THE EMORY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS VOLUME III, SPRING 2015

Table of Contents

Introduction By Ben Perlmutter 1

Does the Involvment of Interest Groups Enhance 3the Legitimacy of EU Policy-Making By Zach Lawrence

The Strategic Logic of Putin’s Annexation of Crimea 6By Elyse H. Lee

The Uncertian Path of Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia 10By Stephen Jaber

Moving Forward and Looking Back: 14The Balkan Struggle for Self-SovereigntyBy Lamija Grbic’

About the Authors 17

About the EJIA By Martin Sigalow 19

Works Cited 20

Introduction

Dear reader,

We at the Emory Journal of International Affairs are proud to present our Spring 2015 volume!

The journal contains a variety of papers by some of Emory’s finest undergraduate international affairs scholars. We begin with an analysis of the role of interest groups in the European Union by the illus-trious Zach Lawrence. Then we have a pair of companion articles by the distinguished Elyse K. Lee and the renown Stephen Jaber that explore Russia’s recent annexation of the Crimea and the status of Russian democracy, respectively. The journal then closes with a piece by the preeminent Lamija Grbic’ that examines the historical legacy of outside powers on the states of former-Yugoslavia.

This year has been an incredible one for us at the EJIA, in which we have seen unprecedented growth as an organization. We have gone from being a “rouge club,” without any formal affiliation to the school and without any form of funding, to a member of Emory’s Media Council, with a steady stream of funding. While last year we could only publish the journal digitally, as a result of our new funding, we were able to print this volume on the glossy paper that you see before your eyes now.

I would like to give special thanks to those who publishing this volume of the Emory Journal of Inter-national Affairs would not have been possible without. First, I would like to thank the writers for their great articles and persistent engagement throughout the editing process. I also would like to thank Sarah Husain for teaching me how to use InDesign. Without Sarah’s graphic design expertise, we would have not been able to make the journal look nearly as nice as currently does. Thanks are also due to Media Council for providing funding and Emory Document Services for printing. Thank you to our faculty advisor Dr. Shawn Ramirez for her enthusiasm, suggestions, and support. Lastly, I would like to thank the rest of the EJIA team, with particular thanks going to our Editor-in-Chief Martin Siga-low, our Managing Editor Nikhil Bontha, and our Associate Editor Nate Sawyer.

We at the EJIA hope that you enjoy the Spring 2015 volume of our print journal, and will continue to follow us going forward.

Sincerely, Ben PerlmutterPublications EditorEmory Journal of International Affairs

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Does the Involvement of Interest Groups Enhance the Legitimacy of EU Policy-Making?

By Zach Lawrence

Throughout the world’s most prominent economies, interest groups play a large role in the formation of policy. This is particularly true within the European Union (EU), as interest groups have played an increasingly important role as time has gone on. Eising and Lehringer detail, “the interest group system in the EU has become much more diverse over time. Initially, it consisted mostly of economic groups. Groups representing diffuse interests, such as environmental groups or devel-opment NGOs, have become more vocal since the 1970s and 1980s.”1 While on the surface one may as-sume interest groups are purely economic in nature, and some may say selfish, the European Union’s structure allows for a variety of interest groups to be have their voices heard. The involvement of interest groups enhances the legitimacy of EU policy-mak-ing, as actors outside the sphere of politics are able to influence intergovernmental bargaining, and therefore represent a wider variety of interests than members of government could alone.

The European Commission and Interest Groups The European Commission, the executive branch of the EU, Eising and Lehringer explain, “ is the most important point of contact for interest groups at the European level.”2 The European Com-mission’s rigid structure limits interest groups from

gaining too much influence on policy making, but still allows for them to have their voices heard. Dür aptly points out that the “commission’s lack of direct electoral legitimation may make it particularly eager to appear ‘even-handed’, further limiting its capacity to give in to interest group de-mands.”3 In other words, political candidates are not as likely to be generous to interest groups when they are not in need of donations for future political sup-port and re-election. Eising and Lehringer explain that the EU is dedicated to allowing interest groups to have their voices heard in policy-making when in 2001, “the Commission signed protocols with the EESC [European Economic and Social Committee] and the Committee of the Regions (COR) to involve interest groups earlier in the policy process, and to enhance [interest groups’] function as intermedi-aries between the EU, on the one hand, and civil society and the regions, on the other.”4 Through this protocol, the EU made legitimate progress in al-lowing interest groups to be heard in policy making.

Influencing Policy This opening to interest groups was quite a difficult balancing act for EU politicians, as “mobi-lized and competing societal interests try to affect public policies, but do not necessarily exchange information directly with one another, politicians

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are situated in a mediating position, enabling them to help overcome impasses and to help balance between divergent interests and concerns.”5 Inter-est groups can lead to further political cleavages amongst EU leaders, which is not necessarily a negative outcome. Interest groups, whether they are big businesses or advocates for global climate change, are relevant actors in the EU—as they are in any democratic system—who deserve to have a say in political processes, just as politicians do. Politi-cians may act solely in their self-interest as well, and are therefore no more inherently legitimate than any given interest group. Interest groups do not just influence the European Union, but they are also influenced by the European Union’s structure and process just as much. Eising proposes, “European integration benefits and is subject to the influence of the trans-national sections of capital while at the same time subduing labor by exerting severe pressures on the flexibility of domestic labor markets.”6 This has the potential to have ramifications on all sectors of the economy, as an effective domestic labor force is essential to all well-functioning economies. Woll provides an interest prospective on interest groups in the EU by comparing them to interest groups in the United States, as “lobbying in the US is much more direct and aggressive than in the EU, where lobbyists take a more subtle and consensus-oriented approach. Coen indicates that the two approaches correspond to the different role played by trust in the relationship between private interests and public officials.”7 This consensus-oriented approach of EU interest groups make them a legitimate functional entity because as compared to US interest groups, they are more willing to compromise.

Limits of Influence Given that the EU is an institution in which many diverse interests are represented, this allows for far greater control on how corrupt the influence of interest groups is on the ground level. If the EU was a unitary state actor, with a greater number of directly elected officials and nationalized industries, large corporations in particular would make the policy making process far less legitimate. However, given that the European Union has become deeply

integrated as a space for intergovernmental bargain-ing between its member states, as well as between EU branches of government such as the European Commission and Court of Justice, interest groups have difficulty monopolizing the policy making pro-cess. Not all interest groups are successful at influ-encing policy making.8 Kluver concludes regarding interest group success in affecting policy outcomes in the EU, “the issue context indeed accounts for variation in lobbying success. The findings suggest that lobbying has to be considered as a collective enterprise rather than as an individual endeavor. Interest groups that are located on the same side of the policy space are fighting for the same goal and therefore push decision-makers in the same direction”.9 These conclusions indicate that inter-est groups in the European Union need to be very strategic, and in often cases lobbying is “promising only for interest groups that belong to the dominant lobbying coalition on a given policy issue.”10 While on the one hand there is far less incentive for less powerful interest groups to attempt to have their voices heard by the European Commission, and EU more broadly, this does not make European Union policy making any less legitimate than it would normally be. No matter how state institutions are structured, dominant groups are bound to have a wide influence on the political agenda in any power-ful state or multistate institution. Moravcsik was interested in investigating why “the internal market program, like the Europe-an Commission itself thirty years before, appears to have been launched independently of pressure from transnationally organized business interest groups. But a few business groups, such as the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Eu-rope, had been pushing vainly for liberalization for a long time. Given their persistence, what needs to be explained is why governments finally listened.11 It was not interest groups themselves who were able to finally push the Single European Act, which further deepened integration, forward.12 He details that “business, at least on the supranational level, was mobilized by the emerging interstate consensus for reform, rather than the reverse.”13 The EU is an institution unlike any other, with mechanisms and

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bodies that are constantly evolving and changing. For this reason, the influence of interest groups is not only dependent on the activity of the groups themselves. Rather, the ever-changing structure of the EU and its policy making both play important roles in the effectiveness of interest groups at having their voices heard. Nevertheless, the growing influ-ence of interest groups in policy making agenda is a positive development in creating institutions which reflect the desires of a multitude of non-state actors.

Conclusion Interest groups are a very important element of the European Union when it comes to influencing policy making, but not overwhelmingly so. The EU is limited in its power to begin with, as it is com-posed of a number of states with far different inter-ests, politically, economically, and socially. For this reason, the EU operates in a far different manner than a unitary state such as the United States, which has a much more narrow range of interests and opinions when it comes to policy making. Moving forward, the EU should give a greater say to interest groups in the European Commission for increasing the legitimacy of the EU. In particular, it is im-portant for smaller interest groups, such as those concerned with environmental reform, to have their voices actively heard by supranational institutions, as well as within individual states of the EU. Interest groups are in many cases far more legitimate than some self-interested politicians who create policy, and therefore deserve to have some influence in the political processes of the European Union.

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The Strategic Logic of Putin’s Annexation of Crimea

By Elyse H. Lee

On March 16, 2014 Crimea held a referen-dum to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. According to the referendum organizers, 97% of Crimeans voted in favor of the referendum.1 Two days later, President Vladimir Putin signed a bill absorbing Crimea into Russia. Many of the Western media outlets ostracized Putin as either irrational or reveled him for his leadership strength. This paper argues that Putin’s annexation of Crimea was a calculated political decision that strengthened his hold on power. This essay will explore the con-text of Putin’s decision to annex Crimea, explain his strategic goals, and assess the consequences of his decision in the larger global context.

Circumstances When Vladimir Putin regained the Russian Presidency in 2012, he enjoyed high public approval ratings as well as street protests by a vocal minori-ty condemning unfair elections. It is clear that the Kremlin rigs elections and the political structure is highly centralized around Putin and his ‘cult of personality,’ but Russia’s hybrid regime structure still requires Putin to seek the approval of the public and his inner circle. Maintaining a high level of public support contributes to his hold on power, and much of his public support stems from the perception that he is responsible for the economic prosperity of the 2000s. Putin’s strategy these past 14 years has been to coast off the economic prosperity of post-com-munism Russia, deserved or not.2 Additionally, data

reveals that Russian citizens are willing to forgo free-doms granted in traditional democratic regimes in exchange for stability. Many Russians fear for the breakdown of Russia’s political and economic structure. The Putin regime plays on this fear by arguing for a “sover-eign democracy” which strives for stability first and democracy second.3 47% of Russian citizens ranked social stability higher in the hierarchy of values than the freedom of press, and thus support this sentiment of a sovereign democracy. Russians also have a ‘pragmatic’ view of democracy, and argue that freedom can only come after an ordered society is structured. The Russian people also hold a great degree of trust into Putin compared to the other government institutions. 55% of Russians believe that Putin’s re-election would follow with democra-cy, and thus they associate the strength of the pres-ident with democracy.4 This provides Putin a great deal of support in implementing policies as long as it is catered toward achieving Russian stability. Unfortunately for Putin, maintaining eco-nomic stability may be an issue as he inherited an economy that was adversely impacted by the 2008 global financial crisis. A World Bank report released in 2012 suggested that Russia was heading towards economic stagnation. Despite the return of high oil prices, economic growth forecasts were pessimistic because of long-standing trends, including an aging population, unproductive working practices, and risk-averse businessman.5 From a high of 3.4 per-

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cent growth in 2012, the Russian economy dipped to 1.3 percent growth in 2013. Furthermore, just prior to the Ukrainian revolution and annexation of Crimea in the first half of 2014, growth fell further from 1.3 percent to 0.8 percent.6 While Putin’s popularity was still high at 64%, it was clear that he needed to begin making arrangements to appease Russian citizens in light of the stagnating economy.7 Ukraine ousted its pro-Russian leader Viktor Yanukovych from the presidency in late February for refusing to negotiate a trade agreement with the European Union. Putin considered this agreement an outrageous insult to Russia’s power by a former Soviet Republic. At first, the Ukrainian revolution seemed like a crippling repudiation of Russia, but Putin has taken advantage of the conflict to further his own interests.

Putin’s Goals This paper views Putin as a political player whose main objective is to consolidate his hold on power. This paper dismisses the widely held notion of Putin as a revisionist who wants to bring Russia back to its Soviet-glory and change the status quo of the international order. Instead, it posits that Putin is intent on securing domestic political support for himself while striving to eliminate as many imme-diate external and internal threats to his regime as possible. It is in Putin’s interest to maintain his highly centralized regime and prevent Western influence. Liberal Western values encourage political participation that may challenge his leadership of Russia. However, there is a possibility that Putin’s strategy to consolidate power may lead non-allied states to view Russia’s defensive actions as aggressive in nature. Thus, Putin’s main objective is to establish a delicate balance between belligerence and retreat as he secures domestic stability, geopolitical resourc-es, and ultimately maintains his seat of power. Treisman convincingly argues that Putin’s initial strategy of building his popularity on the ba-sis of Russia’s economic prosperity is losing traction and he has settled on a “Plan B.” This includes “ap-pealing to emotional nationalism, berating the West, and rallying the public against supposed attempts at cultural imperialism.”8 In other words, Putin uti-

lized the “rally around the flag” effect, which mobi-lizes the citizenry to enter conflict in order to dis-tract citizens from domestic shortcomings.9 In this case, Putin was rallying Russian citizens by making the case for annexing Crimea. Putin attempted to distract Russians from the inefficient and shrinking economy, claiming the West was attempting to break up the Russian Federation by causing revolutions around Russia’s borders. To execute this plan, Putin deployed officials into Crimea to provide Russian passports and facili-tated “fast-tracking processes to give Russian citi-zenship status to thousands of residents of Crimea”.10 Additionally, he backed the new Crimean leadership of ethnic Russian Sergey Aksyonov, and allegedly ordered pro-separatists to capture key institutions in Crimea. This strategy proved successful. On March 1, the Russian Parliament approved Putin’s request to use force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests, and after a successful vote on the 16th, Putin officially signed a bill to annex Crimea on the 18th. According to the Levada Center, a respected independent Russian polling organization, Putin’s approval ratings spiked to 72% only two weeks after the annexation of Crimea.11 Not only was Putin able to increase his popularity by annexing Crimea, but the annexation also served as a tactical move, due to the peninsula’s geopolitical significance. Russia inherited an im-portant naval base at Sevastopol (on the Crimean peninsula) after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and it has been leasing the land from Ukraine ever since. While the lease contract stipulated contin-ued Russian control until 2042, the annexation of Crimea indefinitely assuages Russian concerns about future loss of the naval base. Crimea’s annexation now provides Russia with additional influence over the Black Sea and neighboring regions such as the Mediterranean. It also strengthens Russia’s capability to respond to naval threats from neighboring coun-tries. Furthermore, Russia has already begun prep-ping Sevastopol to be a site for an air defense system that will further increase Russia’s defense capabili-ties. Sevastopol is expected to gain six new subma-rines, frigates, and a Mistral helicopter carrier in the

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next few years alone. Additionally, Crimea provides Russia access to warships with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and weapons. Russia is planning to enhance Crimea’s air defense system based on Russia’s S-400 area defense platform.12 These mili-tary securities are no small venture, and place Russia and its allies in a comfortable position to respond to threats. Because Russia is the largest country in the world, it faces the challenges of providing security to its massive land area, along with insufficient arable land and ethnic Russian nationalism. Additionally, Russia is not blessed with defensible borders such as seas or mountains along many of its borders. This is a significant obstacle. It leaves Russia vulnerable to hostile neighbors, or in Putin’s depiction, allows the West access to infiltrate and destroy the unique culture and stability of Russia.13 Putin is well aware of this, and has prior-itized influencing and coercing his neighbors to depend on Russia’s natural resources and join Rus-sia’s ideological associations to create buffer zones around his regime, a similar tactic to what the Soviet Union did with the Warsaw Pact. For example, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) is an economic association of the former Soviet states of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Yet, this union serves little economic benefit to Russia. For example, Putin was unsuccessful in convincing the two other states to create a Eurasian Parliament or impose economic sanctions on Ukraine. However, it is part of Russia’s grand strategy to create buffer zones along Russia’s borders. The ECU serves as a counter to the West’s NATO and is thus politically significant to Putin as a symbolic body.14 Russia also protects its borders by pressuring surrounding states to take cooperative policies. Putin cut off natural gas and wine exports to Moldova because it refused to cooperate against the EU, and in Ukraine he was able to manipu-late Yanukovych to back out of its EU Association Agreement. Annexing Crimea was a major develop-ment in Putin’s grand plan to secure Russia’s buffer zones, and now he needs to ensure he can sustain it.

Consequences While Putin successfully addressed these main policy goals, the international arena is a quick-

ly shifting environment, and he cannot afford to lose focus or make major missteps that will unravel the progress he has made. Fortunately for Putin, annex-ing Crimea is more important to Russia than it is to the West, and Putin should be willing to devote more resources to preserve his control. However, while Putin’s actions have a popular perception domestically, the opinion of the rest of the world is anything but. This level of international distaste, Western imposed economic sanctions, unsynchro-nized actions of Pro-Russian forces, the ongoing currency crisis, and the escalation of the security dilemma are factors that may challenge the contin-ued success of Putin’s agenda. Some may argue that Crimea did not have a say when Ukraine absorbed it during the Soviet era, and the referendum was an opportunity for Crime-ans to finally determine their own future. Of course, the intention of the annexation goes well beyond that and has significant political repercussions, but it was arguably not until the downing of the Malay-sia Airlines Flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine that international actors expressed significant disproval. Western nations insist there is significant evidence, including voice recordings, that pro-Russian rebels supported by Putin’s regime misidentified the plane for another aircraft and shot it down. Russia on the other hand, continues to blame the new Ukrainian government for the atrocity.15 Whether or not Putin is actually supplying the pro-Russian rebels is insig-nificant if international public opinion believes he is and holds him accountable for the consequences. This was a turning point in Putin’s strategy; a mis-calculation that led to the imposition of harmful multilateral sanctions. The World Bank reported that in addition to Russia’s self-inflicted economic downturn, the geopolitical tensions and international sanctions imposed on the state are beginning to significantly impact its economic performance. Combined with its domestic structural impediments, the World Bank predicts a pessimistic growth outlook with a low-level recession if the sanctions continue to hold and geopolitical conditions do not improve.16 The United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia are a few countries that have made targeted sanctions on Russia.

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Most recently, Russia is facing a currency crisis. Since Russia’s economy is highly dependent on oil and gas and with the price of oil steadily drop-ping in the past few months, coupled with Western sanctions, the ruble has fallen almost 50% in value. This is negatively affecting countries in the region, especially Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyz-stan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, since its citizens working in Russia and sending remittances to their home countries.17 If the ruble continues to fall, this could add pressure from these countries to Russia as well as have a negative effect on immigration into Russia. Internally, Russian citizens and businesses are losing faith in the ruble and are re-pricing their goods. Banks are setting limits on the dollars and euros they are willing to exchange, and the problem seems to be getting worse. If Russia continues to antagonize Ukraine then the West will strengthen its responses. These responses by the West will be designed to reassure allies in the Baltic, but Russia could suffer blowback. It has acknowledged the legitimacy of the indepen-dence movements of eastern Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk and continues to push an aggressive military posture in the regions around the Baltic States. These actions could lead to mili-tary escalation if the West interprets these actions as serious provocations. While there is indeed logic to Putin’s strategy to flirt with open war and continuing to rally anti-Western sentiment, it is to his disadvan-tage if these tactics invite serious actions to damage Russia’s stability, especially with the ominous cur-rency situation.

Conclusion The annexation of Crimea was a popular and tactical move for Putin, and is arguably the best of the options he had to choose from. However, while he was able to make steps toward accomplishing his goals and the consequences remain manageable, Putin is in a precarious international position, espe-cially given the currency crisis of late 2014 and early 2015, and would be foolish to believe his dimin-ishing international reputation is nothing to worry about. The possibility of further sanctions will dam-age the Russian economy, and he cannot afford to simply rely upon berating the West, for he will face

serious political repercussions once Russian citizens begin feeling the effects of economic instability. However, Putin should be comforted by the fact that even with its stagnating economy, much of its economic prosperity is entangled with the West and thus the EU and the United States will be weary of punishing Russia too harshly. Additionally, the West also requires the assistance of Russia to tackle inter-national conflicts such as ISIS and Iran, and thus it will not make any aggressive moves to start a con-flict with Russia as long as Putin does not make any serious provocations. It is in Putin’s best interest to decrease the level of belligerent actions it is making, at the very least until the sanctions are released. Putin has already secured Crimea with low military costs, and may even get away with what-ever his aims may be in Donetsk and Luhansk. Yet, Putin could fulfill his pledge to take advantage of the Western economic sanctions by using it as an op-portunity to encourage the diversification of Russia’s economy.18 Russia already faces the resource curse, and this is an opportune time to make serious com-mitments to solve that issue. Of course, it is much easier said than done, and much more analysis needs to be completed to flesh out this goal. Howev-er, the World Bank suggests that “a more balanced and diversified portfolio of national assets, including natural resources, capital, and economic institutions, will help overcome structural constraints to growth” and Putin should begin by reforming the state in-frastructure to increase productivity and encourage marketplace competition.19 Additionally, he should be actively combatting the currency crisis by negoti-ating bonds extensions and even looking into capital controls. If he is able to accomplish these tasks and mitigate further sanctions from the West, there is a chance he will successfully emerge from the Ukraine crisis with a respected international presence, im-proved economy, and a stable hold on power.

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The Uncertain Path of Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia

By Stephen Jaber

It would be disingenuous to say that liberal democracy has evaporated in Russia, as if it was thoroughly entrenched in any way under Yeltsin, but has now recently disappeared. While the advent of democracy in Russia started with promise, it has slowly devolved into something of a hybrid-authori-tarian system. This process was not sudden, and may continue for the foreseeable future. To summarize the essence of the attempted transition to democracy following the fall of the Soviet Union, Colton et al. write, “the current political system has not consol-idated. Russia’s nascent democracy is on a negative trajectory, but the unconsolidated state of the regime gives some cause for hope.”1 Russia’s democracy is backsliding; the hopeful democratic start of the 1990s has become compromised. Russia can be considered a democracy, yet it is by no definition a liberal democracy. Democra-cy, in basic terms, is a system whereby citizens can contest and participate in elections and major state organs are under control of either the people, or elected agents.2 For a democratic regime to be liber-al, the elections must be free and fair, it must sup-port a vibrant civil society, protect basic rights and freedoms, ensure basic transparency of and account-ability for government actions.3 In contrast, illiberal democratic regimes do not protect civil liberties.4 Despite Russia’s illiberalism, the Russian Constitution includes the following liberal provi-sion: “In the Russian Federation recognition and guarantees shall be provided for the rights and free-doms of man and citizen according to the universal-

ly recognized principles and norms of international law and according to the present Constitution.”5 This is not the case today in Russia, as is demon-strated by the government’s flagrant disregard for civil rights. Russia’s adherence to an illiberal democrat-ic system is a product of many factors. Norms that have persisted from the collapse of the Soviet Union continue to undermine Russian democracy. Norms such as the affinity towards a strong, measured leader, and the distrust for civic organization, civil society, and political parties. These norms, coupled with the magnetism and prerogative of President Vladimir Putin, have hampered Russia’s path to-wards liberal democracy.6 In sum, the weakness of Russia’s democratic evolution falls into two main spheres: inherent institutional weaknesses, and the role of executives, namely Putin, in taking advantage of these weaknesses. Symbolic of Russia’s strained relationship with democracy is Putin himself, who has been the de facto leader of Russia since May 2000, serving two terms as President, and one as Vice President.

Institutions Institutional weakness poses the most obvi-ous threat to Russian democratic development. The weakness of the party system offers the most direct exemplification of the inherent problems in institu-tional politics in Russia. A look at the muzzling of the media also illuminates the reality of private, civil opposition to the government.

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As Russia is a semi-presidential system, the executive President is more powerful than the legislature. During the inception of Russian democ-racy in the 1990s, Yeltsin and his political partners designed the party system to be fractioned and weak so as to not debilitate his agenda in the first few cru-cial months of the Russian federation.7 Under Putin, electoral rules were changed and party competition was introduced, even as the Unity Bloc, Putin’s party, began to dominate as the party of power. The ascension of the Unity Bloc has legitimized Putin’s rule over the Duma, Russia’s parliament, and has enabled his ability to exercise authority through legislative endeavors. Indeed the transformation of entire party system can be summarized, as Robinson says, “during Yeltsin’s administration parties developed into vehicles that signaled which interests had to be accommodated; under Putin, they became vehicles for controlling such interests.”8 Today the parties lack a distinct identity and stable followings; they form around leaders, not ideas. As the leaders of the parties are the type who only seek politician gain, rather than policy outcomes, there is a serious opposition crisis. As a result, the opposition parties cannot check the Kremlin’s power, as “Putin’s brain trust hopes even-tually to push all parties other than United Russia and the KPRF (CPRF) to the sidelines.”9 This is certainly the case now as the legislature is relatively insignificant and even accepted Putin’s motion to extend presidential term limits in 2008. While this evolution of the party system has allowed for more parties, parties are not elected based on ideology, and the Russian people them-selves are skeptical of multi-party systems to begin with. Keterman finds, “35% of the respondents definitely opposed the multi-party system: 19% con-sidered parties unnecessary and 16% would prefer a single national party.”10 These two trends should not be surprising; the Russian affinity towards one-party rule and the active role of the Kremlin manipulating the norm is not foreign to the Russian people, the Soviet Union was ruled by a one party system. While the current party system is unquestionably stronger than the basically non-existent legislature under the Soviet Union, it is by no means a legitimate authority by a

liberal democratic standard. Fortunately, things may be changing if the 2011 Duma elections were any indication. In the 2011 Duma election as the Communist Party (CPRF) gained 19.19% of the vote, while the Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) received 11.67%.11 Indeed this is a hopeful sign for increased party competition, as the CPRF has been demonstrat-ed to be largest force of opposition in the Duma. Unfortunately, the LDPR, traditionally nationalist and xenophobic party gained seats reflecting the increasing “nationalist views among the public.”12 Whether there is hope for the future of the inherent-ly complex party system remains to be seen, as these parties may push to restructure the legislature and make it a more formidable adversary to the execu-tive’s initiative.

Media Under Putin, mass media has been tightened under the state’s grip. In Freedom House’s Global Survey of Media Independence, Russia ranks 81 in Press Freedom Score, with 100 being the worst. Freedom House wrote, “The media environment in Russia, whose score remained at 81, is characterized by the use of a pliant judiciary to prosecute indepen-dent journalists, impunity for the physical harass-ment and murder of journalists, and continued state control or influence over almost all traditional media outlets.”13 In Reporters Without Borders’ 2014 Freedom Press Index, the organization claims that since Putin returned to the Presidency in 2012, “more and more draconian laws have been adopted. Activists, news media and bloggers have all been tar-geted.”14 Both Freedom House and Reporters With-out Borders note the expansion of “extremism” laws, and slander laws that have allowed the government to prosecute, whistleblowers, bloggers and activists. The illiberal implications of media control are numerous. By essentially criminalizing the op-position and handing over the control of the media to the state; “in nationwide television broadcasting, Russia is closer to such a monopoly today than at any time since the establishment of NTV in 1993.”15 According to Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, a free press is crucial to the foundation of liberal democracy as the free press is “the watchdog

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that sounds a warning when other rights are threat-ened.”16

Civil Society Russian civil society is weak. Here, the legacy of the Soviet Union looms over the characteristic frailty of civil society. “In Russia, where the Soviet model had been invented … the ruling party and the state had created a network of organizations that permeated the entire society and was directed in detail by the Communist party … since no legal, independent organized groups were permitted, there was no civil society in the Soviet Union,” Alfred B. Evans writes.17 In a liberal democracy, civil society organizations can pressure the government to act from the bottom up—this vigilance by organizations within the civil sphere is alien to Russian society. The Russian elite subverted reform and movement towards genuine civil society in the early stages of Yeltsin’s government. Neil Robinson writes: “Yeltsin aided this pro-cess of marginalizing parties and public politics by broadening the personnel base of his administration and increasing the number of advisory and poli-cy-making bodies within it so as to draw political actors into the executive and away from parties.”18 Additionally, the concept of path dependence, that historical legacies have to constitute the starting point for any democratization in the post commu-nist world, explains why elites have been so success-ful in keeping power, as elites dominated the one party in the Soviet Union, and why the people have been complicit in not engaging in reform. Because there was no history of civic organization, Russia did not create a vibrant civil society out of thin air. The Soviet Union instilled a general distrust and skepticism for democracy, institutions of de-mocracy, civic society and civil rights (albeit civil rights abuses calmed down following Stalin’s reign). This attitude has persisted in Russian society today, in 2011 only 32% of Russians preferred “democracy over strong leader[ship].” Support for a multi-party system is falling, in 2011, 50% of respondents exhib-ited “support for change to multiparty system.” 63% of Russians are not satisfied with democracy, com-pared with the 27% who are. In all, as Russian na-tionalism is on the rise, (48% of respondents agreed

with the question “Is it natural for Russia to have an Empire”) and Russians feel comfortable about favor-ing a strong role of the state, the pervasive influence of the Soviet Union continues to linger.19

Putin President Putin has essentially taken advan-tage of the institutional vulnerability and his people’s progressively expanding desire for one party rule, capitalizing on it tremendously. It would be dishon-est to call Putin a dictator, however; his influence on Russia’s democratization is, without a doubt, orders of magnitude greater than a conventional democrat-ically elected president. Looking at Putin’s image, his initial aspira-tions and his future as the de facto leader of Russia can clarify the vast impact he has made on the tran-sition to democracy. According to Julie Cassiday and Emily Johnson, in their article “Putin, Putiniana and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of Personality,” Putin enjoys a thorough and dynamic cult of personality in Russia, a cult of personality that could be based on “nostalgia and consumption – it offers Russians, many of whom felt themselves deprived of both cultural and individual identity during the chaotic 1990s, the opportunity to articulate new modes of subjectivity.”20 As a blank personality, Putin became the Russian “everyman,” and was thus symbolic of individual Russian desires and aspirations of what Russia could be. While Putin’s cult of personality differs substantially from that of Joseph Stalin and other Soviet leaders in that is not coercive in nature, it appears to be pervasive.21 “Putin’s regime is indeed not your grandfather’s authoritarianism. Russia is not sinking back into the past but is creating some-thing new.”22 Putin has molded the new Russian re-gime to his benefit via his magnetism and cunning. Putin’s persistent popularity is very much a consequence of the chaos of the 1990s, which was an embarrassment to the Russian nation, given its illustrious history of czars and empire. Kamar notes, “Putin got the majority of votes not because of his popularity but because the Russians are tired of tumult and want stability.”23 Putin articulated that his focus was the creation of the “dictatorship of the law.” Indeed the Russian people saw that as a for

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mer KGB executive who had risen to prominence from mystery, Putin could lead the country forward – democratically or not.24 This is not the singular narrative of Putin’s initial agenda. Putin campaigned on promises such as subverting local district power, and breaking the power of the oligarchs, things he has answered in his first two terms as president.25 While currently currently enjoying an 85% approval rating as of January 26, 2015 it will soon become clear why Putin’s popularity is so perva-sive amongst his electorate.26 He has addressed his campaign promises, and, arguably, boosted Russia’s international prestige and reputation as a genuine force. If Russian polls are any indication, Putin em-bodies the types of things they want, a strong leader who is attempting to return to the “nostalgia” of the Soviet Union. His invasion of Crimea was uncon-troversial in Russia and his violent handling of the Chechnya War has largely been forgotten. Russians like Putin because his somber, sober demeanor is attractive to their individual aspirations – his sup-posed blankness made him the ideal canvas for personalized conceptions of what Russia could be; he is a tabula rasa.27 28 29 Essentially there is the question of whether Putin, in his erosion of democratic institutions, is simply representing the will of the people—they are shown to be disdainful for democratic institutions—or whether the people simply don’t care about democracy and support Putin because of his for-eign policy successes and initial economic reforms. White and McAllister argue “Putin supporters were overwhelmingly in favor of public order rather than democracy in the country’s current circumstances … they thought that the best chance of uniting the society was around the values of stability and law and order.” He could certainly be considered the people’s candidate.30

Putin has been the de facto leader of Russia since May 2000, serving two terms as President, and one as Vice President. Putin will continue to rule as President, due to constitutional amendments that extended term limits, until 2024. This poses a trou-bling and problematic precedent for Russian democ-racy as Putin has shown to be willing to reorganize Russian democracy to fit his agenda. Putin’s view that “a predominant role by the state is necessary,

not only to lead Russia to success in the economic competition stimulated by globalization, but also to manage the consequences of global trends for domestic society,” can best describe his ambiva-lence to undermining democracy if the ends justify the means.31 It should furthermore be noted: “The degree of pluralism that is permitted in the political arena in Putin’s Russia is qualitatively greater than that which was allowed in the Soviet Union … but the limits of pluralism have been tightened since Putin came to power, and the acceptable degree of disagreement is still not entirely clear.”32 Putin is in-tent on preserving the Russian state, and expanding its power firstly. While Putin is not anti-democratic—he de-pends on elections to keep power and respects their outcomes —he will subvert or seriously alter liberal institutions that elected him to make Russia stronger in his view.

Conclusion Russian democracy is firmly in the hands of Putin and his cronies in the Kremlin. While, as noted, there was increased support for opposition parties in the Duma in 2011, the inherent structural weakness of the parliament vis-à-vis Putin will ham-per any genuine reform on that front. Furthermore, if Putin continues to aggressively expand Russia’s in-ternational standing, he will have the support of his people to act by electoral mandate. Putin is willing to define democracy on his own terms, whether or not the international community accepts it.33 34 Russian democracy is an intriguing speci-men, one that has threatened to collapse rather at frequent intervals for the past two decades. How it develops in the near future remains to be seen, but past and current indicators emphatically argue that it will not evolve into a liberal democracy that those in the West are accustomed to. “People are always teaching us democracy,” Putin once said, “but the people who teach us democracy don’t want to learn it themselves.”35 What this means is up to debate, but with certainty it can be contended that Russia’s relationship with democracy has been in crisis for the past decade. It would be within reason to expect much of the same for the next decade as well.

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Moving Forward and Looking Back: The Balkan Struggle for Self-Sovereignty

By Lamija Grbic’

The latter half of the twentieth century was one of tumultuous, and often destructive, changes for those nations closest to the Iron Curtain. The series of wars waged in Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1999 would ultimately produce seven sovereign nations—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. The countries share a common cultural origin yet have experienced varied success in adapting to the pres-sures of post-war existence. These newly sovereign nations continue to be plagued by economic and political troubles and have yet to emerge from the repercussions of conflicts waged fifteen years ago. The central questions demanding consideration are the causes of this lagging performance, how the cur-rent state of affairs has addressed these causes and what challenges remain moving forward. To obtain a more comprehensive perspective on these questions, it is necessary to first explore the historical factors that precipitated Yugoslavia’s horrific disintegration.

Context Often used in political discourse, the word “balkanization—named after the Balkan region, home to the states of former Yugoslavia—means to divide into inept states.1 This term is a rather crude appropriation of a region with a long, rich history, eliciting notions of entrenched schisms due to dis-tinct and unwavering ideologies. Framing this social phenomenon in reference to a region character-ized by a complex ethnic fabric and historic unrest suggests that it is inevitably resigned to bare the

volatility of its factions. “The powder keg of Europe,” as the Balkan region came to be known following the Black Hand’s assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, is not only struggling to overcome ethnic strife. Framing the region’s problems as rooted only in ethnic conflict truncates a deeper analysis of the region’s part in larger world affairs. While Yugosla-via’s disintegration was characterized by ethnically motivated killings and expulsions, these distinctions were artificially produced by the region’s long his-tory of foreign occupation. It is therefore necessary to understand this history in order to better charac-terize the challenges these nations will experience moving forward.

Early History-World War I Located in southeastern Europe, the Bal-kan region is known as a junction between the East and West. From the East, the Ottoman’s rule of the region between the 14th and 19th centuries was re-sponsible for the introduction of Islam, which would become an integral component of the ethnic identi-ties of many Bosnians and Albanians.2 Similarly, the Croat and Slovene cultures had been significantly influenced by Austrian-Hungarian domination following Ottoman decline, including the adoption of the Roman Catholicism.3 Thus what began as a group of Slavs who had migrated to the region during the sixth century soon resulted in several groups distinguished by religion.4

Shifts in power in the region merely incited separat ist fervor, beginning when The Congress of

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Berlin eradicated the Ottoman authority from Serbia in 1878. Yet this newly obtained independence was overshadowed by the Austro-Hungarian influence in Bosnia. Spurred by the desire for self-sovereign-ty, proponents of a “Greater Serbia” sought to expel foreign rule and unify the Slavs in the region. The world would witness the conviction of these senti-ments in 1914, when the Serbian nationalist group Black Hand assassinated Archduke Ferdinand, incit-ing World War I. 5

Following the bloodshed of World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes coalesced on December 1, 1918 merging Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina.6 In addition to the “ethnic and religious tensions” which plagued the Kingdom of Serbs, Cro-ats and Slovenes, the political allocation of power was a controversial issue. Serbs advocated for a high centralization of power in Belgrade, the capital of the Kingdom, while groups such as the Slovenes and Bosnians were unwilling to yield to this demand. 7

World War II The Axis occupation during World War II instigated a civil war between domestic resistance groups, who took advantage of this precarious situ-ation to further their aspirations of gaining power. The infighting was largely propagated by resistance groups aligned along ethnic lines and resulted in the deaths of 1.5 million Yugoslavs within the span of four years.8 The Ustasa, led by Ante Pavelic’, are a nationalist Croatian group which endeavored to assert authority in the Balkan region by practicing genocide against Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, as well as taking part in the Holocaust. The Army of the Fa-therland, commonly known as the Chetniks, was a Serb nationalist group led by Draza Mihajlovic that targeted Croats and Muslims. The Chetniks were formally acknowledged by the Allies as the official Yugoslav liberation force during the initial phases of the war before Josip Broz’s National Liberation Partisan Detachment soon acquired recognition and support from the Allies. Josip Broz, known simply as Tito, was a socialist who aimed to eliminate foreign occupation in the region. Unlike the Chetniks and Ustasa, however, Tito’s campaign was not polarized along ethnic lines. This is reflected in the Partisan

slogan of bratsva i jedinstva–brotherhood and uni-ty. 9

The precarious instability of World War II served a catalyzing role in a variety of respects, per-haps most directly by creating a power vacuum in the Axis-occupied Yugoslavia.10 It was these condi-tions that allowed Josip Broz to rise to power. Broz’s unprecedented success in the liberation effort, as well as his fulfillment of a heroic persona, contrib-uting to a renewed confidence in the Balkan self-de-pendability.11

Communist Era These sentiments undoubtedly permeated beyond the traditionally divisive cultural denomina-tions. Throughout his rule, Broz would emphasize the similarities between ethnic groups while re-stricting religious freedoms. As leader of the newly established Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Tito’s domestic policies centered on the concentration of power at the federal level. During the 1960s, Broz reevaluated the distribution of pow-er along the socio-political hierarchy, primarily by extending more autonomy to the republics.12 Public unrest aiming to secure greater authority for the republics, most notably exemplified by the Croatian Spring of the 1970s, signaled growing dissatisfaction with Tito’s concentration of power. Despite Tito’s emphasis on pan-Yugoslavian unity, his regime was unable to dispel the extreme nationalist sentiments that had characterized the infighting of World War II. These sentiments would reignite following Tito’s death in 1980. Rising to the presidency in the late 1989 Slobodan Milosevic’ cap-italized on Serb nationalism in his presidency. His termination of Kosovo’s autonomous status signaled the revival of Serbian aspirations of greater concen-tration of power. In addition, economic decline as well as the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the republics searching for paths to greater stability.13

Breakup of Yugoslavia Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991, with Bosnia and Herzegovina following shortly thereafter in 1992. The conflict between Bos-nian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims was characterized by ethnic cleansing and the use of rape as a weapon

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of war. The Dayton Peace Accords of December 1995 established dual governing entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina—the Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, reflecting the incompatible interests of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs in the country. Milosevic constricted the political power of Serbia’s largely Muslim province of Koso-vo, prompting resistance groups to emerge and ultimately precipitating war in 1998. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was charged with maintaining stability in the region until Kosovo’s official independence from Serbia in 2008.14

Although Macedonia had seceded peacefully in 1991, conflicts surfaced as the Albanian National Liberation Army’s demands for greater rights and political recognition of Albanians in 2001.15 Imple-mented in the same year, the Ohrid Agreement end-ed the armed fighting and set the stage for further negotiations concerning Albanian minority rights.16 Montenegro and Serbia created the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the secession of the other republics; the former gained independence peaceful-ly in 2006 through referendum.17 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, including “murder, torture, rape, en-slavement, [and] destruction of property.”18

Current Issues Today, most of the countries of former Yugo-slavia struggle with economic and political setbacks. GDP growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina is fragile due to high government spending and low foreign investment. Hopes for economic improvements are stunted by the highly bureaucratic and corrupt polit-ical system. In addition, local economies often rely on remittances from diaspora in Europe and North America. In Kosovo, remittances make up 15% of GDP and unemployment towers at 45%. Poor infrastructure and unresolved missing persons cases linger as reminders of past human rights abuses.19

Some of these nations, however, have experienced a more successful transition in the post-war years. While still grappling with high unemployment and low foreign investment, Croatia has made progress due to tourism and high consumer spending. Cro-atia has successfully joined the EU and Serbia is

currently in the preparatory stages to do the same. Slovenia has experienced perhaps the most successful transition, entering the European Union in 2004 and boasting a GDP per capita of $27,400 as of 2013, one of highest in the region.20 In Serbia, economic reforms are precluded by budget deficits and high government borrowing to sustain expen-ditures on welfare benefits. Macedonia, however, experienced some GDP growth in 2013, and unem-ployment and “disparities in regional development” remain issues in Montenegro.21

Moving Forward These economic challenges are to be expect-ed of countries transitioning from state-controlled to free-market systems, yet how long before we start to see improvement? Citizens of the Bosnian city of Tuzla took to the streets in early 2014 to express their frustration with political corruption and deteriorating economic opportunities. This instigat-ed protests across the country, most of which were concentrated in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The uprising ultimately led to the resignation of several government officials in the cantons of Tuzla, Zenica and Sarajevo.22 Endeavors to improve the quality of life in the countries of former Yugoslavia must focus on immediately addressing job creation and high unemployment, especially for youth. In order for the necessary economic reforms to be carried out efficiently, definitive measures must be adopted to curtail political corruption. Yet will these changes alone be enough to allow people to finally move on from the past? If anything, the protests, which have in recent years spread throughout the region, are indicative of the people’s eagerness for systematic changes. In light of their long history of occupation, it appears that it is finally the people’s turn to rule themselves. Extreme nationalists and proponents of ethnic cleansing had attempted to convince the public that ethnic diversi-ty is an encumbrance to progress and must therefore be eliminated. The path that the former Yugoslavian nations must now adopt is one of integration and pluralism, one that seeks to place common neces-sities and quality of life above jingoistic allegiances to politically constructed ethnicities—it is a difficult path but it is the only viable path to peace and pros-perity in the countries of former Yugoslavia.

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About the Authors

Zach Lawrence is an Junior at Emory, from Katonah, New York. He is majoring in International Studies, with concen-trations in Europe and the Political Economy. He is partic-ularly interested in the politics of public health, and plans to apply to law school next year.

Elyse H. Lee is a junior in the College studying Political Sci-ence and East Asian Studies. Her research interests include developing economies, comparative politics and law, and international institutions. She is an undergraduate research fellow with the Center for the Study of Law, Politics, and Economics; elected in the Student Government Association, a Sexual Assault Peer Advocate, and an intern for the Gifted Education Foundation. She is originally from York, Penn-sylvania.

Stephen Jaber is a Political Science major and Economics minor from Chicago, IL. Stephen attended The American School of Dubai where he developed a serious interest in Geopolitics, American Constitutional Law, the politics of Autocratic Regimes and Human Rights. Stephen is also an avid reader of The Atlantic, The Economist, and Foreign Policy Magazine. He also writes for The Emory Wheel’s Sports Section, manages his own personal rap-review blog “LowFaded” and enjoys traveling.

Lamija Grbic’ is a sophomore majoring in philosophy. She is originally from Bosnia and Herzegovina and grew up in Boise, Idaho. She is an undergraduate tutor at the Emory Writing Center and is involved with Freedom at Emory, a coalition to increase access to higher education for un-documented youth. Her interests include immigration and human rights.

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About the Emory Journal of International AffairsThe Emory Journal of International Affairs is Emory University’s outlet for the showcasing of the written work of undergraduate students interested in international affairs. The intelligence and driven nature of Emory students in the fields of international affairs regularly carry them to jobs in the State Department, international think tanks, and other prestigious offices. This intelligence and passion are facilitated by Emory University’s splendid International Studies department and international affairs related clubs. Overall, Emory is a good place to be interested in the wider world.

It is our job here at the Emory Journal of International Affairs to give Emory’s exemplary international relations students an opportunity to showcase their work in a professional, research-driven format. The consistent publishing of this journal is necessary to that goal. We believe that, given the opportu-nity, Emory undergraduates are capable of producing well researched, Foreign Affairs quality articles.

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If you would like to contact us, please email us at emoryjia@gmail.com.

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Works CitedPicturesFlags of the European Union. N.d. Yale Model United Nations. Web. 5 Mar. 2015. <http://www.ymun.yira.org/committees-xli/flags_of_european_union/>.Putin on a Horse. N.d. Foreign Policy Blogs. Web. 5 Mar. 2015. <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/up-loads/putin-democracy.jpg>.Putin with Binoculars. N.d. Silk Road Studies. Web. 5 Mar. 2015. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/img/publications/Putin-binocs.jpeg>.Yugoslavia Flags Map. N.d. Imgur.com. Web. 5 Mar. 2015. <http://i.imgur.com/6xhMWRD.jpg>.

Zach Lawrence Footnotes1 Rainer Eising and Sonja Lehringer, “Interest Groups and the European Union,” in European Union Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 185.2 Ibid. 3 Andreas Dür, “Interest Groups in the European Union: How Powerful Are They?,” West European Politics 31, no. 6 (2008): 1216. doi:10.1080/01402380802372662.4 Eising and Lehringer, European Union Politics, 187.5 J. Beyers, “Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Societal Interests: How Is European Policy Making Politicized?,” Com-parative Political Studies 37, no. 10 (2004): 1125. doi:10.1177/0010414004269828.6 Rainer Eising, “Interest Groups in EU Policy-making,” Living Reviews in European Governance 3 (2008): 18. doi:10.12942/lreg-2008-4.7 Cornelia Woll, “Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 461. doi:10.1080/13501760600560623.8 H. Kluver, “The Contextual Nature of Lobbying: Explaining Lobbying Success in the European Union,” Europe-an Union Politics 12, no. 4 (2011): 483, accessed December 5, 2014, doi:10.1177/1465116511413163.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional State-craft in the European Community,”International Organization 45, no. 01 (1991): 45-46, doi:10.1017/S0020818300001387.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.

Elyse K. Lee Footnotes1 BBC. “Malaysia Plane Crash: What We Know.” BBC News. 9 Sept. 2014.2 Treisman, Daniel. “Watching Putin in Moscow: What Russians Think of the Intervention in Ukraine.” Foreign Affairs. Council of Foreign Affairs, 5 Mar. 2014. 3 Remington, Thomas F. Politics in Russia. New York: Pearson Longman, 20114 Ibid.5 Kramer, Andrew E. “Russian Economy Slow to Recover, World Bank Says.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 27 Mar. 2012.

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6 World Bank. “Russian Federation.” World Bank. 8 Oct. 2014.7 Schwartz, Paul N. “Crimea’s Strategic Value to Russia.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 18 Mar. 2014.8 Treisman, Daniel. “Watching Putin in Moscow: What Russians Think of the Intervention in Ukraine.” Foreign Affairs. Council of Foreign Affairs, 5 Mar. 2014.9 Baker, W. D., and J. R. Oneal. “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the “Rally ‘Round the Flag” Effect.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45.5 (2001): 661-87.10 Stratfor. “Putting Russia’s Crimean Intervention in Context.” Stratfor. 12 Apr. 2014. 11 BBC. “Malaysia Plane Crash: What We Know.” BBC News. 9 Sept. 2014.12 Schwartz, Paul N. “Crimea’s Strategic Value to Russia.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 18 Mar. 2014.13 Stratfor. “ Russia’s Expanding Influence, Introduction: The Targets.” Stratfor. 8 Mar. 2014.14 The Economist. “The Other EU.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 23 Aug. 2014.15 BBC. “Malaysia Plane Crash: What We Know.” BBC News. 9 Sept. 2014.16 World Bank. “Russian Federation.” World Bank. 8 Oct. 2014.17 Walker, Shaun and Alberto Nardelli. Russia’s rouble crisis poses threat to nine countries relying on remittanc-es. The Guardian. 2015.18 Brown, Hayes. “Putin: U.S. Trying To Punish Russia Will Actually Benefit Russian Democracy.” ThinkProgress RSS. 12 Sept. 2014.19 World Bank. “Russian Federation.” World Bank. 8 Oct. 2014.

Stephen Jaber Footnotes 1. Timothy J. and, Michael McFaul. 2003. “Russian Democracy Under Putin.” Problems Of Post-Communism 50, no. 4: 12.2 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 11th ed. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 2003. Also available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/3 O’Neil, Patrick H., Karl J. Fields, and Donald Share. “Introduction.” In Cases in Comparative Politics, 9. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2012.4 ibid.5 Russian Const. art. XVII, cl. 1.6 Nikolaev, Roman. 2012. “Explaining Support For Vladimir Putin: Culture Versus Performance.” Studies Of Changing Societies: Comparative & Interdisciplinary Focus 1, no. 2: 61. 7 Robinson, Neil. 2012. “Institutional factors and Russian political parties: the changing needs of regime consoli-dation in a neo-patrimonial system.” East European Politics 28, no. 3: 298-309.8 ibid. 9 Colton and McFaul, “Russian Democracy Under Putin” 10 Kertman, Grigorii. 2008. “The Status of the Party in Russian Political Culture.” Russian Politics & Law 46, no. 2: 51-66.11 Nichol, Jim. “Russia’s December 2011 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications.” Russia’s December 2011 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, December 13, 2011. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42118.pdf.12 ibid.13 Karlekar, Karin Deutsch, and Jennifer Dunham. “Press Freedom in 2013: Media Freedom Hits Decade Low.” Freedom House, 2013.14 Reporters Without Borders. “World Press Freedom Index 2014.” Freedom Press Index, January 31, 2014. http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.15 Colton and McFaul, “Russian Democracy Under Putin.”

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16 Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker. “Freedom of the Press.” In Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice, 299. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013.17 Evans, Alfred B. “The Failure of Democratization in Russia: A Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 2, no. 1 (2011): 40-51. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2010.10.001.18 Robinson, “Institutional factors and Russian Political Parties”19 Bell, James, and Elizabeth Muller Gross. “Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union.” Global Attitudes Project, December 5, 2011. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2011/12/Pew-Global-Atti-tudes-Former-Soviet-Union-Report-FINAL-December-5-2011.pdf.20 Cassiday, Julie A. “Putin, Putiniana and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of Personality.” The Sla-vonic and East European Review 88, no. 4 (October 01, 2010): 681-707. http://www.jstor.org/sta-ble/10.2307/41061898?ref=no-x-route:3dbe08e1d486170dc74b10d9b2e71b4e.21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 Kumar, Rama Sampath. “President Putin: Good Czar or Bad Czar?” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 23 (June 03, 2000): 1904-906. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4409354?ref=no-x-route:82eeefcd48e8e-1ba49ea9a4f5079fa9c.24 Ibid.25 Colton and McFaul, “Russian Democracy Under Putin” 26 “Indexes | Levada-Center.” Levada Center. January 1, 2015. Accessed February 13, 2015. http://www.levada.ru/eng/indexes-0.27 Cassiday, “Putin, Putiniana and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of Personality.” 28 Greene, Sam, and Graeme Robertson. “Explaining Putin’s Popularity: Rallying round the Russian Flag.” Wash-ington Post. September 9, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/09/explain-ing-putins-popularity-rallying-round-the-russian-flag/.29 Adomanis, Mark. “Love Him or Hate Him, Vladimir Putin’s Poll Numbers Have Never Been Higher.” Forbes. November 14, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/11/14/love-him-or-hate-him-vladimir-putins-poll-numbers-have-never-been-higher/.30 White, Stephen, and Ian McAllister. “Putin and His Supporters.” Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 3 (May 01, 2003): 383-99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3594606?ref=no-x-route:56563a132abb07aff90128f934ee0a54.31 Evans, “The Failure of Democratization in Russia: A Comparative Perspective.” 32 Ibid.33 White, Stephen, and Ian McAllister. “Putin and His Supporters.” Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 3 (May 01, 2003): 383-99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3594606?ref=no-x-route:56563a132abb07aff90128f934ee0a54.34 Colton and McFaul, “Russian Democracy Under Putin” 35 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Putin Says West Forcing Will On World.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074621.html.

Lamija Grbic’ Footnotes1 “Balkanization.” Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.2”A Democratic Ousting: Yugoslavia Elects a New Leader.” History Behind the Headlines (2002): 1-16. Gale Biography in Context . 3 “Josip Broz Tito.” Economic and Political Weekly 15.1910 May (1980): 829-30. Web. 20 Dec. 2011.Gale Biogra-phy in Context. 4 “A Democratic Ousting.”5 Ibid.6 “Josip Broz Tito.”

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7 “A Democratic Ousting.”8 Davidson, Basil. “Tito.” History Today Oct. 19809 “A Democratic Ousting.”10 Davidson, Basil. 11 Flere, Sergej. “The Broken Covenant of Tito’s People: The Problem of Civil Religion in Communist Yugosla-via.” East European Politics & Societies (2007): 681-702. Web. 9 Apr. 2012. 12 “A Democratic Ousting.”13 Finlan, Alastair. The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-1999. Oxford: Osprey, 2004. Print.14 Derks-Normandin, Maria. “Linking Peace, Security and Durable Solutions in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Kosovo.” Brookings Institute. 2014.15 Kim, Julie. Macedonia Country Background and Recent Conflict. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001. The Library of Congress, 7 Nov. 2001. Web.16 “Macedonia: Implementation of the Framework (Ohrid) Agreement.” Refworld. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 18 July 2003. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.17 “The World Factbook.” Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.18 “ICTY - TPIY : About the ICTY.” United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.19 “The World Factbook.” 20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 Pasic, Lana. “Who Is behind Bosnia’s Riots?” Al Jazeera English. N.p., 10 Feb. 2014. Web.

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