provides a clear and succinct summary of the development of the European Commu-

nity and Union, but on other occasions it is unhelpful. Slovenia, we are told earlier in

the book, is about the size of New Jersey in terms of territory. For many readers this

will be a comparison of two unknowns. Third, the copy editors ought to have removed

the frequent references to the present tense. Although it is true that when this reviewer

read the book Dimitrij Rupel was still ‘currently the high-profile Foreign Minister’

(p. 118), one wonders whether that will still be the case when this review is read let

alone when the book is taken off library shelves in years to come. Indeed, elsewhere in

the monograph, Ivica Racan is described as the Croat prime minister, even though he

was replaced by Ivo Sanader in 2003.

Nevertheless, it would be churlish to dwell too much on these criticisms. Readers

whose knowledge of Slovenia is scant may not find their appetite for knowledge on this

dynamic new EU member state fully satisfied by Cox’s book, but after a few hours

reading Slovenia: Evolving Loyalties they will feel far better briefed.

TIM HAUGHTON

University of Birmingham

Thomas Parland, The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: The Growing Influence of

Western Rightist Ideas. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005. 240 pp. d70

(hbk).

Compared to the 1990s, recent years have seen few book-long studies of Russian right-

wing extremism. This undoubtedly reflects the perceived decrease in the threat posed

by extreme-right or nationalist extremism to Russia’s political order. Gone are the days

when Zhirinovsky’s nationalist party’s victory in the proportional part of the 1993

parliamentary elections alarmed the world. This perception, however, should be

qualified in at least one important respect. As the author briefly notes, the waning

of support for extreme-right movements is not due to public opinion shifting away

from nationalism and populism towards liberal and democratic views, but rather to a

shift in the opposite direction operated by the moderate opinion, mainstream parties

and elite. The main actors of Russian politics, i.e. President Putin and the increasingly

hegemonic pro-Kremlin party United Russia, have themselves adopted important

elements of the nationalist agenda, thus marginalising purely nationalist and anti-

establishment movements. Far from reflecting a decreasing importance of nationalism

as a whole, this dynamics shows that extreme-right movements have succeeded in

bringing some of their themes into mainstream politics. This is why Parland’s new

book is both timely and very relevant to Russian politics.

The main strength of Parland’s book is that it provides a compact review of this

evolution from Yeltsin’s to Putin’s years. In doing so, the main preoccupation of the

book is to ‘map’ the main varieties of Russian nationalism. The author devises a

typology of contemporary Russian national patriotism based on three dimensions. The

first dimension is that of modern nationalism versus traditionalism. Here, one main

difference is the role of orthodoxy, central in the latter but absent, or secondary, in the

former. The second distinction is between moderate/pragmatic and extreme groups,

where the latter include the most colourful and lunatic groups, including neo-Nazis.

Finally, groups are distinguished according to whether they emphasise ethnicity over

the state or vice versa, leading to the dichotomy of ethnocentric vs. statist/great power

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nationalism. Specific groups or thinkers can be located within each of the eight ‘cells’

that corresponds to all possible combinations of the three dimensions, as summarised

in a table on p. 87. Of course, locating any given group or thinker in just one ‘cell’ is

often problematic, as they are often characterised by a variety of nuances and

influences. Indeed, the author is well aware of this complexity in his treatment of

the topic.

It should be noted that the book is only concerned with Russians’ nationalism, not

with the mobilisation of other nationalities of the Russian Federation for their

autonomy, statehood or independence. Parland’s ‘mapping’ of Russian right-wing

extremism is masterfully done, on the basis of the literature produced by nationalist

movements themselves and of other secondary literature (Western and Russian). The

author also traces back the doctrinal roots of the movements to the Soviet and tsarist

past and explores the comparison between Russian nationalism and western Nazism

and Fascism. Parland notes that while fascism and Nazism represented a ‘more or less

secularised radical right’, Russian nationalism had remained linked to religion even

under the Soviet regime, when Marxism-Leninism became a ‘new pseudo-religion’

(pp. 23–4).

In terms of western influences on Russian nationalism, the author stresses that the

‘Russian idea’ – the notion that Russia needs a different path of development from the

Western one based on the division of powers, the rule of law and individual freedoms –

in fact has its roots in Western conservatism and romanticism. These share a common

logic with the Russian idea in rejecting western enlightenment and modernisation.

After 1917, Russian emigre nationalists in Germany had regular exchanges with their

German counterparts, especially on the common ground of anti-Semitism and anti-

Bolshevism. However, also within the officialdom of the Soviet Union a distinctive

form of nationalism emerged: National Bolshevism. Stalin, in particular, is seen as the

decisive promoter of Russian chauvinism and anti-Semitism. The Soviet reinvention of

Russian nationalism was directly inherited by the post-Soviet communist party

(KPRF) led by Gennady Zyuganov, that added a ‘red-brown’ version to the nationalist

panorama, and can be located side by side with anti-communist nationalist groups

within Russia’s political spectrum.

Parland provides a very useful, concise but comprehensive, reconstruction of these

historical lines of continuity and evolution. The ambition of the book, however, is

limited to the systematisation of available information and does not include the

examination of new archival material. There are also a number of other limitations.

Perhaps the most evident one lies in the fact that the part of the book dealing with the

post-Soviet period is in fact overwhelmingly devoted to the Yeltsin’s years (the 1990s).

Indeed, out of six substantive chapters, only one deals with Putin’s Russia and even

this section still contains a discussion of trends that unfolded in the 1990s, in addition

to a review of the main reforms and initiatives introduced by Putin. There is very little

on the organisational or doctrinal changes and continuities experienced by nationalist

movements since 2000. This unbalance seems surprising for a book published in 2005,

even allowing for the time that usually elapses between completion of the manuscript

and actual publication. For example, Andreas Umland’s essay on the same topic,

‘Toward an Uncivil Society?’ (Working Paper, Weatherhead Center for International

Affairs, Harvard University, Paper No. 02-03), contains more up-to-date information

despite having been published in 2002.

The second problem with Parland’s book is a lack of clarity in defining the question

motivating the study. On page 3, in a paragraph devoted to the ‘purpose’ of the book,

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one reads that ‘the nationalist conservative backlash against Yeltsin’s new Russia is

analysed in this study’. Other statements of the book’s goals, elsewhere in the book, do

little to improve clarity. As suggested by the quote, the main purpose of Parland’s

study seems descriptive: indeed, the explanatory task is often left to rather vague

statements that revolve around the theme of the ‘conservative backlash’ against

Yeltsin’s modernising and Westernising reforms. Proposed explanations do not

systematically explore the sociological factors behind nationalist fortunes and mis-

fortunes. From what we know from previous studies, Parland’s interpretation is

broadly sound, but he provides little supporting evidence of his own.If casual explanation is not the main purpose of the book, does it fulfil a descriptive

task instead? As already noted, the book is commendable for drawing a map of the

different ideological strands within the nationalist camp (modern and secularised vs.

traditionalist and religiously oriented; radical vs. moderate, etc.). While this is indeed a

clear merit of Parland’s work, the descriptive material in the book does not closely

follow the promise implicit in the book title. Based on its cover, one would expect

the book to be squarely focused on the ‘threat’ posed by extreme nationalism.

However, the notion of a nationalist threat remains vaguely defined and the author

does not concern himself with assessing the extent to which different nationalist

movements really represented a danger for the political order. In other words, while

Parland is keen to discuss their ideological differences, he does not provide systematic

assessments on the size, organisational capacity and support of the groups he

describes.

The sub-title of the book, on the other hand, does refer to a recurrent theme of the

text, ‘the growing influence of western rightist ideas’. In addition to the above-

mentioned historical influences that Russian nationalism received from western

Romanticism, conservatism and Nazi-fascism, the main argument for the post-Soviet

era is that post-Soviet nationalist groups increasingly looked to neo-Nazi groups for

inspiration. Indeed, in the 1990s, the author notes the appearance of the first Russian

skinheads. More generally, this influence is responsible for the gradual shift of the

Russian nationalist scene from a traditional model valid in pre-Soviet and Soviet times,

in which religion had an important role (as mentioned above), to modern and

secularised versions.

Even the treatment of this recurrent theme of (neo-)Nazi influence, however, seems

crucially incomplete: Parland does not pay enough attention to the inherent problems

that this dynamic of imitation poses for Russian nationalist movements. The problems

stem from a legacy of the World War II that is still relevant in today’s Russia: a well-

known, widespread and deep-rooted hate of Nazism. The rejection of Nazism is likely

to be particularly strong in precisely the most nationalist elements of society, who

cherish the memory of the Soviet war effort against Nazi Germany. This phenomenon

constitutes a key limit in the ability of Russian neo-Nazi nationalist groups to muster

popular support.

In sum, The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia may fail to appeal to the Russian

specialist readership, due to its modest claim to originality and its lack of up-to-date

information. However, the book provides a one-stop, rapid and concise introduction

to Russian post-Soviet nationalism that would be of interest to the comparative

student of right-wing extremism.

CARLO GALLO

London School of Economics

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