The economics of fishery management The role of economics in fishery regulation.
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Transcript of The economics of fishery management The role of economics in fishery regulation.
The economics of fishery management
The role of economics in fishery regulation
Simple model of fish biology
time
Biomass(x)
x
“CarryingCapacity”
xMSY
Stock that gives “maximumsustainable yield”
Interpreting this curve
x
• Growth rate of population depends on stock size
low stock slow growthhigh stock slow growth
• Also “sustainable yield curve”• MSY
Introduce humans
Harvest depends on Harvest “effort”, stock size, and technology
x
kEHx
kELx
H
H = k*E*xk = technology “catchability”E = effort (e.g. fishing days)x = biomass or stock
Harvest for low effort
Harvest for high effort
Does stock grow or shrink?
If more fish are harvested than grow, population shrinks. If more fish grow than are harvested, population grows.For any given E, what harvest level is just sustainable?
Where k*E*x =
“Yield-effort curve”
H(E)
E
Gives sustainable harvest as a function of effort level
Introduce economics
Costs of harvestingTC = w*E • w is the cost per unit effort
Revenues from harvestingTR = p*H(E) • p is the price per unit harvest
Draw the picture
$
TR=p*H(E)
TC=w*E
E
MC
MR$/E
E
w
Rentsto thefishery
EOA
E*
Value of fisherymaximized at E*.Profits attract entryto EOA (open access)
Open access resource
Economic profit: when revenues exceed costs (not accounting profit)Open access creates externality of entry.
I’m making profit, that attracts you, you harvest fish, stock declines, profits decline.
Entrants pay AC, get AR (not MC, MR)So fishers enter until AR = AC
But, even open access is sustainableThough not socially desirable
Why manage fisheries?
Otherwise, open access: externality of entry drives value of fishery to 0.May drive to extinction (or economic extinction)Non-extractive values ignored.Technology may destroy habitat, harvest individuals that should not be harvested, etc (another consequence of open access)Technology may improve, so management must keep up.
How manage fisheries?
Depends largely on characteristics of fishery
Biology & status of stocksHistory of extractionCommercial vs. subsistence, status of stocksOther values (non-extractive, recreational)
May failures, some successes
Some management alternatives
Harvest quotas (for whole fishery)Individual transferable quotas (ITQ, IFQ)Marine reserves (area closures)Season closures Ex-vessel tax (few)Regulated entry (licenses)Regulated efficiency (gear)Effort tax (few)
Small-scale fisheries
Many small, multi-purpose boatsDifficult to enforce regulationsLocal management most successful
Kinship rights, social pressure
Mainly limited entry, also gear, some area closures, etc. Often self-imposed.New entrants, technology, & markets are attractive; can be destructive
Baja CaliforniaBaja California
History of cooperativas
Pre-1991: “Reserved Species Regime”Lobster, abalone, etc. only harvested by fishing cooperatives (A property right)
Post-1991: “Concession Regime”Gave access rights for 20 years in particular areas (benthic) or by boats (pelagic) (Another form of property right)
Post-2000: “National Fishing Guide”Info on catch, status, management of 287 marine species (Pacific) – each fishery different.
Spiny Lobster Fishery
Lobster
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
M T
ons
• Maximum Sustainable YieldMaximum Sustainable Yield
• No increase in Fishing EffortNo increase in Fishing Effort
Abalone Fishery
Abalone meat
-
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
M T
ons
• OverfishedOverfished• Quota systemQuota system• Reference point:Reference point:
Bt > Bt-1
• No increase in fishing effort
-116.00 -115.60 -115.20 -114.80 -114.40 -114.00 -113.60 -113.20
26.20
26.40
26.60
26.80
27.00
27.20
27.40
27.60
27.80
28.00
28.20
28.40
28.60
28.80
29.00
Pacific Ocean
Fishing Areas - Cooperativas
PNAPNA
BPBP
PURPUR
BTBT
EMANEMAN
CSICSI
LRLR PROGPROG
PAPA
Cooperativas
Often devise own rules – social pressure to abide.Have exclusive rights to areas, self-enforce.Federal management supercedes - bargaining process with feds to determine management
Individual Transferable Quotas
Regulator sets “total allowable catch” (TAC).Distributes quotas (auction, sell at fixed price, give away based on historical catch, or equal distribution)Quota rights can be traded.Some systems, buy right to harvest in perpetuity (as % of TAC)
ITQs and property rights
Prior to 1976 coastal nations did not have rights to marine resources in “high seas”
1976 Magnuson Act & Law of the Sea: Grants rights to coastal nations to marine resources 200 miles from shore.
But how to regulate within a country?ITQs effectively secure property rights to fish in the ocean.
Lack of property rights is what causes problems with open access
Potential problems with ITQs
Allocation of quotas?High-grading incentiveEnforcement & administrative costsMost quotas held by largest firms“privatizing the oceans”?How set TAC in first place?
Alaskan Halibut
Prior to adoption, season 1 dayPoor fish quality, excessive investment for harvest, frozen most of year.
Adopted 1995: free allocation to fishing vessels based on historic catch.Debit cards, fish tickets for enforcementA success, longer season, higher profits, more fish, bigger/better quality fish