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The Effects of Nuclear War

May 1979

NTIS order #PB-296946

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 79-600080

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D C, 20402

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Foreword

This assessment was made in response to a request from the SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations to examine the effects of nuclear war on thepopulations and economies of the United States and the Soviet Union. It isintended, in the terms of the Committee’s request, to “put what have beenabstract measures of strategic power into more comprehensible terms. ”

The study examines the full range of effects that nuclear war wouldhave on civilians: direct effects from blast and radiation; and indirect effectsf rom economic , social , and pol i t icai disrupt ion. Part icular at tent ion isdevoted to the ways in which the impact of a nuclear war would extend overtime. Two of the study’s principal findings are that conditions would con-tinue to get worse for some time after a nuclear war ended, and that the ef-fects of nuclear war that cannot be calculated in advance are at least as im-portant as those which analysts attempt to quantify.

This report provides essential background for a range of issues relatingto strategic weapons and foreign policy. It translates what is generally knownabout the effects of nuclear weapons into the best available estimates aboutthe impact on society if such weapons were used. It calls attention to thevery wide range of impacts that nuclear weapons would have on a complexindustrial society, and to the extent of uncertainty regarding these impacts.

Several years ago, OTA convened a panel of distinguished scientists toexamine the effects of a limited nuclear war. The report and testimony ofthat panel, which were published by the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-tee, remain valid. That panel recommended that a more thorough and com-prehensive study of the effects of nuclear war be undertaken. This study issuch an effort.

The Director of this assessment was Dr. Peter Sharfman, Group Managerfor Nat ional Securi ty Studies. OTA is grateful for the assistance of i tsNuclear War Effects Advisory Panel, chaired by Dr. David S. Saxon, Presidentof the University of California, and for the assistance of the CongressionalResearch Service, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disar-mament Agency, and the Central Intel Intelligence Agency. 1 t shouId be under-stood, however, that OTA assumes full responsibility for this report and thatit does not necessarily represent the views of any of these agencies or of theindividual members of the Advisory Panel.

DANIEL DE SIMONEActing Director

Nuclear War Effects Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant DirectorEnergy, Materials, and Global Security Division

Peter Sharfman, National Security Group Manager and Project Director

Jonathan Medalia (on detail from Congressional/ Research Service)

Robert W. Vining (under contract with Systems Science and Software)

Kevin Lewis

Gloria Proctor

Supplemental OTA Staff

Henry Kelly Marvin Ott

Consultants

Advanced Research and Applications CorporationAnalytical Assessments CorporationGeneral Research CorporationSanta Fe CorporationSystems Science and Software

Stuart GoldmanNan RandallGeorge R. RodericksRonald Stivers

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing OfficerKathie S. Boss Joanne Heming

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Nuclear War Effects Project Advisory Panel

David S. Saxon, ChairmanPresident, University of California

Donald G. BrennanDirector of National Securit y StudiesHudson Institute Inc.

Charles CooperDepartment of BiologySan Diego State University

Russell E. DoughertyGeneral, USAF(retired)

Sidney DrellDeputy Director, Stanford linear

Accelerator CenterStanford University

Richard GarwinIBM FellowIBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Gene R. La RocqueRear Admiral, USN [retired)Director, Center for Defense /formation

Cecil LeithDirector, Atmospheric Analysis

and Prediction DivisionNational Center for Atmospheric

Research

J, David LinebaughWashington, D.C.

J. Carson MarkLos Alamos Scientific Laboratory

James V. NeelChairman, Department of Human

GeneticsUniversity of Michigan Medical SchoolUniversity of Michigan

Jack RuinaMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Harriet ScottMcLean, Va.

Huston SmithSyracuse University

John SteinbrunerDirector of Foreign Policy StudiesBrookings Institution

Jeremy StoneDirector, Federation of American

Scientists

Hilary WhitakerDirector, Emergency Preparedness ProjectNational Governors Association

The Advisory Panel provided advice and constructive criticism throughout this project. The paneldoes not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full respon-sibility y for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

Contents

Chapter Page

1. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Il. A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial onthe Effects of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Ill. Civil Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

IV. Three Attack Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

V. Other Long-Term Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Appendixes:A. Letter From Senate Foreign Relations Committee Requesting the Study... 119B. Strategic Forces Assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122C. Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124D. Summary of Contractor Report on Executive Branch Studies . . . . . . . . . . . 139

E. Suggestions for Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146F, Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Volume ll—Working Papers:

1. Examination of the Direct Effects of Nuciear War (CRC Carp).*2. Small Attacks on U.S. and Soviet Energy Production and Distribution Systems

(Santa Fe Corp).3. Long-Term Health Effects From Nuclear Attack Radiation Exposures (Aracor)4. The Effects of Nuclear War Economic Damage (Analytical Assessment Corp.)*

NOTE: A Iimited number of copies of the working papers will be available for congressiorral usefrom OTA by the end of June 1979 Others can obtain the working papers from the National TechnicalInformation Service about the beginning of August 1979

* Indicat es that a classified version is also available to qualified requesters

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Chapter

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Page

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Uncertainties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 10

TABLES

Page

l. Summary of Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52. Summary of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Chapter I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Office of Tech-nology Assessment has undertaken to describe the effects of a nuclear war on the ci-vilian populations, economies, and societies of the United States and the SovietUnion.

Nuclear war is not a comfortable subject. Throughout all the variations, possibil-ities, and uncertainties that this study describes, one theme is constant—a nuclearwar would be a catastrophe. A militarily plausible nuclear attack, even “limited, ”could be expected to kill people and to inflict economic damage on a scale unprece-tiented in American experience; a large-scale nuclear exchange would be a calamityunprecedented in human history. The mind recoils from the effort to foresee thedetails of such a calamity, and from the careful explanation of the unavoidable uncer-tainties as to whether people would die from blast damage, from fallout radiation, orfrom starvation during the following winter. But the fact remains that nuclear war ispossible, and the possibility of nuclear war has formed part of the foundation of inter-national politics, and of U.S. policy, ever since nuclear weapons were used in 1945.

The premise of this study is that those who deal with the large issues of worldpolitics should understand what is known, and perhaps more importantly what is notknown, about the likely consequences if efforts to deter and avoid nuclear war shouldfail. Those who deal with policy issues regarding nuclear weapons should know whatsuch weapons can do, and the extent of the uncertainties about what such weaponsmight do.

FINDINGS

1 The effects of a nuclear war that cannot becalculated are at least as important as those forwhich calculations are attempted. Moreover,even these Iimited calculations are subject tovery large uncertainties

Conservative military planners tend to basetheir calculations on factors that can be eithercontrol led or predicted, and to make pessimis-tic assumptions where control or predictionare impossible. For example, planning for stra-tegic nuclear warfare looks at the extent towhich civilian targets will be destroyed byblast, and discounts the additional damagewhich may be caused by fires that the blastcould ignite. This is not because fires areunlikely to cause damage, but because the ex-tent of fire damage depends on factors such asweather and details is of building construction

that make it much more difficult to predictthan blast damage. While it is proper for a mili-tary plan to provide for the destruction of keytargets by the surest means even in unfavor-able circumstances, the nonmiIitary observershould remember that actual damage is likelyto be greater than that reflected in the militarycalculations. This is particularly true for in-direct effects such as deaths resulting from in-juries and the unavailability of medical care,or for economic damage resuIting from disrup-tion and disorganization rather than fromdirect destruction.

For more than a decade, the declared policyof the United States has given prominence to aconcept of “assured destruction:” the capabil-ities of U.S. nuclear weapons have been de-scribed in terms of the level of damage they

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4 ● The Effects of /Vuc/ear War

can surely inflict even in the most unfavorablecircumstances. It should be understood that inthe event of an actual nuclear war, the destruc-tion resulting from an all-out nuclear attackwould probably be far greater. In addition tothe tens of millions of deaths during the daysand weeks after the attack, there would prob-ably be further millions (perhaps further tensof millions) of deaths in the ensuing months oryears. In addition to the enormous economicdestruction caused by the actual nuclear ex-plosions, there would be some years duringwhich the residual economy wouId decline fur-ther, as stocks were consumed and machineswore out faster than recovered productioncould replace them. Nobody knows how toestimate the likelihood that industrial civiliza-tion might collapse in the areas attacked; addi-tionally, the possibility of significant long-termecological damage cannot be excluded.

2. The impact of even a “small” or “limited” nu-clear attack would be enormous. Although pre-dictions of the effects of such an attack aresubject to the same uncertainties as predic-tions of the effects of an all-out attack, thepossibilities can be bounded. OTA examinedthe impact of a small attack on economic tar-gets (an attack on oil refineries limited to 10missiles), and found that while economic re-covery would be possible, the economic dam-age and social dislocation could be immense.A review of calculations of the effects on civil-ian populations and economies of major coun-terforce attacks found that while the consequences might be endurable (since they wouldbe on a scale with wars and epidemics that na-tions have endured in the past), the number ofdeaths might be as high as 20 million. More-over, the uncertainties are such that no govern-ment could predict with any confidence whatthe results of a Iimited attack or counterattackwould be even if there was no further esca-lation.

3. It is therefore reasonable to suppose thatthe extreme uncertainties about the effects of anuclear attack, as well as the certainty that theminimum consequences would be enormous,both play a role in the deterrent effect of nuclearweapons.

4. There are major differences between theUnited States and the Soviet Union that affect thenature of their vulnerability to nuclear attacks,despite the fact that both are large and diversifiedindustrial countries. Differences between thetwo countries in terms of population distribu-tion, closeness of population to other targets,vulnerability of agricultural systems, vulner-ability of cities to fire, socioeconomic system,and political system create significant asym-metries in the potential effects of nuclear at-tacks. Differences in civil defense preparationsand in the structure of the strategic arsenalscompound these asymmetries. By and large,the Soviet Union is favored by geography andby a political/economic structure geared toemergencies; the United States is favored byhaving a bigger and better economy and (per-haps) a greater capacity for effective decen-tralization. The larger size of Soviet weaponsalso means that they are likely to kill morepeople while aiming at something else.

5. Although it is true that effective shelteringand/or evacuation could save lives, it is not clearthat a civil defense program based on providingshelters or planning evacuation would necessari-ly be effective. To save Iives, it is not onlynecessary to provide shelter in, or evacuationto, the right place (and only extreme measuresof dispersion would overcome the problemthat the location of safe places cannot be reli-ably predicted), it is also necessary to providefood, water, medical supplies, sanitation, secu-rity against other people, possibly filtered air,etc. After fallout diminishes, there must beenough supplies and enough organization tokeep people alive while production is being re-stored. The effectiveness of civil defensemeasures depends, among other things, on theevents leading up to the attack, the enemy’stargeting policy, and sheer luck.

6. The situation in which the survivors of anuclear attack find themselves will be quite un-precedented. The surviving nation would be farweaker—economically, socially, and politi-cally— than one would calculate by adding upthe surviving economic assets and the numbersand skills of the surviving people. Natural re-sources would be destroyed; surviving equip-

Ch. 1—ExecutNe Summary ● 5

ment would be designed to use materials andskills that might no longer exist; and indeedsome regions might be almost uninhabitable.Furthermore, prewar patterns of behaviorwould surely change, though in unpredictableways. Finally, the entire society would sufferfrom the enormous psychological shock ofhaving discovered the extent of its vulnerabili-ty.

7. From an economic point of view, andpossibly from a political and social viewpoint aswell, conditions after an attack would get worse

before they started to get better. For a period oftime, people could live off supplies (and, in asense, off habits) left over from before the war.But shortages and uncertainties would getworse. The survivors wouId find themselves ina race to achieve viability (i. e., production atleast equaling consumption plus depreciation)before stocks ran out completely. A failure toachieve viability, or even a slow recovery,would result in many additional deaths, andmuch additional economic, political, andsocial deterioration. This postwar damagecould be as devastating as the damage fromthe actual nuclear explosions.

APPROACH

The scope of this study is both broader andnarrower than that of most other studies onthis subject. It is broader in three respects:

1. it examines a full range of possible nuclear attacks, with attacking forces rangingin extent from a single weapon to the bulkof a superpower’s arsenal;

2. it deals explicitly with both Soviet attackson the United States and U.S. attacks onthe Soviet Union; and

3. it addresses the multiple effects of nucle-ar war, indirect as well as direct, long termas well as short term, and social and eco-nomic as well as physical.

Those effects that cannot be satisfactorily cal-culated or estimated are described qualita-tively. But this report’s scope is narrower thanmost defense analyses because it avoids anyconsideration of military effects; although ithypothesizes (among other things) missile at-tacks against military targets, only the “col-lateral” damage such attacks would inflict onthe civilian society are examined.

The approach used was to look at a series ofattack “cases,” (table 1) and to describe thevarious effects and overall impact each ofthem might produce. By analyzing the impactof the same attack case for both a U.S. attackon the Soviet Union and a Soviet attack on theUnited States, the report examines the signifi-

cance of the different kinds of vulnerabilitiesof the two countries, and offers some insightsabout the consequences of the differences be-tween the two countries’ nuclear weaponarsenals. The cases were chosen primarily toinvestigate the effects of variations in attacksize and in the kinds of targets attacked. It isbelieved that the analysis is “realistic,” in thesense that the hypothetical attacks are possi-ble ones. Patterns of nuclear explosions wereexamined that are not very different fromthose that, OTA believes, the existing nuclearforces would produce if the military wereordered to make attacks of the specified sizeon the specified targets.

Case 1: In order to provide a kind of tutorialon what happens when nuclear weapons are

Table 1. –Summary of Cases

Case Description

1 Attack on single city: Detroit and Leningrad; 1 weapon.(pp. 27-44) or 10 small weapons.

2 Attack on oil refineries, limited to 10 missiles.(pp. 64-80)

3 Counterforce attack; includes attack only on ICBM silos(pp. 81-94) as a variant.

4 Attack on range of military and economic targets using(pp. 94-106) large fraction of existing arsenal.

For each case the first section describes a soviet attack on the United States and the followingsection a U S attack on the Soviet Union

(3 . The Effects of Nuc/ear war

detonated, the study describes the effects ofthe explosion of a single weapon. Then it ex-amines the effects of such an explosion over asingle U.S. city (Detroit) and single Soviet city(Leningrad) of comparable size. The base casewas the detonation of a l-megaton weapon (1M t = energy released by one million tons ofTNT), since both the United States and theSoviet Union have weapons of roughly this sizein their arsenals. Then, in order to look at theways in which the specific effects and overallimpact wouId vary if other weapons that mightbe available were used, the effects of a 25-Mtweapon over Detroit, the effects of a 9-Mtweapon over Leningrad, and the effects of 10weapons of 40 kilotons (kt) each over Lenin-grad are described. An attempt was made todescribe as well the effects of a small weaponin a large city (such as a terrorist group mightset off) but was unsuccessful because the ef-fects of such a weapon in a metropolitan set-ting cannot be inferred from the existing bodyof knowledge regarding military weapons. Thisis explained in the body of the report.

The casualties from such attacks couldrange from 220,000 dead and 420,000 injuredto 2,500,000 dead and 1,100,000 injured (manyof the injured would wind up as fatalities),depending on the details of the attack and theassumptions made regarding conditions. Thediscussion in chapter I I shows how the time ofday, time of year, weather conditions, size ofweapon, height of burst, and preparation ofthe population could all make a great differ-ence in the number of casualties resulting fromsuch an attack. The extent of fire damage is afurther uncertainty, Even if only one city is at-tacked, and the remaining resources of a na-tion are available to help, medical facilitieswould be inadequate to care for the injured. Afurther imponderable is fallout (if the attackuses a surface burst), whose effects depend onthe winds.

Case 2: In order to examine the effects of asmall attack on urban/industrial targets, thestudy examines a hypothetical attack limitedto 10 SNDVs (strategic nuclear delivery ve-hicles, the term used in SALT to designate onemissile or one bomber) on the other superpow-er’s oil refineries. In “planning” this attack,

which is not analogous to any described in re-cent U.S. literature, it was hypothesized thatthe political leadership instructed the militaryto inflict maximum damage on energy produc-tion using only 10 SNDVs without regard to theextent of civilian casualties or other damage, Itwas assumed that the Soviets would attacksuch targets with SS-18 missiles (each carrying10 multiple independently targetable reentryvehicles, or MlRVs), and that the United Stateswould use 7 MlRVed Poseidon missiles and 3MlRVed Minuteman III missiles.

The calculations showed that the Soviet at-tack would destroy 64 percent of U.S. oil refin-ing capacity, while the U.S. attack would de-stroy 73 percent of Soviet refining capacity.Calculations were also made of “prompt fatal-ities, ” including those killed by blast and fall-out, assuming no special civil defense meas-ures: they showed about 5 million U.S. deathsand about 1 million Soviet deaths. The resultswere different for the two countries for severalreasons. Soviet oil refining capacity is moreconcentrated than U.S. oiI refining capacity, sothat a small attack can reach more of it. At thesame time, Soviet refineries tend to be locatedaway from residential areas (the available dataon population location deals with where peo-ple live rather than with where they work) to agreater extent than U.S. refineries. A furtherdifference is that a limitation on the number ofdelivery vehicles would lead each side to useweapons with many MlRVs, so the UnitedStates would attack most of the targets withPoseidon missiles which have small warheads,while the Soviets would use SS-18 interconti-nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which carrymuch larger warheads, and large warheadscause more damage to things not directlytargeted (in this case, people) than do smallwarheads.

One can only speculate about the conse-quences of such extensive destruction. Therewould have to be drastic changes in both theU.S. and Soviet economies to cope with thesudden disappearance of the bulk of oil refin-ing capacity. Productivity in virtualIy every in-dustrial sector would decline, and some sec-tors would be largely wiped out. There would

Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 7

have to be strict allocation of the remainingavailable refined petroleum products. SomeSoviet factory workers might end up workingin the fields to replace tractors for which fuelwas unavailable. The United States might haveto ban commuting by automobile, forcing sub-urban residents to choose between moving andlong walks to a bus stop. The aftermath of thewar might lead to either an increase or a de-crease i n the amount of petroleum products re-quired by the military. Changes in people’s at-titudes are impossible to predict. Calm deter-mination might produce effective responsesthat would limit the damage; panic or a break-down in civic spirit could compound the ef-fects of the attack itself.

It is instructive to observe the asymmetriesbetween the problems which the United Statesand the Soviets would face. Soviet agriculturalproduction, which is barely adequate in peace-time, wouId probably decline sharply, and pro-duction rates would slow even in essential in-dustries However, the Soviet system is welladapted for allocating scarce resources tohigh-priority areas, and for keeping everybodyemployed even if efficient employment is un-available. The relative wealth and freedom ofthe United States brings both advantages anddisadvantages: while agriculture and essentialindustry wouId probably continue, there wouIdbe a staggering organizational problem inmaking use of resources that now depend onpetroleum — one must ask what the employeesof an automobile factory or a retail establish-ment on a highway wouId do if there were vir-tualIy no gasoline for cars,

A major question relating to these results ishow much they could vary with changed as-sumptions, The figures for fatalities werebased on air bursts, which would maximize de-struction of the refineries. (As an excursion,U.S. fatalities were recalculated on the as-sumption of surface bursts, and use of the bestfallout shelters within 2 miles of where eachperson lives. This reduced fatalities by one-third, ) There was no data available on thetypes of Soviet residential construction in thevicinity of oiI refineries: treating it para-metrically gave casualty figures of about

1,5OO,OOO if the construction is all houses, andabout 800,000 if it is al I apartment buildings.Perfect accuracy was assumed for missiles thatare in fact somewhat inaccurate — some inac-curacy might reduce the extent of damage tothe refineries, but it might well increase thenumber of deaths.

Case 3. I n order to examine the effects on ci-viIian popuIations and economies of counter-force attacks, the study examined attacks onICBM silos and attacks on silos, bomber bases,and missile submarine bases. Such attackshave received fairly extensive study in the ex-ecutive branch in recent years, so OTA sur-veyed a number of these studies in order to de-termine the range of possible answers, and thevariations in assumptions that produce such arange, An unclassified summary of this surveyappears as appendix D of this volume. (Thecomplete survey, classified secret, is availableseparately. )

A counterforce attack would produce rel-atively Iittle direct blast damage to civiIiansand to economic assets; the main damagewould come from radioactive fallout, The un-certainties in the effects of fallout are enor-mous, depending primarily on the weather andon the extent of fallout sheltering which thepopulation makes use of. The calculationsmade by various agencies of the executivebranch showed a range in “prompt fatalities”(almost entirely deaths from fallout within thefirst 30 days) from less than 1 to 11 percent ofthe U.S. population and from less than 1 to 5percent of the Soviet population. This showsjust how great a variation can be introducedby modifying assumptions regarding popu-lation distribution and shelter

What can be concluded from this? First, ifthe attack involves surface bursts of many verylarge weapons, if weather conditions are un-favorable, and if no fallout shelters are createdbeyond those that presently exist, U.S. deathscouId reach 20 m i I I ion and Soviet deaths morethan 10 million. (The difference is a result ofgeography; many Soviet strategic forces are solocated that fa l lout f rom attacking themwouId drift mainly into sparsely popuIatedareas or into China. ) Second, effective fallout

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8 ● The Effects of Nuc/ear war

sheltering (which is not necessarily the samething as a program —this assumes people areactually sheltered and actually remain there)could save many Iives under favorable condi-tions, but even in the best imaginable casemore than a million would die in either theUnited States or the U.S.S.R. from a counter-force attack. Third, the “limited nature” ofcounterforce attacks may not be as significantas the enormous uncertainty regarding theirresuIts.

There would be considerable economicdamage and disruption as a result of such at-tacks. Almost all areas could, in principle, bedecontaminated within a few months, but theloss of so many people and the interruption ofeconomic life would be staggering blows. Animponderable, in thinking about the process ofrecovery, is the extent of any lasting psycho-logical impacts.

Case 4: In order to examine the kind of de-struction that is generally thought of as theculmination of an escalator process, thestudy looked at the consequences of a verylarge attack against a range of military andeconomic targets. Here too calculations thatthe executive branch has carried out in recentyears were used. These calculations tend toassume that Soviet attacks on the UnitedStates would be a first strike, and hence usemost of the Soviet arsenal, while U.S. attackson the Soviet Union would be retaliatorystrikes, and hence use only those weapons thatmight survive a Soviet counterforce attack.However, the difference in damage to civilianpopulations and economies between a “firststrike” and a “second strike” seems to liewithin the range of uncertainty created byother factors.

The resulting deaths would be far beyondany precedent. Executive branch calculationsshow a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 per-cent (i. e., from 70 million to 160 million dead),and Soviet deaths from 20 to 40 percent of thepopulation. Here again the range reflects thedifference made by varying assumptions aboutpopulation distribution and sheltering, and toa lesser extent differences in assumptions

about the targeting policy of the attacker.Soviet casualties are smaller than U.S. casual-ties because a greater proportion of the Sovietpopulation lives in rural areas, and becauseU.S. weapons (which have lower averageyields) produce less fal lout than Sovietweapons.

Some excursions have been run to test theeffect of deliberately targeting populationrather than killing people as a side effect of at-tacking economic and military targets. Theyshow that such a change in targeting could killsomewhere between 20 million and 30 millionadditional people on each side, holding otherassumptions constant.

These calculations reflect only deaths dur-ing the first 30 days. Additional millions wouldbe injured, and many would eventually diefrom lack of adequate medical care. In addi-tion, millions of people might starve or freezeduring the following winter, but it is not possi-ble to estimate how many. Chapter V attemptsto calculate the further millions who mighteventually die of latent radiation effects.

What is clear is that from the day the sur-vivors emerged from their fallout shelters, akind of race for survival would begin. One sideof the race would be the restoration of produc-t ion : p roduc t ion o f food , o f energy , o fclothing, of the means to repair damaged ma-chinery, of goods that might be used for tradewith countries that had not fought in the war,and even of military weapons and supplies.The other side of the race would be consump-tion of goods that had survived the attack, andthe wearing-out of surviving machines. If pro-duction rises to the rate of consumptionbefore stocks are exhausted, then viability hasbeen achieved and economic recovery hasbegun. If not, then each postwar year wouldsee a lower level of economic activity than theyear before, and the future of civilization itselfin the nations attacked would be in doubt. Thisreport cannot predict whether this race foreconomic viability would be won. The answerwould lie in the effectiveness of postwar socialand economic organization as much as in theamount of actual physical damage. There is a


controversy in the literature on the subject asto whether a postttack economy would bebased on centralized planning (in which casehow would the necessary data and planningtime be obtained?), or to individual initiativeand decentralized decision making (in whichcase who would feed the refugees, and whatwould serve for money and credit?).

An obviously critical question is the impactthat a nuclear attack would have on the livesof those who survive it. The case descriptionsdiscuss the possibilities of economic, political,social, and psychological disruption or col-lapse. However, the recital of possibilities anduncertainties may fail to convey the overallsituation of the survivors, especialIy the sur-vivors of a large attack that included urban-in-dustrial targets. In an effort to provide a moreconcrete understanding of what a world after anuclear war would be Iike, OTA commissioneda work of fiction. It appears as appendix C andpresents some informed speculation aboutwhat life would be like in Charlottesville, Va.,assuming that this city escaped direct damagefrom the attack. The kind of detail that such animaginative account presents—detail thatproved to be unavailable for a comparableSoviet city–adds a dimension to the moreabstract analysis in the body of the report.

Civil Defense: Chapter 11 I provides somebasic information about civil defense meas-ures, discusses the way in which they mightmitigate the effects of nuclear attack, anddiscusses the uncertainties regarding their ef-fectiveness. There is a lively controversyamong experts as to the effectiveness of exist-ing Soviet civil defense programs, and anothercontroversy as to whether existing U.S. pro-grams ought to be changed. The major pointsin dispute were identified, but no attempt wasmade to assess the merits of the arguments.For the purposes of this study, it was assumedthat the existing civil defense programs, asdescribed in this report, would be in effect,and that a full-scale preattack evacuation ofcities (sometimes called “crisis relocation”)would not take place. This assumption wasmade because it appeared to be the only wayto descr ibe exist ing vulnerabi l i t ies whi le

avoiding predictions about the course ofevents leading up to a nuclear war. While boththe U.S. and the Soviet Governments profess tobelieve that urban evacuation prior to an at-tack on cities would save lives, ordering suchan evacuation would be a crisis managementmove as welI as a civil defense precaution.

Long-Term Effects: While the immediate dam-age from the blasts would be long term in thesense that the damage couId not be quickly re-paired, there would be other effects whichmight not manifest themselves for some yearsafter the attack. It is well established thatlevels of radiation too low (or too slowly ab-sorbed) to cause immediate death or even ill-ness will nevertheless have adverse effects onsome fraction of a popuIation receiving them.A nuclear attack would certainly produce bothsomatic effects (largely cancer) and genetic ef-fects, although there is uncertainty about thenumbers of victims. OTA calcuIated the rangesof such effects that might be produced byeach of the attack cases analyzed. Cancerdeaths and those suffering some form ofgenetic damage would run into the millionsover the 40 years following the attack. For thecomprehensive attack (Case 4), it appears thatcancer deaths and genetic effects in a countryattacked would be smalI relative to the num-bers of immediate deaths, but that radiationeffects elsewhere in the world would appearmore significant. For counterforce attacks, theeffects would be significant both locally andworldwide.

A 1975 study by the National Academy ofSciences (NAS) l addressed the question of thepossibility of serious ecological damage, andconcluded that while one cannot say just howsuch damage would occur, it cannot be ruledout. This conclusion still stands, although theNAS report may have been more alarmistabout the possibility of damage to the ozonelayer than recent research would support.

Table 2 summarizes the results of the casestudies.

1f.ong-Terrn Wor/dwide E f f e c t s o f Mu/tip/e Nuc/ear-VVeapons Detonations (Washington, DC.: National Acad-emy of Sciences, 1 975).

—

10 . The Effects of A/uc/ear War

Table 2. –Summary of Effects

Main causes ofCase Description civilian damage—1(pp. 27-44)

2(pp. 64-80)

3(pp. 81-94)

4(pp. 94-106)

Attack on single city:Detroit and Leningrad;1 weapon or 10 smallweapons,

Attack on oil refineries,Iimited to 10 missiles,

Counterforce attack:Includes attack only onICBM silos as a variant

Attack on range of mili-tary and economic tar-gets using large fractionof existing arsenal

Blast, fire, & loss of infra-structure, fallout IS else-where,

Blast, fire, secondaryfires, fallout, Extensiveeconomic problems fromloss of refinedpetroleum,

Some blast damage ifbomber and missile submarine bases attacked

Blast and fallout, subse-quent economic disrup-tion; possible lack of re-sources to support surviv -ing population or economicrecovery, Possible break-down of social order. Pos-sible Incapacitating psy-chological trauma.

Immediate deaths Middle-term effects Long-term effects

2oo,oo-2,000,000

1,000,000-5,000 1000

1,000>000-20,000,000

20,000,000-160,000,000

Many deaths from injuries;center of city difficult torebuild,

Many deaths from injuries;great economic hardship forsome years; particular prob-lems for Soviet agricultureand for U.S. socioeconomicorganization

Economic impact of deaths,possible large psychologicalimpact

Enormous economic de-struction and disruption,If Immediate deaths are inlow range, more tens of mil-Iions may die subsequentlybecause economy iS unableto support them Majorquestion about whether eco-nomic viability can be re-stored–key variables maybe those of political and eco-nomic organization Unpre-dictable psychologicaleffects,

Relatively minor

Cancer deaths in millionsonly if attack involvessurface bursts

Cancer deaths and geneticeffects in millions, furthermillions of effects outsideattacked countries

Cancer deaths and geneticdamage in the millions; rela-tively Insignificant inattacked areas, but quitesignificant elsewhere in theworld. Possibility of eco-logical damage.

UNCERTAINTIES

There are enormous uncertainties and im-ponderable involved in any effort to assessthe effects of a nuclear war, and an effort tolook at the entire range of effects compoundsthem. Many of these uncertainties are obviousones: if the course of a snowstorm cannot bepredicted 1 day ahead in peacetime, one must ●

certainly be cautious about predictions of thepattern of radioactive fallout on some un-known future day. Similar complexities existfor human institutions: there is great difficultyin predicting the peacetime course of the U.S.economy, and predicting its course after a nu-clear war is a good deal more difficult. Thisstudy highlights the importance of three cate-gories of uncertainties:

●

● Uncertainties in calcuIations of deathsand of direct economic damage resulting

from the need to make assumptions aboutmatters such as time of day, time of year,wind, weather, size of bombs, exact loca-tion of the detonations, location of peo-ple, availability and quality of sheltering,etc.

Effects that would surely take place, butwhose magnitude cannot be calculated.These include the effects of fires, theshortfalIs in medical care and housing, theextent to which economic and social dis-ruption would magnify the effects ofdirect economic damage, the extent ofbottlenecks and synergistic effects, the ex-tent of disease, etc.

Effects that are possible, but whose likeli-hood is as incalculable as their magni-tude. These include the possibility of a


long downward economic spiral beforeviability is attained, the possibIity of po-litical disintegration (anarchy or regional-ization), the possibility of major epidem-ics, and the possibility of i reversible eco-logical changes.

One major problem in making calculationsis to know where the people wilI be at the mo-ment when the bombs explode. Calculationsfor the United States are generally based onthe 1970 census, but it should be borne in mindthat the census data describes where people’shomes are, and there is never a moment wheneverybody in the United States is at home atthe same time If an attack took place during aworking day, casualties might well be highersince people would be concentrated in fac-tories and offices (which are more likely to betargets) rather than dispersed in suburbs. Forthe case of the Soviet population, the sameassumption is made that people are at home,but the inaccuracies are compounded by theunavailability of detailed information aboutjust where the Soviet rural population lives.The various calculations that were used madevarying, though not unreasonable assumptionsabout population location.

A second uncertainty in calculations has todo with the degree of protection available.There is no good answer to the question:“Would people use the best available shelteragainst blast and fallout?” It seems unreason-able to suppose that shelters would not beused, and equally unreasonable to assume thatat a moment of crisis all available resourceswould be put to rational use, (It has beeppointed out that if plans worked, peoplebehaved rationally, and machinery were ade-quately maintained, there would be no peace-time deaths from traffic accidents. ) The De-fense Civil Preparedness Agency has con-cluded from public opinion surveys that in aperiod of severe international crisis about 10percent of all Americans would leave theirhomes and move to a “safer” place (spontane-ous evacuation); more reliable estimates areprobably impossible, but it could make a sub-stantial difference to the casualty figures

A third uncertainty is the weather at the timeof the attack at the various places wherebombs explode. The local wind conditions, andespecialIy the amount of moisture in the air,may make an enormous difference in the num-ber and spread of fires. Wind conditions over awider area determine the extent and locationof fallout contamination. The time of year hasa decisive effect on the damage that falloutdoes to agriculture–while an attack in Jan-uary might be expected to do only indirectdamage (destroying farm machinery or the fuelto run it), fallout when plants are young cankill them, and fallout just before harvesttimewould probably make it unsafe to get the har-vest in. The time of year also has direct effectson population death — the attack in the deadof winter, which might not directly damageagricuIture, may lead to greater deaths fromfallout radiation (because of the difficulty ofimprovising fal lout protect ion by movingfrozen dirt) and from cold and exposure.

The question of how rapid and efficient eco-nomic receovery would be— or indeed whethera genuine recovery would be possible at all —raises questions that seem to be beyond cal-cuIation. I t is possible to calculate direct eco-nomic damage by making assumptions aboutthe size and exact location of bomb explo-sions, and the hardness of economic assets;however, such calculations cannot address theissues of bottlenecks and of synergy. Bottle-necks would occur if a key product that wasessential for many other manufacturing proc-esses could no longer be produced, or (for thecase of a large attack) if an entire industrialsector were wiped out. I n either case, the eco-nomic loss wouId greatly exceed the peace-time value of the factories that were actuallydestroyed. There does not appear to be any re-liable way of calculating the likelihood or ex-tent of bottlenecks because economic input/output models do not address the possibiIity orcost of substitutions across sectors. Apart fromthe creation of bottlenecks, there couId be syn-ergistic effects: for example, the fire that can-not be controlled because the blast destroyedfire stations, as actually happened at Hiroshi-ma. Here, too, there is no reliable way to

.

12 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

estimate the likelihood of such effects: wouldradiation deaths of birds and the destructionof insecticide factories have a synergistic ef-fect? Another uncertainty is the possibility oforganizational bottlenecks. In the most ob-vious instance, it would make an enormous dif-ference whether the President of the UnitedStates survived. Housing, defined as a placewhere a productive worker lives as distinctfrom shelter for refugees, is another area ofuncertainty. Minimal housing is essential ifproduction is to be restored, and it takes timeto rebuild it if the existing housing stock is de-stroyed or is beyond commuting range of thesurviving (or repaired) workplaces. It should benoted that the United States has a much largerand more dispersed housing stock than doesthe Soviet Union, but that American workershave higher minimum standards.

There is a final area of uncertainty that thisstudy does not even address, but which couldbe of very great importance. Actual nuclear at-tacks, unlike those in this study, would nottake place in a vacuum. There would be aseries of events that would lead up to the at-tack, and these events could markedly change

both the physical and the psychological vul-nerability of a population to a nuclear attack.Even more critical would be the events afterthe attack. Assuming that the war endspromptly, the terms on which it ends couldgreatly affect both the economic conditionand the state of mind of the population. Theway in which other countries are affectedcould determine whether the outside world is asource of help or of further danger. The post-attack military situation (and nothing in thisstudy addresses the effects of nuclear attackson military power) could not only determinethe att i tude of other countr ies, but alsowhether limited surviving resources are put tomilitary or to civilian use.

Moreover, the analyses in this study allassume that the war would end after the hypo-thetical attack. This assumption simplifiesanalysis, but it might not prove to be the case.How much worse would the situation of thesurvivors be if, just as they were attempting torestore some kind of economy following amassive attack, a few additional weapons de-stroyed the new centers of population and ofgovernment?

Chapter II

A NUCLEAR WEAPON OVER DETROITOR LENINGRAD: A TUTORIAL ON THE

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Chapter ll.–A NUCLEAR WEAPON OVER DETROITOR LENINGRAD: A TUTORIAL ON THE


Pdge

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15General Description of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Blast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Direct Nuclear Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Thermal Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Electromagnetic Pulse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Combined Injuries (Synergism). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Detroit and Leningrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271Mt on the Surface in Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Physical Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Infrastructure Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Radioactive Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

1-Mt Air Burst on Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3525-Mt Air Burst on Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Leningrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39l-Mtand 9-Mt Air Bursts on Leningrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Ten 40-kt Air Bursts on Leningrad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

1-kt Terrorist Weapon at Ground Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

TABLESPage

3. Blast Effects of a 1-Mt Explosion 8,000 ft Above the Earth’sSurface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

4. Casualty Estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31S. Burn Casualty Estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

FIGURESPage

l. Vulnerability of Population in Various Overpressure Zones . . 192. Main Fallout Pattern— Uniform 15 mph Southwest Wind . . . . 243. Main Fallout Pattern— Uniform 15 mph Northwest Wind . . . . 254. Detroit 1-Mt Surface Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295. Detroit 1-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366. Casualties. ......., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377. Detroit 25-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388. Leningrad –Commercial and Residential Sections . . . . . . . . . 409. Leningrad –Populated Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

IO. Leningrad l-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4211. Leningrad 9-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4312. Leningrad Ten 40-kt Air Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Chapter II

A NUCLEAR WEAPON OVER DETROITOR LENINGRAD: A TUTORIAL ON THE


INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a brief description of the major effects of nuclear explo-sions on the people and structures in urban areas. The details of such effects wouldvary according to weapons design, the exact geographical layout of the target area,the materials and methods used for construction in the target area, and the weather(especially the amount of moisture in the atmosphere). Thus, the reader should bearin mind that the statements below are essentially generalizations, which are subjectto a substantial range of variation and uncertainty.

To convey some sense of the actual effects of large nuclear explosions on urbanareas, the potential impact of explosions is described in two real cities—Detroit andLeningrad. To show how these effects vary with the size of the weapon, the effectshave been calculated in each city for a variety of weapon sizes.

The descriptions and analysis assume that there is no damage elsewhere in thecountry. This may appear unlikely, and in the case of a surface burst it is certainlywrong, since a surface burst would generate fallout that would cause casualtieselsewhere. However, isolating the effects on a single city allows the setting forth inclear terms of the direct and immediate effects of nuclear explosions. The result is akind of tutorial in nuclear effects. Subsequent sections of this report, which deal withthe effects of larger attacks, discuss the indirect effects of fallout and of economicand social disruption.

Although it is outside the scope of a discussion of “nuclear war, ” there has beenconsiderable public interest in the effects of a nuclear explosion that a terroristgroup might succeed in setting off in an urban area. Accordingly, a discussion of thispossibility y is added at the end of this chapter.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EFFECTS

The energy of a nuclear explosion is released ●

in a

●

●

●

number of different ways:

an explosive blast, which is qualitatively ●

similar to the blast from ordinary chem-ical explosions, but which has somewhatdifferent effects because it is typically somuch larger;direct nuclear radiation;

pulses of electrical and magnetic energy,called electromagnetic pulse (EM P); and

the creation of a variety of radioactiveparticles, which are thrown up into the airby the force of the blast, and are calledradioactive fallout when they return toEarth.

direct thermal radiation, most of which The distr ibut ion of the bomb’s energytakes the form of visible Iight; among these effects depends on its size and on

15

16 . The Effects of Nuclear War

the details of its design, but a general descrip- Blast and shock Thermal radiation

tion is possible.and EMP

Blast

Most damage to cities from large weapons

(called static overpressure) that can crush ob- \ /jects, and high winds (called dynamic pressure) \ /that can move them suddenly or knock themdown. In general, large buildings are destroyedby the overpressure, while people and objectssuch as trees and utility poles are destoyed bythe wind. Initial Residual nuclear

nuclear radiationFor example, consider the effects of a 1-

radiation (fallout)

megaton (Mt) air burst on things 4 miles [6 km] Effects of a nuclear explosion

Thermonuclear ground burstPhoto credit: U S Department of Energy

Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 17

away. The overpressure will be in excess of 5pounds per square inch (psi), which will exert aforce of more than 180 tons on the wall of atypical two-story house. At the same place,there would be a wind of 160 mph [255 km];while 5 psi is not enough to crush a man, awind of 180 mph would create fatal collisions is ionsbetween people and nearby objects.

The magnitude of the blast effect (generallymeasured in pounds per square inch) dimin-ishes with distance from the center of the ex-plosion. It is related in a more complicatedway to the height of the burst above groundlevel. For any given distance from the center ofthe explosion, there is an optimum burst heightthat will produce the greatest overpressure,

and the greater the distance the greater the op-timum burst height. As a result, a burst on thesurface produces the greatest overpressure atvery close ranges (which is why surface burstsare used to attack very hard, very small targetssuch as missile silos), but less overpressurethan an air burst at somewhat longer ranges.Raising the height of the burst reduces theoverpressure directly under the bomb, butwidens the area at which a given smaller over-pressure is produced. Thus, an attack on fac-tories with a l-Mt weapon might use an airburst at an altitude of 8,000 feet [2,400 m],which would maximize the area (about 28 mi2

[7,200 hectares]) that would receive 10 psi ormore of overpressure.

Photo credit: U S Air ForceFireball from an air burst in the megaton energy range

18 . The Effects of Nuc/ear War

Photo credit U S Uepartmenf of Defense

The faintly luminous shock front seen just ahead of the fireball soon after breakaway

Table 3 shows the ranges of overpressures returns to Earth as fallout. An explosion that isand effects from such a blast. farther above the Earth’s surface than the

When a nuclear weapon is detonated on orradius of the fireball does not dig a crater and

near the surface of the Earth, the blast digs outproduces negligible immediate fallout.

a large crater. Some of the material that used For the most part, blast kills people by in-to be in the crater is deposited on the rim of direct means rather than by direct pressure.the crater; the rest is carried up into the air and While a human body can withstand up to 30

Table 3.–Blast Effects of a 1-Mt Explosion 8,000 ft Above the Earth’s Surface

Distance from ground zero—

Peak Peak wind(stat. miles) (kilometers) overpressure velocity (mph) Typical blast effects

.8 1,3 20 psi 470 Reinforced concrete structures are leveled.

3 0 4 8 10 psi 290 Most factories and commercial buildings arecollapsed. Small wood-frame and brickresidences destroyed and distributed asdebris,

4.4 7.0 5 psi 160 Lightly constructed commercial buildings andtypical residences are destroyed, heavierconstruction IS severely damaged

5.9 9 5 3 psi 95 Walls of typical steel-frame buildings areblown away: severe damage to residences.Winds sufficient to kill people in the open.

11 6 18.6 1 psi 35 Damage to structures, people endangered byflying glass and debris


psi of simple overpressure, the winds asso-ciated with as little as 2 to 3 psi could be ex-pected to blow people out of typical modernoffice buildings. Most blast deaths result fromthe collapse of occupied buildings, from peo-ple being blown into objects, or from buildingsor smaller objects being blown onto or intopeople. Clearly, then, it is impossible tocalculate with any precision how many peoplewould be killed by a given blast—the effectswould vary from buiIding to buiIding.

In order to estimate the number of casual-ties from any given explosion, it is necessary tomake assumptions about the proportion ofpeople who will be killed or injured at anygiven overpressure. The assumptions used inthis chapter are shown in figure 1. They arerelatively conservative. For example, weaponstests suggest that a typical residence will becollapsed by an overpressure of about 5 psi.People standing in such a residence have a 50-percent chance of being killed by an over-pressure of 3.5 psi, but people who are lyingdown at the moment the blast wave hits have a50-percent chance of surviving a 7-psi over-pressure. The calculations used here assume amean lethal overpressure of 5 to 6 psi for peo-ple in residences, meaning that more than halfof those whose houses are blown down on topof them will nevertheless survive. Some studiesuse a simpler technique: they assume that thenumber of people who survive in areas receiv-

ple killed in areas receiving less than 5 psi, andhence that fatalities are equal to the numberof people inside a 5-psi ring.

Direct Nuclear Radiation

Nuclear weapons inflict ionizing radiationon people, animals, and plants in two differentways. Direct radiation occurs at the time of theexplosion; it can be very intense, but its rangeis Iimited. Fallout radiation is received fromparticles that are made radioactive by the ef-fects of the explosion, and subsequently dis-tributed at varying distances from the site ofthe blast. Fallout is discussed in a subsequentsect ion.

For large nuclear weapons, the range of in-tense direct radiation is less than the range oflethal blast and thermal radiation effects.However, in the case of smaller weapons, di-rect radiation may be the lethal effect with thegreatest range. Direct radiation did substantialdamage to the residents of Hiroshima andNagasaki.

Human response to ionizing radiation is sub-ject to great scientific uncertainty and intensecontroversy. It seems likely that even smalldoses of radiation do some harm, To under-stand the effects of nuclear weapons, onemust distinguish between short- and long-termeffects:

ing more than 5 psi equal the number of peo-●

Figure 1 .—Vulnerability of Population in VariousOverpres-sure Zones

50 I

Over 12 psi 5-12 psi 2-5 psi 1-2 psi

75

25

Short-Term Effects.-A dose of 600 remwithin a short period of time (6 to 7 days)has a 90-percent chance of creating a fatalilIness, with death occurring within a fewweeks. (A rem or “ roentgen-equivalent-man” is a measure of biological damage:a “rad” is a measure of radiation energyabsorbed; a roentgen is a measure of radi-ation energy; for our purposes it may beassumed that 100 roentgens produce 100rads and 100 rem. ) The precise shape ofthe curve showing the death rate as afunction of radiation dose is not known inthe region between 300 and 600 rem, but adose of 450 rem within a short time is esti-mated to create a fatal illness in half thepeople exposed to it; the other half would


●

get very sick, but would recover. A dose of300 rem might kill about 10 percent ofthose exposed. A dose of 200 to 450 remwill cause a severe illness from whichmost people would recover; however, thisillness wouId render people highly suscep-tible to other diseases or infections. Adose of so to 200 rem will cause nauseaand lower resistance to other diseases, butmedical treatment is not required. A dosebelow so rem will not cause any short-term effects that the victim will notice,but will nevertheless do long-term dam-age.

Long-Term Effects.-The effects of smallerdoses of radiation are long term, andmeasured in a statistical way. A dose of 50rem generally produces no short-term ef-fects; however, if a large population wereexposed to so reins, somewhere between0.4 and 2.5 percent of them would be ex-pected to contract fatal cancer (aftersome years) as a result. There would alsobe serious genetic effects for some frac-tion of those exposed. Lower doses pro-duce lower effects. There is a scientificcontroversy about whether any dose ofradiation, however small, is really safe.Chapter V discusses the extent of the long-term effects that a nuclear attack mightproduce. It should be clearly understood,however, that a large nuclear war wouldexpose the survivors, however well shel-tered, to levels of radiation far greaterthan the U.S. Government considers safein peacetime.

Thermal Radiation

Approximately 35 percent of the energyfrom a nuclear explosion is an intense burst ofthermal radiation, i.e., heat. The effects areroughly analogous to the effect of a 2-secondflash from an enormous sunlamp. Since thethermal radiation travels at the speed of light(actually a bit slower, since it is deflected byparticles in the atmosphere), the flash of lightand heat precedes the blast wave by severalseconds, just as lightning is seen before thethunder is heard.

Photo credit U S Air force

Burn injuries from nuclear blasts

Photo credit’ U S Department of Defense

The patient’s skin is burned in a pattern correspondingto the dark portions of a kimono worn at the time of

the explosion


The visible light will produce “flashblind-ness” in people who are looking in the direc-tion of the explosion. Flashblindness can lastfor several minutes, after which recovery istotal. A l-Mt explosion could cause flashblind-ness at distances as great as 13 miles [21 km] ona clear day, or 53 miles [85 km] on a clear night.If the flash is focused through the lens of theeye, a permanent retinal burn will result. AtHiroshima and Nagasaki, there were manycases of flashblindness, but only one case ofretinal burn, among the survivors. On the otherhand, anyone flashblinded while driving a carcould easiIy cause permanent injury to himselfand to others.

Skin burns result from higher intensities oflight, and therefore take place closer to thepoint of explosion. A 1-Mt explosion can causefirst-degree burns (equivalent to a bad sun-burn) at distances of about 7 miles [11 km],second-degree burns (producing blisters thatlead to infection if untreated, and permanentscars) at distances of about 6 miles [10 km],and third-degree burns (which destroy skintissue) at distances of up to 5 miles [8 km].Third-degree burns over 24 percent of thebody, or second-degree burns over 30 percentof the body, will result in serious shock, andwill probably prove fatal unless prompt, spe-cialized medical care is available. The entireUnited States has facilities to treat 1,000 or2,000 severe burn cases; a single nuclearweapon could produce more than 10,000.

The distance at which burns are dangerousdepends heavily on weather conditions. Exten-sive moisture or a high concentration of par-ticles in the air (smog) absorbs thermal radia-tion. Thermal radiation behaves like sunlight,so objects create shadows behind which thethermal radiation is indirect (reflected) andless intense. Some conditions, such as ice onthe ground or low white clouds over clean air,can increase the range of dangerous thermalradiation.

Fires

The thermal radiation from a nuclear explo-sion can directly ignite kindling materials. In

general, ignitible materials outside the house,such as leaves or newspapers, are not sur-rounded by enough combustible material togenerate a self-sustaining fire. Fires more likelyto spread are those caused by thermal radia-tion passing through windows to ignite bedsand overstuffed furniture inside houses. Arather substantial amount of combustiblematerial must burn vigorously for 10 to 20minutes before the room, or whole house,becomes inflamed. The blast wave, which ar-rives after most thermal energy has been ex-pended, will have some extinguishing effect onthe fires. However, studies and tests of this ef-fect have been very contradictory, so the ex-tent to which blast can be counted on to extin-guish fire starts remains quite uncertain.

Another possible source of fires, whichmight be more damaging in urban areas, is in-direct. Blast damage to stores, water heaters,furnaces, electrical circuits, or gas lines wouldignite fires where fuel is plentiful.

The best estimates are that at the 5-psi levelabout 10 percent of al I buildings would sustaina serious fire, while at 2 psi about 2 percentwould have serious fires, usualIy arising fromsecondary sources such as blast-damaged util-ities rather than direct thermal radiation.

It is possible that individual fires, whethercaused by thermal radiation or by blast dam-age to utilities, furnaces, etc., would coalesceinto a mass fire that would consume alI struc-tures over a large area. This possibility hasbeen intensely studied, but there remains nobasis for estimating its probability. Mass firescould be of two kinds: a “firestorm, ” in whichviolent inrushing winds create extremely hightemperatures but prevent the fire from spread-ing radially outwards, and a “conflagration, ”in which a fire spreads along a front. Hamburg,Tokyo, and Hiroshima experienced firestormsin World War 11; the Great Chicago Fire andthe San Francisco Earthquake Fire were confla-grations. A firestorm is likely to kill a high pro-portion of the people in the area of the fire,through heat and through asphyxiation ofthose in shelters. A confIagration spreads slow-ly enough so that people in its path can

22 ● The Etffects of Nuclear War

escape, though a conflagration caused by a nu-clear attack might take a heavy toll of thosetoo injured to walk. Some believe that fire-storms in U.S. or Soviet cities are unlikelybecause the density of flammable materials(“fuel loading”) is too low–the ignition of afirestorm is thought to require a fuel loading ofat least 8 lbs/ft2 (Hamburg had 32), comparedto fuel loading of 2 lbs/ft2 in a typical U.S.suburb and 5 lbs/ft2 in a neighborhood of two-story brick rowhouses. The Iikelihood of a con-flagration depends on the geography of thearea, the speed and direction of the wind, anddetails of building construction. Another vari-able is whether people and equipment areavai lable to f ight f i res before they cancoalesce and spread.

Electromagnetic Pulse

Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is an electro-magnetic wave similar to radio waves, whichresults from secondary reactions occurringwhen the nuclear gamma radiation is absorbedin the air or ground. It differs from the usualradio waves in two important ways. First, itcreates much higher electric field strengths.Whereas a radio signal might produce a thou-sandth of a volt or less in a receiving antenna,an EMP pulse might produce thousands ofvolts. Secondly, it is a single pulse of energythat disappears completely in a small fractionof a second. In this sense, it is rather similar tothe electrical signal from lightning, but the risein voltage is typically a hundred times faster.This means that most equipment designed toprotect electrical facilities from lightningworks too slowly to be effective against EMP.

The strength of an EMP pulse is measured involts per meter (v/m), and is an indication ofthe voltage that would be produced in an ex-posed antenna. A nuclear weapon burst on thesurface will typically produce an EMP of tensof thousands of v/m at short distances (the 10-psi range) and thousands of v/m at longer dis-tances (l-psi range). Air bursts produce lessEMP, but high-altitude bursts (above 19 miles[21 km]) produce very strong EMP, with rangesof hundreds or thousands of miles. An attacker

might detonate a few weapons at such alti-tudes in an effort to destroy or damage thecommunications and electric power systems ofthe victim.

There is no evidence that EMP is a physicalthreat to humans. However, electrical or elec-tronic systems, particularly those connected tolong wires such as powerlines or antennas, canundergo either of two kinds of damage. First,there can be actual physical damage to anelectrical component such as shorting of acapacitor or burnout of a transistor, whichwould require replacement or repair before theequipment can again be used. Second, at alesser level, there can be a temporary opera-tional upset, frequently requiring some effortto restore operation. For example, instabilitiesinduced in power grids can cause the entiresystem to shut itself down, upsetting com-puters that must be started again. Base radiostations are vulnerable not only from the lossof commercial power but from direct damageto electronic components connected to theantenna. In general, portable radio transmit-ter/receivers with relatively short antennas arenot susceptible to EMP. The vulnerability ofthe telephone system to EMP could not bedetermined.

Fallout

While any nuclear explosion in the atmos-phere produces some fallout, the fallout is fargreater if the burst is on the surface, or at leastlow enough for the firebalI to touch theground. As chapter V shows in some detail, thefallout from air bursts alone poses long-termhealth hazards, but they are trivial comparedto the other consequences of a nuclear attack.The significant hazards come from particlesscooped up from the ground and irradiated bythe nuclear explosion.

The radioactive particles that rise only ashort distance (those in the “stem” of thefamiliar mushroom cloud) will fall back toearth within a matter of minutes, landing closeto the center of the explosion. Such particles

.-

Ch, II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons Ž 23

are unlikely to cause many deaths, becausethey will fall in areas where most people havealready been killed. However, the radioactivitywill complicate efforts at rescue or eventualreconstruct ion.

The radioactive particles that rise higher willbe carried some distance by the wind beforereturning to Earth, and hence the area and in-tensity of the fallout is strongly influenced bylocal weather conditions. Much of the materialis simply blown downwind in a long plume,The map shown in figure 2 illustrates theplume expected from a 1-Mt surface burst inDetroit if winds were blowing toward Canada.The illustrated plume assumed that the windswere blowing at a uniform speed of 15 mph[24 km] over the entire region, The plumewouId be longer and thinner if the winds weremore intense and shorter and somewhat morebroad if the winds were slower. If the windswere from a different direction, the plumewould cover a different area. For example, awind f rom the northwest would deposi tenough fallout on Cleveland to inflict acuteradiation sickness on those who did notevacuate or use effective fallout shelters(figure 3). Thus wind direction can make anenormous difference. Rainfal I can also have asignificant influence on the ways in whichradiation from smalIer weapons is deposited,since rain will carry contaminated particles tothe ground. The areas receiving such contami-nated rainfall would become “hot spots, ” withgreater radiation intensity than their surround-ings, When the radiation intensity from falloutis great enough to pose an immediate threat tohealth, fallout will generally be visible as a thinlayer of dust.

The amount of radiation produced by fall-out materials will decrease with time as theradioactive materials “decay. ” Each materialdecays at a different rate, Materials that decayrapidly give off intense radiation for a shortperiod of time while long-lived materials radi-ate less intensely but for longer periods, Im-mediately after the fallout is deposited inregions surrounding the blast site, radiation in-tensities will be very high as the short-lived

materials decay. These intense radiations willdecrease relatively quickly. The intensity willhave fallen by a factor of 10 after 7 hours, afactor of 100 after 49 hours and a factor of1,000 after 2 weeks. The areas in the plume il-lustrated in figures 2 and 3 would become“safe” (by peacetime standards) in 2 to 3 yearsfor the outer ellipse, and in 10 years or so forthe inner ellipse.

Some radioactive particles will be thrustinto the stratosphere, and may not return toEarth for some years. In this case only the par-ticularly long-lived particles pose a threat, andthey are dispersed around the world over arange of latitudes, Some fallout from U.S. andSoviet weapons tests in the 1950’s and early1960’s can still be detected. There are alsosome particles in the immediate fallout (nota-bly Strontium 90 and Cesium 137) that remainradioactive for years. Chapter V discusses thelikely hazards from these long-lived particles.

The biological effects of fallout radiationare substantially the same as those from directradiation, discussed above, People exposed toenough fallout radiation wiII die, and those ex-posed to lesser amounts may become ill. Chap-ter 11 I discusses the theory of fallout shelter-ing, and chapter IV some of the practical dif-ficulties of escaping fallout from a large coun-terforce attack.

There is some public interest in the questionof the consequences if a nuclear weapon de-stroyed a nuclear powerplant. The core of apower reactor contains large quantities ofradioactive material, which tends to decaymore slowly (and hence less intensely) than thefallout particles from a nuclear weapon explo-sion, Consequently, fallout from a destroyednuclear reactor (whose destruction would, in-cidently, require a high-accuracy surface burst)would not be much more intense (during thefirst day) or widespread than “ordinary” fall-out, but would stay radioactive for a consid-erably longer time. Areas receiving such fall-out wouId have to be evacuated or decontami-nated; otherwise survivors would have to stayin shelters for months,

Figure 2.— Main Fallout Pattern —Uniform 15 mph Southwest Wind (1-Mt Surface Burst in Detroit).(Contours for 7-Day Accumulated Dose (Without Shielding) of 3,000,900,300, and 90 Rem.)


Figure 3. —Main Fallout Pattern —lJniforrn 15 mph Northwest Wind (1-Mt Surface Burst in Detroit).(Contours for 7-Day Accumulated Dose (Without Shielding) of 3,000,900,300, and 90 Rem.)


Combined Injuries (Synergism)

So far the discussion of each major effect(blast, nuclear radiation, and thermal radia-tion) has explained how this effect in isolationcauses deaths and injuries to humans. It is cus-tomary to calculate the casualties accompany-ing hypothetical nuclear explosion as follows:for any given range, the effect most likely tokill people is selected and its consequencescalculated, while the other effects are ignored.it is obvious that combined injuries are possi-ble, but there are no generally accepted waysof calculating their probability. What data doexist seem to suggest that calculations ofsingle effects are not too inaccurate for im-mediate deaths, but that deaths occurringsome time after the explosion may well be dueto combined causes, and hence are omittedfrom most calculations. Some of the obviouspossibilities are:

●

●

Nuclear Radiation Combined With ThermalRadiation.– Severe burns place considera-ble stress on the blood system, and oftencause anemia. It is clear from experimentswith laboratory animals that exposure of aburn victim to more than 100 reins of radi-ation will impair the blood’s ability to sup-port recovery from the thermal burns.Hence a sublethal radiation dose couldmake it impossible to recover from a burnthat, without the radiation, would notcause death.

Nuclear Radiation Combined With Mechan-ical Injuries. –Mechanical injuries, the in-direct results of blast, take many forms.Flying glass and wood will cause puncturewounds. Winds may blow people into ob-structions, causing broken bones, concus-sions, and internal injuries. Persons caughtin a collapsing building can suffer manysimilar mechanical injuries. There is evi-dence that all of these types of injuries aremore serious if the person has been ex-

●

posed to 300 reins, particularly if treat-ment is delayed. Blood damage will clear-ly make a victim more susceptible toblood loss and infection. This has beenconfirmed in laboratory animals in whicha borderline lethal radiation dose wasfollowed a week later by a blast over-pressure that alone would have produceda low level of prompt lethality. The num-ber of prompt and delayed (from radi-ation) deaths both increased over whatwould be expected from the single effectalone.

Thermal Radiation and Mechanical lniu-ries. — There is no information availableabout the effects of this combination,beyond the common sense observationthat since each can place a great stress ona healthy body, the combination of in-juries that are individually tolerable maysubject the body to a total stress that itcannot tolerate. Mechanical injuriesshould be prevalent at about the distancefrom a nuclear explosion that producessublethal burns, so this synergism couldbe an important one.

In general, synergistic effects are most likelyto produce death when each of the injuriesalone is quite severe. Because the uncertain-ties of nuclear effects are compounded whenone tries to estimate the likelihood of two ormore serious but (individually) nonfatal inju-ries, there really is no way to estimate the num-ber of victims.

A further dimension of the problem is thepossible synergy between injuries and environ-mental damage. To take one obvious example,poor sanitation (due to the loss of electricalpower and water pressure) can clearly com-pound the effects of any kind of serious injury.Another possibility is that an injury would soimmobilize the victim that he would be unableto escape from a fire.


DETROIT AND LENINGRAD

Detroit and Leningrad are representative in-dustrial cities large enough to warrant the useof very large weapons. Both have metropolitanpopulations of about 4.3 million, and both aremajor transportation and industrial centers.

In assessing and describing the damage, sev-eral assumptions were made that may not berealistic, but which assisted in making a clearpresentation of the range of possible effects:

. There is no warning. The popuIations havenot evacuated or sought shelter, both ofwhich measures could reduce casualties.

● The detonations take place at night whenmost people are at their residences. Thiscorresponds to the available census dataabout where people are, and indeed peo-ple are near their residences more thanhalf the time.

● There is clear weather, with visibility of 10miles [16 km].

● The air bursts are at an altitude that max-imizes the area of 30 psi or more over-pressure. A higher height of burst wouldhave increased the range of 5-psi overpres-sure (i.e. destruction of all residences) byup to 10 percent, at the cost of lessdamage to very hard structures near thecenter of the explosion.

● No other cities are attacked, an assump-tion that allows for analyzing the extentof outside help that would be required, ifit were avaiIable.

1 Mt on the Surface in Detroit

Physical Damage

Figure 4 shows the metropolitan area ofDetroit, with Windsor, Canada, across the riverto the southeast and Lake St. Clair directlyeast. The detonation point selected is the in-tersection of 1-75 and 1-94, approximately atthe civic center and about 3 miles [5 km] fromthe Detroit-Windsor tunnel entrance. Circlesare drawn at the 12-, 5-, 2-, and 1-psi Iimits.

The l-Mt explosion on the surface leaves acrater about 1,000 feet [300 m] in diameter and200 feet [61 m] deep, surrounded by a rim ofhighly radioactive soil about twice this diam-eter thrown out of the crater. Out to a distanceof 0.6 miles [1 km] from the center there will benothing recognizable remaining, with the ex-ception of some massive concrete bridge abut-ments and building foundations. At 0.6 milessome heavily damaged highway bridge sec-tions will remain, but little else until 1.3 miles[2. I km], where a few very strongly constructedbuildings with poured reinforced concretewalls will survive, but with the interiors totallydestroyed by blast entering the window open-ings. A distance of 1.7 miles [2.7 km] (1 2-psiring) is the closest range where any significantstructure wilI remain standing.

Of the 70,000 people in this area during non-working hours, there will be virtually no sur-vivors. (See table 4.) Fatalities during workinghours in this business district would un-doubtedly be much higher. The estimated day-time population of the “downtown” area issomething over 200,000 in contrast to the cen-sus data of about 15,000. If the attack oc-curred during this time, the fatalities would beincreased by 130,000 and injuries by 45,000over the estimates in table 4. Obviously therewould be some reduction in casualties in outly-ing residential areas where the daytime popu-lation would be lower.

In the band between the 1.7- and the 2.7-mile(5 psi) circles, typical commercial and residen-tial multistory buildings will have the wallscompletely blown out, but increasingly at thegreater distances the skeletal structure will re-main standing.

Individual residences in this region will betotally destroyed, with only foundations andbasements remaining, and the debris quite uni-formly distributed over the area. Heavy indus-trial plants will be destroyed in the inner partof the ring, but some industry will remain func-tional towards the outer edge. The debrisdepth that will clutter the streets will naturally

Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons . 29

:1 , <-- ‘ ; ““+-’-~--k

Miles


o-1 7 9 1 701 7-27 13.8 2502 7 - 4 7 4 6 5 4004 7 - 7 4 1026 600

—

depend on both the building heights and howclose together they are spaced. Typical depthsmight range from tens of feet in the downtownarea where buildings are 10 to 20 stories high,down to several inches where buildings arelower and streets broader in the sector to thewest and north, In this band, blast damagealone will destroy all automobiles, while someheavier commercial vehicles (firetrucks andrepair vehicles) will survive near the outeredges. However, few vehicles will have beensufficiently protected from debris to remainuseful. The parking lots of both Cobb Field andTiger Stadium will contain nothing driveable.

I n this same ring, which contains a nighttimepopulation of about 250,000, about half will befatalities, with most of the remainder being in-jured. Most deaths will occur from collapsingbuildings. Although many fires will be started,only a small percentage of the buildings areIikely to continue to burn after the blast wavepasses. The mechanics of fire spread in aheavily damaged and debris strewn area arenot well understood. However, it is probablethat fire spread would be slow and there wouldbe no firestorm. For unprotected people, theinitial nuclear radiation would be lethal out to1.7 miles [2.7 km], but be insignificant in itsprompt effects (50 reins) at 2.0 miles [3.2 km].Since few people inside a 2-mile ring will sur-vive the blast, and they are very Iikely to be instrong buildings that typically have a 2- to 5-protection factor, the additional fatalities andinjuries from initial radiation should be smallcompared to other uncertainties.

The number of casualties from thermalburns depends on the time of day, season, andatmospheric visibility. Modest variations inthese factors produce huge changes in vulner-ability to burns. For example, on a winter night

70 0 0130 100 20

20 180 2000 150 450

less than 1 percent of the population might beexposed to direct thermal radiation, while on aclear summer weekend afternoon more than25 percent might be exposed (that is, have nostructure between the fireball and the person).When visibility is 10 miles [16 km], a l-Mt ex-plosion produces second-degree burns at a dis-tance of 6 miles [10 km], while under circum-stances when visibility is 2 miles [3 km], therange of second-degree burns is only 2.7 miles[4.3 km]. Table 5 shows how this variationcould cause deaths from thermal radiation tovary between 1,000 and 190,000, and injuries tovary between 500 and 75,000.

In the band from 2.7 to 4.7 miles [4.4 to 7.6km] (2 psi), large buildings will have lost win-dows and frames, interior partitions, and, forthose with light-walled construction, most ofthe contents of upper floors will have beenblown out into the streets. Load-bearing wallbuildings at the University of Detroit will beseverely cracked. Low residential buildings willbe totally destroyed or severely damaged.Casualties are estimated to be about 50 per-cent in this region, with the majority of theseinjured. There wilI stiIl be substantial debris inthe streets, but a very significant number ofcars and trucks will remain operable. In thiszone, damage to heavy industrial plants, suchas the Cadillac plant, will be severe, and mostplanes and hangars at the Detroit City AirportwilI be destroyed.

In this ring only 5 percent of the populationof about 400,000 will be killed, but nearly halfwill be injured (table 4). This is the region ofthe most severe fire hazard, since fire ignitionand spread is more likely in partly damagedbuildings than in completely flattened areas.Perhaps 5 percent of the buildings would beinitially ignited, with fire spread to adjoining


buildings highly likely if their separation is lessthan 50 feet [15 m]. Fires will continue tospread for 24 hours at least, ultimately destroy-ing about half the buildings. However, theseestimates are extremely uncertain, as they arebased on poor data and unknown weather con-ditions. They are also made on the assumptionthat no effective effort is made by the unin-jured half of the population in this region toprevent the ignition or spread of fires.

As table 5 shows, there would be between4,000 and 95,000 additional deaths from ther-mal radiation in this band, assuming a visibilityof 10 miles [16 km]. A 2-mile [3 km] visibilitywould produce instead between 1,000 and11,000 severe injuries, and many of thesewould subsequently die because adequatemedical treatment would not be available.

In the outermost band (4.7 to 7.4 miles [7.6to 11.9 km]) there will be only light damage tocommercial structures and moderate damageto residences. Casualties are estimated at 25percent injured and only an insignificant num-ber killed (table 4). Under the range of condi-tions displayed in table 5, there will be an addi-tional 3,000 to 75,000 burn injuries requiringspecialized medical care. Fire ignitions shouldbe comparatively rare (limited to such kindlingmaterial as newspaper and dry leaves) andeasily control led by the survivors.

Whether fallout comes from the stem or thecap of the mushroom is a major concern in thegeneral vicinity of the detonation because ofthe time element and its effect on generalemergency operations. Fallout from the stemstarts building after about 10 minutes, so dur-ing the first hour after detonation it representsthe prime radiation threat to emergency crews.The affected area would have a radius ofabout 6.5 miles [10.5 km] (as indicated by thedashed circle on figure 4) with a hot-spot adistance downwind that depends on the windvelocity. If a 15-mph wind from the southwestis assumed, an area of about 1 mi2 [260 hec-tares]—the solid ellipse shown —would causean average exposure of 300 reins in the firsthour to people with no fallout protection atall. The larger toned ellipse shows the area of150 reins in the first hour. But the importantfeature of short-term (up to 1 hour) fallout isthe relatively small area covered by life-threatening radiation levels compared to thearea covered by blast damage.

Starting in about an hour, the main falloutfrom the cloud itself will start to arrive, withsome of it adding to the already-depositedlocal stem fallout, but the bulk being dis-tributed in an elongated downwind ellipse.Figures 2 and 3 show two fallout patterns, dif-fering only in the direction of the wind. The

Table 5.–Burn Casualty Estimates(1 Mt on Detroit)

Distance from Survivors of Fatalities (eventual) Injuries

blast (mi) blast effects 2-mile visibility 10-mile visibility 2-mile visibility 10-mile visibility

(1 percent of population exposed to line of sight from fireball)

0 - 1 . 7 0 0 0 0 01 7 - 2 72 7 - 4 . 7 .4 7 - 7 4 .

Total (rounded

0 - 1 7 .

120,000 1,200 1, 200” o 0380,000 0 3,800 500 0600,000 0 2,600 0 3,000— ————.—

1,000 8,000 500 3,000

(25 percent of population exposed to line of sight from fireball)

o 0 0 0 01 7 - 2 7 , 120,000 30,000 30,000 0 02 . 7 - 4 7 380.000 0 95,000 11,000 04 , 7 - 7 4 . 600,000 0 66,000 0 751000

Total (rounded) 30,000 190.000 11.000 75,000

Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons • 33

contours marked are the number of reins re-ceived in the week following the arrival of thecloud fat lout, again assuming no fallout pro-tection whatever. Realistic patterns, which willreflect wind shear, 2 wider crosswind distribu-tion, and other atmospheric varibe much more complex than this i

Infrastructure Status

As a complement to the prece

~bilities, willlustration.

~ing descrip-tion of physical destruction, the status of thevarious infrastructure elements of the Detroitmetropolitan area, and the potential for theirrecovery, can be addressed. The reader shouldunderstand that this tutorial considers Detroitto be the only damaged area in the UnitedStates, that there is no other threat that wouldprevent survivors and those in surroundingareas from giving all possible aid, and thatFederal and State governments will activelyorganize outside assistance.

The near half-million injured present a med-ical task of incredible magnitude. Those partsof Wayne, Macomb, and Oakland countiesshown on the map have 63 hospitals contain-ing about 18,000 beds. However, 55 percent ofthese beds are inside the 5-psi ring and thustotally destroyed. Another 15 percent in the 2-to 5-psi band will be severely damaged, leaving5,000 beds remaining outside the region of sig-nificant damage. Since this is only 1 percent ofthe number of injured, these beds are in-capable of providing significant medical assist-ance. In the first few days, transport of injuredout of the damaged area will be severely ham-pered by debris clogging the streets. In general,only the nonprofessional assistance of nearbysurvivors can hope to hold down the largenumber of subsequent deaths that wouldotherwise occur. Even as transportation for theinjured out of the area becomes available insubsequent days, the total medical facilities ofthe United States will be severely overbur-dened, since in 1977 there were only 1,407,000hospital beds in the whole United States. Burnvictims will number in the tens of thousands;yet in 1977 there were only 85 specialized burn

centers, with probably 1,000 to 2,000 beds, inthe entire United States.

The total loss of all utilities in areas wherethere has been significant physical damage tothe basic structure of buildings is inevitable.The electric power grid will show both the in-herent strength and weakness of its complexnetwork. The CO I lapse of buiIdings and the top-pling of trees and utility poles, along with theinjection of tens of thousands of volts of EMPinto wires, will cause the immediate loss ofpower in a major sector of the total U.S. powergrid. Main electrical powerplants (near GrossePoint Park to the east, and Zug Island to thesouth) are both in the l-psi ring and should suf-fer only superficial damage. Within a day themajor area grid should be restored, bringingpower back to facilities located as close to theblast as the l-psi ring. Large numbers of power-Iine workers and their equipment brought infrom the surrounding States will be able togradually restore service to surviving struc-tures in the 1- to 2-psi ring over a period ofdays.

The water distribution system will remainmostly intact since, with the exception of onebooster pumping station at 2 psi (which willsuffer only minor damage), its facilities areoutside the damaged area. However, the lossof electric power to the pumps and the break-ing of many service connections to destroyedbuildings will immediately cause the loss of allwater pressure. Service to the whole area willbe restored only when the regional power gridis restored, and to the areas of Iight and in-termediate damage only as valves to brokenpipes can be located and shut off over a periodof days. There will be only sporadic damage toburied mains in the 2- to 5-psi region, but withincreasing frequency in the 5- to 12-psi region.Damaged sections near the explosion centerwiII have to be closed off.

The gas distribution system will receive simi-lar damage: loss of pressure from numerousbroken service connections, some brokenmains, particularly in the 5- to 12-psi ring, and

34 ● The Effects of Nuc/ear War

numerous resulting fires. Service will be slowlyrestored only as utility repairmen and serviceequipment are brought in from surroundingareas.

Rescue and recovery operations will dependheavily on the reestablishment of transporta-tion, which in Detroit relies on private cars,buses, and commercial trucks, using a radialinterstate system and a conventional urbangrid. Since bridges and overpasses are surpris-ingly immune to blast effects, those interstatehighways and broad urban streets without sig-nificant structures nearby will survive as far inas the 12-psi ring and can be quickly restoredto use on clearing away minor amounts ofdebris. However, the majority of urban streetswill be cluttered with varying quantities ofdebris, starting with tree limbs and other minorobstacles at 1 psi, and increasing in density upto the 12-psi ring, where all buildings, trees,and cars will be smashed and quite uniformlyredistributed over the area. It could takeweeks or months to remove the debris andrestore road transportation in the area.

The Detroit city airport, located in the mid-dle of the 2- to 5-psi ring, will have essentiallyall of its aircraft and facilities destroyed.Usually runways can be quickly restored to usefollowing minor debris removal but, in this par-ticular example with the southwest wind, theairport is the center of the fallout hot spotfrom the dust column as well as of the inten-sive fallout from the cloud. Thus, cleanup ef-forts to restore flight operations could notcommence for 2 weeks at the earliest, with theworkers involved in the cleanup receiving 100reins accumulated during the third week. TheDetroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airportand the Willow Run Airport are far outside theblast effects area and would be available assoon as the regional power grid electric servicewas restored.

The main train station, near the Detroit-Windsor highway tunnel, would have sufferedmajor damage (5 psi), but since few peoplecommute to the downtown area by train, itsloss would not be a major factor in the overallparalysis of transportation. The surrounding in-

dustry depends heavily on rail transportation,but rail equipment and lines will usually sur-vive wherever the facilities they support sur-vive.

Most gasoline fuel oil tanks are located outbeyond Dearborn and Lincoln Park and, at 16miles from the detonation, will have sufferedno damage. Arrival of fuel should not be im-peded, but its distribution will be totallydependent on cleanup of streets and highways.

The civil defense control center, located justbeyond the Highland Park area in the 1- to 2-psi ring, should be able to function without im-pairment. Commercial communications sys-tems (television and base radio transmitters)will be inoperable both from the loss of com-mercial power in the area and, for those facil-ities in the blast area, from EMP. Those notblast damaged should be restored in severaldays. In the meantime, mobile radio systemswill provide the primary means of communi-cating into the heavily damaged areas. Thetelephone system will probably remain largelyfunctional in those areas where the lines havesurvived structural damage in collapsing build-ings, or street damage in areas where they arenot buried.

Radioactive Fallout

The extent and location of radioactive fall-out will depend on weather conditions, espe-cially the speed and direction of the wind.Figures 2 and 3 show how a uniform windvelocity of 15 mph could distribute fallouteither over sparsely popuIated farming areas inCanada if the wind is from the southwest, orover Cleveland and Youngstown, Ohio, andPittsburgh, Pa., if the wind is from the north-west. It should not be forgotten that these fall-out patterns are idealized—such neat elipseswould occur in reality only with an absolutelyconstant wind and no rain.

No effort was made to calculate the deaths,injuries, or economic losses that might resultfrom such fallout patterns. However, the pos-sibilities are instructive:

. The onset of fallout would depend onwind velocity and distance from the ex-


plosion and it would be most dangerousduring the first few days. In the case of anattack on a single city (using a surfaceburst, as our example does), people livingdownwind would probably evacuate.Those who neither evacuated nor foundadequate fallout shelters would be sub-jected to dangerous levels of radiation:people in the inner contour would receivea fatal dose within the first week; peoplein the next contour out would contractvery severe radiation sickness if theystayed indoors and would probably re-ceive a fatal dose if they spent much timeoutdoors; people in the next contour outwould contract generally nonfatal radi-ation sickness, with increased hazards ofdeaths from other diseases. People in theouter contour (9o roentgens in the firstweek) would suffer few visible effects, buttheir life expectancy would drop as aresult of an increased risk of eventualcancer.

● As time passes, the continuing decay offallout radiation could be accelerated bydecontamination. Some decontaminationtakes place naturally, as rain washesradioactive particles away, and as theyare leached into the soil which attenuatesthe radiation. It is also possible to takespecific measures to speed decontamina-tion. Presumably evacuees would notmove back into a contaminated area untilthe effects of time and decontaminationhad made it safe.

● A Iimiting case is one in which no signifi-cant decontamination takes place, andareas receiving fallout become safe onlywhen the radioactive particles have de-cayed to safe levels. Decay to a level of500 millirems per year would require 8 to10 years for the inner contour (3,000 roent-gens in the first week); 6 years or so for thenext contour (900 roentgens in the firstweek); 3 to 4 years for the next contour(300 roentgens in the first week); andabout 3 years for the outer contour (90roentgens in the first week).

● Natural processes could concentratesome radioactive particles, and those that

entered the food chain could pose an ad-ditional hazard.

Summary

It should be emphasized that there are manyuncertainties in the assumptions underlyingthe description of the results of a l-Mt surfaceburst in Detroit. Nevertheless, several salientfeatures stand out:

●

●

●

●

●

seventy square miles of property destruc-tion (2 psi),a quarter-of -a-roil I ion fatalities, plus half amillion injuries,additional damage from widespread fires,casualties could have been greatly reduced by an alert and informed popula-tion, andrescue and recovery operations must beorganized and heavily supported fromoutside the area (food, medical, utility res-toration, and cleanup).

l-Mt Air Burst on Detroit

For comparison, the same l-Mt nuclearweapon was assumed to have been air burst atan altitude of 6,000 feet [1.8 km] over the sameinterstate intersection as used in the precedingground burst discussion. This altitude will max-imize the size of the 30-psi circle, but theradius of the 5-psi circle that results will beonly 10 percent smaller than what would haveresulted from a height of burst raised to the 5-psi optimized value. There will be severalsignificant differences in this case.

●

●

●

●

●

The sizes of the rings of pressure damagewilI be larger.The range of thermal burns and fire startswill also increase.There will be no significant fallout.There will be no crater.The strongest structures may partly sur-vive even directly under the blast.

Figure 5 shows the corresponding pressurecircles and figure 6 (second column) illustratesthat the number of fatalities nearly doubled,and the number of injured have greatly in-creased. At the same time, damage to major in-


Figure 5.— Detroit l-Mt Air Burst

I 1 1 1 1 J0 2 4 6 8 10

Miles

Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 3 7

Figure 6.—Casualties (thousands)

Population(1 ,000’s)

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

.

420s

220

dustrial facilities is becoming significant, withthe Chrysler plant in the middle of the 2- to 5-psi band, and the Ford River Rouge plant in the1- to 2-psi band.

25-Mt Air Burst on Detroit

For 25 Mt, we assumed a burst altitude of17,500 feet [5.3 km], over the same detonationpoint. Figure 7 shows the 12-, 5-, and 2-psi rings,but the 1-psi ring at 30.4 miles [48.9 km] is com-pletely off the map. It is obvious that damageand casualties wouId be increased even furtherhad the detonation point been moved about 5

1,360

1,840

1,260

390

1,100

2,460

miles [8 km] to the northwest. But even withoutthis shift, it is clear that the whole metropoli-tan area has been heavily damaged by the ex-plosive power of this huge weapon. The casual-ties are again shown on figure 6 (column 3).The contrasts to the l-Mt surface burst arestark:

● There will be very few survivors (1.1 mil-lion available to assist the much more nu-merous casua l t i e1-Mt surface burst in which3.7 mill ion survivors were potentiallyavai I able to assist the 640,000 casualties.


Figure 7.— Detroit 25-Mt Air Burst

I 1 1 1 1 JO 2 4 6 8 10

Miles

Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons . 39

● There wilI be virtually no habitable hous-ing in the area.

● Essentially all heavy industry will be total-ly destroyed.

As a result, rescue operations will have to betotally supported from outside the area, withevacuation of the 1.2 mi II ion survivors the onlyfeasible course. Recovery and rebuilding willbe a very long-term, problematical issue.

Leningrad

Leningrad is a major industrial and transpor-tation center built on the low-lying delta wherethe Neva River enters the Gulf of Finland. Theolder part of the city is built on the delta itself,with the newer residential sections leapfrogg-ing industrial sections, primarily to the southand southwest (figure 8). The residential andcommercial (but not industrial) areas areshown on the map.

The major difference between housing inLeningrad and that in Detroit is that Leningradsuburbs contain very few single-family resi-dences. In the older part of Leningrad, thebuildings have masonry load-bearing walls andwooden interior construction and are typicallysix to eight stories, reflecting the early codethat only church spires could be higher thanthe Tsar’s Winter Palace. The post-World WarI I housing construction is 10- to 12-story apart-ments having steel frames and precast con-crete walls, with the buildings comfortablyspaced on wide thoroughfares in open parklikesettings.

Since actual population density data forLeningrad was unavailable, simplifying demo-graphic assumptions are used. The assumedpopulated areas are shown in figure 9, brokendown into l-km [0.6 mile] squares. The statedarea of Leningrad is 500 km2 [193 mi2]. Sincethe shaded squares cover 427 km2 [165 mi2], itis assumed that the remaining areas are rela-tively uninhabited at night. It has also beenassumed that in these inhabited areas thepopulation density is uniform at 10,000 perkm’, because although the building density islower in the newer apartment areas, the build-

ings themselves are generalIy higher. Thus, thepopulation density does not drop off as it doesin the U.S. suburbs of predominately single-family houses.

l-Mt and 9-Mt Air Bursts on Leningrad

The Leningrad apartments described arelikely to have their walls blown out, and thepeople swept out, at about 5 psi, even thoughthe remaining steel skeleton will withstandmuch higher pressures. Thus, although the typeof construction is totally different from De-troit, the damage levels are so similar that thesame relationship between overpressure andcasualties is assumed (figure 1, p. 19).

The l-Mt and 9-Mt air burst pressure ringsare shown in figures 10 and 11. Note that forthe 9-Mt case the l-psi ring falls completely offthe map, as was the case for 25 Mt on Detroit.The calculated casualties are illustrated onfigure 6 (columns 4 and 5), and are about dou-ble those for Detroit for the comparable l-Mtcase. This resuIts directly from the higher aver-age population density. Other contrasts be-tween the cities can be noted; in Leningrad:

●

●

●

●

●

●

People live close to where they work. Ingeneral, there is no daily cross-city move-ment.Buildings (except in the old part of thecity) are unlikely to burn.Apartment building spacing is so great asto make fire spread unlikely, even thougha few buiIdings wouId burn down.There will be much less debris preventingaccess to damaged areas.Transportation is by rail to the outlyingareas, and by an excellent metro systemwithin the city.There is only one television station— inthe middle of the city— so mass commu-nications would be interrupted until otherbroadcasting equipment was brought inand set up.

Ten 40-kt Air Bursts on Leningrad

Figure 12 shows one possible selection ofburst points, set to have the 5-psi circles

40 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

lm.

13

12

In

,

z

3

4

,

Figure 8.— Leningrad—Commercial and Residential Sections

“ , ,

I I I

—

Ch, II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons . 41

Figure 9.—Leningrad—Populated Area

, I

, I

,

,.4 I .I I I

TIT

I I

,

1\


Figure 10.— Leningrad 1“Mt Air Burst


Figure 11 .—Leningrad 9-Mt Air Burst

LENINGRAD

,, ,

/


11

- . .

t

.<

! ,

+


touching, and with only the envelope of the 2-and l-psi rings shown, Since this is an effectsdiscussion only, it is assumed that this precisepattern can be achieved. The errors arisingfrom neglecting the overlap of the 2- to 5-psibands will be negligible compared to uncer-tainties in population distribution and struc-tural design. Casualty estimates are shown inthe right hand column of figure 6 (p. 37). Note

that fatalities are only slightly greater than forthe l-Mt case, which corresponds well to theequivalent megatonage (1.17 Mt) of the ten 40-kiloton (kt) weapons. However, the number ofinjured are considerably smaller because theyprimarily occur in the 2- to 5-psi band, which ismuch smalIer for the 40-kt pattern than for thesingle 1-Mt case.

1-KT TERRORIST WEAPON AT GROUND LEVEL

To this point this chapter has addressednuclear effects from current strategic weaponsystems. Another nuclear weapon of concern isone constructed by terrorists and detonated ina major city, * A terrorist group using stolen ordiverted fission material, having general tech-nical competence but lacking direct weapondesign experience, could probably build aweapon up to several kilotons. This weaponwould be large and heavy, certainly not theoften-discussed “suitcase bomb, ” so is Iikely tobe transported in a van or small truck, withthreatened detonation either in the street orthe parking garage of a building.

Because of the locations and yield of thisweapon, its effects will be much less devastingthan those of high-yield, strategic weapons.The range and magnitude of all the nuclear ef-fects will be greatly reduced by the low yields;in addition, the relative range of lethal effectswill be changed. At high yields, blast and ther-mal burn reach out to greater distances thandoes the initial nuclear radiation. At 1 kt thereverse is true; for example, 5-psi overpressureoccurs at 1,450 feet [442 m], while 600 reins ofinitial radiation reaches out to 2,650 feet [808m], For the 1-Mt surface burst, 5 psi occurred at2.7 miles and 600 reins at 1.7 miles.

In addition to these changes in range, thehighly built-up urban structure in which theweapon is placed wilI significantly modify theresulting nuclear environment. This occurs

* O T A r e p o r t o n ‘‘ NucIear Proliferation andi Safe-guards, ” U S Government Printing Office, June 1977, pp111-12.2

when the lethal range of effects shrink to suchan extent that they are comparable to the sizeof urban structures. It is indeed reasonable toexpect that the blast effects of a smalI weapon(5 psi at a range of only 1,450 feet) will beseverely infIuenced by nearby structures hav-ing comparable dimensions. Preliminary calcu-lations have confirmed this. For example, sup-pose a device is detonated in a van parkedalongside a 1,000-foot high building in the mid-dle of the block of an urban complex of ratherclosely spaced streets in one direction andmore broadly spaced avenues in the other di-rection. Whereas the 2.5-psi ring would have aradius of 2,100 feet [640 m] detonated on asmooth surface, it is found that this blast waveextends to 2,800 feet [850 m] directly down thestreet, but to only 1,500 feet [460 m] in a ran-dom direction angling through the built-upblocks. These calculations have been made bymany approximating factors which, if more ac-curately represented, would probably lead toan even greater reduction in range.

Other weapons effects will be similarly mod-ified from those predicted on the basis of arelatively open target area. I n the case of ini-tial nuclear radiation, a lethal 600 rem wouldbe expected to extend to 2,650 feet [808 m ]from 1 kt. Because of the great absorption ofthis radiation as it passes through the multiplewalIs of the several buildings in a block, it isexpected that 600 reins will reach out no fur-ther than 800 feet [245 m], thus covering anarea onIy one-tenth as great. The thermal radi-ation wilI affect only those directly exposed up


and down the street, while the majority of peo-ple will be protected by buildings. For thesame reason directly initiated fires will be in-significant, but the problem of secondary firesstarting from building damage wilI remain. Thelocal fal lout pattern also wi l l be highlydistorted by the presence of the buildings. Thefireball, confined between the buildings, willbe blown up to a higher altitude than other-wise expected, leading to reduced local falloutbut causing broadly distributed long-termfallout.

In summary, the ranges of nuclear effectsfrom a low-yield explosion in the confinedspace of an urban environment will differ sig-nificantly from large yield effects, but in waysthat are very difficult to estimate. Thus thenumbers of people and areas of buildings af-fected are very uncertain. However, it appearsthat, with the exception of streets directly ex-posed to the weapon, lethal ranges to peoplewill be smaller than anticipated and dom-inated by the blast-induced CO I lapse of nearbybuiIdings.

Chapter III

CIVIL DEFENSE

Chapter llI.–CIVIL DEFENSE

m . — .rage

494949495051535454545659

Chapter Ill

CIVIL DEFENSE

INTRODUCTION

Effective civil defense measures have the potential to reduce drasticallycasualties and economic damage in the short term, and to speed a nation’s economicrecovery in the long term. Civil defense seeks to preserve lives, economic capacity,postattack viability, and preattack institutions, authority, and values. The extent towhich specific civil defense measures would succeed in doing so is controversial.

Some observers argue that U.S. civil defense promotes deterrence by increasingthe credibility of U.S. retaliation and by reducing any Soviet “destructive advantage”in a nuclear war. Others, however, argue that a vigorous civil defense program wouldinduce people to believe that a nuclear war was “survivable” rather than “unthink-able,” and that such a change in attitude would increase the risk of war.

CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES

Civil defense seeks to protect the popula-tion, protect industry, and improve the qualityof postattack life, institutions, and values. Thissection considers several measures that sup-port these goals.

Population Protection

People near potential targets must eitherseek protective shelter or evacuate fromthreatened areas to safer surroundings; if notat risk from immediate effects, they must stillprotect themselves from fallout. Both forms ofprotection depend on warning, shelter, sup-plies, life-support equipment (e. g., air filtra-tion, toilets, communication devices), instruc-tion, public health measures, and provision forrescue operations. I n addition, evacuation in-volves transportation, This section examineseach form of protection.

Blast Shelters

Some structures, particularly those designedfor the purpose, offer substantial protectionagainst direct nuclear effects (blast, thermalradiation, ionizing radiation, and related ef-

fects such as induced fires). Since blast isusually the most difficult effect to protectagainst, such shelters are generally evaluatedon blast resistance, and protection againstother direct effects is assumed. Since most ur-ban targets can be destroyed by an overpres-sure of 5 to 10 psi, a shelter providing protec-tion against an overpressure of about 10 psi iscalled a blast shelter, although many blastshelters offer greater protection. Other shel-ters provide good protection against fallout,but little resistance to blast–such “falloutshelters” are disccused in the next section.Blast shelters generally protect against fallout,but best meet this purpose when they containadequate Iife-support systems. (For example, asubway station without special provisions forwater and ventiIation wouId make a good blastshelter but a poor fallout shelter. )

Nuclear explosions produce “rings” of var-ious overpressures. If the overpressure at agiven spot is very low, a blast shelter is un-necessary; if the overpressure is very high (e. g.,a direct hit with a surface burst), even the bestblast shelters will fail. The “harder” the blastshelter (that is, the greater the overpressure it

49

—


can resist), the greater the area in which itcould save its occupants’ lives. Moreover, ifthe weapon height of burst (HOB) is chosen tomaximize the area receiving 5 to 10 psi, only avery smalI area (or no area at all) receives morethan 40 to 50 psi. Hence, to attack blast shel-ters of 40 to 50 psi (which is a reasonably at-tainable hardness), weapons must be deto-nated at a lower altitude, reducing the areaover which buildings, factories, etc., are de-stroyed.

The costs of blast shelters depend on thedegree of protection afforded and on whetherthe shelter is detached or is in a building con-structed for other purposes. However, a largevariation in costs occurs between sheltersadded to existing buildings and those built aspart of new construction. The installation ofshelters in new construction, or “slanting,” ispreferable, but it could take as long as 20 yearsfor a national policy of slanting to provide ade-quate protection in cities.

An inexpensive way to protect populationfrom blast is to use existing underground facil-ities such as subways, where people can belocated for short periods for protection. If peo-ple must remain in shelters to escape fallout,then life-support measures requiring specialpreparation are needed.

Other lethal nuclear effects cannot be over-looked. Although, as noted above, blast shel-ters usually protect against prompt radiation,the shelters must be designed to ensure thatthis is the case.

Another problem is protection against fall-out. If a sheltered population is to survive fall-out, two things must be done. First, falloutmust be prevented from infiltrating sheltersthrough doors, ventilation, and other conduits.Other measures to prevent fallout from beingtracked or carried into a shelter must also betaken. More important, the shelter must enableits occupants to stay inside as long as outsideradiation remains dangerous; radiation dosesare cumulative and a few brief exposures tooutside fallout may be far more hazardousthan constant exposure to a low level of radia-tion that might penetrate into a shelter.

Since radiation may remain dangerous forperiods from a few days to several weeks, eachshelter must be equipped to support its occu-pants for at least this time. Requirements in-clude adequate stocks of food, water, and nec-essary medical supplies, sanitary facilities, andother appliances. Equipment for controllingtern perature, humid i t y , and “a i r qua l i t y ”standards is also critical. With many peopleenclosed in an airtight shelter, temperatures,humidity, and carbon dioxide content in-crease, oxygen availability decreases, and fetidmaterials accumulate. Surface fires, naturallyhot or humid weather, or crowded conditionsmay make things worse. If unregulated, slightincreases in heat and humidity quickly lead todiscomfort; substantial rises in temperature,humidity, and carbon dioxide over time couldeven cause death. Fires are also a threat toshelterers because of extreme tern peratures(possibly exceeding 2,000” F) and carbonmonoxide and other noxious gases. A large firemight draw oxygen out of a shelter, suffocat-ing shelterers. World War I I experience indi-cates that rubble heated by a firestorm may re-main intolerably hot for several days after thefire is put out.

Fallout Shelters

In the United States, fallout shelters havebeen identified predominantly in urban areas(by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency(DCPA) shelter survey), to protect against fall-out from distant explosions, e.g., a Soviet at-tack on U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs). On the other hand, Soviet falloutshelters are primarily intended for the ruralpopulation and an evacuated urban popula-tion.

Fallout protection is relatively easy toachieve. Any shielding material reduces theradiation intensity. Different materials reducethe intensity by differing amounts. For exam-ple, the thickness (in inches) of various sub-stances needed to reduce gamma radiation bya factor of 10 is: steel, 3.7; concrete, 12; earth,18; water, 26; wood, 50. Consider an averagehome basement that provides a protection fac-tor (PF) of 10 (reduces the inside level of radia-

Ch. ///—Civi/ Defense . 51

tion to one-tenth of that outside). Without ad-ditional protection, a family sheltered herecould still be exposed to dangerous levels ofradiation over time. For example, after 7 daysan accumulated dose of almost 400 reins in-side the basement would occur if the radiationoutside totaled 4,000 roentgens. This could beattenuated to a relatively safe accumulationof 40 reins, if about 18 inches of dirt could bepiled against windows and exposed walls be-fore the fallout begins. Thirty-six inches of dirtwould reduce the dose to a negligible level of 4re ins (400 - 100). Thus, as DCPA notes,“fallout protection is as cheap as dirt. ” Movingdry, unfrozen earth to increase the protectionin a fallout shelter requires considerable timeand effort, if done by hand. A cubic foot ofearth weighs about 100 lbs; a cubic yard about2,700 Ibs. Given time, adequate instructions,and the required materials, unskilled peoplecan convert home basements into effectivefallout shelters.

The overall effectiveness of fallout shelters,therefore, depends on: (a) having an adequateshelter—or enough time, information, andmaterials to build or improve an expedientshelter; (b) having sufficient food, water, andother supplies to enable shelterers to stay shel-tered until the outside fallout decays to a safelevel (they may need to remain in shelters forperiods ranging from a few days to over 1month, depending on fallout intensity); and (c)entering the shelter promptly before absorbingmuch radiation. (An individual caught by fall-out before reaching shelter could have diffi-culty entering a shelter without contaminatingit. )

Over the years, home fallout shelters havereceived considerable attention, with the Gov-ernment distributing plans that could be usedto make home basements better shelters. Suchplans typically involve piling dirt against win-dows and (if possible) on fIoors above the shel-ter area, stocking provisions, obtaining radiosand batteries, building makeshift toilets, andso forth. Such simple actions can substantiallyincrease protection against radiation and mayslightly improve protection against blast. How-

5

ever, few homes in the South and West havebasements.

With adequate time, instructions, and mate-rials, an “expedient” shelter offering rea-sonable radiation protection can be con-structed. This is a buried or semi buried struc-ture, shielded from radiation by dirt and othercommon materials. Expedient shelter construc-tion figures prominently in Soviet civil defenseplanning.

Evacuation

Evacuation is conceptually simple: peoplemove from high-risk to low-risk areas. I n effect,evacuation (or crisis relocation) uses safedistances for protection from immediate nu-clear effects. The effectiveness of crisis reloca-tion is highly scenario-dependent. If relocatedpeople have time to find or build shelters, ifthe areas into which people evacuate do notbecome new targets, and if evacuated targetsare attacked, evacuation will save many Iives.

Although evacuating is far less costly percapita than constructing blast shelters, plan-ning and implementing an evacuation is diffi-cult. First, people must be organized and trans-ported to relocation areas. This is a staggering


logistics problem. Unless people are assignedto specific relocation areas, many areas couldbe overwhelmed with evacuees, causing severehealth and safety problems. Unless privatetransportation is strictly controlled, monumen-tal traffic jams could result. Unless adequatepublic transportation is provided, some peoplewould be stranded in blast areas. Unless neces-sary supplies are at relocation areas, peoplemight rebel against authority. Unless medicalcare is distributed among relocation areas,health problems would multiply.

Once evacuated, people must be sheltered.They might be assigned to existing public shel-ters or to private homes with basements suit-able for shelter. If materials are available andtime permits, new public shelters could bebuilt. Evacuees require many of the same life-support functions described previously underfallout shelters; providing these in sufficientquantity would be difficult.

Evacuation entails many unknowns. Thetime available for evacuation is unknown, butextremely critical. People should be evacuatedto areas that will receive little fallout, yetfallout deposition areas cannot be accuratelypredicted in advance. Crisis relocation couldincrease the perceived threat of nuclear warand this might destablize a crisis.

Whether people would obey an evacuationorder depends on many factors, especiallypublic perception of a deteriorating interna-tional crisis. If an evacuation were ordered andpeople were willing to comply with it, wouldtime allow compliance? If the attack camewhile the evacuation is underway, more peo-ple might die than if evacuation had not beenattempted. Sufficiency of warning depends oncircumstances; a U.S. President might order anevacuation only if the Soviets had started one.In this case, the United States might have lessevacuation time than the Soviets. The abun-dance of transportation in the United Statescould in theory permit faster evacuation, butpanic, traffic jams, and inadequate planningcould nullify this advantage. Disorder andpanic, should they occur, would impede evac-uation.

The success of evacuation in the UnitedStates would likely vary from region to region.Generally, evacuation requires little planningin sparsely populated areas. In some areas,especially the Midwest and South, evacuationis feasible but requires special planning be-cause fallout from attacks on ICBMs mightmean longer evacuation distances. Evacuationfrom the densely populated Boston-to-Wash-ington and Sacramento-to-San Diego corridors,with their tens of millions of people and lim-ited relocation areas, may prove impossible.

The Soviet Union reportedly has plans forlarge-scale evacuation of cities, and recent de-bate on its effectiveness has stimulated discus-sion of a similar plan, known as “crisis reloca-tion’” for the United States. Some key consid-erations are:

●

●

●

Tactical warning of a missile attack doesnot give enough time for an evacuation.Evacuation plans thus assume that an in-tense crisis will provide several days’ stra-tegic warning of an attack, and that theleadership would make use of this warn-i ng.

Unlike in-place blast sheltering, peace-time expenditures on evacuation are rela-tively small, since most expendituresoccur only when a decision has beenreached to implement plans.

Evacuation involves considerably morepreattack planning than a shelter-basedcivil defense plan, as logistical and otherorganizational requirements for movingmill ions of people in a few days are muchmore complex. Plans must be made tocare for the relocated people. Peoplemust know where to go. Transportation orevacuation routes must be provided. A re-cent survey of the U.S. population re-vealed that many would spontaneouslyevacuate in a severe crisis, which could in-terfere with a planned evacuation.

Some U.S. analysts argue that detailedSoviet evacuation plans, together with evi-dence of practical evacuation preparations, in-dicate a reasonable evacuation capability,Others claim that actual Soviet capabilities

Ch. Ill—Civil Defense ● 5 3

are far less than those suggested in officialplans and that, in particular, an actual evacua-tion under crisis conditions would result in amixture of evacuation according to plan forsome, delay for others, and utter chaos in someplaces. In any case, a large evacuation hasnever been attempted by the United States.The extent of Soviet evacuation exercises is amatter of controversy.

Crisis relocation of large populations wouldhave major economic impacts. These are thesubject of a current DCPA study in which theTreasury, Federal Reserve Board, and FederalPreparedness Agency are participating. Resultsto date indicate that economic impacts of relo-cation, followed by crisis resolution and returnof evacuees, could continue for 1 to 3 years,but that appropriate Government policiescould significantly reduce such impacts. Ifblast shelters for key workers are built in riskareas, and if workers are willing to accept therisks, essential industries couId be kept func-tioning while most people were in relocationareas. Such a program would substantially re-duce the economic impacts of an extendedcrisis relocation.

Protection of Industry andOther Economic Resources

Efforts to preserve critical economic assets,and thereby accelerate postattack recovery,could take several forms. For example, if thereis warning, railroad rolling stock might bemoved from urban classification yards intorural locations, perhaps saving many cars andtheir cargo. Some industrial equipment andtooling might be protected by burial and sand-bagging. Other industrial facilities, such aspetroleum refineries and chemical plants, maybe impossible to protect. Industrial defensemeasures include measures to make buildingsor machinery more resistant to blast pressure(hardening), dispersal of individual sites and ofmobile assets (e. g., transport, tools, equip-ment, fuel), proliferation of “redundant” andcomplementary capabilities, and plans to min-imize disruption to an economy and its compo-nents in wartime by coordinated shutdown of

industrial processes, speedy damage control,and plant repair.

There is no practicable way to protect an in-dustrial facility that is targeted by a nuclearweapon with 1980’s accuracy. Protective meas-ures might, however, be helpful at industrialfacilities that are not directly targeted, butthat are near other targets.

Some equipment within structures can beprotected against blast, fire, and debris withsuitable measures. Other equipment, especial-ly costly and critical equipment, and finishedproducts, can be sheltered in semiburied struc-tures and other protective facilities. A recentstudy’ demonstrated that special hardeningmeasures could save some machinery at blastoverpressures higher than necessary to destroythe building in which the machinery is housed.However, it is unknown whether the amount ofequipment that could actually be protectedwould make much difference in recovery.

Another method of protecting industrialcapabilities is the maintenance of stock piIes ofcritical equipment or of finished goods. Stock-piling will not provide a continuing output ofthe stockpiled goods, but could ensure theavailability of critical items until their produc-tion could be restarted. Stockpiles can ob-viously be targeted if their locations areknown, or might suffer damage if near otherpotential targets.

Finally, dispersal of industry, both within agiven facility consisting of a number of build-ings and between facilities, can decrease dam-age to buildings from weapons aimed at otherbuildings. A Soviet text on civil defense notesthat:

Measures may be taken nationally to limitthe concentration of industry in certain re-gions. A rational and dispersed location of in-dustries in the territories of our country is ofgreat national economic importance, primari-ly from the standpoint of an accelerated eco-nomic development, but also from the stand-

‘T. K, Jones, “lndustrlal Survival and Recovery AfterNuclear Attack A Report to the Joint Committee on De-fense Production, U S Congress” (Seattle, Wash TheBoeing Aerospace Co , November 1976)

54 Ž The Elfects of Nuclear War

point of organizing protection from weaponsof mass destruction. 2

However, there is little evidence that theU.S.S.R. has adopted industrial dispersion asnational policy. Despite reports of Soviet in-dustrial decentralization over the last decadeor so, Soviet industry appears more concen-trated than ever. An excellent example is theKama River truck and auto facility, a giantcomplex the size of Manhattan Island whereabout one-fifth of al I Soviet motor vehicles isproduced. Clear ly, Soviet planners havechosen industrial efficiency and economies ofscale over civil defense considerations. Sim-

2P. T, E gorov, 1 A S hl yakov, and N. 1. A Iabi n, Civi/ De-fense. Translated by the Scientific Translation Service(Springfield, Va : Department of Commerce, NationalTechnical Information Service, December 1973), p 101.

ilarly, the United States has no directed policyof decentralization, and other facts suggestthat nuclear war is not a significant civil plan-ning determinant. There are those who reasonthat this “disregard” for many of the conse-quences of nuclear war indicates that policy-makers betieve nuclear war is a very low possi-bility.

Planning for Postattack Activities

The economic and social problems follow-ing a nuclear attack cannot be foreseen clearlyenough to permit drafting of detailed recoveryplans. In contrast, plans can be made to pre-serve the continuity of government, and boththe United States and the Soviet Union surelyhave such plans.

U.S. AND SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

U.S. Civil Defense

U.S. attitudes have been ambivalent towardcivil defense ever since the Federal Civil De-fense Act of 1950 responded to the first Soviettest of atomic bombs in 1949. Indeed, much ofthe U.S. civil defense was a reaction to exter-nal factors rather than part of a carefully-thought-through program. The “duck and cov-er” program and the evacuation route pro-gram, both of the early 1950’s, responded tothe threat of Soviet atomic bombs carried bymanned bombers. Lack of suitable protectionagainst fire and blast led to plans for rapidevacuation of cities during the several hoursseparating radar warning and the arrival ofSoviet bombers.

The first Soviet test of thermonuclear weap-ons in 1953 necessitated changes in theseplans. The much higher yield of these weaponsmeant that short-distance evacuations andmodestly hard blast shelters in cities were inef-fective for protecting people, and that simply“ducking” in school corridors, while perhapsbetter than nothing, was not part of a seriouscivil defense plan. H-bombs also raised the

specter of radioactive fallout blanketing largeareas of the country. Previously, civil defensecould be conceptualized as moving people ashort distance out of cities, while the rest ofthe country would be unscathed and able tohelp the target cities. Fallout meant that largeareas of the country—the location of whichwas unpredictable— would become contam-inated, people would be forced to take shelterin those areas, and their inhabitants, thuspinned down, would be unable to offer muchhelp to attacked cities for several weeks.

The advent of ICBMs necessitated furtherchanges. Their drastically reduced warningtimes precluded evacuations on radar warningof attack.

With previous plans made useless by ad-vances in weapons technology, the UnitedStates cast around for alternative plans. Oneapproach was to identify and stock falloutshelters, while recognizing the impracticabilityof protecting people from blast. After theBerlin crisis of 1961, the President initiated aprogram to provide fallout shelters for the en-tire population. The National Shelter Survey


Program was commenced on a crash basis. ThePresident proposed:

1. the survey, identification, and stocking ofexisting shelters;

2. the subsidization of fallout shelter in-stalIation in new construction; and

3. the construction of single-purpose falloutshelters where these were needed.

Only the first step in this program was author-ized. The Government also urged people tobuild home fallout shelters.

The civil defense program was broadened inthe early 1970’s to include preparedness forpeacetime as well as wartime disasters. The1970’s also saw a new emphasis on operationalcapabilities of al I available assets, includingwarning systems, shelters, radiological detec-tion instruments and trained personnel, policeand fire-fighting forces, doctors and hospitals,and experienced management. This develop-ment program was called On-Site Assistance.

I n the mid-1970’s, contingency planning toevacuate city and other high-risk populationsduring a period of severe crisis was initiated.

At present, U.S. civil defense has the follow-ing plans and capabilities:

Organization. – The Federal civil defensefunction has been repeatedly reorganizedsince the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.The most recent organization gave prime re-sponsibility for civil defense to the DefenseCivil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), housed inthe Defense Department. The Federal Pre-paredness Agency (FPA) in the General Serv-ices Administration conducts some planningfor peacetime nuclear emergencies, economiccrises, continuity of Government following anuclear attack, and other emergencies. TheFederal Disaster Assistance Administration(FDAA), in the Department of Housing and Ur-ban Development, is concerned with peace-time disaster response. In 1978, Congressassented to a Presidential proposal to reorga-nize civil defense and peacetime disaster func-tions into a single agency, the Federal Emer-gency Management Agency, which will incor-porate DC PA, FPA, FDAA, and other agencies.

Civil Protection. -The United States is look-ing increasingly at crisis relocation (CR), underwhich c i ty-dwel lers would move to rural“host” areas when an attack appeared likely.CR would require several days of warning, so itwould be carried out during a crisis rather thanon radar warning of missile launch. The UnitedStates has conducted surveys to identifypotential fallout shelters in host areas, andblast and fallout shelters in risk areas. ThroughFY 1971, about 118,000 buildings had beenmarked as shelters; about 95,000 other build-ings have been identified as potential sheltersbut have not been marked. Marking would bedone in crises. In the early 1960’s, the FederalGovernment purchased austere survival sup-plies for shelters. The shelf life of these sup-plies has expired; shelter stocking is now to beaccomplished during a crisis.

Direction and Control.–The Federal Govern-ment has several teletype, voice, and radiosystems for communicating in crises betweenDCPA, FDAA, and FPA headquarters, regionaloffices, States, and Canada. State and localgovernments are planning to integrate commu-nication systems into this net. DCPA has eightregions, each with emergency operating cen-ters (EOCs). Six of these centers are hardenedagainst nuclear blast. Forty-three States haveEOCs, and EOCs with fallout protection areoperational or under development in localesincluding about half the population.

Attack Warning.–Warning can be passedover the National Warning System to over1,200 Federal, State, and local warning points,which operate 24 hours a day. Once warninghas reached local levels, it is passed to thepublic by sirens or other means. Almost half ofthe U.S. population is in areas that couldreceive outdoor warning within 15 minutes ofthe issue of a national warning. Disseminationof warning to the public, however, is inade-quate in many places.

Emergency Public Information.–Fallout pro-tection, emergency power generators, and re-mote units have been provided for radio sta-tions in the Emergency Broadcast System, to


permit broadcast of emergency informationunder fallout conditions. About a third of thestations are in high-risk areas and could bedestroyed by blast. A program has been initi-ated to protect 180 stations from electromag-netic pulse (EM P). About one-third of the morethan 5,000 localities participating in the civildefense program have reported developmentof plans to provide the public with informationin emergencies.

Radiological Defense. — This function encom-passes radiological detection instruments,communication, plans and procedures, andpersonnel trained to detect and evaluate radio-logical hazards. Between FY 1955-74, the Fed-eral Government had procured about 1.4 mil-lion rate meters, 3.4 million dose meters, andrelated equipment. Effective radiological de-fense would require an estimated 2.4 millionpeople to be trained as radiological monitorsin a crisis.

Citizen Training.–The civil defense programonce provided substantial training for the pub-l i c v i a n e w s m e d i a.must now be relied on to educate citizens onhazards and survival actions. DCPA offersclassroom and home study training for civil de-fense personnel.

Several points emerge from this discussion:

1.

2.,

On paper, civil defense looks effective.The United States has more than enoughidentified fallout shelter spaces for the en-tire population, which include under-ground parking, subways, tunnels, anddeep basement potential blast shelters.The United States has a vast network ofhighways and vehicles; every holidayweekend sees a substantial urban evacua-tion. CB and other radios can aid commu-nicat ion after an attack. The UnitedStates has enormous resources (food,medical supplies, electrical-generatingcapability, etc. ) beyond the minimumneeded for survival.However, no one at all thinks that theUnited States has an effective civil de-fense.

3,

4.

U.S. civil defense capability is weakenedbecause some elements are in place whileothers are not or have not been main-tained. Shelters will not support life iftheir occupants have no water. Evacua-tion plans will save fewer people if hostareas have inadequate shelter spaces andsupplies, or if people are poorly distrib-uted among towns.Faced with drastic technological change,moral and philosophical questions aboutthe desirability of civil defense, and budg-etary constraints, Federal plans have beenmarked by vacillation, shifts in direction,and endless reorganization.

Soviet Civil Defense

Soviet civil defense has faced the same tech-nical chalIenges as the United States — atomicbombs, hydrogen bombs fallout, ICBMs, lim-ited warning, and so on. The Soviet Union hasconsistently devoted more resources to civildefense than has the United States, and hasbeen more willing to make and follow long-term plans. However, it is not known howSoviet leaders evaluate the effectiveness oftheir civil defense.

The Soviet civil defense organization is apart of the Ministry of Defense and is headedby Deputy Minister Colonel-General A. Al-tunin. Permanent full-time staff of the organ i-zaiion is believed to number over 100,000.Some civil defense training is compulsory forall Soviet citizens, and many also study firstaid. There has also been a large shelter-build-ing program.

The Soviets reportedly have an extensive ur-ban evacuation plan. Each urban resident isassigned to a specific evacuation area, locatedon COIIective farms; each farmer has instruc-tions and a list of the people he is to receive. Iffallout protection is not available, it is plannedthat simple expedient shelters would be con-structed quickly. Soviet plans recommend thatshelters be located at least 40 km [25 miles]from the city district to provide sufficient pro-tection against the effects of a l-Mt weapon

Ch. Ill—Civil Defense . 57

exploding at a distance of 10 to 20 km [6 to 12miles].

In July 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) released its unclassified study, “SovietCivil Defense. ”3 In brief, the report finds thatSoviet civil defense is “an ongoing nationwideprogram under military control. ” It notes sev-eral motivations for the Soviet program: thetraditional Soviet emphasis on homeland de-fense, to convince potential adversaries theycannot defeat the Soviet Union, to increaseSoviet strength should war occur, to help main-tain the logistics base for continuing a war ef-fort following nuclear attack, to save peopleand resources, and to promote postattack re-covery. It observes that Sov’iet civil defense “isnot a crash effort, but its pace increased begin-ning in the late 1960’ s.” It points to several dif-ficulties with the Soviet program: bureaucraticproblems, apathy, little protection of econom-ic installations, and little dispersal of industry.

According to the report, the specific goals ofSoviet civil defense are to protect the leader-ship, essential workers, and others, in that pri-ority order; to protect productivity; and to sus-tain people and prepare for economic recov-ery following an attack. In assessing Soviet ef-forts to meet these goals, the CIA found:

The Soviets probably have sufficient blast-shelter space in hardened command posts forvirtually all the leadership elements at al Ilevels (about 110,000 people) Shelters atkey economic installations could accommo-date about 12 to 24 percent of the total workf o r c e

A minimum of 10 to 20 percent of the totalpopulation in urban areas (including essentialworkers) could be accommodated at presentin blast-resistant shelters

The critical decision to be made by theSoviet leaders in terms of sparing the popula-tion would be whether or not to evacuatecities. Only by evacuating the buIk of the ur-ban population could they hope to achieve amarked reduction in the number of urbancasualties. An evacuation of urban areas couldprobably be accomplished in two or three

‘Sov/et Civil Defense (Washington, D C Director o fCentral Intelligence, July 1978), the text quotation belowIS from pp 2-3

days, with as much as a week required for fullevacuation of the largest cities

Soviet measures to protect the economycould not prevent massive industrial dam-a g e

(Regarding postattack recovery), the coor-dination of requirements with available sup-plies and transportation is a complex problemfor Soviet planners even in peacetime, letalone following a large-scale nuclear attack

Assessing the effectiveness of Soviet civildefense, the CIA study found that a worst caseattack could kilI or injure welI over 100 milI ionpeople, but many leaders would survive; with afew days for evacuation and shelter, casualtiescould be reduced by more than 50 percent;and with a week for preattack planning, “So-viet civil defenses could reduce casualties tothe low tens of milIions. ”

The U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency (AC DA) released “An Analysis of CivilDefense in Nuclear War” in December 1978.4

This study concluded that Soviet civil defensecould do Iittle to mitigate the effects of a ma-jor attack. Blast shelters might reduce fatal-ities to 80 percent of those in an unshelteredcase, but this could be offset by targeting addi-tional weapons (e. g., those on bombers andsubmarines that would be alerted during acrisis) against cities. Evacuation might reducefatalities to a range of 25 million to 35 million,but if the United States were to target theevacuated population, some 50 million mightbe killed. Furthermore, civil defense could dolittle to protect the Soviet economy, so manyevacuees and millions of injured could not besupported after the attack ended.

The sharp disagreement about Soviet civildefense capability revolves around several keyissues:

Can the Soviets follow their stated civil defenseplans? Some believe that the Soviets would filltheir urban blast shelters to maximum occu-pancy rather than leave unevaluated peoplewithout protection and would evacuate allpersons for whom no urban shelter spaces

‘“An Analysls of CIVII Defense In Nuclear War” (Wash-ington, D C U S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agen-cy, December 1978)

1 -! ‘ -

58 ● The Effects of Nuclear war

were available. Others believe that administra-tive confusion and other difficulties might ren-der the Soviets far more vulnerable in practice.

How widely would evacuees be dispersed? Itis obvious that the more widely dispersed anurban population is, the fewer casualties an at-tack on cities will produce. It is equally ob-vious that the more time there is for an evacua-tion, the more widely people can disperse.Nevertheless, there is great uncertainty overhow well an evacuation would perform inpractice. A Boeing study estimates that if ur-ban dwellers walked for a day away from thecities, the population of cities would be moreor less distributed over a circle of radius 30miles [48.3 km]. 5 If they did not dig shelters, aU.S. attack would kill about 27 percent of theSoviet population; if they dug expedient shel-ters, the attack would kill about 4 percent. Ifthe Soviets fulIy implemented their evacuationplans but the evacuees were not protectedfrom fallout, then 8 percent of the total popu-lation would die; if they constructed hastyshelters, 2 percent would die. AC DA, however,argues that even if the Soviet Union is totallysuccessful in implementing its evacuation, theUnited States could, if the objective is to killpeople, use its reserve weapons against theevacuated population and ground burst itsweapons, thus inflicting from 70 million to 85milIion fatalities.

How well would evacuees be protected fromfallout? Some believe that Soviet evacueescould be fully protected against very highradiation levels if they are allowed a 1- to 2 -week preattack “surge” period. (Tests con-ducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratoryhave shown, for example, that American fam-ilies can construct adequate fallout shelters in24 to 36 hours, if they are issued the necessarytools and instructions.)b The ACDA study as-

5T K. Jones, “Effect of Evacuation and Sheltering onPotential Fatalities From a Nuclear Exchange” (Seattler

Wash.: The Boeing Aerospace Co,, 1977),6S J Condie, et al , “Feasibility of Citizen Construction

of Expedient Fallout Shelters” (Oak Ridge, Term,: OakRidge National Laboratory, August 1978), See also R. W,Kindig, “Field Testing and Evaluation of Expedient Shel-ters” (Denver, Colo,: University of Colorado, February1978)

sumes that from one-third to two-thirds of theevacuees would have little protection againstfallout. The two cases are not necessarily ex-clusive, since the ability to dig in depends onassumptions, especially time available forpreparations before an attack. Some assume alengthy and deepening crisis would precedenuclear strikes. Others believe that error ormiscalculation would lead to nuclear war,leaving the United States or the Soviet Unionunprepared and not having ordered evac-uation. I n addition, should an attack occurwhen the earth is frozen or muddy, construc-tion of expedient shelters would be difficult.

How effective is Soviet industrial hardening?Soviet civil defense manuals provide instruc-tions for the last-minute hardening of key in-dustrial equipment in order to protect it fromblast, falling debris, and fires. A considerablecontroversy has developed in the United Statesas to how effective such a program would be.The Boeing Company and the Defense NuclearAgency carried out a number of tests that ledthem to conclude that “techniques similar tothose described in Soviet Civil Defense manu-als for protecting industrial equipment appearto hold great promise for permitting earlyrepair of industrial machinery and its restora-tion to production.’” Others have challengedthis conclusion: for example, the ACDA civildefense study concluded that “attempts toharden above-ground facilities are a futile ex-ercise, and that even buried facilities whichare targeted cannot survive. ”

To understand this issue, one must recog-nize that it is virtually impossible to harden aneconomic asset so that it would survive if itwere directly targeted. By lowering the heightof burst, the maximum overpressure can be in-creased (at a small sacrifice to the area cov-ered by moderate overpressures), and evenmissile silos can be destroyed by sufficientlyaccurate weapons. However, many economictargets are relatively close together (for exam-ple, separate buildings in a single factory), andit iS possible and efficient to aim a single

‘E”dwin N, York, Industrial Survival/Recovery (Seattle,Wash.: The Boeing Aerospace Co., undated).

—


weapon so that it destroys a number of targetsat once. If each target is adequately hardened,then the attacker must either increase thenumber or yield of weapons used, or else ac-cept less damage to the lower priority targets,However, the practicability of hardening entireinstallations to this extent is questionable, andthe more likely measure would be to hardenkey pieces of machinery, The uncertaintiesabout the Soviet program include the follow-ing:

● How much hardening could be done inthe days before an attack?

. Would the United States target additionalor larger weapons to overcome the effectsof hardening?

● To what extent would the survival of themost important pieces of machinery in theless important Soviet factories contributeto economic recovery?

CONCLUDING NOTE

These pages have provided a brief descrip- ●

tion of civil defense as it might affect the im-pact of nuclear war. However, no effort hasbeen made to answer the following key ques- ●

tions:

• WouId a civiI defense program on a largescaIe make a big difference, or onIy a mar- ●

ginal difference, in the impact of a nucle-ar war on civil society?

What impact would various kinds of civildefense measures have on peacetime di-plomacy or crisis stability?

What civil defense measures would be ap-propriate if nuclear war were consideredlikely in the next few years?

What kind and size of civil defense pro-gram might be worth the money it wouldcost ?

Chapter IV

THREE ATTACK CASES

—

overview ● **************************Case 2: A Soviet Attack on U.S. Oil Refineries

The First Hour: Immediate Effects . . . . .Fatalities and Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . .Petroleum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Electric Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Casualty Handling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Military. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reaction: The First Week . . . . . . . . . . . .Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Long-Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 2: A U.S. Attack on Soviet Oil RefineriesImmediate Effects: The First Hour . . . . .Reaction: The First Week . . . . . . . . . . . .Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Long-Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 3: A Counterforce Attack Against theUnited States ● * * * * e * *o** * * * * * * * * * * *

Prompt Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Period Before Fallout Deposition.Casualty Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Contamination Period . . . . . . . . . . .Economic Disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recuperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Long-Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 3: A Comterforce Attack Against theSoviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The First Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Shelter Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Recuperation . . . . . . . . . . .“. . . . . . . . . .Long Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 4: A large soviet Attack On U.S. Militaryand Economic● Targets ● 8 * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The First Few Hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

636465696977717172727273747576777880

8181818386888890

9090919394

9495

Page

The First Few Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96The Shelter Period (Up to a Month). . . . . 97The Recuperation Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Case4: A large U.S. Attack on Soviet Militaryand Economic Targets

The First Few Hours. .The First Few Days . .The Shelter period. . .Recuperation . . . . . .

● * * * * * * * * * * * * 100. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104. ’ . 105., . . . . . . . . . .

TABLES

6.

7.

8.

9.10.11.

13.

14.15.

16.

Page

Energy Production and DistributionComponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65U.S. Refinery Locations and RefiningCapacity by Rank Order. . . . . . . . . . . . 67Summary of U.S.S.R. Attack on theUnited States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Electric Powerplants in Philadelphia. . . 71Summary of U. S. Attack on U.S.S.R. . . . 76Approximate Distance of Various EffectsFrom Selected Nuclear Air Bursts . . . . . 77

FIGURESPage

Approximate Footprint Coverage–U.S.and Soviet attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66Philadelphia and Surrounding Counties 70Counterforce Targets in the UnitedStates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Expected Casualties as a Function ofTypical Monthly Winds Resulting From anAttack on Selected Military Targets inthe United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Chapter IV

THREE ATTACK CASES.

OVERVIEW

The following pages present descriptions of three ‘*cases” of nuclear attacks.(The tutorial on nuclear effects–chapter H-was the first of our four cases.) As men-tioned in the Executive Summary, these cases do not necessarily represent “prob-able” kinds of nuclear attacks; they were chosen rather to shed light on the way inwhich different types of attacks could have differing effects on the civilian popula-tion, economy, and society. Moreover, each case is considered in isolation—eventsthat could lead up to such an attack are deliberately ignored (because their predictionis impossible), and it is assumed (although that assumption is questionable at best)that the attack described is not followed by further nuclear attacks.

Each case considers first a Soviet attack on the United States, and then a U.S. at-tack on the Soviet Union. These attacks are similar in that they attack similar targetsets, but different in detail because both the weapons available to the attacker andthe geography of the victim are different. It should be emphasized that this discus-sion is not suggesting that in the real world an attack would be followed by a mirror-image retaliation; rather, it is looking at similar attacks so as to highlight the asym-metries in the ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union are vulnerable.To save space, it is assumed that the reader will read the Soviet attack on the UnitedStates in each case before turning to the U.S. attack on the Soviet Union, and repeti-tion has been minimized.

The analyses that follow are much more like sketches than detailed portraits.Precise prediction of the future of the United States or the Soviet Union is impossibleeven without taking into account something as unprecedented as a nuclear attack. Adetailed study would say more about the assumptions used than about the impact ofnuclear war. What is possible, and what this report tries to do, is to indicate the kindsof effects that would probably be most significant, and to comment on the majoruncertainties.

The following pages discuss the impact oncivil i an societies of:

● A Iimited attack on industrial targets. Forthis case the hypothesis was an attackthat would be limited to 10 strategic nu-clear delivery vehicles (S NDVs) (i. e., 10 ●

missiles or bombers, in this case SovietSS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles(I CBMs), and U.S. Poseidon submarine-Iaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), andMinuteman Ill ICBMs), and that would bedirected at the oil refining industry. Oilrefining was chosen as the hypothetical

target because it is vital, vulnerable, andconcentrated in both countries. It is as-sumed that the attack would be plannedwithout any effort either to minimize or tomaximize civiIian casualties.

A large counterforce attack. The possibil-ities considered included both an attackon ICBM silos only (a case that has gainedsome notoriety as a result of assertions bysome that the United States may becomevulnerable to such an attack) and an at-tack on silos, missile submarine bases, andbomber bases (which some characterize

63

64 • The Effects of Nuclear War

●

as the least irrational way to wage a stra-tegic nuclear war). The analysis draws onseveral previous studies that made ‘vary-ing assumptions about attack design,weapon size, targets attacked, and vulner-ability of the population; the ways i nwhich variations in these assumptions af-fect the calculations of estimated fatal-ities are discussed.

A large attack against a range of militaryand economic targets. This attack is in-tended to approximate “the ultimate de-

terrent’’—the climax of an escalationprocess. The description of the results ofthis attack draws upon several previousstudies that made differing assumptionsabout the number of weapons used andthe precise choice of targets, but suchvariations are useful in indicating therange of possibilities. However, deliberateefforts to kill as many people as possibleare not assumed, which would lead tomore immediate deaths (perhaps 10 mil-lion to 20 million more) than targetingeconomic and military facilities.

CASE 2: A SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. OIL REFINERIES

This case is representative of a kind of nu-clear attack that, as far as we know, has notbeen studied elsewhere in recent years–a“limited” attack on economic targets. This sec-tion investigates what might happen if theSoviet Union attempted to infIict as much eco-nomic damage as possible with an attacklimited to 10 SNDVs, in this case 10 SS-18ICBMs carrying multiple independently target-able reentry vehicles (MlRVs). An OTA con-tractor designed such an attack, operating oninstructions to limit the attack to 10 missiles,to create hypothetical economic damage thatwould take a very long time to repair, and todesign the attack without any effort either tomaximize or to minimize human casualties.(The contractor’s report is available separate-ly.) The Department of Defense then calcu-lated the immediate results of this hypotheti-cal attack, using the same data base, method-ology, and assumptions as they use for theirown studies. *

Given the limitation of 10 ICBMs, the mostvulnerable element of the U.S. economy wasjudged to be the energy supply system. Astable 6 indicates, the number of components

*The Office of Technology Assessment wishes tothank the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency for theirtimely and responsive help in calculations related to thiscase, the Command and Control Technical Center per-formed similar calculations regarding a similar U S at-tack on the Soviet Union

in the U.S. energy system forces the selectionof a system subset that is critical, vulnerable toa small attack, and would require a long timeto repair or replace.

OTA and the contractor jointly determinedthat petroleum refining facilities most nearlymet these criteria. The United States has about300 major refineries. Moreover, refineries arerelatively vulnerable to damage from nuclearblasts. The key production components are thedist i l lat ion uni ts, cracking uni ts, cool ingtowers, power house, and boiler plant. Frac-tionating towers, the most vulnerable compo-nents of the distillation and cracking units, col-lapse and overturn at relatively low winds andoverpressures. Storage tanks can be I if ted fromtheir foundations by similar effects, sufferingsevere damage and loss of contents and raisingthe probabilities of secondary fires and explo-sions.

MlRVed missiles are used to maximize dam-age per missile. The attack uses eight l-mega-ton (Mt) warheads on each of 10 SS-18 ICBMs,which is believed to be a reasonable choicegiven the hypothetical objective of the attack.Like all MIRVed missiles, the SS-18 has limita-tions of “footprint” –the area within whichthe warheads from a single missile can beaimed. Thus, the Soviets could strike not any80 refineries but only 8 targets in each of 10footprints of roughly 125,000 mi2 [32,375,000

Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 65

hectares], The SS-18’s footprint size, and thetendency of U.S. refineries to be located inclusters near major cities, however, make theSS-18 appropriate. The footprints are shown infigure 13. Table 7 lists U.S. refineries by capaci-ty; and table 8 lists the percentage of U.S. re-fining capacity destroyed for each footprint.

The attack uses eighty l-Mt weapons; itstrikes the 77 refineries having the largestcapacity, and uses the 3 remaining warheadsas second weapons on the largest refineries inthe appropriate missile footprints, In perform-ing these calculations, each weapon that deto-nates over a refinery is assumed to destroy itstarget. This assumption is reasonable in viewof the vulnerability of refineries and the factthat a l-Mt weapon produces 5-psi overpres-sure out to about 4.3 miIes [6.9 km]. Thus, dam-age to refineries is mainly a function of num-bers of weapons, not their yield or accuracy;collateral damage, however, is affected by allthree factors. it is also assumed that everywarhead detonates over its target. In the realworld, some weapons would not explode orwouId be off course. The Soviets could, how-ever, compensate for failures of launch vehi-cles by readying more than 10 ICBMs for theattack and programming missiles to replaceany failures in the initial 10. FinalIy, all weap-

February 1976

ons are assumed detonated at an altitude thatwouId maximize the area receiving an over-pressure of at least 5 psi. This overpressure wasselected as reasonable to destroy refineries.Consequences of using ground bursts arenoted where relevant.

The First Hour: Immediate Effects

The attack succeeds. The 80 weapons de-stroy 64 percent of U.S. petroleum refiningcapacity.

The attack causes much collateral (i. e., unin-tended) damage. Its only goal was to maximizeeconomic recovery time. While it does notseek to kill people, it does not seek to avoiddoing so. Because of the high-yield weaponsand the proximity of the refineries to largecities, the attack kills over 5 million people ifall weapons are air burst. Because no fireballwouId touch the ground, this attack wouId pro-duce little fallout. If all weapons were groundburst, 2,883,000 fatalities and 312,000 falloutfa ta l i t i es a re ca lcu la ted fo r a to ta l o f3,195,000. Table 8 lists fatalities by footprint.

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency(DC PA) provided fatality estimates for this at-tack. DCPA used the following assumptions re-


Figure 13

8Kalingrad

● ‘Moscow

Approximate footprint coverage of U.S. attack

Approximate footprint coverage of Soviet attack

Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases ● 67

Table 7.–U.S. Refinery Locations and Refining Capacity by Rank Order

Rank Percent Cumulative Rank Percent Cumulativeorder Location capacity percent capacity order Location capacity percent capacity

123456789

101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233

3.62.92.32,12.12,02,01,91 91.81.61.61,51.61.31,21.11.11.11.01 01 01 00.90.90 90 90.90 80.80 80.80 7

3,66.48.7

10.812,914,916,918,820.722.524,125.727,328,930.131.332.433.534.63 5 736.737.738.739.640,641,54 2 44 3 344,14 4 94 5 746,547.2

3435363738394041424344454647484950515253545556575859606162636465

0 70 70 70 70.70 70.60 60 60.60 60 60 50.50.50.50 50 50 50 50 50 50.50.50 40 40.44 11,60 50 3

3 1 3

47,948,649.350.05 0 651.351.952,55315 3 75 4 35 4 95 5 45 5 956,557.057.558.05 8 559,05 9 56 0 060.46 0 96 1 361 76 2 266.36 7 968.468.7

1000

asum of all refineries m the mdlcated geographic areabForelgn Irade zone onlyc[n~lude~ summary data from ali rehnerles with capacity less than 75000 bblfday 224 refineries Included

SOURCE National Petroleum Refiners Assoclahon

Table 8. –Summary of U.S.S.R. Attack on the United States

Totals ., ., ., 80 63.7 NA 5,031

aEMT = Equlvalenl megatons

bNA = Not applicable

68 • The Effects o/ Nuclear War—— . —.—— —

Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases Ž 69

garding the protective postures of the pop-ulation in its calculations:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Ten percent of the population in largecities (above 50,000) spontaneously evac-uated beforehand due to rising tensionsand crisis development;Home basements are used as fallout shel-ters as are such public shelters as sub-ways;People are distributed among fallout shel-ters of varying protection in proportion tothe number of shelter spaces at each levelof protection rather than occupying theb e s t s p a c e s f i r s t ;The remaining people are in buildings thatoffer the same blast protection as a single-story home (2 to 3 psi); radiation protec-tion factors were commensurate with thetype of structures occupied.

These assumptions affect the results for rea-sons noted in chapter III. Other uncertaintiesaffect the casualties and damage. These in-clude fires, panic, inaccurate reentry vehicles(RVs) detonating away from intended targets,time of day, season, local weather, etc. Suchuncertainties were not incorporated into thecalculations, but have consequences noted inchapters I I and I I 1.

The attack also causes much collateral eco-nomic damage. Because many U.S. refineriesare located near cities and because the Sovietsare assumed to use relatively large weapons,the attack would destroy many buildings andother structures typical of any large city. Theattack would also destroy many economic fa-cilities associated with refineries, such as rail-roads, pipelines, and petroleum storage tanks.While the attack would leave many U.S. portsunscathed, it wouId damage many that areequipped to handle oil, greatly reducing U.S.petroleum importing capability. Similarly,many petrochemical plants use feedstocksfrom refineries, so most plants producing com-plex petrochemicals are located near refin-eries; indeed, 60 percent of petrochemicalsproduced in the United States are made inTexas gulf coast plants. l Many of these plants

‘ Bill Curry , “Gulf PIants Combed for Carcinogens, ”W’ash/ngton Post, Feb 19, 1979, page A3

would be destroyed by the attack, and many oftherest would be for lack of feed stocks.III the attack aimed only at refinerieswould cause much damage to the entire petro-leum industry, and to other assets as well.

All economic damage was not calculatedfrom this attack, because no existing data basewould support reasonably accurate calcula-tions. Instead, the issue is approached by usingPhiladelphia to illustrate the effects of theattack on large cities. Philadelphia containstwo major refineries that supply much of theNortheast corridor’s refined petroleum. In theattack, each was struck with a l-Mt weapon.For reference, figure 14 is a map of Philadel-phia. Since other major U.S. cities are near tar-geted refineries, similar damage could be ex-pected for Houston, Los Angeles, and Chicago.

Fatalities and Injuries

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency(DCPA) provided not only the number of peo-ple killed within each of the 2-minute grid cellsin the Philadelphia region but also the originalnumber of people within each cell. These re-sults are summarized in the following table fordistances of 2 and 5 miles [3 and 8 km] fromthe detonations:

Deaths From Philadelphia Attack

Distance from Original Number Percentdetonat ion popula t ion ki l led ki l led

2 m l 155,000 135,000 875 ml 5,785,000 410,000 52

Detailed examination of the large-scale mapalso indicates the magnitude of the problemsand the resources available to cope with them.These are briefly discussed by category.

Petroleum

Local production, storage, and distributionof petroleum are destroyed. 1 n addition to thetwo refineries, nearly all of the oil storagetanks are in the immediate target area. Presum-ably, reserve supplies can be brought to Phila-delphia from other areas unless– as is likely–they are also attacked. While early overlandshipment by rail or tank truck into north andnortheast Philadelphia should be possible,water transport up the Delaware River may not


Figure 14.— Philadelphia and Surrounding Counties

The two large dots represent the ground zeros of the two l-Mt Soviet weapons. Within 2 miles of these aroundzeros, there are approximately 155,000 people of which 135,000 were calculated to have been kil led. Within 5miIes, there are 785,000 people of which 410,000 would have died.


be. This busy, narrow channel passes withinabout 1.3 miles [2.1 km] of one of the targetsand could become blocked at least temporari-ly by a grounded heavily laden iron ore ship(bound upriver for the Fairless Works) or bysunken ships or barges.

Electric Power

There are four major electric powerplants inor near Philadelphia. Table 9 summarizes ca-pacity, average usage (1976), and expecteddamage to these four installations.

While the usage figures in table 9 are aver-age and do not reflect peak demand, it shouldbe noted that a large percentage of this de-mand will disappear with destruction of the in-dustrial areas along the Schuylkill River and ofa large portion of the downtown business dis-trict. Thus, the plant in the Richmond sectionof Philadelphia, Pa., may be able to handle theemergency load. Assuming early recovery ofthe Delaware plant,quate emergency eing portion of the d

Transportation

Air.– The majorphia International1.5 nautical miles

there probably will be ade-ectric power for the surviv-stribution system.

facilities of the PhiIadel-Airport are located about[2.8 km] from the nearest

burst. These can be assumed to be severelydamaged. The runways are 1.5 to 2.5 nauticalmiIes [2.8 to 4.6 km] from the nearest burst andshould experience Iittle or no long-term dam-

age. Alternate airfields in the northeast andnear Camden, N. J., should be unaffected.

Rail.– The main Conrail lines from Washing-ton to New York and New England pass abouta mile from the nearest burst. I t can be ex-pected that these will be sufficiently damagedto cause at Ieast short-term interruption. Localrail connections to the port area pass within afew hundred yards of one of the refineries. Thisservice suffers long-term disruption. An impor-tant consequence is the loss of rail connec-tions to the massive food distribution centerand the produce terminal in the southeast cor-ner of the city.

Road.– Several major northeast-southwesthighways are severed at the refineries and atbridge crossings over the Schuylkil l River.While this poses serious problems for the im-mediate area, there are al ternate routesthrough New Jersey and v ia the westernsuburbs of the city.

Ship.– Barring the possible blockage of thechannel by grounded or sunken ships in thenarrow reach near the naval shipyard, ship traf -fic to and from the port should experience onlyshort-term interruption.

Casualty Handling

Perhaps the most serious immediate andcontinuing problem is the destruction of manyof Philadelphia’s hospitals. Hospitals, assum-ing a typical construction of muItistory steel or


reinforced concrete, would have a SO-percentprobability of destruction at about 2.13 miles(1 .85 nautical miles [3.4 km]). A detailed 1967map indicates eight major hospitals within thisarea; all are destroyed or severely damaged.Another nine hospitals are located from 2 to 3miles [3 to 4 km] from the refineries. Whilemost of the injured would be in this area, theiraccess to these hospitals would be curtailed byrubble, fire, and so on. Thus, most of the seri-ously injured would have to be taken to moredistant hospitals in north and northeast Phila-delphia, which would quickly become over-taxed.

Military

Two important military facilities are locatednear the intended targets. The Defense SupplyAgency complex is located within 0.5 miles [0.8km] of one of the refineries and is completelydestroyed. The U.S. Naval Shipyard is 1.0 to 1.8miles [1.6 to 2.9 km] from the nearest targetand can be expected to suffer severe damage.The large drydocks in this shipyard are within amile of the refinery.

Other

Several educational, cultural, and historicalfacilities are in or near the area of heavy de-struction. These include Independence Hall,the University of Pennsylvania, Drexel insti-tute of Technology, Philadelphia Museum ofArt, City Hall, the Convention Hall and CivicCenter, Veterans Stadium, Kennedy Stadium,and the Spectrum.

Reaction: The First Week

During this period people would be in astate of shock, with their lives disrupted andfurther drast ic changes inevi table. Manywould have loved ones killed and homes de-stroyed. Factories and offices in the targetareas would be destroyed, throwing people outof work. People would face many immediatetasks: care of the injured, burial of the dead,search and rescue, and fire fighting.

Fires at petroleum refineries, storage tanks,and petrochemical factories would rage for

hours or days, adding to the damage caused byblast. Some oil tanks would rupture and the oilwould leak onto rivers or harbors, where itwould ignite and spread fire. Fires at refineriescould not be extinguished because of intenseheat, local fallout, an inadequate supply ofchemicals to use on petroleum fires, and roadsblocked by rubble and evacuees. Petrochem-ical plants, already damaged by blast, wouldbe further damaged by fire and would leak tox-ic chemicals. As discussed in chapter 11, fire-storms or conflagrations might begin, in thiscase supported by thousands of tons of gas-01 inc. Anyway, the plants would likely be dam-aged beyond repair. Finally, with fires threat-ening to burn, poison, or asphyxiate people inshelters, rescue crews would attach top prior-ity to rescuing survivors.

Once it was clear that further attacks wereunlikely, the undamaged areas of the countrywould supply aid. However, the available med-ical aid would be totally inadequate to treatburns this attack would cause. The radius ofthird-degree burns (5.2 nautical miles [9.6 km]for a l-Mt weapon air burst) is far greater thanfor any other life-threatening injury, and hugefires would cause more burns. But, even inpeacetime, the entire United States has facil-ities to treat only a few thousand burn casesadequately at any one time.

If the attack used ground bursts exclusively,it would cause fewer prompt fatalities (2.9 mil-lion instead of 5.0 million for the air burstcase), but much fallout. Given the extensivefallout sheltering described above, 312,000people would die of fallout. Fallout casualties,however, would depend strongly on wind di-rections: would gulf coast fallout blow towardAtlanta, Miami, Cuba, or Venezuela? WouldNew Jersey fallout land on New York City onits way out to sea? The problems of shelterersare discussed under “Case 3: A CounterforceAttack Against the United States, ” in thischapter.

Beyond the physical damage, people wouldrealize that a central assumption of theirlives–that nuclear war could not occur—waswrong. Even people beyond target areas wouldknow immediately that secondary effects

Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases w 73—.——..———.——— — —.—

would irrevocably change their way of Iife; sur-vivors traveling to undamaged areas woulddrive this point home. Most would fear furtherattacks, and would seek protection by evac-uating or seeking shelter. While recovery planscould be made and damage assessed, little re-construction could be done with many peopleaway or in shelters. Thus, the reaction periodwould not end until most people acted as ifthey believed the war was over.

Recovery

Once people believed that the war was over,the Nation would face the task of restoring theeconomy. The human consequences would besevere, but most deaths would have occurredwithin 30 days of the attack. Economic disrup-tion and the economic recovery process wouldlast much longer.

Restoring an adequate supply of refinedpetroleum would take years. It is unlikely thatany of the attacked refineries could be re-paired, although enough infrastructure mightsurvive to make it cost effective to clear anddecontaminate the rubble and rebuild on theold sites, The attack would kill many peopleskilled in building or operating refineries. Theattack wouId also destroy many ports with spe-cial facilities for handling large quantities ofcrude oil and refined petroleum, While inten-sive use of pIant and equipment can substan-tially increase output for many industries, itcan increase a typical refinery’s output by only4 percent. Thus, the attack would leave theUnited States with about a third of its prewarrefining capacity and with Iittle of its prewaroil importing capacity; this situation wouldpersist until new refineries and ports could bebuilt.

The survival of a third of the Nation’s refin-ing capacity does not mean that everyonewould get a third of the petroleum they didbefore the war. The Government would surelyimpose rationing. Critical industries and serv-ices would have top priority— military forces,agriculture, railroads, police, firefighting, andso on. Heating oil could be supplied, but ataustere levels. Uses of petroleum for which

P

there were substitutes would receive little orno petroleum. For example, railroads couldsubstitute for airlines, trucks, and buses on in-tercity routes; mass transit would probablysubstitute for private automobiles and taxis inlocal transportation.

The demise of the petroleum industry wouldshatter the American economy, as the attackintended. A huge number of jobs depend on re-fined petroleum: manufacture, sales, repair,and insurance of cars, trucks, buses, aircraft,and ships; industries that make materials usedin vehicle manufacture, such as steel, glass,rubber, aluminum, and plastics; highway con-struct ion; much of the vacation industry;petrochemicals; heating oil; some electricpower generation; airlines and some railroads;agriculture; and so on. Thus, many workerswould be thrown out of work, and many indus-tries would be forced to close.

The limited direct economic damage, al-ready muItiplied by thousands of secondary ef-fects just enumerated, would be multipliedagain by tertiary effects. Economic patternsthat rest on the petroleum economy would bedisrupted. Much of the American way of life isdependent on automobiles, from fast-food res-taurants and shopping malls to suburban hous-ing construction and industries located on ma-jor highways whose workers commute by car.The many people thrown out of work wouldhave less money to consume things made byothers. Service industries of all kinds would beespecialIy hard hit.

These economic changes would lead tosocial changes tha t wou ld have fu r thereconomic consequences. Gasoline rationingwould at best severely curtail use of privatecars; mass transit would be used to its capaci-ty, which would appear inadequate. Demandfor real estate would plummet in some areas,especially suburbs, and skyrocket in others,notably cities, as people moved nearer to workand stores. Such mass movement, even withincities but especially between them, wouldupset the demographics underlyin g t axes ,schools, and city services. With many peopleout of work, demand for unemployment com-


pensation would rise at the same time taxeswere falling. Vacation patterns would shift;cuts in air and car travel would force people totravel by train, which would lead people tovacation closer to home. The situation follow-ing the attack could lead the dollar to tumble,but whether or not that occurred, the curtail-ment of commercial air travel would preventmost people from traveling abroad. The eco-nomic system on which production dependswould be radicalIy different. To be sure, mostworkers and equipment would survive un-scathed, and economic recovery would even-tually take place.

Production depends, however, not only onthe use of physical resources, but also on awide range of understandings between produc-ers and consumers. These underpinnings wouldbe destroyed by the attack just as surely as ifthey were targeted. Prices would be uncertain,and various kinds of barter (trading favors aswell as goods) would supplement the use ofmoney. Credit and finance could not functionnormally in the absence of information aboutthe markets for continuing production. Con-tracts would have uncertain meaning. Manybusinesses would go bankrupt as patterns ofsupply and demand changed overnight. Courtswould be seriously overburdened with the taskof trying to arbitrate among all of these com-peting claims. Corporations and individualswouId be reluctant to make commitments orinvestments.

Given this disruption, the effort to resumeproduction would require grappling with somebasic organizational questions. To which taskswould surviving resources be applied? Howwould people be put back to work? What mixof goods would they produce? Which indus-tries should be expanded, and which curtailed?Which decisions would Government make,and which wouId be left to the market?

This organizational task is unprecedented,but in principle it could be performed, Pre-sumably the United States would follow theprecedent of the mobilization for World WarsI and 11, in which extensive Government plan-ning supplemented private enterprise, and key

assets and key people from the private sectorwere borrowed by the Government for the du-ration of the emergency. Certain tasks, such ascaring for the injured, decontamination, high-priority reconstruction, and serving as an em-ployer of last resort (to say nothing of meetingmilitary requirements), would obviously behandled by the Government. The difficultywouId be in planning and facilitating the trans-formation of the private sector. The combina-tion of unusable factories and service faciIitieswith unemployed workers could easily create asituation analogous to that experienced in theUnited States between 1929-33.

Long-Term Effects

Postattack society would be permanentlyand irrevocably changed. People would live indifferent places, work at different jobs, andtravel in different ways. They would buy dif-ferent things and take different kinds of vaca-tions. The Nation would tend to apply thelessons of the past to future policy by seekingto reduce its vulnerabilities to the last attack.Energy conservation, where not required byregulations, would be encouraged by prices,taxes, and subsidies. Railroads and mass transitwould supplant travel by cars and planes; railand ships would substitute for planes andtrucks in hauling freight. Automobile produc-tion would drop sharply and would emphasizeenergy-efficient models; bicycles and motor-cycles would be popular. While housing con-struction would not necessarily end in thesuburbs, new homes there would probably bebuilt closer together so that mass transit couldserve them. Construction in cities would boom.All houses would be better insulated; morewould use solar energy as fuel costs soared.

Farms would be able to obtain adequatesupplies of petroleum and its derivatives. Agri-culture uses only 4 or 5 percent of the Nation’spetroleum, and its products are necessary.While gasoline and petrochemical-based fer-tilizers and pesticides wouId be much more ex-pensive, they comprise only a small fraction offarm expenses and would be essential forlarge-scale efficient agriculture. Moreover

Ch, IV—Three Attack Cases Ž 75

much fertilizer is made from natural gas ratherthan petroleum, so its price would not rise asdramatically as that of gasoline, Petroleum-related cost increases would be passed on tothe consumer. The character of agriculturecouId change, however. I n particular, the Iive-stock industry might be sharply curtailed. Atevery stage, Iivestock raising, slaughter, anddistribution require much more energy than docrops. For example, rapid transportation andextensive refrigeration are required. MeatwouId become very much more costly in rela-tion to other foods than it is now, and so wouldbecome a luxury. If l ivestock productiondropped, a major source of demand for corn,soybeans, and other fodder would decline,possibly slowing price increases for other farmproducts.

Although refineries and oil importing facil-ities would be rebuilt, U.S. refining capacityafter recovery wouId probably be less than pre-attack capacity. Increased prices for gasolineand heating oil would shift demand to othersources of energy, raising their prices and en-couraging an acceleration of their develop-ment.

Patterns of industrial production would shiftdramatically because of these changes, forcingmassive shifts in demand for ski I Is and re-sources. Many people and factories would beoriented to the production of things no longerin demand; it would take many years for theeconomy to adjust to the sudden, massivechanges imposed by the attack.

The at tack would af fect publ ic heal th.Chapter V discusses the long-term effects ofsublethal levels of radiation. Petrochemicalplants damaged by the attack would leak car-

cinogenous petrochemicals, but numbers ofcancer cases from this source, the time of theirappearance, and the duration of the threatcannot be predicted. To the extent that con-tamination or destruction of housing, or eco-nomic collapse, force people to live in sub-standard housing, illness would increase. Notall changes, however, would be for the worse.Some new patterns of living would promotepublic health. There would be fewer auto, air-craft, and boating accidents. More peoplewould walk or bicycle, increasing exercise. Re-duced consumption of meat would reduce die-tary fats, heart attacks, and strokes. At somepoint, Government-imposed controls necessi-tated by the attack could be lifted becausesocietal changes and market forces (price in-creases, alternative energy sources, residentialpatterns, and numbers and efficiency of cars)would achieve the goals of controls withoutcoercion. For example, gasoline rationingwould certainly be imposed immediately afterthe attack, and might be lifted in stages as re-fining capacity was restored, or subsidies to ex-pand and support mass transit could level offor decline as revenues made it self-supporting.

The Nat ion ’s ad jus tment to a l l thesechanges would be painful. The problemswould be especially severe because of thespeed of their onset. Many people say that theUnited States would be better off if it was lessdependent on cars and petroleum. Whilechanging to new patterns of Iiving via nuclearattack would minimize political problems ofdeciding to change, it would maximize the dif-ficulties of transition. Problems would appearall at once, while any advantages of new pat-terns of Iiving would come slowly.

CASE 2: A U.S. ATTACK ON SOVIET OIL REFINERIES

This case investigates what might happen if ber and long construction time, and becausethe United States tried to inflict as much eco- of the severe economic consequences of doingnomic damage as possible on the Soviet Union without refined petroleum,with 10 SNDVs without seeking to maximize orminimize casualties. Petroleum refineries were The Soviet refining industry is at least asselected as targets because of their small num- vulnerable as its U.S. counterpart, though the


vulnerabi l i t ies di f fer s l ight ly. The UnitedStates refines more petroleum than does theU. S. S. R., about 17.9 million barrels per day ofcrude (1978 figures) versus 11.0 million (1980projection). 2 According to a 1977 source, theU.S.S.R. had 59 refineries, including at least 12under construction, some of which are verylarge; the U.S. and its territories have at least288 .3 All individual refineries in both nationsare highly vulnerable to attacks with nuclearweapons. The U.S. attack destroys most ofSoviet refining capacity because the U.S.S.R.has few refineries; the Soviet attack destroysmost of U.S. refining capacity because U.S. re-fineries are clustered.

The hypothetical attack targets 24 refineriesand 34 petroleum storage sites. Some major re-fineries are beyond range of Poseidon missiles,so the United States uses 7 Poseidons with atotal of sixty-four 40-kiloton (kt) RVs and 3Minuteman IIIs with a total of nine 170-kt RVs.Because of the dispersal of Soviet refineriesand limits of footprint size, each footprint had

2“U S. Refining Capacity” (Washington, D.C NationalPetroleum Refiners Association, July 28, 1978), p 1 (U. Sfigures), and International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1976(Tulsa, Okla.: Petroleum Publishing Co , 1977), p, 323 (So-viet figures).

‘International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1976, op. cit.,p, 393 (Soviet figures); and “U.S. Refining Capacity,” opcit.; passim, (U.S. figures).

fewer refineries than available RVs. The addi-tional RVs were first allocated 2 on 1 againstlarge refineries; remaining RVs were targetedagainst petroleum storage complexes. As in theU.S. case, every weapon is assumed to deto-nate over and destroy its target. It is assumedthat all weapons are air burst, and the conse-quences of using ground bursts are notedwhere appropriate.

Immediate Effects: The First Hour

The attack destroys 73 percent of Soviet re-fining capacity and 16 percent of Soviet stor-age capacity, as table 10 shows. Collateral eco-nomic damage could not be calculated or col-lateral damage to a large Soviet city assessedbecause sufficient unclassified data could notbe found.

If all weapons are air burst, the attack kills1,458,000 people assuming everyone to be insingle-story buildings, and 836,000 assumingeveryone in multistory buildings; the latterassumption comes closer to reality. If allweapons were ground burst, the attack wouldkill 1,019,000 people, 722,000 promptly and297,000 by fallout, assuming the worst case,everyone Iiving in single-story buildings.

The estimated injuries from the attack aresubstantial under all conditions. Under thesingle-story assumption on housing, the air-

— -- — -- — - -- - - - —— —-

burst attack would produce 3.6 million injuriesand a surface-burst attack about a m i I I ion less.I f in mult istory bui ldings, the populat ionwould suffer 3.8 miIIion injured from an air-burst attack and 2.5 million for the surfaceburst. (A protection factor of 5 was assumedagainst fallout from the surface bursts. )

The attack kills fewer Russians than Ameri-cans. The differences in fatalities do not meanthat the United States is necessarily more vul-nerable than the Soviet Union to nuclear at-tack; rather, the asymmetries occur from thedesign of the attack. Soviet refineries are far-ther from cities than are U.S. refineries : a n dU.S. weapons are smaller, so fewer Russiansare within the lethal radii of U.S. weapons. Sen-sitivity of fatalities and injuries to distancefrom ground zero is shown in table 11, Hadeither nation sought to kill people, it wouldhave used different weapons and targetedthem differently.

Reaction: The First Week

As in the United States, life for the survivingmajority would be totally disrupted. Manywould be directly affected by the attack: theinjured, those with injured relatives, the home-

Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 77— —-- — .-—-—

less, people affected by shortages. Accommo-dation to a future with a sharply reducedpetroleum supply would begin: gasoline andother products might be hoarded, by enter-prises if not by individuals. Some less-im-portant industries would probably be closed tosave fuel or to allow their workers to shift tothe military, agriculture, and essential indus-try. Until it became clear that the war wasover, millions of reservists would be mobilizedfor military service, placing a heavy demandon the domestic economy to replace them. Be-cause of the mobilization, hours worked andthe mix of production would change dramat-ically and overnight; workers in essential in-dustries might be on 12-hour shifts; other work-ers not drafted wouId be pressed into service inessential industries, and quite possibly movedto factories in distant areas. The speed andmagnitude of disruption would cause muchpsychological shock.

How would the Soviet Union cope with thedamage? Although a greater percentage of itsrefining capacity would be destroyed, it wouldsuffer fewer fatalities than would the UnitedStates (1.0 million to 1.5 million versus 3.2 mil-lion to 5.0 million) and fewer injuries (2.5 mil-lion to 3.8 million versus 3.9 million to 4.9 mil-

Table 11 .–Approximate Distance (Nautical Miles) of Various Effects From Selected Nuclear Air Bursts(personnel casualties)


lion) because of the lower yield of U.S. weap-ons and the location of Soviet refineries awayfrom cities. If all weapons were air burst at op-timum height of burst, there would be negligi-ble fallout in both countries; if all weaponswere ground burst, the Soviet Union would re-ceive far less fallout because of the lower yieldof the weapons. Because the Soviets have builtmany widely dispersed small dispensaries andfirst aid centers, rather than smaller numbersof modern full-service hospitals concentratedin cities, more of these facilities would survivethan in the United States. In addition, manyRussians have received first aid training, andpeople with injuries that could be treated byparamedics, dispensaries, and first aid wouldprobably be better off than their Americancounterparts; others would be at least as badoff. Those who required treatment at majorhospitals would suffer because of the smallnumber of beds in nearby modern hospitalsand the inability of the Soviet transportationsystem to move them elsewhere. Like theUnited States, the U.S.S.R. could not cope withlarge numbers (say, over 100) of severe burncases. There would be many victims of severeburns in both nations who would die for lackof adequate treatment.

The damage, the emergency conditions, andthe risk of further attacks would remind every-one of the special horror that the Soviets facedin World War II. The psychological traumawould be exacerbated in the first week by an-ticipation of crisis economic conditions. TheSoviet Government in past crises has proved tobe ruthless and efficient in moving people toparts of the country where labor was needed.Such action would be likely in this crisis aswell, along with cutbacks in food, consumergoods, housing construction and maintenance,and transportation. Only regimentation wouldbe likely to increase. Life would be grim, andwouId remain so for years.

Recovery

What course would Soviet recovery take?Economic viability would not be at issuefollowing this attack, and the Government

could be expected to remain firmly in controlbecause of the limited scale of this attack.Assuming that there are no further attacks,most of the deaths would occur within 30 daysof the attack. While the course of economicrecovery cannot be predicted in detail, it isclear that:

●

●

●

The attack would hurt. The recovery peri-od would be marked by shortage and sac-rifice, with particular problems stemmingfrom agricultural shortfalls.

Nevertheless, the Soviet economy and po-litical system would survive, and woulddo so with less drastic changes than theUnited States would probably experience.

The asymmetries between the two nationsin effects for a given attack are greater forthis case than for a very large attack.

The political and economic structure of theU.S.S.R. appears designed to cope with drasticemergencies like this attack. While almost alleconomic assets would be unscathed, re-sources would need to be shifted rapidly toproduce a different mix of outputs. The attackwould totally disrupt existing economic plans.The economic planning apparatus and Govern-ment control methods in place in the U.S.S.R.would permit the Government to shift plansand resources, but the speed with which suchchanges could be made is uncertain. To the ex-tent that revisions in the economic plan werenot made or were delayed, people and equip-ment would sit idle or would be producing ac-cording to less-efficient priorities, drainingscarce resources from higher priority tasks andhindering recovery. Workers would be shiftedto different industries as pIants closed; somewould be forced to move, share apartmentswith strangers, or work at new jobs (includingmanual labor in farms or factories).

Some insight into the economic conse-quences can be obtained by looking at foursectors of the economy— military, agriculture,

transportation, and industry. Each of these sec-tors would have a strong claim on availablepetroleum, but their total demand would ex-ceed the supply.


The military would have first call on fuel,especially if the war continued. It has ade-quate stocks to prosecute a war for severalweeks. However, unless this attack led to adecisive Soviet victory or to a major relaxationof tensions, the military would need refinedpetroleum to rebuild its stocks and to carry outnormal training.

Soviet agriculture is precarious even inpeacetime because of its inefficiency. Agricul-ture engages about a third of the work forceand consumes a third of Soviet gasoline anddiesel fuel. (U.S. agriculture, in contrast, uses2.7 percent of the work force (in 1978) and asmall fraction of U.S. refined petroleum .)4 TheSoviet Union imports grain in most years. Nev-ertheless, the U.S.S.R. has maintained a largecattle industry at considerable expense to pro-vide a consumer good much in demand. Farmsuse petroleum for tractors and trucks; petro-leum and natural gas are feedstocks for ferti-lizer and pesticides. Agricultural use of petro-leum is increasing. One small example is theSoviet use of light aircraft to spread fertilizer;while this task could be done by tractors or byhand, it is much more efficiently done by air-craft.

Cutbacks in petroleum would magnify agri-cultural inefficiency. Even if the Soviet Unionallocated all the petroleum it produced to agri-culture, it would not produce enough to sus-

4Statistica/ Abstract of the United States, 1978 (Wash-ington, D C U S Department of Commerce, Bureau ofthe Census, 1978), I ists 91,846,000 employed persons age16 and over in the United States, of whom 2,469,000 werelisted as farmworkers, for January-April 1978 (p. 418). TheStatistical Abstract does not present the amount of petro-leum consumed by Amer ican agr icu l ture . Severa l s ta t is -t ics , however , ind icate th is number to be a smal l f rac t iono f t o t a l U S p e t r o l e u m c o n s u m p t i o n P r e l i m i n a r y 1 9 7 7data showed all U S prime movers (automotive and non-automotive) had 26,469,000,000 horsepower, whi Ie farmsaccounted for 328,000,000 horsepower, or 1 2 percent (p.604) In 1976, industrial consumption of petroleum ac-counted for 18 percent of total U S petroleum consump-tion (p 764) And a National Academy of Sciences studyfound that agriculture accounted for 3.5 percent of totalnational energy consumption In 1968 Agricu/?ura/ Pro-duction Efficiency (Washington, D C National Academyof Sciences, National Research Council Committee onAgricultural Production Efficiency, 1975), p 119)

tain agriculture’s prewar consumption, andother critical sectors would compete for petro-leum. Drawing on inventory would sacrificelater agricultural production for earlier pro-duction. Following the attack, the main con-cern of agriculture would be planting, growing,or harvesting the year’s crop; sacrifices andsubstitutions would be required in other agri-cultural subsectors to meet this goal withavailable petroleum. The U.S.S.R. would belikely to divert people from schools, factories,and (depending on the international situation)the military to work the fields, as it does inpeacetime, but to a greater extent. The substi-tution of human labor for mechanical energywould be a poor but perhaps unavoidabletrade. The most obvious cutback would belivestock; meat is a luxury, livestock consumemuch food that could otherwise be used forhuman consumption, and cat t le rais ing,slaughter, and distr ibut ion require muchenergy. The Soviet Union might slaughtermuch of its Iivestock after the attack to freefarmers, fields, trucks, and petroleum to pro-duce crops. Russians might have a 3-monthorgy of meat followed by two decades with-out.

Soviet transportation would be pinched. Afew top leaders would still have cars; othercars would sit idle for years, monuments to theprewar standard of living. Air transportationwould be sharply curtailed, and Soviet super-sonic transports would be grounded. Trucktransportation would be curtailed, with trucksused almost exclusively for intracity transpor-tation and hauling goods between railroadsand loading docks. By elimination, the trans-portation burden would fall to railroads be-cause of their energy efficiency. Key trunklinesare electrified, and might obtain electricityfrom sources other than petroleum. The Sovi-ets have stored a number of steam locomo-tives, which would be hauled out, refurbished,and put to use.

The tempo of industrial production wouldslow. Even as it stands now, the Soviets havebarely enough energy and occasional short-ages. Electric power would continue, butwould probably be cut back 10 to 15 percent,


forcing some industries to close and reducingheat and light at other industries and apart-ments. With transportation cut back, factorieswould have to wait longer for inputs, loweringproductivity.

Some less-essential industries, especially en-ergy- or petroleum-intensive ones, might shutdown. Plastics use petroleum derivatives asfeedstocks. Aluminum production uses greatamounts of energy, though some Soviet alumi-num pIants, such as at Bratsk in Siberia, usehydroelectric power. Truck production wouldstop for lack of fuel for existing vehicles, idlingthe huge Kama River truck plant.

Construction consumes much petroleum, soit would be curtailed except for essential in-dustries, hydroelectric powerplant construc-tion, refining construction, and minimal hous-ing for workers in those occupations.

These changes would disrupt workers’ lives.Closing of some plants would idle many work-ers, forcing them to work in other industries;many could be moved long distances to otherplants. Workers would not necessarily beforced to work long hours. While some plantswould operate around the clock, others wouldbe closed or cut back to enable the energythey consume to be diverted. At the same time,however, and within limits of substitutability,workers could Iikewise be diverted from closedto open plants, providing extra labor for fac-tories that remained open extra time.

In sum, the reduction in the standard of liv-ing and the amount of disruption would prob-ably be less than in the United States but theremight well be more hardship and misery. Rus-sians would have less food, especially protein,than they did before the attack, while Amer-ican agriculture consumes so Iittle petroleumthat its output could probably be maintained,

though some variety might be sacrificed. Therewould be less heat in both nations, but wintersare shorter and milder in the United States,and U.S. indoor temperatures in winter couldbe reduced 50 or 10° F without ill effect.Therefore, heating could probably not be cutas much in the U.S.S.R. as in the United Stateswithout jeopardizing health. Cars would besacrificed at least temporarily in both nations.Soviet industries producing consumer goodswould be cut back more sharply than their U, S.counterparts after the attack, and would re-gain productivity more slowly.

Long-Term Effects

Destroying 73 percent of refining capacitywould force the economy onto a crisis footing,curtailing choices and consumer goods, drop-ping the standard of living from austere togrim, and setting back Soviet economic prog-ress by many years. Recovery might follow thepost-World War II pattern, with a slow butsteady improvement in the quality of life. Butrecovery wouId be slow, The desire to reducevulnerabi l i ty to future at tacks would un-doubtedly divert resources from recovery tosuch tasks as building some underground re-fineries. While the United States could possi-bly recover in a way that would use less petro-leum than it did prewar, this course would bedifficult for the U.S.S.R. because much ofSoviet petroleum goes to necessities. Long-term health and genetic effects would be lessthan for the United States because of thesmaller size of U.S. weapons and the locationof Soviet refineries away from people. But theSoviet Government might accept greater radia-tion exposure for people in order to speed pro-duction, increasing such effects.


CASE 3: A COUNTERFORCE ATTACKAGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The case of a Soviet attack on U.S. strategicforces has received extensive public attentionin recent years, since some observers believe itis the least irrational way of waging strategicwar. For the purposes of this study, the militarysuccess of such an attack (i. e., how many U.S.forces would be destroyed) and the resultingU.S. responses are not important. It is suffi-c ient to assume that such an attack islaunched, and to examine the consequencesfor the civilian population, economy, andsociety. For this purpose, small variations inthe attack design (e. g., whether control centersas well as silos are targeted) are immaterial.While there are many possible variations in thedesign of a counterforce attack, a question ofparticular interest is whether the attack wouldbe delivered only against ICBM silos, orwhether bomber bases and missile submarinebases would also be attacked. Some of thepublic discussion of such an attack suggeststhat an attack on ICBM silos alone could causemuch less civilian damage than a full-scalecounterforce attack because the silos are moreisolated from population centers than arebomber bases. It is certainly true that, holdingal I the other possible variables constant, an at-tack that included bomber bases and missilesubmarine bases would cause more civiliandamage than one that did not. Nevertheless,the difference between the ICBM-only attackand a comprehensive counterforce attack wasfound to be no greater than the differencemade by other variables, such as the size ofweapons used, the proportion of surface burstsused, and the weather. Both cases are consid-ered in this section; the countersilo attack is asubset of the counterforce attack, and avail-able data is too coarse to support a believabledifferentiation between the civilian effects ofeach attack.

Prompt Effects

The blast damage from a counterforce at-tack is concentrated on military installations.

Attacks on submarine bases and bomber baseswould cause considerable blast damage tonearby populations and urban structures; at-tacks on silos would cause relatively littlecivilian blast damage. Unlike ICBM silos, manybomber bases and fleet ballistic missile sub-marine (SSBN) support facilities are near cities.(See figure 15.) For example, an attack on Grif-fiss Air Force Base, near Utica and Rome, N. Y.,would place nearly 200,000 people at risk fromprompt effects; attacking the SSBN support fa-cility near Charleston, S. C., would place morethan 200,000 people at risk; attacking MatherAir Force Base, near Sacramento, Cal if., wouldplace more than 600,000 people at risk. The ad-ditional attacks would simultaneously reducethe number of people able to provide aid andincrease the number of injured or evacuees requiring aid. The attacks would make it harderfor people able to provide aid to sustain thoseneeding it.

Countersilo attacks would probably deto-nate some weapons at or near the Earth’s sur-face to maximize the likelihood of destroyingICBM silos. Surface bursts produce intensefallout, causing most of the damage to the ci-vilian population, economy, and society. Theprincipal civilian impact of adding attacks onbomber and SSBN bases is the large increase inurban destruction.

The Period Before Fallout Deposition

Fallout would begin to reach closer popu-lated areas in a few hours; it would reach manyothers in a few days. As fallout arrives, radi-ation levels rise sharply and rapidly. Peoplewould therefore have to take any protectiveact ions —shelter or evacuation — before thefallout arrives. This prearrival period wouldthus be one of intense activity and intense con-fusion. How would people react? Trainingcould help, but people trained in how to be-have under fallout conditions would fare poor-ly if they could not get to shelters or if shelterswere unstocked. To what extent would people


Figure 15.—Counterforce Targets in the United States

State capital

NOTE: No targets in 15 States; one target each in 11 States

panic, seek other family members, or evacuatespontaneously, and what would be the conse-quences of such actions?

Evacuat ion would probably be a poorchoice, since it would be difficult or impossi-ble to predict which would be the safe areasand which the hot spots, and since a car in atraffic jam would offer poor shelter indeed.The decision on whether or not to evacuate,however, is complicated because evacuation isa reasonable response for people who wouldbe at risk from blast from further attacks eventhough evacuation is a poor strategy for peo-ple at risk from fallout alone.

Shelter would in theory be available to a ma-jority of people, although the best availableshelter might not be good enough in areaswhere the fallout proved to be very intense.However, the practical difficulties of falloutsheltering could be very great. The time toseek shelter could be very limited (and people

would not know how long they had), and peo-ple would want to get their families togetherfirst. A shelter must have a sufficient protec-tion factor. Fallout particles must be kept outof the shelter, which requires a ventilationsystem more complicated than an open win-dow or door, and if anybody enters a shelterafter fallout has fallen there must be somemeans of decontaminating the new arrival.Water is necessary; heat may be necessary de-pending on the time of year; sanitation is aproblem. Finally, people could not tell howlong it was necessary to stay in the shelterwithout radiation rate meters.

It is obvious that the time of day, the time ofthe year, and the degree of emergency prep-arations during the hours or days before the at-tack would all affect the level of deaths. What-ever the circumstances, the few hours after theattack would see a frantic effort to seek shel-ter on the part of most of the American popu-

Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases Ž 83

Iation. Then, in densities and locations deter-mined by the attack parameters and theweather, the fallout would descend. ManyAmericans would be lucky enough to be inareas where the fallout level was low. Manyothers (between an estimated 2 million and 20million), would be caught without shelter, orwith inadequate shelter, and would die. Stillothers would suffer from a degree of radiationthat would make them sick, or at least lowertheir life expectancy, but would not kill them.The trials of living in fallout shelters would beintensified by the fact that many people wouldnot know which category they and their fam-ilies were in.

A comprehensive counterforce attack wouldimpose a greater burden than a countersi 10 at-tack. Many more people would be injured byprompt effects, and people near bomber andSSBN bases would have only a few minuteswarning in which to seek shelter.

Cities in the blast area –those near SSBN orbomber bases–would be heavily damaged. Afew cities, such as Charleston, SC., and LittleRock, Ark., could suffer consequences similarto Detroit in Case 1 (chapter 11) or Philadelphiain Case 2 (above in this chapter); most wouldnot. People in blast areas would face hazardsas noted in Case 1 — injuries from blast, initialnuclear radiation, and thermal radiation, andfrom such secondary effects as falling build-ings and fires. As in other cases, rescue wouldbe difficult, with streets blocked by rubble,water pressure gone, and emergency vehiclesdestroyed.

People in areas damaged by blast and in thepath of fallout would be in greatest peril. in-juries, damage to prospective shelters, damageto transportation, and damage to power andwater could make them highly vuInerable. Lit-tle Rock, Ark., for example, the site of an ICBMbase and a bomber base, would receive bothblast damage from a pattern attack (designedto destroy bombers in flight) and intensefallout radiation from the attack on ICBMs.

People in areas neither damaged by blastnor threatened by fallout would believe them-selves to be at risk from blast or, at a min-

imum, from fallout until it was clear that at-tacks had ended. To these people would fallthe burdens of producing necessities and car-ing for the injured and evacuees. Yet people inthese areas, believing themselves to be at risk,would feel compelled to seek shelter or, es-pecially in unattached cities, to evacuate spon-taneously. These actions would reduce theflow of aid to damaged areas. Indeed, theeconomy would probably shut down until peo-ple were certain that the war had ended anduntil most people could get back to work,probably until the end of the shelter period.Even if some people reported to work, produc-tion would be difficult with many absentees.There would be large credit, monetary, con-tractual, and legal problems. If productionstopped even for a week, the loss wouId be tre-mendous. This attack would disrupt the econ-omy less than Case 2, however, because mostproductive resources would remain intact.

Casualty Estimates

In seeking to estimate prompt damage fromthe attacks, fatalities are the most importantcomponent of damage and the most calcu-lable. To estimate fatalities, the critical ques-tions are which areas would be damaged byblast, and to what extent? How much falloutwould there be, and where wouId it be depos-ited? These questions cannot be answered withgreat confidence because estimates of deathsfrom these attacks are highly sensitive to at-tack parameters and civilian shelter assump-tions. However, reference can be made to sev-eral recent executive branch studies of coun-terforce attacks.

OTA drew on several executive branchstudies, conducted between 1974 and 1978, ofcounterforce attacks. These studies differedwidely in their results, primarily because of dif-ferences in the assumptions they made. OTAfelt that it would be more useful to look at theways in which these assumptions affect the re-sults than to attempt to determine the “cor-rect” assumption for each uncertainty. Conse-quently, a range of results is presented; it isbelieved that if OTA had done a new study of


this case the results would have fallen some-where within this range. 5

The executive branch countersilo studiesthat OTA drew on indicated that between 2million and 20 million Americans would diewithin the first 30 days after an attack on U.S.ICBM silos. This range of results is so wide be-cause of the extent of the uncertainties sur-rounding fallout. The key uncertainties are:

●

●

●

Height of Burst.– If the fireball touchesthe ground, it vaporizes some dirt, irradi-ates it, and draws it up into the mushroomcloud. This material condenses to becomefallout. The lower the height of burst, themore of the fireball touches the ground,and the more fallout that is produced. Anair burst in which none of the fireballtouches the ground creates negligiblefallout. Because ICBM silos are very hard,a surface burst offers the greatest prob-ability of destroying the silo with one ex-plosion; it also maximizes fallout. Theprobability of destroying an ICBM silo isincreased if two warheads are targetedagainst it; opinions differ as to whetherthe most effective tactic is to use two sur-face bursts, which doubles the amount offallout, or one air burst and one surfaceburst.Weapon Design.— Some weapons derive agreater portion of their energy from fis-sion (as opposed to fusion) than others;the more fission, the more fallout. Theweapon yield affects the amount of fall-out; the higher the yield of a given explo-sion, the greater the fallout.Wind.– The speed and direction of thewind at various altitudes determines thedirections and distance from the explo-sion at which fallout is deposited, and in-fIuences fallout concentration. Winds typ-ically vary with the season; indeed, thisvariance is so great that it can affectcasualties by about a factor of three, as

‘For exdmple, after the OTA analysis, was completed,a new study was completed showing fatalities from acounterforce attack with the current U S civil defenseposture to be 8 to 12 million without warning, and 5 to 8million with warning. See Roger Sullivan et al , “CivilDefense Needs of High-Risk Areas of the United States”(Arlington, Va System Planning Corporation, 1979), p.22

●

●

●

figure 16 shows. The hourly and daily vari-ation of winds also affects casualties. It isimportant to bear in mind, when consider-ing possible civil defense measures, thatwinds could not be accurately predictedeven after an attack had taken place,much less in advance.Rain. – Raindrops collect fallout particlesfrom the radioactive cloud, thereby creat-ing areas of intense fallout where it is rain-ing, and reducing fallout elsewhere.Terrain. — Hills, buildings, and ground tem-perature gradients (such as are caused byhighways and small lakes) affect the exactpattern of fallout, creating hot spots insome places and relatively uncontam-inated spots nearby.Distance.—Other things remaining con-stant, fallout decreases with distancefrom the explosion beyond roughly 50miles [80 km].

As chapter 11 explained, radiation from fall-out in large doses causes death, in smallerdoses causes illness, and in still smaller dosescreates a probability of eventual illness ordeath (hence, .Iowers life expectancy). Aschapter I I I explained, protection can be ob-tained when matter is placed between the fall-out and people— in general, the more matter(the greater the mass) between a source ofradiation and a person, the greater the protec-tion. The degree of protection offered by var-ious materials is described as a protection fac-tor (PF). The adequacy of a given PF dependson the intensity of the fallout. For example, aPF of 20 (typical of a home basement withearth piled over windows and against thewalls) would reduce an outdoor radiation levelof 60 rem per hour to an indoor level of 3 remper hour. In this case, a person outdoors for 10hours would almost certainly be killed by radi-ation, and a person in the basement shelterwould have a good chance of survival. But ifthe outdoor level is not 60 reins per hour but600 reins per hour, a PF of 20 is inadequate tosave I ives.

Calculations of deaths from fallout aremade by combining:

● an assumed distribution of fallout, withvarious intensities at various locations;

Ch. /V—Three Attack Cases ● 85

Figure 16.—Expected Casualties as a Function of Typical Monthly Winds Resulting From an Attackon Selected Military Targets in the United States

1 I 1 I I I I I I I

I I I I I I 1 I I IJ F M A M J J A s 0 N D

Typical monthly wind

● an assumed distribution of populationwithin the areas where fallout is assumedto be deposited; and

● an assumed distribution of PFs for thepopulation.

Some computer models use a grid (perhaps4,000 yards on a side for a fine-grained model,but much larger in other cases) and assumethat within each square of the grid the falloutintensity and population density are constant,with PFs mixed. Other calculations use re-gional or nationwide averages. In general, thecalculations show lower numbers of deathswhen they assume that the population is wide-ly dispersed, and higher numbers when theytake into account concentrations of popula-tion. The calculations also show lower num-bers of deaths when they assume high PFs; ingeneral, increasing PFs above 40 does notreduce casualties much in the calculations,

but that does not mean that raising a PF above40 might not save an individual’s Iife in reality.The calculations also show lower numbers ofdeaths when the winds do not blow fallout intodensely populated areas.

The studies mentioned previously madeseparate calculations for attacks includingbomber and missile submarine bases, as wellas silos. Assuming that there is no preattackevacuation, calculated deaths range from alow of 2 million to a high of 22 million. The dif-ferences result primarily from variations inassumptions regarding fallout protection: thehigh figure assumes approximately to degreeof protection which people receive in theirdaily peacetime lives (PF of 3), and the IO W

figure assumes that the entire populationmoves after the attack to fallout shelters witha PF of at least 25. A more reasonable assump-tion, that the fallout shelters which now exist

86 ● The Effects of Nuclear War -.

are utilized by people Iiving near them, pro-duces a calculation of 14 million dead. Thesame studies also assessed the effects of exten-sive preattack evacuation (crisis relocation),and found that it reduced the range of pre-dicted deaths. However, the assumptions re-garding fallout protection, both for those whoare assumed to evacuate and for those who areassumed to remain near home dominate theresults. Further detail is in appendix D.

Given the threat U.S. bombers pose to theSoviet Union, a Soviet preemptive counter-force attack on bomber bases would probablyseek to destroy the aircraft and supportingfacilities rather than cratering the runways. Todestroy airborne bombers launched on warn-ing of attack, an attacker might detonateweapons in a spaced pattern over the base. Air-bursting weapons rather than ground-burstingthem could reduce the threat of fallout but in-crease casualties from blast and thermal ef-fects; if the weapons were detonated muchabove the optimum height of burst for max-imizing overpressure on the ground, faIloutwould be negligible and blast damage wouldbe reduced. The attacks against missile sub-marine bases are much less complex. Ususallya single high-yield weapon with medium-to-good accuracy will destroy docks, piers,cranes, and other facilities — and nearby cities,factories, and people as well.

Accordingly, it is certain that if the only dif-ference between two attacks is that one at-tacks only ICBM silos and the other attacksbomber and missile submarine bases as well,the latter attack would kill more people. How-ever, the variations in assumptions madeabout attack design, weather, and fallout pro-tection obscure this. Since these variationsreflect genuine uncertainties, it is not possibleto determine which set of assumptions andwhich fatality calculation is most probable.However, some of the extreme assumptions doappear implausible. One Defense Departmentstudy notes that its highest fatality figureassumed the use of Soviet weapons larger thanthose which U.S. intelligence estimates theSoviets possess. Very low fatality estimatesassume abnormally low winds, an absence ofsurface bursts, and /or virtually perfect fallout

protection. On balance, it does not appearpossible to sustain greater precision than tosay that “studies of hypothetical counterforceattacks show deaths ranging from 1 million to20 million, depending on the assumptionsused. ” However, the low end of this range(deaths below the 8 to 10 million level) requiresquite optimistic assumptions, while the highend of the range is plausible only on theassumption that the attack is not preceded bya crisis period during which civilians areeducated about fallout protection.

The data on injuries contained in the execu-tive branch studies are quite limited; for thecounterforce attacks, however, the results sug-gest that injuries would about equal fatalities.

The Contamination Period

For several days or weeks, radioactive con-tamination would be so intense that people infallout areas would have to stay in shelters orevacuate. What might be called the “shelterperiod” begins at each location when falloutstarts arriving and ends when people can leavetheir shelters long enough to do a day’s work.The length varies from place to place; manyplaces will receive no fallout, and some hotspots will be hazardous long after surroundingareas are safe. Note, however, that peoplecould go outside for brief periods before an 8-hour day outside a shelter became safe, andcould not live in houses with a low protectionfactor for weeks afterwards. After 2 or 3months people would ignore the residual radi-ation, though it would be far higher than isconsidered “safe” in peacetime.

For the first 10 to 30 days, shelterers wouldhave to remain in shelters almost all the time.Brief excursions outside, for example, to ob-tain water or food, would substantialIy reducethe effective protection factor. Life in a shelterwould be difficult at best. People would notknow if the shelter offered a sufficient PF, orwhether further attacks were imminent. Theshelter might be dark, as power could be out,and windows would be covered with dirt. Un-less the shelter had a good air filtration system,the air would become clammy and smelly, andcarbon dioxide concentration would increase.Supplies of food and water might or might not

Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases Ž 87

be adequate, depending on what peoplebrought and how many people were in a shel-ter. Unless the shelter were specially stocked,medical supplies would probably be inade-quate. This would be a severe problem in lightof unhealthy conditions in shelters. Peoplewho required special medicines would bethreatened unless they could obtain an ade-quate supply. While most people would haveradios to receive broadcasts, few would havetwo-way radios to transmit. While phonesmight or might not work, it would be difficultto obtain help, as anyone in a contaminatedarea who left shelter would be in jeopardyfrom radiation. In particular, medical carewould probably be unavailable because of theradiation risk of going to a hospital and thetremendous number of patients seeking help atthe few hospitals that remained open.

Radiation sickness would present specialproblems. Exposures too low to cause acuteradiation sickness nevertheless weaken bodilyresistance to infection. Resistance would alsobe weakened by a deterioration in sanitation,prolonged exposure to heat or cold, lack ofmedical care, psychological shock, and inade-quate food, water, and medicine. Hence shel-terers would be especially vulnerable to con-tagious diseases, ranging from colds and in-fluenza to typhoid fever. There is a trend in theUnited States away from immunization; as aresult, many would contract diseases theyotherwise wouId not.

While many people would contract radia-tion sickness and Iive, it is very difficult for thelayman to determine whether an individualshowing pronounced symptoms of radiationsickness has received a moderate, severe, orlethal dose of radiation. Moreover, acute psy-chological shock induces symptoms similar toradiation sickness, and vomiting— a symptomof both— is contagious in small spaces. Thus,someone who vomited would not know if hehad received a moderate, severe, or lethal doseof radiation; if he had severe psychologicalshock; if he had vomited because of con-tagion; or if he had some other illness. Thisuncertainty about one’s own condition andthat of one’s loved ones, and nausea itself,

would increase the tension in a shelter. More-over, nausea weakens people.

Some people will be better off than others:people in adequately equipped shelters ofgood PF; people who are neither very young,very old, or ill; people who have received littleor no radiation before entering the shelter;people in less-crowded shelters. Moderate am-bient temperature would be better than hot,and hot would be better than cold. People insnow zones in the winter, however, would bemore Iikely than others to have adequate pro-visions as a precaution against being strandedat home by snow. I n addition, much would de-pend on how shelterers used their time beforefallout arrived to prepare the shelter.

Even if the winds were perverse, there wouldbe substantial areas of the country that wouldreceive little or no fallout. I n some cases (e. g.,Oregon), it would be evident that no falloutcould be expected unless the war continuedafter the counterforce attack; in other cases itwould be several days before people in an un-contaminated area were certain that they hadbeen among the lucky ones. Once it becameclear that a given area had been spared, thepeople living there could be expected to stepup their normal pace of activity. To the extentpossible, help would be offered to the contam-inated areas. Depending on circumstances,there might be large numbers of evacuees tocare for. The major task, however, would be tokeep the country going until the other surviv-ors could emerge from shelters. Intense butrather disorganized activity would be likely,and essential production would probably takeplace.

Most productive resources would surviveunscathed, but would shut down until thethreat of attack had ended; those in falloutareas would remain closed until radiationlevels had diminished, with the possible excep-tion of such critical services as radio stations,water pumping facilities, and sewage disposalunits. Some plants, and some sectors of theeconomy, would use productive resources asintensively as possible to meet the demands ofthe damaged areas and the injured, and tocompensate for loss of production elsewhere.The burden imposed on the economy by the


Armed Forces would depend on the interna-tional situation.

Economic Disruption

Most economic damage would occur fromlost production, but there would be otherlosses as well: fires would burn unchallenged,and machinery would suffer damage frombeing shut down in haste or not at all, or frombeing left outside unprotected. The majordamage to the economy, however, would re-sult from deaths and long-lasting injuries (toconsumers and producers), and persona I trag-edies and other traumas making people lessable to work. The magnitude of economic losscould be expected to vary with the number ofdeaths.

The attack would cause considerable eco-nomic disruption in the uncontaminated area.Facilities there would need to produce a vastlydifferent mix of goods and cope with the ab-sence of goods that normally come from con-taminated areas. Until people acted as if theybelieved the war was over, it could prove dif-ficult to organize production in the uncon-taminated areas. Uncertainties about the legaland financial arrangements that support pro-duction (money, contracts, credit, etc.) follow-ing a nuclear attack might impede productionin the uncontaminated areas. Some workers,fearing further attacks, would spontaneouslyevacuate. Public disorder could also impedeproduction. The changes and uncertaintieswould cause some economic disruption; how-ever, the greater effort put forth would prob-ably more than compensate for it.

Recuperation

Economic viability would not be at issuefollowing a counterforce attack. Because theattack seeks no economic damage, it would befar less likely than a deliberate strike oneconomic targets to create any bottlenecksthat would greatly hinder recovery. The Nationwould be able to restore production and main-tain self-sufficiency. The attack would causeenormous economic loss, but the Nation’s ca-pacity for growth would be at worst only slight-

ly impaired. The major task would be endingdisruption and disorganization rather thanrebuilding the economy — putting the piecesback together. Most likely these tasks wouldbe accomplished by a mixture of individual,local, State, and Federal initiatives, withFederal intervention used as a last resort.

The main problem areas would be:

1. Agriculture. The attack could be expectedto destroy a tiny fraction of farmland withblast and fire; of much greater significance,fallout would contaminate a substantial frac-tion of cropland because many ICBMs are in ornear the Great Plains. Other cropland wouldescape with little or no fallout. It is unlikelythat more than a fraction of the livestock innearby fallout areas would be adequately pro-tected. Fallout would affect agriculture in twoways: by killing livestock and crops, and bypreventing farmers from working in the fields.

Damage from fal lout contaminat ion ofcrops would depend on the time of year. Mostcrops take up relatively Iittle fallout and exter-nal irradiation does not contaminate them.Moreover, it is easy enough to remove falloutparticles from food. However, the vulnerabil-ity of crops to fallout varies significantly withthe type of crop and the stage of its growth.For example, yield of various crops can bereduced 50 percent by the following doses, inroentgens (R): peas, less than 1,000 R; rye, 1,000to 2,000 R; wheat, corn, cucumber, 2,000 to4,000 R; cotton, melons, 6,000 to 8,000 R; soy-beans, beets, 800 to 12,000 R; rice, straw-berries, 12,000 to 16,000 R; and squash, 16,000to 24,000 R. At the same time, young plants aremost vulnerable to radiation, whiIe those nearmaturity are least vulnerable.

Knowledge about radiation effects on cropsis, however, limited because much more isknown about how gamma radiation affectscrops than about beta radiation effects. Sincefallout emits both types, and since beta dosesto plants could be from 1 to 20 times the gam-ma dose, this is a major uncertainty.

Fallout would prevent farmers from workingin fields for a time. Fallout does decay, and

Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases . 89

weathering would further reduce its effects onpeople. By a year after the attack, falloutwould no longer be of consequence to farm-workers in most areas. How soon after the at-tack they could begin work would depend onthe amount of fallout deposited on a field.

The effects would thus depend significantlyon time of year. An attack between Octoberand January would have little effect, as falloutwould have decayed enough by planting timeto permit farmers to work the fields and toavoid serious damage to crops. Radiation onfields could be substantially reduced by plow-ing the fallout under or by scraping off the toplayer of dirt. An attack in February or MarchwouId delay planting, reducing crop yields ormaking it necessary to shift to crops thatmature more quickly. An attack between Apriland June could kill the entire crop. An attackin July or August could conceivably have littleeffect, if the plants were undamaged by radia-tion. But the resulting crop should be safe forhuman consumption in an emergency. An at-tack during or just before the harvest couldresult in the loss of the whole crop, not bydamaging the plants, but by prevent ingfarmers from harvesting.

Fallout would be more damaging to live-stock than to plants. Animals are only slightlymore resistant to radiation than are people; forsheep, cattle, and pigs in barns, where they areprotected from direct contact with the inges-tion of fallout, a dose of 400, 500, and 600 R,respectively, will kill half these animals. Themedian lethal dose is considerably lower foranimals in pastures, where they can eat falloutalong with grass. Poultry are considered moreresistant; a dose of 850 R will halve the poultryin a barn. Many animals in heavy fallout areaswould probably be killed, as farmers generallyhave no fallout shelters for animals. Moreover,depending on the damage the attack wreakson human food crops, it might be necessary touse animal feed as human food. The conse-quence could be that it would take many yearsto rebuild the national livestock supply, anduntil then meat would become a scarce luxury.

2. Decontamination. Cities, farms, and fac-tories in contaminated areas would requiredecontamination in order to reopen for humanuse. Decontamination involves moving falloutto areas where it can do less harm in order toreduce the dose rate to people in certainplaces. It can be done with bulldozers, streetsweepers, firehoses, brooms, etc. It does,however, require people to place themselvesat risk. Would enough people be willing to runthese risks? Training is required for people toknow that certain doses are tolerable andother doses are not; this training would makepeople less unwilling to face these risks, butwiII enough people have received this training?

3. Public health standards would have to belowered following the attack. in peacetime,standards are often set cautiously; when ac-ceptable exposure risk is unknown, it is pref-erable to err on the side of safety. Followingthe attack, that luxury would not be possible.Fields would be farmed while low-level radio-activity persisted; the risks, quite unaccept-able in peacetime, wouId be preferable to star-vation. The cost-benefit ratio would change:the benefits of individual safety would need tobe weighed against the costs of foregoingcritical production. Moreover, how applicablewould our knowledge be for setting standardsfor the entire population after an attack?Could enough instruments be made availableto enable everyone to know what dose theywere receiving? And what role wouId politicsplay in setting standards when “acceptablerisk” rather than “negligible risk” was at issue?Society would be running greater risks withoutknowing just how great the risks were; so doingwouId increase low-level radiation sickness,cancers, genetic damage, and so on.

4. Burdens on society would increase, remov-ing people from production while increasingdemand on production. Many people wouldsuffer long-lasting, permanent, or debilitatinginjuries. Demands for more military forcecould well increase. Inefficiencies stemmingfrom economic dislocation would reduce theoutputs from any given set of inputs. Decon-taminat ion and civ i l defense would drawresources.


5. Economic disorganization would be a prob-lem, possibly a severe one. Once people wereconfident that the war had ended, moneywould retain its value, and so would propertyin uncontaminated areas. But the marketplacethat organizes the American economy wouldbe severely disrupted by abrupt shifts in de-mand, abrupt changes in supply, questionsabout the validity of contracts involving peo-ple or things in contaminated areas, etc. In ad-dition, a major question would develop overhow to share the losses from the attack in anequitable way.

Long-Term Effects

The main long-term damage would becaused by countersilo strikes, which releasethe great bulk of radiation even if bomber andmissile submarine bases are also attacked.Radiation has long-term health consequences,such as cancers, other illnesses, deaths, andgenetic damage, that blast does not.

Simi lar ly, ecological damage would becaused mainly by countersilo attacks; thistopic is dealt with in chapter V.

In the long run, the economy would recover,although it would be some decades before thepeople killed would be “replaced” in either ademographic or an economic sense. Therewould undoubtedly be permanent shifts in de-mand (e. g., there might be little market forhouses without basements or fallout shelters),and supply of some goods (notably meat )might be scarce for some time.

An imponderable is the psychological im-pact. The United States has never suffered theloss of millions of people, and it is unlikelythat the survivors would simply take it instride. The suffering experienced by the Southin the decade after 1860 provides the nearestanalogy, and a case can be made that these ef-fects took a century to wear off.

CASE 3: A COUNTERFORCE ATTACKAGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

As in the case of the Soviet counterforce at-tack on the United States (described in the pre-vious section), the main threat to the civiIianpopulation, economy, and society is derivedfrom fallout, while the damage done to thestrategic forces is outside the scope of thisstudy. Here too OTA drew on the executivebranch for calculations, and here too the un-certainties are very great.

The First Day

Each of the parameters mentioned in theprevious section as affecting the damage tothe United States would also affect the dam-age to the Soviet Union. An additional sourceof variation is pertinent: the U.S. missiles most-ly carry smaller warheads than their Sovietcounterparts, but U.S. bombers carry weaponswith quite high yields. Ground bursts of bomb-er-carried weapons (which are especialIy Iikely

in an attack on Soviet bomber bases) wouldcreate very large amounts of fallout.

As in the case of a counterforce attack onthe United States, sheltering is preferable toevacuation for protection provided there areno subsequent attacks. Depending on the timeof year, the Soviets might have more difficultythan the United States in improvising falloutprotection (both frozen earth and mud wouldcreate problems); on the other hand, Sovietpreparations for such sheltering in peacetimeare more extensive than their U.S. counter-parts.

The executive branch has performed severalcalculations of fatalities resulting from coun-terforce attacks, and variations in the assump-tions produce a range of estimates. All thesestudies except one assume a Soviet first strikeand a U.S. retaliatory strike. As a result, esti-mates of Soviet fatalities are lower than theywould be for a U.S. counterforce first strike,


partly because the United States would havefewer ICBMS available for a second strike, andpartly because the Soviets are more likely totake precautionary civil defense measuresbefore a Soviet first strike than before a U.S.first strike. All of these studies consider onlyfatalities in the so days following the attack;they exclude later deaths resulting from rela-tively less intense radiation or the effects ofeconomic disruption.

For both counterforce and countersilo at-tacks, with an in-place Soviet population, thefatality estimates are very similar: for theformer, from less than 1 to 5 percent of thepopulation; for the latter, from less than 1 to 4percent. The low end results from usingsmaller weapons air burst, while the high endresults from using larger weapons groundburst. A comprehensive counterforce attackcan logically be expected to kill more peoplethan the countersilo attack because the latteris a subset of the former. However, other fac-tors have a greater influnce on numbers of fa-talities: A full counterforce attack in which theUnited States deliberately tried to minimizeSoviet fatalities by using small weapons airburst, in which winds were favorable, and inwhich the Soviets had tactical or strategicwarning, would kill far fewer people than acounters ilo-only attack in which the UnitedStates used one large weapon ground burstagainst each ICBM silo.

An unpublished Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency (AC DA) analysis highlights theimportance of sheltering and attack character-istics for fatal ities from a U.S. countersilo at-tack. One estimate is that, with the urbanpopulation 90-percent sheltered and the ruralpopulation given a PF of 6, Soviet fatalitieswould range from 3.7 million to 13.5 million,depending on attack parameters. With a de-graded shelter posture (urban population 10-percent sheltered and rural population given aPF of 6), fatality estimates for the same set ofattacks range from 6.0 m i I I ion to 27.7 miIIion.

The Shelter Period

If bomber bases (or airfields with long run-ways that were attacked even though r-to

bombers were present) are attacked, tacticalwarning could be of great importance to peo-ple living nearby. There would be an area neareach base (roughly, the area more than 1 mile[2 km] but less than 10 miles [16 km] from a sur-face burst) in which people who were shelteredat the moment of the blast would have a muchgreater chance of survival than those who wereunsheltered. Soviet civiI defense plans envis-age that civilians in such high-threat areaswould receive some warning, but it cannot besaid to what extent this would actually be thecase.

Many millions of Soviet citizens Iive in areasthat would receive substantial amounts of fall-out from such an attack. Those far enoughaway from the explosions to be safe from blastdarnage would have some time (a range from30 minutes to more than a day) to shelter them-selves from fallout, but evacuation from high-faliout areas after the attack would probablynot be feasible. The Soviet civil defense pro-gram gives attention to blast shelters ratherthan fallout shelters in urban areas (seechapter I I l), and while such blast shelterswould offer good protection against fallout,some of them may not be habitable for thenecessary number of days or weeks for whichprotection would be required.

The sheltering process would be much moretightly organized than in the United States.The Soviet Government has extensive civildefense plans, and while Americans would ex-pect to try to save themselves under generalguidance (informational in character) from theFederal authorities, Soviet citizens would ex-pect the Government to tell them what to do.This introduces a further uncertainty: efficientand timely action by the authorities would bevery effective, but it is also possible thatSoviet citizens would receive fatal radiationdoses while waiting for instructions or follow-ing mixed-up instructions. I n any event, somehours after the attack would see a situation inwhich a large number of people in contam-inated areas were in fallout shelters, otherswere receiving dangerous doses of radiation,and those outside the fallout areas were con-gratulating themselves on their good luck

92 • The Effects of Nuclear War— . — — — . . ——.——. —— .— ———. - .———...— .——.—-.—

while hoping that no further attacks wouldtake place.

Would Soviet shelterers be better off thantheir American counterparts? They have sev-eral advantages. They are more accustomed tocrowding and austerity than are Americans, sowould probably suffer less “shelter shock. ”They would be more accustomed to followingGovernment orders, so to the extent thatorders proved correct and were correctly im-plemented, they would be more evenly distrib-uted among shelters. Training in first aid andcivil defense is widespread, which would im-prove people’s ability to survive in shelters. Ifthe U.S. attack used low-yield warheads, fall-out would be less widespread and less intense.

Soviet shelterers face some problems thatAmericans would not. They would be more vul-nerable than Americans to an attack in winter.The Soviet economy has less “fat,” so otherthings being equal, Soviet citizens could bringless food and supplies into shelters than couldAmericans.

Public health is a major uncertainty. To theextent that shelters are well stocked, providedwith adequate medications and safe ventila-tion, have necessary sanitary facilities, arewarm and uncrowded, and have some peoplewith first aid knowledge, health would be lessof a problem. If Soviet citizens receive lessfallout than Americans, they would be lessweakened by radiation sickness and more re-sistant to disease. If conditions were austerebut reasonably healthy, public health in shel-ters would be mainly a matter of isolating illpeople and practicing preventive medicine forthe others. Doctors would be unnecessary formost such tasks; people trained in first aid, es-pecially if they have some access (by phone orradio) to doctors, could perform most tasks. Tobe sure, some people would die from being un-treated, but the number would be relativelysmall if preventive care worked. However, iso-lating the ill would not be easy. It is likely thatmany people would be moderately ill (fromflu, etc.) when they entered their shelter, andradiation would make the others more sus-ceptible to contamination. The Soviet Govern-

ment might send medical teams to contami-nated areas, especially to shelters containingworkers with key skills. The Soviet Army hasbuilt tanks and some other military vehicleswith protection against fallout, and has trainedits soldiers for operations in areas contami-nated with fallout. In addition, as in the UnitedStates, military helicopters could ferry peopleand supplies into contaminated areas withlimited exposure to crews. Using such re-sources would obviously improve health ofshelterers, but priority military tasks mightmake these miIitary resources unavailable.

People in hasty shelters, if they could bebuilt, would face worse health problems,despite the legendary ability of Russians to en-dure hardships. Presumably these shelterswould have inadequate supplies, heat, air fil-tration, sanitary facilities, waterproofing, andso on. Placing people in a cold, damp hole inthe ground for 2 weeks with little food andmakeshift toilets would make many peoplesick even in peacetime; how well would suchproblems be overcome in war?

Soviet civil defense presents a large ques-tion mark. Some believe that the Soviets havemassive food stockpiles, meticulous plansdetailing where each person should go, ampleshelter spaces, subways and buildings converti-ble to shelters, and so on that would be valu-able in the shelter period. Others contend thatthese claims are vastly overstated and confusespeculation about a plan with its existence andthe existence of a plan with its operational ef-fectiveness. (See chapter III on civil defense.)If Soviet civil defense works well, it would savemany lives; if it doesn’t, Soviet sheltererswould face conditions at least as hazardous astheir American counterparts.

Agricultural losses would, as in the UnitedStates, depend on the time of the year whenthe attack came and on the precise patterns offallout. In general, Soviet agriculture appearsmore vulnerable because it borders on inade-quacy even in peacetime–even relativelyminor damage would hurt, and major croplosses could be catastrophic. On the otherhand, for this very reason the Soviets would


know how to handle agricultural shortages:surviving production and stockpiles (the extentof Soviet food stockpiles is a matter of con-troversy, apart from the fact that they arelowest just before each harvest) would prob-ably be used efficiently.

The economy outside the contaminatedarea would continue to function. There wouldbe more than enough industrial facilities in un-contaminated areas to keep necessary produc-tion going. The key task facing Governmentplanners, however, would be using availableworkers and resources to best advantage. Howfast could planners generate new economicplans that were detailed enough for that task?Because the Soviet economy operates closerto the margin than does that of the UnitedStates, the Soviets could tolerate less loss ofproduction than could the United States. Thiswould make superproduction the norm, withkey factories working all the time. It wouldlead to suspending production of many con-sumer goods. It would probably lead the Cov-ernment to begin decontamination earlier andto take more risks with radiation exposure thanwould the United States. These actions to in-crease production would be aided in generalby the Government’s control of the economy,and in particular by keeping work groupstogether in shelters and host areas.

Recuperation

As in the United States, economic viabilitywould not be threatened. The key question,which would begin to be answered in the shel-ter period, is how appropriate Soviet emer-gency plans are and how rapidly planning mis-takes could be corrected. Major shifts, and theinefficiencies that accompany them, would beinevitable. To what extent could planningminimize them? Could a command economydo better under the circumstances than amixed economy? The Soviet Union’s long ex-perience with central planning would meanthat the changes would involve details withinthe existing system rather than changing fromone economic system to another.

In the U. S. S. R., as in the United States, thecrop loss caused by the attack would dependon season, fallout deposition, which cropswere hit by fallout, and so on. Similarly, theamount of food reserves would vary with theseason. The immediate goal for agriculturewould be to send adequate food supplies tocities. Presumably, the Government would tryto meet this goal by tightening controls ratherthan by giving farmers more capitalistic incen-tives. For a moderate attack like this one, withlittle physical damage, controls would prob-ably work.

It is questionable whether adequate laborwould be available for agriculture. Dependingon the situation, millions of men might bemobilized into the Army. On the other handthe Soviets have well-established proceduresfor getting military personnel, factory workers,and others to help with harvests; moreover,following a nuclear attack, some workers innonessential industries would be out of work,and could be sent to farms. The large numberof farmers (perhaps 35 to 40 percent of theSoviet work force is in agriculture, comparedto 2 or 3 percent in the United States), thefallout contaminating some farmland, and ac-cepting more exposure to radiation would in-crease the Soviet population’s exposure toradiation.

If a year’s crop were lost, would there beausterity, short rations, or starvation? Howmuch surplus food is there? In particular,would there be enough to maintain a livestockindustry, or would meat be seen as a nonessen-tial consumer good and feed grains divertedfor human use?

As in the United States, the attack wouldcreate many burdens for the Soviet economy.Mi l i tary expenditures would probably in-crease; people injured by the attack wouldneed care, and fewer people would be aliveand well to care for them; major changes in theeconomy would cause inefficiencies; loweredpublic health standards would increase earlyproduction at the expense of later healthburdens.


The Soviet Union would not face certainproblems that a market economy faces. Thelegal and financial devices supporting produc-tion – money, credit, contracts, and ownershipof productive resources — would be far less im-portant than in the United States. Instead,Soviet production would be guided by a cen-tral plan. There are reports that contingencyplanning has been done for postwar recupera-tion; such contingency plans (or the peacetimeplan if there are no applicable contingencyplans) would have to be adjusted to take ac-count of the actual availability of survivingworkers and economic assets. Without doubtsuch adjustments would be made, thoughthere would be some waste and inefficiency.

CASE 4: A LARGEU.S. MILITARY AND

This case discusses a massive attack thatone normally associates with all-out nuclearwar. The attack uses thousands of warheads toattack urban-industrial targets, strategic tar-gets, and other military targets. The number ofdeaths and the damage and destruction in-flicted on the U.S. society and economy by thesheer magnitude of such an attack wouldplace in question whether the United Stateswould ever recover its position as an orga-nized, industrial, and powerful country.

OTA favored examining purely retaliatorystrikes for both sides, but all of the availableexecutive branch studies involved Soviet preemption and U.S. retaliation. However, the dif-ferences between a Soviet first strike and aretaliation do not appear to be appreciablylarge in terms of damage to the civilian struc-ture. Like the United States, the Soviets have asecure second-strike force in their SLBMs andare assumed to target them generally againstthe softer urban-industrial targets. Moreover, aU.S. first strike would be unlikely to destroythe bulk of Soviet ICBMs before they could belaunched in retaliation.

The effects of a large Soviet attack againstthe United States would be devastating. The

Long-Term Effects

Chapter V discusses the likely long-termhealth hazards from such an attack.

All things considered, an attack of thisnature could be somewhat less damaging thanWorld War II was to the Soviet Union, andSoviet recovery from that conflict was com-plete. However, it helped that in 1945 theSoviets were victorious and able to draw onresources from Eastern Europe. Much woulddepend on whether the aftermath of this at-tack found the Soviet people pleased or ap-palled at the results of the war and on therelative power and attitudes of the Soviets’neighbors.

SOVIET ATTACK ONECONOMIC TARGETS

most immediate effects would be the loss ofmillions of human lives, accompanied by simi-lar incomprehensible levels of injuries, and thephysical destruction of a high percentage ofU.S. economic and industrial capacity. The fullrange of effects resulting from several thou-sand warheads — most having yields of a mega-ton or greater— impacting on or near U.S.cities can only be discussed in terms of uncer-tainty and speculation. The executive branchstudies that addressed this level of attackreport a wide range of fatality levels reflectingvarious assumptions about the size of the at-tack, the protective posture of the population,and the proportion of air bursts to groundburst weapons.

The DOD 1977 study estimated that 155 mil-lion to 165 million Americans would be killedby this attack if no civil defense measures weretaken and all weapons were ground burst.DCPA looked at a similar attack in 1978 whereonly half the weapons were ground burst; itreduced the fatality estimate to 122 million.ACDA’s analysis of a similar case estimatedthat 105 million to 131 million would die.

If people made use of existing shelters neartheir homes, the 155 million to 165 million


fatality estimate would be reduced to 110 mil-lion to 14s million, and the 122 million fatal-ities to 100 million. The comparable ACDAfatality estimate drops to 76 million to 85million. Again ACDA gets a lower figurethrough assuming air bursts for about 60 per-cent of the incoming weapons. Finally, if urbanpopulations were evacuated from risk areas,the estimated prompt fatality levels would besubstantially reduced. The DOD study showedfatalities of 40 million to 55 million, withDCPA showing a very large drop to 20 millionfrom the 100 mill ion level. The primary reasonfor the 2-to-1 differential is the degree of pro-tection from fallout assumed for the evac-uated population.

In summary, U.S. fatality estimates rangefrom a high of 155 million to 165 million to alow of 20 million to 55 million. Fatalities of thismagnitude beg the question of injuries to thesurvivors. None of the analyses attempted toestimate injuries with the same precision usedin estimated fatalities. However, DCPA didprovide injury estimates ranging from 33 mil-lion to 12 million, depending on circum-stances. An additional point worth noting isthat al I of the fatality figures just discussed arefor the first 30 days following the attack; theydo not account for subsequent deaths amongthe injured or from economic disruption anddeprivation.

The First Few Hours

The devastation caused by a single l-Mtweapon over Detroit (chapter I l), and of twosimilar weapons denoted near Philadelphia,have been described. In this attack the samedestruction would take place in 30 or so othermajor cities (with populations of a million orgreater). Many cities with smaller populationswould also be destroyed. The effects on U.S.society would be catastrophic.

The majority of urban deaths will be blast in-duced, e.g., victims of collapsing buildings, fly-ing debris, being blown into objects, etc. Ex-cept for administering to the injured, the nextmost pressing thing (probably ahead of han-

dling the dead) for most survivors would be toget reliable information about what has oc-curred, what is taking place, and what is ex-pected. Experience has shown that in a disasterSituation, timely and relevant information iscritical to avoiding panic, helpful in organizingand directing productive recovery efforts, andtherapeutic to the overall psychological andphysical well being of those involved. Presum-ably, the civil preparedness functions wouldbe operating well enough to meet some of thisneed.

Rescuing and treating the injured will haveto be done against near insurmountable odds.Fire and rescue vehicles and equipment not de-stroyed wil I find it impossible to move about inany direction. Fires wilI be raging, water mainswill be flooding, powerlines will be down,bridges will be gone, freeway overpasses willbe collapsed, and debris will be everywhere.People will be buried under heavy debris andstructures, and wi thout proper equipmentcapable of lifting such loads, the injured can-not be reached and will not survive. The for-tunate ones that rescuers can reach will thenbe faced with the unavailability of treatmentfacilities. Hospitals and clinics in downtownareas would likely have been destroyed alongwith most of their stocks of medical supplies.Doctors, nurses, and technicians needed toman makeshift treatment centers are likely tohave been among the casualties. The entirearea of holocaust will be further numbed byeither the real or imagined danger of fallout.People will not know whether they should tryto evacuate their damaged city, or attempt toseek shelter from fallout in local areas andhope there will be no new attacks. No doubtsome of both wouId be done.

If this situation were an isolated incident oreven part of a smalI number of destroyed citiesin an otherwise healthy United States, outsidehelp would certainly be available. But if 250U.S. cities are struck and damaged to similarlevels, then one must ask, “Who is able tohelp?” Smaller towns are limited in the amountof assistance they can provide their metropoli-tan neighbors. It is doubtful that there wouldbe a strong urge to buck the tide of evacuation

in order to reach a place where most of thenatives are trying to leave. Additionally, thesmaller cities and towns would have their ownpreparedness problems of coping with the an-ticipated arrival of fallout plus the influx ofrefugees. In light of these and other considera-tions, it appears that in an attack of thismagnitude, there is Iikely not to be substantialoutside assistance for the targeted areas untilprospective helpers are convinced of twothings: the attack is over, and fallout intensityhas reached safe levels. Neither of these condi-tions is likely to be met in the first few hours.

The First Few Days

Survivors will continue to be faced with thedecision whether to evacuate or seek shelter inplace during this interval. The competence andcredibility of authority will be under con-tinuous question. Will survivors be told thefacts, or what is best for them to know, andwho decides? Deaths will have climbed due tountreated injuries, sickness, shock, and poorjudgement. Many people will decide to at-tempt evacuation simply to escape the realityof the environment. For those staying, it likelymeans the beginning of an extended period ofshelter survival. Ideally, shelters must protectfrom radiation while meeting the minimums ofcomfort, subsistence, and personal hygiene.Convincing people to remain in shelters untilradiation levels are safely low will be difficult,but probably no more so than convincing themthat it is safe to leave on the basis of a radi-ation-rate meter reading. There w i l l beunanswerable questions on long-term effects.

Sheltering the survivors in the populousBoston to Norfolk corridor will present un-precedented problems. Almost one-fifth of theU.S. population lives in this small, 150- by 550-mile [250 by 900 km] area. Aside from thethreat of destruction from direct attack, thesepopulations are in the path of fallout from at-tacks on missile silos and many industrial tar-gets in the Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Duluth tri-angle. Depending on the winds at altitude, thefallout from the Midwest will begin arriving 12to 30 hours after the attack.

At the time when fallout radiation first be-comes intense, only a fraction of the survivingurban population will be in adequate falloutshelters. Those that are sheltered will face avariety of problems: making do with existingstocks of food, water, and other necessities orelse minimizing exposure while leaving theshelter for supplies; dealing with problems ofsanitation, which will not only create healthhazards but also exacerbate the social tensionsof crowds of frightened people in a smallspace; dealing with additional people wantingto enter the shelter, who would not only wantto share scarce supplies but might bring con-tamination in with them; dealing with disease,which would be exacerbated not only by theeffects of radiation but by psychosomatic fac-tors; and finally judging when it is safe to ven-ture out. Boredom will gradually replacepanic, but will be no easier to cope with. Thosewith inadequate shelters or no shelters at allwill die in large numbers, either from lethaldoses of radiation or from the combination ofother hazards with weakness induced by radia-tion sickness.

The conditions cited above are generallymore applicable to urbanites who are trying tosurvive. The problems of rural survivors aresomewhat different, some being simpler—others more complex. With warning, peopleliving in rural areas could readily fabricateadequate fallout shelters. However, it might bemore diifficult for a rural shelteree to have cur-rent and accurate information regarding fall-out intensity and location. The farm family islikely not to have suffered the traumatic ex-posure to death and destruction, and conse-quently is probably better prepared psycho-logically to spend the required time in a shel-ter. (Possible consequences to livestock andcrops are addressed later in this section. )

Outdoor activity in or near major cities thatwere struck would likely be limited to emer-gency crews attempting to control fires or con-tinuing to rescue the injured. Crews wouldwear protective clothing but it would be neces-sary to severely limit the total work hours ofany one crew member, so as not to risk danger-ous accumulations of radiation. Areas not


threatened by fallout could begin more delib-erate fire control and rescue operations.Whether a national facility would survive toidentify weapons impact points and predictfallout patterns is doubtful.

The extent of death and destruction to theNation would still be unknown. For the mostpart, the agencies responsible for assemblingsuch information would not be functioning.This task would have to wait until the numbingeffect of the attack had worn off, and theGovernment could once again begin to func-tion, however precariously.

The Shelter Period (Up to a Month)

As noted earlier, after the initial shockperiod, including locating and getting settledin shelters, the problem of sheltering largemasses of people will be compounded as theshelter time extends. Survival will remain thekey concern. People will experience or witnessradiation death and sickness for the first time.Many previously untreated injuries will requiremedical attention, if permanent damage ordeath to the individual is to be avoided. Stock-piles of medical, food, and water supplies aresure to become items of utmost concern.Whether some people can safely venture out-side the shelter for short periods to forage foruncontaminated supplies will depend on fall-out intensity, and the availability of reliablemeans of measuring it.

This period will continue to be marked bymore inactivity than activity. Many areas willhave been freed from the fallout threat eitherby rain, shifting winds, or distance from thedetonations. But economic activity will notresume immediately. Workers wilI remain con-cerned about their immediate families andmay not want to risk leaving them. Informa-tion and instruction may not be forthcoming,and if it is, it may be confusing and misleading,and of little use. Uncertainty and frustrationwill plague the survivors, and even the mostminor tasks wilI require efforts far out of pro-portion to their difficulty. Many will interpretthis as symptomatic of radiation effects andbecome further confused and depressed. The

overall psychological effects will likely worsenuntil they become a major national concern,perhaps on the same level with other incapaci-tating injuries.

Deaths occurring within the first 30 days ofan attack are categorized as prompt fatalities.This duration is a computation standard morethan it is related to specific death-producingeffects, and is the basis for most fatalityestimates. However, deaths from burns, in-juries, and radiation sickness can be expectedto continue far beyond this particular interval.

The Recuperation Period

Whether economic recovery would takeplace, and if so what form it would take, woulddepend both on the physical surv ival ofenough people and resources to sustain recov-ery, and on the question of whether these sur-vivors couId adequately organize themselves.

Physical survival of some people is quiteprobable, and even a population of a few mil-lion can sustain a reasonably modern economyunder favorable circumstances. The survivorswould not be a cross-section of prewar Amer-ica, since people who had Iived in rural areaswould be more likely to survive than the inhab-itants of cities and suburbs. The survivingpopulation would lack some key industrial andtechnical skills; on the other hand, rural peopleand those urban people who wouId survive aregenerally hardier than the American average.

While the absolute level of surviving stocksof materials and products would seem low byprewar standards, there would be a muchsmaller population to use these stocks. Apartfrom medicines (which tend to have a shortshelf life and which are manufactured exclu-sively in urban areas), there would probablynot be any essential commodity of which sup-plies were desperately short at first. A lack ofmedicines wouId accentuate the smallness andhardiness of the surviving population.

Restoring production would be a much moredifficult task than finding interim stockpiles.Production in the United States is extremelycomplex, involving many intermediate stages.


Photo credit: U.S. Air ForceA part of Hiroshima after atomic blast

New patterns of production, which did not relyon facilities that have been destroyed, wouldhave to be established.

It cannot be said whether the productivefacilities that physically survived (undamagedor repairable with available supplies and skills)would be adequate to sustain recovery. Itseems probable that there would be enoughequipment and that scavenging among theruins could provide adequate “raw materials”where natural resources were no longer ac-cessible with surviving technology.

The most serious problems would be organi-zational. Industrial society depends on thedivision of labor, and the division of labordepends on certain governmental functions,

Physical security comes first—a person is re-luctant to leave home to go to work withoutsome assurance that the home will not belooted. While some degree of law and ordercould probably be maintained in localitieswhere a fairly dense population survived, theremaining highways might become quite un-safe, which would reduce trade over substan-tial distances. The second requirement is someform of payment for work. Barter is notorious-ly inefficient. Payment by fiat (for example,those who work get Government ration cards)is inefficient as well, and requires a Govern-ment stronger than a postwar United Stateswould be Iikely to inherit. A strong Govern-ment might grow up, but most survivin g citi-zens would be reluctant to support a dictator-

Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases • 99

ship by whatever name. The best solution is aviable monetary system, but it would not beeasy to establish. Regions or localities mightdevelop their own monies, with “foreign”trade among regions.

The surviving resources might not be usedvery efficiently. Ideally one would want toconduct a national survey of surviving assets,but the surviving Government would probablynot be capable of doing so, especially sincepeople would fear that to acknowledge a surviv-ing stock was to invite its confiscation. Tomake use of surviving factories, workers wouldhave to live nearby, and they might be unwill-ing to do so in the absence of minimally ade-quate housing for their families. Ownership ofsome assets would be hopelessly confused,which wouId diminish the incentives for invest-ment or even temporary repairs.

There is a possibility that the country mightbreak up into several regional entities. If thesecame into conflict with each other there wouldbe further waste and destruction.

In effect, the country would enter a race,with economic viability as the prize. The coun-try would try to restore production to the pointwhere consumption of stocks and the wearingout of surviving goods and tools was matchedby new production. If this was achieved beforestocks ran out, then viability would be at-tained. Otherwise, consumption would neces-sarily sink to the level of new production andin so doing would probably depress productionfurther, creating a downward spiral. At somepoint this spiral would stop, but by the time itdid so the United States might have returnedto the economic equivalent of the MiddleAges.

The effect of an all-out attack would beequally devastating to the U.S. social struc-ture. Heavy fatalities in the major urban areaswould deprive the country of a high percent-age of its top business executives, GovernmentofficiaIs, medicaI speciaIists, scientists,educators, and performers. There is no meas-ure for estimating the impact of such lastinglosses on our society. In addition to the ir-replaceable loss of genius and talents, the

destruction of their associated institutions isstill another compounding of effects that isoverlooked by some recovery estimates. Whocould calculate how long to get over the lossof Wall Street, an MIT, a Mayo Clinic, and theSmithsonian?

The American way of life is characterized bymaterial possessions, with private ownershipof items representing substantial long-term in-vestments (such as homes, businesses, andautomobiles) being the rule rather than excep-tion. Widespread loss of individual assets suchas these could have a strong, lasting effect onour social structure. Similarly, the question ofwhether individual right to ownership of sur-viving assets would remain unchanged in apostattack environment would arise. For exam-ple, the Government might find it necessary toforce persons having homes to house familieswho had lost their homes.

The family group would be particularly hardhit by the effects of general nuclear war.Deaths, severe injuries, forced separation, andloss of contact could place inordinate strainson the family structure.

Finally, major changes should be antici-pated in the societal structure, as survivors at-tempt to adapt to a severe and desponding en-vironment never before experienced. The lossof a hundred million people, mostly in thelarger cities, could raise a question on the ad-visability of rebuilding the cities. (Why recon-struct obvious targets for a nuclear Armaged-don of the future?) The surviving populationcould seek to alter the social and geopoliticalstructure of the rebuilding nation in hopes ofminimizing the effects of any future confIicts.

How well the U.S. political structure mightrecover from a large-scale nuclear attack de-pends on a number of uncertainties. First, withwarning, national level officials are presumedto evacuate to outlying shelter areas; State andlocal authorities will take similar precautions,but probably with less success, especially atthe lower levels. The confidence and credibili-ty of the system will come under severe strainsas relief and recovery programs are implemented. Changes in an already weakened


structure are sure to result as many normalpractices and routines are set aside to facili-tate recovery. Survivors may demand more im-mediate expressions of their likes, dislikes, andneeds. Widespread dissatisfaction could resultin a weakening of the Federal process, leadingto a new emphasis on local government. An

CASE 4: A LARGESOVIET MILITARY AND

A U.S. retaliatory attack against the SovietUnion would destroy 70 to 80 percent of itseconomic worth. The attacking force wouldconsist primarily of U.S. strategic bombers andPoseidon/Polaris SLBMs, since most U.S. land-based ICBMs are assumed lost to a Soviet firststrike. Bombers carry gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles having yields of about 1Mt and 200 kt respectively. Poseidon SLBMsnominally carry up to 10 RVs of 40 kt each.

The attack would strike the full set of Soviettargets —strategic offensive forces, other mil-itary targets, economic targets, and cities.Population would in fact be struck, althoughkilling people would not be an attack objec-tive in itself. The objectives would be to causeas much industrial damage as possible and tomake economic recovery as difficult as possi-ble. The attacks might not be limited in time.Concentrations of evacuees would probablynot be struck, but industries that recoveredvery quickly after the attack could be.

The immediate effects of the attack wouldbe death and injury to millions of Soviet citi-zens, plus the destruction of a large percent-age of Soviet economic and industrial capaci-ty. As with the all-out Soviet attack, the execu-tive branch studies provided a wide range ofcasualty estimates. Since the thrust of thoseanalyses was to look at the potential effec-tiveness of Soviet civil defense, casualtieswere estimated under various assumptions reIated to the posture of the population.

If the Soviet population remained in-place,fatality estimates range from a high of 64 mil-lion to 100 million (26 to 40 percent of the

alternative possibility is martial law, whichmight be controlled in theory but decentral-ized in practice.

All of this assumes that there would be nosignificant ecological damage, a possibilitydiscussed in chapter V. Chapter V also dis-cusses long-term health hazards.

U.S. ATTACK ONECONOMIC TARGETS

Soviet population) to a low of 50 million to 80million (20 to 32 percent). The high-value rangeis due to the different data bases used by DODand ACDA and the higher protection levelsassumed by AC DA. The low-value range resultsfrom the use of day-to-day alert status by theinteragency intelligence study as compared toACDA’s use of generated forces, and the typesof weapons used against the economic targetbase in the two studies. With evacuation, theACDA study estimated that fatalities would bereduced to 23 million to 34 million. It is dif-ficult to judge whether these figures representa high or low estimate. They could be consid-ered as representing the low side because ofthe coarseness of Soviet data as used byACDA. On the other hand, some would saythat the evacuation scheme assumed by ACDAwas unrealistic, and the results should be con-sidered a high estimate. Nevertheless, Sovietfatalities are lower than the United States forboth in-place and evacuated population pos-tures. The lower Soviet fatalities are again pri-marily due to major differences in the yields ofthe weapons detonating in each country, andto the greater proportion of Soviet populationthat lives in rural areas.

As to the cause of fatalities (blast, thermalradiation, and direct nuclear radiation versusfallout radiation), DCPA data suggests that, inlarge attacks, that is, attacks that includeeconomic or economic and population targets,fatalities are primarily due to prompt effectsas opposed to fallout. Prompt effects accountfor at least 80 percent of the fatalities for allpopulation postures when economic targets orpopulation are included in the attack. ACDA


notes a similar result in its study for attacksthat include counterforce and other militarytargets. The reason for this is that in attacks ontargets near urban areas, that is, attacks involv-ing economic targets or popuIation, those pro-tected enough to survive the blast effects alsohave enough protection to survive the fallout.Conversely, those who do not have enoughprotection against fallout in urban areas neartargets will not have enough protection againstprompt effects and will already be dead beforefallout has an effect.

Estimates of Soviet injuries were generallynot included in the analyses. However, onestudy suggested that injuries might be roughlyequal to fatalities under certain attack and ex-posure assumptions.

The First Few Hours

As chapter 11 I notes, Soviet civil defense canhave substantial impact on the full range of ef-fects. Fallout shelters, blast shelters, and in-dustrial hardening can reduce the overall dam-age from nuclear attack. First aid and civildefense training can ameliorate health prob-lems. Storing supplies in shelters lengthensshelter stay time. Thus, the issue is how wellSoviet civil defense would in fact work. Manyunknowns— numbers of shelters, amount off o o d a n d m e d i c i n e stock piIes, small eramounts of surplus resources than the UnitedStates–prevent a judgment in detail. It seemssafe to assume, however, that Soviet civiI de-fense measures would be at least as effectiveas U.S. measures and probably better.

Preattack preparations would have a de-cided influence on damage caused. Since aU.S. retaliatory attack is by definition pre-ceded by a Soviet first strike, it would seemlogical that some evacuation would have oc-curred. However, there are reasons why evac-uation might not have taken place. These in-clude the following Soviet concerns: an evac-uation could increase the risk of a U.S. attack;the U.S. attack might be so close at hand thatan evacuation couId increase casualties; a pro-longed evacuation might be such an economicdisruption that it would be better to wait until

war appeared certain; or war through miscal-culation. I n any event, a Soviet decision tostrike first would allow the Soviets to makepreparations—distribute supplies, improveand stock shelters, increase production ofessential goods, harvest grain, protect Iive-stock, conduct civil defense training, hardenindustrial facilities, and so on. These actionswould also make Soviet citizens more respon-sive to civil defense instructions, especially toa warning that an attack was underway. Whilethese actions would be observed by the UnitedStates, they would be more ambiguous than anevacuation, so the United States could seethem as safeguarding against an attack ratherthan preparing for one.

The effects of evacuation in reducing casu-alties could be diluted to some extent by vary-ing U.S. attack strategy. Spreading the attackover a period of time could extend shelter peri-ods, enhance economic disruption, and delayrescue and emergency operations.

The Soviet Union, despite its vast geograph-ical size, is vulnerable to an urban/industrialattack in many of the same ways as the UnitedStates. Although there has been extensive pub-licity on their reported dispersal of industry, in-dications are that population and industry arebecoming more and more concentrated. Whilesome industries may have been moved awayfrom cities, many others have been built nearcities. Indeed, some of the industries recentlybuilt away from cities are themselves so con-centrated that they form new targets of theirown. Hedrick Smith describes

the Kama River Truck Plant as an arche-type of the gigantomania of Soviet planners,as a symbol of the Soviet faith that biggermeans better and the Soviet determination tohave the biggest at any cost.

Kama is the kind of massive crash projectthat appeals to Russians. It emanates brutestrength. In 1971, Soviet construction brigadesstarted from scratch to build the wor ld ’slargest truck plant in the open, rolling, wind-swept plains about 600 miles east of M o s -cow Kama was not just one factory but six,all huge The production complex, costingin the bilIions, occupies 23 square miles, anarea larger than the entire island of Manhat-


tan. At full capacity, Kama is slated to pro-duce 150,000 heavy trucks and 250,000 dieselengines a year, dwarfing anything in Detroit orthe German Ruhr.6

The attack could cause “derussification. ”The U.S.S.R. is a nation of nationalities, ofwhich Great Russians — who dominate politics,industry, and much else— comprise about 48.5percent of the population. Most Great Rus-sians live in cities, so an attack would reducetheir numbers and influence. Derussificationcould weaken Great Russians’ control of theU. S. S. R., with unforeseeable consequences.

Timing makes a critical difference in de-struction. An attack at night would have peo-ple with their families and more dispersed;they would seek shelter in apartment build-ings. An attack during the day would strikepeople at factories and offices; to the extentthey left to find family members, chaos wouldresult as in the United States, but to the extentthey sought shelter at work, they would be or-ganized by economic task. Such organizationwould be useful for postattack recovery.

An attack in winter would expose more peo-ple to bitter cold and impede evacuation; anattack in spring or fall, when many roads aremade impassable by mud, would hinder evac-uation by motor vehicle. An attack near har-vest time could result in the loss of an entireyear’s crop, thus leaving food reserves at a lowpoint. This effect could be magnified if theUnited States attacked agricultural targets,such as storage silos, dams, and drainage facil-ities.

Even time of month makes a difference be-cause of the Soviet practice of “storming.” TheSoviet factory month in practice divides intothree periods: “sleeping,” the first 10 days;“hot” work, the second 10; and “feverish”work, the third. This division occurs becausethe economic plan calls for a specified outputfrom each plant by the end of the month, butthe inputs needed often arrive only after the15th or 20th of the month. Thus, perhaps 80

‘Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: BallantineBooks, 1977), p. 241.

percent of a factory’s output is produced inthe last 10 or 15 days of the month. (This 80percent is typically of such reduced qualitythat Soviet consumers often refuse to buy mer-chandise made after the 20th of a month. ) Hy-pothetically, an attack around the 15th or 20thof a month would cause the loss of most of amonth’s production, and would destroy thelarge inventory in factories of partially com-pleted goods and of inputs that cannot be useduntil other inputs arrive.

On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. has severalstrengths. Cities are in general less flammablethan U.S. cities, as there are more large apart-ment buildings and fewer wood frame houses.These buildings would also provide bettershelter, especially those that have sheltersbuilt in. People would expect to follow instruc-tions and would be less likely to evacuatespontaneously. The Party apparatus wouldprobably survive with a far lower casualty ratethan the population at large because it is welldistributed and because blast shelters havebeen constructed for party members. Russiansare likely to be less traumatized by shelter con-ditions, as they are more accustomed to aus-terity and crowding. The nation is larger, whichin theory provides more land area over whichpeople could relocate, but much of the area ismountain, desert, or arctic.

The First Few Days

Actions in this period would greatly affectthe number of casualties and the amount ofeconomic damage. Obviously, much damagewould have been caused in the first hour.Many people trapped in the rubble could berescued, would be seriously injured but couldsurvive with medical care or first aid, would beable to seek shelter or evacuate, could preparehasty fallout shelters, could improve existingshelters, and so on. Some industries would bedamaged but not destroyed; if small fires wereextinguished, undamaged equipment hard-ened against blast, exposed equipment pro-tected from rust, and so on, more resourceswould be available for recovery. Likewise,farms could harvest crops, shelter livestock,

Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases • 103

and protect harvested crops in the few daysbefore fallout deposition.

The issue is not what could be done butwhat would be done. Proper use of time— or-ganization and prioritization to get the mostimportant tasks done with the least wasted ef-fort and resources —would be critical. TheSoviet system offers a major advantage in thisperiod. As we noted in the case of a counter-force attack, the Government’s role in thiscrisis would be more clearly defined, and itscontrol over individual action and the econ-omy would be much stronger than that of theU.S. Government in a comparable situation. Itsexperience with central planning and a com-mand economy would be good preparation forthe actions needed —decisions involving largeshifts in behavior and resources, obeyedwithout argument. Its decisions would savesome people and industries and condemnothers, but delay in order to make better deci-sions could easily condemn more. Evacuationwould have to be ordered in this period, or elsewould-be evacuees would have to wait untilradiation had reached safe levels. For citiesdamaged only slightly, evacuation wouldprove difficult but not impossible. With manyrail yards and some key bridges out, it wouldbe difficult to get trains to smaller cities.Destruction of petroleum refineries, somepetroleum storage capacity (especially thatlocated in rail marshaling yards that were at-tacked), and some electric power generators,would further impede evacuation by train.Fallout contours would be difficult to predict,so it would be hard to select the best evacua-tion routes and relocation centers. An attack inwinter wouId add other problems.

Survivors in Soviet cities would face thesame severe problems as those in U.S. cities.Many would be injured, trapped in rubble, ir-radiated with initial nuclear radiation, etc.Many shelters would be destroyed or dam-aged. Power would be out, so water pressurewould be too low for fighting fires. Rubblewould impede rescue.

Undamaged areas, especially those notthreatened by heavy fallout, wouId face severeburdens. They would receive many evacuees inthe first few days, would send rescue teamsand resources to devastated areas, and wouldstrive to produce as much as possible. Evac-uees in undamaged areas would be pressedinto work in fields and factories, and would besheltered in public buildings or private homes.The performance of undamaged areas wouldthus largely determine the nation’s ability toprosecute the war and to achieve economicviability. The Government would, however,face a dilemma in how to use resources surviv-ing in undamaged areas: it could maximizecurrent production, leaving workers and re-sources vulnerable to further attacks, or itcould seek to protect workers and resources,thus reducing current production. The specificchoices wouId depend on the likelihood of fur-ther attacks, criticality of various products,and so forth, but the dilemma would stand.

An all-out attack would exacerbate the inef-ficiencies that Soviet industry has in peace-time. The Government would have to decidewhat it needed to have produced, and whetherthe factories existed to have them produced.The Government would have far more difficul-ty correlating inputs and outputs and arrang-ing for their transportation. It would have toassign people to jobs, and arrange to transport,shelter, and care for workers. Many workerswould be sick, in shelters, killed, traumatized,or debilitated by radiation sickness. However,the Government would probably be able tocontrol what movement of people did takeplace. Even in peacetime, the Government hasvery high control over mobility. People are notin the habit of going anywhere without permis-sion, and everyone’s actions must be justifiedand accounted for. There is little independenttravel. The internal passport system strength-ens these controls. I n wartime, the Govern-ment would presumably strengthen its controlof transportation. People would have nowhereto go where they could be sure of shelter fromfallout unless the Government arranged theirtransportation and shelter. This control would

104 “ The Effects of Nuclear War

help the Government maintain economic orga-nization following attack.

The Shelter Period

By all reports, the Soviets are better pre-pared than Americans to spend extended peri-ods of time in shelters. In their literature well-conceived protective structures are seen thatshould af ford good survivabi l i ty. Li fe inshelters and evacuation areas would in someways be similar to that described in earliercases. Actions taken before fallout depositionwould affect casualties. Public health, numberand quality of shelters, and amount of foodand medicine stockpiled are uncertainties.Civil defense and first aid training wouldmitigate deaths, but to an unpredictable ex-tent. People in uncontaminated areas wouldbe best off, followed by those in fallout shel-ters in contaminated areas, those in securefallout shelters in blast areas, and those inhasty shelters in contaminated areas.

One public health problem would be espe-cially acute in this case. Antibiotics, which areinvaluable in fighting many diseases, are inshort supply in the U.S.S.R. even in peacetime.Antibiotics have a short sheIf life and cannotbe frozen. Large doses of radiation destroymost of the body’s antibodies, which fight dis-eases. Antibiotics are typically used to com-pensate for the drastic decrease in antibodiesin radiation victims, as it takes the body a longtime to rebuild its antibodies after large radia-tion doses. Because of the U.S.S.R. ’S limitedsupply of antibiotics, many people could beexpected to die from diseases.

In areas contaminated by fallout but un-damaged by blast, shelter life would be less in-tolerable. Utilities might be working, buildingswould be undamaged so would offer bettershelter, people would be uninjured, therewould be time to prepare and provision shel-ters, there would be less incl inat ion toevacuate, and there would be less pressure toleave shelters prematurely.

Fallout deposition patterns would becomeclear in this period, and would largely deter-

mine the damage to agriculture and which in-dustries would need to remain closed. Harvest-ing crops uncontaminated by fallout would beimpeded by fuel shortages, but evacueeswould be plentiful and could harvest crops byhand. Similarly, evacuees could work in surviv-ing industries in uncontaminated areas.

The key issue that the Government wouldface would be successful organization. Pro-duction would be far below prewar levels. Itwould take some time before the Governmentcould take inventory, set priorities, arrange forinputs of workers, resources, and power, andtransport the outputs. Most needs in thisperiod would be met from inventory. The Cov-ernment would thus need to establish strictcontrols over inventory; it could be necessaryto implement severe rationing of food, as wasdone in Leningrad in World War 11.

Problems of organization would be especial-ly critical in light of the intense struggle forresources and the need to use resources aswidely as possible. The competition for petro-leum, discussed previously in Case 2, would beminimal compared to the competition here.The military, agriculture, industry, transporta-tion, and life support systems would all haveurgent claims on resources. Everything wouldbe in short supply; there would be hundreds ofbottlenecks instead of one. How would theGovernment mediate among these claims?There would be far less margin for error than inpeacetime, and a decision to use resources forone purpose would almost automatically preelude other courses of action. Viability wouldbe at issue, and deaths would increase becauseof delays in achieving it.

What sacrifices would the Government de-mand? Obviously, each critical sector wouldbe called on to make some, and consumergoods would probably be sacrificed complete-Iy. Public health would be sacrificed to someextent by starting production in contaminatedareas early and by giving people contaminatedfood rather than nothing.

The Government would probably be able tomaintain control. Food rationing, control oft ransportat ion and shel ters, and internal


passports would help the Government restartthe economy. Its economic plans would be theonly alternative to chaos, and people wouldexpect to obey them and their demands evenwithout controls. Many party members wouldsurvive. Contenders for resources wouId strug-gle inside the Government, but externalthreats, the specter of chaos, the urgency ofdecisions, and the recognized impossibility ofgetting everything needed would dampen thedebate. All sectors would make sacrifices. Themilitary, for example, might be forced toforego fuel-intensive training. In agricultureand industry, manual labor—which would beplentiful – would substitute for machinery.People would use wood for fuel where possi-ble; many would go cold. Coal-burning loco-motives woud Iikely be taken from storage.Decisions would be taken quickly and set rigid-ly, Productivity would decrease before it in-creased. The standard of living would be farlower, and some would die in this period andthe next as a result. The question is— howmany?

Recuperation

Production– and with it, standard of livingand the number of people production couldsupport —would go down before it went up. In-dustries would use inventories of supplies forproduction, then would have to close until sup-ply could be reestablished. TransportationwouId wind down as petroleum refining wascut off, and petroleum supplies became ex-hausted or requisitioned by the military. Peo-ple would be diverted from production by be-ing sick or injured, caring for the sick or in-jured, or being drafted for military service.What production took place would be far lessefficient. Many workers would be debilitatedby minor cases of radiation sickness, other ill-ness, malnutrition, psychological shock, and soon. Many would be called on to do tasks forwhich they lacked the training or the physicalstrength. Factories would be damaged or couldnot obtain necessary parts, so industrial proc-esses would have to substitute labor for capitalor use shortcuts that would reduce the qualityof the product or the efficiency of the process.

If things went well, production would sta-bilize at a level that made good use of surviv-ing resources, and would recover from there.The Government would increase its controlover people and the economy, production ofconsumer goods wouId be delayed, many re-sources would flow to the military, publichealth would be lower, but sacrifices wouldpay off. Soviet engineers and plant managersreputedly are skiIIful at improvising solutionsto mechanical problems. Such skills, Govern-ment organization and control, and bruteforce could overcome bottlenecks, use pro-duction to expand capacity, and give peopleaustere but adequate food, housing, medicalcare, and other necessities.

The recovery could go poorly, however. Agreat many people could require medical carethat could not be provided, and would die. Theharvest could be lost, and more would die.Starving people would find and eat grain to beplanted next year, reducing that crop and caus-ing others to starve. Transportation could col-lapse, preventing factories from obtaining in-puts and making it impossible for their prod-ucts to be distributed, forcing them to close.Hardening might save key machine tools, butthese tools might be buried under tons of rub-ble or be in intensely radioactive areas, preeluding their use. The Government might beunable to conduct a detailed resource inven-tory that could integrate these tools into theeconomy, or there might be no way of trans-porting them to a factory that could use them.A war or threat of war, from NATO, China, orboth, might divert surviving industry and mate-rials into producing for the war effort andaway from the economy. Which way the econ-omy would go is unpredictable, for there arefar too many unknowns. But should economicproductivity fall precipitously, for whateverreason, the economy couId support fewer peo-ple, and more would die. Indeed a failure toachieve viability could cause as many Sovietdeaths as the attack itself.

I n summary, the effects of a large-scale nu-clear attack against Soviet military and urban-industrial targets wouId remove that nationfrom a position of power and influence for the


remainder of this century. Soviet fatalities, due ing industry would be less severely damagedto asymmetries in weapons yields and popula- than their U.S. counterparts. Nor is there anytion densities, would be lower than those for evidence that the Soviets face a lower risk ofthe United States. However, there is no evi- finding themselves unable to rebuild an indus-dence that the Soviet economy and its support- trial society at all.

Chapter V

OTHER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

.

Chapter V.—OTHER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

TABLES

Page

12. Assumed Effects of Radiation Exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11113. Assumed Sources of Cancer Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11114, Long-Term Radiation Effects From Nuclear Attacks . . . . . . . 113

Chapter V

OTHER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

The preceding chapter has made it clear that even the immediate effects of anuclear attack would have a long-term impact. Structures and resources that wouldbe destroyed in seconds (by blast) or hours (by fire) might not be rebuilt or replacedfor years, or even decades. People who would die in seconds or in weeks (from falloutradiation) might not be repiaced in a demographic sense for several generations. Po-Iitical social, and economic changes arising from the immediate postattack disrup-tion would probably prove in some significant respects to be irreversible.

There is another category of effects of nuclear war, however, which are “longterm” in the sense that they would probably not be noticeable for some months, oreven years, after the attack took place. Such effects include long-term somatic andgenetic damage from radiation, possible changes in the physical environment (in-cluding the possibility of damage to the ozone layer of the upper atmosphere), andpossible changes in the ecological system of which humans area part. These are ef-fects that conventional weapons cannot produce. They are discussed under threerubrics:

●

●

A

Effects from low-level ionizing radiation,which are reasonably certain to takeplace, whose magnitude would depend onthe scope of the attack, and which can tosome extent be calculated on the basis ofexisting data and theory.Damage to the ozone layer in the at- ●

mosphere. Such damage could injurehuman and animal health, and possibly

lead to changes in the Earth’s climate. Atthe present time it is not known how tocalculate the Iikelihood of its occurrence,but ongoing research into the chemistry ofthe upper atmosphere offers promise ofgreater understanding in the future.Other effects whose magnitude and likeli-hood are incalculable, but whose possibil-ity should not be ignored.

CALCULABLE EFFECTS: IONIZING RADIATION

large body of scientific literature ad-dresses itself to the issue of long-term effectsfrom low levels of ionizing radiation, There hasbeen an intensive study over the years of thehealth of the survivors of Hiroshima and Naga-saki, and of some of those who were subjectedto radioactive fallout as a result of nuclearweapons testing. There has been considerableresearch into the question of how large a quan-tity of radioactive particles of various kindsare produced by nuclear weapon explosions.There is a body of theory regarding the effectsof ionizing radiation on the human body. Butthere are also formidable uncertainties. Newinformation is coming to Iight regarding some

of the effects of past weapons testing, andthere are unresolved scientific controversiesover matters as basic as whether a small doseof radiation does more damage to the humanbody (or, from a statistical point of view, ismore likely to do a given amount of damage toa human body) if it is absorbed during a briefperiod of time than if it is absorbed over alonger period. There are pertinent questionswhose answers are only known to within a fac-tor of 10.

Previous chapters have discussed the effectsof very intensive ionizing radiation: 1,000 reinswill almost certainly be lethal if absorbed

109


within a matter of days; 450 reins will kill 50percent of a healthy adult population, and aslightly higher percentage of the young, theold, and those without adequate medical care;250 reins will cause acute radiation sickness,from which “recovery” is probable; and evenlower doses may lower the body’s resistance toinfectious diseases of various kinds. It isgenerally assumed that because of the rate atwhich fallout radiation decays, doses of thismagnitude are likely to be received during thefirst so days after an attack if they are receivedat all. The preceding chapter, and appendix D,include calculations on the numbers of peoplewho might die from radiation effects duringthe first 30 days after various kinds of nuclearattack.

However, doses of ionizing radiation thatare too small or too slowly accumulated toproduce prompt death or radiation sicknessnevertheless have harmful effects in the longrun. These effects can only be discussed statis-tically, for it appears that if a large populationis exposed to a given (small) dose of radiation,some will suffer harmful effects while otherswill not. The larger the dose, the greater thepercentage of the population that is harmed,and the greater the risk to any one individual.

There are a number of ways in which a nu-clear attack would lead to radiation exposureswhich, although too low to cause death withinthe first 30 days, nevertheless pose an appreci-able long-term hazard:

● Prompt radiation from the nuclear explo-sions could inflict sublethal doses onsome survivors, especially if the weaponsare small ones. Most of the radiation ab-sorbed by survivors of the Hiroshima andNagasaki attack was direct radiation. Asubstantial number of U.S. weapons haveyields in the tens of kilotons, and might in-flict radiation on people far enough awayfrom the explosion to survive the blast ef-fects. Few Soviet weapons are of such lowyields and high-yield weapons are ex-pected to kill those within radiation rangeby blast. A terrorist weapon would almostcertainly inflict direct radiation on sur-

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●

—

vivors. There is a particular area of uncer-tainty regarding the effects on humans oflow levels of neutron radiation.Local fallout will inflict small doses ofradiation on people who are on the fringeof “fallout zones, ” or on people who arein fallout shelters in zones of heavier fall-out. It is important to realize that even thebest fallout shelters attenuate falloutrather than block it completely, and thewhole theory of fallout shelters is to see toit that people who would, if unsheltered,receive a lethal dose would instead re-ceive a sublethal dose. However, this sub-lethal dose will produce harmful long-term effects for some percentage of thoseexposed.After a period of time, local fallout radia-tion levels decay to the point where thearea would be considered “safe,” and sur-vivors in fallout shelters would emerge.Nevertheless, low levels of radiat ionwould persist for some time— indeed, lowlevels of radiation have persisted for yearsat some sites of nuclear weapons tests.The question of safety here is a relativeone. By the standards of peacetime, manysuch areas would be considered unsafe,because living in them would expose apopulation to a significant risk of long-term hazards— cancer, genetic damage,etc. However, in the aftermath of a nuclear attack, there may be few habitableareas that do not have a measurable(though low) level of additional radiation,and the survivors wouId simply have to ac-cept the hazards.Some fallout is deposited in the tropo-sphere, and then is brought down to Earth(largely by rain) over a period of weeks.Such fallout reaches areas quite far fromthe blast. While the doses inflicted wouldbe relatively small, they would add to therisk.Some fallout is deposited in the strato-sphere. It returns to Earth over a period ofyears (through the effects of gravity), andconsequently only very long-lived radio-active isotopes pose a significant hazard.If the attacks are confined to the territory

Ch. V—Other Long-Term Effects Ž711

of the United States and the Soviet Union(and, for that matter, to Europe and Chinaas well), then stratospheric fallout will beconfined mostly to the Northern Hemi-sphere, and the region between 300 and600 north latitude will receive the bulk ofit.

In quantifying the radiation dose receivedby individuals, radiation from external and in-ternal (ingested) sources must be distinguished.External radiation passes through the skin. ln-gested radioactivity derives its effects fromparticular radioactive isotopes becoming con-centrated in specific organs. For example,radioactive iodine (l-1 31), which may enter thebody through breathing, eating, and drinking,is concentrated in the thyroid, and radioactivestrontium (Sr 89 and Sr 90) is concentrated inbone.

An OTA contractor performed a series ofcalculations to estimate the magnitude of thelong-term health hazards that would be cre-ated by the long-term, low-level radiation thateach of the OTA cases might produce. Thebasic method was to calculate the totalamount of radiation that all the survivors ofeach hypothetical nuclear attack might absorbduring the 40 years following the attack, andthen calculate the numbers of adverse healtheffects that this much radiation could be ex-pected to produce. (Tables 12 and 13 presentthe risk factors used for these calculations.)The difficulties in such a procedure are for-midable, and precise results are manifestly im-possible to obtain.

The major uncertainties, which result in awide range of answers, are the following:

●

●

●

All of the uncertainties discussed in pre-vious chapters about the size and natureof the attack, and the distribution of thepopulation.How much of the population benefitsfrom what degree of fallout sheltering? Ithas been noted that there is no necessaryrelation between civil defense plans andactual shelter received.How many people die in the immediateaftermath of the attack?

●

●

Does radiation that is part of a low ex-posure or a very slow exposure do asmuch damage per rem absorbed as radia-tion received as part of a high and rapidexposure? One theory holds that, giventime, the body can repair the damagedone by radiation, and that hence thesame dose spread over years does lessdamage than it would if received within afew days. Another theory is that radiationdamages the body in ways that are essen-tially irreparable. The contractor cal-culated the effects both ways (DEF = 1and DEF = 0.2), which accounts for someof the range in the answers.IS there a threshold dose below whichradiation exposure does no harm at all? Ifthere is, then the methodology used pro-duces somewhat exaggerated results,


●

●

since it attributes damage to radiation ab-sorbed by people whose total dose is be-low the threshold.

How to deal with the distribution of agesof the population at the time of the at-tack, since susceptibility to cancer, etc.,from causes other than radiation varieswith age.

How great are the genetic effects from agiven level of radiation? Extensive experi-mental results permit an approximate cal-culation of the number of mutations thatwould be produced, although one sourcenotes that the doubling dose for geneticdisorders might be anywhere from 20 to200 reins. However, it is far more difficultto predict exactly how these mutationswould manifest themselves in future gen-erations.

The results of these calculations are summa-rized in table 14. [The full report of the con-tractor is available separately. ) The ranges re-sult from the uncertainties noted above, and itis expected that the “actual” results if a wartook place would be some distance from eitherextreme. It is observed that:

● Cancer deaths in the m i I I ions couId be ex-pected during the 40 years following alarge nuclear attack, even if that attackavoided targets in population centers.These millions of deaths would, however,be far less than the immediate deaths

●

●

caused by a large attack on a full range oftargets.A large nuclear war could cause deaths inthe low millions outside the combatantcountries, although this would representonly a modest increase in the peacetimecancer death rate.These results might not apply if an at-tacker set out deliberately to create veryhigh radiation levels.

Just as this study was going to press, theresults of the new report of the Committee onthe Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations(“BEIR II”) of the National Academy of Sci-ences (NAS) became available. (The full report,entitled “The Effects on Populations of Expo-sure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiations,” willbe published by NAS during the second half of1979. ) In general, the new report suggests aslightly narrower range of uncertainty than theOTA calculations, but generally confirms theirassumptions. OTA used assumptions of cancerdeaths per million person-reins which appearto be about 10 percent higher at the high endof the range and about 40 percent lower at thelow end of the range than the findings of thenew BEIR report. OTA calculated genetic ef-fects on the basis of a doubling dose of 20 to200 reins, compared with a range of 50 to 250reins suggested by the new BE I R report, whichmay mean that the OTA estimates are too highat the high end of the range. The new BEIRreport also notes that the incidence of radi-ation-induced cancer would be higher forwomen than for men.

EFFECTS ON THE OZONE LAYER

Large nuclear explosions would, amongother things, inject a variety of particles intothe upper atmosphere. In recent years, consid-erable attention has focused on the possibilitythat the injection of a substantial quantity ofnitrogen oxide (NOX) into the stratosphere by alarge number of high-yield nuclear weaponsmight cause a depletion or thinning of theozone layer. Such a depletion might produce

changes in the Earth’s climate, and wouldallow more ultraviolet radiation from the Sunthrough the atmosphere to the surface of theEarth, where it could produce dangerous burnsand a variety of potentially dangerous ecologi-cal effects.

As of 1975, a report by the National Acad-emy of Sciences (discussed more fully below)

Ch. V—Other Long-Term Effects •113

Table 14.–Long-Term Radiation Effects From Nuclear Attacksa

fallout sheltering treated parametrically

Somatic effects PF* = 5 PF* = 10Cancerdeaths 2,000.000-5.500,000 1,000,000-3,000>000

Thyroidcancers about 2,000,000 about 1,000,000

Thryoldnodules about 2,500,000 about 1,500,000

Genetic effectsAbortIons due to chromosomal

damage 250,000-2,500,000 150,000-1,500,000Other genetic

effects 900,000-9,000,000 500,000-5,000,000

Estimated effects outside he United States from this attackSomatic effectsCancer deathsThyroid cancersThyroid nodulesGenetic effectsAbortIons due to chromosomal damageOther genetic ffects

PF* =40

300,000-1 ,000! 000

about 300,000

about 500,000

50,000-500,000

150,000-1,500,000

8,000-80,000about 30,000about 50,000

4,000- 40,00013,000-130,000

of air bursts and surface bursts was assumed, and the ranges include variations fallout protection

Somatic effectsCancer deaths 1,200,000-9,300,000T h y r o i d c a n c e r s about 5,500,000Thyroid nodules 7,700,000-8,400,000Genetic effectsAbortins due to chromosomal damage 320,000-8,000,000Other genetic effects 1,000,000-12,500,000


called attention to this danger as a serious one,estimating that a 30- to 70-percent reduction inthe ozone column was a possibility.

Since that time, however, there have beentwo changes which bear on the question of thedegree of risk of ozone depletion:

1. Further research into the chemistry of theupper atmosphere has modified the mod-el calculations used in 1975. The results ofpast nuclear tests do not, however, pro-vide data adequate for the complete vali-dation of any chemistry model. There arealso indications that the chemistry con-cerned is much more complex than wasformerly believed. The state of knowledgein early 1979 is roughly this: injections ofNO. could deplete the ozone layer if theyoccur at very high altitudes (80,000 ft [24km] and upwards), which would resultfrom very high-yield explosions (i.e., sub-

2

stantially more than 1 Mt) in large num-bers (1 ,000 or more), or possibly from high-altitude explosions. Otherwise, ozone de-pletion is not believed to be likely. How-ever, further changes in the theory of whatwould happen are Iikely in the future.

The development of MIRVs has reducedthe number-of very high-yield warheads inthe arsenals of the superpowers, as theyare replaced by multiple weapons oflower yield.

These changes cast doubt on the likelihoodof serious ozone depletion as a consequenceof nuclear war. However, they by no meansdemonstrate that ozone depletion is impossi-ble, and even slight depletion could cause anincrease in the incidence of skin cancer.

This is an area where research continues,and further changes should not be surprising.

INCALCULABLE EFFECTS

In 1975, the National Academy of Sciencespublished a report, Long-Term Worldwide Ef-fects of Mu/tip/e Nuclear-Weapons Detona-tions, which addressed the question of whethera large-scale nuclear war would be Iikely toproduce significant, irreversible effects on theworld environment.

This document may be summarized as fol-lows:

●

●

●

It is possible that a large nuclear warwould produce irreversible adverse ef-fects on the environment and the ecologi-cal system.In particular, it would not require verylarge changes to greatly diminish the pro-duction of food. The report notes that itwould be di f f icul t to adapt to suchchanges in view of the likelihood thatmuch of the world’s expertise in agricul-tural technology might perish in the war.The physical and biological processes in-volved are not understood well enough tosay just how such irreversible damage, if itoccurred, would take place.

—-.——.-—. — .-

. Therefore, it is not possible to estimatethe probability or the probable magnitudeof such damage.

With the exception of the discussion ofpossible damage to the ozone layer, wherethere has been some advance in knowledgesince 1975, these conclusions still hold in 1979.

Moreover, there are at least two other re-spects in which there are hazards whose mag-nitude cannot be calculated. It is certain thatthe radiation derived from a nuclear warwould cause mutations in surviving plants andanimals; it is possible that some of these muta-

FINDINGS

The calculations for long-term radiationhazards, with all their uncertainties, permit anorder-of-magnitude conclusion: ●

There would be a substantial number ofdeaths and illness due to radiation amongthose who were lucky enough to escape a

much greater than what is considered tol-erable today.The number of deaths would be rathersmall compared to the number of deathsresulting from the immediate effects ofthe attack — millions compared to tens orhundreds of millions.

lethal dose during the first weeks after the I n contrast, the incalculable effects of dam-attack. age to the Earth’s ecological system might be

on the same order of magnitude as the immedi-The number of deaths would be very large ate effects, but it is not known how to calcu-by peacetime standards, and the hazards late or even estimate their likelihood.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A–LETTER OF REQUEST

COMMllTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

W ASHINGTON , D.C. 20510

September 8, 1978

The Honorable Edward M. KennedyChairman, Technology Assessment BoardOffice of Technology AssessmentUnited States CongressWashington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Several years ago, a study conducted under the auspicesof the Office of Technology Assessment at the requestof tCommittee on Foreign Relations provided guidance which ledto substantially improved analyses by the Department ofDefense of the effects of limited nuclear war.

The resulting study was released by the Committee andhas become an invaluable aid in the study of nuclear con-flict. However, the OTA panel, under the chairmanship ofDr. Jerome M. Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Insti-tute of Technology, which was convened to oversee the study,went on to point out the need for a more thorough and com-prehensive study of the effects of nuclear warfare andrecommended that such a study be undertaken.

On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, we arewriting to request that the Office of Technology Assessmentorganize and conduct such a study on the effects of nuclearwarfare, which would put what have been abstract measures ofstrategic power into more comprehensible terms. The studyshould concentrate on the impact which various levels ofattack would have on the populations and economies of theUnited States and the Soviet Union. In the case of largerlevels of attack, the study should address impact upon othernations. The earlier Department of Defense analyses concen-trated upon short-term effects. In this more comprehensivestudy, intermediate and long-term, direct and indirect effectsshould be addressed as well. In the original study, the panelcited in its appendix a list of effects which should be de-tailed in a comprehensive and systematic way. The list isattached.

119


- 2 -

We believe that this study would be valuable to theCommit tee, and to the Congress and the general public.It would become a basic reference work in this area ofinquiry. We hope that the Office of Technology Assess-ment will be able to embark upon this project promptly,so that a finished product can be provided the Commit-tee at the outset of the new Congress to assist theCommittee in its oversight of strategic arms limitationissues. The earlier effort was conducted with the fullsupport of the executive branch. We stand ready againto seek the assistance of appropriate government agenciesin carrying out the necessary supporting work.

Ranking Member

Sincerely,

Chairman

Attachment

Appendix A—Letter of Request ● 121

1975 OTA Panel’s List of Damage Effects Requiring Examination

1. Damage effects should be detailed in a comprehensive and systematicway. At a minimum, each case examined should include the followinginformation:

a . Fatalities and injuries resulting from:-Direct and indirect blast effects;-Indirect effects resulting from fires, disruption of trans-

portation, communications, medical facilities, etc.;-Acute radiation deaths from fallout;-Cancers, genetic defects, life shortening and other direct

effects of radiation exposure resulting from: external exposure~inhalation of radioactive particles, ingestion of material fromthe food chain or the water supplies;

-Infections and diseases aggravated by the loss of resistanceresulting from exposure to radiation.

Analysis of exposure should include both people exposed ini-tially and people who have been sent to the area to assist inrecovery. There should also be a discussion of world-wide effectswith particular attention paid to Canada because of that nation’sproximity to many U.S. targets which may be of strategic interest.

b. The average integrated REM per survivor from all sources(prompt and fallout) should be indicated along with the geographicdistribution of these dosages and a discussion of the disabilitiesresulting from each exposure level.

co A detailed analysis should be made” of the impact of the attackson the local areas most heavily affected. The discussion should in-clude a discussion of the feasibility of restoring the area to aviable economy, the land lost to agriculture, manufacturing assetslost, skilled manpower lost, and the impact on local ecologies(permanent altering of watersheds, pollution of streams and riverswith radioactivity, bursting of dams, etc.) . The effect of theselocal losses and problems on the national economy and environmentshould also be indicated.

d. An attempt should be made to indicate the magnitude of theeffort which would be required to clean up the contaminated areaand restore it to its pre-attack condition. It should be possibleto draw on the experience which we have had in attempting torestore the Bikini and Eniwetok atolls.

2. An attempt should be made to determine the amount of radioactivematerial which would be released by U.S. sites damaged by theeffects of the enemy attack. Such material might be found in poweror research reactors, nuclear material reprocessing facilities,waste disposal areas for radioactive materials, military installa-tions where some nuclear weapons are not in hardened storage areas,weapons carried by aircraft which are on the bases attacked, andpossibly on the ICBM’s which may be destroyed in their silos. Theadded fallout from these sources should be included in the assess-ment of overall radiation exposure.

APPENDIX B—STRATEGIC FORCES ASSUMED

The strategic forces assumed to be availablefor an early to mid-1980’s conflict between theUnited States and the Soviet Union are derivedfrom open-source estimates of weapons char-acteristics and force levels. Generally, theforces are assumed to be within SALT I I estab-lished limits and assume the completion ofongoing intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM) modernization programs of both super-powers. For the United States this means thatyield and accuracy improvements for theMM I I I force are carried out. On the Sovietside, it means completing the deployment oftheir fourth-generation ICBMS, the SS-17,SS-18, and SS-19.

A recent study conducted by the Congres-sional Budget Office, entitled, “CounterforceIssues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, ”provided table B-1, which shows Soviet forcesand their capabilities for the early to mid-1980’s.

Western estimates differ as to the exact at-tributes and capabilities of Soviet strategicsystems, As a result some of the assumptionsused in the studies drawn on for this report aremutually inconsistent. This wouId be an impor-

tant factor in an analysis of relative U.S. andSoviet military effectiveness, where the out-comes of a study would be very sensitive to theexact technical data used. In a study of the im-pacts of nuclear war on civilian population,however, a slight difference in the estimatedyield or accuracy of a Soviet weapon will haveno corresponding effect on the computation ofthe consequences of a given attack, relative tothe degree of uncertainty that already exists inthe prediction of those consequences.

U.S. estimates, on the other hand, are notsubject to such great uncertainties. The Con-gressional Budget Office summary of U.S.forces is shown in table B-2.

It is useful to bear in mind that Soviet ICBMwarheads are much higher in yield than theirU.S. counterparts. While this has only a mar-ginal impact on relative capabilities to destroycivil ian targets on purpose, it means thatSoviet attacks on U.S. targets will producemuch more collateral damage (i.e. populationcasualties from attacks on economic targets,or economic and population damage from at-tacks on military targets) than will U.S. attackson Soviet targets.

Table B-1 .–Estimated Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1985

Warheads per Equivalent

Total SLBMs .

Bear. ., ., .,Bison ...( B a c k f i r e ) . . , . ,

Total bombers ., .

G r a n d t o t a l

600

300

900

100

(250)

140(390)

2,438(2,688)

1 600

3 900

1,500

1 100

(2) (500). —140

(640)

8,294(8,794)

1.0 600

0.2 180

780

20 2,000200

(0.2) (loo)

2,200(2,300)

10,111(10,211)

600

306

906

740116

(170)

856(1,026)

8,622(8,792)

1 2 2

Appendix B—Strategic Forces Assumed ● 123

Table B-2.–Estimated U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1985

(Mid-1980’s force)Warheads per Equivalent

Launcher Number launcher Total warheads Yield in megatons Total megatons megatons

T o t a l I C B M s . 1,054

Poseidon ., 336P o s e i d o n C - 4 160Trident I ., 240

Tota l SLBMs . , 736

B - 5 2 G / H . , 165

B-52CM ., 165

FB-111, ., ., 60

T o t a l b o m b e r s 390

1 450 1,0 450,03 1,650 0.17 280.53) (1 ,650) (0.35) (572.5)1 54 9.0 486,0

2,154 1,216.5(1 ,508,5)

o 3,360 0.04 1348 1,280 0.108 1,920 0.10

128192

454198660660

24120

450512

(825)232

1,1941 ,507)

403282422

1,107337660

1,12241

1201,662 2,280

APPENDIX C—CHARLOTTESVILLE:

A FICTIONAL ACCOUNT BY NAN RANDALL

/n an effort to provide a more concrete understanding of the situationwhich survivors of a nuclear war would face, OTA commissioned the followingwork of fiction. It presents one among many possibilities, and in particular itdoes not consider the situation if martial law were imposed or if the social fabricdisintegrated into anarchy. It does provide detail which adds a dimension to themore abstract ana/ysis presented in the body of the report.

At first, it seemed Iike a miracle. No fireballhad seared the city, no blast wave had crum-bled buildings and buried the inhabitants, nodark mushroom cloud had spread over the sky.Much of the country had been devastated bymassive nuclear attack, but the small, graciouscity of Charlottesville, Va., had escapedunharmed.

* * *

The nuclear attack on the Nation did notcome as a complete surprise. For some weeks,there had been a mounting anxiety as themedia reported deteriorating relations be-tween the superpowers. The threat of possiblenuclear war hung heavy in the world’s con-sciousness. As evidence reached the U.S. Presi-dent’s desk that a sizable number of Amer-icans were deserting the major cities for whatthey perceived to be safety in the rural areas,he considered ordering a general evacuation.But, with the concurrence of his advisors, hedecided that an evacuation call from theFederal Government would be premature, andpossibly provocative. There was no hardevidence that the Soviets were evacuating andthere was a good chance that the crisis wouldpass.

Spontaneous evacuation, without officialsanction or direction, grew and spread. A weekbefore the attack, Charlottesville had no freehotel or motel rooms. A few evacuees foundlodgings with private families, at great ex-pense, but most were forced to camp by theircars in their traiIers next to the fast-food chains

124

on Route 29. The governing bodies of Char-lottesville and surrounding Albemarle Countywere rumored to be concerned about the drainon the area resources, without really havingany way of turning back newcomers. “If thiskeeps up, ” remarked a member of the Al be-marle Board of Supervisors, “we’re going to beoverrun without any war. ”

A few of the students at the University ofVirginia lef t Charlot tesvi l le to join theirfamilies. But the majority of the studentsstayed, believing that they could go home easi-ly if it were necessary.

Refugees came from Washington, 130 milesto the north, and they came from Richmond,70 miles to the east. A few of the hardier typescontinued on into the mountains and cavernsnear Skyline Drive; the majority sought thereassurances of civilization that the small citycould provide.

The population of Charlottesville normallystood a little above 40,000, while AlbemarleCounty which surrounds the city like a donutboasted an additional 40,000 to 50,000. Withthe arrival of the city evacuees, the combinedpopulation was well over 120,000.

In the week before the nuclear attack, muchof the population familiarized itself with thelocation of fallout shelters. Little hoardingtook place as retailers limited sales of foodand other necessities. Transistor radios accom-panied both adults and children when theywere away from home. However, most of theresidents of CharlottesviIIe continued to Iive as

Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall ● 125

they always had, although they were particu-larly alert for sirens or bulletin broadcasts onthe radio. Many children stayed out of school.

* * *

At the sound of the sirens and the emergen-cy radio alerts, most of Charlottesville and Al-bemarle County hurried to shelter. FortunateIy, Charlottesville had a surplus of shelterspace for its own population, though the refu-gees easily took up the slack. Many headed forthe University grounds and the basements ofthe old neoclassical buildings designed byThomas Jefferson; others headed downtownfor the office building parking garages. Carry-ing a few personal effects, blankets, cans andbottles of food, and transistor radios, they con-verged in a quiet if unordered mass, For mostpeople, the obvious emotional crises —grief atleaving behind a pet, anxiety at being unableto locate a family member or relative—weresuppressed by the overwhelming fear of theimpending attack.

Some residents chose not to join the groupshelters. Many suburbanites had ample, sturdybasements and food stocks. They preferred notto crowd themselves. In the event, those whohad taken the precaution of piling dirt againstthe windows and doors of their basementsfound that they provided adequate shelter.Among the rural poor, there was a reluctanceto desert the small farms that represented thesum of their Iife’s work. They wondered wheth-er, if they left, they would return to find theirmeans of livelihood gone. Further, many livedfar from an adequate public shelter. So theystayed.

* * *

Most did not see the attacks on Richmondand on Washington as they huddled in theirshelters. But the sky to the east and north ofCharlottesville glowed brilliant in the noondaysun. At first no one knew how extensive thedamage was.

Communication nationwide was interruptedas the Earth’s atmosphere shivered with theassault of the explosions. Each town, city,village, or farm was an island, forced to suffer

its selected fate of death or salvation alone.(Some time later it was learned that more than4,000 megatons (Mt) had destroyed militaryand industrial targets, killing close to 100million people in the United States. The U.S.counterattack on the Soviet Union had had asimilar, devastating effect. Destruction rangedfrom the large industrial centers on the coastsand Great Lakes to small farming communitiesthat had the misfortune to be close to the greatmissile silos and military bases. )

Areas of the country such as the northeastcorridor were reduced to a swath of burningrubble from north of Boston to south of Nor-folk. Still, there were some sections of the Na-tion that were spared the direct effects of blastand fire. Inland in Virginia, only the town ofRadford, west of Roanoke, received a directhit. The farming and orchard land of the ruralcounties were not targets.

Charlottesville, the small but elegant centerof learning, culture, and trade in central Vir-ginia, was not hit either. This monument to themind and manner of Jefferson retained itsstatus as a kind of genteel sanctuary, momen-tarily immune to the disaster that had leveledthe cities of the Nation.

* * *

An hour after nothing fell on Charlottesville,rescue squads and police were dispatched toscour the countryside for stragglers to getthem to shelters. Because, even if the popula-tion was safe from the direct effects of thenuclear warheads, another danger was immi-nent. Fallout, the deadly cloud of radioactiveparticles sucked up by the nuclear fireballs,could easily blanket the town of Charlottes-ville in a matter of hours. And no one couldpredict how much, and where it would go. Fall-out could poison many of those idyllic ruraltowns and villages that seemed light-yearsaway from the problems of internat ionalpower and politics. While a few places, such asRoseberg, Ore., would receive no fallout at all,the rest of the Nation would have to constantlymonitor to know the level of radiation andwhere it was located. Fortunately for Char-lottesville, the University and the hospitals had


sophisticated radiological monitoring equip-ment, and the training to use it. Many othertowns were not so lucky.

Two and one-half hours after the warningshad sounded, the nuclear engineering stafffrom the University picked up the first fallout.Starting at a moderate level of about 40 reinsan hour — a cumulative dose of 450 reins re-ceived in a l-week period would be fatal toone-half of those exposed —the intensity roseto 50 reins before starting the decline to a levelof about four-tenths of a rem an hour after 2weeks. (The total dose in the first 4 days was2,000 reins, which killed those who refused tobelieve shelter was necessary, and increasedthe risk of eventually dying of cancer for thosewho were properly sheltered. ) For the immedi-ate period, it was essential to stay as protectedas possible.

For several days, Charlottesville remainedimmobile, suspended in time. It was unclearjust what had happened or would happen. ThePresident had been able to deliver a messageof encouragement, which was carried by thoseemergency radio stations that could broad-cast. As the atmosphere had cleared, radio sta-tion WCHV was able to transmit sporadicallyon its backup transmitter and emergency gen-erator in the basement. However, the messagefrom the President posed more questions thanit answered — the damage assessment was in-complete. Nevertheless, he said that there wasa tentative cease-fire.

In the first days of sheltering, only thosewith some particular expertise had much to do.Nuclear engineers and technicians from theUniversity were able to monitor radiation inthe shelters they occupied, and CB radiosbroadcast results to other shelters. The doctorswere busy attempting to treat physical andpsychological ailments — the symptoms ofradiation sickness, flu, and acute anxiety beingunnervingly similar — while the police and gov-ernment officials attempted to keep order. Therest waited.

For the time being, the food stocks broughtto the shelter were adequate if not appetizing.The only problem was the water supply which,

though it kept running because of its gravitysystem, was contaminated with lodine 131. Po-tassium iodide pills, which were available insome shelters, provided protection; elsewherepeople drank bottled water, or as little wateras possible.

Not all of the shelters had enough food andother necessities. Most shelters had no toilets.The use of trash cans for human waste was animperfect system, and several days into theshelter period, the atmosphere was often op-pressive. As many suffered from diarrhea –theresult either of anxiety, flu, or radiation sick-ness — the lack of toilet facilities was especial-ly cliff i cult.

Shelter life was bearable in the beginning.Communications by CB radio allowed someshelters to communicate with one another, tolocate missing family members and friends. Agenuine altruism or community spirit of coop-eration was present in almost all the shelters —though some of them were fairly primitive.Even those refugees who were crowded intohalls and basements with the local residentswere welcomed. Parents watched out for oneanother’s children or shared scarce baby food.Most people willingly accepted direction fromwhomever took charge. Among the majority ofthe shelter residents, the out-of-town refugeesbeing an exception, there was a sense of relief,a sense that they had been among the luckyones of this world. They had survived.

Within a few days, the emergency radio wasable to broadcast quite regularly. (As theionosphere does not clear all at once, occa-sional interruptions were expected. ) The sta-tion had had no protection from the electro-magnetic pulse that can travel down the anten-na and shatter the inner workings of electronicequipment during a nuclear explosion. How-ever, by detaching the back-up transmitter atthe sound of the warning, the station engineerhad protected equipment. Intermittent com-munications from Emergency Operations Cen-ters got through to Charlottesville officials,though the main communications center atOlney, Md., was silent. Telephone switching fa-cilities were almost entirely out, although the


small, independent phone company could ex-pect to be operational fairly quickly. The com-plex, coast-to-coast trunk lines of Ma Bellmight take a year or more to reconnect.

Lifeline of the sheltered community was theCB radio. Rural Virginians had been CB fanslong before it became a national craze, andthey put their equipment to imaginative use.Prodded by anxious refugees, as well as bylocal residents who had relatives and friends inother parts of the world, CBers tried to set up arelay system on the lines of an electronic ponyexpress. Though less than perfect, the CB relaywas able to bring Iimited news from outside,most of that news being acutely distressing.From the limited reports, it was clear that therewas Iittle left in the coastal cities; those whohad abandoned family or friends to come toCharlottesville understood that probably theywouId never see them again.

The first surge of grief swept over the refu-gees and those Charlottesville residents whowere affected. In time, the sorrow of losswould affect almost everyone. Although theyhad survived themselves, still they had lost.

* * *

Three days after the attacks, the next largeinflux of refugees poured into Charlottesville,many of them suffering with the early symp-toms of radiation sickness. They had beencaught poorly sheltered or too close to thenuclear targets themselves. A few showed theeffects of blast and fire, bringing home toCharlottesville the tangible evidence of thewar’s destruction. Some refugees had driven,while others had hitchhiked or even walked toreach what they hoped was safety and medicalhelp. On the way, many were forced to aban-don those who were too weak to continue.

The hosp i ta l s were comp le te ly over -whelmed. Up to now, the hospitals had man-aged to treat the ill with some modicum oforder. The hospitals themselves were falloutshelters of a kind; patients’ beds had beenmoved to interior corridors for fallout protec-tion; emergency surgery was feasible with theemergency generators, hospital staff slept inthe most protected areas. Some borderline

cases in intensive care were released tonature’s devices while any elective medicalprocedures were eliminated, Still, hospitalswere able to cope, even with the increasingnumber of common ailments caused by theshelter crowding.

Suddenly, this changed. Fallout levels weretoo high for anyone to be out in the open forany length of time, but the people came any-way. The carefully laid plans of the Universityof Virginia Emergency Room, devised for thepossibility of peacetime accidents, were hur-riedly modified. No longer was the carefulshowering and decontaminating of victimspossible with the single shower and uncertainwater pressure. Instead, patients were strippedof their clothes and issued hospital gowns.With no time for studied decision, doctors seg-regated the very sick from the moderatelysick — the latter to be treated, the former givenmedication and allowed to die.

Nevertheless, the day came when the hospi-tals were full. The University Hospital, MarthaJefferson Hospital, the Blue Ridge Sanatorium,and the others were forced to lock their doorsto protect those patients they had already ac-cepted.

After being turned away, the sick had nospecific destination. Many st i l l c lusteredaround the middle of town near the two majorhospitals, taking up residence in the housesabandoned by local residents several daysbefore. With minimal protection from falloutand no medical treatment for other trauma,many died, their bodies left unburied for sever-al weeks.

The combined populations of Charlottes-ville and Albemarle County rose to 150,000 inthe 7 days after the nuclear attack. Slowly,hostility and resentment wedged a gap be-tween residents and refugees who attemptedto join the group shelters, The refugees, still ina daze from their experience, believed thatthey had priority rights after all they had suf-fered. The local residents viewed the outsidersas a threat to their own survival, particuIarly asthe extent of the war damage was becomingevident.


In fact, the supply of food was not a prob-lem in the short run. Like most other towns andcities, Charlottesville and Albemarle had some3 weeks worth of food on hand, on homeshelves, in supermarkets and wholesale out-lets. The Morton Frozen Food plant could beexpected to supply a rich diet of conveniencefoods for a short time, even after the refriger-ation was off. The problem was, after the localsupplies were exhausted, where could they getmore?

Nerves, already frayed by the stresses of thepast days, threatened to snap. Older peoplewere irritated by the noise and commotion ofchildren; children resented the lack of freedom. The friction between differing groupsbecame increasingly evident, and vocal. An ex-periment in communal living was clearly not tothe taste of many, and the discomforts, bothphysical and psychological, had the effect ofpushing local residents out of the shelters.(There was some effort to stop them as theradiation levels still posed some hazards; theywere urged at least to stay inside most of thetime.) Left in the shelters, now, were mostlythose out-of-town refugees who had no homesto go to.

Not all the residents of Charlottesville andAlbemarle found their homes intact. In somecases they returned to find the house looted oroccupied by refugees who were unwilling togive up squatters’ rights. Sometimes claimswere backed with guns; in a few cases, squatterand owner worked out a modus vivendi ofsharing the property.

Some animals had survived, in varying statesof health. Unprotected farm animals weredead, while those which had been confined tofairly solid barns with uncontaminated feedhad a fair chance of surviving. Many of thesefarm animals, however, were missing, ap-parently eaten by hungry refugees and resi-dents. Some pets had remained indoors ingood de facto shelters so that, if they hadfound water, they needed only to be fed toregain health. Worried about the amount offood pets could consume, many families sim-ply put them out to fend for themselves.

For the first week or so after the nuclear at-tacks, authorities had few options. Simple sur-vival was the priority, the elements of which in-cluded food and water distribution, falloutprotection, and retention of some civil order.Government was ad hoc, with the leadership ofthe city and county naturally cooperating,along with the different police forces. As thepopulation left the shelters, however, officialsfelt that some more formalized system was de-sirable. After several long meetings — in thebasement of the courthouse where the govern-ment officials had stayed to avoid fallout— anemergency government, led by the city man-ager of Charlottesville, was agreed on. Thecombined city council and the AlbemarleCounty Board of Supervisors also elected thechairman of the board of supervisors as depu-ty, and the sheriff of the county as chief ofpublic safety to oversee the combined policeforces and provide liaison with those militaryunits which were still in the area.

The powers given to the city manager weresweeping in scope, certainly far beyond anypowers he had held before, and ran “for theduration of the emergency. ” While some con-sidered the new form of local governmentclose to martial law, great care was exercisedto be sure that the offensive term was notused. In effect, however, Charlottesville andAlbemarle were under a highly centralized,almost totalitarian rule.

Whatever it might be called, under the newsystem, the city manager was able to take overall resources and their allocation. Following tosome extent the paper plan that the area haddeveloped, the new government attempted toset out priorities. It was greatly aided by the ex-perts from the University, who volunteeredtime and expertise to analyzing the needs ofthe area. (In this respect, Charlottesville wasparticularly fortunate in having an extensivepool of talent on which to draw.)

However, if Charlottesville was lucky tohave reasonably functioning government anda number of experienced planners and man-agers, and to have suffered comparativelymodest disruption from refugees and fallout,

Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall Ž 129

the city and county authorities were becomingpainfully aware that they were not set up to ‘goit alone’ without any outside help. Even werethe weather suitable for planting, Charlottes-ville was no longer an agricultural center.There wasn’t enough energy to process anyfood that might be grown. Where would peo-ple get clothes and building materials andmedicines and spare parts for the cars andbuses? The very complexity of American soci-ety— its technological marvels and high stand-ard of Iiving — could well prove to be a barrierto the reconstruction of any one part.

* * *

During the third week after the attacks, thenew rationing system come into force. indi-vidual identification cards were issued toevery man, woman and child. Food was distrib-uted at centralized points. Those without I.D.cards were unable to get their ration of flour,powdered milk, and lard–and the processingof cards could take 3 or more days. Some des-perate refugees resorted to stealing I.D. cardsin order to get food, while an enterprisingprinter started turning out forgeries within 2days after the government had first issuedcards. Rumors of hoarding and black mar-keteering abounded. Some of the missingsupermarket food turned up in black marketcenters, accompanied by exorbitant prices.

Fuel supplies were dropping more rapidlythan the government had hoped. Most familieswere heating their homes with wood, either infireplaces or in recycled oil drums for stoves.As the winter was waning, the most desperateneed was for fuel for driving motors and gen-erators. Even the drinking water was depend-ent on the emergency generator that ran asingle purifying system for the Rivanna Waterand Sewer Authority. (Water for other usescould simply be drawn from the gravity-pow-ered reservoir system, bypassing the filtrationsystem entirely. ) The hospital and radio sta-tions all ran on small generators. The Universi-ty could luxuriate in its coal-powered steamheat, but there was no way, save generators orcandles and lanterns, to get lights.

No one was exactly certain how much fuelthere was in the area. Both jurisdictions hadonce surveyed, for emergency planning pur-poses, the fuel storage capacity, and theyhoped they could count on having about halfof that on hand. Armed guards were assignedto those larger facilities that had not alreadybeen raided by the desperate. All private useof cars or tractors was outlawed, and thegovernment threatened to confiscate any mov-ing vehicles.

Electricity was restored, partially, some twoweeks after the attack. Workers from the smalIBremo Bluff generating plant, about 15 milesaway from Charlottesville, succeeded in start-ing the p I ant with the coaI reserves that wereon hand. From then on, limited electricity usewas permitted for a few hours hours a day. Thiswas particularly pleasant for those familieswhose water came from electrically poweredwell pumps. Well water was issued to childrenfor drinking, as it had escaped the Iodine 131contamination which was still elevated in thereservoirs.

The radioactivity level continued to drop(after two weeks it was 0.4 rem per hour) and itwas “safe” to go outdoors. However, the resuiting doses, though too low to cause immedi-ate illness or deaths, posed a long-term healthhazard. The authorities, while recognizing thateverybody would receive many times the pre-war “safe dose, ” tried to reduce the hazards byurging people to stay inside as much as possi-ble when not picking up food rations at thedistribution centers. Life for the residents ofCharlottesville revolved around those trips andfiguring out ways to make do without the nor-mal supplies and services. Some chancedoutings to forage for a greater variety of food,but most were resigned to waiting. Therewasn’t much else they could do.

* * *

Three weeks after the nuclear attack, almostall the Charlottesville and Albemarle Countyresidents had returned to their homes. Thosefew whose homes had either been occupied bysquatters, or been destroyed by fire, easily

130 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War— . — — — . . — — .-—.- ——— — — — . — . — — . — . — . —

found some alternate housing with the govern-ment’s help.

This left the refugees. Though the drop infallout intensity allowed the refugees to moveout of basements and interior halls, they stillwere forced to I ive a version of camp Iife. Theyspent their endless, empty hours waiting inlines for food, for a chance to use the bath-rooms — which at least functioned now — for achance to talk to authorities. Information fromthe outside was stil l sketchy, and for therefugees, this uncertainty added to theiralready high level of anxiety.

The ci ty manager and the emergencygovernment attempted to solve the refugeehousing problem by billeting refugees inpr i va te homes. A t f i r s t they asked fo rvolunteers, but got few, The authorities thenannounced that any house with fewer than twopeople per room would be assigned a refugeefamily. Resistance to this order was strong,and, particularly in the outlying areas where itwas hard to check, outright defiance was com-mon. Families would pretend to comply andthen simply force the refugees out as soon asthe authorities had left. The refugees wouldstruggle back to town, or take up residence inbarns or garages.

And still the refugees came to Charlottes-vilIe, bringing with them stories of the horrorsthey had exper ienced. They camped inschools, in banks, in warehouses. By night theneoclassical architecture of the University waspacked with the residents of Arlington andAlexandria. By day, the new downtown mallwas awash with a floating mass of men,women, and children, who, with nothing to do,milled around the unopened stores. A retiredambassador was overheard comparing thescene to that of downtown Calcutta.

By now, the emergency government recog-nized that the need for food was going to beacute. Without power for refrigeration, muchfood had spoiled; stocks of nonperishablefoods were mostly exhausted. As the shortagesbecame clear, the price of food skyrocketed.Many people refused money for food, prefer-ring to barter. Food and fuel were the most

valuable commodities, with shoes and coatshigh on the list as well.

Since shortly after the attack, the citymanager had been in contact both with theFederal Government and with the relocatedState government in Roanoke. He had repeat-edly asked for emergency rations, only to bemet with vague promises and explanationsabout the problems of transportation. He wasgenerally urged to cut rations further and hangon. Help would arrive when it could.

For some time, the relatively few survivingfarm animals had been gradually and myster-iously disappearing. The farmers concludedthat “those damned city folks” were stealingthem for food, although some of the localresidents were also making midnight forays onthe livestock. Farmers themselves slaughteredanimals they had planned to fatten-up for thefuture. They couldn’t spare the feed grain, andthey needed food now.

Finally the emergency authorities announc-ed that they would take a percentage of everyfarmer’s livestock to help feed residents andrefugees, Farmers were outraged, consideringthe action simple theft. There were rumors thatangry farmers had shot several agents who hadtried to confiscate the animals. Though theywere offered promissory notes from the cityauthorities, the farmers thought such paymentworthless.

(The radiological experts at the Universityhad been questioned on the advisability ofeating the meat of animals with radiationsickness. Many of those beasts which had re-mained outside during the high fallout periodwere showing clear signs of illness. The expertsdecided that the meat would be edible ifcooked suf f ic ient ly to k i l l any bacter ia linvasion — the result of the deterioration of theanimal’s digestive tract. Strontium 90 wouId beconcentrated in the bones or the milk, not themuscle tissue. )

Although the city government had relativelyfrequent contact, mostly by radio, with theFederal and State governments, the citizens


had to rely on the occasional Presidentialmessage that was broadcast on WCHV. Threeweeks after the attacks, the President made amajor address to reassure the people. He an-nounced that the cease-fire was still holdingand he saw no reason why that would change.He described the damage that the U.S. retal-iatory strike had done to the Soviet Union. Healso noted that the United States still retainedenough nuclear weapons, most of them at seaon submarines, to inflict considerable damageon any nation that attempted to take advan-tage of the recent past. He did not mentionthat he suspected that the Soviets also heldreserve weapons.

Describing the damage that the country hadsuffered, the President noted that, even withthe loss of over 100 million lives, “We stilI havereserves, both material and spiritual, unlikeany nation on earth. ” He asked for patienceand for prayers.

There had been broadcasts earlier by theLieutenant Governor of Virginia —the Gover-nor was killed in Richmond — from his shelterin Roanoke. However, as fal lout in theRoanoke area was quite high (Radford just tothe west had been struck), he was effectivelyimmobiIized for some time. The State govern-ment appeared less organized than the Feder-al.

CharlottesvilIe was still on its own. Residentshunted game as the last of the food stocks dis-appeared, but the fallout had killed most ani-mals that were in the open. Refugees were re-duced to stealing. A number of people man-aged to fill their gas tanks with contrabandgasoline and set out to forage in the mountainsto the west.

Three and one-half weeks after the attack,an old propeller-driven cargo plane landed atthe Charlottesville Airport with a supply offlour, powdered milk, and vegetable oil. Thepilot assured the few policemen who guardedthe airstrip that more would be on the way bytruck as soon as temporary bridges could bebuilt over the major rivers.

The emergency airlift was supposed to sup-ply CharlottesviIle with food for a week or two.

However, the officials who had calculated theallotment had overlooked the refugees. Char-lottesville’s population was some three timesthe normal. (No one was absolutely sure be-cause the refugees moved around a good deal,from camp to camp )

The first of the deaths from radiation hadoccured 10 days after the attacks, and thenumber grew steadily. By now, it was not un-common to see mass funerals several times aday. The terminally ill were not cared for bythe hospitals — there were too many, and therewas nothing that could be done for them any-way— so it was up to their families to do whatthey could. Fortunately there were still amplesupplies of morphia, and it was rumored thatcollege students had donated marijuana. Thecity set aside several locations on the outskirtsof town for mass graves.

In addition to those with terminal radiationsickness, there were those with nonfatal casesand those who showed some symptoms. Oftenit was impossible for doctors to quickly iden-tify those with flu or psychosomatic radiationsymptoms. The number of patients crowdingthe emergency rooms did not slacken off. Therefugees, crowded together, passed a varietyof common disorders, from colds to diarrhea,back and forth, Several public health expertsworried that an outbreak of measles or evenpolio could come in the late spring. “So far, wehave been lucky not to have a major epidemicof typhus or cholera, ” a doctor observed to hiscotleagues.

The supply of drugs on hand at the hospitalswas dwindling fast. Although penicillin couldbe manufactured fairly easily in the labora-tories at the university, many other drugs werenot so simple, even with talent and ingenuity.(The penicillin had to be administered withlarge veterinary hypodermics as the home-made mix was too coarse for the small dispos-able hypes that most doctors stocked. Therewas a considerable shortage of needles.) Othermedications were in such short supply thatmany patients with chronic illnesses such asheart disease, kidney failure, respiratory prob-


Iems, hypertension, and diabetes died within afew weeks.

* * *

Food riots broke out 4½ weeks after theattacks — precipitated by the first large ship-ment of grain. Three large tractor-trailers hadpulled into the parking lot of the Citizens Com-monwealth Building quite unexpectedly, theword of their arrival somehow misplaced be-tween the Agriculture Department dispatchersand the local authorities. The trucks weregreeted with cheers until the residents ofCharlottesville discovered that they had beenshipped raw grain rather than flour. The driverswere taken unawares when empty cans andbottles showered them and one driver jumpedin his cab and departed. (The official explana-tion, delivered some time later, was that proc-essed food was going to those areas where thebulk of the population was sick or injured. Itwas also assumed that Charlottesville hadsome livestock reserves. )

With only a fraction of the population know-ing what to do with raw grain, a number ofangry citizens broke open the sacks and scat-tered wheat through the parking lot. They inturn were set upon by those who wanted toconserve as much as possible. The local publicsafety forces waded into the melee with nightsticks and tear gas.

Everyone blamed everyone else for the inci-dent, but the fragile glue that had held publicorder together began to unstick.

From this time on, it was almost impossiblefor the local authorities, not to mention theState and Federal governments, to convinceeveryone they were getting a fair share. Peoplein one section of town would watch suspicious-ly as delivery trucks passed them by andheaded somewhere else. Blacks distrustedwhites, the poor distrusted the rich and every-one distrusted the refugees as “outsiders. ”

The refugees were convinced that the localauthorities were favoring the residents andtried repeatedly to get State intervention, withlittle success. Still billeted in dormitories,schools, and motels, the refugee camps were a

breeding ground for discontent and even rebel-lion.

* * *

The presence of the Federal Governmentwas not entirely confined to the occasionaldelivery of food or radio broadcast. Some timebefore, the National Guard and the ReserveUnit were moved to North Carolina, partly togive the impression of military readiness, andperhaps to be assigned to dig out cities andstart reconstruction. The Government had putout calls for volunteers to help in the recon-struction, but found that most workers, youngand old, wanted to stay with their families. Asystem of national conscription for young menand women with no children was in the plan-ning stage.

The Federal Government attempted to urgerefugees back to where they had come from,first to assist in the rebuilding of the damagedcities which were rich in resources, and ulti-mately to redistribute the population to amore normal pattern. Some refugees were hap-py to attempt to return, particularly thosewhose houses were more or less intact. How-ever, those who found their homes destroyedpreferred to return to the refugee camps in-land. There was nothing to hold them to theirformer lives. Fearful memories of the pastmade any time spent in the cities painful.

One day, quite without warning, the citymanager was informed that one-half of his fuelstores were to be confiscated by the FederalGovernment, for the military and for the re-construction effort. (Earth-moving equipmentwas gathering on the outskirts of the devas-tated cities and needed fuel. ) After it was clearthat there was no way to stop the Governmentfrom taking the fuel, the city manager sug-gested that unmarked tank t rucks, wel lguarded, pick up the stocks at night. He wasaware of the effect this action would have onthe morale of the population.

Already transportation was difficult for theelderly and those who lived in the rural areas.A sporadic bus service ran from one end oftown to the other once a day and an occasion-al school bus made a sortie out into thesuburbs. Bicycles were prized, and sometimes


fought over. Those gentlemen farmers whosethoroughbred horses had been protected fromfallout could use these animals for transporta-tion, but it was risky to let the animals standunprotected. Horse thievery had made ananachronistic reappearance.

With even less fuel, the bus service would becut in half.

* * *

By now, barter was clearly established as thepreferred means of trade. For a time, the gov-ernment had paid for commandeered food-stuff and resources with checks and prom is-sory notes, but no one wanted them any more.The local banks had opened for a few days,only to find all their savers lined up to with-draw everything. They closed down. Storeseither never opened, or shut down quicklywhen they were overrun. (Many stores hadbeen looted in the second week after the at-tack, when the fallout intensity had dropped.)A few people hoarded money, but mostthought money worthless.

Workers in the small industries in the Char-lottesville area saw no point in turning up forwork if all they could get was paper money.They preferred to spend the time hunting forfood and fuel. If barter was a highly inefficientway to do business — it’s hard to make changefor a side of beef–still, it was preferable tousing worthless currency.

Psychologically, the population seemed tobe in a quiet holding pattern. The refugees,many of them, had survived experiences thatwould mark them for years. The memories offire, collapsing buildings, and screaming,trapped people were stil l vivid, and somewould tremble at loud noises. However, theprofound grief over what they had lost–fam-ily members, possessions, or friends — underlayemotions and made many apathetic and pas-sive Victims of the nuclear attacks, they ap-peared willing to be victims afterwards too.Still shunned as outsiders by the resident popu-lation, most refugees appeared to accept theexclusion just as the surviving population ofHiroshima and Nagasaki had 30 odd yearsbefore.

The effect on the Charlottesville and Albe-marle residents was less pronounced. Theywere disoriented. For each lucky one who hada specific job to do, there were many morewho were in effect unemployed. They turnedinward to their families or else friends and rela-tives. Their worries about the future–wouldthere be another attack, would they go back totheir old jobs, etc. — made most days ratheranxious, unproductive ones. Children particu-larly reflected a continuous nervousness,picked up from their elders, and had difficultysleeping at night. Though many parents hopedfor a return to normalcy once the schools re-opened, others quietly decided not to sendtheir children for fear of a second outbreak ofwar.

* * *

Spring changed a lot of things. A new opti-mism surfaced as everyone looked forward toplanting, to good weather and warmth. Theresidents of Charlottesville had survived thefirst hurdle; they felt confident they could sur-vive the next.

At the University, agronomists studied thebest crops to plant in the Charlottesville area.No one was certain what effect the nuclear ex-plosions had had on the ozone layer. If indeedthe ozone was severely damaged, more ultra-violet rays could reach the crops and perhapsburn them. This effect would be more pro-nounced on delicate crops such as peas andbeans. Instead it was suggested that potatoesand soybeans be encouraged and whateverlimited fertilizer became available go to farm-ers who followed the government guidelines.

The emergency government announced thattwo-thirds of the former pasture land was to becultivated. Feed grains were to be used forhumans, not Iivestock. Dairy cattle andchickens were the only exceptions.

The next few months in Charlottesville andAlbemarle County had a slow, almost dream-like quality. Fears of new attacks had abated.It was a time of settling into a new lifestyle, aseverely simplified way of being, of making do.Children ate meat, cheese, or eggs rarely,


adults practically never. A good pair of shoeswas guarded — and worn only on special occa-sions. (With warmer weather, most childrenand adults went barefoot, bringing concern todoctors that there would be an increase inparasitic diseases such as hookworm. )

Many people were unable to return to theirformer jobs. In some cases, their employersnever reopened for business, their goods andservices being irrelevant in the postattacksociety. College teachers, for example, had nostudents to teach; computer programmers hadno computers to program.

For some, it was relatively easy to adapt.Electronics experts set up CB and short waveradio repair shops. Cottage industries — sandaland clothing manufacturing from recycledmaterials, soap and candle making — sprang upin many homes. Some workers were able to ac-quire new, relevant skills quickly.

Others had to make do with menial jobs–burying the dead, cleaning the streets, assistingcarpenters and bricklayers — that took littleskill.

And then there were those who could not fitin anywhere. Many found it difficult to adaptto the idleness. Disruption of the 9 to 5 workethic was a disruption of basic psychologicalprops, of a sense of identity. In the immediateperiod after the attacks, parents concentratedon protection of their families. Once theirfamilies were no longer directly affected,adults were robbed of their traditional roles.

By now, a few of the refugees had meltedinto the general popuIation. But the vast ma-jority were no further along than in the latewinter. The drag on the area resources was sig-nificant, and many in the leadership wanted toforce them out.

Charlottesville was fortunate in many re-spects, however. Being located on two easilyrepairable rail Iines — with a major storageyard for cars only two counties away—therewas some access to the outside world. Travelwas only permit ted wi th a special pass,naturally, and so the younger members of the

community resorted to the hallowed art of rid-ing the rods.

Government officials, many of whom hadvisited CharlottesvilIe and the University fre-quently in the past, kept in closer contact withthe city than with many other locales. Doubt-less the area residents benefited with moreFederal assistance, As a result, Charlottesvillebecame the unofficial “capital” of the area,economicalIy and politicalIy.

But as autumn approached, a universal de-pression settled on the residents and refugees.Starvation had been heId at bay by the plant-ing — but crop yields were smalIer than ex-pected. No one was cold, but the weather wasstill fine. There seemed to be no appreciableprogress towards preattack conditions. Thoseyoung men and women who had been con-scripted to build housing for the Nation’srefugees returned with gloomy reports of thedevastation to the Nation’s commerce. Theeast coast was effectively leveled. Where fac-tories were rebuildable, the shortage of materi-als precluded their operation.

Recognizing that many families would haveto make do without heating oil or gas, theAgricuIture Extension Service issued pam-phlets on how to make your own wood-burningstove. Fortunately for Charlottesville and thesurrounding area, trees were plentiful. How-ever, the momentum that had started with thespring planting slowed,

* * *

Winter was harder than anyone had ex-pected. There were few additional deaths thatcould be directly attributed to the nuclearblast effects or the radiation; however, a largepercentage of the surviving population wasweakened. Lack of medicines, lack of ade-quate food and reasonable shelter, plus thelingering physical and psychological effects,meant that many were unable to work effec-tively, even if there were work available. Anepidemic of flu raged through the cities of theeast where refugees were huddled in camps.Many died, especially children and old people.Although vaccine for this particular, common


strain of fIu had been developed, the stockshad been destroyed in the attacks

I n the northern sections of the country, foodsupplies were inadequate and poorly distr ib-uted. The average diet — day in, day out — con-s is ted o f un leavened bread and pota toes,where there was enough of those. As animalherds, both domestic and wild, had been deci-mated by faIlout and indiscriminate hunting,the only available meat came from dogs, cats,and rats — those animaIs whose Iiving habitsprotected them from fallout. Dietary deficien-cy diseases appeared.

Growing children were the first to notice thel a c k o f r e p l a c e m e n t c l o t h e s – p a r t i c u l a r l yleather shoes. Coats and blankets were highlyprized in the cold climates.

Next to food, the most severe shortage washousing. Even with the temporary barracksthat had been erected in a cluster around thedamaged cities, refugees were crowded two orthree to a room, Kitchens were shared by fourand five families; bathrooms by as many as 12people.

Although there was relatively little work tooccupy time, and schooling was strictly cur-tailed, if indeed it existed, there was also verylittle available recreation. The entertainmentindustry located in California and New Yorkhad been particularly hard hit. Local TV sta-tions could broadcast and rebroadcast thoseold films and cartoons they had in stock, butlittle was fed nationwide, In the small towns,public libraries were overwhelmed. In the largecities, the Iibraries had been destroyed. Therewere no movie houses to speak of; there wereno professional sports. The lack of recreation,perhaps a minor problem, still served to under-score the bleakness of the winter.

In Charlottesville alone, several thousandpeople died in the first winter after the nuclearattack.

* * *

A year almost to the day after the nuclearwar between the United States and the SovietUnion, Charlottesville was host to a blue rib-bon panel of experts on reconstruction plan-

ning. The University had not returned to nor-mal — there were no undergraduate classes asthe students had been conscripted for recon-struction work in the cities — but it was a natu-ral meeting place since so many centers oflearning had been destroyed.

The questions before the group centered onsetting priorities: what were the goals and howcouId the country reach them?

The U.S. Government still existed, if in aSIightly reordered form. The President, nowpermanently located in the Midwest alongwith the surviving Members of Congress andthe Cabinet, retained the emergency powers hehad taken just after the attacks. (Congress hadhad no choice but to ratify his assumption ofthese extraordinary powers at the time. How-ever, there was growing resentment that heshowed few signs of relinquishing them. Con-gress was reduced to a kind of advisory body,its Members spending most of their time onhelping constituents relocate or obtain a id.)

The State governments had, by and large, re-established themselves, often in new locations.Virginia’s government was located in Roanoke,for example, under the Lieutenant Governor.State governments were not as well respectedas before; citizens tended to blame them forthe mixups in aid distribution. Only the refu-gees looked to the States for assistance againstthe local governments, which they distrusted.The residents of an area such as Charlottesvillewere most loyal to their local government, par-ticularly when that government had a reputa-tion of basic evenhandedness.

Everyone, however, was growing hostile tothe imposition of strict governmental controlsover their lives —what they could or could notbuy, or eat, where they could travel, etc. I n cer-tain rural sections, such as Nelson County,south of Charlottesville, farmers had barri-caded themselves off, ignored governmentorders, and occasionally, it was rumored, tookpotshots at the government agents.

Attempts to conscript the able-bodied to re-build the damaged areas often failed miser-ably. Many simply walked off the job and re-turned to their families. Since there were no


adequate records remaining of the prewarpopulation, and no records at all of wardeaths, the Government found it an impossibletask to track down offenders. (Criminals inmedium- and light-security detention facilitieshad simply evaporated into the population.)

Charlottesville, like the rest of the undam-aged parts of the country, still had a hugerefugee population that was unwil l ing orunable to return to former homes. The majori-ty were in camps such as the large facility inthe old Lane School, and children were in daycare or orphanages, depending on the status oftheir surviv ing famil ies. I f anything, therefugees were both more apathetic and morerebellious when faced with simple assign-ments. Lawless bands of teenaged refugeesroamed the countryside, hijacking supplytrucks and raiding farms and villages. Partly itwas simple bravado, partly a way to feedthemselves. Most refugees simply sat andwaited for the next meal.

Yet even now, the f low of re fugees con-tinued. The winter had driven out those whocould not find enough to eat or enough shelter.Stories of Vermont families subsisting onmaple syrup and wild rabbits might haveproven entertaining in the retelling, but thosewho had survived did not want to repeat theperformance.

The medical problems were still acute. Drugsupplies were almost exhausted, but the weak-ened population remained more susceptible todisease. The birth rate had fallen drastically 9months after the attacks, partly because of theradiation, which produced temporary steriliza-tion – but there had also been a rise in miscar-riages, stillbirths, and abnormalities. Infantmortality soared. Experts worried that an un-precedented increase in cancer, particularly inchildren, could be expected in several years.And there was still the possibility of somedevastating epidemic as cholera running un-checked through the population. The BlueRidge Sanatorium in Charlottesville, which hadseen few tuberculosis patients in the last yearsbefore the attacks, was making plans to con-vert back to specializing in the disease. TB wasmaking a comeback.

The Nation’s economy was in shambles. Thebulk of the oil refining capacity had beenknocked out, and only a few facilities werefunctioning again. The small oil wells aroundthe country that were situated away fromtarget areas produced more oil than therefineries could handle— and it was only afraction of the need. Coal mining, mostly bythe time-honored pick and shovel method asstrip mining took heavy equipment, was theonly industry that could be called booming.(There was a major migration to the miningareas by the unemployed. ) Agriculture, ofcourse, was a major undertaking for much ofthe population. However, yields from thefarms were considerably below what had beenhoped for. The lack of pesticides and fertilizercut heavily into the crops and there was con-cern about a major insect invasion next sum-mer. Food processing —wheat and corn millingpart icular ly– showed encouraging signs ofrecovery.

Most major industries, however, were in dis-array as a result of lack of energy, lack of rawmaterials, and lack of managerial expertise.The world economy was staggering from theeffect of losing both the United States and theSoviet Union as suppliers and markets. (If theLatin Americans were able to make small for-tunes on selling the U.S. refined petroleum,political pressures were building in those coun-tries to raise the prices to double the currentrates. )

An efficient system of money still had notbeen reestablished. The Federal Governmentpaid the military and other Federal employeeswith dollars and tried to preserve purchasingpower through a series of price controls. How-ever, most people were reluctant to acceptdollars in exchange for essentials such as foodor clothing. As a result, a barter system con-tinued to flourish and the black market, withits highly inflated prices, continued to en-courage defiance of the law.

Most experts believed that the experience ofpost-World War II in Europe and Japan couldprovide the model for currency reform, includ-ing replacement of the dolIar, that was neces-sary to restore an economy based on the divi-

Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall Ž 137

sion of labor. However, the resolution of twopolicy issues stood in the way. First, should themarket, on one hand, or Government control,on the other, determine the distribution ofscarce resources? Second, should the newmoney go to those with legitimate claims, pen-sions, promissory notes for goods confiscatedduring the postattack period etc., or to thosewho held productive jobs, or even to the entirepopulation even if many were more drag thanhelp to the recovery? Politically, the Govern-ment was unable to deny any one of thegroups; practically, it was obvious the Govern-ment couId not satisfy al I three.

It was clear that if the economy did not getmoving again soon, it might never. Alreadythere were indications that manufacturing wasnot reestablishing itself with anywhere nearthe speed the planners had hoped. The amountof shipping, by rail and by truck, was actuallydown from the mid-summmer high.

“We are in the classic race, ” remarked oneof the participants who had written a majorstudy of postattack recovery some yearsbefore. “We have to be able to produce newgoods and materials before we exhaust ourstored supplies. We can continue to eat thewheat that is in the grain elevators of theMidwest for another year, perhaps. But afterthat, we have to have the capacity to grow newwheat, When our winter coats wear through,we have to have the capacity to weave thecloth for new ones. When our railroad carsbreak down, we have to be able to make newones, or replacement parts. Right now we are along way from that capacity. ” Privately, heand a group of conferees agreed that heavycontrols on the economy, and ultimately onthe population, would be the only way to getthings going. Resources, both material andhuman, were severely limited,

One of the major problems, it was obviousto everyone, was the drag the huge refugeepopulation had on the recovery effort. Whilenumbers of workers were actively engaged inthe rebuilding of the cities as well as the fac-tories and services that powered the economy,there were as many more who were unem-

ployed and unemployable for the time being.Their skills were not suited to the prioritytasks. Several participants had prepared astatement on what should be done with thesenonproductive members of society. “We can-not let this mass of people drain our resourceswhile they do nothing to contribute, ” it wasrumored to say. “If we cannot let them starveoutright, we suggest that they be issued onlythat amount of food which is minimal lynecessary to sustain life. They should bemoved to camps away from the center of ac-tivity for reason of public morale. ” The reportwas suppressed but several copies were leakedto the press anyway.

The most basic disagreement among the par-ticipants in the conference was over the levelof reconstruction that might actually be feasi-ble. Optimists cited the phenomenal recoveryof Japan and West Germany after World WarI I and insisted that these be the models for theUnited States in the next 5 to 10 years

Pessimists, noting the major differences be-tween the post-World War 11 era and the situa-t ion o f Japan and Germany, fe l t these ex-amples were irrelevant, or worse, misleading.“Everyone forgets the amount of aid that camein from outside in the late ‘4o’s and early ‘50’s.We don’t have the United States, wealth toturn to. Such a goal is unrealistic and un-reachable, even with absolute controls on theeconomy. ”

The pessimists were divided. Some saw theNation building itself along the line of some ofthe Asian nations, which boasted a small tech-nologically advanced segment in the midst ofa large agrarian or unskilled worker popula-tion, on the model of India or Indonesia. Somethought technology itself would eventuallydisappear from American society. “If youdon’t have computers to run, you don’t traincomputer programmers, ” one expert was over-heard to say. “After a while, in a few genera-tions, no one remembers how the machinesworked at all. They remember the importantthings: how to plant crops, how to train drafthorses and oxen, how to make a simple pump.We will have survived biologically, but our


way of Iife is going to be unrecognizable. In get there, the conference report straddled allseveral generations, the United States is going fences and concluded nothing. Follow-up taskto resemble a late medieval society.” forces were appointed and the conferees

agreed to meet again in the summer. PerhapsBecause the conferees could not agree on by then they would have a better idea of

what was a reasonable goal, much less how to whether or not they were winning the race.

APPENDIX D–SUMMARY OF REPORT ON

[Note: The full

EXECUTIVE BRANCH CALCULATIONS

report, classified SECRET, is available separately to qualified requesters.]

PURPOSE

This appendix summar izes and analyzes Iy viewed by the sponsoring agency as beingstudies of the direct effects of nuclear attacks val id and appl icable to the current throughthat have been performed by and for various mid-1980's time period, with the U.S. andagencies of the executive branch of the U.S. Scviet forces projected under a SALT I I agree-

Government in recent years. This review in- ment.

eludes those studies whose results are current-

SCOPE

The estimates of the direct effects of nucle-ar attacks presented in this paper representanalyses performed by or for the Departmentof the Defense (DOD), the Arms control andDisarmament Agency (ACDA), and the intelli-gence community. Although these analysesdescribe the direct effects of nuclear attacks interms of popuIation fatalities and attack dam-age objectives against military, Ieadership, andeconomic target systems, it is recognized thata more meaningfuI basis for assessing thedirect effects of nuclear attacks would be toanalyze the effects of such attacks in terms ofpostwar national survival and recovery Todate, however, analytical capabilities have notpermitted such analyses, I n fact, the complexissues concerning nationaI recovery shouIdnucIear war occur, or the postwar power andrecovery capabilities of the belIigerents, haveas yet not even been properly formulated foranalysis. Until that is accomplished, analysesof the direct effects of nuclear attacks willcontinue to focus, as have the studies used forthis analysis, on one-dimensional first-orderdirect effects

Furthermore, all analyses examined in thisstudy assume a “two-shot” nuclear war — theSoviets strike first against all targets includedunder a particuIar scenario and the U S. retali-

ates against a similar set of Soviet targets.More protracted (and more likely) attack sce-narios are not examined. Hence, such factorsas the feasibility of sustaining popuIation in a“ protected or evacuated” posture over a pro-tracted duration, either i n a continuing crisiswith no nuclear attacks or one with attacks re-

peated every few days or so, are not refIectedi n the damage estimates avaiIable from thesestudies and included in this report

Five questions provided the focus for theanaIyticaI results exam in this study:

1. How many people would be killed by:– Prompt effects of nuclear explosions?– Fallout radiation?

2. What number of nonfataI but disubIing in-juries C OuId be expected?

3. What areas would possibly receive dam-a g i n g l e v e l s o f o v e r p r e s s u r e a n d h o w

many peopIe Iive o r work i n those areas?4. What areas would receive what levels of

fallout contamination ?5. What wouId be the possible extent of fire

damage, and what mechanisms would cre-ate it?

Answers to these questions, as provided in thevarious studies used in this anaIysis, are giveni n the following section.

139

—


SUMMARY OF RESULTS

In viewing the estimated direct effects of nu-clear attacks, particularly population casual-ties, it is important to focus on the relativenumbers for the various nuclear attack scenar-ios examined, as opposed to the absolute. Theanalyses on which these estimates are baseddo not take into account the many imponder-able associated with such a cataclysmicevent, the majority of which would causehigher levels of human devastation than are in-dicated by the analyses of hypothetical at-tacks. A significant imponderable is the uncer-tainty of human behavior. Would people reallyreact as planned and as assumed in the com-puter models? Also, our ability to simulateeven the immediate direct effects from thou-sands of nuclear detonations based on data ex-trapolateions from single bursts is suspectbecause of its inherent uncertainties. And,finally, the inability to assess the longer termprospects for the immediate survivors, whichwould depend not only on the availability ofsubsistence levels of food, medical supplies,etc., but also on how quickly they could adapt

to a radically unfamiliar environment and so-cial structure, further limits the validity ofthese estimates as a net assessment of thedamage to be expected as a result of nuclearwar.

Population Damage

Table D-1 summarizes in terms of total na-tional population high- and low-range fatalityestimates derived from the various analysesused for this report. I n view of the many uncer-tain factors involved in such estimates, it is notpossible to synthesize a “best estimate” rangefrom the results of the studies used for thisanalyses.

Differences within and between the low andhigh ranges listed in the table are due primarilyto differences in force alert status, weaponslaydown, population protection level, popula-tion data base, and/or evacuation schemeassumed.

Table 0-1 .–OTA Attack Cases–Executive Branch Fatality Estimates

Population Percent of national fatalities

Case OTA attack cases posture Low range High range

(not available)(not available)

1-3< 1< 1 - 5

35-5010-2620-32

9-14

14-23

28-40

8-101-4

7-115-71-5

59-7732-4326-40

26-2718-2522-24

60-8847-5140-50

Appendix D—Summary of Report on Executive Branch Calculations ● 141

For Soviet First-Strike Attackson the United States, Against:

ICBM Targets Only (Case 3). – The 1- to 3-per-cent spread in the low range results fromassureing two 550-kiIoton (kt) optimum height-of-burst (OPT HOB) weapons per silo (1-per-cent national fatalities) versus assureing one550-kt OPT HOB and one surface burst 550-ktweapon per silo (3-percent national fatalities).The 8- to 10-percent spread in the high rangeresults from assuming one 3-megaton (Mt) OPTHOB and one surface-burst 3-Mt weapon persilo (8 percent) versus assureing two 3-Mt sur-face bursts per silo (1 O percent). The differencebetween the ranges is due to the difference inthe yield of the assumed weapons.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).–The lessthan 1-to 3-percent low range for in-p/ace U.S.population fatalities results from the dif-ference in fallout protection levels assumed byDOD and AC DA. The less than l-percent valueassumes an enhanced U.S. in-place fallout pro-tection program that would provide a falloutprotection factor (PF) of at least 25 for the en-tire population. The 3-percent value assumesin-place fallout shelters providing PFs of 10 to1,000 and that 90 percent of the populationwould use the shelters. The unprotected por-tion of the population is assumed to be equallydivided between a PF of 3 and 6. The 7- to 11-percent high range also results from differ-ences in fallout protection levels assumed byDOD and AC DA. In this case, the 7-percentvalue assumes the current U.S. in-place falloutprotection program. PFs as low as 5 are as-sumed for about one-half of the U.S. ruralpopulation, and PFs as low as 15 for one-quar-ter of U.S. urban population. The 1 l-percentvalue assumes essentially no U.S. civil defenseprogram and a PF of 3 for the entire U.S. popu-lation. The difference between the rangesrefIects the differences in the assumed falloutprotection levels.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).– The 5- to7-percent high range for evacuated U.S. popu-lation fatalities reflects ACDA’s assumptionsconcerning the amount of fallout protectionavailable for the combined rural and evacu-ated urban population. The 5-percent value

assumes 66 percent of the total exurban popu-lation would be able to obtain fallout protec-tion of 10 to 40 PF. Those persons not pro-tected were assumed to be equalIy divided be-tween between a PF of 3 and of 6. The 7-per-cent value assumes only 33 percent of the totalexurban population would be able to obtainfallout protection of 10 to 40 PF. The rest wereassumed to be equally divided between a PF of3 and 6. This range of values is listed as “high”because it results from assuming that no ex-pedient fallout protection upgrading could beachieved by the evacuated popuIation.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Eco-nomic Targets (Case 4). — The 35- to 50-percentlow range for in-p/ace U.S. population fatal-ities results from assuming day-to-day alert (35-percent fatalities) versus generated forces (50-percent fatalities), and that 90 percent of theU.S. population are sheltered in available civildefense shelters. The 59- to 77-percent highrange reflects differences in weapons Iaydownand popuIation protection level. The 59-per-cent vaIue assumes a generated forces Sovietattack with about 60 percent of the weaponsair burst and that only 66 percent of the U.S.population are sheltered in available civi ldefense shelters. The 77-percent value alsoassumed a generated forces attack, but withall weapons ground burst and no civil defensesheltering of the popuIation. The reasons forthe differences between the ranges are the dif-ferences in assumed population protectionlevels and weapons Iaydown.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Eco-nomic Targets (Case 4). — The 10- to 26-percentlow range for evacuated U.S. population fatal-ities results from differences in assumed weap-ons Iaydown. The 10-percent value assumesabout half the attacking weapons are air burst.The 26-percent value assumes all weapons areground burst. Both values in the low rangeassume expedient upgrading of fallout protec-tion couId be achieved by the evacuated popu-lation, that is, a fallout PF of at least 25 for theentire U.S. population. The 32- to 43-percenthigh range reflects ACDA’s assumptions as tothe fallout protection that could be achievedby the evacuated population. The 32-percent

142 ● The Effects of Nuclear War———-——.—-————

retIects the effect of ground bursting allweapons versus air bursting about half theweapens The difference between the ranges isdue to differences in assumed population pro-tection levels,

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Econom-ic, and Population (Case 4 excursion).— In thiscase the 60- to 80-percent fatality range forU.S. population in-place reflects the impact ofthe protection levels assumed. The 60-percentvalue corresponds to the high protection levelsused by DC PA. The 88-percent value cor-responds to the more modest levels assumedby OSD analysts. This range is listed as “high”because of the severity (all ground bursts andall but 10- to 15-percent of Soviet weapons) ofthe attack used.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Econom-ic, and Population (Case 4 excursion). — The 28-to 40- percent low range for U.S. populationevacuated refIects the d inferences betweenDOD’s and ACDA’s assumptions concerningleve ls o f fa l lou t p ro tec t ion , evacua t ionscheme, and weapons Iaydown. The 28-percentvalue assumes expedient upgraded protectionlevels as specified by DCPA and evacuation of80 percent of all risk area population. The 40-percent value reflects ACDA’s less extensiveevacuation scheme (only cities with popula-tion greater than 25,000 are evacuated) and noexpedient upgrading of protection levels. Inaddition, the 28-percent value results from anattack with all weapons ground burst and the40- percent value assumes about half the val-ues are air burst. The 47- to 51-percent highrange also results from differences in falloutprotection, evacuation scheme, and weaponsIaydown. In this case the 47-percent valueassumes degraded protection levels based onDOD’s sensitivity analysis, and evacuation of80 percent of all risk area population. The 51-percent value also reflects degraded protec-tion levels, only 33 percent of the total exur-ban population are able to obtain protectionin rural shelters, and AC DA’s Iess-extensiverelocation scheme. Once again, the range alsor e f l e c t s t h e e f f e c t o f g r o u n d b u r s t i n g a l lweapons versus air bursting about half theweapons. The difference between the ranges is

Appendix D—Summary of Report on Executive Branch Calculations ● 1 4 3

clue to differences in assumed population pro-tection levels.

For U.S. Retaliatory Attacks onthe U. S. S. R., Against:

ICBM Targets Only (Case 3).– The low, lessthan l-percent, value assumes one OPT HOBweapon per silo In this case fatalities are lessthan 1 percent for attacks using only 40-kt,only 200-kt, or only 1-Mt weapons The highrange of 1 to 4 percent results from assumingone ground-burst weapon per silo. I n this casethe 1-percent value assumes only 200-kt weap-ons and the 4-percent value assumes only 1-Mtweapons are used. The differences betweenthe range reflects the effect of OPT HOBweapons versus ground bursting al I weapons.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).– The lessthan 1-percent low value for in-p/ace Sovietpopulation assumes relatively good falloutprotection for the entire Soviet populationand, in the case of ACDA’s analysis, a U.S. at-tack based on a preplanned laydown using inpart U.S. ICBMs that do not survive the Sovietfirst strike. The high range reflects differencesin weapons laydown, population protectionlevels, and data bases used by ACDA andDOD. The less than l-percent value reflectsACDA’s preplanned attack laydown, relativelygood fat lout protection assumptions, and useof a coarser Soviet population data base. The5-percent value refIects DOD’s attack laydown, which does not attrite U.S. weapons dueto a Soviet first strike, lower fallout protectionassumptions, and use of a finer Soviet popula-tion data base The difference between theranges results from all these differences i ndassumptions.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).– The lessthan 1- to 2-percent variation results from dif-ferences in popuIation protection levels as-sumed by ACDA for evacuated Soviet popu-Iation. The less than 1 -percent value assumes66 percent of the exurban popuIation useavaiIable sheltering. Those not using such shel-tering are assigned protection levels of 3 and 6in equal shares. It is difficuIt to judge whetherthis represents a low or high range On onehand the range could be considered on the low

side because of the coarseness of the Sovietdata base used by ACDA. Conversely, the evac-uation scheme assumed by ACDA would sug-gest that it be considered a high range.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Eco-nomic Targets (Case 4). — l-he 20- to 32-percent

low range for in-place Soviet population fatal-it results from d inferences i n force aIertstatus and weapons Iaydown assumed T he 20-percent value reflects day-to-day alert forcesand an attack using only 40-kt air-burst weap-ons against economic targets. The 32-percentvaIue reflects generated forces and an attackusing d mixture of weapens against economic

targets. The 26- to 40-percent high rangerefIects differences between ACDA and DODassumptions. The 26-percent vaIue from ACDAanalysis assumes relatively good popuIationprotection levels and a lower amount of EMTused against economic tar-gets than assumed i nthe DOD analysis. The W-percent vaIue fromDOD analysis reflect lower popuIation pro-tection levels, a finer popuIation data base,and a Iarger attack against economic targetsthan used i n the ACDA anaIysis. The differencei n assumptions made by DOD, AC DA, and theinteragency intelIigence group.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Eco-nomic Targets (Case 4). — The 9- to 14-percentrange reflects the difference in poplation pro-tection levels used by ACDA for evacuatedS o v i e t p o p u l a t i o n . The 9-percent valueassumes 66 percent use available sheIters The14 percent assumes only 33 percent use avail-able shelters It is difficult to judge whetherthis refIects a low or high range. The coarse-ness of the Soviet data base used by AC DAwouId suggest it be treated as a low rangeConversely, the ACDA evacuation schemewould suggest it be considered a high range.

Counter-force and Other Military Targets (Case3 excursion) .—The differences within bothranges for Soviet population in-p/ace refIectsthe variation in protection levels assumed byAC DA. The difference between the ranges isdue to the alert status of U.S. forces used.

Counterforce and Other Military Targets (Case3 excursion).–The 6- to 9-percent range


reflects the variation in protection levelsassumed by ACDA for evacuated Soviet popu-lation, 66 percent use available shelters versus33 percent. As in the previous cases, withSoviet population evacuated, it is difficult tojudge if this is a low or high range of fatalities.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Econom-ic, and Population (Case 4 excursion). — Fatalityestimates range from 40 to 50 percent for Sovi-et population in-p/ace based on DOD analysis.The variation is primarily due to differences inassumed population protection levels. Giventhe rather low protection levels assumed byDOD, the range probably represents the highlevel of Soviet fatalities.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Econom-ic, and Population (Case 4 excursion). — Fatalityestimates range from 22 to 26 percent for Sovi-et population evacuated based on ACDA anal-ysis. The variation reflects differences inassumed popuIation protection levels; 66 per-cent use available shelters versus 33 percent.Once again it is difficult to judge whether thisis a high or low range. The coarse data baseused by ACDA suggests their estimates are low,but the evacuation scheme suggests theymight be high.

In examining the fatality ranges listed intable D-1 it should be noted that the differ-ences between U.S. and Soviet fatality levelsfor comparable attacks and population pos-tures can be primarily attributed to:

The nature of the nuclear attacks as-sumed in the various studies; that is, theassumption that the Soviets attack firstand the United States retaliates in thevarious attack scenarios examined,

The higher yields of Soviet weapons,which resuIt in significantly higher Ievelsof nuclear yield detonating in the UnitedStates than the U.S.S.R. for comparableattack cases.

Although the data on nonfatal injuries avail-able from the studies used in this analysis arequite Iimited, the results suggest that:

●

●

●

For attacks against ICBMs or counterforcetarget sets, nonfatal injuries would aboutequal fatalities.For attacks that include economic targets,but not population per se, nonfatal in-juries would vary from about 20 to 40 per-cent of total casualties.For attacks including population, non-fatal injuries vary from about 8 to 25 per-cent of total casualties.

Military and Economic Damage

Unlike population damage levels, which (ex-cept for excursions to Case 4) result only col-laterally from attacks on other target sets,damage levels against military and economictarget sets are input objectives used in struc-turing the attack laydowns examined in thevarious analyses on which this report is based.Damage levels attained against these targetsystems in the studies examined in this analysiswere:

For Soviet First-Strike Attacks Againstthe United States:

Counterforce Targets (Percent Total Dam-aged).— ICBMs (42 to 90 percent), SAC bomberbases (90 to 99 percent), and submarine sup-port facilities (90 to 99 percent).

Other Military Targets (Percent InstallationsDamaged). –Major military leadership facil-ities (90 to 95 percent), State capitals (95 per-cent), DCPA and FPA emergency operatingcenters (95 percent), and other military in-stalIations (77 to 90 percent).

Economic Targets. – 70- to 90-percent damageof the national manufacturin g value of theeconomic targets attacked.

For U.S. Retaliatory Attacks Againstthe U. S. S. R.:

Counterforce Targets (Percent Total Dam-aged).— Bomber bases (70 to 90 percent).

Other Military Targets (Percent InstallationsDamaged).– Major military leadership facil-

ities (70 to 90 percent), major political

Appendix D—Summary of Report on Executive Branch Calculations ● 145

leader- As in the case of population fatalities, theship facilities (7o to 90 percent), and other differences between U.S. and Soviet damagemiliitary instalI at ions (20 to 50 percent). levels against strategic forces, other military

Economic Targets. – 70- to 90-percent damage targets, and economic targets can be attrib-

of the national manufacturing value addeduted to the assumption that the Soviets strikefirst and to the larger yields of Soviet weapons.

plus capital replacement cost of the economictargets attacked.

APPENDIX E–SUGGESTIONS FOR

FURTHER READING

Physical Effects of Nuclear Warfare

Ayers, R. N., “ Environmental Effects of Nucle-ar Wea pens” (3 VOLS, ), Hudson Inst., H 1-518,December 1965.

Batten, E. S., “The Effects of Nuclear War onthe Weather and Climate, ” RAND C o r p . ,RM-4989, November 1966,

Bennett, B., “Fatality Uncertainties in LimitedNuclear War, ” RAN D, R-2218-AF, Novem-ber 1977.

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, U.S. De-partment of Defense, “DCPA Attack Envi-ronment Manual , ” Publication CPG 2-1A, 9Vols, June 1973 (vol. 4 revised June 1977).

Drell, S. and von Hippel, “Limited NuclearWar, ” Scientific American, November 1976.

Glasstone and Dolen, eds: Effects of N u c l e a r

Weapons, 3rd ed., U.S. Department of De-fense and Department of Energy, Washing-ton, DC., 1977,

Green, J., “Response to DCPA Questions onFallout, ” Defense Civil Preparedness Agen-cy, Washington, D. C., November 1973.

Mark, J, C., “Global Consequences of NuclearWeaponry, ” Annual Review of Nuclear Sci-

ence, 1976, 26:51-87.

National Academy of Sciences, “Effects ofMultiple Nuclear Explosions Worldwide, ”Washington, D. C., 1975.

U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency,“The Effects of Nuclear War,” Washington,D. C., April 1979.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on ForeignRelations, Subcommittee on Arms Control,International Organizations, and SecurityAgreements, Hearings: Effects of LimitedNuclear Warfare, 94th Cong., 1st sess.(1975). 61 p.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on ForeignRelations, Subcommittee on Arms Control,International Organizations, and Security

Agreements, Comm. Print: “Analyses of Ef-fects of Limited Nuclear Warfare,” 94thCong , 1st sess (1975). Contains, amongother things, the Sept. 11, 1974, Briefing onCounterforce Attacks by Secretary ofDefense, James R Schlesinger, and thereport of the Office of Technology Assess-ment Ad Hoc Panel on NucIear Effects.

Economic Impact of Nuclear War(General) and Economic Recovery

From Nuclear War

Goen, R., et al., “Analysis of National EntitySurvival,” Stanford Research Institute, No-vember 1967,

Goen, R., et al , “Critical Factors Affecting Na-tional Survival,” Stanford Research insti-tute, 1965,

Goen, R., et al., “Potential Vulnerabilities Af-fecting National Survival,” Stanford Re-search Institute, 1970,

Hanunian, N , “Dimensions of Survival: Postat-tack Survival Disparities and National Via-bility,” RAND Corp., KM-51 40, November1966.

Hirshleiter, j., , “Economic Recovery, ” RAND,P-11 60, August 1965,

Katz, A., “Economic and Social Consequencesof Nuclear Attacks on the United States, ”U S Senate, Committee on Banking, Hous-ing, and urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (March 1979),

Laurius, R., and F. Dresch, “National EntitySurvival: Measure and Countermeasure, ”Stanford Research Institute, 1971.

Lee, H., et al., “ Industrial Production and Dam-age Repair Following Nuclear Attack, ”Stanford Research Institute, March 1968.

Pettis, Dzirbals, Krahenbuhl, “Economic Re-covery Fol lowing Nuclear Disaster : ASelected, Annotated Bibliography,” RANDCorp., R-2143, December 1977.

146

Appendix E—Suggestions for Further Reading Ž 147

Sobin, B., “Post Attack Recovery, ” ResearchAnaIys is Corp., RAC-P-51, june 1970.

Winter, S.G., Jr., “Economic Recovery Fromthe Effects of Thermonuclear War, ” RAND,p-2416, August 1961.

Winter, S.G., Jr, “Economic Viability AfterNuclear War: The Limits of Feasible Pro-d u c t ion, R A N D , R M - 3 4 3 6 , S e p t e m b e r1963

Economic Impacts of Nuclear War(Specific), Including Agricultural

Impacts

Brown, S., “Agr icu l tura l Vulnerabi l i ty to Nu-c l ea r War , ” Stanford Research Institute,February 1973.

Jones, T.K., “Industrial Survival and RecoveryAfter Nuclear Attack: A Report to the JointCommit tee on Defence Production, U.S.Congress, ”The Boeing Co., Seattle, Walsh.,1976

Kill ion, et al., "Effects of Fallout Radiation onCrop. Production,” Comparative Animal Re-search Laboratory, July 1975

Leavitt, J., “Analysis and Identification of Na-tIonaIIy EssentiaI Industries, Vol. I: TheoreticaI Approach, ” Inst i tu te for DefenseAnalyses, P-972, March 1974

Stanford Research Institute, “U S. Agriculture:P’otentiaI VuInerabiIities,” January 1969.

Stantford Research Institute, “Agr icu l tura l Vul -nerability in the National Entity SurvivalContext, ” July 1970

Stephens, M M , “VuInerabiIIty of Total Petro-leum Sytems,” Office of Oil and Gas, De-partment of the Interior, May 1973.

Administrative, Social, Psychological,etc., Factors Relating to Postattack

Issues

Allmitt, B., ‘‘A S tudy o f Consensus on soc ia land PsychologicaI Factors ReIated to Re-covery From NucIear Attack, ” Human Sci-ences Research, Inc., May 1971

Brown, W. M., “Emergency Mobi l iza t ion forPostattack Reorganization, ” Hudson Insti-tute, H1-874/2, May 1968.

Brown, W., M , ‘‘On Reorganizing After NuclearAttack, ” RAND, P-3764, January 1968.

Dresch, F., "Information Needs for Post-AttackR e c o v e r y M a n a g e m e n t , ” S t a n f o r d R e -

s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e , A p r i I 1 9 6 8

EIlis, Dresche, “ Industrial Factors in Total Vul-nerabi I i ty , ” Stanford Research Ins t i tu te ,April 1968.

Hirshleiter, J , “Disaster and Recovery: A His-torical Survey, ” RAND, RM-3079, April1963.

Ikle, F.,C., The Social Impact of Bomb Destruc-tion, Norman, Okla., University of OkIa-homa Press, 1958.

Janis, l., Air War and Emotional Stress, Newyork: McGraw Hill, 1951.

Vestermark, S., (cd.), “Vulnerabilities of SocialStructure, ” Human Sciences Research, Inc.,December 1966.

Winter, S. G., Jr., “The Federal Role in Post At-tack Economic Organization, ” P-3737,RAND, November 1967.

Civil Defense

Aspin, Les, “The Mineshaf t Gap Rev is i ted, ”Congressional Record, Jan. 15, 1979, pp.E26-35.

Egorov, P. T., et al., Civil Defense, Springfield,Va.: National Technical Information Serv-ice, 1973. A translation of CrazhdanskayaOborna, 2nd cd., Moscow, 1970.

Goure, L., War Survival in Soviet Strategy,Washington, D. C.: Advanced InternationalStudies Institute, 1976.

Goure, L., Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies,Washington, D.C.: Advanced InternationalStudies Instititute, 1975.

Kaplan, F. M., “The Soviet Civil Defense MythParts I & Il,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-tists, March and April 1978.


Kincaid, W., “Repeating History: the Civil De-fense Debate Renewed,” International Se-curity, winter 1978.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Civil Defense(Grazhdanskaya Oborna) (translation), De-cember 1973.

Sullivan, R., et al., “Candidate U.S. Civil De-fense Programs,” System Planning Corp.,March 1978.

Sullivan, R., et al., “Civil Defense Needs ofHigh-Risk Areas of the United States,” Sys-tem Planning Corporation, SPC 409,1979.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,“An Analysis of Civil Defense in NuclearWar,” Washington, D. C., December 1978.

U.S. C. I. A., “Soviet Civil Defense,” Director ofCentral Intelligence, N178-10003, July 1978.

U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking,Housing, and Urban Affairs, (Hearings onCivil Defense), Jan. 8, 1979.

APPENDIX F–GLOSSARY

[This glossary is excerpted from the larger one in The Effects of Nuc/ear Weapons, 3rd cd., compiledand edited by Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. DoIan, prepared and published by the U.S. Departmentof Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D. C., 1977.]

Alpha Particle: A particle emitted spontaneous-ly from the nuclei of some radioactive ele-ments. It is identical with a helium nucleus,having a mass of four units and an electriccharge of two positive units.

Cloud Column: The visible column of weapondebris (and possibly dust and water droplets)extending upward from the point of burst ofa nuclear (or atomic) weapon.

Crater: The pit, depression, or cavity formed inthe surface of the Earth by a surface or un-derground explosion. Crater formation canoccur by vaporization of the surface materi-al, by the scouring effect of air blast, bythrowout of disturbed material, or by subsi-dence. In general, the major mechanismchanges from one to the next with increasingdepth of burst. The apparent crater is the de-pression which is seen after the burst; it issmaller than the true crater (i. e., the cavityactually formed by the explosion), becauseit is covered with a layer of loose earth, rock,etc.

Dynamic Pressure: The air pressure that resultsfrom the mass air flow (or wind) behind theshock front of a blast wave. It is equal to theproduct of half the density of the air throughwhich the blast wave passes and the squareof the particle (or wind) velocity behind theshock front as it impinges on the object orstructure.

Electromagnetic Pulse: A sharp pulse of radiofrequency (long wavelength) electromag-netic radiation produced when an explosionoccurs in an unsymmetrical environment, es-pecially at or near the Earth’s surface or athigh altitudes. The intense electric and mag-netic fields can damage unprotected electri-cal and electronic equipment over a largearea.

Fallout: The process or phenomenon of the de-scent to the Earth’s surface of particles con-taminated with radioactive material fromthe radioactive cloud. The term is also ap-

plied in a collective sense to the contami-nated particulate matter itself. The early (orlocal) fallout is defined, somewhat arbitrari-ly, as those particles which reach the Earthwithin 24 hours after a nuclear explosion.The delayed (or worldwide) fallout consistsof the smaller particles that ascend into theupper troposphere and into the stratosphereand are carried by winds to all parts of theEarth. The delayed fallout is brought toEarth, mainly by rain and snow, over ex-tended periods ranging from months toyears.

Fire Storm: Stationary mass fire, generally inbuilt-up urban areas, causing strong, inrush-ing winds from all sides; the winds keep thefires from spreading while adding fresh oxy-gen to increase their intensity.

Fission Products: A general term for the com-plex mixture of substances produced as a re-sult of nuclear fission. A distinction shouldbe made between these and the direct fis-sion products or fission fragments that areformed by the actual splitting of the heavy-element nuclei. Something Iike 80 differentfission fragments result from roughly 40 dif-ferent modes of f ission of a given nuclearspecies (e. g., uranium-235 or plutonium-239).The fission fragments, being radioactive, im-mediately begin to decay, forming addition-al (daughter) products, with the result thatthe complex mixture of fission products soformed contains over 300 different isotopesof 36 elements.

Gamma Rays (or Radiations): Electromagneticradiations of high photon energy originatingi n atomic nuclei and accon:panying manynuclear reactions (e. g., fission, radioactivity,and neutron capture). Physically, gammarays are identical with X-rays of high energy,the only essential difference being that X-rays do not originate from atomic nuclei butare produced in other ways (e. g., by slowingdown (fast) electrons of high energy).

149


Height of Burst (HOB): The height above theEarth’s surface at which a bomb is deto-nated in the air. The optimum height ofburst for a particular target (or area) is thatat which it is estimated a weapon of a speci-fied energy yield will produce a certain de-sired effect over the maximum possiblearea.

Kiloton Energy: Defined strictly as 1 012 calories(or 4.2 x 1019 ergs). This is approximately theamount of energy that wouId be released bythe explosion of 1 kiloton (kt) (1 ,000 tons) ofTNT.

Megaton Energy: Defined strictly as 1015 cal-ories (or 4.2 x 1022 ergs). This is approximate-ly the amount of energy that would be re-leased by the explosion of 1,000 kt (1 milliontons) of TNT.

Neutron: A neutral particle (i. e., with no electri-cal charge) of approximately unit mass, pres-ent in all atomic nuclei, except those of ordi-nary (light) hydrogen. Neutrons are requiredto initiate the fission process, and large num-bers of neutrons are produced by both fis-sion and fusion reactions in nuclear (oratomic) explosions.

Nuclear Radiation: Particulate and electromag-netic radiation emitted from atomic nucleiin various nuclear processes. The importantnucIear radiations, from the weapons stand-point, are alpha and beta particles, gammarays, and neutrons. AlI nucIear radiations areionizing radiations, but the reverse is nottrue. X-rays, f o r e x a m p l e , a r e i n c l u d e damong ionizing radiations, but they are notnuclear radiations since they do not origi-nate from atom i c nucIei,

Nuclear Weapon (or Bomb): A general namegiven to any weapon in which the explosionresults from the energy released by reactionsinvolvin g atomic nuclei, either fission or fu-sion or both. Thus, the A- (or atomic) bomband the H- (or hydrogen) bomb are both nu-clear weapons. It would be equally true tocall them atomic weapons, since it is theenergy of atomic nuclei that is involved ineach case However, it has become more-or-Iess customary, although it is not strictly ac-curate, to refer to weapons in which all the

energy results from fission as A-bombs oratomic bombs. In order to make a distinc-tion, those weapons in which part, at least,of the energy results from thermonuclear(fusion) reactions of the isotopes of hydro-gen have been called H-bombs or hydrogenbombs.

Overpressure: The transient pressure, usuallyexpressed in pounds per square inch, ex-ceeding the ambient pressure, manifested inthe shock (or blast) wave from an explosion.The variation of the overpressure with timedepends on the energy yield of the explo-sion, the distance from the point of burst,and the medium in which the weapon is det-onated. The peak overpressure is the maxi-mum value of the overpressure at a givenlocation and is generally experienced at theinstant the shock (or blast) wave reachesthat location.

Rad: A unit of absorbed dose of radiation; itrepresents the absorption of 100 ergs of nu-clear (or ionizing) radiation per gram of ab-sorbing material, such as body tissue.

Rem: A unit of biological dose of radiation; thename is derived from the initial letters of theterm “roentgen equivalent man (or mam-real). ” The number of reins of radiation isequal to the number of rads absorbed multi-plied by the relative biological effectivenessof the given radiation (for a specified effect).The rem is also the unit of dose equivalent,which is equal to the product of the numberof rads absorbed and the “quality factor” ofthe radiation.

Roentgen: A unit of exposure to gamma (or X)radiation. It is defined precisely as the quan-tity of gamma (or X) rays that will produceelectrons (in ion pairs) with a total charge of2.58 X 10-4 coulomb in 1 kilogram of dry air.An exposure of 1 roentgen results in the dep-osition of about 94 ergs of energy in 1 gramof soft body tissue. Hence, an exposure of 1roentgen is approximately equivalent to anabsorbed dose of 1 rad in soft tissue. SeeRad.

Thermal Radiation: Electromagnetic radiationemitted (in two pulses from an air burst)from the fireball as a consequence of its

Appendix F—Glossary ● 1 5 1

very high temperature; it consists essentialIy radiation I ies in the v is ib le and inf raredof ultraviolet, visible, and infrared radia- regions of the spectrum, For high-aItitudetions. I n the early stages (first pulse of an air bursts (above 100,000 feet [30,480 meters]),burst), burst), when the temperature of the fireball the thermal radiation is emitted as a singleis extremely high, the uItraviolet radiation pulse, which is of short durartion belowpredominates; i n the second puIse, the tem- about 270,000 feet [82,296 meters] but in-peratures are lower and most of the thermal creases at greater burst heights

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