Balarabe Musa was the only executive Governor so impeached under the 1979 constitution.

FOURTH REPUBLIC - THE PDP YEARS (1999-2015)

1999-2015• Going by Sections 69 and 110 of the Nigerian Constitution, while constituents can recall their elected

representatives serving in the legislature, Sections 143 and 188 prescribe impeachment of an erring President, Vice-President, Governor or Deputy-Governor. Section 188 (1-11) outlines the procedure for the removal of a Governor or Deputy Governor like 143(1-11) for President and Vice-President as well.

• The legislature demonstrated strong will in holding executive accountable through oversight tools, without which the executive would have assumed dictatorial tendencies in certain circumstances.

• The recurring cases of impeachment fraught with controversies have further enhanced the prominence of the legislature, more as an impediment to governance and a threat to institutional and systemic stability.

• The energy, time, and resources committed to impeachment campaigns were often at variance with the letters and spirit of the constitution as regards legislative oversight and representation.

• Principal officers in the legislature at both levels were not spared the new-found confidence in the potency of impeachment, depriving legislatures the benefit of cohesion, leadership and institutional stability.

• Leadership turnover was high in the executive and the legislature at both levels. Between 1999 and 2003, the Senate had three Presidents, just as it had two between 2004 and 2007. There were six Speakers of the Federal House of Representatives between 1999 and 2015.

FREQUENCY & SELECT CASES 1

Survey of Impeachments in the Fourth Republic 1999-2015 (National Level)• The controversial deployment of impeachment became a recurring subject during the first decade of the Fourth Republic.

• Former Senate President, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo claimed to have survived seven impeachment attempts before his eventual removal by his colleagues on sundry charges.

• The legislative-executive relationship at the federal level was characterized by threats of impeachment at the slightest provocation.

• Over six impeachment campaigns were launched against President Obasanjo.

• The first threat was recorded with a motion moved by Senator Francis Arthur Nzeribe in May 2000 on a fifteen-count charge.

• The second unsuccessful impeachment move was the House of Representatives attempt to pass of Vote of no confidence on the President on the eve of President Bill Clinton’s visit to Nigeria.

• The impeachment threat came to the climax with the two-week ultimatum issued on August 13 2002 by the House of Representatives for President Obasanjo to either resign or face impeachment on a seventeen-count impeachable offences.

• This was repeated in May 2005, when some members of the lower chamber again embarked on impeachment campaign against the President.

• The House of Representatives also issued an impeachment threat against President Umaru Yar’Adua for his failure to implement the 2009 budget.

FREQUENCY & SELECT CASES 2

• There were four unsuccessful impeachment campaigns against President Jonathan in 2012 alone.

• The first impeachment threat was made following the January 2012 anti-fuel subsidy removal protests 

• The second was during the controversial private contribution to the Anglican Community Church renovation project in President Jonathan’s home town of Otuoke, a gesture interpreted as a bribe for contract award by the House of Representatives.

 • President Jonathan President was also accused of nepotism in his appointments in another threat.

 • There was the 19th July, 2012 impeachment campaign against Jonathan on allegation of non-implementation of the 2012

budget, which came into force only on April 13, 2012. The campaign spearheaded by Hon. Femi Gbajabiamila of the then Action Congress of Nigeria accused the President of haphazard implementation of the budget which the group thought must be 100 percent implemented.

Subnational Level• Only a few subnational legislature in Nigeria have not experience impeachment of its principal officers. The Speaker of Abia

State House of Assembly was changed twice within the first legislative year May 1999 and June 2000. At the same time in Delta State, the Speaker was initially suspended and later impeached for visiting President Olusegun Obasanjo without the prior approval of the Assembly.

• The first Speaker of the Ekiti House of Assembly, was on record to have had the shortest stay in office having stayed for only 37 days. He resigned on July 7 1999 due to impeachment threats from his colleagues.

• In Northern Nigeria, Speaker of the Kano State House of Assembly, Ibrahim Gwaramai and his Deputy, Zakari were impeached within the first legislative year 1999-2000.

• As regards the executive, Deputy Governors were the initial victims, as impeachment became a potent instrument at the disposal of Governors to whip uncooperative and recalcitrant Deputies into line like in Abia, Osun, Anambra, Akwa Ibom, Ekiti, Enugu State and Ondo States.

• Common to all was non-adherence to extant rules and constitutional provisions.

FREQUENCY & SELECT CASES 3

• For the Governors, the impeachment campaign against Jolly Nyame was dropped allegedly on the intervention of Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, then Vice President. This was however alleged to have cost the State 2.2million Naira graft for each legislator.

• Impeachment was grossly abused as rules of engagement were flouted or observed in breach particularly between 2005 and 2007. No fewer than 5 Governors were impeached on sundry charges.

• Hasty impeachment campaigns were launched against Governors of Bayelsa, Plateau, Oyo, and Ekiti States. • 18 of the 32-member Oyo State House of Assembly impeached the State Governor, Rashidi Ladoja.• Ekiti State Governor, and his Deputy, were impeached amidst dissenting pronouncements of two different Investigative

Panels leading to the declaration of a state of emergency.

• 21 lawmakers of the Anambra State Assembly impeached Governor Peter Obi at 5.30am on November 2 2006. • Joshua Dariye of Plateau State was impeached by a faction of six legislators of the 24-member Assembly at 6.30am on

November 13 2006. Adamawa, Nasarawa and Enugu cases in 2014 were also mired in controversies.

• Impeachment campaign were launched for the settlement of personal scores or to achieve limited political gains and for financial gratifications.

• While not exonerating victims of malfeasance, incessant deployment of impeachment in a manner suggestive of sinister motives or for reasons other than constitutionally envisaged was an extreme abuse of powers.

• Impeachment campaigns also thrive on the vulnerability of State Assemblies to external manipulations on account of their structural inadequacies and palpable weak dispositions of legislators.

 • Federal might also interfere in impeachment campaigns with the militarisation of the impeachment processes through

massive deployment of security forces, huge funding for plots and tacit support for default interpretation, and manipulation of the numerical requirement for the exercise of impeachment power.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT

Implications for the Consolidation of Popular Government • Incompatibility of Oversight and Constitutional Breaches: Identifiable irregularities in each of the

cases invalidate the processes. Panel membership composition controversies witnessed in Ekiti, breach of constitutional provisions regarding what constitute a quorum experienced in Plateau and Oyo State, hasty impeachment exhibited in Adamawa & Ondo States and militarization of the processes are worthy of note.

 • Perception of Roles and Responsibilities: The ease with which impeachment was deployed affirmed the

view that perhaps, only a handful of elected officials genuinely understood the different and varied roles attached to their respective positions.

• Impeachment as Inhibition: Ii has brought about gridlocks on a number of occasion with huge cost on governance, stultifies the growth of quality representation. It has led to the dissolutions of legitimately constituted representative institutions including the legislature through the declaration of state of emergency in Plateau and Ekiti States in 2005 & 2006 respectively.

• Compromised Institution/Monetisation of Impeachment: In a veiled scare of impeachment, some executives were forced to bend over backwards to negotiate for ‘legislative loyalty and understanding’ The level of energy on display during impeachment campaigns and impeachment processes is not comparable to the energy applied to the core representative duties of the legislators.

• Impeachment in lieu of elections: impeachment was used as shortcut to power (Sections 146(2) & 191(2)) as was the case in Adamawa and Ekiti, which paved the way for the declaration of state of emergency (Section 305) with the appointment of an administrator by the national executive in lieu of all democratic structures for a period of 6 months in the first instance.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Concluding Remarks• Virtually all impeachment proceedings initiated between 1999 and 2007 were fraught with substantive

and procedural inadequacies laying bad precedence which subsequent actors exploited thereby endangering democracy and laying the groundwork for further distortions.

 • Most victims had no benefit of fair hearing going by the speed with which investigative panels

purportedly concluded their assignments vis-à-vis the pronouncement of impeachment.

• Indiscriminate use of impeachment was a negation of the intention of the framers of the Constitution. 

• While those who commit impeachable offences should not be spared, impeachment campaign should not be to the detriment of effective representation, and good governance.

• Legislatures at all levels should be more proactive in holding the executive accountable through active and unbiased oversight. Legislators should also dispose their responsibilities with utmost decorum.

• They must resist the temptation to abdicate their statutory roles and representative calling for damaging political expediency.

• The judiciary must live above board when the intent and process of impeachment are flawed and its intervention required.

• Electorate must take elections into the legislature more seriously to ensure quality representation, and checkmate the performance of legislative duties in ways and manners not contemplated by the constitution.