The Economics of US Civil War Conscription

Tim Perri

Department of Economics

ASU

September 15, 2006

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5 times the United States used conscription during wars: in the CW, WWI, WWII, the Korean War, &in the Vietnam War.

In the 20th century wars with conscription, the % of those who served who were draftees: 59, 61, 27, and 21.

The same % for the CW is 2.

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Civil War conscription (CWC) was not designed to directly attract volunteers.

The federal govt. was weak & had little ability to tax. CWC was used to shift some of the payroll cost of the armyto state & local govt.

Historians have criticized bounties,substitution, & commutation.

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Others (including economists)have argued sub. & commutationwere only for the relatively affluent.

Draft riots suggest it was not easy to avoid service.

However, only 2% of those who served were drafted.

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Among the arguments herein are:

1) Riots did not reflect draft risk.

2) There were many ways to avoid svc.

3) Commutation & substitution wereused to reduce the # of those who were conscripted.

4) The bounty system worked reasonablywell given constraints.

5) Commutation could have loweredsocial cost but was used as a price ceiling.

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History of conscription in the US

All but Pa. of the coloniesallowed sub. in the militia; some allowed payment of a fee to avoid svc.

Militia drafts were used in Indian Wars, War of 1812, & in the Revolution.

1812: Troup/Monroe plans:classes of 25 men, each class of wealth. No volunteer from a class? Pay a tax.

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Lindsay (1968) & Rafuse (1970): Troup/Monroe similar to vol. army.

I argue CWC was similar: shift some of the tax burden to the local level without taxing only drafteesor compelling anyone to enter military service.

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CW: early attempts to raise troops were left to the states (militias were used). Recruiting in summer 1862.

Demand for men .

In the army:1/62: 575,917 1/63: 918,121 1/64: 860,737 1/65: 959,460

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Militia law of 1862: transition tofederal authority to raise troops.

Before this, federal troop callswere voluntary; states appropriated$$ to pay for militia.

With militia law, draft from militiasif troop calls were not met.

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Exemptions and substitutions were allowed. Riots occurred & the draft wasrescinded.

The Enrollment Act of 1863 completed the transition to federal control of recruitment and to national conscription.

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Enlistment quotas were assigned to each Congressional district by its pro rata share of the # called minus the # of previous enlistees from the district.

After 50 days, a lottery would be held to obtain the remainder of a district's quota.

Not all districts had drafts.

The draft calls were 10/63, 3/64, 7/64,& 12/64.

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Substitution & commutation All 4 drafts: hire & avoid svc.for 3 years.

Pay $300: 1st draft, avoid svc.for 3 yrs.; 2nd draft, avoid svc. forthat draft; & 3rd & 4th drafts,only COs could avoid svc.

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Table One. Draft Statistics from the US Civil War.*

Draft #

# called (**)

# reporting

#discharged (***)

#examined

#exempted

#held to service

#commuted

# hiring subs.

#drafted

1 292,441

253,026 460 252,566 164,395 88,171 52,288 26,002 9,881

2 113,446

86,253 1,296 84,957 39,952 45,005 32,678 8,911 3,416

3 231,918

165,759 27,223 138,536 82,531 56,005 1,298 28,502 26,205

4 139,024

110,547 64,419 46,128 28,631 17,497 460 10,192 6,845

All 776,829

615,585 93,398 522,187 315,509 206,678

86,724 73,607 46,347

* Source: Murdock (1971), p.13. ** These are the numbers called in a draft after volunteers were obtained. The government calls for men were, as best as can be determined, 500,000, 200,000, 500,000, and 300,000, respectively (Geary, 1991, p.81).*** These individuals apparently were discharged because their districts had met their quotas.

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Table Two. Various Draft Percentages.*

Draft # % called who reported

% reportednot discharged

% examinedheld to svc.

% held to svc. who were drafted

% called whowere drafted

1 87% 100% 35% 19% 3%

2 76% 98% 53% 8% 3%

3 71% 84% 40% 47% 11%

4 80% 42% 38% 39% 5%

All 80% 85% 40% 22% 6%

* Source: Table One

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# who served: estimates 1.5 m to over 2.5 m. I use 2.1m. 92% of those who served were volunteers.

Volunteers non-regular army.

Regular army: authorized to have 42,000 men---never did.

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Enrollment Act 50 days to meet quotas

then a draft occurred

Bounties at state & local levelto hire subs. & vols. $285m.

Federal bounties $300m.

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Fall ’63. A vol. in NYC, $300 (county), $75 (state), & $200-$400(fed.): $775.

Rafuse (1970): a union private earned $6.40 per month in 1864.

Lonn (1928): pay was initially $13 per mo. rising to $16 by 5/64.

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Bounty system

Jumping was a big prob.

12/64: bounties held until men reached the front.

Incentive to pay up front;one “counted” even if he did not serve.

Why? Limited fed. power.

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Long (1975): ave. annual earnings in manufacturing of $297 (1860) &$384 (1870).

Could those not wealthy affordto hire or commute?

YES!!

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1) Communities raise $$ forsubs. & commutation.

2) Draft insurance (formal & informal) existed.

Pay for commut. or subs.

Fees: $10-$50.

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Draft opposition

Why riots & oppo. to commutation?

1) Non-affluent wanted a taxon the wealthy to pay forsub. & commut.

2) Commut. was a focal point.

3) Riots occurred before peoplerealized community fundswould be forthcoming.

4) Anti-fed. govt. sentiments.

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Why the draft?

1) Assertion of fed. powerto prevent disunion.

2) Feds. could not pay for troops.

Induce communities to pay.

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A model

a) Market for subs.

inds. U on [0,N] with density of 1.

Random draft of m inds., m < N.

Feds. pay WM.

Each enlistee gets B from the community.

Seller reservation wage = W.

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P = price of a substitute.

Hire if called &

W-P > WM + B.

Go as a sub. if not called &

W < WM + B + P.

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Mkt. clearing:

P = m – WM – B.

A sub. gets P + WM + B = m.

Those with W < m serve.

D = # of reluctant draftees.

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Reluctant if drafted &

WM + B < W < m.

D = (m - WM - B)m/N.

No resource misallocation(“wrong” people in svc.).

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Figure One. Conscription with substitution.

W0 WM+B

Go as a substituteif not called

N

Reluctant drafteesif called

Hire if called

WM+B+P=m

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b) The community

T = total funds raised.

F = fixed cost of fundraising.

T = Bm + F.

Opposition to the community = .

= (D,T).

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D

T

all > 0. 2

2

D

2

2

T

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Min. w.r.t. B & totallydifferentiate f.o.c.:

-1 < dB/dWM < 0,

dB/dF < 0.

If dkD > 0 an increase

in /D: dB/dkD > 0.

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c) The federal govt.

Feds. min. C w.r.t. WM,

C = C(, mWM).

S.o.c. requires |dB/dWM| < 1.

dWM/dkD > 0.

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d) Costly substitution

Let cost = sW.

Now hire if W > W”,& go as a sub (if not called)if W < W’:

s1

PBWM

W” =

W’ = WM + B + P.

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As s, demand for sub., P, &quantity of subs..

If s = 0, W’ = W” = m.

D/s > 0: more reluctant draftees.

Some of the “wrong” people are now in the army.

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With costly substitution, P = Ps>0:

)mN(sN

mN)s1(

Ps>0 = -WM - B.

With costless substitution, P = Ps=0:

Ps=0 = m – WM – B.

Ps>0 < Ps=0 < Ps>0 + sW”.

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Figure Two. Costly substitution. Animation

W0 WM+B W’ W”

Go as a substituteif not called

N

Reluctant drafteesif called

Hire if called

Potential for the wrong people to be enlisted

m

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Commutation could...

...lower social cost. Instead of subs., have commutation, withthe fee = z.

Set z = Ps = 0 = m – WM – B z*.

1) Cost of finding subs. is avoided;

2) D; &

3) eliminates resource misallocation.

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Ps > 0 < z* < Ps > 0 + sW”.

More commute with z* than substitute with Ps > 0.

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Commutation actually...

...worked as a price ceiling.

z was set < PS > 0.

In 1862 (Militia Act),P = $1000 in some areas.

3/63, Enrollment Actset z = $300.

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Economists knew theeffects of a price ceiling

(Mill, 1848).

Did Lincoln & his advisorsknow?

Apparently not.

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Conclusions

1) CW draft not to raise mendirectly.

2) Designed to attract “m”soldiers with states & localitiesbearing some of the payroll cost.

3) Many options to avoid svc.

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4) Commutation could have lowered social & private cost,but was used as a price ceiling, fewer than “m” were enrolled.