The emergence of noopolitik: toward an American information strategy

title: TheEmergenceofNoopolitik:TowardanAmericanInformationStrategy

author: Arquilla,John.;Ronfeldt,DavidF.publisher: RAND

isbn10|asin: 0833026984printisbn13: 9780833026989ebookisbn13: 9780585243481

language: English

subject

Internationalrelations,Informationsociety,Telematics--Socialaspects,UnitedStates--Foreignrelations--1989-,Informationpolicy--UnitedStates.

publicationdate: 1999lcc: JZ1254.A771999ebddc: 327

subject:Internationalrelations,Informationsociety,Telematics--Socialaspects,UnitedStates--Foreignrelations--1989-,Informationpolicy--UnitedStates.

TheresearchdescribedinthisreportwassponsoredbytheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD).TheresearchwasconductedinRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute,afederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcentersupportedbytheOSD,theJointStaff,theunifiedcommands,andthedefenseagenciesunderContractDASW01-95-C-0059.

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Arquilla,John.Theemergenceofnoopolitik:towardanAmericaninformationstrategy/JohnArquillaandDavidRonfeldt.p.cm."PreparedfortheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefensebyRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute.""MR-1033-OSD."Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.).ISBN0-8330-2698-41.Internationalrelations.2.Informationsociety.3.TelematicsSocialaspects.4.UnitedStatesForeignrelations1989.5.InformationpolicyUnitedStates.I.Ronfeldt,DavidF.II.UnitedStates.Dept.ofDefense.OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense.III.NationalDefenseResearchInstitute(U.S.).IV.Title.JZ1254.A771999327dc2199-10120CIP

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TheEmergenceofNoopolitikTowardanAmericanInformationStrategy

JohnArquillaDavidRonfeldt

PreparedfortheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionunlimited

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PrefaceThisreportbuildsonwhatwehaveaccomplishedsofarinasetofstudies,since1991,aboutfuturemilitaryaffairs(cyberwar),societal-levelconflictandcrime(netwar),andinformationstrategy(seetheBibliographyforrelevantcitations).Hereweadvancetheideaof"noopolitik"(nü-oh-poh-li-teek),anewapproachtostatecraftbasedprincipallyontheprimacyofideas,values,laws,andethics,asenabledbytheemergenceofthenoosphere(anall-encompassingrealmofthemind),toextendourresearchagendainanewdirection.

PrimarilyofinteresttoU.S.policymakersandstrategists,thisreportwillalsointerestthoseinacademiaandthinktanksconcernedwithhowtheinformationrevolutionisalteringtheconditionsforandconductofstrategy.

Thisstudywaspreparedforaprojectoninformationstrategy.TheprojectwassponsoredbytheOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefense/Command,Control,Communications,andIntelligence(OASD/C3I),andwasconductedwithinboththeAcquisitionandTechnologyPolicyCenterandtheInternationalSecurityandDefensePolicyCenterofRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute(NDRI).NDRIisafederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcentersponsoredbytheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,theJointStaff,theUnifiedCommands,andthedefenseagencies.

JohnArquilla DavidRonfeldt

U.S.NavalPostgraduateSchool

RAND

Monterey,CA93943 SantaMonica,CA90407-2138

(408)656-3450 (310)393-0411

[email protected] [email protected]

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Contents

Preface iii

FigureandTables vii

Summary ix

Acknowledgments xiii

ChapterOneWhither"InformationStrategy"?

1

ChapterTwoRecognitionoftheNoosphere

7

Why"Information"Matters 7

ThreeConceptsofInformation-BasedRealms 9

Cyberspace 10

Infosphere 11

Noosphere 12

ComparisonsLeadtoaPreferencefortheNoosphereConcept

15

EmergenceandConstructionoftheNoosphere 20

ChapterThreeEmergenceofNoopolitik

27

GrandStrategicShiftsattheTurnoftheCentury 27

FromRealpolitiktoNoopolitikAComparisonoftheParadigms

28

LoomingLimitationsofRealpolitik 29

LiberalInternationalismATransitionalParadigm 32

NoopolitikinTheoryandPractice 34

TrendsThatInviteNoopolitik 35

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MutualRelationshipBetweenRealpolitikandNoopolitik

44

FosteringNoopolitik:SomeGuidelinesandTasks 46

ChapterFourInternationalCooperationandConflict

55

InformationStrategyandGlobalCooperation 55

TheEconomic-LegalRealm 57

Military-SecurityAffairs 59

TheSociopoliticalArena 61

BuildingGlobalCooperation 62

InformationStrategyinCrisisandConflict 64

TheRoleofPublicDiplomacy 65

StrategicInformationDoctrine(SID) 66

ChapterFiveMovingAhead

71

ANewTurnofMind 71

U.S.HegemonyRequiredtoConsolidatetheNoosphere?

74

Bibliography 77

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Figure

ThreeRealmsofInformation 16

Tables

1.InformationRealmsAcrossThreeLevels 17

2.ContrastBetweenRealpolitikandNoopolitik 47

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SummaryInformationandcommunicationshavealwaysbeenimportanttostrategy.Buttheyarechangingfromsubsidiarytosingularconcerns"information"mattersmorethaneverforreasonsthatdidnotexisteven20yearsago.Onereasonistechnologicalinnovation:thegrowthofavastnewinformationinfrastructureincludingnotonlytheInternet,butalsocablesystems,directbroadcastsatellites,cellularphones,etc.inwhichthebalanceisshiftingawayfromone-to-manybroadcastmedia(e.g.,traditionalradioandtelevision)towardmany-to-manyinteractivemedia.Inmanynationsagrowing,thoughvaried,populationisenjoyinganeaseofentryandaccesstothenewinfrastructureforcommercial,social,diplomatic,military,andotherinteractions.Thiseasyaccessisresultinginahugeincreaseinglobalinterconnectivity.

Asecondreasonistheproliferationofneworganizations:Vastarraysofstateandnonstateorganizationsareemergingthatdirectlyconcerninformationandcommunicationsissues.Athirdreasonwhyinformationandcommunicationshavebecomemoreimportantisthat"information"and"power"arebecomingincreasinglyintertwined.Acrossmanypolitical,economic,andmilitaryareas,informational"softpower"istakingprecedenceovertraditional,material''hardpower."

Thenewfieldknownas"informationstrategy"isemergingaroundtwopoles,whichdefineoppositeendsofaspectrumofsecurityconcerns.Oneisanessentiallytechnologicalpole,thatofcyberspacesafetyandsecurity.Theotherpoleisessentiallypoliticalandideationalinformationstrategyisseenasawaytoharnessandex-

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pressthe"softpower"ofAmericandemocraticandmarketideals,toattract,influence,andleadothers.

Ofthetwopoles,thetechnologicalonehasreceivedfarmoreattention.Thus,thereisanimbalanceincurrenteffortstoframeanAmericaninformationstrategy.Bothpolesareimportant.Yet,theconcernsthatencompassthetechnologicalpolehavereceivedthebulkofattentionandappeartobewellonthewaytobeingfiguredout.Theideationalpoleisnowtheonemoreinneedofworkandclarification.Moreover,thetechnologicalandideationalpolesshouldbelinkedtogetherbystrategicanalysisthatbridgesthegapbetweenthem.

SuchstrategicthinkingshouldimpelashiftinAmericangrandstrategy,ashiftgrowingoutofandledbytherisingimportanceofinformationstrategy.Inourview,anewparadigmisneededinfact,itisalreadyemergingwhichwecallnoopolitik(nü-oh-poh-li-teek).Thisistheformofstatecraftthatwearguewillcometobeassociatedwiththenoosphere,thebroadestinformationalrealmofthemind(fromtheGreeknoos)underwhichcyberspace(i.e.,theNet)andtheinfosphere(cyberspaceplusthemedia)aresubsumed.

Noopolitikisforeign-policybehaviorfortheinformationagethatemphasizestheprimacyofideas,values,norms,laws,andethicsitwouldworkthrough"softpower"ratherthan"hardpower."Noopolitikisguidedmorebyaconvictionthatrightmakesformight,thanbytheobverse.Bothstateandnonstateactorsmaybeguidedbynoopolitik;butratherthanbeingstate-centric,itsstrengthmaylikelystemfromenablingstateandnonstateactorstoworkconjointly.Thedrivingmotivationofnoopolitikcannotbenationalinterestsdefinedinstatistterms.Nationalinterestswillstillplayarole,buttheymaybedefinedmoreinsocietywidethanstate-centrictermsandbefusedwithbroader,evenglobal,interestsinenhancingthetransnationally

networked''fabric"inwhichtheplayersareembedded.Whilerealpolitiktendstoempowerstates,noopolitikwilllikelyempowernetworksofstateandnonstateactors.Realpolitikpitsonestateagainstanother,butnoopolitikencouragesstatestocooperateincoalitionsandothermutualframeworks.

Noopolitikwillnotlikelysupplanttheexistingrealpolitikparadigmofpowerpoliticsinthenearfuture.Ratherthetwoformswillcoex-

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ist,inanoftenrough,edgybalancethatwillvaryregionallybecausepatternsofdevelopmentremainunevenaroundtheworld.Someareasarealreadyquitesteepedinthedynamicsoftheinformationage,whileothersstillseemmoremedievalthanmodern.Thus,noopolitikwillbemorepertinentinsomepartsoftheworldthaninothers,andinregardtosomeissuesmorethanothers.

Wesurmisethatnoopolitikwillbemostpertinentwheretechnologicallyadvancedsocietiespredominate:e.g.,partsofWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica.Itwillbelesssowhereconditionsremaintraditionallystate-centric,andthusripeforthecontinuationofrealpolitik(e.g.,muchofAsia).Moreover,noopolitikwillbemosteffectivewhereallmannerofmediaareprevalent,nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)1haveanedgeingeneratingattentiontoissues,theissuesarecomplexratherthanstrictlyeconomicorpoliticalormilitary,andwheregovernment-NGOrelationsaregood.

Thefollowingmeasurescouldencourageconstructionofaglobalnoospherethatwouldbeofinteresttoallrealmsofsociety.Theyalsoembodyamixofmeasurestofavoropenness,ononehand,andprotection,ontheother.Inthisregard,theycapturetheessenceofourpreferredstrategyfortheUnitedStates"guardedopenness."

Continuetosupportworldwideaccesstocyberspace.SupporttheaccessofNGOsaswellasstateandmarketactorstoit,includingwherethisrunscountertothepreferencesofauthoritarianregimes.

Moveawayfromrealpolitik-orienteddesignstocontrolencryption,andmovetowardfreedomofencryption.

Toassurecyberspacesafetyandsecurityattheinternationallevel,developmultitieredinformationsystemsforconditionalinformationsharing,creatingasharedbutstillsecureinfosphere.

1Awordofclarification:NGOsare,forthemostpart,civil-society

organizations.Thepointhasbeenmadetousseveraltimesbydevoteesofeconomicpowerthatprivate,for-profit,commercialcorporationsarepowerfulNGOs.Butthisisincorrectusage.SuchcorporationsarenonstateactorsbutnotNGOsthatterm(andacronym)apparentlydatesfromtheearlyyearsoftheUnitedNationsandwasnotmeanttoincludecommercialcorporations.Neitherwasarelatedterm,internationalnongovernmentalorganization(INGO),whichwedonotusehere.

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Promotefreedomofinformationandcommunicationsasaright(andresponsibility)aroundtheworld.

Encouragethecreationof"specialmediaforces,"modeledalongthelinesofspecialforcesunitsbutarmedwiththeweaponsofthemediaratherthanthoseofthemilitary.Thesesquadscouldbedispatchedintoconflictzonestohelpsettledisputesthroughthediscoveryanddisseminationofaccurateinformation.

Openupdiplomacytogreatercoordinationbetweenstateandnonstateactors,especiallyNGOs,byundertakinga"revolutionindiplomaticaffairs"thatmatchestherevolutionsunderwayinbusinessandmilitaryaffairs.

Inadditiontobuildingaglobalnoosphere,itmightalsobeadvisablefortheU.S.governmenttoworkonconstructingamilitarynoospherethat,emphasizingjointnessandsharing,wouldspantheU.S.servicesandalliedandotherfriendlyforcesaroundtheworld.However,thebalancebetweenopennessandguardednessmighthavetobedifferentinamilitarynoospherefromwhatitshouldbeinageneralglobalnoosphere.

Intheimmediatefuture,todealwithaworldinwhichnoopolitikisemergingbutstrongelementsofrealpolitikpersist,thereisaneedtoprepareforinformation-ageconflictbydevelopingastrategicinformationdoctrine(SID)toguidepolicyincrisisandconflict.Composedof"depthdefenses"(i.e.,layeredelectronicdefensesagainsthackers),butalsoofproactiveelements(electronicmeasuresforgoingontheoffensive),aSIDshouldemphasizetheguidanceofthemoraldimensionsofnoopolitik.Thisemphasisimpliesapolicyof"nofirstuse"ofinformationweapons,whichwouldallowtheUnitedStatesto"dogood"intermsofdecreasingthelikelihoodofinformation-ageconflictbutalsoto"dowell"bymitigatingitsownvulnerabilitiestoattackincyberspace,whereithasmoreinformation

targetsthanalmostanyotherentity.

Finally,weurgeashiftfromfocusingonan"electronicPearlHarbor"toaspiringtothebenefitsofanAmerican-inspiredinformation-age"ManifestDestiny."

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AcknowledgmentsOnceagain,weareespeciallygratefultoCaptainRichardO'Neill(U.S.Navy,nowretired)attheOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefense/Command,Control,Communications,andIntelligence(OASD/C3I)forhisinterest,support,andguidance.WearealsogratefulforencouragingcommentsandotherguidancefromOASD/C3IpersonnelCaptainGregoryBlackburn(U.S.Navy),LieutenantColonelRobertWalter(U.S.Army),andCommanderBobScott(U.S.Navy).Inaddition,weareindebtedtoDr.JohnHamre(DeputySecretaryofDefense)forhisinsightfulcommentsonanearlierversionofthisstudy.

WearethankfultoanumberofmembersoftheHighlandsForum,aconsortiumofgovernment,business,academic,andmedialeadersdevotedtothestudyofinformation-ageissues,fortheinsightfulcommentstheyprovidedaboutsomeoftheideasweadvanceinthisstudy.Finally,webenefitedfromthoughtfulreviewcommentsprovidedbyourRANDcolleaguesRobertAndersonandGregTrevertonandfromskillfuleditingbyChristinaPitcher.

ChapterOneWhither"InformationStrategy"?Somethingunsettlingishappeningtograndstrategy.Nationalsecurityexpertshavelongbasedtheircalculationsonthetraditionalpolitical,economic,andmilitarydimensionsofpower.Nowtheyseethatanewfieldisemerging:"informationstrategy."Althoughstillinchoate,itpromisestoredefinethesethreetraditionaldimensions.Moreover,itpromisestoseedthecreationofafourththe"information"dimension,whichisbroadlyunderstoodtoincludetechnologicalconduitsandconceptualcontents.Theworldisturninganewintoahighlychargedbattlegroundofideas;itisnotjustaworldinwhichmaterialresourcesaretheobjectsofprotracted,oftenviolentcompetition.Inthisemergingworld,thekeytosuccesswilllikelylieinmanaginginformationalcapabilitiesandresourcesskillfullyi.e.,strategically.

Informationstrategyremainsdifficulttodefineandboundwithprecision,buttheissuesanddebatesshapingitsappealhavebeenclusteringaroundtwopolesforthepastseveralyears.Onepoleisbasicallytechnological:thatofcyberspacesafetyandsecurity.WhatdrivesconcernshereisasenseofthevulnerabilityofessentialU.S.informationinfrastructurestovariousformsofattack,especiallybymaliciousactorswhoareskilledatlaunchingcyberspace-basedthreats.Worryinghowtodefendagainstattacksbyadversarialregimes,terrorists,andcriminals,andwonderinghowtousecyberspaceforcounteroffensiveattacksthatiswhatthispoleislargelyabout.(SeeHundleyandAnderson,1994;Molander,Riddile,andWilson,1996;andCampen,Dearth,andGoodden,1996.)

Theotherpoleisconcernedwiththepoliticsofideasinformationstrategyisseenasawaytoharnessandexpressthe"softpower"ofAmericanideals,soastoattract,influence,andleadothers(Nye,1990;NyeandOwens,1996).Thedebatesherearemainlyaboutthebenefitstobegainedbyopeningandsharingourinformationandrelatedinformationinfrastructureswithouralliesandothers,insuchareasasintelligenceandcoalitionformation.Moreover,thereisastrong,optimisticemphasisonthemedia'srolesinshapingpeople'sviews,aswellastheInternet's.Broadstrategies,involvingthemediamorethancyberspace,areenvisagedforusing"informationpower"topromotedemocraciesandconstrainauthoritarianregimesabroad.Thus,opportunitiesratherthanthreatsarethemotivatingconcerns.

Ofthetwopoles,thetechnologicalonehasreceivedfarmoreattention.Numerousconferencesandgamingexerciseshavebeenheldabout"informationwarfare."Agrowingbodyofstudiesthink-tankanalyses,congressionalhearings,andapresidentialcommissionareservingtoidentifythekeytechnologicalrisksandvulnerabilities.Optionsareemerging,andinteragencymechanisms(e.g.,theNationalInfrastructureProtectionCenter)aretakingshapeforinstitutingsystemicandnodaldefensestoprotectAmerica'snationalandglobalinformationinfrastructuresandstrategicsubsystems.

Despitethisconsiderableprogress,inspectionofthedebatesthatareevolvingaroundthemoretechnicalissuesindicatesthatthetechnologicalpolecannotprovideasolebasisfortheformulationofinformationstrategy.Thedebatesremainlargelyaboutcyberspace-basedvulnerabilities,andtheensuinglanguageandscenariostendtorecapitulateoldnuclearandterroristparadigmsthatplaceheavyemphasisonpotentialworst-casethreats(e.g.,an"electronicPearlHarbor").Allthisisneededindeed,infrastructureprotectionmustbeapriorityoftheU.S.governmentandprivatesector.1Butthisisfar

fromadequate,evenfordevelopingthetechnologicaldimensionasa

1Forarecentdiscussion,seeSmith,(IssuesinScienceandTechnology),andtherepliespostedintheForumsectionoftheWinter1998issueofthatjournalbyJohnJ.Hamre(DeputySecretaryofDefense),MichaelA.Vatis(chief,NationalInfrastructureProtectionCenter),andArthurK.Cebrowski(ViceAdmiral,U.S.Navy,andPresident,NavalWarCollege).Allthisisavailablebyfollowinglinksathttp://205.130.85.236/issues/index.html/.

basisforinformationstrategywritlarge.Analystsmustlookbeyondinfrastructuredefense;moreisatstakeincyberspacethanjusttechnologicalvulnerability.Theymustlookbeyondrisks,too,tohelpclarifytheopportunities.

Meanwhile,lessattentionhasbeengiventothedevelopmentofsoftpowerasabasisforinformationstrategy.Strategistsrarelyconvenetodiscussit,anditsinfluenceismeasuredmainlybyasmallnumberofpublications.True,therehavebeennumerousconferencesandstudiesaboutthechangingrolesofthemedia,publicdiplomacy,andintelligenceintheinformationage.Butastrategistinterestedinsoftpowerasabasisforinformationstrategymustpullthesepiecestogethertheyarerarelypresentedandanalyzedasacoherentwhole.Theoptionsinthisareaarenotspelledoutverywell.

Moretothepoint,thecommunitiesofexpertsassociatedwitheitherthetechnologicalortheidea-sharingareadonotmeetmuchwiththoseoftheother.Bothcommunitiesareawareofeachotherandsharesomecommonnotions.Forexample,bothcommunitiespresumablyagree(withNyeandOwens,1996,p.35)that

[i]nformationisthenewcoinoftheinternationalrealm,andtheUnitedStatesisbetterpositionedthananyothercountrytomultiplythepotencyofitshardandsoftpowerresourcesthroughinformation.

Nevertheless,theyremaindisparate,insularcommunities,withfewbridgesconnectingthem.

Thus,thereisanimbalanceincurrenteffortstoframeanAmericaninformationstrategy.Bothpolesareimportant.Yet,theconcernsencompassingthetechnologicalpolehavereceivedthebulkofattentionandappeartobewellonthewaytoresolution.Thesociopoliticaldimensionofideasharingisnowtheoneinneedofmuchmoreworkandclarification.

Further,thetechnologicalandideationalaspectsshouldbelinkedbystrategicanalysis.Lettingthemdevelopseparatelyalongtheircurrenttrajectoriesmayleadtoregrettableomissionsofanalysis.Forexample,narrowtechnicalconcernaboutcyber-terroristswhomighttake"theNet"downmissesthestrategicpossibilitythat,politically,terroristsmightprefertoleavetheNetup,soastospreadtheirown

soft-powermessageorengageindeceptionorintelligencegathering.Ontheotherhand,enthusiasmaboutspreadingAmericanideasmaycausetheUnitedStatestooverlookthepossibilitythatadversariesmayexploitthemedia,theInternet,andothercommunicationstechnologiestotheirownadvantage.

However,moreisatstakethanomissionsofanalysis.Developingthetechnologicalandideationaldimensionsofinformationtechnologytogetherratherthanallowingthemtotakeseparatepathswillgarnergreatopportunities.Itisamistaketothinkthatthesetwopolesrepresentanunremittingdichotomyratherthantwopartsofthesamewhole.Goodideasandoptionsareneededforbridgingandunitingthemtocreateabroad,integratedvisionofwhatAmericaninformationstrategycanbecome.Weproposetounfoldsuchavision.

Webeginbyreconceptualizingtheinformationrealm.First,wearguethatexistingnotionsofcyberspaceandtheinfosphere(cyberspaceplusthemedia)shouldbeseenassubsetsofabroader"noosphere"orglobe-girdlingrealmofthemind.AdvancedbytheFrenchscientistandclergymanPierreTeilharddeChardininthemid-20thcentury,thisconceptisbeingrekindledbyvisionariesfromavarietyofquartersandcanbeofservicetoinformationstrategists.Inadditiontorecommendingadoptionoftheconceptofthenoosphere,wesuggesttheneedtoshiftfromthecurrentemphasison"informationprocessing"(atechnology-orientedactivity)tothinkingalsoabout"informationstructuring"(whichemphasizesissuesrelatedtoideasandorganization).

Ourdiscussionofthenoosphereanticipatesthenextkeyproposal:Atthehighestlevelsofstatecraft,thedevelopmentofinformationstrategymayfostertheemergenceofanewparadigm,onebasedonideas,values,andethicstransmittedthroughsoftpowerasopposedtopowerpoliticsanditsemphasisontheresourcesandcapabilities

associatedwithtraditional,material"hardpower."Thus,realpolitik(politicsbasedonpracticalandmaterialfactorsthoseof,say,HenryKissinger)willgivesomegroundtowhatwecallnoopoli-

tik(nü-oh-poh-li-teek2politicsbasedonethicsandideas,whichweassociatewithmanyofthoseofGeorgeKennan).Asnoopolitikemerges,thetwoapproachestostatecraftwillcoexistforsomedecades.Sometimestheywillcomplementeachother,butoftentheywillmakeforcontradictoryoptions.Atfirst,informationstrategymaywellserveinsubordinatewaystotraditionalpowerpoliticsbut,inourview,thiswillbecomeeverlessthecase.Statesmenwillalwayshaverecoursetotraditionalformsofpower,buttheywillincreasinglyseebenefitsinemphasizingstrategiesthattakeadvantageofinformationalmeansfirst,withforceplacedinacomplementaryrole.Thiswillworkespeciallywellwhenethicalnotionsformakeypartofaninformationstrategyapproachtoconflict,andwhentheinitiativecancomefromeithernonstateorstateactors.

Strategy,atitsbest,knitstogetherendsandmeans,nomatterhowvariousanddisparate,intoacohesivepattern.InthecaseofanAmericaninformationstrategy,thisrequiresbalancingtheneedtoguardandsecureaccesstomanyinformationalcapabilitiesandresources,withtheopportunitytoachievenationalaimsbyfosteringasmuchopennessaspracticableintheinternationalsystem.Ofcourse,anAmericanstrategythatsupportsasubstantialamountofopennessissuretobaseitselfontheassumptionthatgreaterinterconnectivityleadstomoreliberalpoliticaldevelopmentanupdatedversionofLipset's(1960)"optimisticequation,"whichsawdemocracymovingintandemwithprosperity.Evenso,itmaybeprudenttohedgeagainstatavistictendencies(e.g.,aninformation-agetotalitarianism)bymeansofcontinuingguardedness.Ourtermtorepresentsuchastrategicbalancingactis"guardedopenness,"whichwewilldiscussfurtherinthisreport.

Buildinguponthisfoundation,wenextexaminethestrategicinformationdimensionsoftwokeyareasthatbearcloselyuponAmericannationalsecurity,bothinpeaceandwar:strategiesfor

fosteringinternationalcooperationwithotherstatesandnonstateactors;andastrategicinformationwarfightingdoctrine.WeexamineavarietyofapproachestobuildingrobustcoalitionstructuresandconsiderthewaysinwhichAmericaninfluencecanbeadvancedinamannerthat

2Thisisthepronunciationweprefer,becauseitadheresbesttothepronunciationoftheGreekrootnoos.However,somedictionariesmayindicatethatotherpronunciationsarepossible(e.g.,n-uh-poh-li-teek).

willneitherthreatennorsparkreactions.Intheeventthatdiplomaticstrategyfailstopreventconflict,ourviewisthatinformationweaponswillhavegreateffectsuponthefuture"faceofbattle."Withthisinmind,weadvancesomedoctrinalstrategiesthatstrivetoreconcilethepragmaticneedtostrikepowerfullywiththeethicalimperativetowagewarjustly.

Ourstudyincludesrecommendationsforpolicy,rangingfromhigh-levelemphasisonsupportingtheemergenceofaglobalnoosphere,toinstitutionalrecommendationsthat,forexample,theU.S.militaryshouldbegintodevelopitsownnoosphere(amongandbetweentheservices,aswellaswithU.S.friendsandallies).Intheareaofinternationalcooperation,weofferrecommendationsforstrategicapproachestoinfluencebutnotalienatethestateandnonstateactorsofthenoosphere.Finally,werecommendspecificdoctrinerelatedtoinformationstrategyincludingthepressingneedtodealwithsuchethicalconcernsasthefirstuseofinformationweapons,conceptsofproportionalresponse,andtheneedtomaintain,tothegreatestextentpossible,theimmunityofnoncombatants.

Fromthesebeginnings,wehopethatanarticulated,integrated,U.S.informationstrategywillemerge.

ChapterTwoRecognitionofTheNoosphere

Why''Information"Matters

Informationandcommunicationshavealwaysbeenimportanttostrategy.Buttheyaremovingfrombeingsubsidiarytobecomingoverarchingconcerns"information"mattersmorethanever,forreasonsthatdidnotexisteven20yearsago.

Onereasonistechnologicalinnovation:thegrowthofanewinformationinfrastructurethatincludesnotonlytheInternet,butalsocablesystems,directbroadcastsatellites,cellularphones,etc.inwhichthebalanceisshiftingfromone-to-manybroadcastmedia(e.g.,traditionalradioandtelevision)tomany-to-manyinteractivemedia.Ahugeincreaseinglobalinterconnectivityisresultingfromtheeaseofentryandaccessinmanynations,andfromthegrowing,thoughvaried,interestsofsomanyactorsinusingthenewinfrastructureforeconomic,social,diplomatic,military,andotherinteractions.

Thus,asecondreasonistheproliferationofneworganizations:Vastnewarraysofstateandnonstateorganizationsareemergingthatdirectlyconcerninformationandcommunicationsissues.TheneworganizationalecologyistherichestintheUnitedStates,withsuchnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)1astheElectronicFreedom

1Awordofclarification:NGOsare,forthemostpart,civil-societyorganizations.Thepointhasbeenmadetousseveraltimesbydevoteesofeconomicpowerthatprivate,for-profit,commercialcorporationsarepowerfulNGOs.Butthisisincorrectusage.SuchcorporationsarenonstateactorsbutarenotNGOsthatterm(andacronym)

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

Foundation(EFF)andComputerProfessionalsforSocialResponsibility(CPSR)exemplifyingthetrend.ThesegroupsspanthepoliticalspectrumandhaveobjectivesthatrangefromhelpingpeoplegetconnectedtotheInternet,toinfluencinggovernmentpoliciesandlaws,andadvancingparticularcausesathomeorabroad.Itisnotjusttheproliferationofsuchorganizations,butalsotheirinterconnectioninsprawlingnetworksthatmakesthemincreasinglyinfluential.AsthestrengthofNGOsinparticularandnonstateactorsingeneralgrows,thenatureofworldpoliticspromisestobecomelessstate-centric.

Athirdreasonisideational:aspreadingrecognitionthat"information"and"power"areincreasinglyintertwined.Acrossallpolitical,economic,andmilitaryareas,informationalsoftpower(Nye,1990;NyeandOwens,1996)isbecomingmoreimportant,comparedtotraditionalhardpower.Thistrendmaytakedecadestounfold;intheinterim,traditionalmethodsofexercisingpowermayremainsquarelyatthecoreofinternationalpolitics.Butmeanwhile,theriseofsoftpowerprovidesanotherreasonforattendingtotheformulationofinformationstrategypower,security,andstrategyareincreasinglyupforredefinitionintheinformationage.

Atallthreelevelsthetechnological,organizational,andideational"networkeffects"aretakinghold,furtherhelpingexplainwhyinformationisinfluencingmorethaneverpeople'sbehavioraswellasgovernmentpoliciesandstrategies.Networkeffectsmean,forexample,thatifonlyonepersonhasatelephoneorfaxmachine,itisnotusefulheorshecannotcommunicatewithanyoneelse.Butasmorepeopleusephonesandfaxes,thevalueofeachoneincreases,asdoesthevalueofthenetworkasawhole.2Accordingto"Metcalfe'slaw"(namedafterRobertMetcalfe,whodesignedthecommunicationprotocolgoverningtheEthernet),the"power''ofanetworkisproportionaltothesquareofthenumberofnodesinit.

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

apparentlydatesfromtheearlyyearsoftheUnitedNationsandwasnotmeanttoincludecommercialcorporations.Neitherwasarelatedterm,internationalnongovernmentalorganization(INGO),whichwedonotusehere.2Thenetworkeffectinvolvesnotonlyexpansionofanetworkbutalsostandardizationtoeaseaccesstoit.Oft-citedstoriesaboutnetworkeffectsexplain,forexample,whytheVHSformatprevailedoverBetainvideocassetterecordertechnology,eventhoughBetawasconsideredasuperiortechnology.

Networkeffectsmayapplytothespreadofnotonlynewtechnologies,butalsoneworganizationsandideas.

Together,thesetechnological,organizational,andideationaldevelopmentsmeanthatinformationisincreasinglyviewedasanagentofsystemchangeandtransformation.Theyalsomeanthatinformation-basedrealmsarebeingcreatedthatthriveonnetworkeffects.

ThreeConceptsofInformation-BasedRealms3

Asinformationandcommunicationhavecometomattermore,sohavetherealmsordomainsdefinedbythem.Thethreethatmatterthemostarecyberspace,theinfosphere,andthenoosphere.4Allareaboutinformation,andallcombinetechnological,organizational,andideationalelements.Buteachhasadifferentfocusandemphasisandthisaffectstheirsignificanceforstrategy.Theyarediscussedbelowinaprogression,fromthemosttechnological(cyberspace),tothemostideational(thenoosphere).

Analysts,strategists,andpolicymakersfacechoicesastowhichterm(s)toprefer.Thetermnoospheremaybedifficulttoadoptitsoundsweird.Butrecallthatthetermcyberspacewasinitiallyreceivedthiswayyetnowitisroutine.Theterminfospherehasneverbeensocontroversial;and,formanypeople,itmaylooklikeagood-enoughtermofart.However,it,liketheotherterms,hassomeinherentbiasesandlimitationsthatshouldgivepause,asnotedbelow.

Meanwhile,somepeoplemayprefertocastasideallthreeterms,infavorofjustreferringtoa"realmofinformation,"muchaspeople

3SomeofthewritinginthissectionisrepeatedfromRonfeldt(1992).4Dertouzos(1997)proposesanotherconcepttheInformationMarketplacewhichmeans(p.10)

thecollectionofpeople,computers,communications,software,andservicesthatwillbeengagedintheintraorganizationalandinterpersonalinformationtransactionsofthefuture.

Inhisview(p.12),"theInformationMarketplacenotCyberspaceisthetargettowardwhichtheInternetandtheWebareheaded."Hisconceptisavariantoftheinfosphere,withanemphasisoneconomicmotivationsandtransactions.Butithasanoosphericelementhehopesforacoming"AgeofUnification"inwhichthe"techie-humiesplit''isresolvedandanewagendaforhumanismisserved.

havelongreferredtotherealmsofpolitics,economics,andsecurity.Eventually,thatmaymakesense.However,inourview,itistooearlytodothatasamatterofcourse;thenotionofa"realmofinformation"remainstoooverarchingandall-inclusive,tooshapelessandunbounded,toprovideasoundbasisforstrategy.Forthetimebeing,itismoreadvisabletoclarifyandmakebetteruseoftheconceptsofcyberspace,theinfosphere,andthenoosphere.

Cyberspace

This,themostcommonofthethreeterms,referstotheglobalsystemofsystemsofinternettedcomputers,communicationsinfrastructures,onlineconferencingentities,databases,andinformationutilitiesgenerallyknownastheNet.ThismostlymeanstheInternet;butthetermmayalsobeusedtorefertothespecific,boundedelectronicinformationenvironmentofacorporationorofamilitary,government,orotherorganization.

Thetermservestoenvisiontheelectronicstocksandflowsofinformation,thelogged-inprovidersandusersofthatinformation,andthetechnologieslinkingthemasarealmorsystemthathasanidentityasdistinctasthatofaneconomicorpoliticalsystem.Ideally,astechnologyadvances,ausershouldbeabletoaccessandoperateincyberspacethroughhardwareandsoftwarethatrendertheimpressionofbeinginsideathree-dimensionalenvironmentcontainingrepresentationsoftheplaces,actors,instruments,andrepositoriesthatauserisinterestedin.

Cyberspaceisthefastestgrowing,newestdomainofpowerandpropertyintheworld.TheInternetalonenowembracessome20millioncomputerhosts,nearlyahundredmillionusers(expectedtoexceedabillionbytheyear2000),andbillionsifnottrillionsofdollars'worthofactivities.Furtherdevelopingthisrealm,nationallyandglobally,isoneofthegreatundertakingsofourtime.Nowonder

thetermhasgainedsuchcurrency.

Thetermhasamoretechnologicalbentthaninfosphereornoosphere.Yet,therehasalwaysbeenatendencytoseecyberspaceasfarmorethantechnology,fromthemomentthetermwasproposedbycyberpunkwriterWilliamGibson(1984)asa"consensualhallucination,"throughrecentnotionsofcyberspaceasarealmforbuilding

"virtualcommunities"(Rheingold,1993),creatinga"globalmatrixofminds"(Quarterman,1990and1993),andstrengtheningpeople'sspiritualbondsaroundtheworld(Cobb,1998).Suchviewsimplicitlyportendanoverlapofcyberspacewiththenoosphere(seebelow).

Cyberspaceismoreboundedthantheinfosphereorthenoosphere,inthatitrefersmainlytotheNet.ButsomedefinitionsextendbeyondtheInternettoincludethepublicswitchednetworks(PSNs)andothercyberspaceaccesspointsandcontrolsforaffectingcriticalinfrastructures:e.g.,electricpowergrids,oilandgaspipelines,telecommunicationssystems,financialclearinghouses,airtrafficcontrolsystems,railroadswitchingsystems,trucklocationanddispatchsystems,mediabroadcastsystems,andmilitaryandothergovernmentsecuritysystems.Strategicinformationwarfareislargelyaboutassuringcyberspacesecurityandsafetyathome,anddevelopingacapacitytoexploitvulnerabilitiesinsystemsabroad.

Infosphere

Knowingthespatialandtechnicallimitationsofthecyberspaceconcept,someanalystsprefertheterminfosphere.Sometimesthetwotermsareusedinterchangeably,orthedistinctionsbetweenthemareunclear.Forexample,inonerecentview(Vlahos,1998,p.512),

TheInfosphereisshorthandforthefusionofalltheworld'scommunicationsnetworks,databases,andsourcesofinformationintoavast,intertwinedandheterogeneoustapestryofelectronicinterchange....TheInfospherehasthepotentialtogatherallpeopleandallknowledgetogetherintooneplace.

Thiscouldaseasilybeadefinitionofcyberspaceinsomequarters.

But,whendefineddistinctly,theinfosphereisfarlargerthancyberspaceitencompassesthelatter,plusarangeofinformationsystemsthatmaynotbepartoftheNet.Inthecivilianworld,this

oftenincludesbroadcast,print,andothermedia(i.e.,themediasphere),aswellasinstitutions,suchaspubliclibraries,partsofwhicharenotyetelectronic.Inthemilitaryworld,theinfospheremayincludecommand,control,communications,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancesystemstheelectronicsystemsofthe"militaryin-

formationenvironment"(anothertermofart)aboveandaroundabattlespace.

AccordingtoJeffreyCooper(1997,pp.iii,3,27),theinfosphereisemerging,likecyberspace,asa"trulyglobalinformationinfrastructureandenvironment"inwhichtraditionalnotionsofspaceandtimenolongerprevail.Thetermhasmeritbecauseitfocuseson"informationenvironments,"broadlydefined,ratherthanoncomputerizedtechnologiesandinfrastructures.Thetermisalsofavoredbecauseit"carriesresonancesofbiosphere"meaningthattheinfosphereis"adistinctdomainbuiltoninformation,butoneintimatelyrelatedtotherestofasetofnestedglobesinwhichweexistsimultaneously."

Inobservingthis,JeffreyCooperimplicitlyentertainsaviewoftheworldthatpartakesofthenextconcept.SodoesFrenchphilosopherPaulViriliointhefollowinginsightfromaninterviewwithJamesderDerian(1996):

Ithinkthattheinfospherethesphereofinformationisgoingtoimposeitselfonthegeosphere.Wearegoingtobelivinginareducedworld.Thecapacityofinteractivityisgoingtoreducetheworldtonearlynothing.Infact,thereisalreadyaspeedpollution,whichreducestheworldtonothing.Inthenearfuture,peoplewillfeelenclosedinasmallenvironment.Theywillhaveafeelingofconfinementintheworld,whichwillcertainlybeatthelimitoftolerability,byvirtueofthespeedofinformation.IfIweretoofferyoualastthoughtinteractivityistorealspacewhatradioactivityistotheatmosphere.

Noosphere

Themostabstractandsofar,leastfavoredoftheavailabletermsisthatofthenoosphere.Thisterm,fromtheGreekwordnoosfor"themind,"wascoinedbythecontroversialFrenchtheologianandscientistPierreTeilharddeChardinin1925anddisseminatedin

posthumouspublicationsinthe1950sand1960s.5Inhisview,the

5Teilhard'sbeliefintheneedforanexpansive,ethicallybasednoospheremayhavebeenbasedpartlyonhisgrimexperiencesduringWorldWarI,whicharemovinglychronicledinhiscorrespondencefromthisperiod(Teilhard,1961).

worldfirstevolvedageosphereandnextabiosphere.Nowthatpeoplearecommuningonglobalscales,theworldisgivingrisetoanoospherewhathevariouslydescribes(1964and1965)asaglobe-spanningrealmof"themind,"a"thinkingcircuit,"a"stupendousthinkingmachine,"a"thinkingenvelope"fulloffibersandnetworks,andaplanetary"consciousness.''InthewordsofJulianHuxley(inTeilhard,1965,p.18),thenoosphereamountstoa"weboflivingthought."

AccordingtoTeilhard,forcesofthemindhavebeencreatinganddeployingpiecesofthenoosphereforages.Now,itisfinallyachievingaglobalpresence,anditsvaried"compartments"arefusing.Beforelong,asynthesiswilloccurinwhichpeoplesofdifferentnations,races,andcultureswilldevelopconsciousnessandmentalactivitythatareplanetaryinscope,withoutlosingtheirpersonalidentities.Fullyrealized,thenoospherewillraisemankindtoahigh,newevolutionaryplane,onedrivenbyacollectivecoordinationofpsychosocialandspiritualenergiesandbyadevotiontomoralandjuridicalprinciples.However,thetransitionmaynotbesmooth;aglobaltremorandpossiblyanapocalypsemaycharacterizethefinalfusionofthenoosphere(1964,pp.175181;1965,pp.287290).

Althoughthisconceptisessentiallyspiritual,andfarlesstechnologicalthancyberspaceortheinfosphere,Teilhardidentifiedincreasedcommunicationsasacause.NothingliketheInternetexistedinhistime.Yet1950s-eraradioandtelevisionsystemswerefosteringtheemergenceof"asortof'etherized'universalconsciousness,"andheexpected"astonishingelectroniccomputers"togivemankindnewtoolsforthinking(1964).Today,heisoccasionallycreditedwithanticipatingtheInternet.Indeed,thegestaltofWiredmagazineevokesthecreedthat"anelectronicmembranecoveringtheearthwouldwireallhumanitytogetherinasinglenervoussystem,"givingrisetoaglobalconsciousness(fromWired,Vol.6,No.1,

January1998;alsoseeCobb,1995).JohnPerryBarlow,afrequentWiredcontributorandacofounderoftheElectronicFreedomFoundation,observes(inCobb,1998,p.85)that

[w]hatTeilhardwassayingcanbesummedupinafewwords.Thepointofallevolutiontothisstageistocreateacollectiveorganismofmind.Withcyberspace,weareessentiallyhardwiringthenoosphere.

Furthermore,Teilhardvoiced,decadesago,manynotionsnowinfavoramonginformation-agethinkersaboutcomplexity,theassociationofcomplexitywithconsciousness,andtheshiftfromgenestowhathecalled"noogenesis"(avehicleformemes?6)asabasisoffuturehumanevolution.Hisviewofplanetarysocietyasa"superorganism"helpedinspireMarshallMcLuhan'snotionofthe"globalvillage"andJamesLovelock'sandLynnMargulis's"Gaiathesis"(which,inturn,influencedVicePresidentAlbertGore'sideasaboutkeepingtheEarth'senvironmentinbalance).

Thenoosphereconceptthusencompassescyberspaceandtheinfosphereandhasitsowntechnological,organizational,andideationallevels.Itrelatestoanorganizationalthemethathasconstantlyfiguredinourownworkabouttheinformationrevolution:theriseofnetworkformsoforganizationthatstrengthencivil-societyactors(ArquillaandRonfeldt,1996a,1997;Ronfeldt,1996).Fewstateormarketactors,bythemselves,seemlikelytohavemuchinterestinfosteringtheconstructionofaglobalnoosphere,exceptinlimitedareashavingtodowithinternationallaw,orpoliticalandeconomicideology.TheimpetusforcreatingaglobalnoosphereismorelikelytoemanatefromactivistNGOs,othercivil-societyactors(e.g.,churchesandschools),andprivateindividualsdedicatedtofreedomofinformationandcommunicationsandtothespreadofethicalvaluesandnorms.7

TestimonyforthiscomesfromEliseBoulding,ascholar-activistwhohaslongworkedinpeacenetworks.Shesees,àlaTeilhard,a"many-layeredmapoftheworld"consistingofthegeosphere,biosphere,andwhatshecallsthe"sociosphere,"whichincludesfamilies,communities,nation-states,internationalorganizations,and"thepeoples'layerthetransnationalnetworkofinternationalvoluntaryorganizations"(Boulding,1988,pp.5455).Atopthatisthenoosphere,

6Dawkins(1989)originatedthenotionof"memes"asapostgeneticbasisforcontinuedhumanevolution.Lynch(1996)discusseshowmemesmayspreadthrough"thoughtcontagion."7Foranoveldiscussionthatactuallyreliesontheconceptofthenoospherearguingthatopen-sourcesoftwareisanexpressionofagift-cultureamonghackersworkinginthenoosphere,definedas"theterritoryofideas,thespaceofallpossiblethoughts"seeEricS.Raymond,HomesteadingtheNoosphere,April1998,postedathttp://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/writings/.

whichconsistsof"thesumtotalofallthethoughtsgeneratedinthesociosphere."Inherview,

[t]hemorewecaninvolveourselvesinthenetworksthatgiveusaccesstothatenvelope,themorewecancontributetotheemergenceofthat[globalcivic]culture.

Herhopeisthatglobe-circlingassociationsofprivatecitizenswillfostera"globalcivicculture"basedonthenotionthatpeopleofvariousnationalitieshavecommoninterests.NGOsandothergroupingsofethicallymindedindividuals,energizedbyanoosphericculture,couldalterhowtheworldisgoverned(Boulding,1988and1993).

Boulding'swritings,inadditiontoothers'(e.g.,Frederick,1993aandb),indicatethatthenoosphereconcepthasgainedmoreresonanceandcredibilityamongtransnationalcivil-societyactorsthanamonggovernmentandcommercialactors.Webelieveitistimeforthelattertobeginmovinginthisdirection,too,particularlysincepowerintheinformationagewillstem,morethaneverbefore,fromtheabilityofstateandmarketactorstoworkconjointlywithcivil-societyactors.

ComparisonsLeadtoaPreferencefortheNoosphereConcept

Allthreerealmsareunderdevelopmentandwillremainso.Eventhoughallareexpandingrapidlyaroundtheworld,theyarestillsplitintocompartments,whicharemoreadvancedinsomepartsoftheworldthaninothers.Asteadyinternettingoftheirvariedcompartmentsisunderway(althoughatotalworldwidefusionseemsunlikely,ifonlybecauseofsomeactors'interestsinprotectingpartitionsinsomeareas).Butevenasthethreerealmsgrow,theywillcontinuetooverlap.Cyberspacewillremainthesmallest,nestedinsidetheothertwo.Theinfosphereisthenextlargest,andthenoosphereencompassesallthree(seetheFigure).Asonerealm

grows,soshouldtheothersalthoughnotnecessarilyevenly.

Noneofthethreeconceptsshouldbedismissedallareuseful.Buttheirbiasesshouldberecognized.Therealmsallhavetechnological,

FigureThreeRealmsofInformation

organizational,andideationallevels;buttheselevels,andtheirsignificance,aresomewhatdifferentforeach.Moreover,eachhasaninherentimagethatmayaffecthowapersonthinksabouteach.8Ofthethree,thecoreimageforcyberspaceisthemosttechnological,thenoospherethemostidealized.Whenapersonthinks"cyberspace,"whattypicallycomestomindisacomputerscreenloggedontotheInternetwhetherthecontentonthescreeniscivilizedoruncivilizedisbesidethepoint.Whenapersonthinks"infosphere,"theimageislikelyatelevisionshowingsomethingalongthelinesofaCNNbroadcastconveyedbyasatellite.Whenapersonthinksofthe"noosphere,"theimagewillnotbeofatechnology,butprobablyofanideafloatinginaculturaletherandthecontentislikelycivilized.

Whilediscussionsabouttheexpansionofcyberspacetendtobetechnological,discussionsabouttheinfosphereoftenemphasizecommercialmotivationsandconsiderations.Incontrast,discussions

8Ontherolesofmetaphorsinthinking,seeLakoffandJohnson(1980).

aboutthefutureofthenoosphere,althoughtheyremainfewandfarbetween,areboundtobephilosophical.Table1laysoutsomeoftheideational,organizational,andtechnologicalaspectsofeachoftherealms.

Ofcourse,whicheverrealmservesasthepointofdeparture,discussionsofissuesmaywellbranchinthedirectionofanotherrealm.Thus,manyadiscussionofcyberspacemayturnrathernoospheric.Forexample,militaryanalystswhotalkaboutinformationwarfarewagedviacyberspaceortheinfospheremayarguethatsuchwarfareisreallyaboutpeople'smentalities,andaboutattackingtheirperceptionsandepistemologies(seeSzafranski,1994and1995;Stein,1995).WhiletherehasbeenmuchdiscussionabouthackerstakingdowntheNet,itisalsothecasethatU.S.perceptionsmaybe"hacked"byadversariesandmanipulatorswhowanttheNetup,sotheycanairtheirpronouncementsinthebroadcastmediaaswellasontheInternet(seeTofflerandToffler,1993;DeCaro,1996;Libicki,1997).Atthesametime,information-agephilosophers(e.g.,Cobb,1995and1998)whofavorthenoosphereconceptnotethatitsgrowthdependsontheworldwideproliferationofhighlyaccessible,internettedinformationandcommunicationssystems.

Butthepointremainsthenoosphereisthemostideationalrealm.Insobeing,ithasacomparativestrength.Cyberspace,theinfosphere,andthenoospherearerealmsbasedon"information"inallitsguises,fromlowlybitsofdatatothehighestformsofknowledgeandwisdom.Thustheserealmsareallinformation-processingsystems.Yet,inbeingmoreaboutideasthantechnologies,thenoosphere,morethantheotherrealms,alsoconcerns"information

Table1InformationRealmsAcrossThreeLevelsCyberspace Infosphere Noosphere

Ideationaltenets Interconnectivity Prosperityand Sharingideas

anddemocracy interdependenceOrganizationalexemplars

InternetSociety,EFF,CPSR

CNN,Disney,Time-Warner

PeaceNGOs,universities,theUN

Technologicalconduits

Internet,theWebRadio,TV,cableEducationalandtrainingsystems

structuring."Thenoosphere,likethemind,isaninformation-processingandaninformation-structuringsystemandthisisanimportantdistinction.Theprocessingviewfocusesonthetransmissionofmessagesastheinputsandoutputsofasystem.Incontrast,thestructuralviewilluminatesthegoals,values,andpractices9thatanorganizationorsystemembodieswhatmatterstoitsmembersfromthestandpointofidentity,meaning,andpurpose,apartfromwhetheranyinformationisbeingprocessedatthetime(seeArquillaandRonfeldt,1997and1998a).Whiletheprocessingviewtendstoilluminatetechnologyasacriticalfactor,thestructuralviewismorelikelytoupholdhumanandideationalcapital.

Inourview,strategistsshouldbeginattendingasmuchtothedynamicsofinformationstructuringastoinformationprocessing.Grandstrategistsrarelyignoretheroleofvaluesandpractices.Butlatelythisroletendstobedownplayedinrhetoricabouttheinformationrevolution.Webelievethatnewconceptscanprovideacorrective.Adoptionofthenoosphereconceptcouldhelpinformationstrategistsfocusonthesignificanceofinformationstructuring.

Comparatively,allthreerealmsraisesimilarpropositionsaboutthelong-rangefutureofhumansociety.Thesepropositionsentailsimilarhopesandfears,ambiguitiesandparadoxes.Consider,asoneexample,thefollowingMcLuhanesqueobservation,whichheraldstheemergenceofa"globalvillage"butcouldequallybeaboutcyberspace,theinfosphere,ornoosphere.Similarremarkshavebeenmade,repeatedly,abouteachoftheserealms:

Electriccircuitryhasoverthrowntheregimeof"time"and"space"andpoursuponusinstantlyandcontinuouslyconcernsofallothermen.Ithasreconstituteddialogueonaglobalscale.Itsmessageis

9Comparedtotraditionalconceptslikeends,values,andnorms,"practices"isarecentadditionintheliteratureonsocialthoughtand

behavior.Forexample,Bellahetal.(1996)statethat

Practicesaresharedactivitiesthatarenotundertakenasmeanstoanendbutareethicallygoodinthemselves(thusclosetopraxisinAristotle'ssense).Agenuinecommunitywhetheramarriage,auniversity,orawholesocietyisconstitutedbysuchpractices.

Thisconceptgoestotheheartofwhatismeantby"structuralinformation."WearegratefultoGeorgeDenningforpointingouttheconceptofpracticesanditsrelevanceforthinkingaboutstructuralinformation.

TotalChange,endingpsychic,social,economic,andpoliticalparochialism....Oursisabrand-newworldofallatonceness."Time"hasceased,"space"hasvanished.Wenowliveinaglobalvillage...asimultaneoushappening(McLuhan,Fiore,andAgel,1967,pp.16and63).

IfoneacceptsthespatialandtemporalshiftsasMcLuhanlaudsthem,thenaunited,globalvillageisinthemaking.Yet,thatisnottheonlypossibleimplication.LikeTeilhardandMcLuhan,DanielBell(1977,pp.2627)foresaw,yearspriortotheInternet,thattechnologyisresultingin"theeclipseofdistanceandtheforeshorteningoftime,almosttothefusionofthetwo."Butinhisview,instabilityandinsecuritywerelikelyimplications.Societies,theUnitedStatesinparticular,areundergoinga"lossofinsulatingspace"asconditionsandeventsinoneplacearequickly,demandingly,transmittedtootherplaces.Politicalsystemsarebecomingmorepermeabletodestabilizingevents,andpeoplearemoreabletoresponddirectlyandimmediately.InsomesocietiesBellwasmainlyworriedabouttheUnitedStatesthisraisesthelikelihoodnotofavitalcommunitybutofcontagiousmassreactionsandmobilizationsthatmayallowrulerstotightentheirgrip.10

Insum,theinformationrevolutioncontributestoboththeintegrationandthefragmentationoccurringaroundtheworldtoday.Thisisevidentviaallthreerealmscyberspace,theinfosphere,andthenoospherealthoughthelastmaybethebestsuitedtoilluminatevalue-ladenconflicts.

Againstthisbackground,shouldanyofthethreeconceptscyberspace,theinfosphere,orthenoospherebepreferredbyinformationstrategists?Todate,strategistshaveworkedmostlyintermsofthefirsttwo.Ourrecommendationisthattheyturntoworkequallyifnotmainlyintermsofthethird.Thisisnottosaythatall

10Onewayforleadersandtheirregimestotightentheirgriponsociety

anditspotentialmalcontentsandmalefactorsisbyusingthenewinformationrealmsforsurveillance.Forarecentdiscussion,seeastudyknownastheScientificandTechnologicalOptions(STOA)InterimStudy,"AnAppraisaloftheTechnologiesofPoliticalControl,"ExecutiveSummary,preparedbySteveWright(ManchesterGroup)fortheEuropeanParliament,September1998,asavailableontheInternet.Thisstudyprovidesanoverviewofhigh-techsurveillanceinnovationsoccurringinEuropeandelsewherearoundtheworld.

whoreadourreportshouldrushtoperuseTeilhard'swritings;hisviews,thoughinspiring,remainunclearandabstruse.11Nonetheless,thenoosphereconcepthasappealingfeatures:Littleislostanalyticallyandmuchmaybegainedbyfocusingequallyonthenoosphereasontheothertworealms.Itisthebroadestofthethreeandbroadertendstomeanbetterforstrategicthinkingandplanning.Thenoospherepresentsinformationintermsofanexpandingrealmwheretheemphasisisontheideationalandorganizationaldimensions,withoutignoringthetechnologicalone.Itinclinestheanalystandthestrategisttothinkintermsoftherolesofideas,values,andnorms,ratherthanintermsofInternethosts,Websites,andbaudratesthatis,intermsofstructuralinformationratherthanintermsofinformationprocessing.Moretoourpoint,preferringthenoosphereconceptsetsthestageforakeythesisofthisstudy:Thetimeisripeningtodevelopanewapproachtograndstrategy,onewecallnoopolitikanddescribemorefullyinthenextchapter.

EmergenceandConstructionoftheNoosphere

Figuringoutthenoospherewillrequireyearsofprodigiousanalysis.Thestructuresandprocessesthatareshapingitsemergencewillsurelybenosimplerthanhasbeenthecasewiththegeosphere,biosphere,andsociosphere.Andfullydeveloped,thenoospherewillsurelybeanenormous,complexrealmofactivitythat,liketheotherspheres,hasitsowndynamics.Evenso,aspectsofitsnaturemaybemolded,atleastinpart,bydeterminedactorsoperatinginsideit,andbywhathappensoutsideit,especiallyinthesociosphere.Thus,asthenoosphereemergesonitsown,inwaysnoteasytoanalyze,itmayalso,tosomeextent,beresponsivetodeliberateeffortsatdesignandconstruction.

TakeanotherlookattheFigureandTable1.TheUnitedStates,inallitsfullnessandvariety,istheworld'sleaderinthecreationand

constructionofcyberspaceandtheinfosphere.TheUnitedStates

11ReaderswhowanttolearnmoreaboutTeilhard'sideas,withoutstrugglingthroughhiswritings,canfindsympatheticoverviewsinWright(1989,pp.258274)andCobb(1998).Therearealsomanyvaluablewritingsforexample,inpartsofBateson(1972),Capra(1996),Castells(1996,1997),andDertouzos(1997)thatcontainexpositionsabouttheriseofforcesofthemindaroundtheworld,butwithoutexplicitlydiscussingTeilhardortheconceptofthenoosphere.

asawhole,muchlesstheU.S.government,doesnotandcannotcontroltheseglobe-girdlingrealms.Butcontrolisnotthepoint.TheserealmshavegrownsomuchandAmericansarebenefitingmorethananyoneelsebecausetheUnitedStateshasaconstellationofvalues(likefreedomandinnovation),interests,actors,andtechnologicalcapabilitiesthatisboundtostimulatesuchgrowth.Moreover,thegeniusinherentinthisconstellationseemslessaboutcontrolthanaboutacapacityforpoliticalandeconomicdecontrol12thatisunmatchedelsewhereintheworldwhenitcomestocreatingandbuildingsuchrealmsofinformation.

Americastandsonthebrinkofasimilar,buttougher,situationwithregardtothenoosphere.Thereisagoodprospect,butalimitedonewithnoguarantee,thatAmericanideas,agents,andpracticesmaygovernmuchofitscontentandtheconductitinspires.Yet,thenoosphere'semergencederivesfrommyriadnotjustAmericanforcesaroundtheworld.TheremustberoomforpeoplesandtraditionsthataredifferentfromAmerica's,aswellasroomforsuchnewlyempowerednonstateactorsasglobalcivil-societyNGOsthatmaycarelittleaboutnationalidentityandsovereignty.Also,thenoospheremustcontainanethicalbrightnessandsoliditybuthereagainthereisariskydownside:Such"uncivilsociety"actorsasterroristsandcriminalsmaybeabletoexploitaspectsofit,oratleastofitsconduits,fortheirowndarkpurposes.Moreover,unlesssolidlyarticulated,anoospheremaybedistortedbynew"isms"(e.g.,basedonreligiousrevivalism,orethnonationalism)thatappealtopeoplewhomayfeelleftout.

Thus,theemergenceandconstructionofthenoosphereisunlikelytobesmooth,easilyguidable,oruniformlypositiveinitseffects.Sinceitsdesignwillrestonacomplexbundleofideational,organizational,andtechnologicalelements,itmaygiverisetounusual,unexpecteddynamics.Perhaps,likeothercomplexsystems,itwillsometimes

surprisepeoplewithintimidatingturbulence,"normalaccidents"

12Foradiscussionabouthowbeing"outofcontrol"canbenefitasystem,seeKelly(1994).

(àlaPerrow,1984),13andunintendedconsequences(seeTenner,1996;Jervis,1997)thatcouldproveunpleasantforAmericans.

Despitethesepotentialdifficulties,itbehoovesAmericanstomakeanefforttofostertheriseofthenoosphere,inharmonywithAmericanidealsandinterests.Thepolicychoicesinvolvetheextenttowhich,andhow,thenoosphere'spendingemergencecanbeshapedthroughdeliberateactions.Allpublic,private,state,andnonstatesectorsofU.Ssocietycouldplayroles;theU.S.governmentcouldplayasubstantialrole.

Butthefollowingconundrumshouldbethoughtthrough.Statescanassistwiththeconstructionofanoosphere,forexample,throughpoliciesthatassureopenness,informationsharing,andtheruleoflaw.Yet,thenoospherecannotbeanartifactofstates,muchlesstheinstrumentofanysinglestate.Indeed,atruenoosphere,givenitsglobalnature,mayservetorestrictsomestateactionsandnotonlyaggressive,inhumaneones.Insubtlewaysnotyetapparent,evenstatesthatbehavejustlymayfindthemselvesmoreconstrainedthanintheheydayofthestate.Thereissomeevidence,forexample,thatthe"CNNeffect"ofshowinghorrendousimagesofhumansufferingfromplaceslikeBosniaandRwandainshort,imagesprovidedbythenoospherehelpedpromptU.S.involvementsinareasfarremovedfromitsrecognizedspheresofinterest.Further,afullyfunctioningnoospheremay,undersomecircumstances,makeitmoredifficulttouselegitimatemilitaryforceagainstanactorwhomastatewantstostop(e.g.,aSaddamHussein).Doesthismean,paradoxically,thattheU.S.governmentwouldriskundoingitsownpowerandpresenceifitundertooktoencourageanoosphere?Perhapsifitweretouseitspowerandpresenceinstate-centric,unilateralterms.Yetnotatalltoreiterateapointmadethroughoutthisstudyifitlearnstoworkconjointlywithnonstate(andotherstate)actorstobringofftheformationofaglobalnoosphere.Thisisanundertakingformultiactor

networks,notstand-alonehierarchies.

Whatwouldafull-fledgednoosphereencompass?Whatideas,values,andnormswhatprinciples,practices,andrulesshouldit

13Perrow(1984)showsthatoccasional,evencatastrophic,accidentsmaybeanormalfeatureofhigh-techhigh-risksystemswhosepartsaretightlyratherthanlooselycoupled,andwhoseinteractionsarecomplex(nonlinear)ratherthanlinear.

embody?WepresumethatthesewouldincludemuchthatAmericastandsfor:openness,freedom,democracy,theruleoflaw,humanebehavior,respectforhumanrights,apreferenceforpeacefulconflictresolution,etc.Thegrowthofthenoospherewilldependnotonlyonincreasedflowsofideasandideals,butalsoongrowthinthestocksofideasandidealstowhichpeoplesubscribe.Inaddition,anoospheremayhavetohavecomplexorganizationalandtechnologicalbasestosupportitsideationalessence.

Goingintothesemattersindetailismorethanthispreliminarystudycanaccomplish.Butopenness,progress,andknowledgearebrieflydiscussedbelow,thefirstbecauseitissoessentialtoanoosphere,thesecondandthirdbecausetheyarenotsoobviousbutmayprovetobeessentialoverthelongrun.

Opennessisutterlyessentialforaglobalnoosphere.Itcannotcomeintobeingorendurewithoutopenness,alongwithacommitmenttothecohortsofopennessfreedomanddemocracy.OpennessisnotmerelyanAmericanphilosophicalabstraction.Variouspolicyanalysts(e.g.,seeShultz,1985)haveshownthattheinformationrevolutionservestoopenupclosedsystems,andthatonlyopensystemscantakefulladvantageofthenewformsofpoweritgenerates.Indeed,thespreadofdemocracyisrelatedtothespreadofconnectivity(Kedzie,1997).Inaddition,thenewtechnologies,alongwithacommitmenttodeeplyshareinformation,couldmaketheworldimpeccablytransparent,perhapsalongthelinesthatDavidBrin(1998)calls''reciprocaltransparency"whichseemsquiteappropriateforanoosphere.14

Afull-fledgednoosphereshouldembodysomeconceptsofwhatconstitutes"progress"forhumanity.Atpresent,thisisacontentiousmatter.TheendoftheColdWarinspiredaconvictionthatliberaldemocraticsocietieswithstrongmarketsystemsandcivilsocieties

werebest,havingwontheevolutionarycompetition.Butlately,inmanypartsoftheworld,debatesaregrowinganewastowhetherAmerica's,oranyothersociety's,modelofprogressiscommendable

14Thisisnottodenytheimportanceofinformationalguardedness,asinournotionof"guardedopenness"discussedlaterinthisreport.Indeed,insomeareasguardednessmaywellservetoprotectopenness.Butopenness,notguardednessperse,istheessentialrequisiteforthecreationandconstructionofanoosphere.

forall."Illiberaldemocracy"(seeZakaria,1997)hasevencomeintovogueasatransitionalmodel.Moreover,postmodernistthinkingamongWesternintellectualsiscurrentlyfondofraisingdoubtsaboutwhetherprogresstrulyexistsasadefinableideal,freeofethnocentric,religious,orotherpresumptions.Suchnegativismandrelativismwillnotlikelyservetheriseofanoosphere.Thenoospherebegsforapositivetelosorgoalnotsomuchthatitwouldbevulnerabletochargesofbeingirredeemablyteleological,butenoughtolinkittoservinghighends.Justwhatmaybethebestconceptofprogressortherighttheoryofsocietalevolutionforanoosphere?Itremainsunclear,butwepresumethatthenoosphereshouldpreferdemocraticsystemchange,althoughitmayaccept,withinlimits,whateversystemaparticularpeoplemaychoosetosuittheircircumstances.Completeaccordaboutthemeaningandnatureofprogressmaybeaskingtoomuch;butabetter,moreharmoniousconsensusisneededthanexiststoday.15Anoospherewillhavedifficultyemergingifa"clashofcivilizations"(àlaHuntington,1996)prevailsinsectionsoftheworld.

Anoosphereisarealmofknowledgeandwisdom.Theveryconceptimpliesthatsomekindsofknowledgewill,andshould,prevailoverotherkindsthatthereisagreementastothenatureandsourcesoftrueknowledge.Thustheconceptmayseemtoimplyanintegrationacrossallbranchesoflearning"consilience,"tousethetermproposedbybiologistE.O.Wilson(1998).Butitneednotmeanthat.Scientificknowledgemayeventuallybesubjecttoconsilience,butknowledgethatstemsfromculture(nottomentioncounterculturesandsubcultures)isanothermatter.InthewordsofanthropologistPeterWorsley(1997,p.10),"Knowledge,then,isnecessarilyplural:thereareknowledges,notsimplyKnowledgewithacapitalK."Ifanoosphereistoappealtopeopleallaroundtheworld,itmustallowforadiversityofknowledge,muchasalargeecosystemwithdiverseplantlifemayprovehealthierthananecosystemwherediversityis

stymied.

Withoutdepthandbreadthinsuchareas,anoosphereisunlikelytoserveasastrong,globe-circlingreferenceforallpeoplesandsoci-

15WritingsbySanderson(1995)andbyRonfeldt(1996)mayprovideinstructiveinsightsforworkingoutatheoryofsocietalevolutionthatisconsistentwiththeemergenceofanoosphere.

eties,withacapacitynotonlytoguidebehaviorinpositive,inclusiveways,butalsototampdownunjust,exclusivistideas.Keenchallengesfortheconstructionofanoospheremaystemfromthefactthatthenewtechnologiesenableallmannerofinformation-ageactorstoprojecttheirpresenceintodistantlocationswheretheymayinfringeonlocaltraditionsandpriorities.TheseactorsrangefromthesatellitebroadcastcompaniesofsuchleadersasRupertMurdochandTedTurner,totheexpatriatedissidentswhowanttoreachintotheirhomelandsinChina,Cuba,SaudiArabia,andelsewhere.ThisaugursformightystrugglestodominatetheInternet,satellitebroadcasting,andothermediaaspartandparceloftheformationofaglobalnoosphere.

ChapterThreeEmergenceofNoopolitik

GrandStrategicShiftsattheTurnoftheCentury

TheendoftheColdWarhasbroughttwomajorshiftsthatappealtograndstrategists.Thefirstconcernspoliticalandmilitarydynamics.Thebipolarinternationalsystemhasexpired,andtheworldappearstobereturningtoaloose,multipolar,balance-of-powersystem,withpossibilitiesforU.S.dominanceinkeymilitaryareas.Sincethisshiftislargelyaboutinterstaterelations,itarousesthetheoristsandpractitionersofrealpolitik.Thesecondshiftismainlyeconomic:theenormousgrowthofliberalmarketsystemswoventogetheringlobaltradeandinvestmentwebs.ThisshiftbeganlongbeforetheColdWarendedandisnowascendant.Itsdynamicsappealespeciallytotheliberal-internationalistorglobal-interdependenceschoolsofstrategy,whoseproponentsargue,contrarytorealistsandneorealists,thatstatistdynamicsmatterlessthaninthepast,andthattheprospectsforpeacedependonmultilateralcooperationthroughinternationalregimesthattranscendthestate.

Theresultoftheseshiftsisnotonlyachangingworld,butalsoacontinuinginterplaybetweenAmerica'stwomainschoolsofgrandstrategy:realpolitikandliberalinternationalism.1Meanwhile,a

1InformativemanifestationsofthisappearintheSpring1998issueofForeignPolicy,whosecoverthemeis"FrontiersofKnowledge:TheStateoftheArtinWorldAffairs,"andintheAutumn1998issueofInternationalOrganization,whosethemeis"ExplorationandContestationintheStudyofWorldPolitics."Whilethese(andother)journalsemphasizetheinterplaybetweentheacademicschoolsofrealismand


third,emergingshifthasbeennoted:theintensificationoftheinformationrevolution,withitsimplicationsthatknowledgeispower,thatpowerisdiffusingtononstateactors,andthatglobalinterconnectivityisgeneratinganewfabricforworldorder.Manytheoristsandstrategistsdonotseemtoknowquitewhattodowiththisshift.Someviewitasspellingaparadigmchange,butmoststilltrytomakeitfitintoeitheroftheparamountparadigmsaboutrealpolitikandinternationalism.

HerewereassesshowtheinformationageisaffectingthetwodominantparadigmsandcallforanewparadigmforU.S.strategy.Thestructuresanddynamicsofworldorderarechangingsodeeplythatneitherrealpolitiknorinternationalismsuitsthenewrealitiesoftheinformationagewellenough.Anewparadigmisneededinfact,itisalreadyemerging,especiallyinnongovernmentalcirclesconsistingofcivilsocietyactorswhichwecallnoopolitik.2Thetermextendsfromourfindinginthepriorchapterthataglobalnoosphereistakingshapethedevelopmentofcyberspace,theinfosphere,andthenoospheremakenoopolitikpossible,andinformationstrategywillbeitsessence.

FromRealpolitiktoNoopolitikAComparisonoftheParadigms

Noopolitikmakessensebecauseknowledgeisfastbecominganeverstrongersourceofpowerandstrategy,inwaysthatclassicrealpolitik


liberalism,theyhavealso,injustthepastfewyears,begunaddressingtheemergenceofathirdschoolknownasconstructivism(orsocialconstructivism).Itholdsthatideationalfactorse.g.,socialidentities,andnormsdeterminethenatureofinternationalreality,asmuchasdomaterialfactors.Thus,theconceptsbehindconstructivismaremuchlikethosebehindournotionofnoopolitik.However,wedonotdiscussconstructivisminthisstudy,mainlybecause,unlikerealismandliberal

internationalism,thisnewacademicschooldoesnotyetfigureintheworldsofpolicyanalysis.Forgoodoverviewsofconstructivism,seeRuggie(1998),andHopf(1998).2Inourview,otherpossibletermslikecyberpolitikorinfopolitikarenotappealing.Weconsideredandrejectedthetermcyberpolitik,becausewewantedtofocusattentiononthenoosphere,notcyberspace,andbecausewewantedatermwhoseconnotationwouldbelesstechnologicalandmoreideational,whichisinkeepingwiththenoosphereconcept.Also,wefeltthatyetanothertermwithacyberprefixwouldnottakehold.However,seeRothkopf(1998,p.326)foranilluminationofwhy"therealpolitikoftheneweraiscyberpolitik,inwhichtheactorsarenolongerjuststates,andrawpowercanbecounteredorfortifiedbyinformationpower."

andinternationalismcannotabsorb.Noopolitikisanapproachtostatecraft,tobeundertakenasmuchbynonstateasbystateactors,thatemphasizestheroleofsoftpowerinexpressingideas,values,norms,andethicsthroughallmannerofmedia.Thismakesitdistinctfromrealpolitik,whichstressesthehard,materialdimensionsofpowerandtreatsstatesasthedeterminantsofworldorder.Noopolitikhasmuchincommonwithinternationalism,butwewouldarguethatthelatterisatransitionalparadigmthatcanbefoldedintonoopolitik.

Inthecomingyears,grandstrategistsinterestedininformationstrategywillbedrawntobothrealpolitikandnoopolitik.Asnoopolitiktakesshapeandgainsadherents,itwillservesometimesasasupplementandcomplementtorealpolitik,andsometimesasacontrasting,rivalparadigmforpolicyandstrategy.Astimepassesandtheglobalnoosphereswells,noopolitikmayprovideamorerelevantparadigmthanrealpolitik.

LoomingLimitationsofRealpolitik

Realpolitikmaybedefinedasaforeign-policybehaviorbasedonstate-centeredcalculationsofrawpowerandthenationalinterest,guidedbyaconvictionthatmightmakesright(seeKissinger,1994).ClassicrealpolitikasputintopracticebyCardinalRichelieu,PrinceMetternich,andOttovonBismarckdependsonraisond'etat,whereby"reasonsofstate"(includingmaximizingthestate'sfreedomofaction)takeprecedenceoverindividualrights.Itadvancesstateinterestsbyaimingtocreateandpreserveabalanceofpowerthatkeepsanystatefrombecominghegemonicorotherwisetoopowerful,intheexpectationthatbalancingbehaviorbyallpartiescanproduceaself-regulatingequilibrium.Inamultipolarenvironment,realpolitikregardsbalancingactsastheessenceofstrategy,thewaytokeeporderandavoidchaos(seeWaltz,1979).Anditrequiresthatalliancesandotherbalancingactsbebasedstrictlyonpowercalculations,with

littleregardforwhetheranallyhassimilarordifferentbeliefsamajorpowershouldseekalliancesthatrestrainarival,evenif"moralcompromisesandodiousassociations"

arenecessaryattimes.3Inthislight,realpolitiktendstobeamoral.Butitworksbestatconstrainingadversarialbehavioriftheplayerssharesomecommonvalues(seeMorgenthau,1948;Kissinger,1994).Sinceitisstate-centric,itadmitsonlyagrudging,selectiverecognitionofnonstateactors.

Althoughrealpolitikhasbeenthedominantparadigmofstatecraftforseveralcenturies,itshouldnotbetakenforgrantedasapermanentparadigm.ItemergedinaparticularepochinEurope,whenthenation-statewasgainingstrengthasthekeyformofsocietalorganization,endinganotherepochwhentheaspirationwastointegrateallEuropeunderaHolyRomanEmpireblessedbytheCatholicChurch(Kissinger,1994).Thus,realpolitikspelledaharshdeparturefromthethen-prevailingparadigmfordiplomacy,whichcalledforbuildingauniversalempire,notacompetitivesystemofnation-states;whichwasrationalizedbymorallaw,notrawpowercalculations;andwhichoftenworkedmorethroughmarriagepoliticsthanpowerpolitics,asdynastiesandaristocraticclansusedintermarriagestoextendtheirsway.4Althoughitisidentifiedwiththeacademicschoolknownasrealism,itshouldalsobenotedthatrealpolitikhasnocorneronthenotionofbeingrealistic.Alltheseapproachestostrategyfrommarriagediplomacytorealpolitik,andnoopolitikamounttodifferentwaysofbeingrealisticbymakingsensible,appropriatecost-benefit,win-loss,andriskcalculations,assuitedtotherealitiesofthetimes.

Realpolitikretainsastrongholdonstatecrafttoday,butonceagaintheworldisenteringanewepoch,andtherearemanysignsthatrealpolitikisreachingitslimitsasareflectionofunderlyingrealities.Realpolitikworksbestwherestatesfullyruletheinternationalsystembutnonstateactorsfromtheworldsofcommerceandcivilsocietyaregainingstrengthandreshapingtheinternationalenvironment.Itworksbestwherestatescanmaneuverfreelyand

independentlybutcomplextransnationalinterconnectionsincreasingly

3PhrasefromHuntington,1991,p.16.4Thisprogressionfrommarriagepoliticstorealpolitik,tonoopolitikappearstoreflectaprogressionintheevolutionofsocieties(discussedinRonfeldt,1996),fromthosecenteredfirstaroundtheriseoftribesandclans,thenaroundhierarchicalinstitutions,andlatermarkets,withnetworksnowontheriseasthenextgreatformofsocialorganization.

constrainthis.Itworksbestwherenationalinterestsdominatedecisionmakingbutahostof"globalissues"isarisingthattranscendsnationalinterests.Itworksbestwherestatesrespondmainlytocoercivecalculationsandapplicationsofhardpowerbutstateandnonstateactorsareincreasinglyoperatingintermsofsoftpower.Itworksbestwhereethicsmatterlittlebutethicsareincreasinglycomingtotheforeasglobalcivil-societyactorsgainvoicethroughalltypesofmedia.Itworksbestwherethereisnosuchthingasaglobe-circlingnoospheretotakeintoaccountbutoneisemerging.Furthermore,realpolitikworksbestwherediplomacyandstrategycanbeconductedmainlyinthedark,awayfrompublicscrutiny,understrongstatecontrol,andwithoutnecessarilyhavingtoshareinformationwithmanyactorsbuttheinformationrevolutionismakingallthatincreasinglydifficultandisfavoringactorswhocanoperateinthelightandgainadvantagefrominformationsharing.Indeed,theinformationrevolutionunderliesmostofthetransformationsnotedaboveitistheinformationrevolution,aboveallelse,thatisdelimitingtheappropriatenessofrealpolitik.

Realpolitikhasanaturalreactiontotheinformationrevolution:Itinclinesstrategiststopreferstatecontrolofinformationalstocksandflows,andtostressguardednessoveropennesswhenitcomestoissuesofsharingwithothers(unlessthereisaclearcost-benefitadvantagetobeingopen).Arealpolitikpostureisevident,forexample,ingovernmentaleffortstoimposelegalandtechnicalcontrolsoverencryption.Thisresemblesrealpolitik'spastmercantilisttreatmentofcommerce.

Realpolitikcanbemodifiedandadaptedtotheinformationrevolution,sothatitremainsanactiveparadigm.5Indeed,theinternationalpoliticalsystemmaybereturningtoaconditionofloosemultipolarity;andstate-centricbalance-of-powergameswillsurelyremaincrucialattimesandinplaces(e.g.,intheMiddleEastand

Asia).ButseekingfavorablebalancesofpowerinamultipolarsystemisonlyoneprocessthatU.S.strategyshouldtakeinto

5Maynes(1997)discussestheprospectsfor"ethicalrealpolitik."Rothkopf(1998)aimstomodifyrealpolitikundertherubricofcyberpolitikandanalyzeshowtheinformationrevolutionisalteringthetraditionalpolitical,economic,andmilitarypillarsofU.S.policyandstrategybuthisessayislessclearastowhatcyberpolitikmayactuallyconsistofinthefuture.

account.Globalinterdependence(andinterconnection),combinedwiththeprospectthattheUnitedStatesisbecomingaglobalpower,asdistinctfromanationalone,suggeststhatnoordinarybalance-of-powergame-of-nationsliesaheadAmericaninformationstrategistswillneedmorethanrealpolitikintheirtoolkits.

LiberalInternationalismaTransitionalParadigm

Liberalinternationalism(orglobalinterdependence)theprincipalparadigmthathasaspiredtomoderateifnotsupersederealpolitikalsodoesnotprovideanadequatebasisforAmericaninformationstrategy.Amorerecentparadigm,sinceitrequireshighlevelsofeconomictransactionsthatdidnotexistwhenrealpolitikemerged,internationalismhasrootsthatliein19thcenturyliberalviewsthatheldthatincreasesintradeopennesswouldfosterharmonious,prosperousinterdependenceamongnations,andthateconomicinterdependencewouldmakewarunthinkable.Thisviewwasfirstelucidatedinthe19thcentury"ManchesterCreed,"6andthenextolledbySirNormanAngell(1913),whodeclaredwar"dead"becauseofthepeace-enhancingpropertiesofinterlockingtradeandtheunacceptablecostsofconflict.Ironically,WorldWarIbrokeoutsoonafterpublicationofhisideas.Furthermore,thisparadigmundertherubricof"Wilsonianinternationalism"(namedforU.S.PresidentWoodrowWilson)aspiredtoreplacerawpowercalculationswithanunderstandingthatthespreadofdemocraticvalues,andtheirenshrinementininternationalinstitutions,wouldpreventconflict,inpartbyencouragingevergreatereconomicinterdependenceandopenness.

Theseminalacademicwritingsabout"complexglobalinterdependence"byRobertKeohaneandJosephNye(1972and1977)fleshedoutthisparadigm,showingthatthestate-centricbalance-of-powerparadigmneglectsthegrowinginfluenceof

transnationalties.Indeed,thetrendsheraldedtwodecadesagobytheprognosticatorsofinterdependencearestillunfolding:theglobaldiffusionofpower,theerosionofbothnationalsovereigntyandinternationalhierarchy,

6TheManchesterCreedepitomized19thcenturyclassicalliberalthought,positingthenotionthatfreemarketsandexpandedtradewouldleavelittleornoroomforwarmaking.

thegrowthoftransnationaleconomicsandcommunications,theinternationalizationofdomesticpolicy,theblurringandthefusionofdomesticandforeignpolicy,theriseofmultilateraldiplomacy,andtheneedtobroadensecurityconceptsbeyondtheirmilitarydimensions(fromNye,1976).Recently,interdependencetheoryhasbeenrevivifiedbyanotionthatstatesarebecoming"tradingstates"whoseenoprofitinwarandthushavenoreasontogotowar(seeRosecrance,1984).

Ingeneralterms,theinterdependenceparadigmfurtherstheWilsonianquesttocreatestate-basedglobalregimestoregulateandresolvespecificissues.However,thegoalisnotsimplytobuildnewbureaucratichierarchiesthatstandabovestates,butrathertoembedstatesinasetofconstrainingtransnationalnetworks:

Theinternationalorganizationmodelassumesthatasetofnetworks,norms,andinstitutions,onceestablished,willbedifficulteithertoeradicateordrasticallytorearrange.Evengovernmentswithsuperiorcapabilitiesoverallorwithintheissueareawillfindithardtoworktheirwillwhenitconflictswithestablishedpatternsofbehaviorwithinexistingnetworksandinstitutions(KeohaneandNye,1977,p.55).

Meanwhile,akeynotionthatinterdependencewilltampdownconflictandensurepeacehasnotfaredwelleventhoughtherecordismixed,theworldremainsasturbulentasever,ifnotmoreso.Thishasleftthedooropenforcriticstoreiteratetherealpolitikmantra:Statecraftbasedonrealpolitikmaynotbeanybetteratpreventingconflict,butatleastpowerbalancingcanrestoreanequilibriumonceithasbeendisturbed.Indeed,theinterdependenceparadigmhasbeensubjectedtoconstantheavycriticismbyrealistsandneorealistswhoarguethat,onallessentialmatters,statescontinuetoruletheinternationalsystem,andthatinternationalregimesofanyinfluencemerelyreflectthis(seeMearsheimer,19941995;Waltz,1979).Moreover,acasecanbemadethatthestructuresanddynamicsofthe

worldeconomyreflecteconomicmultipolarity(i.e.,realpolitik)asmuchaseconomicinterdependence.

Nonetheless,theinternationalismparadigmkeepspacewiththenewrealitiesoftheinformationagebetterthanrealpolitikdoes.Butevenso,ittoohassomenotableweaknessesandshortcomings.Although

iteffectivelyemphasizesthespreadoftransnationalties,itdoessomainlyineconomicterms,despitesomenodstoincreasedinformationandcommunicationflows.Andalthoughitrecognizesthegrowthininfluenceofactorsbesidesstates,includingNGOs,itmainlyspotlightsmultinationalcorporationsandinternationalorganizationscomposedofstaterepresentatives,whilebarelykeepingupwiththegrowthininfluenceofglobalcivil-societyNGOs.Lastly,althoughitheraldstheriseofnetworkformsoforganization,ittakesmoreatop-downthanabottom-upapproachtothem.

Notlongago,aleadingproponentoftheinterdependenceparadigmhasrespondedtotheinformationrevolutionwithamajorcontribution:theconceptofsoftpower(Nye,1990;NyeandOwens,1996).Asnotedearlier,thisconceptrelatestotheidea-sharingpoleofinformationstrategy,whichismostinneedofdevelopment.Thesoftpowerapproachcontravenesrealpolitik'semphasisonrawpower.Italsocontravenesrealpolitik'sinherentlyguardedorientationtowardtheinformationrevolution,byfavoringposturesofopennessandsharingwithalliesandotheractors.Moreover,evenwhereguardednessisneeded,softpowerallowsforless-pronouncedstatistoptionsthandoesrealpolitikforexample,inrelationtofreedomofencryption.

Muchofliberalinternationalismissocloseinspiritandsubstancetonoopolitikthat,withmodification,itmaybeabsorbedbyit.AlinerunsfromWilsonianinternationalism,throughinterdependencetheory,tonoopolitik,althoughitismoreabrokenthanastraightline.

NoopolitikinTheoryandPractice

AnoldmetaphoraboutrealpolitikviewsworldpoliticsinNewtoniantermsasthoughstates,astheonlyimportantgamepieces,weretheonlybilliardballsmovingaroundonapooltable.Whatwouldbe

moreaccuratenowisapost-Newtonianmetaphor,oratleastachangedunderstandingofthisoldone.Thenewmetaphorshouldnotonlyaddballsfornonstateactors,butshouldalsoshowthatwhathappensonthetabledependsonthedynamicsofthetablefabricaswellastheinteractionsamongtheballs.And,metaphori-

callyspeaking,thatfabricischanginginwaysthatmakeitthefabricitselfanewandimportantfactor.7

TrendsthatInviteNoopolitik

Noopolitikmakessensebecausetrendsexistthatmakeitincreasinglyviable.Weidentifyfivetrends:thegrowingfabricofglobalinterconnection,thecontinuedstrengtheningofglobalcivilsociety,theriseofsoftpower,thenewimportanceof''cooperativeadvantages,"andtheformationoftheglobalnoosphere.Thesetrendsdonotspelltheobsolescenceofrealpolitik,buttheyareatoddswithit.Toalesserdegree,theyarealsoatoddswiththetenetsofliberalinternationalism.Wediscusseachofthefivetrendsbelow.

GlobalInterconnection.

Theeraofglobalinterdependencebeganinthe1960s,andmanytrendsitstheoristsemphasizecontinuetocometrue.However,theterm"interdependence"iswearing,andisnotquiterightforourpurposes.Itretainsaprimarilyeconomicconnotation;itisoverlyassociatedwithrecommendationsforthecreationofstate-basedinternationalregimes;anditconnotestherathertraditional,evennegative,dynamicsof"dependence,"asinthecontrastbetweenindependenceandinterdependence.Moreover,thetermdoesnotquiteconveythepointwewanttomakethatanew"fabric"ofrelationsisemergingintheinformationage,weavingtheworldandallitskeyactorstogether.Inourview,thecomingageisdefinedbetterbytheterm"interconnection."AmericaandAmericansaremovingoutoftheageofglobalinterdependenceintooneofglobalinterconnection.

Therearemanyreasonswhytheworldbecameinterdependent,andchangesinthosereasonshelpexplainwhyinterconnectionmaybethebestwordtodescribethesituation.Theseincludethefollowing:ashiftintheunderlyingnatureofinterdependence,theglobalriseof

nonstateactors,andtheemergenceofglobalnetworksofinterestandactivity.

7WewereinspiredtoposethismetaphoricalreferenceafterameetingoftheHighlandsForuminNovember1997,whereseveralattendeesbroachedtheobsolescenceofthebilliard-ballsmetaphorinadiscussionaboutdiplomacyintheinformationage.Theoreticalwritingsaboutcomplexityalsosometimesraisethiskindofmetaphor.

First,theworldbecameinterdependentbecausetransnational"flows"ofallkindscapital,labor,technology,information,etc.becameimmense.Butastheflowshavegrown,the"stocks"thatreceivingnationsaccumulatefromthesendingnationse.g.,foreignimmigrationandinvestmenthavegrownlargeandpermanent.Formanynations,thenatureofinterdependenceisnowdefinednotonlybytheflows,butincreasinglybythepresenceofforeignstocksthatareself-perpetuating,andthathavemultiple,complexeconomic,cultural,andotherlocalconsequences.8Thus,societiesarebecomingconnectedinnewways.

Thischangecombineswithasecond:Interdependencewasspurredbytheriseoftransnationalandmultinationalactors,especiallymultinationalcorporationsandmultilateralorganizations.Now,anewgenerationofactorse.g.,newsmedia,electroniccommunicationsservices,human-rightsorganizationsareincreasingly"goingglobal,"sometothepointofclaimingtheyare"stateless"anddenyingtheyare"national"or''multinational"incharacter.Theyareredefiningthemselvesasglobalactorswithglobalagendas,andpursuingglobalexpansionthroughtieswithlike-mindedcounterparts.Interconnectionimpelsthisexpansion.

Third,thecapital,technology,information,andotherflowsthathavemovedtheworlddowntheinterdependencepathwereinitiallyquiteinchoate,episodic,anddisconnectedfromeachother.Thatisnolongerthecasethebestexamplebeingthataglobalfinancialsystemhastakenshape.Thesenewflowsandstocksareresultinginmyriad,seamlessnetworksofeconomic,social,andotherrelationships.Asthesebecomeinstitutionalized,stateandnonstateactorsacquireinterestsinthegrowthofthesenetworksseparatefromthenationalandlocalintereststheymayhave.Thisgrowthrequirescontinuedinterconnection.Forsomeglobalactors,buildingandprotectingthenewnetworksbecomemoreimportantthanbuildingandprotecting

nationalpowerbalancesasthenetworksthemselvesbecomesourcesofpowerfortheirmembers.

Someglobalactorsarethuslookingattheworldmoreintermsofwidespreadnetworksthanintermsofdistinctgroupsandnationslo-

8ThesepointsaboutstocksandflowsarerepeatedfromRonfeldtandOrtízdeOppermann(1990,Ch.6).

catedinspecificplaces.TheprocessofglobalinterconnectionisconcentratedamongtheindustrializednationsoftheNorthernHemisphere.Yet,thegrowthoftheglobal"borderless"economyoftenmeansthatthekeybeneficiariesarenotnationspersebutparticularsubregions,suchasAlsace-Lorraine,Wales,Kansai,OrangeCounty(seeOhmae,1990,1995),aswellas"worldcities"(e.g.,London,LosAngeles,andTokyo)thatarebecomingsolinkedastorepresentcollectivelyadistributed"globalcity''(Brand,1989;Sassen,1991;Kotkin;1993).TheUnitedStatesisincreasinglyaglobal,asdistinctfromapurelynational,actor.

Insum,interconnectingtheworldmaybethemostforward-looking"game"inthedecadesaheadasormoreimportantthanthebalance-of-powergame.Barringareversiontoanarchyorotherstepsbackwarde.g.,endemicethnonationalism,orneofascismthatwouldmaketheworldlookmorelikeitdidinpastdecades,interconnectionislikelytodeepenandbecomeadefiningcharacteristicofthe21stcentury.Theinformationrevolutioniswhatmakesthispossibleitprovidesthecapabilityandtheopportunitytocircuitizetheglobeinwaysthathaveneverbeenseenbefore.

Thisislikelytobeamessy,complicatedprocess,rifewithambivalent,contradictory,andparadoxicaleffects.Itmayleadtonewpatternsofcooperation,competition,andconflictacrossalllevelsofsociety(local,national,international),acrossallspheresofactivity(public,private),inalldirections(East-West,North-South),allatthesametime.Itmayweakenstatesinsomerespects,whilestrengtheningtheminothers.Ultimately,globalinterconnectionshouldbenefititsproponents,inbothstateandnonstatearenas;butitmaywellexposethem,andothers,tounexpectedrisksandvulnerabilitiesalongtheway.Anambitiousactormayhavetoenterinto,andmanage,manycross-cuttingconnectionsandpartnershipsandmanyofthesemayinvolvetransnationalcivil-societyactors.

GrowingStrengthofGlobalCivilSociety.

Nodoubt,stateswillremainparamountactorsintheinternationalsystem.Theinformationrevolutionwillleadtochangesinthenatureofthestate,butnottoits"witheringaway."Whatwillhappenisatransformation.9Atthe

9Thereisanongoingdebateabouttheimplicationsoftheinformationrevolutionforthefutureofthestate.Ourownviewissummarizedratherthanelaboratedhere.


sametime,nonstateactorswillcontinuetogrowinstrengthandinfluence.Thishasbeenthetrendforseveraldecadeswithbusinesscorporationsandinternationalregulatoryregimes.ThenexttrendtoexpectisagradualworldwidestrengtheningoftransnationalNGOsthatrepresentcivilsociety.Asthisoccurs,therewillbearebalancingofrelationsamongstate,market,andcivil-societyactorsaroundtheworldinwaysthatfavornoopolitikoverrealpolitik.10

Realpolitiksupposesthatstatesthoroughlydefineanddominatetheinternationalsystem.Thiswillbelessthecaseasnonstateactorsfurthermultiplyandgaininfluence.Thetop-downstrengtheningofinternationalregimes,asfavoredbyinternationalism,willbeonlypartofthenewstory.Equallyifnotmoreimportant,fromthestandpointofnoopolitik,willbethebottom-upstrengtheningofNGOsthatrepresentcivilsociety.

Noopolitikupholdstheimportanceofnonstateactors,especiallyfromcivilsociety,andrequiresthattheyplaystrongroles.Why?NGOs(nottomentionindividuals)oftenserveassourcesofethicalimpulses(whichisrarelythecasewithmarketactors),asagentsfordisseminatingideasrapidly,andasnodesinanetworkedapparatusof"sensoryorganizations"thatcanassistwithconflictanticipation,prevention,andresolution.Indeed,largelybecauseoftheinformationrevolution,advancedsocietiesareonthethresholdofdevelopingavastsensoryapparatusforwatchingwhatishappeningaroundtheworld.Thisapparatusisnotnew,becauseitconsistspartlyofestablishedgovernmentintelligenceagencies,corporatemarket-researchdepartments,newsmedia,andopinion-pollingfirms.Whatisnewistheloomingscopeandscaleofthissensoryapparatus,asitincreasinglyincludesnetworksofNGOsandindividualactivistswhomonitorandreportonwhattheyseeinallsortsofissueareas,usingopenforums,specializedInternetmailinglists,Webpostings,and


Somereasonsforourview,andliteraturecitations,areprovidedinArquillaandRonfeldt(1996b;and1997,Ch.19)andRonfeldt(1996).AlsoseeSassen(1998,Ch.10)andSkolnikoff(1993).10Forelaborationofthesepoints,andcitationstotheliterature,seeArquillaandRonfeldt(1996b)andRonfeldt(1996).Foranearlyelucidationoftheconceptof"globalcivilsociety,"seeFrederick(1993aandb).Forrecentstatements,seeSlaughter(1997),Simmons(1998),Sassen(1998,Ch.9),andClark,Friedman,andHochstetler(1998).

faxmachineladdersastoolsforrapiddissemination.11Forexample,earlywarningisanincreasingconcernofdisaster-reliefandhumanitarianorganizations.

Againstthisbackground,thestatesthatemergestrongestininformation-agetermsevenifbytraditionalmeasurestheymayappeartobesmaller,lesspowerfulstatesarelikelytobethestatesthatlearntoworkconjointlywiththenewgenerationofnonstateactors.Strengthmaythusemanatelessfromthe"state"persethanfromthe"system"asawhole.Allthismaymeanplacingapremiumonstate-societycoordination,includingthetolerationof"citizendiplomacy''andthecreationof"deepcoalitions"betweenstateandcivil-societyactors(lattertermfromTofflerandToffler,1997).Inthatsense,itmightbesaidthattheinformationrevolutionisimpellingashiftfromastate-centrictoanetwork-centricworld(whichwouldparallelapotentialshiftinthemilitaryworldfromtraditional"platform-centric"toemerging"network-centric"approachestowarfare).12

Thisisquiteacceptabletonoopolitik.Whilerealpolitikremainssteadfastlyimbuedwithnotionsofcontrol,noopolitikislessaboutcontrolthan"decontrol"perhapsdeliberate,regulateddecontrolsothatstateactorscanbetteradapttotheemergenceofindependentnonstateactorsandlearntoworkwiththemthroughnewmechanismsforcommunicationandcoordination.Realpolitikwouldleantowardanessentiallymercantilistapproachtoinformationasitoncedidtowardcommerce;noopolitikisnotmercantilistbynature.

RiseofSoftPower.

Theinformationrevolution,asnotedearlier,isalteringthenatureofpower,inlargepartbymakingsoftpowermorepotent.InthewordsofNye,writingwithAdmiralWilliamOwens(1996,p.21,referringtoNye,1990),

11Schudson(1998,pp.310311)arguesthatitistimeforAmericatogiverisetoanew(inhishistoricalview,afourth)modelofcitizenshipthatwillemphasizecivicmonitoring.Thismeansenvironmentalsurveillancekeepinganeyeoutmorethanitmeanstryingtobeknowledgeableaboutallthings(histhirdmodel).12Thephrase"network-centric"isfrommilitarydiscussionsaboutwhetherfuturemilitaryoperationsshouldbe"platform-centric"or"network-centric."SeeCebrowskiandGarstka(1998).

"Softpower"istheabilitytoachievedesiredoutcomesininternationalaffairsthroughattractionratherthancoercion.Itworksbyconvincingotherstofollow,orgettingthemtoagreeto,normsandinstitutionsthatproducethedesiredbehavior.Softpowercanrestontheappealofone'sideasortheabilitytosettheagendainwaysthatshapethepreferencesofothers.

Thisdoesnotmeanthathardpowerandrealpolitikareobsolete,oreveninabeyance.AccordingtoJosefJoffe(1997,p.24),

Let'smakenomistakeaboutit.Hardpowermenandmissiles,gunsandshipsstillcounts.Itistheultimate,becauseexistential,currencyofpower.Butontheday-to-daylevel,"softpower"...isthemoreinterestingcoin....Todaythereisamuchbiggerpayoffingettingotherstowantwhatyouwant,andthathastodowiththeattractionofone'sideas,withagenda-setting,withideologyandinstitutions,andwithholdingoutbigprizesforcooperation,suchasthevastnessandsophisticationofone'smarket.

Playinguponadistinctionaboutthreedifferentkindsofinformationfree,commercial,andstrategicKeohaneandNye(1998,p.94)proposethatsoftpowerrestsultimatelyoncredibility,andthatthisderivesmainlyfromtheproductionanddisseminationoffree(public)information:

Theabilitytodisseminatefreeinformationincreasesthepotentialforpersuasioninworldpolitics....Ifoneactorcanpersuadeotherstoadoptsimilarvaluesandpolicies,whetheritpossesseshardpowerandstrategicinformationmaybecomelessimportant.Softpowerandfreeinformationcan,ifsufficientlypersuasive,changeperceptionsofself-interestandtherebyalterhowhardpowerandstrategicinformationareused.IfgovernmentsorNGOsaretotakeadvantageoftheinformationrevolution,theywillhavetoestablishreputationsforcredibilityamidthewhitenoiseoftheinformationrevolution.

Inourview,theriseofsoftpowermakesnoopolitikfeasible.Whereasrealpolitikoftenaimsatcoercionthroughtheexerciseofhardpower(whoseessenceismilitary),noopolitikaimstoattract,persuade,

coopt,andenjoinwithsoftpower(whoseessenceisnonmilitary).Inkeepingwiththepointthattherootnoosreferstothemind,noopolitikmeanshavingasystematicabilitytoconduct

foreigninteractionsinknowledge-relatedterms.Itrequiresinformationstrategytoworkindeed,atitsindivisiblecore,noopolitikisinformationstrategy.

Therelationshipbetweeninformationstrategyandthetraditionalpolitical,military,andeconomicdimensionsofgrandstrategycanevolveinbasicallytwodirections.Oneisforinformationstrategytodevelopasanadjunctorcomponentundereachofthetraditionaldimensions.Thisprocessisalreadyunderwayasseen,forexample,inmetaphorsaboutinformationbeingamilitary"forcemultiplier"andacommercial"commodity"thatbenefitstheUnitedStates.Thesecondpathstillfarfromchartedistodevelopinformationstrategyasadistinct,newdimensionofgrandstrategyforprojectingAmericanpowerandpresence.Toaccomplishthis,informationstrategistswouldbewelladvisedtogobeyondnotionsofsoftpowerandconsiderSusanStrange's(1988,p.118)relatednotionof''knowledgestructures"asafoundationofpower:

Morethanotherstructures,thepowerderivedfromtheknowledgestructurecomeslessfromcoercivepowerandmorefromconsent,authoritybeingconferredvoluntarilyonthebasisofsharedbeliefsystemsandtheacknowledgmentoftheimportancetotheindividualandtosocietyoftheparticularformtakenbytheknowledgeandthereforeoftheimportanceofthepersonhavingtheknowledgeandaccessorcontroloverthemeansbywhichitisstoredandcommunicated.

Theproponentsofrealpolitikwouldprobablyprefertostickwithtreatinginformationasanadjunctofthestandardpolitical,military,andeconomicelementsofgrandstrategy;theveryideaofintangibleinformationasabasisforadistinctdimensionofstrategyseemsantitheticaltorealpolitik.Itallowsforinformationstrategyasatoolofdeceptionandmanipulation(e.g.,asintheU.S.deliberateexaggerationoftheprospectsforitsStrategicDefenseInitiativeduringthe1980s).Butrealpolitikseemsaversetoaccepting

"knowledgeprojection"asamountingtomuchofatoolofstatecraft.However,fornoopolitiktotakehold,informationwillhavetobecomeadistinctdimensionofgrandstrategy.

Wewillelaboratelaterthatthereismuchmoretobedoneinregardtobothpaths.Ourpointfornowisthattheriseofsoftpowerisessentialfortheemergenceofthesecondpath,andthusofnoopolitik.

ImportanceofCooperativeAdvantages.

Statesandotheractorsseektodevelop"comparative"advantages.Thishasmostlymeant"competitive"advantages,especiallywhenitcomestogreat-powerrivalriesconductedintermsofrealpolitik.But,intheinformationage,"cooperative"advantageswillbecomeincreasinglyimportant.Moreover,societiesthatimprovetheirabilitiestocooperatewithfriendsandalliesmayalsogaincompetitiveadvantagesagainstrivals.

TheinformationrevolutionandtheattendantriseofnetworkformsoforganizationshouldimproveU.S.competitiveness.Buttheyshouldalsostimulateshiftsinthenatureofcomparativeadvantage:fromitscompetitivetoitscooperativedimensions.Anactor'sabilitytocommunicate,consult,andcoordinatein-depthwithotheractorsmaybecomeascrucialastheabilitytocompete(orengageinconflict)withstillotheractors.Anewinterweavingofcompetitiveandcooperativeadvantagesmaybeexpected.Thistrendisalreadypronouncedineffortstobuildregionalandglobalpartnerships.

SomeU.S.strategistshavebeguntoseethevalueof"cooperativecompetition"inregardtoglobaleconomic,political,andmilitaryrelations:

Fromthisnetworkperspective,nationalstrategywilldependlessonconfrontationwithopponentsandmoreontheartofcooperationwithcompetitors....Thenewstrategyofcooperativecompetitionwouldbedefinedmoreintermsofnetworksofinformationflowsamongequalsthatprovideforenhancedcooperationontechnologicaldevelopmentsandpotentialresponsestointernationalcrisesinaframeworkofshiftingadhoccoalitionsandintenseeconomiccompetition....Thestrategyofthe

UnitedStates,then,wouldbetoplaytheroleofstrategicbroker,forming,sustaining,andadjustinginternationalnetworkstomeetasophisticatedarrayofchallenges(Golden,1993,pp.103,107,108).

Thinkingalongtheselinescouldadvanceviasoftpowerandnoopolitik.Inthemilitaryarea,forexample,whereadvancedinformationsystemsgivetheUnitedStatesanedgeforbuildinginterna-

tionalcoalitions,"selectivelysharingtheseabilitiesisthereforenotonlytherouteofcoalitionleadershipbutthekeytomaintainingU.S.militarysuperiority"(NyeandOwens,1996,p.28).MartinLibicki's(1998andforthcoming)ideaforcreatingan"opengrid"formilitarilyilluminatingtheworldaglobalcommand,control,communications,computing,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(C4ISR)system,installedandsustainedbytheU.S.military,whoseinformationwouldbeavailabletoanycountry'smilitarysolongasitacceptsilluminationofitsownmilitarydeploymentsandotheractivitiesisverymuchinlinewithnoopolitik.Similarnotionsarebeingfieldedaboutglobalcooperationtoaddresseconomic,social,judicial,andotherissues(e.g.,Joffe,1997;Mathews,1997;andSlaughter,1997).DavidGompert(1998)argues,morebroadly,thatfreedomandopennessarenecessaryforbenefitingfullyfromtheinformationrevolutionandthusa"core"ofdemocratic,market-orientedpowers,ledbytheUnitedStates,isgainingaglobalpresence,suchthatanypotentiallyadversarialpowerlikeChinawhowantstobenefitaswellfromtheinformationrevolutionwillhavetoadapttocooperatingwiththiscore,includingbysharingitsinterestsandeventuallyitsvalues.13

TheUnitedStates,withitsdiversityofofficial,corporate,andcivil-societyactors,ismoredisposedandbetterpositionedthanothernationstobuildbroad-based,networkedpatternsofcooperationacrossallrealmsofsociety,andacrossallsocieties.Thissurelymeansmovingbeyondrealpolitik,which,unlikenoopolitik,wouldavoidinformationsharing,defineissuesandoptionsinnationalratherthanglobalterms,prefercontainmenttoengagement,andfocusonthreatsanddefensesratherthanonmutualassurances.

FormationofaGlobalNoosphere.

Thiswasdiscussedatlengthinthepriorchapter.Butthepointshould

bereiteratedthattheformationofanoosphereiscrucialfornoopolitik.Withouttheemergenceanddeliberateconstructionofamassive,well-recognizednoosphere,therewillbelittlehopeofsustainingthenotionthattheworldismovingtoanewsysteminwhich"power"isunderstoodmainlyintermsofknowledge,andthatinformationstrategyshould

13AnopinionpiecebyIkenberry(1998)articulatesasimilarsetofpoints,althoughwithouttyingthemtotheinformationrevolution.

focusonthe"balanceofknowledge,"asdistinctfromthe"balanceofpower."

MutualRelationshipbetweenRealpolitikandNoopolitik

Realpolitik,nomatterhowmodified,cannotbetransformedintonoopolitik.Thetwostandincontradiction.Thisislargelybecauseoftheuncompromisinglystate-centricnatureofrealpolitik.Itisalsobecause,foranactortoshifttheemphasisofitsstatecraftfromrealpolitiktonoopolitik,theremustbeashiftfrompowerpoliticstopower-sharingpolitics.Nonetheless,thecontradictionisnotabsolute;itcan,intheoryandpractice,bemadeacompatiblecontradiction(ratherlikeyinandyang).Indeed,truerealpolitikdependsontheplayerssharingandrespondingtosomecorebehavioralvaluesabitofnoopolitikmaythuslieattheheartofrealpolitik(seeMorgenthau,1948,pp.224231).Likewise,truenoopolitikmayworkbestifitaccordswithpowerpoliticshowever,thisperspectiveshouldbelessaboutmightmakesright,thanaboutrightmakesmight(asalsoexpositedinGompert,1998).Understandingthismayhelpinperseveringthroughthetransitionalperiodinwhichrealpolitikandnoopolitikarelikelytocoexist.Skillfulpolicymakersandstrategistsmayfacechoicesastowhenitisbettertoemphasizerealpolitikornoopolitik,orastohowbesttoalternatebetweenthemorapplyhybrids,especiallywhendealingwitharecalcitrantadversarywhohasbeenabletoresistrealpolitiktypesofpressures.

Therelationshipbetweenrealpolitikandnoopolitikmaybedynamicinanothersense.Patternsofdevelopmentremainunevenaroundtheworld;partsofitarealreadyquitesteepedinthedynamicsoftheinformationage,whileotherpartsstillseemmoremedievalthanmodern.Thus,noopolitikwillbemorepertinentinsomepartsoftheworldthaninothers,andinregardtosomeissuesmorethanothers.Wesurmisethatitwillbemostpertinentwhereadvancedsocieties

predominate:e.g.,inWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica.Itwillbelesssowhereconditionsremaintraditionallystate-centric,andthusripeforthecontinuationofrealpolitik(e.g.,muchofAsia).Moreover,noopolitikwillbemosteffectivewhereallmannerofmediaareprevalent,wherecivil-societyNGOshaveanedgeingeneratingattentiontoissues,wheregovernment-NGOrelationsarequitegood,

andwhereissuesareintricateratherthanstrictlyeconomic,political,ormilitary.

Onewaytobalancetherealpolitikmodelwithaspectsoftheglobalinterdependencemodelistotheorizethatworldpoliticsisbifurcatingintotwoworldsthatcoexist,overlap,andinteract.Inthisview,asexplicatedbyJamesRosenau(1988,1990),a"multicentricworld"of"sovereignty-free"actorsconcernedwith"autonomy"isgrowinginparalleltotheold"state-centricworld"of"sovereignty-bound''actorsconcernedabout"security."Thelatterworldcorrespondstothetraditionalnation-statesystem,theformertothenonstateactorswhosenumbers,diversity,andinfluenceareincreasingincludingglobalcorporations,internationalregimes,andcivil-societyadvocacygroups.Thisbifurcationmayendurealongtimeandbefraughtwithmajorepisodesofcitizen-basedactivism,asinthefallofthecommunistregimesinEasternEurope,

wheretheactivistsinthepopulationbecomeagentsofcommunication,eitherthroughuncoordinatedbutcumulativebehaviororthroughadhoc,informalorganizationalnetworks(Rosenau,1992,p.268).

Butevenif"bifurcation"makestheoreticalsense,asomewhatobversepointisimportantforthepracticeofnoopolitik:Thiskindofanalysisunderscores,again,thatnoopolitikwillrequiregovernmentstolearntoworkwithcivil-societyNGOsthatareengagedinbuildingcross-bordernetworksandcoalitions.EvenageopoliticalstrategistastraditionalasZbigniewBrzezinskirealizesthis.Attheendofhislatestbook(1997,p.215),aftertreatingtheworldasa"chessboard"tobemasteredthroughstatistrealpolitik,heturnstopostulatethateffortstobuildanewtransnationalstructureforassuringpeacewouldhavethe

advantageofbenefitingfromthenewwebofgloballinkagesthatisgrowingexponentiallyoutsidethemoretraditionalnation-statesystem.

Thatwebwovenbymultinationalcorporations,NGOs(non-governmentalorganizations,withmanyofthemtransnationalincharacter)andscientificcommunitiesandreinforcedbytheInternetalreadycreatesaninformalglobalsystemthatisinherentlycongenialtomoreinstitutionalizedandinclusiveglobalcooperation.

Inhisview,theUnitedStatesshouldworkforthecreationofsuchlinkagesbecausewearetheonlyoneswhocanpullthisoff.EvenifU.S.primacywereultimatelytowitherawaywhichislikelyinhisviewthisweboflinkageswouldremain"afittinglegacyofAmerica'sroleasthefirst,only,andlasttrulyglobalsuperpower."

Forcasesinwhichitisnoteasytobringrealpolitikandnoopolitikinlineonethicalgrounds,andinwhichtherearecontradictionsandtrade-offsthatmayresultinaccusationsofhypocrisy,therelationshipbetweenthetwowillbreakdown.U.S.policytowardIraqoffersanexample.Inthe1980s,whenIraqseemedtobelosingtheIran-Iraqwar,theU.S.governmentsuppliedintelligencetoIraq,ignoringIraq'suseofchemicalweapons(e.g.,inIraq's1988counterattackagainstIranontheFawPeninsula).Thiswasarealpolitikposture.Realpolitikallowsfortakingthepositionthataleadermaybeaheathenbutheis"our"heathenapositionthatwouldgenerallybeinconsistentwithnoopolitik.Today,U.S.policyopposesIraq'sdevelopmentofchemicalweaponsongroundsthatmixaspectsofrealpolitikandnoopolitik.Inotherpartsoftheworlde.g.,Algeria,Nigeria,andSaudiArabiatherealsoappeartobetrade-offsbetweensupportingdemocracy(animportantgoalfornoopolitik)andsupportinganauthoritarianortheocraticregimebecauseitrulesacountryofstrategicvalue(animportantgoalforrealpolitik).

FosteringNoopolitik:SomeGuidelinesandTasks

Noopolitikisforeignpolicybehaviorandstrategyfortheinformationagethatemphasizestheshapingandsharingofideas,values,norms,laws,andethicsthroughsoftpower.Noopolitikisguidedmorebyaconvictionthatrightmakesformight,thantheobverse.Bothstateandnonstateactorsmaybeguidedbynoopolitik;butratherthanbeingstate-centric,itsstrengthmaylikelystemfromenablingstateandnonstateactorstoworkconjointly.Thedrivingmotivationof

noopolitikcannotbenationalinterestsdefinedinstatistterms.Nationalinterestswillstillplayarole,buttheymaybedefinedmoreinsocietywidethanstate-centrictermsandbefusedwithbroader,evenglobal,interestsinenhancingthetransnationallynetworked"fabric"inwhichtheplayersareembedded.Whilerealpolitiktendstoempowerstates,noopolitikwilllikelyempowernetworksofstateandnonstateactors.Realpolitikpitsonestateagainstanother,but

noopolitikencouragesstatestocooperateincoalitionsandothermutualframeworks.Inalltheserespects,noopolitikcontrastswithrealpolitik.Table2summarizesthiscontrast.

Kissingermaybesaidtoepitomizethezeitgeistandpracticeofrealpolitik.Whomaystandforthezeitgeistofnoopolitik?OnenamethatcomestomindisGeorgeKennan.Hehasalwaysbeenmindfulofrealpolitik.Yet,hisoriginalnotionofcontainmentwasnot(ashehaspointedoutmanytimes)essentiallymilitary.Rather,itwascenteredontheideaofcreatingacommunityofinterests,basedonsharedideals,thatwouldsecurethefreeworld,whiledissuadingtheSovietUnionfromaggression,andeventuallypersuadingittochange.Thisseemsanearlyexpressionofnoopolitik,gearedtoastate-centricsystem.NelsonMandelaandGeorgeSoros,nottomentionahostoflessrenownedindividualswhohaveplayedleadingrolesincivil-societyactivistmovements,arethosewhosebeliefsandactivitiesreflecttherisingimportanceofnonstateactors.

Someofthebestexemplarsoftheemergenceofnoopolitikinvolve"socialnetwars"wagedbycivil-societyactivists(seeArquillaand

Table2ContrastBetweenRealpolitikandNoopolitik

Realpolitik NoopolitikStatesastheunitofanalysis Nodes,nonstateactorsPrimacyofhardpower(resources,etc.)

Primacyofsoftpower

Powerpoliticsaszero-sumgame Win-win,lose-losepossibleSystemisanarchic,highlyconflictual Harmonyofinterests,

cooperationAllianceconditional(orientedtothreat)

Allywebsvitaltosecurity

Primacyofnationalself-interest PrimacyofsharedinterestsPoliticsasunendingquestforadvantage

Explicitlyseekingatelos

Ethosisamoral,ifnotimmoral EthicscruciallyimportantBehaviordrivenbythreatandpower CommongoalsdriveactorsVeryguardedaboutinformationflows Propensityforinfo-sharingBalanceofpowerasthe"steady-state" BalanceofresponsibilitiesPowerembeddedinnation-states Powerin"globalfabric"

Ronfeldt,1996aand1997).14Whileall-outmilitarywars,suchasWorldWarsIandII,representtheconflictualheights(andfailures?)ofrealpolitik,nonmilitarynetwarsmayprovethearchetypalconflictsofnoopolitik.TheNobelprize-winningcampaigntobanlandmines;15NGO-ledoppositiontotheMultilateralAgreementonInvestment(MAI);16theGreenpeace-ledcampaignagainstFrenchnucleartestingintheSouthPacific;theswarmingoftransnationalNGOsindefenseoftheZapatistainsurgentsinMexico;17andrecentinformation-ageeffortsbyBurmeseandChinesedissidents,withsupportfromU.S.-basedNGOs,topressforhumanrightsandpoliticalreformsinthesecountries18allexemplifyhowtransnationalcivil-societynetworks,insomecaseswithstrongsupportfromstates,canpracticenoopolitik,withvaryingdegreesofsuccess,tochangethepoliciesofstatesthatpersistinemphasizingthetraditionalpoliticsofpower.Thesecasessubstantiatethatoldideasabout"peacethroughstrength"maygivewaytonewideasof"peacethroughknowledge."Theyalsoshowthatideasthemselves,particularlyoneswithdeepethicalappeal,maybefusedwithadvancedcommunicationstechnologiesandneworganizationaldesignstocreateanewmodelofpoweranddiplomacythatgovernmentswillincreasinglyencounterandhavetoheed.Noopolitikismoreattunedthanrealpolitiktotheadventofsocialnetwar.Andfornow,activistNGOs,perhapsbecausetheylacktheresourcesforrealpolitik,appeartobe

14Netwarisaninformation-ageentryonthespectrumofconflictthatisdefinedbytheuseofnetworkformsoforganization,doctrine,andstrategy,madepossiblebytheinformationrevolution.Wepresumeherethatmostreadersarefamiliarwiththeconcept.SeeArquillaandRonfeldt(1996a,1997).15Foranacademicanalysisofthismovementthattreatsmoralsuasionandorganizationalnetworkingasimportantfactorsinthegrowthoftransnationalcivilsociety,seePrice(1998).16Kobrin(1998)viewsthisoppositiontotheMAIasa"clashof

globalizations"betweenthetypeofglobalizationfavoredbyinvestors,andanewertyperepresentedbyelectronicallynetworkedglobalcivilsocietyactorswhoopposeeconomicglobalization.17OntheZapatistamovementinMexico,seeCleaver(1998)andRonfeldtetal.(1998).18OnBurma,seeDanitzandStrobel(forthcoming).OnChina,seedissidents'declarationspostedatsitesmaintainedbyHumanRightsinChina(www.hrichina.org)andtheDigitalFreedomNetwork(www.dfn.org).PeriodicarticlesinTheLosAngelesTimeshavealsoprovidedexcellentcoverageofeffortsbyChinesedissidentstousetheInternettospreadtheirviews.

aheadofstatesinhavingthemotivationandabilitytoapplynoopolitik.

Butwhatifstatesregardnoopolitikasattractive,withoutcaringabouttheemergenceandconstructionofthenoosphere?Inthehandsofademocraticleader,noopolitikmightthenamounttolittlemorethanairy,idealisticrhetoricwithlittleornostructuralbasis;while,inthehandsofadictatororademagogue,itcouldbereducedtomanipulativepropaganda.19Ornarrowversionsofnoopolitikmaybepracticedmainlyforprivategaininthecommercialworldsofadvertisingandpublicrelations,thisalreadyoccurswhencompaniesdevelopamediablitzandplanttestimonialstoshapepublicopinion.

Muchastheriseofrealpolitikdependedonthedevelopmentandexploitationofthegeosphere(whosenaturalresourcesenhancestatepower),sowilltheriseofnoopolitikdependonthedevelopmentandexploitationofthenoosphere.Topursuethis,measuresneedtobeidentifiedthat,inadditiontofosteringtheriseofanoosphere,arelikewisegearedtofacilitatingtheeffectivenessofsoftpower,thedeepeningofglobalinterconnections,thestrengtheningoftransnationalcivil-societyactors,andthecreationofconditionsforgovernmentstobebetterabletoactconjointly(intermsofcooperativeadvantages),especiallywithnonstateactors.

ThefollowingaresomemeasuresforU.S.policyandstrategythatcouldassistwiththedevelopmentofthenoosphereandnoopolitik.Allaretakenfromongoingdiscussionsaboutissuesraisedbytheadvanceoftheinformationrevolution.

Continuetosupportexpansionofcyberspaceconnectionaroundtheworld.SupporttheaccessofNGOsaswellasstateandmar-

19IthasbeensuggestedthataHitlerwouldliketheconceptofnoopolitik.Ourrejoinderisthatnoopolitikmustbebasedontheexistenceofa

noosphere,andthattheopennessandinterconnectednessthatcomeswithanoospherewouldexposeandconstrainaHitler.Additionally,somereligiousandothercultsmaypracticeaversionofnoopolitiktoattractadherentsandassailtheircriticsandopponents,althoughatbasethesecultistsoperatefromaclosed,evenisolatingethosthatreallycontradictsthenotionofanopen,globalnoosphere.

ketactorstoit,includingwherethisrunscountertothepreferencesofauthoritarianregimes.20

Moveawayfromrealpolitikdesignstocontrolencryption,towardfreedomofencryption.(Foragooddiscussion,seeDyson,1997.)

Toensurecyberspacesafetyandsecurityattheinternationallevel,developmultitieredinformationsystemsforinformationsharing,creatingasharedinfosphere.21

Promotefreedomofinformationandcommunicationsasaright.Article19oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsstatesthat"everyonehasarighttoseek,receiveandimpartinformationandideasthroughanymediaandregardlessoffrontiers."AnequivalentappearsintheInternationalCovenantforCivilandPoliticalRights.Noopolitikrequiresmore.Activistsonthepoliticallefthavedrafteda"PeoplesCommunicationsCharter."22Somethingalongtheselines,madesuitableforpeopleacrossthepoliticalspectrum,seemsessentialfortheevolutionofaglobalnoosphere.23

Encouragethecreationof"specialmediaforces."Theymightbemodeledalongthelinesofspecialforcesunitsbutshouldbearmedwithweaponsofthemedia(e.g.,digitalcamerasandsatelliteuplinks)ratherthanthoseofthemilitary.Undersomecircumstances,theycouldbedispatchedintoconflictzonesto

20SeeKedzie(1997)fortheargumentthatcommunication,interconnection,anddemocracyreinforceeachother.21ThispointisfromabriefingbyRANDcolleagueRobertH.Anderson.22Seehttp://www.waag.org/pcc/.AlsoseeFrederick(1993b).23Thispoint,withvariations,hasadherentsinJapan,aswellasinAmericaandEurope.KumonandAizu(1993,p.318)write:

[T]heemergenceofhypernetworksocietywillrequirenotonlyphysical/technicalinfrastructurebutalsoawiderangeofnewsocial

agreementsbindingtheinfostructurethatisthesocial/humannetwork.Weproposethatthecoreofsuchinfostructurewillbe"informationrights,"anewconceptofhumanrightsthatwillsupplement,andinpartreplace,propertyrightsthathavebeenwidelyacceptedinmodernindustrialsociety.

AlsoseeFrederick(1993a),inthesamebook.

helpsettledisputesthroughthediscoveryanddisseminationofaccurateinformation.24

Opendiplomacytogreatercoordinationbetweenstateandnonstateactors,especiallyNGOs,byundertakinga"revolutionindiplomaticaffairs"(RDA)thatmatchestherevolutionsunderwayinbusinessandmilitaryaffairs(seeArquillaandRonfeldt,1997and1998b).25

Broachwithotherpotentiallyinterestedstateandnonstateactorstheideaofbuildingan"informationcommonwealth"(termfromCooper,1997,andothersources).26

Thesemeasuresrelatetothecreationofaglobalnoospherethatwouldbeofinteresttoallrealmsofsociety.ItmayalsobeadvisablefortheUnitedStatestoworkoncreatinga"militarynoosphere"andforthat,differentmeasuresmaybeneeded.ThegoalsmightincludeimprovingjointnessintheU.S.military,aswellastheeffectivenessoftheU.S.militaryengagement,alliance,andcoalitionactivitiesabroad,andU.S.abilitytoaddresssmallscalecontingencies(SSCs)involvingNGOs.Theemphasisinrecentyearson"jointness"amongtheU.S.armedservicescouldbeakeyaspectofthecreationofamilitarynoosphere.Inasimilarlight,themanyforeigninternaldefense(FID)missionsofU.S.forcesthroughouttheworld(inover100countries)couldbeseenasexternalaspectsofanemergingmilitarynoosphere.

24Forrelatedideas,alsoseeMetzl(1997),DeCaro(1996),andTofflerandToffler(1993).Anearlieridea,fieldedbyAndersonandShapiro(1992),isthatofcreating"deployablelocalnetworkstoreduceconflict,"whichcouldberushedintoconflictsituationsintheexpectationthatincreasedcommunicationsmayfosterconflictresolution.Stillearlier,Keohane(1984,p.121)proposedthat"datasovereignty,"ifitcouldbeestablished,wouldeaseenvironmentaldebates.25ForbackgroundontheprospectsforanRDA,andontheconceptof"virtualdiplomacy,"seematerialsfromtheconferenceon"Virtual

Diplomacy:TheGlobalCommunicationsRevolutionandInternationalConflictManagement,"organizedbytheU.S.InstituteforPeace,Washington,D.C.,April12,1997,locatedathttp://www.usip.org/.AlsoseeCambone(1996),Shultz(1997),Solomon(1997),Wriston(1997),TheProjectontheAdvocacyofU.S.InterestsAbroad(1998),andBurt,Robison,andFulton(1998).26BenedictAnderson's(1991)notionofan"imaginedcommunity"maybeappropriate,too.

Inasense,amilitarynoosphereisalreadyemerging,althoughnoonehasyetcalleditthat.Inaddition,noonehasthoughtthroughtheideational,organizational,strategic,andtechnologicalimplicationsofthisemergence.Anoverarchingaimofmilitarynoopolitikmightbetosupersederealpolitik'semphasison"strongdefenses"withanewemphasison"strongsharing,"whichmayavoidaccusationsthatthemilitarynoosphereisonlyanewnameforanoldapproachtodominationrealpolitikindisguise.Atraditionalrealpolitikmind-setmakesitdifficulttosharewithothersandcouldthusencouragean"informationarmsrace.''However,intoday'sworld,afailuretoengageinstrongsharingwithfriendsandallies,inregardtosuchissuesascyberspacesecurityandsafety,mayunderminetheprospectsforeitherrealpolitikornoopolitik.

IfaU.S.-ledmilitarynoospherecanbebuilt,thekeygainsmaybeinpeacetimeratherthanwartime,forsuchpurposesasconflictanticipationandprevention,nation-building,humanitariananddisasterrelief,andconfidence-buildingwithregardtonewmilitaryandsecurityarrangementsinvariouspartsoftheworld.Libicki'snotion,mentionedearlier,ofan"opengrid"aglobalC4ISRsystemopentoallcouldprovideastructuralelementforamilitarynoosphere.Successwithdesigningamilitarymodelofthenoospheremightleadthewayforcreationofadiplomaticcounterpart.

AsU.S.informationstrategyapproachestheriseofthenoosphereandnoopolitikitshouldbebasedon"guardedopenness."Thisisanadvisablepolicyposturefordemocracies(ArquillaandRonfeldt,1996band1997).Opennessiscrucialforsharing,whichistheethicalandpracticalessenceofthenoosphereandnoopolitik,butguardednesswilllongremaincrucialforsecurity.Mostofthegeneralmeasuresnotedaboveemphasizeopenness,butmilitarynoospheremeasureswillrequireadifferentbalancebetweenopennessandguardedness.Thenextchaptergoesmoredeeplyintomilitaryand

securitymatters,whereachievingthebestbalancebetweenguardednessandopennessandbetweentheenduringvalueofrealpolitikandtheemergingvalueofnoopolitikmayrequireadefthandintheyearsahead.

Asallthisgetsworkedout,itmaybecomeclearthatthereisalotmoretonoopolitikthanmerelyasserting,sharing,andinstitutingtheparticularvalues,norms,ethics,laws,andotheringredientsofsoft

powerthatanactorwantstouphold.Whatmayespeciallymatterforallpartiestheadvocatesandtheiraudiencesisthe"story"thatisbeingtold,implicitlyorexplicitly.27Realpolitikistypicallyaboutwhosemilitaryoreconomywins.Noopolitikmayultimatelybeaboutwhosestorywins.

27Thus,furtheranalyticalelaborationofnoopolitikmaybenefitfrominquiringintothe"postmodernist"literatureabouttheimportanceofnarrativeanddiscourseintheexerciseofpower,asexemplifiedbythewritingsofMichelFoucaultandJacquesDerrida;andintoanewacademicliteratureaboutstorymodeling,asexemplifiedbyPenningtonandHastie(1986).WeareindebtedtoRANDcolleagueTanyaCharlick-Paleyforcallingthestory-modelingliteraturetoourattention.

ChapterFourInternationalCooperationAndConflictThischapterconsidersselectedpolicy-relevantimplicationsoftheemergenceofnoopolitikthatarelikelytoinfluencethedevelopmentofAmericaninformationstrategy.Theanalysisfirstexaminesvariouswaysinwhichthetraditionalpolitical,economic,andmilitarydomainsofgrandstrategymaybeaffected,especiallyintermsoftheprospectsforbroadeninganddeepeninginternationalcooperation.Next,theroleofinformationstrategyincrisisandconflictisexamined,bothintermsoftheimportanceofnewformsofpublicdiplomacyandtheneedtocraftanintegratedstrategicinformationdoctrine(SID)toguidethemanagementofinformationalcapabilitiesandresourcesinwartime.

InformationStrategyandGlobalCooperation

Becausetheverynotionofanoosphereisglobal,itshouldbeapparentfromtheoutsetthatsuccessinactualizingthisrealmoftheminddependsupontheabilitytoenlistothersfromstates,toNGOs,to"deepcoalitions"ofthetwotocooperateinsupportofit.Inthinkingabouthowtobuildcooperation,wehavemodifiedclassicalnotionsaboutgrandstrategytoreflectthesensibilitiesimpliedbytheriseofnoopolitik.

Thus,economicstrategyshouldbefusedwithlegalstructuresandnormsastheglobaleconomygrowsevermorereliantuponideasandknowledgeproductsandpracticesforitsgrowthandhealth.Inthemilitaryrealm,itwilllikewisebeincreasinglyimportanttomovebeyondtraditionalquantitativemeasuresofmilitaryeffectiveness,inwhichoneparty'sstrengththreatensanother.Instead,militaryis-

suesareviewedastiedinextricablytomutualsecurityplacingtheneedforcooperationinthisrealmatapremium.Indeed,inanoopolitikworldevenonethatmustcoexistwithsubstantialrealpolitikelementsmilitariesthatareattractiveaspartners,ratherthanfearedashegemons,aremorelikelytocraftrobustmutualsecurityarrangements.

Withregardtothepoliticalmeansandendsoftraditionalgrandstrategy,therealistandneorealistdaysofstate-monopolized"highpolitics"(seeMorgenthau,1948;Waltz,1979)arelikelynumbered,astheriseofnonstateactorsandtheemergenceofaglobalcivilsocietybringthesocialdimensionofworldpoliticstothefore.Thus,thetightcouplingbetweensocialandpoliticalaffairswillfeaturetheactiveparticipationsometimesthepredominanceofnonstatecivil(anduncivil)societyactors.

Thesemodifiedspheresofgrandstrategyeachaffordglimpsesintohowinformationstrategymaycomplementthetraditionaltoolsofstatecraft.Buttheyalsoshowhowinformationstrategymightemergeasadistinctdimensionofstatecraftaswell.Notethatthefollowingdiscussionisexemplaryratherthanexhaustive.Ourgoalatthispointissimplytosketchoutthetypesofpolicyissueslikelytoriseineachrealm,andthemannerinwhichinformationstrategymayhelptofostercooperationanddeterconflict.

Finally,itisimportanttorecognizethatsomeblurringand/orblendingoftherealmsislikelytooccur.Forexample,whilethediffusionoflegalnormsandpracticeswillbecloselyinterwovenwitheconomicaffairsinanoopolitikworld,normativeinstitutionsandpracticeswillbevisibleintheotherrealmsaswell.Whilenotlikelytotakeonthesamedegreeofstatutorypenetrationasineconomicsandtrade,military-securityandsociopoliticalaffairswillnodoubtbemoreinfluencedbyethicalconsiderationsinanoopolitikworld.Thisdoes

notchangethepointthattheprincipaleffectofnewlegalparadigmswillbefeltintheworldeconomy.Itjustsuggeststhepermeabilityofthe"membrane"thatdividesourstrategicanalyticconstructs.

TheEconomic-LegalRealm

Intheeconomic-legalsphere,theprimaryconcernsarecommercial.Giventheexplosivegrowthofinternationaltradeandfinance,especiallyincyberspace,ensuringthesafetyandsecurityofflowsofgoodsandtransactionsnecessarilyformsthefoundationforcooperation.Fromaneconomic-legalperspective,thiscooperationmaydependuponreachingagreementinseveralissueareas,beginningwithwhatmightbecalled"substantivelaw."Thisnotionbasicallycallsforagreementastowhatconstitutesa"crime,"includingfraud,forgery,hacking,andsabotage(or,aswehavecalledit,"cybotage").

Cooperationmayalsohingeuponacceptanceofabodyofadministrativeandlegalprocedurethatwouldestablishjurisdictionandallowenforcementofthesubstantivelawsdesignedtoprotectpropertyandotherassets,bothinandoutofcyberspace.Intheinformationrealm,agreementaboutsuchmattersasterritoriality,extradition,andthenotionof"hotpursuit"mayformaminimumbasisforinternationalcooperation.Thechallengewillbetoharmonizethesebasesforcooperationespeciallyintheareaofcyberspace-basedterritorialitywiththenoosphere.

Informationstrategywilllikelyplayakeyroleintransnationallawenforcement,sinceanyinformation-age"policingparadigm"wouldrelyheavilyuponregularflowsofinformationamonglawenforcementbodies.Althoughpoliceagenciesareindeedshowingsignsthattheyrecognizetheimportanceofnetworking,itmaybethatsomesortofclearinghousewillbeneededtofacilitatecooperation.Atapolicylevel,itmightevenbeusefultobuildontheInterpolmodel,addingtoitan"Infopol"specializingindealingwithcyberspace-basedcriminalactivities,tohelpoptimizethebenefitsofalreadyexistingpoliceinformationmanagementoperations.

Thecurrentmultilaterallawenforcementregime(e.g.,Interpol)isbuiltonsignificantinformationsharing,andagreatdealofcoordination,bothformally(instate-to-statetreatiesoragreements)andinformally(intermsofday-to-dayinteractionsofpolicingorganizations).Apolicingparadigmshouldalsoprovideagrassrootsbasisforbroadeningtheroleofinternationalcourtsoflawintheinformationaldomainakeyprincipleinbuildingaglobalnoosphere.Asdesirableasthisapproachseems,itwouldhavedifficultyindealing

withtheproblemofnoncompliancebyrecalcitrantstatesassertingtheirsovereignrights.Thus,thisframeworkwouldalsohavetoincludesignificantintelligencecapabilitiestoidentifyandcopewiththeproblemofnoncompliance.

Themostseriousaspectofnoncooperationwouldbethatjustafew"defectors"fromtheenvisionedinternationalregime,providing"havens"formalefactors,couldcompromiseoverallinformationsecurity,damagingtheglobaleconomyandweakeningnascentinternationallegalcooperation.Thisdifficultycouldariseifastatedecidedthatitsnationalinterestsoverrodecommitmentstosomeinternational"publicgood."Alternately,somenonstateactors(e.g.,transnationalcriminalorganizations,orTCOs)mighthavelittlereasontocooperatewithmultilateralagreements.Indeed,thesenonstateactorsmightprofitbydefyingthecooperativeregime;andtheymightthenattractsomestatestoalignwiththem,providing"piratenets"toprovidefortheirinformationinfrastructuralrequirements.

Also,somestatesmightbemotivatedtosupportdefianceofaninternationalcooperativeregimesimplybecausetheyfearthegrowthoftransnational,orpossiblysupranational,authorityorbecausetheyfeelthatthe"wiringoftheworld"mightsimplymaketherichnationsricher,wideningthegapbetweenthe"haves"and"have-nots."Thus,effortstoknittogetheraninformation-driveneconomic-legalregimemightengenderitsown"backlash,"whichmightalsoaffectthemilitary-securityrealm.Finally,evenamongstatesinclinedtocooperate,theremightbereluctancetoagreetoaregimeinwhich,say,encryptionaffordedagreatdegreeofprotectiontoelectroniccommerce,butonlyatthepriceofallowingsupranationalbodiesthatwouldactas''keyescrowagents."Theothersideofthisissueisthatmanystatesmightbalk,astheUnitedStateshas,atthenotionofprovidingunbreakableencryptiontoindividualsandcommercial

concerns,sincethiswouldrestrictthesurveillancecapabilities(andtherefore,thepower)ofthestate.IfU.S.policymakersaretobepersuadedtoencourageandnurturethedevelopmentofthenoosphere,thepotentialconstraintsthataglobalnoospherewouldimposeuponAmericanpowerwouldhavetobecarefullyanalyzedandweighedagainsttheoverallbenefits.

Concerningadvancedhardware,however,thereiseagerness,throughouttheworld,toseethediffusionofhigh-performancecom-

puters(HPCs).TheUnitedStateshasacontrollingpositionintheworldmarket;therefore,theeconomicgainsfromwidesalesofthesemachinesaresubstantial.However,HPCscanalsobeusedasacovertmeanstorefinenucleardevices,aswellastoaidinthedevelopmentofotherarms,includingstrategicinformationwarfareweaponry.Thus,thetensioninthiscasebetweenprospectsforcommercialgainandnewworriesaboutweaponsdiffusionwilllikelybemanagedonlybyaninformationstrategydesignedtomaintaintheequilibriumbetweencompetingeconomicandsecurityvalues.

Currently,officialU.S.policyleansheavilytowardopennessinlargepartbecauseofearlyassessmentsthatguardednesswasinfeasibleinthisarea,sincetheUnitedStatesisnotabletocontrolthediffusionofHPCtechnology(Goodman,Wolcott,andBurkhart,1995).Thisviewhasbeendisputed(Arquilla,1996),andtheGeneralAccountingOffice,afterconductingitsownstudyofthematter,hasrecentlyconcludedthatmore-guardedapproachesareindeedworkable.1Thekeypointfromthisexampleisthat,byadoptingastrategygroundedinguardedopenness,policymakersmightbecomehabituatedtoseekingout"blended"solutions,andbecomelesssusceptibletoassessmentsthatruleoutfromthestarteitheroftheseaspectsofinformationstrategy.

Military-SecurityAffairs

Amajordimensionofgrandstrategyandofinformationstrategyinparticularismilitary-securityissues.Internationalcooperationinprotectingandsecuringtheuseofcyberspaceandothermeansofcommunicatingvitalinformationwillbenecessaryfortransnationaldefense.Inthisrealm,itmaybenecessarytoarticulateanewvisioninwhicharobustvariantof"commondefense"willemergeasatopprioritytoenablebothcollectivesecurityandcoalitionwarfareinthefuture.Commondefense,intermsofinformationstrategy,refersto

thenotionthatallmembersofasecurityregimeoralliancemusthavesimilarlystrongremediesagainstthreatstotheirinformationinfrastructures.Becauseofthedeeplyinterconnectednatureofinformationsecurity,compromiseofonesectorcouldhaveseriousef-

1SeeJeffGerth,"U.S.AgencyFaultsStudyonExportsofComputers,"TheNewYorkTimes,September17,1998.

fectsuponthewholethechainisonlyasstrongasitsweakestlink.Thisimpliesless"slack"thansometimesexistedinColdWareracollectivesecurityregimes,whichoftenhadwidedisparitiesincapabilities,andinwhichdeterrenceanddefenserestedontheabilityofthestrongestpartner(s)todefendagainstaggression.Inthefuture,acompromiseininformationsecurityofevenasmallermemberofacoalitionmightcrippleeffortstodealwithanattacker.Therefore,informationsecuritymustbeseenofparamountimportancetomilitaryaffairs.

Specifically,commondefensewouldneedtobeabletocopewiththreetypesofthreats.First,thealliance'sinformationinfrastructurewouldhavetofeaturesufficientrobustnesstoensurethatdisruptiveactions,incyberspaceandout,couldnotseriouslycompromisethedeploymentorprojectionofmilitaryforcesinatimelymanner.Asecondrelated,andequallynettlesome,concernrelatestotheneedtoguardagainstcyberspaceandotherattacksthatmightbeusedinconjunctionwithasubversiveinsurgentorrevolutionarymovement,eitheraninternalorexternalone.Theriskinthiscasewouldbethatakeynodeinacommondefensenetworkmightbe"broughtdown"byactionsthatmightnoteverbeidentifiedasthoseofanexternalaggressor.

Finally,globalcooperationforinformationsecuritywouldalsohavetoaddresstheproblemofprotectionagainstlesser"pinprick"attacks(forexample,bycyberterrorists)onmembersoftheallianceorcoalition.Suchattacksmaybeaimedatwearingdownthewilltoengageinanintervention,ortocontinueanongoingfight,andrepresentsomethingofaninformation-agevariantofwhattheearlyairpowertheorists,Douhet(1942)andDeSeversky(1942),thoughtcouldbeachievedwiththeaerialbombardmentofciviliantargets.Thesimilaritybetweentheairpowertheoryandlesserattacksoncyberspaceinfrastructureliesinthevulnerabilityofacivilpopulation

toeitherair(includingmissile)orcyberspaceattacks,despitethefactthatitsarmedforceshavenotbeendefeatedinthefield.

Thisvisionofthecomplexmilitary-securitydimensionofinformationstrategymayfaceproblemsontwolevels.First,establishingatrue"commondefense"structurewouldrequirethesharingofagreatdealofsensitive,proprietaryinformationamongallianceandcoalitionmembers,andperhapsevenwithinformallyaligned

"friends."Inanerawhenalliesmaylaterbecomeenemies(e.g.,SyriaduringtheGulfCrisis,andsubsequently),theneedtodisseminateinformationcoupledwiththepossibilityofhavingonlyconditionallyloyalorinconstantalliesposeadilemma.And,ifthisconcernimpedesthedevelopmentofacollaborativesecurityregime,thennotsharingsensitivedatamaysparkaninformation"armsrace"acompetitiontodeveloptoolsforoffensiveinformationwarfareevenamongputativeallies.Thus,theremustbebothguardedness,toavoidunduesecurityrisks,butalsoenoughopennessandsharingofsensitiveinformationandtechnologiestoprovidedisincentivestootherstocommencesuchanarmsrace.Clearly,informationarmsraceswouldbeinimicaltothegoalofbuildingaglobalnoosphere.

Asecondconcernthatcouldcloudglobalcooperationinthemilitary-securityrealminvolvestheriseofnonstateactors.Itispossiblethatthenatureofcombatantswillblurinfuturewars,withmanyparticipantshavingprincipalallegiancestoethnic,religious,orrevolutionarymovementsratherthantonation-states.Thetendrilsoftheseorganizationswillreachinto,among,andbetweenstates,makingthesemalefactorshardtodeterordefendagainst.TCOsalsofallintothiscategory,withtheirpotentialtoengagein"strategiccrime"againstastate'spolitical,economic,andsocialinstitutions(e.g.,inColombiaand,toalesserdegree,inRussia).

TheSociopoliticalArena

Inthesociopoliticalsphere,unlikeinthepreviousrealms,theremaybeamuchmorerobust,globalharmonyofinterests.Indeed,itispossiblethat,withtheriseofaglobalcivilsociety,acooperativenoospheremightariseandbesustainedevenintheabsenceofstrongintergovernmentalparticipatoryregimes.Thisprospectcanbecharacterizedasanew"optimistichypothesis,"updatingLipset's(1960)ideaofprosperityfosteringtheadvanceofdemocracy.Inthis

newerformulation,interconnectivitywouldhaveademocratizinginfluenceonallsocieties.Thus,theidealfuturemaybeoneinwhichfreespeechisprotectedasapublicgoodandisdisseminatedwidelytoeverfreeraudiences.However,itisimportanttounderscorethepointthatthisisahypothesisonethatmightbeunderminedorfalsifiedbytheriseofantidemocraticinfluencesthattakeadvantage

ofinterconnectivitytosowseedsofrepressionanddistrustratherthanoftransnationalharmony.

Thinkingstrategicallyregardingtheprospectofdemocraticsocialevolutionviafreeflowsofinformationthroughaburgeoningnoosphere,wemustnotethatsuchflowscouldcreatepermissiveconditionsforthewagingofactivist"socialnetwars"designedtodisruptstatestabilityandcontrol.Ononehand,itispossibletoarguethatsuchdisruption,aimedatanauthoritarianstate,isultimatelybeneficial.Ontheotherhand,bothmoralandpracticaldilemmaswouldbeposedbythenear-termdisruptionoffriendly,evenifauthoritarian,states.Lastly,theethicalguidanceprovidedbyanoopolitikperspectiveonstatecraftshouldimpelstatestoaskwhethertoallowthemselvestobeusedassanctuariesforthosewhoattackotherstates.

BuildingGlobalCooperation

ThedevelopmentofAmericaninformationstrategy,especiallyinsupportofbuildingacooperativeglobalnoosphere,requiresthatthemajorpathsaheadbeidentified.Twostandout.Onepathconsistsofawidespreadgrassrootsefforttofostercooperationfromthebottomup.ThisapproachwouldrelyheavilyuponcontributionsfromandleadershipofNGOsandavarietyofothercivilsocietyactors;itwouldalsopresumeuponstatestorelaxtheirholdonsovereignty.Thesecondpathwouldtakeatop-downapproach,relyinguponeitherthehegemonicstabilityaffordedbyaleadingpower(e.g.,theUnitedStatesisseenbymanyasproviding,byvirtueofitsmatchlesspower,thebasisforaliberalinternationaleconomicorder),ortheprimacyofsuchinternationalgovernmentalorganizationsastheUnitedNationsandtheOrganizationforEconomicCooperation&Development.

Eachapproachwouldseektocreateanexpandingwebofcooperation.Wenotethatsimilarmethodsandgoalscanbeseeninearliereras.With

regardtotheriseofmarketeconomies,therewastheinterplayoftop-downandbottom-upforces,particularlyfromthebeginningoftheageofoceanicdiscoveryinthe16thcentury.Duringthisera,greattradingstatessoughttoexpandglobaltrade,oftenlinkingwithgrowingregionaltradingregimes.However,thiscreatedagreatdealoftensionasthegreatmaritimestatessoonsoughtto

bendthemarkettotheirparochialinterestsleadingtothehighlycompetitive,conflictualeraofmercantilism.Eventually,bottom-upmarketforceshelpedtooverturnmercantilisttendencies(seeSchumpeter,1954;vonMises,1957;North,1981;Rosecrance,1984).

Asimilarpatternexistedintherealmofpowerpolitics,beginningwiththeemergenceofthemoderninternationalsystemwhichalsostartedatthedawnofthe16thcentury.Duringthisperiod,greatempiresstrovetobringorderfromthetopdown.Atthesametime,localactorsoftencontrivedbottom-upbalancesofpowerthatcreatedsmall,butoftengrowing,spheresofpeaceandorder.TheItaliancity-statesofthisperiod,infact,servedastheinspirationforthemodernnotionofthebalanceofpower.However,asintheeconomiccase,thegreatpowersbecameimperialistinoutlook,causingsharpconflicts.Acenturies-longstrugglebetweentop-downeffortstoimposeorderandgrassrootsindependencemovementsensued,withtheempiresslowlylosingground,untilthelast,theSovietUnion,dissolvedin1991(Dehio,1961;Kennedy,1987).

Theseexamplesfromthepastsuggestthatinformationstrategywilllikelydevelopalongmultiplepaths.Theremaybeincentivestoachieveorderthroughatop-downprocess:(1)Americanprimacy;(2)centralinstitutions,suchastheWorldCourtandtheUnitedNations;or(3)alliancesofleadingstates,suchasNATO.Therewillalsobegrassrootseffortstobuildaglobalnoospherefromthebottomup,ledprincipallybynonstateactors,especiallyNGOs.And,justasthemarketeconomicsandpowerpoliticsofthepastfeaturedtensionsbetweenthetwoapproachestoestablishingorderandcooperation,therewilllikelybesimilarfrictionsintheinformationage.Forexample,encouragingabenevolentAmericanhegemonymaysparkresistance;theUnitedNationsmaybehamstrungbythelossofconsensusamongthosewithvetopower;andNATO'sexpandingwebofsecuritymayencourageunrulycounterbalancingresponses.Indeed,

themanyconstraintsontop-downapproachesleaveroomfornoosphere-buildingbynonstateparticularlyglobalcivilsocietyactors.

However,somestates,confrontedwiththischallengetotheircontroloftheinternationalsystem,mayactinconcerttotrytodelimittheinfluenceofNGOs.Whethersuchstatessucceedinsuppressingtheriseofthenoosphereorhavesufficientmotivationeventotry

seemsproblematic.Afarmoreproductiveapproachwouldbeforstatestorecognizethecomparativeadvantagesofworkingwith,ratherthanagainst,NGOs.Inthisinsightliethebeginningsofatruerevolutionindiplomaticaffairs.

Tocopewiththesesortsofproblems,askillfulblendingofthetop-downandbottom-upmethodsmayhelpinsidesteppingthepitfallsofconflictandthreat.SuchahybridstrategywouldlikelyfeatureuseofAmericanpolitical,economic,andmilitarycapabilitiestodeliberatelyempowernonstateactorsincludingbybringingthemintotheUnitedNations(TofflerandToffler,1997).Insomeways,thisstrategyisanalogoustotheColdWarerastrengtheningofwar-tornWesternEuropeandJapanagainstthecommunistthreatastheUnitedStatesuseditspowertobuildupothers,eventothepointofcreatingneweconomicgiantsthatcouldrivalitsownmarketpower.

Therearerisksinsuchastrategy.Avibrant,NGO-ledglobalcivilsocietymightonedayeffectivelycurtailtheexerciseofAmericanpowerinsomearenas.Yet,iffreeflowsofinformationdoindeedfosterdemocracyandopenmarkets,thebenefitsofsuchastrategyarelikelytoexceedtheliabilities.However,evenastheUnitedStatesleadsinthecreationofwhatsomein(andoutof)governmentarecallingan"informationcommonwealth"(e.g.,Cooper,1997),itmustalsoberememberedthattheemergingnormsofnoopolitikwillriseandtakeholdinaworldrifewiththeconflictsendemictorealpolitik.

InformationStrategyInCrisisandConflict

Inadditiontoaddressingtheusesofinformationstrategyinpeacetime,itisalsonecessarytoexaminethestrategicutilityofinformationincrisisandconflict.Withthisinmind,thissectionfocusesontwomajordimensionsofinformationstrategy:publicdiplomacyandstrategicinformationwarfare.Theformerconsists

primarilyoftheuseofthe"content"aspectofinformationtoinfluencebehaviorofanadversarywhetheramasspublic,aspecificleader,orboth(onthis,seeManheim,1994).Thelattercomprisestheeffortstostrikeatanenemy'sinformationconduits(frommilitarycommandandcontroltoindustrialandotherinfrastructures)byprincipallyelectronicmeans(Molander,Riddile,andWilson,1996).Also,wenotethatalthoughpublicdiplomacyismostusefulincrisis,itmayalsoproveeffectiveinwartime.Inaddition,strategicinformation

warfarestrikes,althoughclearlyintendedforuseinwartime,mightalsohavegreatpreemptiveeffectifusedduringacrisis.Forthosereasons,itistimenowtodevelopastrategicinformationdoctrinetohelpguideandgoverntheuseofpublicdiplomacyandinformationwarfareincrisisandconflict.

TheRoleofPublicDiplomacy

Intheareaofpublicdiplomacy,weconsiderseveralkeyissues.First,tohavetrulystrategic(i.e.,lasting)effect,initiativesinthisareashouldbebasedonthetruth.ThisisalreadyafundamentaltenetoftheAmericanpracticeofpsychologicaloperations,ascanbeseeninJointPublication3-53,DoctrineforPsychologicalOperations.Butitmustbenotedthatothershave,inthepast,foundgreatvalueintheuseoffalsehoodsseekingstrategicleveragethroughdeception.DuringtheColdWar,theSovietUnionadoptedthisapproachforpsychologicaloperations,whichwereofteneffectiveforlongperiodsoftime(seeRadvanyi,1990).Inourview,anapproachbasedonfalsehoodswillmorelikelyhaveonlyshort-term,ortacticaleffectsnotenduringstrategicones.Therefore,truthmustbethepolestarofAmericanstrategicpublicdiplomacy,andusesofinformationas"propaganda"shouldbeeschewed.

Theeffectiveuseofpublicdiplomacywilllikelyhingeupontheabilityofnation-statestoreachouttoandform"deepcoalitions"(termfromTofflerandToffler,1997)withNGOs.InthiswayU.S.publicdiplomacywouldbecomplementedbytheactionsofcountlesssupportersoperatingonbehalfofanemergingglobalcivilsocietysteepedinAmerican-orientedvalues:democracy,humanrights,andsocial,political,andeconomicliberalism.Akeydoctrinalquestionis,WhatshouldbedonewhenglobalcivilsocietydiffersinitsaimsfromwhatarethoughttobekeyAmericaninterests?Theanswertothisquestionistwo-part.

First,U.S.informationstrategycoulddeterminewhethercivilsocietyactorsaredividedorlargelyunitedintheirviews.Ifdivided,thentheclearstrategyistoreachouttothosemostcongenialtotheAmericanpositionandtoallywiththemtohelpshapetheworldperceptualenvironment.Second,iftherewerewidespreadoppositiontoanAmericanpolicyposition,theremaybeaneedtoreconsiderthepolicyitself.Thegoalwouldbetoamenditsoastobringpolicy

moreintolinewiththepreferencesofcivilsociety.Failuretodosowouldgreatlyhampertheabilitytocontinueusingpublicdiplomacyinthegivenissuearea.

AnexampleofthissortofproblemistheU.S.policyinresponsetotheglobalcivilsocietyefforttobanlandmines.U.S.leaders,keenlyawareofthebroadinternationalconsensusontheban,andtheunanimityamongtheNGOs,strovetosoftentheAmericanpositionbyseekingaphaseoutovera10-yearperiod,withanexceptionmadefortheKoreanpeninsula.ThesemarginaladjustmentstoU.S.policyhadlittleeffectontheactivitiesofthemovementtobanlandmineswhichhaveledtothesigningofamultilateraltreatybyover100countries.TheUnitedStateshasrefusedtosignit,mainlyformilitaryreasons.Yet,iftheUnitedStatesweretoreconsideritspositiononthisissueitcouldfocusonrethinkingthemilitary'srelianceonlandmines,eitherintheformofshiftingtonewmaneuverdoctrinesthathavelittleutilityforlandminesorintheformofdevelopingmobileminesthatwillmovealongwithgroundtroops.Eithersolutionwouldresolvetheissue,andbothmayleadtobettermilitarydoctrines.

Thekeypointisthatwhenfacedwithseriousandsustainedoppositionfromglobalcivilsociety(andbymanynation-statesalso)toaparticularpolicy,Americawillnotfindthatpublicdiplomacyalonewillprevailinthearenaofinternationaldiscourse.Itwillbenecessary,incaseslikethese,toreconsiderthepolicyinquestionverycarefullyandtolettheworldknowthatreassessmentisunderway.

StrategicInformationDoctrine(SID)

Fromthe1997reportofthePresident'sCommissiononCriticalInfrastructureProtectionandtheemergingspateofgovernment,military,andacademicstudies,itseemsclearthatmostanalystsaccepttheargumentthatstrategicinformationwarfare(SIW)electronicattack

againstcommunications,transport,andotherkeynodeshasemergedasathreattoU.S.nationalsecurity.Whilethereissomeconcernaboutthreatsfromothernations,thebasicAmericanviewisthatthistypeofwar,orcyberterror,willbecommonlywieldedbynonstateadversaries.Abroad,wealsoseethatthereisinternationalconsensusaboutthisthreattoforeignassetsaswellhowever,foreign(especiallyRussianandChinese)viewsofSIWgenerallysee

theUnitedStatesastheseriousthreat(Thomas,1997;ArquillaandKarmel,1997).

Againstthisbackdrop,incentivesaregrowingfortheUnitedStatestomovetowardthedevelopmentofa"wartime"strategicinformationdoctrine(SID)tocomplementitspeacetimeapproachestoperceptionmanagementandpublicdiplomacy.Todate,strategicthinkinginthisissueareaisredolentwithnuclear-eraconcepts.Withregardtodefense,ithasbeenarguedbythePresident'sCommissiononCriticalInfrastructureProtectionandothers(e.g.,seeMolander,Riddile,andWilson,1996)thata"minimumessentialinformationinfrastructure"(MEII)becreated.Thisnotionhasclearrootsinthenuclear-eraminimumessentialemergencycommunicationnetwork(MEECN).Ontheoffensiveside,SIWisseenasconsistingofstrikesthataimatcountervalueorcounterforcetargetseitherinmassiveorproportionateretaliatoryfashion.

Thenuclearanalogywilllikelyprovetobeaninsufficientbasisfordevelopingaclearstrategicframeworkforwaginginformationwarfare.ThedifferencesbetweennuclearwarandSIWaretoogreat,beginningwiththeoverwhelmingdestructivepowerofnuclearweapons,whoseverylethalityhasmadedeterrencestrongforover50years.Bycomparison,SIWisbasicallydisruptiveratherthandestructive.Furthermore,thenuclear"club"remainssmallandisstillcomposedofstatesonly,whileSIWdoesnotrequirethewherewithalofastate.Moreover,itisextremelyunlikelythatanuclearattackcouldbeundertakenanonymously,ordeniably.SIWischaracterizedbytheinherenteasewithwhichperpetratorsmaymaintaintheiranonymity.

Afinaldifferencebetweenthetwoisthateventoday,overhalfacenturyintothenuclearage,defensesremainminimalandproblematic(partlyaresultofpoliticaldecisionsnottodeveloprobust

defensesduringtheColdWar).2Intheareaofinformationsecurity,however,goodalthoughcertainlynotleakproofdefenseshavebeenidentifiablefromtheoutset.Astothecurrentstateofdefensesoftheinformationinfrastructure,WillisWarehasputitsuccinctly,"Thereisnoevidencethat'theskyisfalling'"(1998,p.vii).

2Thispointishighlightedbytherecent(May1998)failuresinfieldexperimentsheldtotesttheefficacyofatheaterhigh-altitudeareadefense(THAAD).

InthecaseofSIW,theefforttolookahead,doctrinally,isnotlikelytobewellrewardedbylookingbacktothenuclearparadigmsaveperhapsfortheexceptionprovidedbythenuclear''nofirstuse"concept,asdiscussedbelow.Instead,theremustbefreshtheorizingaboutthenatureandscopeofSIW,whichmustthenberelatedtoAmericannationalsecurityneeds.Whataretheseneeds?Onthedefensive,orguardedside,theUnitedStatesmustdeveloparobustinformationsecurityregimethatprotectsboththeabilitytoprojectmilitaryforceabroadandthekeynodesthatsustaintheAmericanwayoflifeathome.

TheMEII,asoriginallyconceptualized,isnotlikelytoachieveasecureinfosphereforeitheroftheseneeds.TheMEIIallowsmuchoftheUnitedStatestoremainwideopentodisruption;italsomissesthepointthatpresentmilitaryrelianceuponciviliancommunicationsmeansthataninsecureciviliansectorimperilsAmericanmilitarycapabilities.However,broaduseofstrongencryptionwillsubstantiallyimprovethedefensesofboththecivilianandmilitarysectorsfromthethreatposedbySIW.3Animportantrecentdevelopmenthasbeentheefforttorethinktheverynotionsofwhatconstitutesa"minimum"informationinfrastructure,andwhatindeedis"essential."Thislineofdiscussionholdsoutthepromisethatitwillbepossibletocreatelayersofinformationsecuritythatvaryacrossthoseareaswherethereiseitherasubstantialorapoorabilitytocontrolaccessanduse(Andersonetal.,forthcoming).

Onthemoreproactiveside,theUnitedStatesshoulddevelopaSIDthateschewsfirstuseofinformationattacksonothers.Inthisregard,SIWfeaturesmanyofthemoraldilemmasthatwerepartoftheemergenceofstrategicairpower(e.g.,seeArquilla,forthcoming).

Generallyspeaking,anethicalimperativetoavoidfirstuseofSIWcouldactuallyhavepracticalbenefits.Thisisthecasebecausethe

UnitedStateshasthelargestsetofinformationtargetsintheworldandwillcontinuetodosofortheforeseeablefuture.Inthisregard,

3Itmustberecognizedthatthepriceofdiffusingstrongencryptionthroughoutcyberspacewilldecreasegovernmentabilitytogainaccesstoprivatecommunications.FBIdirectorLouisFreehhasbeenthemostarticulateopponentofwidespreaddiffusionofstrongencryptiontools,citingthelimitingeffectitwouldhaveoncriminalinvestigations.However,examinationofallfederalprosecutionsin1996indicatesthatlessthanoneone-hundredthofapercentofthesecasesemployedcybertaps.

anAmericaninformationstrategyaimedatmountingnormativeprohibitionsontheuseofSIWcouldformapowerfulstepinthedirectionoffosteringnoopolitik.But,asdesirableasthismightbe,aconventiononnofirstuse(oneofthefewnuclear-ageconceptsthatdoeshaveinformation-agerelevance)wouldalsohindertheUnitedStatesfromusingSIWasapreemptivetoolinacrisisorconflictsituation.

ThesolutiontothismoraldilemmamaylieinthemedievalThomist"just-war"formulationabouttheneedtobalancethebenefitsofanactagainsttheharmdone.Seeninthislight,theUnitedStatesmightthenintroducedoctrinalnuances,suchasreservingtherighttouseinformationattackfirstonlyiftheadversaryhasalreadybeguntouseotherformsofforceandiftheinitiatorofSIWhastheclearintenttoengageininformationoperationsasameanstoforeshortenmilitaryoperations.

Insum,astrategicinformationdoctrineforcrisisandconflictshouldbebuiltaroundtwodoctrines.First,todefendandprotectagainstinformationattacks,emphasisshouldbeplacedonaregimewherethemostadvancedencryptionisdisseminatedwidely.Second,regardingoffensiveSIW,doctrinemustbedrivenbytheconstraintsofanethicalnoopolitikwiththebenefitthatplacingconstraintsonfirstusewilllikelyhavepracticalpositiveeffects.Thesearekeystrategicissuesforinformationdoctrineincrisisandwarthatcanandshouldformthecoreofthinkingaboutdefenseagainst,aswellasuseof,SIW.

ChapterFiveMovingAheadThisreporthasarguedforthedevelopmentofanAmericaninformationstrategybasedonnoopolitik.Theinformationrevolutionhasalreadydeepenedanddiffusedtosuchadegreethatotheractorsbothstateandnonstatehavebeguntoincorporateinformationalelementsintotheirownstrategies.ThespreadoftheinformationrevolutionbeyondtheUnitedStatesforeshadowsanerainwhichmanyactorswillbecompetingoverwhohasan"informationedge"(NyeandOwens,1996),aswellasoverwhois"boundtolead"theinternationalsystem(Nye,1990).ThereisnoassurancethattheUnitedStateswillnecessarilyassumeorsustainsucharole.DespiteallofAmerica'sadvancesinthetechnologicalrealm,onlystrategiesappliedwiselywillenabletheirpotentialtoberealized.Thus,whethertheUnitedStateswantstoornot,itmustthinkstrategicallyabouttheroleofinformationinstatecraft.

ANewTurnofMind

Thekeytomakinginformationstrategyaworkable,distincttoolofstatecraftliesinlearningtobenefitfromtheemergenceofaglobalnoosphere.Withoutanunbounded,global"realmofthemind,"itwillbedifficulttoproject"informationpower"tothedistantlocalesandintothemanysituationswhereitislikelytoproveuseful.Justwhatbuildingaglobalnoospheremeansisnotyetclear.But,inourview,itconsistslessofexpandingcyberspaceandtheinfosphere,andmuchmoreofbuildingnewinstitutionalandorganizationallinks.ThesemighttaketheformofincreasingjuridicalrecognitionofNGOs(perhapseventothepointofgivingthemseatsinthe

UnitedNations,astheTofflershavesuggested).Italsolikelymeansthattraditionalapproachestodiplomacymayhavetobeupended,tobereplacedbyarevolutionindiplomaticaffairs.1

ThebestpossibilitiesforU.S.informationstrategygravitatetowardfosteringopenness.Butwhatofguardedness?WhilewenotedinChapterFoursomeoftheareasinwhichguardednessisapreferredpolicy(e.g.,protectionofintellectualpropertyandsharingsensitivedatawithsemi-trustedallies),itisimportanttorealizethatguardednesscancoexistwithopenness.Thus,theUnitedStatesmaybequiteopenwithsemi-trustedallies,eventhoughtherewillbesometypesofverysensitiveinformationthatoughtnottobesharedwiththem.Finally,whilesomethingwilloftenbeheldback,ininformationstrategytheoverallbalancebetweenbeingopenandbeingguardedismorelikelytobeweightedinfavorofopenness.

Inaddition,asymbioticrelationshipexistsbetweeninformationstrategyandtheothertoolsofstatecraft.Itseemsclearthatinformationstrategycanimprovemilitaryperformance,increaseeconomicefficiency(whetherviamarketsorsanctions),andaiddiplomaticprocesses.Whatarelesscleararetheeffectsthatpolitical,economic,andmilitaryinitiativesmighthaveoninformationstrategy.Forexample,aparticularpolicyaimedatencouragingtheliberalizationofanauthoritariansociety,bymeansofincreasingitsinterconnectivity,mightactuallybeunderminedifthatsamesocietyweresufferingundereconomicsanctionsdesignedtocloseitofffromtherestoftheworld.Thesamesortofreservationsmightbeapplicabletothecaseofusingmilitarydemonstrationsorshowsofforcetotrytocoerceadesiredresponse.Undersuchcircumstances,itwouldbeharderforaninformationstrategytobeoptimized.

Thepossibilitythattraditionalpolitical,economic,andmilitarymeansmayactuallyvitiateinformationstrategiessuggeststheneedtothink

throughtheproblemsinquestionpriortoselectingwhichtoolsofstatecrafttoemploy.Ifthesituationseemstocallintuitivelyformilitaryinvolvement,oreconomicsuasion,thetendencytoseekoutcounterintuitivesolutions(i.e.,theuseofinformationasanalternativetotheuseofforce)willbediminished.Thisisrelatedtothe

1ForelaborationofwhatwemeanbyanRDA,seeArquillaandRonfeldt(1997,Ch.19,and1998b).

phenomenonthatHerbertSimon(1982)called"satisficing"searchingoutalternativesforalimitedtime,thensettlingonthefirstacceptableoption.Unlessdecisionmakershabituatethemselvestothinkingaboutthepossibilityofusinginformationfirst,inlieuofsanctionsormilitaryaction,itwillbealltooeasyto"satisfice"bysettlingonold,familiarpolicyoptions.

Wearenotarguingthatpolitical,economic,andmilitarypowerarepassé.Rather,wearesuggestingthatdecisionmakersbeencouragedtodevelopanewturnofmindonemoreopentothinkingaboutinformationstrategyearlier,andmoreoften.Otherwise,theoldertoolsofstatecraftmaybeundulyreliedupon,andpossiblyemployedinappropriatelyorineffectively.Theaddedbenefitoffirstemployinginformationstrategyisthatitwillrarelyimpedelateruseofotherpolitical,economic,ormilitarymeasures.Butfirstusingarmiesoreconomicsanctionsmaymakeitimpossibletouseinformationstrategylatertoreacheithertheleadersormasspublicsoftheotherpartyinsomeinternationalnegotiationordispute.

Ultimately,informationstrategywillbecomeanattractivechoiceforthedecisionmakeronlyafterithasbeencultivatedanddevelopedsufficiently.Thechallengeistobeginflexingthisnew,sensorymusculatureofstatecraftthatholdssomuchpromise.Inthisregard,wehavementionedthattherearetwofundamentalapproachestoinformationstrategy.Thefirstrecognizesthecontinuingimportanceofthetraditionalpolitical,economic,andmilitarydimensionsofgrandstrategy,andseekstoemployinformationincomplementaryways,asanadjunctofeachofthetraditionaldimensionsasinthecaseofusingadvancedinformationtechnologiesandnetwork-centricorganizationaldesignstoenhancemilitaryeffectiveness.Thesecondapproachproposesthatinformationisitselfintheprocessofbecomingitsowndistinctdimensionofgrandstrategye.g.,itiscapableofbeingemployedinlieuoffieldarmiesoreconomic

sanctions.Gettingbothapproachesrightintheirowntimesandmakinganeffectivetransitionfromthefirsttothesecondovertimearemajorchallengesthatlieahead.

U.S.HegemonyRequiredtoConsolidatetheNoosphere?

TheinformationrevolutionisfullofparadoxesandambivalenciesfortheUnitedStates.Itenhancesourcountry'scapabilitiestodealwithothers,butitalsoamplifiesourvulnerabilitiestheAmericaninfospherepresentstherichesttargetsetofall.ItbenefitsourworldwidetechnologicaledgeandideationalappealandthusmakesotherslooktotheUnitedStatesforleadershipbuttheprospectofU.S.hegemonyand"informationimperialism"mayalsoarousefearandconcern.Whenconflictoccurs,itmakesusbetterabletoorganizeandmanagesecuritycoalitionsinwhichwecansharesensitiveinformationforcommonsecuritybutthisalsoraisestherisksofmisuseandmisconductbysemi-trustedfriendsorallies.HowareAmericanstoworktheirwaythroughtheseparadoxesandambivalencies?

Wherebalance-of-powerdynamicspersistandprevail,sowillrealpolitikandneitheraglobalnoospherenornoopolitikwillspreadsufficientlytoguidethecourseofworldpolitics.Americansthusfaceachoice:whethertopersistintheexerciseofclassicpowerpolitics,asleadingpowersnormallydo,ortoembraceandhastentheriseofanewparadigm.NoopolitikwillnotbereadilyadoptedamongstatesiftheUnitedStates,astheworld'sleadingpower,stressespowerbalancinggamesaboveallelse(orifittriestowithdrawfromthesegamesentirely).Tothecontrary,heavy,thoughinsomerespectsredirected,U.S.engagement,maybeessentialfornoopolitiktospread.Inourview,Americastandstobenefitfromtheriseofthenoosphereandnoopolitikandshouldbegintoworktoshapeit.

Itmaytakesomeexerciseofhegemonicpowertofosterthedevelopmentofaglobalnoosphere.Muchasclassictheoriesoftradeopennessdependonabenignhegemontokeepmarketsopenandprovide"publicgoods"(likefreedomoftheseas),so,too,noopolitik

mayneeda"hegemonicstabilitytheory"ofitsownespeciallyiftheriseofnoopolitiknecessitatesapermanentdisturbanceofthebalanceofpowerthatproponentsofrealpolitikssocloselyguardandrelish.2Inparticular,abenevolenthegemonmaybeneededsothat

2Itshouldbenotedthatabodyofthoughtholdsthateffortstoachievehegemonycausetheirowncyclesofconflictanddestruction(Gilpin,1981;Goldstein,1988;and


NGOs,individualactivists,andothers,havethespacetobuildthenetworkedfabricofaglobalcivilsocietyandanoosphere.

Butistherenotultimatelysomecontradictionbetweentheconsolidationofaglobalnoosphereandthepersistenceofthehegemonwhoworkstoimplantit?Onceitscatalytic/midwiferoleshavebeencompleted,doesthehegemonjust"witheraway"?Shouldn'tit?Oriscontinuedhegemonyneededtosustainandsafeguardthenoosphere?Justhowrobustwillanoospherebeonitsown?Andifitisbutanartifactofsomekindofhegemony,doesthismeanthatnoopolitikdependsonacontinuanceofrealpolitikatitsbase?Because,afterall,thehegemon,bydefinition,isthemostoverarchinglypowerfulstate.Thesequestionsandissuesbearfutureinquiry.

CouldtheUnitedStatesserveinthishegemoniccapacitytogoodeffect?Ifso,weshouldceaselettingthethreatofa"digitalPearlHarbor"beamainmetaphorforourstrategicthinkingandshifttoanequallyclassic,butpositive,metaphoralongthelinesofa"ManifestDestiny"fortheinformationage.


Modelski,1987).Alloffercritiquesofanyformofhegemony,althoughModelskiconsidersthathegemonymightbeagoodthing.

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The emergence of noopolitik: toward an American information strategy

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